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CHAPTER VI:

AFTERMATH OF THE COUP 1953

Mossadeq’ Trial

Mossadeq was detained on 20 August 1953. His hearing was being

started on 17 September and was ended on 29 September 1953. Two days

later, 1 October, martial attorney issued a lawsuit against Mossadeq and

accused him to betray, but martial tribunal began its work after six weeks. On

21 December 1953, verdict of trial was issued and Mossadeq was sentenced to

3 years solitary confinement. Both Mossadeq and martial tribunal made an

appeal of the tribunal verdict. On 8 April 1954; the revision court was formed

and after one month, its end was declared. The first verdict was affirmed in this

court, too. 1 Regime was trying to prevent posing Mossadeq’s complaint in the

Supreme Court through some tactics and plans, because it was concerned of its

judicial consequences. Therefore, the revision case and other issues especially

appealing process was deliberately delayed until 3 August of 1956, exactly two

weeks before ending 3 years conviction of Mossadeq, the Supreme Court

verdict was announced to Mossadeq. After ending a 3 years imprisonment, he

was directly transferred to Ahmad Abad and was monitoring till end of his life.

Mossadeq’s trial should not be regarded as a special or non-special

judicial procedure, because this trial was continuation of political struggle of

the Shah and conservative ruling class from one hand and the national

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movement from the other hand. Hence, if Mossadeq was showing conformity

towards prison guards and regime agents, their behavior was different towards

him, too. If, Mossadeq accepted the coup he would have a peaceful and

respectful life. The reason of delaying his trial for four weeks was this. Regime

was trying to have a deal with him not before his hearing but during all his 3

years confinement. Four months interruption between issuing the court verdict

and formation of revision court was for reaching an agreement with Mossadeq.

Even postponing final investigation in the Supreme Court was for reaching an

unofficial agreement out of the court. Once, it was said that if Mossadeq

retook his appealing Shah would forgive him. It is evident that regime’s benefit

was in peace not political crying. Also, Shah was envying Mossadeq for his

publicity and independence. But, the old man was not going to appease with

Shah. The main reason of trial and sentencing to imprisonment and lifetime

banishing to Ahmad Abad was this.

Hearing

Hearing was generally done during 5 sessions and 19 hours and 35

minutes. It is seemed from studying the first hearing session, that regime was

examining Mossadeq’s views to settle the issue calmly. Official investigator

was an army colonel whose course was engineering but was not instructed in

legal and judiciary grounds. But, army attorney brigadier-general Hossien

Azmoodeh was present from the first sessions of hearings, and from the second

session he practically charged Mossadeq’s hearing. In the first session,

behavior of investigator and attorney was respectful with Mossadeq. Moreover,

Mossadeq was regulating respectful behavior, which was his characteristics;

meantime, his behavior was in legal frame and was not influenced. With ending

the session, attorney convicted Mossadeq to plot against the constitution and

intriguing against monarchy and issued his arrest order. Mossadeq meantime

receiving announcement wrote under it; “I strongly deny above accusations

which are untrue and unfair and I do complain to my illegal arrest which is

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baseless17و September 1953, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq.” 2

from the second

session, so, Azmoodeh personally undertook hearing affair. When he assured

Mossadeq was not going to deal, he confronted Mossadeq with the Justice

Minister of his Cabinet, Lotfi. Lotfi said he was not aware from Shah’s note

over removal of Mossadeq in unsuccessful coup of 16 and 17 August.

Azmoodeh asked Mossadeq why one of his cabinet ministers was unaware of

the Shah’s note. Mossadeq said he would reply conditional on writing in the

process-verbal. Prosecutor was refusing to give such a guarantee and

Mossadeq conditioned replying to that pre-condition. This struggle ended with

Mossadeq’s threat to go on food strike; but confronting and hostility of the

investigator and accused continued until end of Mossadeq’s confinement.

The third session was totally specified to hearing Mossadeq’s statements

and his performances and goals after receiving Shah’s note in 16 August. In

the fourth session, hearing turned violent. Prosecutor asked about bringing

down the Shah and the Reza Shah’s statues on 16 August and whether he had

issued orders on stopping these actions. Mossadeq’s reply had that normal

procedure. He said that he had not heard anything over bringing down the

Shah’s statue, but the Tudeh party informed him of subverting the Reza Shah’s

statue and he asked the National Front Parties to take those statues. He

supported this act for he considered Reza Shah as a dictator and usurper of

people’s property. If government prevented people’s action on removing these

statues, it would offend people’s right. If the Tudeh party removed the statues,

government had two ways: one, force them to install it that was bad on the

public or not to install them, which in that case government was at the same

rank of the Tudeh Party, so, government, asked democratic and liberal parties

to accomplish it. Regarding to this reasoning of Mossadeq prosecutor never

put on this debate again.

In fact, this was the last question of the investigator which Mossadeq

answered it. Hearing Mossadeq’s reply, prosecutor warned and spoke angrily

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to him. Mossadeq stated his question would be answered in the court.

Azmoodeh, again, warned him if he would not answer his questions, he would

act according to his legal duty, and then Mossadeq answered that, “go and act

based on your legal duty” and hearing ended here. On 1 October 1953,

Azmoodeh issued his lawsuit against Mossadeq and brigadier-general Riyahi.

Accusation was quite simple and brief: those two were accused of intriguing

people to armed revolt and according to the article 317 of penal law of army

punishment of it was execution. But, the lawsuit was so long and it was

provided another political struggle against Mossadeq in the court and out of it.

Mossadeq was convicted to betray and making terror and horror system during

his premiership and was trying to weaken people’s belief toward official

religion of the country. 3

They believed Mossadeq was asking those who

visiting him about the authorities activities and appointed conservative, weak

and disrespectful ones in pivotal and important positions.

Trial on Martial Tribunal

Six weeks after ending hearing, the Primary martial tribunal began its

work. Members of the court were consisting of some brigadier-general

including brigadier –General Teimour Baktiar and one major general. None of

them had judicial instruction or experience. Mossadeq suggest Lieutenant-

general Naghdi as his attorney but Naghdi did not accept. Informing of this

case Colonel Jalil Bozorgmehr contacted Naghdi and announced his readiness

for defending Mossadeq. Bozorgmehr was a noticeable and famous lawyer and

in army was famed for his merits and honest. Having 39 years old made him

one of the youngest army colonels who if did not undertake defend of

Mossadeq became brigadier-general nearby. Army prosecutor office officially

appointed him as Mossadeq’s defend lawyer. At the beginning, Mossadeq

performed cautiously and perhaps was thinking he would prefer loyalty to army

and Shah than attorney. Nevertheless, during trial, he completely relied on him

and in the revision; court of army paid him the attorney right and personally

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made Bozorgmehr as his attorney. However, Mossadeq was defending himself

in his way and was successful but Bozorgmehr, also, served him properly

including he was mediator between Mossadeq and his adherences and political

advisors out of the court.

Defending of Mossadeq had both legal and political aspects. At first, he

objected to his trial in the martial tribunal and said based on the Constitution,

government members should be tried by the Supreme Court. Defendant text

was prepared by Ali Shahid Zadeh, an outstanding lawyer who became

Mossadeq’s attorney at the time of referring his case to the Supreme Court, and

Bozorgmehr gave it to Mossadeq. Mossadeq read the defendant text himself.

As it was predictable, court rejected his objection and Mossadeq started

defending accusation cases. Prosecutor was claiming that Mossadeq had been

against the Constitution and had ignored his removal order by the Shah and

invited people to armed revolt. Mossadeq replied:

a) The removal order, which Shah had sent him, was a part of a coup and

he was informed before of it. The order was declared him at one a.m.

and simultaneously his residence had been under military siege, and

three political figures were stolen from their houses including the

foreign minister.

b) From writings of note, it was evident before Shah signed a white paper

and after, in his absence something had written on it over my removal.

c) He headed no armed or unarmed revolt but he was waiting to contact

Shah and clear about what he had received;

d) Removal order that Shah had issued was against the Constitution and so,

he rejected it, because Shah had no right of doing so, because Majlis had

not been officially dissolved. Meanwhile representatives who had

resigned could retake their resignations.

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In 1984, all trial procedures and reports and its documents was published

for the first time in two volumes. It seems all trial was for making a political

struggle against Mossadeq and the national movement Army prosecutor was

practically administered the Court. Even in rare cases that the court head was

pretending to neutrality, he threatened him. Even he did not refuse personal

attacks on Mossadeq like “baby servant of Qajar’s courts”. 4 Azmoodeh read a

letter from an unknown journalist who had offended Mossadeq’s attorney. He

was threatening to make the court sessions secret when Mossadeq embarked on

exposing especially about Pahlavi dynasty. Some mercenaries as spectators

were placed in the court and during the trial were offending Mossadeq like “a

law Doctor” who does know nothing of law. Mossadeq, also, addressed

Azmoodeh as “that man” not by his name or his military rank. Apart from

contempt the court by Mossadeq, he had a legal reason for it: Mossadeq in a

part of Judicial reforms of his government and democratizing laws,

qualification of martial laws had limited to some special cases like field trials.

Based on reformative program of Mossadeq, the army prosecutor office had

been dissolved, so, legally this office was not there. Martial prosecutor

presence was illegal, because after dissolving army prosecutor in his

government no other law had been legislated to abrogate it.

