Afzal's Supreme Court Judgement

8/14/2019 Afzal's Supreme Court Judgement

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AFZAL GURU SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT04/08/2005

CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 373-375 of 2004

PETITIONER:

STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI)

RESPONDENT:

NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/08/2005

BENCH:

P. VENKATARAMA REDDI & P.P. NAOLEKAR

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 376-378 OF 2004

STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) APPELLANT

VERSUS

SYED ABDUL REHMAN GILANI RESPONDENT

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 379-380 OF 2004

SHAUKAT HUSSAIN GURU APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) RESPONDENT

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 381 OF 2004

MOHD. AFZAL APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI)

P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.1. The genesis of this case lies in a macabre incident that took placeclose to the noon time on 13th December, 2001 in which five heavily armedpersons practically stormed the Parliament House complex and inflicted heavycasualties on the security men on duty. This unprecedented event bewilderedthe entire nation and sent shock waves across the globe. In the gun battle thatlasted for 30 minutes or so, these five terrorists who tried to gain entry intothe Parliament when it was in session, were killed. Nine persons including eightsecurity personnel and one gardener succumbed to the bullets of the terroristsand 16 persons including 13 security men received injuries. The five terroristswere ultimately killed and their abortive attempt to lay a seize of theParliament House thus came to an end, triggering off extensive and effectiveinvestigations spread over a short span of 17 days which revealed the possibleinvolvement of the four accused persons who are either appellants orrespondents herein and some other proclaimed offenders said to be the leadersof the banned militant organization known as "Jaish-E-Mohammed". After theconclusion of investigation, the investigating agency filed the report underSection 173 Cr.P.C. against the four accused persons on 14.5.2002. Chargeswere framed under various sections of Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC'), thePrevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'POTA') and theExplosive Substances Act by the designated Court. The designated SpecialCourt presided over by Shri S.N. Dhingra tried the accused on the charges andthe trial concluded within a record period of about six months. 80 witnesseswere examined for the prosecution and 10 witnesses were examined on behalfof the accused S.A.R. Gilani. Plethora of documents (about 330 in number)were exhibited. The three accused, namely, Mohd. Afzal, Shaukat Hussain


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Guru and S.A.R. Gilani were convicted for the offences under Sections 121,121A, 122, Section 120B read with Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 120-B IPC, sub-Sections (2), (3) & (5) of Section 3 and Section 4(b) of POTA andSections 3 & 4 of Explosive Substances Act. The accused 1 & 2 were alsoconvicted under Section 3(4) of POTA. Accused No.4 namely Navjot Sandhu @Afsan Guru was acquitted of all the charges except the one under Section 123

IPC for which she was convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for five yearsand to pay fine. Death sentences were imposed on the other three accused forthe offence under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC (it would be moreappropriate to say Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC) and Section3(2) of POTA. They were also sentenced to life imprisonment on as many aseight counts under the provisions of IPC, POTA and Explosive Substances Act inaddition to varying amounts of fine. The amount of Rs.10 lakhs, which wasrecovered from the possession of two of the accused, namely, Mohd. Afzal andShaukat Hussain, was forfeited to the State under Section 6 of the POTA.

2. In conformity with the provisions of Cr.P.C. the designated Judgesubmitted the record of the case to the High Court of Delhi for confirmation ofdeath sentence imposed on the three accused. Each of the four accused filed

appeals against the verdict of the learned designated Judge. The State alsofiled an appeal against the judgment of the designated Judge of the SpecialCourt seeking enhancement of life sentence to the sentence of death in relationto their convictions under Sections 121, 121A and 302 IPC. In addition, theState filed an appeal against the acquittal of the 4th accused on all the chargesother than the one under Section 123 IPC. The Division Bench of High Court,speaking through Pradeep Nandrajog, J. by a well considered judgmentpronounced on 29.10.2003 dismissed the appeals of Mohd. Afzal and ShaukatHussain Guru and confirmed the death sentence imposed on them. The HighCourt allowed the appeal of the State in regard to sentence under Section 121IPC and awarded them death sentence under that Section also. The High Courtallowed the appeals of S.A.R. Gilani and Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru andacquitted them of all charges. This judgment of the High Court has given rise

to these seven appealstwo appeals preferred by Shaukat Hussain Guru andone appeal preferred by Mohd. Afzal and four appeals preferred by theState/Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi against the acquittal ofS.A.R. Gilani and Navjot Sandhu.It may be mentioned that the accused Mohd. Afzal and Shaukat HussainGuru are related, being cousins. The 4th accused Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guruis the wife of Shaukat Hussain. The third accused S.A.R. Gilani is a teacher inArabic in Delhi University. It is he who officiated the marriage ceremony ofShaukat Hussain Guru and Navjot Sandhu who at the time of marriageconverted herself to Islam.

3.(i) Now, let us make a brief survey of the incident and theinvestigation that followed, which led to the filing of the charge-sheet, as

apparent from the material on record.(ii) There is practically no dispute in regard to the details of actualincident, the identification of the deceased terrorists and the recoveries andother investigations made at the spot.(iii) Five heavily armed persons entered the Parliament House complexin a white Ambassador Car. The said five persons (hereinafter referred to asthe 'slain' or 'deceased terrorists') were heavily armed with automatic assaultrifles, pistols, hand and rifle grenades, electronic detonators, spareammunition, explosives in the form of improvised explosive devices viz., tiffinbombs and a sophisticated bomb in a container in the boot of the car madewith enormous quantity of ammonium nitrate. The High Court observed: "Thefire power was awesomeenough to engage a battalionand had the attacksucceeded, the entire building with all inside would have perished."

(iv) It was a fortuitous circumstance that the Vice President's carcade,which was awaiting departure from Gate No.11 was blocking the circular road


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outside the Parliament building, with the result the deceased terrorists wereunable to get free and easy access to the Parliament House building. Theattack was foiled due to the immediate reaction of the security personnelpresent at the spot and complex. There was a fierce gun-battle lasting fornearly 30 minutes. As mentioned earlier, nine persons including eight securitypersonnel and one gardener lost their lives in the attack and 16 persons

including 13 security personnel, received injuries. The five assailants werekilled.(v) From the evidence of PW5 who was the ASI in-charge of Escort-Ivehicle of the Vice-President, we get the details of the origin of the incident. Hestated that at about 11.30 a.m. one white Ambassador car having red lightentered the Parliament complex and came to the point where the carcade ofthe Vice-President was waiting near Gate No.11. Since the escort vehicle wasblocking the way, the car turned towards left. He got suspicious and orderedthe vehicle to stop. Then, the driver of the Ambassador car reversed thevehicle and while doing so struck the rear side of the car of the Vice-President.When the car was about to move away, he and the driver of the Vice-President's car ran towards the car and caught hold of the collar of the driver.As he was trying to drive away, PW5 took out his revolver. At that juncture,

the five persons in the car got out of it and quickly started laying wires anddetonators. Then PW5 fired a shot, which struck on the leg of one of theterrorists. The terrorist also returned the fire as a result of which he received abullet injury on his right thigh. There was further exchange of fire. Theevidence of other witnesses reveal that there was hectic movement of theterrorists from gate to gate within the complex firing at the security men onduty and the latter returning the fire.(vi) The Station House Officer of Parliament Street Police Station, ShriG.L. Mehta (PW1) along with his team of police personnel reached the spotafter receiving a wireless message. By that time, the firing spree was over.PW1 cordoned off the area. He found one deceased terrorist lying oppositeGate No.1 of the Parliament building, one deceased terrorist at the porch ofGate No.5 and three deceased terrorists lying in the porch of Gate No.9. The

Bomb Disposal Squad of NSG, a photographer and a crime team weresummoned to the spot. PW1 then deputed three Sub-Inspectors (PWs2 to 4) toconduct investigation at the three gates. PW1 then examined the spot ofoccurrence, prepared a rough sketch of the scene of occurrence and seizedvarious articles including arms and ammunition, live and empty cartridges andthe car and the documents found therein. Blood samples were also lifted fromvarious spots. The photographs of the five slain terrorists were caused to betaken. Then, he sent the dead bodies to the mortuary in the hospital forpostmortem.(vii) After the Bomb Disposal Squad had rendered the area safe and hispreliminary observations were over, PW1 recorded the statement of S.I. ShamSingh (PW55) who was in the security team of Vice-President. On the basis ofthis statement, 'Rukka' (Ext.PW1/1) was prepared and PW1 despatched the

same to the police station at about 5 p.m. This formed the basis forregistration of First Information Report. The FIR was registered for offencesunder Sections 121, 121A, 122, 124, 120-B, 186, 332, 353, 302, 307 IPC,Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Sections 25 & 27 of theArms Act by the Head Constable (PW14) of the Parliament Street PoliceStation. The copy of FIR was sent to the Court on the same day, as seen fromthe endorsement on the document (PW 14/1). The further investigation was,taken up by the special cell of Delhi Police.(viii) Investigations conducted by PW1 and his team of officers led to therecovery and seizure of the following articles inter alia:A white ambassador car, DL3CJ1527, with a VIP red light. The car had asticker of the Home Ministry (subsequently found to be fake) on the windshield(Ex. PW 1/8) containing an inscription at the rear denigrating India and

reflecting a resolve to 'destroy' it. Certain papers relating to the car were foundinside the car.