One of the cases which army prosecutor had used it several times against

Mossadeq was having no religious beliefs. His reason was his PhD thesis forty

years before and his apostasy sentences. In 1907, when Mossadeq was deputy

of the Finance Ministry, and was ardently following fighting against influential

and famous factors of corruption, his dissidents misinterpreted his PhD thesis

little and had accused him of apostasy and infidelity. The army prosecutor was

using advisory of conservative statement like Senator Ibrahim Khajeh Noori

and Ali Dashti and they gave him information over Mossadeq. 5

Emphasizing

of army prosecutor to convicting Mossadeq to apostasy was for encouraging

Qom clerics, Ayatollah Behbahani and Fadian Islam to cooperate with

government. Mossadeq got anxious of these convictions, because not only he

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was religious person but also he was afraid of assassinating by religious and

bias elements in the court. This concern was not baseless because during two

courts of Mossadeq, his government foreign minister, Dr. Hossein Fatemi, who

was arrested assassinated by some mercenaries, but could rescued like a

miracle. Later, he sentenced to death in a fake trial. Fatemi was injured before

execution for shots of Abde Khodaei, one of the young members of “Islam

Devotees” who was elected later as Tehran deputy in the Islami consultative

Parliament. The “Islam Devotees” (Fadian-e Eslam) had sworn to murder

Mossadeq from first of his premiership. Immediately after the 19 August coup,

the “Islam Devotee’s” leader who had been imprisoned two months before for

intriguing was freed by the coup regime.

Regarding to political nature of the trial, all the trial including the head of

court were going to show Mossadeq’s case as a political case not legal one. At

last, Mossadeq succeeded to prove the political nature of the trial through

restoring to various ways and tactics including threatening to go for food

strike, demanding, shouting on the court head. Mossadeq was insisting on the

point (that) his trial was doing aftermath a coup by American organization.

Proving this claim, he relied on some documents, which were providing by

Mossadeq’s friends and by his defense lawyer was reaching him. 10

In the

following, some part of his last defense in the 34th

session on 20 December

1953 is being narrated:

“Yes, my only sin, my large and very big sin is to nationalize the Iranian

Oil Industry and to shorten and cut off the Political and economic

influence and monopoly of the largest world empire from this country.

….In the price of demolishing I and my family and my life and wealth,

God helped me to abolish this dreadful system by aspiration and will of

these free people….My life, wealth and existence and some like me is

worthless for existence, independence and glory of millions of Iranians

and future generations. it is apparent from premise and legal procedure

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that I will die in jail and they will turn off my voice and ardent which I

have used for people goodness. …I bid farewell to the dear, brave and

elegant people of Iran and stress on their honorable way “not to afraid of

any event and be assure that God will be their aid and friend.” 6

In the last moment, a message from the Shah reached to the Court and

was read in the open session of court. Shah had said that if Mossadeq

personally asked Shah for forgiveness, Shah would acquit him. At once,

Mossadeq got angry and rejected the suggestion. Court convicted him to the

previous accusation, considered for him 3 years solitary confinement, and

prohibited to vote for execution, the verdict for such a crime. Based on law,

execution of individuals more than 60 years was prevented and the Shah

forgave some years of his punishment. Some days later, Mossadeq received

from Lord stokes the royal stumper of Britain in the labor cabinet, for

congratulation of Jesus Birth celebration in jail. Lord stokes had been leading

the ex-company delegacy for oil in Tehran. Stokes had written in his hand

script: “In the hope of bringing your country in peace and happiness in next

Christian year.” Supportive letters were being sent for Mossadeq from Arabic,

Asian, German, U.S. and Argentine. 7

Renewed Trial in the Martial Revision Court

Immediately after finishing the legal procedure, it was begun to provide

next term of struggle. According to those days legal procedure, a copy of the

court verdict was delivering to the accused and he was signing it in a private

place to say has seen the court verdict. Mossadeq wrote in this paper that, “I

appeal of this illegal vote which has been issued from an illegal court.” He

appealed without mentioning name of the Supreme Court.

Some days later, it became obvious that Mossadeq had used “appealing”

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word, purposely. Three lawyers of the Justice Court, Ali Shahid Zadeh,

Bahram Magdzadeh and Hassan Sadr, asked appealing from the Supreme Court

as Mossadeq’s lawyer and relying on legal procedures of army announced that

appealing of martial court verdict can be asked just of the Supreme Court.

According to some reasons, regime was not desire to have Mossadeq’s trial in

the Supreme Court and an independent investigation be done by the Supreme

Court. After creating some difficulties, the Supreme Court in a letter asked the

army prosecutor to “send Mossadeq’s file if you don’t need it.” The Supreme

Court was going to give his file to Mossadeq’s lawyers in order to study and

provide the ground for renewed trial. Prosecutor rejected the Supreme Court

request. Two month later, Mossadeq wrote a letter to the head of revision court

of army asked to send his file to the Supreme Court and through that court his

lawyers could study it. The Court head replied that, “Because your request on

sending file has no legal base, so this court cannot do it.”

Regime had not still stabilized and threatened of Mossadeq’s publicity.

Public support of people had strongly concerned the regime. The ruling class

was inclined to allow Mossadeq to live calmly in Ahmad Abad contingent on

leaving enmity and struggle. Even before trial, one of the army doctors said

him during his daily test if he would write a two lines letter to American

embassy, he would free at once. Now, this suggestion was given him

apparently. Yousef Moshar, one of the second rank representatives of the

National Front who later joint to opposed line, send a message through colonel

Borzorgmehr from Shah to Mossadeq and said him if he would agree, the trial

would end and banish to Ahmad Abad. Mossadeq again rejected this

suggestion of the Shah. 8 The file was sent to the revision court, but creating

difficulties were continued till March 1954. Two days before beginning the

court, Mossadeq and his lawyers in a letter to the court head – major-general

Javadi – asked to allow them act as Mossadeq’s defenses in the court. Javadi

only in reply to Mossadeq’s letter said that it was impossible. Mossadeq, again,

requested for presence of his defenses for consulting in the recess time. Javadi

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answered that: a) Defenses can present in the court sessions as spectator with

court permission; b) Permission for private talk in recess time is just with army

prosecutor. 9

The revision court was like the primary court from many aspects, that is to

say the army prosecutor could do everything, and the court head was trying to

hide his shame of this case. The revision court had totally 26 sessions and all

lasted one month. Mossadeq, again, objected to qualification of the court and it

was not accepted again. When the court entered accusation cases, Mossadeq

was more ready than previous court, to prove legality of his government

according to foreign and domestic evidences. Even once, he relied on a report

of Tribune Donasieun newspaper on 4 September 1953. It had been written that

Senator Khajeh Noori and others had prepared a lawsuit against him before,

which prosecutor used it in the primary court procedure. The same newspaper

in its number of 14 September exposed assassination plot to Dr. Hossein

Fatemi, the Foreign Minister, “Fatemi was assassinated by that general Shaban

Bi Mokh who was leader of thugs and hooligans at the time of arresting.”

Mossadeq in his last defense said that wanted to inform “Court and his

Civilians” his only goal during his entire political career had been:

“Yes, I during all my life had no more than goal and it was and is

Iranians can live with independence and glory and except majority will

no one rule on him. Glorious struggle of people against the ex-

company, which I was one of its leaders and now regarding God’s help,

I am, expressing my idea from jail, will end to the Middle East

monopoly. Aside from economic aspect, which loots our wealth, the

national movement had been created for removing this dreadful cancer

and people can use of real freedom and political independence. Who

does not know previous governments of mine were agent and captive of

political agents of the ex-company. …….I thank God in this gloomy and

sinister destiny, the trial has become an instrument that after 50 years

constitutionality, in public thoughts this important issue will set forth

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that in Constitutional regime and democracy removal and appointment

of a government head who is manifestation of a government authority is

depend on one person or on majority nation will”. 10

Appealing

Appealing request from the Supreme Court was a different case. All

judicial reforms of Mossadeq’s government, through Abdol Ali Lotfi the old

justice Minister and Mohammad Soruri the Supreme court head, was

demolished one night after the coup. Many of honest judges of the Supreme

Court were dismissed and replaced by de-famous ones. This was especially for

“Ali Heiat”, the new head of the Supreme Court, that government ultimately

forced to remove him based on Parliament approve. Apart all of these, these

courts still had high power and significant independence and especially the

Supreme Court, the highest judicial part of the country, had its independence.

In addition, for these reasons, both sides in the Mossadeq’s case was pressuring

to the Supreme Court. From one side, Shah and the coup government was

requesting to reject Mossadeq’s appeal and from the other side, Mossadeq’s

adherences were requesting to regulate law. Nevertheless, there was a

clandestine struggle. No one was active over Mossadeq’s file as himself. First,

file was referred to three branch of the Supreme Court. Branch judges, at once,

contacted privately with “Ali Heiat”, the Supreme Court head and stressed they

would not regard government consideration in this case. The file was sent to 9

branches with no reason. During 11 months, nothing was done on this file in

this branch. Their excuse was having many files and cases in turn. Ultimately,

on 10 July 1954; Mossadeq broke his silence, wrote to “Ali Heiati”, and asked

him about not summoning him for the lawsuit:

“From 5 September of last year that I offered my appealing I have been

waiting according to 452 article of penal trial principle to summon and

according to 451 article of the same law defend myself. All people saw

whenever I was going to defend myself, some of Taj club persons said

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and wrote offences against him in the newspapers and threatened him to

making the trial clandestine, so, I rejected to disclose”.

Iran’s Supreme Court, like other countries, had limitations and should

do in the frame of law. Various cases of law were given right to Mossadeq to

present in the court and according to legal articles, set forth an appealing

lawsuit. Mossadeq was ending his first letter as follows:

“My appealing is not a case that I can finish so I should say orally that it

is near two years that I have tolerated jail with my old age and weak and

inability of temper just for the day that present in the Supreme Court and

express whatever I have about my innocence.”

This was the last, simplest, more effective and exposing of proposing

political and legal lawsuit of Mossadeq against the Shah regime against public

thought. Hence, regime was trying to prohibit it. The Supreme Court head

wrote in answering Mossadeq: “Mr. Dr. Mossadeq….regarding to present you

at the time of Supreme Court for proposing, according to usual procedure of the

Supreme Court from beginning to present the accused was inviting for

elaboration to relevant branch….”. 11

Head of the Court did not answer any

later letters of Mossadeq addressed him or other judicial authorities and instead

he insisted on his defense in occasion interviews with newspapers.

Making differences and postponing was effective- for instance the nine

branch judges who should survey the Mossadeq case, other duties were

determined for them like extra files. These procedures made the old man tired

till his three years imprisonment ended and banished to Ahmad Abad.

Mossadeq who had understood the regime plot, went on for unlimited food

strike. Regime was compelled to justify its way. Flatters began to write in the

newspapers that name of Mossadeq was in the list of those who were going to

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be forgiven by the Shah for the 26 October celebration. Reaction of Mossadeq

was rapid and angrily and within a letter to “Ali Heiat” objected to this matter:

“As it was said in one of the martial court sessions, if His Majesty is

going to acquit and forgive me, because it is the biggest offence to a

servant of country I cannot accept it and I will end my life. Now, I say if

the branch wouldn’t invite me for presence in the court and take me the

right of any accused I will prefer death to live because I don’t have any

instrument to defend myself.” 12

Corresponding of Mossadeq from jail and wasting time by regime

continued. First, Mossadeq letters were sent for army prosecution and

prosecutor was studying them. Soon, it became apparent that in spite of explicit

text of law, they would not invite Mossadeq to present in the court. Also, his

defenses are not allowed to present in the court and propose lawsuit. Even for

visiting defenses, he should fight with army prosecutor and finally during one

year he just could see his defenses twice. He wrote several letters to “Ali

Heiat” and expressed necessity of his presence in the court based on political

and legal reasons. Even he referred to precedents of such a case in France,

Belgium and Switzerland courts. The 9 branch of the Supreme Court,

ultimately announced its brief vote on 5 May 1956 as follows which was

communicated (to) Mossadeq on 23 June 1956: “Considering all aspects and

regarding personal conditions of the appellant is not effective, the issued

verdict (by the revision martial court) is confirmed.” 13

Mossadeq read the news of the Supreme Court in the newspapers

(because it lasted seven days to communicate the court verdict to him through

army prosecution). Issuing this judgment caused defaming of the government.

The judgment had referred to no precedent appealing or its reason and had not

been relied on any legal article about affirming qualification of army legal

procedure and the primary courts.

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It was obvious the nine branch judges had been under pressure of

government and regime. Meantime they acquit themselves and held

government and regime responsible for all sins and faults. Disgracing of the

judgment was so much that Jamal Emami, old enemy of Mossadeq, had cited in

the Senate he wished they would be efficacious to appealing. Jamal Akavi, the

Justice Minister, who was famous till the time resigned in order to keep himself

aside from all dishonors and embarrassments. But, regime forced him to

dispense with his decision for two or three months and served in foreign state.

The Supreme Court head was ousted disgracefully with votes of both Majleses.

Mossadeq was angry but did not leave the struggle. Meantime, issuing a

declaration from Jail rejected officially the Supreme Court judgment, also

complained to the supreme disciplinary of judges against the 9 branch judges

and wrote letters to the Justice Minister (Jamal Akhavi who had resigned), and

complaint about the new head of Supreme Court who was famous for Gess-

Golshaeian Agreement. At the time of Mossadeq’s imprisonment, a law had

passed by the Majles which according it the Supreme Disciplinary of Judges

could not survey about technical problems like the Mossadeq’s case. The 9-

branch vote was kept in the army prosecution for 50 days and then conferred

Mossadeq. Now, it had remained 2 weeks to ending his conviction period and

his three years imprisonment. However, Mossadeq did not surrender and asked

for visiting with his defenses. He wrote a reproaching letter to army

prosecution for it’s deliberately delay in sending letters and court judgments

and asked for a visit with his defenses. The Supreme Court head personally

wrote him for having no legal prohibition over his visit with defenses. The

army prosecutor in an offensive reply wrote him he did not have any right to

use lawyer because now he was a convicted and his conviction had been

approved. Mossadeq received army prosecutor letter two or three days before

being free from jail that is to say in the early of August 1956. He was directly

sent to Ahmad Abad and spent rest of his life there. 14

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Section 2

The national Movement after the Coup

Resistance on the Coup

The 19 August coup shocked and frightened the national movement

forces, but the coup regime itself had frightened, too. Zahedi and his colleagues

in the army, conservative statesmen, landlords, and religious system all

believed to return the situation before 1948 that is to say both the Tudeh Party

and the National Front would be prevent and ex-communicate from the Majles.

Shah had a new plan for his autocratic ruling like his father, but he did not

expose his plan for conservative allies. Most of the National Front leaders in

Majles, Cabinet, Bazaar and political parties were banished. They were

included Shaygan, Nariman, Rzavi Seddighi, Lotfi, Shamshiri and Ayatollah

Zanjani’s brothers and many activists of the movement. Dr. Hussein Fatima

was hiding some months, but accidentally was arrested and during arresting

one of the coup regime agents assassinated him that had no result. He was

secretly tried in the martial court and was executed. Khalil Maleki arrested and

exiled to Falak-ol Aflak jail. Many of the Tudeh Party leaders and activists

were imprisoned in this Middle Age jail. 15

Bazaar reacted against the coup before all. The coup regime destroyed

ceiling of bazaar in retaliation of rallies and strikes of bazzaries. Trial of

Mossadeq had attracted people’s unanimity. Therefore, regime was trying to

reach an agreement with him out of the court. However, Mossadeq was

completely aware of political performance of trial and his conflict results in the

court were clear for the society. Even he referred to bazzar destruction by

regime in the court. Within first three weeks of the coup, resistance thought

against regime was formed. Khalil Maleki was simulating Iran to France at the

time of the World War II under occupation of Nazi German. However, soon he

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was arrested and had no role in forming to the National Resistance Movement.

Ayatollah Hajagha Reza Zanjani, his brother Ayatollah Seyyed Abolfzl

Zanjani, Mehdi Bazargan, Seyyed Mohmood Taleghani, Dr. Yadollah Sahabi

and some young activists who mainly belonged to the religious wing of the

National Front., did organizing this movement. The Third Force party and

group of Mohammad Nakhshab with new name of Iran’s people party had role

in organizing the National Resistance Movement. Later, Iran’s party and

young Pan Iranists of Daryush Forohar joint them. 16

On 12 November 1953; almost three months after the coup, first

organized coalition was appeared as a public demonstration against the Usurper

rule of Shah and Zahedi. Its reason was re-establishing political relation with

Britain before settling the oil issue. That day, bazzar was closed and in

different parts, self-stimulating rallies were done. However, it was not a power

showing off, but presence of dissent forces was showing. Martial law was still

there in Tehran and tanks were fixed in sensitive points of city. From beginning

of education year, Tehran University and Alborz College were not calm and

armed forces were always there. On 7 December, for student Day and coming

Richard Nixon, the then deputy president of America, some of students said

mottos against regime. Regime ordered fire to armed forces to prevent repeat

of such actions in Tehran at the time of Nixon staying in Iran. Three students

of Tehran University in Technical faculty were killed by shot. At the time, the

most important concern of the coup regime and the U.S. state was unrest of

Ghashghaee tribe in Fars and South parts of the country. Ghashghaees had a

threatening gesture one or two months before. Of course, they were not going

to move towards Tehran, but if their unrest became successful, it could make

disturbances in Tehran and other cities. Both Iran’s government and the U.S.

directly acted and convinced them. Still reason of Ghashghaees dispensing with

making upheaval and going Naser Khan Ghashghaee to Tehran is unclear. 17

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The National resistance movement coalition could not resist. Moreover,

tactical problems, personalities and their treats with each other was effective.

Iran’s Party left the coalition soon. This party did not come back to Political

activity till 1950, although during this period, two of its leaders – Allahyar

Saleh and Karim Sanjabi – had some objective enterprises. Reason of partition

the Third force was something else. Exactly after arresting and imprisoning

Khalil Maleki, two members of executive committee of the Party – Dr.

Mohammad Ali Khonji and Dr. Mosood Hejazi – started a conflict against him

and asked for his immediate expulsion. Their accusation to Khalil Maleki was:

a) Once Maleki had met the Shah (according to Shah’s request); b) Party had

received 50 thousands rials from religious foundation of Hazrat-e Masoomeh in

Qom. Of course, unanimous approving of the Party executive committee did

these two acts and also Maleki’s visit with Shah was done by before agreement

of Mossadeq and then Maleki in a report informed the Party executive

committee of that meeting. 18

In June 1956, Maleki was transferred from Falkol

– Aflak to Qasr jail in Tehran and after some weeks, he was released.

Meantime, internal research over Khonji – Hejazi’s criticizes was continuing

and finally these two along with other 9 left the party. When Maleki was in

jail, they were communicator with the National Resistance Movement.

Vacating them of the third force was like partiating the Party from the National

Resistance Movement. However, the Movement in 1955 was consisted just of

religious persons and the National Front activists.

Khonji and Hejazi’s action led to weakening mentality of members and

adherences of the Third Force. While, the party was on the verge of collapsing,

they did not continue jeopardizing conflict with the coup regime. Maleki

personally believed that all branching was due to enterprises of major general

Farhad Dadsetan, the head of regime security forces. Maleki was narrating a

published declaration without name that it had been confirming such a plot.

Although, it is clear that Khonji had no information of these plots and whatever

he did was his belief.

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Struggle with regime continued, but it was weakening day by day.

America and Britain announced their support of the regime from the first. In

November 1955, Iran was entered to Baghdad Treaty. Following to Abdol

Karim Ghasem Coup in Iraq in 1958, this treaty renamed to SANTO.