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Six fake identity cards purportedly issued by Xansa Websity, 37,Bungalow Road, New Delhi to different students with their address as 120-A,Adarsh Nagar, Delhi and the telephone number as 9811489429. These identitycards were in the names of Anil Kumar, Raju Lal, Sunil Verma, Sanjay Koul,Rohail Sharma and Rohail Ali Shah (which were subsequently found to be fakenames of the deceased terrorists).

One fake identity card of Cybertech Computer Hardware Solutions in thename of Ashiq Hussain which was being carried by the deceased terroristMohammed.Two slips of paper bearing five domestic mobile phone numbers, whichwere related to the instruments found on the deceased terrorists and two UAEnumbers. Three SIM cards corresponding to the mobile phone numbers notedon the slips were found inside the aforementioned three instrumentsExt. P28,P37 & P27. In addition, three other SIM cards were recovered from the purseof the deceased terrorist Mohammad at Gate No.1.One sheet of paper on which the topographical details regarding theParliament House building and the compound were handwritten.

4.(i) So far, about the incident and the preliminary investigations at the

scene of occurrence regarding which there is practically no dispute. We shallnow narrate briefly the further factual details as unfolded by the prosecution:(ii) While investigations were on at the spot, PW20 came to theParliament Complex and met PW1. PW20 provided the first leads to theinvestigating officials by informing PW1 that he had sold the Ambassador carused in the attack (DL 3C J 1527) on 11.12.2001. He had come to the spotafter seeing the said car on the television screen. PW20 had brought with hima delivery receipt dated 11.12.2001, photocopy of the identity card of oneAshiq Hussain etc. PW20 identified the deceased terrorist (Mohammad) at GateNo.1 as being the said Ashiq Hussain who had purchased the car.(iii) Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma of special cellPW66 undertookthe investigations pertaining to the mobile phones. Phone call details wereobtained and analysed from the respective cellular mobile service providers.

Analysis of the call records indicated that the number 9811489429 which wasfound on the I.D. cards, (subsequently discovered to be that of the accusedAfzal) appeared to be integrally connected with the deceased terrorists and thisnumber had been in frequent contact with the cell phone No. 9810693456(recovered from the deceased terrorist Mohammad at Gate No.1) continuouslyfrom 28.11.2001 till the date of the attack. It was further revealed that thisnumber of Afzal, namely, 9811489429 was in contact with the above cellphone of Mohammad, just before the incident i.e. at 10.40 a.m., 11.04 a.m.and 11.22 a.m. It was also ascertained that the said number of Afzal wasactivated only on 6.11.2001 close to the attack.Further analysis of the cell phone call records showed that another cellphone number i.e. 9811573506 (subsequently discovered to be that ofShaukat and recovered from the 4th accused Afsan Guru) appeared to be in

close contact with Afzal's number namely 9811489429 and these numberswere in contact with each other a few minutes before the attack on theParliament commenced. It was also found that the said number of Shaukat wasactivated only on 7.12.2001 just a week prior to the attack. An analysis of thecall records relating to Shaukat's mobile phone further revealed that soon afterthe attack i.e at 12.12 hours, there was a call from Shaukat's number to thecell phone number 9810081228 (subsequently discovered to be that of SARGilani) and there was a call from Gilani's number to Shaukat's number 10minutes later. Moreover, it was ascertained that Gilani's number was inconstant touch with the other two accused namely Shaukat and Afzal. Ittranspired that Afzal's cell phone bearing number 9811489429 was reactivatedon 7.12.2001 and the first call was from Gilani's number.With the recoveries of the cell phones and SIM cards and on an analysis

of the details of phone numbers noted on the slips of papers in the light of thecall records, the investigation narrowed down to three numbers, namely,


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9811489429, 9811573506 and 9810081228 which belonged to Afzal, Shaukatand Gilani respectively. It was also found that the first two numbers were cashcards and hence the details regarding their ownership were not available.However, as regards 9810081228, the information was received from theservice provider (AIRTEL) that SAR Gilani with the residential address 535, Dr.Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi was the regular subscriber.

PW66 then took steps on December 13th for obtaining permission fromthe Joint Director, I.B. as per the requirements of Indian Telegraph Act forkeeping surveillance and tapping of the mobile phone Nos.9811489429,9811573506 and 9810081228. On 14th December, at 12.52 hours, an incomingcall to Gilani's No. 9810081228 was intercepted by S.I. Harender Singh(PW70). The call was in Kashmiri language. A Kashmiri knowing person(PW71) was requested to interpret the call recorded on the tape. He translatedthe call in Hindi which was recorded in Ext. PW66/4. That was a call from thebrother of Gilani which was made from Srinagar. On the same day, at 8.12P.M. a call was intercepted on the number 9811573506 which disclosed thatone woman was talking in a state of panic to a male person whom sheaddressed as Shaukat. This conversation was transcribed by PW70 as per PW66/3. The subsequent forensic analysis revealed that the male voice in the

conversation was of the accused Shaukat Hussain and that the female voicewas that of his wifeaccused No.4 who was the recipient of the call. The callcame from Srinagar. Both the intercepted conversations were analysed andconsidered by PW 66 (Inspector M.C. Sharma) at about 10 P.M. on 14thDecember. PW 66 resultantly drew an inference that the persons who wereconversing on the two mobile phones were having knowledge about the attackon Parliament and that two persons namely, Shaukat and Chotu who wereconnected with the case were in Srinagar. The calling No. 0194 492160 wassent to the Central Agency of Srinagar Police for surveillance.(iv) The next move was to arrest Gilani, which according to theprosecution was at about 10 A.M. on December 15th when he was entering hishouse at Mukherjee Nagar. Shri Gilani is alleged to have made disclosures tothe investigating agency, the contents of which were recorded subsequently as

Ex. PW 66/13. The disclosure statement implicated himself and the otheraccused in the conspiracy to attack the Parliament. According to theprosecution, he disclosed the facts on the basis of which further investigationwas carried out, certain recoveries were effected and discovery of facts tookplace. The identity of the deceased terrorist Mohammad and others, the partplayed by Shaukat and Afzal and other details are said to have been given byhim. According to the prosecution, Shri Gilani then led the InvestigatingOfficer to the house of Shaukat which was also located at Mukherjee Nagar.The 4th accused Afsan Guruthe wife of Shaukat was found there with cellphone No. 9811573506. The search of the premises resulted in the recoveryof another cell phone 9810446375 which was in operation from 2nd Novemberto 6th December. Accused Navjot, on interrogation, disclosed that Mohammad(deceased terrorist) gave Rs. 10 lac and laptop computer to Shaukat and

asked him to go to Sri Nagar in the truck along with Afzal. The truck wasregistered in her name. The disclosure statement of Navjot is Ex.PW66/14.According to the prosecution, she was arrested at about 10.45 a.m. on 15thDecember. The truck number given by her was flashed to Srinagar. Srinagarpolice was successful in apprehending the two accused Afzal and Shaukat whilethey were in the truck belonging to Navjot. On their pointing out, the laptopcomputer and an amount of Rs. 10 lac were recovered from the truck by theSDPO, Srinagar (PW61). A mobile handset without any SIM card was alsofound. It transpired that this hand set was used in the operation i.e. No.9811489429 which established contacts with deceased terrorists minutesbefore the attack. Mohd. Afzal and Shaukat Hussain, who were arrested by theSrinagar Police at about 11.45 A.M., were brought to Delhi in a special aircraftand were formally arrested in Delhi. The investigation was handed over the

PW76 (Inspector Gill of Special Cell) on 16th December.(v) It is the case of the prosecution that on interrogation, they made


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disclosure statements (Ex.PW 64/1 and PW 64/2) in relation to their role in theconspiracy. On December 16th, Afzal and Shaukat led the investigating teamto the various hideouts, viz., Indira Vihar and Gandhi Vihar where the terroristsstayed. On the search of these places, the police recovered chemicals,prepared explosives, detonators, gloves, mixer grinder, motor cyclesonebelonging to Shaukat and the other purchased by the deceased terrorist

Mohammad from PW29 which was allegedly used for reconnaissance (reccee).On December 17th , the investigating officer took Mohd. Afzal to the mortuaryat the L.H. Medical College Hospital where Afzal identified the bodies of thefive deceased terrorists as Mohammad (dead body found at Gate No.1), Raja,Rana, Hamza (dead bodies found at Gate No.9) and Haider (dead body foundat Gate No.5). From December 17th to December 19th, Afzal led the police tovarious shops from where the chemicals and other materials required forpreparing explosives were purchased and also the shops from where red lightfound on the seized car, motor cycle, dry fruits, mobile phones etc. werepurchased. From December 17th onwards, the laptop was analysed by the IOwith the assistance of an expertPW72. PW72 submitted a report narratingthe results of his examination. The laptop was also sent to BPR&D Office inHyderabad and another report from PW73 was obtained. The forensic analysis

revealed that the documents found at the spot with the deceased terroristsincluding various identity cards and sticker of the Home Ministry, were foundstored in that laptop.(vi) On 19th December, the important development was that theprovisions of Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance were invoked and the offencesunder the said Ordinance were also included in the relevant columns of crimedocuments. According to the prosecution, this was done after dueconsideration of the material collected by then and upon getting definiteinformation about the involvement of a banned terrorist organizationJaishe-Mohammad. The investigation was then taken over by the AssistantCommissioner of Police Shri Rajbir Singh (PW80). He recorded asupplementary disclosure statement being Ext. PW64/3.(vii) On the same day i.e. 19th December, there was another crucial

development. According to the prosecution, the three accusedAfzal, Shaukatand Gilani expressed their desire to make confessional statements before theauthorized officer.On 20th December, PW80 made an application before the DCP (Special

Cell) (PW60) for recording the confessional statements of these three accused.PW60 gave directions to PW18 to produce the three accused at the OfficersMess, Alipur Road, Delhi. On the next day i.e. 21st December, the accusedGilani was first produced before PW60 at the Mess building. However, ShriGilani refused to make a statement before PW60 and the same was recordedby him. Thereafter, Shaukat Hussain was produced before PW60 at 3.30 P.M.Shaukat Hussain expressed his desire to make the confessional statement andthe same was recorded by PW60 in his own handwriting which according tohim was to the dictation of Shaukat. The confessional statement recorded

purportedly in compliance with Section 32 is marked as Ex. PW60/6. The otheraccused Afzal was also produced before PW60 at 7.10 P.M. on 21st December.After he expressed the desire to make the confession, his statement wasrecorded by PW60 in his own handwriting allegedly as per the dictation of thesaid accused. This is Ex.PW60/9. PW80 obtained copies of the confessionalstatements in sealed envelopes. In substance, both Afzal and Shaukatconfessed having been parties to the conspiracy to launch an attack on theParliament House. The details of the confessions will be adverted to later.On 22nd December PW80 produced the accused persons before the Addl.

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (PW63) in compliance with Section 32 of POTA.The learned Magistrate conducted the proceedings in respect of each of theaccused persons in order to satisfy himself that the statements recorded byPW60 were not the result of any inducements or threats. No complaint of any

such threat or inducement was made to PW63. Shaukat Hussain and SARGilani were remanded to judicial custody on 22nd December itself. However,


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the police custody of Mohd.Afzal was allowed for the purpose of conductingcertain investigations in the light of the supplementary disclosure statementmade by him to PW80.(viii) On 4.5.2002 sanction was accorded by the Lt. Governor of Delhi inview of the requirements of Section 50 POTA and Section 196 Cr.P.C.Sanction was also accorded by the Commissioner of Police on 12th April for

prosecution under Explosives Substances Act. On conclusion of theinvestigations, the Investigating Agency filed the report under Section 173Cr.P.C. against the four accused. By the time the charge sheet was filed andthe charges were framed, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 was enactedand brought into force with effect from 28th March, 2002. By the same Act, thePrevention of Terrorism (2nd) Ordinance, 2001 was repealed subject to asaving provision. The charges were framed on 4th June, 2002 and the trialbefore the designated Judge commenced on 4th July. An Advocate wasnominated by the court at State's expense for providing legal assistance to theaccused Afzal as he did not engage any counsel on his own. Subsequently, thecounsel was changed. Before the trial started, an order was passed by thelearned designated Judge that certain documents viz. post-mortem reportsand documents relating to recoveries of arms, explosives etc. from the scene

of occurrence shall be treated as undisputed evidence in view of the consentgiven by the accused persons and there was no need for formal proof of thosedocuments. After the trial commenced, an application was moved on behalf ofGilani, Shaukat and Navjot challenging the admissibility of the interceptedconversations in evidence. The learned Judge of the designated Court rejectedtheir contention by his order dated 11.7.2002. Assailing this order, theaccused moved the High Court. The High Court set-aside the order of thedesignated court and allowed the applications of the accused. The SLP filedagainst that order was disposed of by this Court on 9.5.2003 during thependency of the appeals in the High Court holding inter alia that the orderpassed by designated Judge was in the nature of an interlocutory order againstwhich appeal or revision was barred under Section 34 POTA. Withoutexpressing any opinion on the merits, the parties were permitted to urge the

point at issue before the Division Bench of the High Court. The decision isreported in (2003) 6 SCC 641. The verdict of the trial court was given on16th and 18th December, 2002. The details of conviction and sentences havealready been referred to. As noticed earlier, the High Court allowed theappeals of A3 and A4 and dismissed the appeals of A1 and A2 and their deathsentences were confirmed.

5. Preliminary submissions:(i) There are certain issues which arise at the threshold viz., validity ofsanction orders, non-addition of POTA offences at the beginning and framing ofcharges which need to be addressed before we embark on a discussion of otherquestions.Sanction:

(ii) Section 50 of POTA enjoins that no Court shall take cognizance ofoffences under the Act "without the previous sanction of the CentralGovernment or as the case may be, the State Government". So also, Section196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts a bar against taking cognizanceof any offence punishable under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code exceptwith the previous sanction of the Central Government or the StateGovernment. Some of the offences charged in the present case are underChapter VI of IPC.(iii) It is first contended by the learned senior counsel Mr. RamJethmalani, that the sanctions were not given, nor signed by the competentauthority. It is submitted that in relation to the Union Territory, only CentralGovernment is competent. Delhi being a Union Territory known as the NationalCapital Territory of Delhi with effect from the date of commencement of the

Constitution (69th Amendment Act), the Central Government alone is thecompetent authority to accord sanction. In the present case, both under POTA


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and Cr.P.C. sanctions have been accorded 'by order and in the name of the Lt.Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi'. The Lt. Governor did notact on behalf of the Central Government nor did he act as Administrator of U.T.He acted as the Constitutional head of the Government of NCT of Delhi andplayed the role assigned to him under Section 41 of NCT of Delhi Act, as theauthentication in the order shows. Therefore, it is submitted that the sanction

purportedly granted under Section 50 of POTA is a nullity.(iv) We find no substance in these contentions. Section 2(h) of POTAread with Articles 239 & 239AA of the Constitution of India furnish completeanswers to these arguments and that is what the learned senior counsel for theState has highlighted.'State Government' is defined in Section 2(h) of POTA and it says that "inrelation to a Union Territory, 'State Government' means the Administratorthereof". The expression 'Administrator' finds place in Article 239 of theConstitution of India. Article 239(1) reads"Save as otherwise provided byParliament by law, every Union Territory shall be administered by the Presidentacting to such an extent as he thinks fit through an Administrator to beappointed by him with such designation as he may specify". Article 239AAinserted by the Constitution (69th Amendment Act, 1991) effective from

1.2.1992 lays down that from that date, the Union Territory of Delhi shall becalled the NCT of Delhi and "the Administrator thereof appointed under Article239 shall be designated as the Lt. Governor." By such designation as the Lt.Governor, the constitutional functionary contemplated by Article 239, namely,the Administrator has not lost his status as Administrator. The designation ofAdministrator gets merged into the new designation of Lt. Governor in keepingwith the upgraded status of this particular Union Territory. Thus, the Lt.Governor who continues to be the Administrator also derives his or herauthority to grant sanction under Section 50 of POTA by virtue of thelegislative fiction created by Clause (h) of Section 2 read with Article 239. TheAdministrator is deemed to be the State Government for the purpose ofSection 50 of POTA. In effect and in substance, there is a clear delegation ofpower statutorily conferred in favour of the Administrator (designated as Lt.