Immediately, after the coup, U.S. started its financial and military aids to

regime. In 1954, oil consersium agreement caused to escalate Iran’s annual oil

incomes. These incomes led to expend huge amount of money by regime for

military and security affairs. These expenses and non-military expenses caused

temporary economic flourishing and middle class benefited it. At the time, the

Tudeh Party was broken down and the Soviet Union was trying to establish

friendly relations. The Soviet Union began negotiation with Zadedi’s

government for paying their debts to Iran that had not paid to Mossadeq’s

government. Of course, in practice it was paid in Ala’s cabinet after Zahedi.

The Soviet Union welcomed the Shah’s visit from there and arranged a

magnificent welcome in Moscow. In 1959, it was Shah who engaged with the

Soviets and entered a bilateral defensive agreement with the US; instead,

America undertook to pay more financial aid to Iran. 19

In 1955, Shah released himself of Zahedi and solidified his control on

security forces and army. Finally, in 1957, elected Dr. Manuchehr Eghbal as

Prime Minister Major-general Teimour Baktiar, a cruel and ambitious military

man, established the Information and Security Organization of the country, by

Shah’s order. Bakhtiar before as military governor monitored activities of

secret and security police. There is no surprise that little resistances were

demolished, while public dissatisfaction towards regime was going to increase.

The National Resistance Movement was publishing leaflet of “Mossadeq’s

way” till 1958 semi-hidden. “Hashiye-bi Hashiye” was one of these leaflets,

which were occasionally publishing. 20

Maleki and some of the Third Force

activists focused on analytic notes. These notes were publishing first in “Life

battle” and then in “Science and life”.

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Objection to Consortium Agreement

The coup regime announced Mossadeq’s plebiscite and dissolution of

the seventeen Majles. Therefore, it was expecting the seventeen Majles re-

started its activity from beginning. But, this was the Majles that two third of its

representatives had resigned in support of voluntary referendum. Moreover,

parliamentary group of the National Front was among these representatives,

who some of them were in jail despite of Parliamentary immunity in prison of

the coup regime. For this reason, all previous declarations of the coup

government in illegal case of plebiscite was ignored and the eighteenth Majlis

election in 1954. At first, the second term election of Senate for selection 30

Senators was held. The Shah appointed 30 Senators. It was not allowed the

National Front to announce its nominees list. 21

But advocators of the National

Front knew vote to which otherwise full list of the National Front they had not

received nominees. Regime settled thugs and hooligans in ballot booths to

frighten voters. In any case, votes of the National Front candidates had not

been read and declared. Again, like the fourteenth to sixteenth periods,

landlord deputies from rural areas were entered the eighteenth Majles.

Nevertheless, candidates of cities and towns were determined by the regime

they were not completely under control of government which regime needed in

next years.

Experiment of regime power in the eighteenth Majles was done when

Ali Amini, then Finance Minister, offered the proposal of oil consortium

agreement for Parliamentary approving. In fact, the consortium Agreement was

granting another oil concession to foreign companies, that is to say despite oil

nationalization, all the fourteenth Majles policies, Negative Equilibrium and

not-granting north oil concession to the Soviet. Apart of this, conditions of the

consortium Agreement was much more worse than conditions which Lord

stokes had proposed Mossadeq in August 1951. AIOC had been in worse

situation, because it was forced to accept American oil companies’ presence in

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consortium due to America’s help in overthrowing Mossadeq and the National

Front. The National Resistance Movement, also, attacked on the oil Agreement

legally and politically.

“The National Resistance Movement emphasizes on Mossadeq’s way

and settling politically the oil issue and this is aspect of making Iran free

from foreigners interferences and providing freedom and independence

of Iran which is prior to any other affair.” 22

Simultaneously, long and objective letter signed by Dehkhoda, Zanjani,

Moazami, Saleh, Bazargan, Maleki and Shahpour Bakhtiar and some others

was distributed between Senators and deputies. This letter had been stressed on

precedents of the ex-company interferences and putting freedom and

independence of the country as scapegoat by the governments that are despite

nationalizing oil industry. This letter had been stated no chance or opportunity

had been given to people or national leaders or those who had been hidden or

were under monitoring. The Press and media didn’t say anything about it;

however, it had been signed by the seventeenth Majles speaker (Moazami), the

ex-head of Oil Company (Bazargan), ex-Ministers of the interior and justice,

some of religious leaders’ university professors and political parties head.

Expulsion of 12 professors including Moazami, Bazargan, Gharib, Sahabi and

Abedi was regime reaction. 23

.

The nineteenth Majles election in 1958 was held by fraud more than the

eighteenth Majles. In spite of previous period, the National front even could not

distribute secretly its nominees’ name. Those independent deputies who

entered Majles with government agreement like Derakh Shesh, was put aside

this term. In this election, Allahyar Saleh tried through sit-down in Majles

objected to election fraud. But, this sit-down did not prolong. An army vehicle

full of soldiers went to Majles court and took him forcefully out and put him

under control in his house. During 1954-60, there were objections like this and

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regime was embarking on arresting, banishing and expulsion of opponents

from governmental organizations.

With reducing threat of the National Movement and effective repression

of it and following to reduction of independent and loyal conservative

statement to regime, existing differences were drawn inside regime and

different lobby and pressure groups, different and opponent attitudes and trends

were appeared. From first, Shah’s goal was to increase his power by price of

demolishing conservative politicians’ power and this led to a gap between Shah

and conservative ruling class. First victim of this power struggle was Zahedi

who was put aside respectfully. He went and stayed in Switzerland rest of his

life. Dr. Amini was ousted from key position of Finance Ministry and

appointed as the Justice Minister. Ultimately, he was appointed as Iran’s

ambassador in the U.S. Shah’s problem with political leaders like Ali Amini or

Abdollah Entezam (first foreign Minister and then Oil company director), and

Abolhassan Ebtehaj (Program organization director) was not personality

differences or even power politics. They were self-organized and competent

technocrats and political leaders who were not ready to implement any order

blindly; they were dissent with increasing corruption and inefficiency of

organizations, while subjugated statesmen were encouraging or at least

tolerating this corruption or inefficiency.

Domestic dissatisfaction from regime had repercussion in the army,

too. In winter of 1957, major-general Qarani, G.2 head, was prosecuted and

was tried and convicted to an undeclared accusation. Apparently, he was trying

to do a coup in order to limit and define Shah’s power and establishing a

reformative regime. He had talked to many politicians including some of the

National Movement leaders. 24

Allusively, he had spoken of social and political

reforms and had castigated regime corruption, dictatorship and government

inefficiency. These politicians were not informed of Qarani’s intentions, but

Hassan Arsanjani, close colleague of Dr. Amini and his future cabinet

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Agriculture Minister was deeply engaged. For this reason, Arsanjani was

arrested for a while and Dr. Amini was ousted from his position in Embassy. It

is not clear whether America had been engaged in this plot or not, but

considering to punishing style of agents in martial court, it can be said this plot

had been directly or indirectly enjoyed of American support. 25

These incidents did not disturb his mind at all. He had led the National

Movement through his continues struggle with regime inside jail. With ending

his conviction period, he transferred to Ahmad Abad and was controlled in his

house. The National Resistance was passing its descending route. He could do

less than jail, because he had been far of Tehran and there was no good

communication. His family was preventing him to do any jeopardizing

activity. He wrote first volume of his memoirs relating to 1881-1923 in jail.

Now he started second volume of his memoirs which finished in 1961. In this

volume, he elaborated exact incidents of oil nationalization and responded to

attacks and accusations of Shah in the book “Mission for My Country.” Now,

Mossadeq had been a live myth and the most popular person in Iran. It was

impossible to publish a subject with his name. But people made a political idol

of him. This was almost due to his behavior in trial process and martial court

and for people’s increasing discontent of regime and dictatorship and informing

of the coup procedures. Even, Tudeh’s had no way except turning back to

Mossadeq. Mossadeq was studying many especially about political memoirs,

historic interpretation and newspaper articles about oil nationalization. Still, he

was suffering from that old illness. Sometimes was in bed and sometimes was

playing tar. He was learned it from Agha Hossiengholi playing the tar.

Formation of the Second National Front and Socialist Society

Immediately after the 19 August coup, Iran’s economy came out of

recession and a flourishing period was started by American aid and enormous

oil revenue. Nevertheless, in 1960, all things changed and bankruptcy crisis

255

was threatening the fragile economic flourishing. 26

Shah and his bureaucracy

had been specified the most share of these revenues to themselves and new

middle class and traditional class benefited indirectly of economic splendor.

The second five years program did not achieve its social and economic goals.

Industry had not improved much and agriculture had a terrible situation, and

was under control of landlord and was administrating traditionally. In 1960,

huge expenses of regime inside and economic policy of “open doors” and much

imports caused economic crisis, which its features were strong inflation,

increasing unemployment and budget balance deficit, which was increasing

every year and formed a huge number. The Central Bank was facing problems

in implementing foreign exchange commitments. Following this economic

crisis events was occurred which was making ground for the 1979 Revolution.

Unconditional support of America from Iran did not prolong. In lobby

and influential circles, it was always criticism against America helps to Iran.

Deep corruption of governmental system was intriguing criticism of those

circles to the extent that America did not want to help financially Iran and

rescued Shah’s regime from bankruptcy. These criticisms and discontents

spread rumors in Iran that the U.S. was going to establish independent

government of Shah. Rumors were indicated of a deep change by a foreign

power. Follow to these rumors, regime dissidents were mobilized and at least

some changes were done. Prime Ministry of Dr. Ali Amini in 1961 was done

after this process, and if the second National front was ready to manipulate this

chance and assumed power. One, two years before, Khalil Maleki had tried to

encourage the National Movement leaders to start a private and un-official

organized contact. Maleki had told Mossadeq in a letter in March 1962 that,

“At last according to explicit words of Mr. Saleh, their Irani party friends

prevented of making unity.” In addition, continues:

“I suggested Mr. Saleh the least and said certainly a time would be there

for political activities and in this recession period, it is the leader’s duty

to examine and analyze different issues till making enough time. Then I

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asked Mr. Saleh: If today a chance is made, do you know what to do?