Governor) in respect of granting sanction under POTA. The fact that thesanction order carries the designation of the Lt.Governor is of no consequenceand does not in any way impinge on the operation of Section 2(h) read withArticle 239. POTA is a Parliamentary enactment. Sub-Clause (b) of Clause 3 ofArticle 239AA makes it explicit that notwithstanding the law making powerconferred on the Legislative Assembly of NCT, the Parliament retains its powerunder the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a UnionTerritory or any part thereof. The reliance sought to be placed on GoaSampling Employees' Association Vs. G.S. Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. [(1985)1 SCC 206] is rather misconceived. That case turned on the interpretation ofthe expression 'appropriate Government' occurring in Section 10 of theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947. The industrial dispute pertained to the workmenemployed at Mormogao Port which is located in the then union territory of Goa,

Daman and Diu. It was contended by the employer that the CentralGovernment was not competent to refer the dispute to the Tribunal foradjudication. This contention found favour with the High Court of Bombaywhich held that the Administrator appointed under Article 239 of theConstitution is the State Government for the Union Territory of Goa and is theappropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the IndustrialDisputes Act. The judgment of the High Court was reversed by this Court afterreferring to Articles 239 and 239 A and the provisions of the Govt. of UnionTerritories Act, 1963 and the definitions of General Clauses Act and observedthus:"On a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Constitutionand the 1963 Act, it clearly transpires that the concept of StateGovernment is foreign to the administration of Union Territory and

Article 239 provides that every Union Territory is to beadministered by the President. The President may act through an


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administrator appointed by him. Administrator is thus thedelegate of the President. His position is wholly different fromthat of a Governor of a State. Administrator can differ with hisMinister and he must then obtain the orders of the Presidentmeaning thereby of the Central Government. Therefore, at anyrate the administrator of Union Territory does not qualify for the

description of a State Government. Therefore, the CentralGovernment is the 'appropriate Government'.

That decision, in our view, has no relevance. This Court was not called upon to

consider a specific provision like Section 50 or Section 2(h) of POTA. We are,

therefore, of the view that by virtue of specific statutory delegation in favour of

the Administrator who is constitutionally designated as Lt.Governor as well, the

sanction accorded by the said authority is a valid sanction under Section 50 of

POTA. It is of relevance to note that the order of sanction under POTA

(Ext.P11/1) itself recites that the Lt.Governor acted in exercise of powers

conferred by Section 50 read with Clause (h) of sub-Section (1) of Section 2 of

POTA. We find on the perusal of relevant file that the Lt.Governor saw the file

and he himself approved the proposed sanction. The grant of sanction was not

an act done by a delegate of the Lt. Governor under the Business Rules. It

may be noted that the sanction file was produced before the trial Court and

was allowed to be perused by the defence counsel vide para 149 of the trial

Court's judgment.

(v) As regards the sanction under Section 196 Cr.P.C. it is recited in

the sanction order (Ext.P11/2) that the Lt. Governor acted in exercise of

powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section 196 Cr.P.C. read with the

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs notification dated 20th March,

1974. Under that notification, there was delegation of powers to the Lt.

Governor to grant sanction. The said notification which finds place in theAnnexures to the written submissions made on behalf of Gilani shows that it

was issued under Article 239(1) of the Constitution enabling the Administrator

of the Union Territory to discharge powers and functions of the State

Government under the Cr.P.C. We accept the submission of the learned senior

counsel for the State that the delegation of power contained in the said

notification will continue to operate unless the Parliament by law provides

otherwise. The Government of NCT of Delhi Act, 1991 does not in any way

affect the validity of delegation contained in the Presidential Notification issued

under Article 239.

We therefore hold that the sanctions under Section 50 of POTA andSection 196 of Cr.P.C. were accorded by a competent authority.

(vi) Touching on the validity of sanction, the next point urged by Mr.

Ram Jethmalani was that there was no proper application of mind by the

authority granting the sanction. There was no sanction for the offences under

POTA whereas sanction was given for inapplicable offences under the Indian

Penal Code. The facts constituting the offence have not been stated in the

sanction order and no evidence has been adduced to show that the competent

authority addressed himself to the relevant facts and material.

The careless and inept drafting of the sanction order has given scope for

some of these comments. Surprisingly, in the first para of the order containing

recital as to the prima facie satisfaction of the Lt.Governor the POTA offences

are not specifically mentioned. They are however embraced within the


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residuary terminology "along with other offences". Instead of mentioning the

POTA offences specifically and conspicuously in the order passed under Section

50 of the POTA, the drafter reversed that process by mentioning the POTA

offences under the residuary expression "apart from other offences". However,

in our view, this careless drafting cannot deal a fatal blow to the sanction

order. Looking at the substance and reading the entirety of the order, we come

to the irresistible conclusion that the sanction was duly given for the

prosecution of the accused for the offences under POTA after the competent

authority (Lt.Governor) had reached the satisfaction prima facie in regard to

the commission of the POTA offences as well. A specific reference to the POTA

offences mentioned in FIR is contained in the opening part of the order. The

order then contains the recital that the Lt.Governor was satisfied that the four

accused persons "have prima facie committed offences punishable under

Sections 121, 121A, 122, 124 and 120B of the IPC being involved in criminal

conspiracy to commit the said offences with intention of waging war against

the Government of India along with other offences." In the context in whichthe expression 'along with other offences' occurs, it must be reasonably

construed so as to be referable to POTA offences mentioned in the opening

clause. The operative part of the order is more explicit inasmuch as the

Lt.Governor granted sanction for the prosecution of the four accused in a

competent Court "for committing the said offences punishable under Sections

3, 4, 5, 20 & 21 of the POTA". It is pertinent to notice that in the sanction

order under Section 196 Cr.P.C. the POTA offences do not find specific mention

at all. Thus, a distinction was maintained between the sanction under POTA

and the sanction under Cr.P.C.

The other submission that the addition of the offence under Section 120Bwhich does not require sanction, reveals total non-application of mind, does

not appeal to us. Though the conspiracy to commit the offences punishable by

Section 121 is covered by Section 121A, probably Section 120B was also

referred to by way of abundant caution though the prosecution for the said

offence does not require sanction. At any rate, the insertion of a seemingly

overlapping provision does not and cannot affect the validity of the sanction

order. Nor can it be said that the addition of Section 124 which has really no

application to the present case by itself vitiates the sanction order. From the

insertion of one inapplicable provision, a reasonable inference cannot be drawn

that there was no application of mind by the competent authority. A meticulous

and legalistic examination as to the offences applicable and not applicable is

not what is expected at the stage of granting sanction. It was observed by the

Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas Vs. The King [AIR 1948 Privy

Council 82] that, "the charge need not follow the exact terms of the sanction,

though it must not relate to an offence essentially different from that to which

the sanction relates". In any case we do not think that the mention of an

inapplicable Section goes to the root of the matter or otherwise makes it

vulnerable to attack.