He replied that he didn’t know what to do” and if some duties are

suggested to me, I should reject or not. Anyway, it could be some small

sessions for debate but it was not formed; till “free election” heat

suddenly brings out everyone.”

It is clear that the National Movement leaders did not have any hope to

political activities in years before 1960. Even, Maleki suggested officially to

national leaders to install Iran’s Socialist society. According to him,

considering domestic and international circumstances, a “relevant clear and

exact doctrine” is necessary and according to him for improving this doctrine

establishing an organization was seemed necessary. Such a social ideology

could be nothing except democratic socialism. In Maleki’s belief, a socialist

society should be installed that its founder believes to “work and attempt as

feature of Iran’s future society not based on social inherited or acquired

privileges”. 27

The Second National Front

In 1960, the nineteenth Majles was finished and Shah in a speech

announced next election would be free. This was the chance that Khalil Maleki

had anticipating. Two ordered political parties “Melliun” and “Mardom”

which had been established some years before, was allowed by Shah to

participate in political debates and election competitions and campaigns. Ali

Amini and other “Monfaredins” and independent conservatives found a chance.

Allahyar Saleh nominated from Kashan and regarding to freedom of election,

his representation was definite.

Now, the national movement leaders were understanding about finding

grounds of renewed activities. Un-official contacts were begun. Many of these

contacts and visits were doing in Allahyat Saleh’s house, however, he was

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engaging with election campaign in Kashan. In one of these visits – in absence

of Saleh – a short declaration was compiled and published and formation of the

Second National Front was declared. Gholam Hossein Sedighi, Karim Sanjabi,

Bager Kazemi, and Mehdi Bazargan were the first rank of the front leaders;

Daryush Foruhar, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Keshararz, Shapour Bakhtiar,

Yadollah Sahabi, Ayatollah Taleghani were considered as second rank leaders

of the front; Razi, Karim Abadi, Khonji, Behnam and Ghani Zadeh were third

rank leaders of the front. Those who signed the declaration or later joint it

formed the first “Senior Council of the Second National Front.” Later, it

renamed to “Central Council.”

Remained national resistance movement individuals joint to the front as

their leaders did. They had some complaints about some groups of the National

Front before especially Iran’s party leaders. Finally, discontents separated from

the Second national Front and informed “Iran’s Freedom Movement” in the

early 1960. On the other hand, Khalil Maleki and other old activists of the

Third Force who were not consulted decided to establish a new organization.

Its name was “Socialists society of Iran’s National Movement”. Adding

“National Movement” to “Socialists Society” was for comprising all National

Movement. They issued a manifest, set fort their program, and hoped their

program to be accepted by all the National Movement by the second National

Front leadership. 28

This organization started publishing monthly “Science and

life” and weekly leaflet of “Science and Life” but it was arrested that year.

Socialists’ society did a large tactical fault by removing its old name

“Iran’s Zahmatkeshan party – Third force.” The Third Force was a familiar

name and had historic precedent and people were known it as the most

accepted party of the National Front in Mossadeq’s era, while new identity of

the organization was vague even for the National Movement. Thought of

accepting a new name for organization was held by young Iranian activists who

were resident in Europe. Those who were calling themselves socialism

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adherences were publishing a political leaflet titled “socialism”. Soon, after

forming socialists’ society of Iran, they also made a socialists society of

Iranians in Europe, which was an independent organization. Iranian socialists’

society in Europe was forming of three groups: 1) old activists of Third force

like Amir Pishdad, Naser Pakdaman, Abdollah Borhan, Hamid Mahamedi and

Manuchehr Hezar Khani; 2) ex-activists of the Tudeh party who’s its

prominent figure was Hamid Enayat; 3) some of the National movement

adherences. In the summer of 1960, it was seemed that the second National

Front was on the verge of assuming power. Nevertheless, not it did not do like

that but during next four years the front was oppressed; and the Third National

Front, which was established in those days, was ruthlessly suppressed by

regime. Now, Iran’s Party leaders, Khonji, and Hejazi who had the largest

responsibility of defeat one by one left jeopardizing politics scene.

Bazargan,Maleki, Sahabi, Taleghani, Forouhar and number of active students

who created the Third National Front by the leadership of Mossadeq were

imprisoned and convicted in the martial courts. Cabinet of Ali Amini fell

contemptuously. The 5 June revolt was repressed and Shah solidified his

power on all institutions and classes for the first time of his assuming power as

king.

The Twentieth Election of Majles

In September 1960, Eqbal’s cabinet was put aside. There was much

pressure on Shah. He preferred to show his trust persons responsible for all

disordering. Shah went more forward and said election had not held freely as

he wanted and recommended deputies to resign voluntarily and paved the way

for a free election. The National Front could not introduce its nominees for

election and its re-organized problems finished when election had been held in

the most part of the country. Now, Shah’s regime was in its weakest position

and it was a good chance that the National Front organized its election

campaign. At the time, Sharif Emami’s government was in power as result of

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struggle between three power centers – Shah, the National Front, Conservative

reformists by leadership of Ali Amini. While, the second National Front was

not enough ready to take part in political activities and regime was also pushing

on it and unjust discriminations were going on, this front was trying to boycott

the election and declare the results as a results of pro forma election. So,

through this lead public struggle against election fraud and solidify its

organization. They had extensive support of people. Front was providing its

staging power through showing people’s protection to domestic and foreign

power centers. Even, front could nominee some of its leaders in Tehran and

other cities, this was the way that Mossadeq and first National Front was

taking. 29

However, front did not choose any way and only published some

declarations and announced election had not been free. Amini manipulated this

chance and imposed its government to Shah.

From August 1961, the National Front did a series of public meetings.

Mehdi Bazargan was organizing all these meetings and none of the National

Resistance Movement leaders were taking part and agreed them. A large public

meeting was held in Jalalieh Square (present Laleh Park) and some thousands

activists of the National Resistance Movement, Third Force, Iran’s people party

(Forouhar) took part in it. Importance of these demonstrations was in the point,

after years of preventing holding political meetings Mossadeq’s name was

telling by people apparently. With coming October and starting education year,

Tehran University began its political activity after seven years imposing and

forcing silence. On 7 December, a calm rally was done in commemoration of

murdering 3 students of technical faculty at the time of coming Nixon to Iran.

Students had harsh speeches against regime, regime was not certain to dispatch

police and soldiers to University again. SAVAK spies in University were

recognizing activists’ students and were prosecuting them out of University.

Many students were imprisoned even for some days but in a tactical retreat

freed all of them.

260

There was no student union. Among students, main activists of the

National Front including some Marxist-Leninists like Bijan Jazani and

remained elements of the National Resistance Movement and socialist society

had their own organization.

The national Front did nothing for its organizing and taking part in

election in January and February 1960. Just sometimes, it was declaring of not

being free election through publishing declaration. The Front had introduced

two candidates for Isfahan and six ones for Tabriz including Bazargan and two

local leaders of socialist society. In addition, two local individuals’ members of

the Front nominated themselves in Shiraz. Awaking of dissidents’ resistance

against election fraud in Tehran, regime decided to postpone the capital

election. But at the time of election Front had not still announced its fifteen

candidates list and one of the reason was internal differences and struggle for

determining nominees. Disappointedly, the Front banned election, but Allahyar

Saleh as individual candidate entered election campaign from Kashan. There

was a shameless election fraud in Tehran. “Dad” and “Elm and Zendegi”

newspapers disclosed strongly regime frauds. Senior council of Front decided

to stay out in Court of Senate house in objection to these frauds. Regime asked

Seyyed Hassan Taghi Zadeh, the Senate House speaker, to dissuade the Front

leaders of staying out. 30

But he could not do anything so; regime imprisoned

front leaders in Senate court through closing doors.

Senior Council was caring to keep out two of its members. One, Karim

Sanjab for contact and Shapour Baktiar for University and students problems.

On 26 January 1960, it was informed to students’ activists to hold a large rally

not inside university, but out in streets. The order was reached to students’

activists, but students’ leaders of socialists’ society believed to defeating of

these rallies, because police had perpetual presence out of University.

261

Next day following these debates, the National front students decided to

talk to police in order to break the strike and going out of University and non-

violent demonstration in Tehran Streets without police interference. Police

accepted and students came out of University, but at the time of going out, they

faced with armed police and…., and some were arrested. An objective strike

which started successfully and had frightened regime, ended contemptuously.

If students were going on stay-in, the National Front could take important

privilege, because the time conditions were suitable for taking such privilege.

Later in 1970 and 1980s, it was claimed that Shapoor Bakhtiar had made this

decision despite his desire and in the direction of executive committee demands

of the National Front. This claim was baseless, because the five members

committee of the National Front had been created three months later of this

event. Anyway, from the national Front leaders just Sanjabi and Bakhtiar were

out of Senate House. 31

Failure of the Second National Front

The Second National Front had been founded on wrong basis and

programs and group competitions and personality problems inside the National

Movement. These factors made basic role in enduring these problems and

making new troubles. The Front publicity was due to credit and respect of Dr.

Mossadeq and some of its leaders like Sanjabi, Saleh, Sedighi, Bazargan in its

first days. During some months, three second rank of leaders, Shapour

Bakhtiar, Mohammad Ali Khonji and Masood Hejazi, took leadership of the

front. Bakhtiar was independent but strong technocracy element of Iran’s party

was manifesting at him. He was the main reason of gulfs and the National

front branching during Mossadeq’s ruling and driving away leaders such as

Kashani and Baghaee from Mossadeq. Iran’s party had been including of high

organized potentials. According to Bakhtiar, Iran’s party could efficiently

control the second National Front and used it as its public base. Bakhtiar’s

individual characteristics and attractive personality, from one hand and his

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good and close relation with Saleh. Sanjabi and Khonji (Iran’s party leaders

and three most prominent and recognized leaders of the second National Front)

from the other hand caused Bakhtiar to find much influence in the National

Front. His appointing as leadership of student part of the second National

Front helped him, because the strongest and most respected of the Front organ

was put under his control which was not his deserve.

Khonji and Hejazi who had leadership of nine remained leaders of the

third force after the 19 August coup, were convicting Maleki to betray. They

were so experienced in organized and theoretical problems and had no rivals in

the Second National Front. At the time, Khonji was official theorician of the

front and was responsible for domestic and foreign political instructive affairs.

The three members group of Bakhtiar-Khonji –Hejazi had common interest and

mutual dependencies and dominated on it until ending work of the Front in

1963. These three individuals needed to neutralize effect and influence of

strong organizations and powerful personalities inside the front and the

National Movement in order to achieve their goals. Therefore, they should put

Khalil Maleki, Socialist society, Bazargan and Freedom Movement under

pressure. When Socialist society officially asked for joining to the second

National Front, executive committee of the Front did not respond this request.

Bazargan and the National Resistance Movement was another case. Khonji

and Hejazi couldnot accuse him to betray; also, Bakhtiar couldn’t consider him

as secessionist. Bakhtiar had entitled Khalil Maleki as secessionist. But, Dr.

Sanjabi was desire of joining Khalil Maleki to the second National Front

leadership and was sorry of not joining him. Bazargan and the National

Resistance Movement had support of Ayatollah Zanjani and Ayatollah Firuz

Abadi and Bazzariz and national –religious society. On the other hand, a

misunderstanding had occurred between Iran’s party and National Resistance

Movement, so, Resistance Movement was continuously attacking Saleh and

Sanjabi and this was causing of struggle between 3 members of the Front with

the National Resistance Movement. In Spiring of 1961 the National Resistance

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Movement separated the Second National Front and announced its existence as

Iran’s Freedom Movement. Leadership of the Freedom Movement was with

Mehdi Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi and Ayatollah Taleghani. From this time

until founding the Third National Front, the National Movement was including

of three main organizations. National Front, Freedom Movement, Socialist

Society. Other remained parties in the front including Iran’s party, Iran’s

Nation party of Forohar, Iran’s people party, had not been dissolved, but were

not going beyond official organizations with least independent activity.32

The first and only congress of the second National Front was held in

January 1962 and 3 weeks before the Shah’s “White Revolution”. Through

this referendum, destiny of democrat opponents was determined for next 15

years. This congress could not end internal differences and make itself as an

effective political force.

National Movement and Amini’s Cabinet

Until holding the National Front Congress, two precious opportunities

had been lost by the front; opportunities that front could assume government

power. Of course, it prolonged much to understand the point by the front

leaders and activists; so, its power went on decline. The first opportunity was

in the first days of the second front formation and during renewed election of

the twentieth Majles election, and the second opportunity was in Amini’s Prime

Ministry period -1961 until August 1962 – National Front could appear as

substitute power of national cabinet. 33

In twentieth Majles, Allahyar Saleh was present as the only national

movement figure. Again, a dual ruling was appeared in Iran’s politics; Amini

was associated in Shah’s power. But after one or two month, his power was

weakened by uncorrect policy of the second National Front. The front tried

much to attack Amini’s government. Soon, Amini was facing with

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simultaneous opposing of Shah, Landlords, conservative religious leaders and

Assadollah Rashidian and Fathollah Forud and public by leadership of the

second National front. At first, Amini was going to make relation with the

front. Reports of the front activities were publishing in daily press of the

country. Amini allowed the front to hold a meeting in Jalalieh in June 1961.

After the 19 August of 1953 coup, it was the first time that the National front

was permitted for such an activity. Huge population gathered in Jalalieh and

one of crowd reason was rumors about presenting Dr. Mossadeq in the

meeting.

Socialist society analysis of existing condition can be briefed as follows:

Amini is representative of reformative faction of ruling class, and has conflict

with Shah. He is serious in implementing land reform program and is ready to

give more freedom for the National front and in the loss of Shah and

Landlords. On the other hand, he was afraid of Shah and would stimulate

landlord class against himself. Therefore, the National Front should organize

itself through manipulating new condition. This would be possible through

more modern programme like Land reforms, administering justice of Iran’s

nation in oil issue, non-alignment foreign policy, and democratic government.

Land Reform programme of socialists’ society was that government transfers

ownership of lands in each village to all peasants and given them technical

credits and services. Within some month, the freedom movement resulted that

the National Movement forces should not do anything in the direction of

Amini’s subversion. The second National front attacks to Amini’s government

had at least two reasons: one, this attack was easy and it didn’t rise Shah’s

enmity, landlord and conservatives religious leaders. But, instead, the front

adherents were welcoming these attacks, because they had not forgotten

Amini’s role as contractor of consersium accord in Zahedi’s government. Two,

three members group and their adherents inside the front were thinking of

cooperation with landlord representatives and circles like Lieutenant –general

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Teimour Bakhtiar which could rapidly overthrow “Amini’s government and

took part in a coalition government instead of Amini’s government.

The first open facing occurred when the National front demanded for

holding a meeting in Jalalieh square. The front was going to hold public

meeting in commemoration of Iranians historic revolt on July 21 and returning

Mossadeq to Prime Ministry in 1952. Amini reminded privately to the Front

leaders that Shah would not tolerate such an offence. Therefore, it was better

to hold it on days before 21 July and Amini promised not to let Shah hold

meeting in commemoration of the 19 August coup. The Front did not accept

and government prohibited the meeting and announced the front leaders would

be arrested for 24 hours in order to safe their lives. Front had not schedule for

organizing public, thus, socialist society came to preserve the National front

credit. This meeting was not so splendid and led to reduction and limiting

freedoms, which had been created some months before. 34

Events of 21 January

1961 which is famous in Iran to 21 January conspiracy had totally another

process. Lieutenant –general Teimour Bakhtiar, the disgusting head of

SAVAK, who had before tried to substitute Iran’s Shah, were disfavored by

Shah. But still he had remarkable influence in SAVAK and army and

Landlords and statement were with him. Also, Shah did not see that kind of

power and assurance in himself to get rid of him. Bakhtiar was ready to take

power any time and in any price. Ultimately, he lost his life for this

imagination and was murdered in Iraq in 1960. He was agent of Iraqi regime

and was acting against Shah, he was murdered by two secret agents of

SAVAK.

Bakhtiar was working with three groups: a) Army officers who were

constituting “adherent officers of the Constitution” and were Bakhtiar’s group;

b) Landlords and conservative statement opponent to Amini and his Land

Reform policy; c) Conservative religious leaders like Ayatollah Behbahani who

were opposing with Land Reforms. Two latest group still hoped Shah to rescue

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them from danger of Amini’s land reforms, but when Land Reform law of

Amini-Arsanjani was executed in 1962, so, some of them supported Teimour

Bakhtiar conditional on making no change in regime. Even, it was said that

Shah himself had role in these clandestine actions, because he was afraid of

Amini to take him the chance through full support of America.

Teimour Bakhtiar had almost good relation with his cousin Shapour

Bakhtiar. Shapour Bakhtiar still had been controlling student activities.

Teimour Bakhtiar needed many things to stroke regime, one of them was

acquiring national reputation, and it was at the hand of the National front.

Hence, full facing with Amini’s government was in the benefit of Teimour

Bakhtiar. Based on this strategy, one day before ending his directing period on

SAVAK, he made free the front leaders and notified some of them, they were

right in criticizing regime. Once, in a message to the front leaders reminded he

was a national figure, too, and if front helped him in assuming power, he was

ready to apologize Mossadeq for the 19 August coup. Nevertheless, Saleh,

Sanjabi, Hasibi, Sedighi and other front leaders were not those kinds of persons

who accept coalition with Teimour Bakhtiar. But, this point should be notified:

despite their personal publicity among public that could attract people’s support

towards front, but they did not have essential instruments for developing tactics

and front strategies. 35

Anyway, Amini asked Shah to banish Lieutenant –general Teimour-

Bakhtiar from country, and five days later he left Iran. From other hand, anger

and fury was dominated on the National Front and it was mostly for three

members group of Bakhtiar –Khonji –Hejazi. It was claimed they were

complicit with conspirators and even in possible cabinet of Lieutenant –general

Bakhtiar some posts had been promised to them. 36

Other accusation of

Mossadeq was towards the National Front council. It was predictable that front

did not do anything for inside research.

267

In August 1962, Amini resigned and two months later he was monitored

in his house. He was said to not go out Tehran. On the verge of unexpected

subversion of Amini’s cabinet, socialist society analyzed political

circumstances and through explicit estimation delivered blance sheet of the

National Front which is one of the most previous National Front history

documents. In its introduction, it had been said that a country would put its

seal on Iran’s future in passing stage. It had been reasoned that the National

Movement needed a strong and firm social base among workers, peasants,

craftsmen, national burgeois and educated developed forces, but achieving this

goal the National movement had done nothing. Following to elaborated

critique of the Front tactics and strategies, direct attack and challenge of the

Front against Amini’s government for postponing election spread. Amini did

not want to give any privilege for Land Reform issue and government fear of

controlling Majles majority by Landlords. Announcing public strike without

enough readiness was a big mistake:

“The day that retrogress agents and feudals assumed it as their victory

day and had determined their cabinet two, we entered an unknown event

and calamity of 21 January was created. More surprising that awaring

individuals had warned the NationalFront leaders about clandestine

conspiracies…but the Front leadership with an astonishing insist send

thousands of students under lashes and its result was just hundreds

injured and long closing of University and more suppress.We could

become a big and strong force at the time but our results show we are on

the verge of bankruptcy…If circumstances go-on like this, the National

Front will destroy as a political force, and instead of being as Iran’s

national movement struggle base, it will alter to an abandoned temple

which its most faithful would present just in their mourning ceremonies

and shake head for acquaintance and sorrow…” 37

268

The Second National Front Congress and White Revolution

Before collapsing Amini’s cabinet,Shah visited Washington and

threatened American authorities to resign of monarchy, unless they gave him

blank check. Americans assured him of making decision and acting freely.