On the validity of sanction, we have to consider yet another contention

of the learned senior counsel Mr. R. Jethmalani that in the absence of recital of

facts to sustain prosecution or proof of consideration of such facts, the sanctionorder must be held to have been vitiated on the ground of non-application of


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mind. Relying on the dicta of the Privy Council in Gokulchand's case, it has

been pointed out that no facts constituting the relevant offences were set out

in the order nor any extraneous evidence was let in to show that the

sanctioning authority was seized of the facts alleged to constitute the relevant

offence. In Gokulchand's case (supra), the sanction order of the Government

was a bald order stating that the Government was "pleased to accord sanction

under Clause 23 of Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order to the prosecution of

Mr. Gokulchand Dwarkadas for breach of the provisions of Clause 18(2) of the

said order". The Privy Council held that the sanction read with the evidence

adduced at the trial was not in compliance with the provisions of Clause 23 of

the said Control Order. The following observations in that judgment may be

noted:

"In their Lordships' view, in order to comply with the provisions of

clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect

of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable

that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, butthis is not essential, since clause 23 does not require the sanction to

be in any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts

constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the

sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that

those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority"

The ruling of the Privy Council was cited with approval by this Court in

Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 124] and certain other

cases. Ultimately, the test to be applied is whether relevant material that

formed the basis of allegations constituting the offence was placed before the

sanctioning authority and the same was perused before granting sanction.We are of the view that this test has been amply satisfied in the instant case.

The sanction orders on their face indicate that all relevant material viz., FIR,

disclosure statements, recovery memos, draft charge sheet and other material

on record was placed before the sanctioning authority. The fact that the

sanctioning authority perused all this material is also discernible from the

recital in the sanction orders. The sanction orders make it clear that the

sanctioning authority had reached the satisfaction that prima facie the accused

committed or conspired to commit the offences mentioned therein. The

elaborate narration of facts culled out from the record placed before the

sanctioning authority and the discussion as to the applicability of each and

every Section of the penal provision quoted therein is not an imperative

requirement. A pedantic repetition from what is stated in the FIR or the draft

charge-sheet or other documents is not what is called for in order to judge

whether there was due application of mind. It must be noted that the grant of

sanction is an executive act and the validity thereof cannot be tested in the

light of principles applied to the quasi-judicial orders vide the decisions in

State of Bihar Vs. P.P. Sharma [(1992) supp.1 SCC 222] and

Superintendent of Police Vs. Deepak Chowdary [(1995) 6 SCC 225].

Apart from this, the oral evidence of PW11Deputy Secretary, Home who

dealt with the file also reveals that the notes prepared by himself and the

Principal Secretary, Home had drawn the attention of the Lt. Governor to therole of individual accused and the Principal Secretary's note was approved by


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interception of wire, electronic or oral communication under Chapter V shall be

admissible as evidence against the accused during the trial of the case. There

are two provisos to the Section and the 1st proviso reads as follows.

"Provided that, the contents of any wire, electronic or oral

communication intercepted pursuant to this Chapter or evidence

derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise

disclosed in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in any court

unless each accused has been furnished with a copy of the order

of the Competent Authority and accompanying application, under

which the interception was authorized or approved not less than

ten days before trial, hearing or proceeding:"

It is common ground that the embargo placed by the first proviso comes

into operation in the instant case inasmuch as no orders were obtained for

interception from a competent authority in compliance with the various

provisions of Chapter V. The embargo under proviso to Section 45 is equally

applicable when the special Court tries along with the POTA offences, theoffences under other enactments viz., IPC, Explosives Act and Arms Act. That

is one aspect. Secondly, there are certain procedural safeguards that are laid

down in Section 52 when a person is arrested for the offences under POTA.

These safeguards were apparently introduced in keeping with the guidelines

laid down in D.K. Basu's case. They are discussed in detail later on. The

question arises whether there was deliberate failure on the part of the

investigating agency to invoke POTA initially in order to circumvent the

requirements of Sections 45 & 52.

(ii) Incidentally, another question raised is whether there was

manipulation of FIR by not showing the POTA offences though in fact POTAwas resorted to by that date. In regard to the latter aspect, the learned

counsel for the accused has drawn our attention to the letter of AIRTEL (Cell

phone service provider) addressed to the I.O.M.C. Sharma (PW66). In that

letter (Ext.PW35/1), while giving the reference to the FIR dated 13.12.2001,

the offences under various Sections of POTO were mentioned in addition to

other offences. From this, an inference is sought to be drawn that the FIR was

tampered with by deleting reference to POTO Sections so as to make it appear

that on the 13th & 14th December when the interceptions took place, the

investigation was not extended to POTO offences. We find it difficult to accept

this contention. We find no basis for the comment that the FIR would have

been manipulated by deleting the POTO offences. No such suggestion was ever

put to the police officials concerned, namely, PWs 1, 9 & 14 connected with the

registration of FIR and they were not even cross-examined. The original FIR

register was produced by PW14. The trial Court perused the same while

recording the depositions and returned it. In fact, this contention about the

manipulation of FIR was not even raised in the trial Court. The High Court

rightly found no substance in this contention. As regards the letter of AIRTEL,

no question was put to PW35the Security Manager of AIRTEL as to the basis

on which the reference was given to the FIR mentioning various POTO

offences. When the question was raised for the f irst time before the High

Court, the High Court perused the case diaries and found that the addressee ofthe letter (Inspector M.C. Sharma) had sent up a written request on


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25.12.2001 to furnish the requisite information to him. By that time, the POTO

provisions were invoked. According to the High Court, there was every

possibility that in that letter of 25.12.2001, the POTO provisions were

mentioned and based on that, the same would have been noted in the

AIRTEL's letter. The High Court also observed that the possibility of the date

17th being a mistake cannot be ruled out. Irrespective of the question whether

the High Court was justified in observing that the date 17th noted in (Ext.

PW35/1) could be a mistake, we do not consider it necessary to delve further

into this aspect, in view of the fact that none of the witnesses pertaining to FIR

were cross examined. By reason of the purported description of FIR given in

the letter of AIRTEL (Ext.PW35/1) alone, we cannot reach the conclusion that

POTO offences entered initially in the FIR were deleted for extraneous reasons.

It is pertinent to note that the letters addressed by the Essar Cell phone

provider (vide Exts.36/6 and 36/7, dated 13th and 18th December) do not

contain any reference to POTO.

(iii) It was next contended by the learned counsel appearing forShaukat and Gilani that from the beginning it was crystal clear that the

persons who attempted to take control of the Parliament House were terrorists

and there was no apparent reason why the offences under POTO were not

entered in the FIR. Attention is drawn to the fact that the language used in the

narration given by PW1 in the 'rukka', viz. "the terrorist organizations in order

to disintegrate the unity and integrity of India and to carry out destructive

activities in a planned manner." is a clear pointer that the investigating

authority was conscious of applicability of POTO from the beginning, it is

contended. Though we feel that POTO provisions could have been invoked on

the very first day having regard to the nature and manifestations of this gravecrime, we find no justification to characterize the action of the concerned

police officers as malafide or motivated. It cannot be disputed that POTA

contains drastic and stringent provisionsboth substantive and procedural, for

dealing with special categories of offences which have bearing on the security

and integrity of the country. In view of this special feature of the law, it is

necessary to bestow sufficient care and thought before prosecuting an offender

under this special law instead of proceeding under the ordinary law. This

aspect has been emphasized in more than one decision of this Court dealing

with TADA provisions. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi Vs.

Jitendra Bhimraj Bijiaya [(1990) 4 SCC 76] this Court after noticing the

views expressed in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon Vs. State of Gujarat

[(1988) 2 SCC 271] observed thus:

"the provisions of the Act need not be resorted to if the nature of

the activities of the accused can be checked and controlled under

the ordinary law of the land. It is only in those cases where the

law enforcing machinery finds the ordinary law to be inadequate

or not sufficiently effective for tackling the menace of terrorist and

disruptive activities that resort should be had to the drastic

provisions of the Act. While invoking a criminal statute, such as

the Act, the prosecution is duty-bound to show from the record of

the case and the documents collected in the course of


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required to be stated shall be regarded as material unless the accused was in

fact misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned a failure of justice.