Meanwhile, Shah wanted to be known as a reformative ruler in west, so, he

knew leaving Land Reform is impossible. At the time of Amini’s ruling, Shah

was in a tactical alliance with Landlord feudals and retrogress agents. Now,

(with green light of Americans) he could lead a complete revolution easily and

through it impose his autocratic and despotic ruling on all classes and

institutions. The National Front had not still chosen a stance on Land Reforms

and other social affairs. Only in October 1961, through a declaration wrote

since there had not been any European feudalism in Iran, so Land Reforms is

meaningless. At the time, regime had begun a spread propaganda for social

reforms including Land Reforms, Women Enfrachiment, and having share

workers in factories.

Revolution of the Shah and people, or six articles program of Shah on

6 January 1962 was put for referendum. Two weeks before referendum, the

Second National Front Congress including three official boards of Iran’s party,

Iran’s Nation party and Iran’s people party was held. Freedom Movement was

not officially present in congress, but their leaders presented at the beginning of

congress. Some of its members were present as other fields representatives.

Socialists’ society was not invited to Congress and it had no representative, but

powerful leader of one of its organization in Azarbijan as the region

representative was present in the congress. 38

Students to election fraud for selecting representation boards especially

accused Congress bagan from uncorrect angle. A 39 member’s central council

was selected by the congress and because Shah’s referendum was impending,

congress decided to compile a full political program which encompass most

269

issues. But, it delivered no certain policy and suggestion and it was the best

reason of uncertainty and non-commitment of the front leadership. This

deliberate and knowing opaque in the National Front program can be seen in its

foreign policy. No clear policy consisting of nullificaliant or alignment or non-

alignment had not been accepted as long-term policy. Instead, Iranian national

and independent foreign policy non-alignment – was rejected and it wanted to

assure Americans if they assumed power, they would be subjugated. Two

years before, Front did not want to declare about its contact with the Tudeh

party (really they did not have any contact) because they were afraid of making

disturb unorganized adherents of the above party among intelligentsia and

educated of Middle class. Now it was putting aside historic stance of the

National Front in foreign policy (non-alignment) without acquiring anything.

After that time, Shah was describing Iran’s foreign policy as “Iranian

independent national policy”.

Congress holders had asked Mossadeq to send a message for beginning

the Congress and after default election of Mossadeq as the head, his message

was read. At the time, Mossadeq was quite aware of inner struggles of the

front. Mossadeq had specified half of its message to importance of parties in

the National Front and had said that, “At the beginning of the Constitutional

Revolution, when still political parties had not been established in this country,

victory of the Constitutional Revolution was mostly due to associations that

people were organizing them.” Mossadeq stressed on the need “the Front

doors should be open to all individuals, groups and parties who are ready for

self-sacrifice and struggle on the way of subverting colonization and for

bringing all lovers of freedom and independence of Iran.” 39

But one year later,

Mossadeq complained the congress leaders had totally ignored his message.

This letter did not publish long time in Iran or abroad, till Tehran University

students who had leadership of dissidents inside the Front embarked on its print

and publish.

270

Two days before plebiscite on 26 January 1962, a declaration was

published by the front that after using some bombastic it was ending like this:

“Land Reforms, yes, I agree! Dictatorship, No, I disagree!” with this it had

neither banned the Shah’s referendum nor had said to advocators what to do.

People’s complaint and discontent of regime not only had not reduced but also

it had increased.

Leaders of religious community were also dissatisfied of the Shah.

Some like Ayatollah Milani and Ayatollah Zanjani were advocating the

National Movement; some like Ayatollah Khonsari and Ayatollah

Shariatmadari who were moderate conservatives had not such dissents with

land reforms but they were concerned of creating dictatorship; others like

Ayatollah Behbahani and Ayatollah Khomeini were opposing land reforms and

women enfranchisement and also had been annoyed of increasing trend of

regime towards putting aside religious leaders from the mainest political issues.

Qom was disturbed and for the first time police beat religious students. Tehran

University student were unrest, regime mercenaries came to University. They

had come by the name of “workers and free peasants” to express their anger

towards opposed students with reforms and their freedom. They beat students.

Public speeches of (Ayatollah) Khomeini against regime made him as the most

prominent leader of anti-despotic movement, which ultimately led to the 5 June

1963 revolt and regime suppressed them violently. 40

From many angles, this revolt was base of the 1979 Revolution; all civil

social classes and ideologies were taking part in it. All the National Movement

forces including bazzar, students, freedom movement and socialist society

supported it. Reason of non-presence of the National Front leaders in rallies of

5 June 1963 was being in prison leaders and front was preventing any rapid

decision. Hence, front never prohibited its adherences of taking part in rallies.

271

Mossadeq and the Third National Front

In February 1962, Short after Shah’s referendum, many of the National

front leaders were imprisoned. Maleki wrote his famous letter from jail to

Mossadeq in March 1962. Meantime criticizing the second National front, he

wrote:

“Result of all surprising mistakes of the National Front leaders led to

those events which all know. That is to say the Front lost the struggle in

this period and the ruling class succeeded to deceive peasants at present,

improve its relation with the Soviet and could convince President

Kennedy to congratulate the ruling regime situation and a knowledge

unclaimed leadership of the Shah.” 41

In 1960, regime which faced with problems both in foreign relations and

domestic affairs Shah sent Asadollah Alam to visit Maleki three times. Shah

had told Maleki that it wouldn’t make difference for him Saleh would be Prime

Minister or another person, but the National Front should clarify its view

towards the Constitution and the Tudeh party. Maleki delivered Shah’s

message to the Front leaders, but they took a negative position:

“At the time that ruling class was so unstable and shaky and every

privilege could be taken for the National Front, two words about the

Constitution and the Tudeh party could clear the Front domestic and

foreign position. However, leaders remained “these two cases silent till

they themselves had changed to supporter of the Constitution and

Constitutional monarchy and they had to give several declarations

against the Tudeh party and the Soviet’s affiliated radios for accusations

of the Security organization. But if they had been clarified their position

at first they did not have to such followings.” 42

272

Before, Mossadeq had attention towards front leadership tactics and its

inner challenges and indirectly he had wanted to settle them. His most

effective interference was in November 1962 that he wrote his views under a

photo and sent for the front leaders. This caused to stop talks between the front

leader and Asadollah Alam over forming coalition government. It was as

follows: Following to vacating Dr. Amini, Shah appointed one of his loyal

servants, Asadollah Alam. Then, he provided the ground for White

Revolution. The National Front still was strong and Shah was aware of his

despotic regime opponents and disagree landlords with land reforms. Hence,

he decided to achieve cooperation of the National front. His program was to

hermit front leaders and then started talks with them. The Front leader were

arrested for some weeks, Shah had sent his agent to prison to talk to Allahyar

Saleh. Saleh after consulting with his colleagues conditioned any talk after

making free the front leaders. Alam invited front leaders for lunch to his

house. Saleh did so, too. These parties continued. 43

The first suggestion of

Shah was the National Front leaders introduced two recognized figures for

Prime Ministry and Shah select one of them. They introduced Aboghasem

Najm and Mohammad Soruri. Najm was not acceptable by Shah, so, he

suggested Prime Ministry to Soruri. Soruri was the Supreme Court head in

Mossadeq’s government. But, Soruri rejected Shah’s suggestion. Then, the

Front leaders and Alam tried to form a coalition government. Mossadeq who

had understood events wrote under one of his photos:

“Offering to all those when there is public interests put aside their

personal differences and private interests, to all whom do not appease

others policy and do resist till reaching victory. To all whom are ready

to sacrifice what they have for freedom and independence of Iran.” 44

Allahyar Saleh paled when he received the photo by Hassan Enayat and

asked: “What is meaning of these words” who has appeased? “Each of leaders

was received like the photo and words and printed it in large scale and

273

distributed it among the National Front members. Talks to Alam cut off. When

Front leader were in jail, Shah’s regime announced in summer of 1963 that the

21 Majles election would be held in October. During Dr. Amini’s Prime

Ministry, National Front put all its energy to ask government for holding

Majles election. Now that all front leaders were in jail, students and activists

asked front leaders to take part actively in election. Nevertheless, they faced

with previous uncertainty. The front leaders replied: “Prisoners cannot express

their views.” They believed that executive board should lead all things, but

because they did not want to undertake any commitment told students that they

were free in making any decision. Any way, the National Front did not take

part in election and asked students and activists to go on vacation for one

month.45

With resignation of executive board, front central council embarked on

re-surveying of the country circumstances through holding gatherings in

autumn 1962 and resulted to more solidifying of Shah’s regime. Council gave

Allahyar Saleh full executive power and he declared that, “the National front

should take patience and refuse of any reaction towards regime action.” Two

months later in March 1962, student committee sent a message to Mossadeq for

anniversary of oil Nationalization day and New year, along with full report of

student activities. Mossadeq in a short letter responded, “it is pleasure that

respected board still consider affairs of Iran’s nation and has not suspend it.”

After this time, Mossadeq decided to interfere directly in national movement

affairs. Two days later, in a detailed letter to executive board of the National

Front organization in Europe he wrote and its news reached all the movement.