The test of prejudice or reasonable possibility of prejudice was applied by this

Court in William Slaney's case [AIR 1956 SC 116] in testing the argument

based on the omission, error or irregularity in framing the charges. The same

test was also applied in State of A.P. Vs. C. Ganeswar Rao [(1964) 3 SCR

297]. It has not been demonstrated in the instant case as to how the accused

or any of them were misled or any prejudice was caused to them on account of

the alleged defects in framing of charges. No such objection was even taken

before the trial Court. As pointed out in William Slaney's case (para 45 of

AIR), it will always be material to consider whether the objection to the

nature of charge was taken at an early stage. To the same effect are the

observations in Ganeswar Rao's case (supra). It is difficult to spell out with

exactitude the details relating to the starting point of conspiracy. As pointed

out in Esher Singh Vs. State of A.P. [(2004) (1 SCC page 585, 607], it is

not always possible "to give affirmative evidence about the date of formationof the criminal conspiracy". We do not think that if instead of mentioning 'the

first week of December, 2001' the wording 'before December, 2001' is

employed, the prosecution should fail merely for that reason. The accused

cannot be said to have been misled or prejudiced on that account. On the

other hand, it is more than clear that the accused did understand the case

they were called upon to meet. The question whether Section 120B applies to

POTA offences or Section 3(3) alone applies is not a matter on which a definite

conclusion should be reached ahead of the trial. It is not uncommon that the

offence alleged might seemingly fall under more than one provision and

sometimes it may not be easy to form a definite opinion as to the Section inwhich the offence appropriately falls. Hence, charges are often framed by way

of abundant caution. Assuming that an inapplicable provision has been

mentioned, it is no ground to set aside the charges and invalidate the trial.

Other legal issues

We shall, now, deal with certain legal issues, which have been debated

before us in extenso. These issues have a bearing on the

admissibility/relevancy of evidence and the evidentiary value or weight to be

attached to the permissible evidence.

8. Law regarding confessions

We start with the confessions. Under the general law of the land as

reflected in the Indian Evidence Act, no confession made to a police officer can

be proved against an accused. 'Confessions'-which is a terminology used in

criminal law is a species of 'admissions' as defined in Section 17 of the Indian

Evidence Act. An admission is a statement-oral or documentary which

enables the court to draw an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact.

It is trite to say that every confession must necessarily be an admission, but,

every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession. While Section 17

to 23 deals with admissions, the law as to confessions is embodied in Sections

24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 bars proof of a confession made to a

police officer. Section 26 goes a step further and prohibits proof of confessionmade by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be


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made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 24 lays down the

obvious rule that a confession made under any inducement, threat or promise

becomes irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Such inducement, threat or

promise need not be proved to the hilt. If it appears to the court that the

making of the confession was caused by any inducement, threat or promise

proceeding from a person in authority, the confession is liable to be excluded

from evidence. The expression 'appears' connotes that the Court need not go

to the extent of holding that the threat etc. has in fact been proved. If the

facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence adduced make it

reasonably probable that the confession could be the result of threat,

inducement or pressure, the court will refrain from acting on such confession,

even if it be a confession made to a Magistrate or a person other than police

officer. Confessions leading to discovery of fact which is dealt with under

Section 27 is an exception to the rule of exclusion of confession made by an

accused in the custody of a police officer. Consideration of a proved confession

affecting the person making it as well as the co-accused is provided for bySection 30. Briefly and broadly, this is the scheme of the law of evidence vis-

a-vis confessions. The allied provision which needs to be noticed at this

juncture is Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. It prohibits the use of any statement

made by any person to a police officer in the course of investigation for any

purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation.

However, it can be used to a limited extent to contradict a witness as provided

for by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 162 makes it

explicit that the embargo laid down in the Section shall not be deemed to apply

to any statement falling within clause (1) of Section 32 or to affect the

provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.In the Privy Council decision of P. Narayana Swami vs. Emperor

[AIR 1939 PC 47] Lord Atkin elucidated the meaning and purport of the

expression 'confession' in the following words:

". A confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any

rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An

admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively

incriminating fact is not of itself a confession."

Confessions are considered highly reliable because no rational person

would make admission against his interest unless prompted by his conscience

to tell the truth. "Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly

proved are among the most effectual proofs in law". (vide Taylor's Treatise on

the Law of Evidence Vol. I). However, before acting upon a confession the

court must be satisfied that it was freely and voluntarily made. A confession

by hope or promise of advantage, reward or immunity or by force or by fear

induced by violence or threats of violence cannot constitute evidence against

the maker of confession. The confession should have been made with full

knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession. If any

reasonable doubt is entertained by the court that these ingredients are not

satisfied, the court should eschew the confession from consideration. So also

the authority recording the confession be it a Magistrate or some other

statutory functionary at the pre-trial stage, must address himself to the issuewhether the accused has come forward to make the confession in an


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atmosphere free from fear, duress or hope of some advantage or reward

induced by the persons in authority. Recognizing the stark reality of the

accused being enveloped in a state of fear and panic, anxiety and despair while

in police custody, the Indian Evidence Act has excluded the admissibility of a

confession made to the police officer.

Section 164 of Cr.P.C. is a salutary provision which lays down certain

precautionary rules to be followed by the Magistrate recording a confession so

as to ensure the voluntariness of the confession and the accused being placed

in a situation free from threat or influence of the police.

Before we turn our attention to the more specific aspects of confessions

under POTA, we should have a conspectus of the law on the evidentiary value

of confessions which are retracted - which is a general feature in our country

and elsewhere.

As to what should be the legal approach of the Court called upon to

convict a person primarily in the light of the confession or a retracted

confession has been succinctly summarized in Bharat vs. State of U.P.[1971 (3) SCC 950]. Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench

observed thus:

"Confessions can be acted upon if the court is satisfied that they

are voluntary and that they are true. The voluntary nature of the

confession depends upon whether there was any threat,

inducement or promise and its truth is judged in the context of the

entire prosecution case. The confession must fit into the proved

facts and not run counter to them. When the voluntary character

of the confession and its truth are accepted, it is safe to rely on it.

Indeed a confession, if it is voluntary and true and not madeunder any inducement or threat or promise, is the most patent

piece of evidence against the maker. Retracted confession,

however, stands on a slightly different footing. As the Privy

Council once stated, in India it is the rule to find a confession and

to find it retracted later. A court may take into account the

retracted confession, but it must look for the reasons for the

making of the confession as well as for its retraction, and must

weigh the two to determine whether the retraction affects the

voluntary nature of the confession or not. If the court is satisfied

that it was retracted because of an after-thought or advice, the

retraction may not weigh with the court if the general facts proved

in the case and the tenor of the confession as made and the

circumstances of its making and withdrawal warrant its user. All

the same, the courts do not act upon the retracted confession

without finding assurance from some other sources as to the guilt

of the accused. Therefore, it can be stated that a true confession

made voluntarily may be acted upon with slight evidence to

corroborate it, but a retracted confession requires the general

assurance that the retraction was an after-thought and that the

earlier statement was true. This was laid down by this Court in an

earlier case reported in Subramania Gounden v. The State ofMadras (1958 SCR 428)."


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The same learned Judge observed in Haroom Hazi Abdulla v. State of

Maharashtra [1968 (2) SCR 641] that a "retracted confession must be

looked upon with greater concern unless the reasons given for having made it

in the first instance are on the face of them false." There was a further

observation in the same paragraph that retracted confession is a weak link

against the maker and more so against a co-accused. With great respect to

the eminent Judge, the comment that the retracted confession is a "weak link

against the maker" goes counter to a series of decisions. The observation

must be viewed in the context of the fact that the Court was concentrating on

the confession of the co-accused rather than the evidentiary value of the

retracted confession against the maker.

Dealing with retracted confession, a four-Judge Bench of this Court

speaking through Subba Rao, J, in Pyare Lal v. State of Assam (AIR 1957

SC 216), clarified the legal position thus:

"A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if

the court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made.But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on

such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law,

but is only rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an

inflexible rule of practice or prudence that under no circumstances

such a conviction can be made without corroboration, for a court

may, in a particular case, be convicted of the absolute truth of a

confession and prepared to act upon it without corroboration; but

it may be laid down as a general rule of practice that it is unsafe

to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confession,

unless the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is trueand voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material

particulars."

As to the extent of corroboration required, it was observed in

Subramania Gounden's case (1958 SCR 428) that each and every

circumstance mentioned in the retracted confession regarding the complicity of

the maker need not be separately and independently corroborated. The

learned Judges observed :

"it would be sufficient in our opinion that the general trend of the

confession is substantiated by some evidence which would tally

with what is contained in the confession".

Then we have the case of Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan [1978 (3)

SCC 435] decided by a three-Judge Bench. Sarkaria, J, noted the twin tests

to be applied to evaluate a confession: (1) whether the confession was

perfectly voluntary and (2) if so, whether it is true and trustworthy. The

learned Judge pointed out that if the first test is not satisfied the question of

applying the second test does not arise. Then the Court indicated one broad

method by which a confession can be evaluated. It was said:

"The Court should carefully examine the confession and compare it

with the rest of the evidence, in the light of the surrounding

circumstances and probabilities of the case. If on such examination

and comparison, the confession appears to be a probable catalogueof events and naturally fits in with the rest of the evidence and the


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surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the

second test."

In Parmanand Pegu v. State of Assam [2004 (7) SCC 779] this

Court while adverting to the expression "corroboration of material particulars"

used in Pyare Lal Bhargava's case clarified the position thus:

"By the use of the expression 'corroboration of material

particulars', the Court has not laid down any proposition contrary

to what has been clarified in Subramania Goundan case as

regards the extent of corroboration required. The above

expression does not imply that there should be meticulous

examination of the entire material particulars. It is enough that

there is broad corroboration in conformity with the general trend

of the confession, as pointed out in Subramania Goundan case."

The analysis of the legal position in paragraphs 18 & 19 is also worth

noting:"Having thus reached a finding as to the voluntary nature of a

confession, the truth of the confession should then be tested by

the court. The fact that the confession has been made voluntarily,

free from threat and inducement, can be regarded as presumptive

evidence of its truth. Still, there may be circumstances to indicate

that the confession cannot be true wholly or partly in which case it

loses much of its evidentiary value.

In order to be assured of the truth of confession, this Court, in a

series of decisions, has evolved a rule of prudence that the court

should look to corroboration from other evidence. However, thereneed not be corroboration in respect of each and every material

particular. Broadly, there should be corroboration so that the

confession taken as a whole fits into the facts proved by other

evidence. In substance, the court should have assurance from all

angles that the retracted confession was, in fact, voluntary and it

must have been true."

The use of retracted confession against the co-accused however stands

on a different footing from the use of such confession against the maker.

To come to the grips of the law on the subject, we do no more than

quoting the apt observations of Vivian Bose, J, speaking for a three-Judge

Bench, in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1952 SC

159). Before clarifying the law, the learned Judge noted with approval the

observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins that a confession can only be used to

"lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused." The legal position

was then stated thus:

"Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to

this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first to

marshall the evidence against the accused excluding the

confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is

believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable

of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is notnecessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where


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the Judge is not 'prepared set on the other evidence as it stands

even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a

conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the

confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and

thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the

confession he would not be prepared to accept."

The crucial expression used in Section 30 is "the Court may take into

consideration such confession". These words imply that the confession of a co-

accused cannot be elevated to the status of substantive evidence which can

form the basis of conviction of the co-accused. The import of this expression

was succinctly explained by the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu vs. King (AIR

1947 PC 257) in the following words:

"The Court may take the confession into consideration and

thereby, no doubt, makes its evidence on which the Court may

act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount

to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession isonly one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the

case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other

evidence".

(emphasis supplied)

After referring to these decisions, a Constitution Bench of this Court in

Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [1964 (6) SCR 623] further clarified

the legal position thus:

".In dealing with a case against an accused person, the Court

cannot start with the confession of co-accused person; it must

begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after ithas formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the

said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in

order to receive assurance to the confession of guilt which the

judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence."

(emphasis supplied)

What is the legal position relating to CONFESSIONS UNDER THE POTA is

the next important aspect.

Following the path shown by its predecessor, namely TADA Act, POTA

marks a notable departure from the general law of evidence in that it makes

the confession to a high ranking police officer admissible in evidence in the trial

of such person for the offence under POTA. As regards the confession to the

police officer, the TADA regime is continued subject to certain refinements.

Now, let us take stock of the provisions contained in Section 32 of POTA.

Sub-Section of (1) of this Section starts with a non obstante provision with the

words "Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the

Indian Evidence Act.." Then it says: "a confession made by a person before a

police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by

such police officer either in writing or on any mechanical or electronic device.

shall be admissible in the trial of such person for an offence under the Act or

the rules, subject to other provisions of the section". By this provision, the ban

against the reception of confessional statements made to the police is lifted.That is why the non-obstante clause. This sub-section is almost identical to


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concerned, rule of prudence requires that it should not be relied upon "unless

corroborated generally by other evidence on record". In paragraph 705, the

learned Judge made the following observations:

"But I wish to make it clear that even if confession of an accused

as against a co-accused tried with the accused in the same case is

treated as 'substantive evidence' understood in the limited sense

of fact in issue or relevant fact, the rule of prudence requires that

the court should examine the same with great care keeping in

mind the caution given by the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu

case",

keeping in view the fact that the confession of a co-accused is not required to

be given under oath and its veracity cannot be tested by cross-examination is

yet another reason given by the learned Judge for insisting on such

corroboration. Thus the learned Judge struck a balance between two extreme

arguments. The view taken by Quadri, J. does not seem to conflict with the

view of Wadhwa, J. Though Wadhwa, J. observed that confession of theaccused is admissible with the same force in its application to the co-accused

and it is in the nature of substantive evidence, the learned Judge, however,

qualified his remarks by observing thus:

`"Substantive evidence, however, does not necessarily mean

substantial evidence. It is the quality of evidence that matters.

As to what value is to be attached to a confession will fall within

the domain of appreciation of evidence. As a matter of prudence,

the court may look for some corroboration if confession is to be

used against a co-accused though that will again be within the

sphere of appraisal of evidence."Thomas, J. was of the view that the non-obstante words in Section 15(1) of

TADA were not intended to make it substantive evidence against the non-

maker, and it can be used only as a piece of corroborative material to support

other substantive evidence.

Reference is to be made to a recent decision of this Court in Jameel

Ahmed & anr. V. State of Rajasthan [2003 (9) SCC 673] a case arising

under TADA. After a survey of the earlier cases on the subject, this Court

observed: "If the confessional statement is properly recorded satisfying the

mandatory provisions of Section 15 of TADA Act and the rules made

thereunder and if the same is found by the Court as having been made

voluntarily and truthfully then the said confession is sufficient to base

conviction of the maker of the confession." This proposition is

unexceptionable. The next proposition, however, presents some difficulty. The

learned Judges added: "Whether such confession requires corroboration or not,

is a matter for the Court considering such confession on facts of each case."

This Court observed that once the confessional statement becomes admissible

in evidence then, like any other evidence, "it is for the Court to consider

whether such statement can be relied upon solely or with necessary

corroboration." The ratio behind the view taken by the learned Judges is

perhaps discernible from the following passage:

"We have already noticed that this provision of law is a departurefrom the provisions of Sections 25 to 30 of the Evidence Act. As a


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matter of fact, Section 15 of the TADA Act operates independent

of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure."

The Court then observed that the confession duly recorded under Section

15 of TADA Act becomes admissible in evidence by virtue of statutory mandate

and if it is proved to be voluntary and truthful in nature there is no reason why

such a statement should be treated as a weak piece of evidence requiring

corroboration merely because the same is recorded by a police officer. We

have to add a caveat here, while wholeheartedly accepting the view that the

confession recorded by a police officer under Section 15(1) of TADA Act

(corresponding to Section 32(1) of POTA) stand on the same footing as the

confession recorded by a Magistrate and the Court can act upon it in spite of its

retraction if it inspires confidence in the mind of the Judge, we feel that the

rule of corroboration evolved by this Court as a matter of prudence in relation

to a retracted confession recorded by a Magistrate under Cr.P.C. need not be

dispensed with. Viewing the confession in the light of other evidence on record

and seeking corroborative support therefrom is only a process of ascertainingthe truth of the confession and is not extraneous to the first proposition laid

down by their Lordships in paragraph 35. Viewed from another angle, we

wonder whether a confession recorded by a police officer under the special

enactment should have more sanctity and higher degree of acceptability so as

to dispense with the normal rule of corroboration and leave it to the discretion

of the court whether to insist on corroboration or not, even if it is retracted.

The better view would be to follow the same rule of prudence as is being

followed in the case of confessions under general law. The confessional

statement recorded by the police officer can be the basis of conviction of the

maker, but it is desirable to look to corroboration in a broad sense, when it isretracted. The non obstante provision adverted to by the learned Judges

should not, in our considered view, affect the operation of the general rule of

corroboration broadly.

As regards the confession being used against a co-accused, this Court in

Jameel Ahmed's case (supra), laid down the following propositions:

"(iii) In regard to the use of such confession as against a co-

accused, it has to be held that as a matter of caution, a general

corroboration should be sought for but in cases where the court is

satisfied that the probative value of such confession is such that it

does not require corroboration then it may base a conviction on

the basis of such confession of the co-accused without

corroboration. But this is an exception to the general rule of

requiring corroboration when such confession is to be used against

a co-accused.

(iv) The nature of corroboration required both in regard to the use

of confession against the maker as also in regard to the use of the

same against a co-accused is of a general nature, unless the court

comes to the conclusion that such corroboration should be on

material facts also because of the facts of a particular case. The

degree of corroboration so required is that which is necessary for

a prudent man to believe in the existence of facts mentioned inthe confessional statement."


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While we agree with the proposition that the nature of corroboration

required both in regard to the use of confession against the maker and the co-

accused is general in nature, our remarks made earlier in relation to the

confession against the maker would equally apply to proposition No.(iii) in so

far as it permits the Court in an appropriate case to base the conviction on the

confession of the co-accused without even general corroboration. We would

only add that we do not visualize any such appropriate case for the simple

reason that the assurance of the truth of confession is inextricably mixed up

with the process of seeking corroboration from the rest of the prosecution

evidence. We have expressed our dissent to this limited extent. In the normal

course, a reference to the larger Bench on this issue would be proper. But

there is no need in this case to apply or not to apply the legal position clarified

in proposition No.(iii) for the simple reason that the trial court as well as the

High Court did look for corroboration from the circumstantial evidence relating

to various facts narrated in the confessional statement. Perhaps, the view

expressed by us would only pave the way for a fresh look by a larger Bench,should the occasion arise in future.

The learned senior counsel Mr. Ram Jethmalani severely criticised the

view taken in Nalini, Jameel Ahmed and other cases decided after Nalini. He

pointed out that the confession of a co-accused is held to be admissible in view

of the expression "shall be admissible in the trial of such person or co-

accused". But, the legislature did not intend that in deviation of the general

law, the confession of a co-accused could become the sole basis of conviction

irrespective of whether it is corroborated in relation to material particulars or

not. The counsel commends the acceptance of the ratio laid down by Privy

Council in Bhuboni Sahu in the context of a confession covered by Section 30of Evidence Act. The counsel reminds us that admissibility is one thing, and the

weight to be attached to the evidence is another. The learned counsel Mr. Ram

Jethmalani repeatedly pointed that the crucial observations of the Constitution

Bench in Kartar Singh's case (supra) were not noticed by this Court in

Nalini's case and this error, according to the learned senior counsel,

perpetuated. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to the categorical

observation of this Court in paragraph 255 of the majority judgment to the

effect that "the present position is in conformity with Section 30 of the

Evidence Act." He has also drawn our attention to the submission of the

learned Additional Solicitor General in Kartar Singh's case that the probative

value of the confession recorded under Section 15 should be left to the Court

to be determined in each case on its own facts and circumstances. According to

the learned counsel, the confession of co-accused should not have been

elevated to the status of confession operating against the maker. The

contention advanced by the learned senior counsel is not without force.

However, we need not dilate further on this aspect as the terminology in POTA

is different and the view which we hold is that Section 32 of POTA does not

enable the Court to take into account the confession of the co-accused. We

shall now advert to this aspect, on a comparative reference of the provisions of

TADA Act and POTA.

10. Use of confession under POTA against co-accusedNow, let us examine the question whether Section 32(1) of POTA takes


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within its sweep the confession of a co-accused. Section 32(1) of POTA which

makes the confession made to a high ranking police officer admissible in the

trial does not say anything explicitly about the use of confession made by co-

accused. The words in the concluding portion of Section 32(1) are: "shall be

admissible in the trial of such person for an offence under this Act or rules

made thereunder." It is, however, the contention of the learned Senior

Counsel Shri Gopal Subramanium that Section 32(1) can be so construed as to

include the admissibility of confessions of co-accused as well. The omission of

the words in POTA "or co-accused, abettor or conspirator" following the

expression "in the trial of such person" which are the words contained in

Section 15(1) of TADA does not make material difference, according to him. It

is his submission that the words 'co-accused' etc. were included by the 1993

amendment of TADA by way of abundant caution and not because the

unamended Section of TADA did not cover the confession of co-accused.

According to the learned senior counsel, the phrase "shall be admissible in the

trial of such person" does not restrict the admissibility only against the makerof the confession. It extends to all those who are being tried jointly along with

the maker of the confession provided they are also affected by the confession.

The learned senior counsel highlights the crucial words-"in the trial of such

person" and argues that the confession would not merely be admissible

against the maker but would be admissible in the trial of the maker which may

be a trial jointly with the other accused persons. Our attention has been

drawn to the provisions of Cr.P.C. and POTA providing for a joint trial in which

the accused could be tried not only for the offences under POTA but also for

the offences under IPC. We find no difficulty in accepting the proposition that

there could be a joint trial and the expression "the trial of such person" mayencompass a trial in which the accused who made the confession is tried

jointly with the other accused. From that, does it follow that the confession

made by one accused is equally admissible against others, in the absence of

specific words? The answer, in our view, should be in the negative. On a plain

reading of Section 32(1), the confession made by an accused before a police

officer shall be admissible against the maker of the confession in the course of

his trial. It may be a joint trial along with some other accused; but, we cannot

stretch the language of the section so as to bring the confession of the co-

accused within the fold of admissibility. Such stretching of the language of

law is not at all warranted especially in the case of a law which visits a

person with serious penal consequences (vide the observations of Ahmadi, J

(as he then was) in Niranjan Singh vs. Jitendra [(1990) 4 SCC 76] at

page 86, which were cited with approval in Kartar Singh's case). We would

expect a more explicit and transparent wording to be employed in the section

to rope in the confession of the co-accused within the net of admissibility on

par with the confession of the maker. An evidentiary rule of such importance

and grave consequence to the accused could not have been conveyed in a

deficient language. It seems to us that a conscious departure was made by

the framers of POTA on a consideration of the pros and cons, by dropping the

words "co-accused" etc.. These specific words consciously added to Section

15(1) by 1993 amendment of TADA so as to cover the confessions of co-accused would not have escaped the notice of Parliament when POTA was


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enacted. Apparently, the Parliament in its wisdom would have thought that

the law relating to confession of co-accused under the ordinary law of

evidence, should be allowed to have its sway, taking clue from the

observations in Kartar Singh's case at paragraph 255. The confession

recorded by the police officer was, therefore, allowed to be used against the

maker of the confession without going further and transposing the legal

position that obtained under TADA. We cannot countenance the contention

that the words 'co-accused' etc. were added in Section 15(1) of TADA, ex

majore cautela.

We are, therefore, of the view that having regard to all these weighty

considerations, the confession of a co-accused ought not be brought within the

sweep of Section 32(1). As a corollary, it follows that the confessions of the 1st

and 2nd accused in this case recorded by the police officer under Section 32(1),

are of no avail against the co-accused or against each other. We also agree

with the High Court that such confessions cannot be taken into consideration by

the Court under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. The reason is that theconfession made to a police officer or the confession made while a person is in

police custody, cannot be proved against such person, not to speak of the co-

accused, in view of the mandate of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. If

there is a confession which qualifies for proof in accordance with the provisions

of Evidence Act, then of course, the said confession could be considered against

the co-ac

Afzal's Supreme Court Judgement

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