Mossadeq wrote as follows:

“…you have tried to dissolve parties and wherever you have succeeded

you have got a good result, but I think it has not been a good work…the

National front shouldbe considered as centre of the country parties

which all believe to one principle and that is freedom and independence

274

of the country. If parties and communities do not take part in the front,

it will be that it is now…and they cannot take a step for defending…I

was asked to send a message but it was not affected and they made Front

that can do nothing.” 46

Addressers of this letter asked Mossadeq to determine a leader for them,

but Mossadeq wrote blame worthy that in that case “nobody will obey”.

Exactly, one week later this event, central council and new executive board of

the front in Tehran wrote to “honourable leader” and it had been claimed that

parties had not been put aside of the front. it had been said to the freedom

movement it can be stayed in the front conditional on purifying and banishing

undesired elements, and send a report of that to central council of the front:

“….the only party that demanded to enter the National Front is the

Tudeh party, but for its disqualification the National movement never

could and can accept this party as its ally.” 47

At the end of the letter it had been written that front leadership was

facing with a larger avoided because from one side opposing with Mossadeq’s

views was not in the interest of country and movement, and from other side,

front could not perform against its beliefs and congress legislations which was

creator of that council. But, Mossadeq did not listen to threats. He answere

allusively to their detailed and long words about parties and organizations and

said that they had clearly more experience than he did; his little information

had been forgotten during these eleven years prison and isolation:

“…but at the time of congress formation you asked me to offer a

message, I obeyed and said in that message which the Front doors

should be opened on parties, associations and groups….and there was no

view towards the Tudeh party which have made it so large and have said

in the letter. The Tudeh party is that one in the first year of the oil

275

Nationalization was opposing harshly to it. But because its views was

not favorable for the society it remained quiet and dissident. My mean

of that message was to form parties, communities and groups that were

ready to sacrifice all things for freedom.” 48

The central council spoke again over details of congress combination

and justified it as demand of Iran’s Socialists society membership in the

National Front had been remained quiet for dissent vote of some members and

till now membership of the society had not been examined by the central

council. At the end, it had been resulted because Mossadeq is the National

Front leader, they were not going to challenge with him. But meantime, they

were not going to change their principles and regulations. Therefore, if

Mossadeq was not ready to accept this letter and previous letter of the council,

“Council cannot continue its work.” 49

Mossadeq sent a copy of their letter to student committee of the National

Front and they answered point by point to Mossadeq; members of Freedom

movement, not as members of political parties, but only as individuals could

take part in the congress; the Socialists society demand for membership did not

examine for three years. Inside dissidents of the front were not limited to some

individuals and groups, but it was consisting of all the National Front parties

(of course except Iran’s party and youth organization) including bazzar and

University. Mossadeq in a short response replied: “Now that I can do nothing

and I am in jail I want your success from God with sadness heart and crying

eyes.” Still, Mossadeq had not disappointed. Again, he wrote another letter to

the central council and attached responses and reactions of student committee,

Freedom Movement, Socialist society and other discontent parties. Mossadeq

stressed to end opposing with organs and parties member of the National Front.

At end he remained, it would be his last letter if they did not accept his

suggestion. They even did not respond his letter. Six weeks later on 2 June

1963, Mossadeq wrote a respectful and polite letter to Allahyar Saleh and

276

asked him to do something. Saleh responded he himself was not in a good

situation and regarding to the Front constitution “answer is that you have

received in official letters of the front council and executive board.”

Regime was strengthening day by day, freedom movement leaders were

being tried in martial courts and front could do nothing in the best situation.

Leaving politic scene slowly was an easy but humbling case and after they

made Mossadeq guilty for all his interferences. The National Front leader4s in

Europe who were close advocators of Front leaders in Tehran wrote a letter to

Mossadeq and accused him of “interferencing in the front affairs after years

vacating.” Mossadeq replied with his situation in Ahmad Abad fort, he had

never such an intention and just had offered some suggestions over constitution

and articles of the front. 50

In the same vein, the second National Front went on

decline. Those who behaved with Mossadeq humbling were protecting by

people for publicity and authencity of Mossadeq, and if he did according to

desire, he made an idol of him. Anyway, with collapsing the second National

front, most of its European and some of its Iranian members joint Maoist or

Marxist – Leninist branches.

The Third National Front

Mossadeq’s contact with the National Front forces and parties

continued. He decided to help these forces and parties in holding a new front

by his leadership. From 1960, he was receiving several messages from

different parties and student conferences both in and out of Iran. Personal

reports and letters were sending for him over the movement activities. All

these reports and letters were reaching him through his family members who

were allowed to see him sometimes in Ahmad Abad. Parties, groups and

persons were asking him for signed photos and were distributing those photos

in the movement.

277

Military guard was constantly fixed there and it monitored all visitors

and contacts of Mossadeq. When he began his direct interference in the

movement affairs, SAVAK was informed and reported Shah. Shah ordered to

intensify controls and pressure on old man. SAVAK head was going without

informing and was behaving as if he wanted to frighten a baby. He asked

colonel of Ahmad Abad guard head that why he had not full control on

Mossadeq’s corresponding. After that, he asked Mossadeq not to reply letters.

Mossadeq said to colonel for this they had to put him handcuffs, try, put him in

solitary confinement, or ask him in a letter to leave corresponding. More limits

Mossadeq’s life hard. Two months later in October 1963, Mossadeq asked a

specialist doctor to examine him medically, but his request was not accepted. 51

Freedom movement leaders – Mehdi Bazargan, Sahabi, Taleghani- were

in jail at the time. Two executive board members of Socialists society –

Manuchehr Safa and Abbas Agheli Zadeh – were also convicted in martial

court to three years prison. Many of the National Movement students and

activist were in custody. Maleki and other leaders of socialists society were

free but under strong control of police. Condition was so hard even small

private visits for establishing and organizing the Third National Front were

done hard. Attempts from both sides continued – Mossadeq and the National

Movement but process had been slowed. New front combination and its

constitution and regulations should be determined. Mossadeq was so cautious

this time no leaders who appoint himself as leader come inside the Third

National front. The new front constitution was compiled in the early 1965 and

Mossadeq agreed it. Writing style of the first article brings this feeling that

Mossadeq himself has compiled it:

“The Third National Front of Iran is assembling centre of parties and

political associations and clergy community and student community and

political organizations and Trade Union Associations and local unions

and groups which have their special aim and just have a common aim

278

with the Third National front that is Iran’s freedom and independence.

Therefore, nobody who is member of this association can enter the

National Front council.” 52

On 7 July, Khalil Maleki in a letter to Amir Pishdad, secretary of Iran’s

socialists society in Europe, wrote Iran’s party leaders had had much intrigues

against the Front, but their plan was not efficient and would not: “First

declaration of the Third National Front was welcomed. Great father

[Mossadeq] was quite agree to it and said it has no more or less.” Maleki added

about increasing misbehavior of regime with fighters: “This political closeness,

has weakened mentally condition of struggle, however, in my opinion identical

conditions are very suitable…we try to overcome troubles.” Here Maleki has

anticipation, which is incorrect:

“However, regime has threatened the Third National Front leaders

especially friends in (Socialist society) and has said formation of Front

is forbidden and it will be formed there is serious consequences, but

regime cannot do anything. Perhaps, regime has much confidence and

trust to itself and its acquired successes.”

Three weeks later, he and other leadership members of Socialists society

–Alijan Shansi, Reza Shayan, and Hossein Sarshar – were arrested to direct

order of Shah and were tried in martial court and convicted. Kazem Sami and

Foruhar from Iran’s people and Nation party were imprisoned, too. The Third

National Front before existence disappeared. Therefore, regime increased its

political dissidents mass, paved the way for Islamism, and took its result during

the 1979 Revolution. Because at the time National Front and its forces had ben

weakened so much and could not take leadership of revolution, if we put aside

advocators of pure Islam, the National Front performed better than other

political groups and parties. 53

279

Death of Mossadeq

One month before full attack of regime to the Third National Front,

Mossadeq’s wife passed away and her loss at the last days of his life affected

him so much. In response, one of his adherent condolence letters wrote:

“I suffer deeply of this deplorable loss. During more than 64 years my

dear wife tolerated everything. After my mother, she was my only hope

to life. I wished to die before her and I ask God to take me near her as

soon as possible and make me easy of this hard life.” 54

Now he became really alone, many of his close friends and colleagues

had left him, the Front had been again defeated, its leaders were in jail or were

tried in courts, his political contacts had been stopped. Pressures and limits of

regime was increased on him. There was no hope to future. On 26 March

1965, he wrote one of his friends:

“…More than 12 years life in two jails and now in Ahmad Abad, have

taken my energy and I always ask God to die and will be free of this

pitiful life. I cannot say more than this and make you sad.” 55

In autumn 1965, he became ill seriously. In November, he was escorted

with security forces to his house in Tehran and was cured in Najmieh hospital –

which his mother endowed it and his son Gholam Hossien was its head -. His

ill was larynx cancer. Shah did not accept his family request for his cure in

Europe. He in his last letter which is now available in Europe has thanked of

socialists Society executive board in Europe for their inquiries after his health

and has written his cure with power has made his digestive condition worse

than before. For curing cancer, that nerve illness has arise again and my

stomach bleeding is not stopping. Finally, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq died in

85 years old on 4 March 1967.

280

Public burial, obsequies ceremony was forbidden by regime, but people

all over the country were in mourning. He had made will to be bury beside the

21 July martyrdoms. Regime did not accept this request of his family. Regime

announced he could not be buried in any of public cemeteries. At last, his dead

body was transferred to Ahmad Abad and buried in his house that he had been

lived most of years exile. One year later, for his first death anniversary people

were going to Ahmad Abad but regime prevented thousands Tehrani’s move

towards Ahmad Abad. Next month, Khalil Maleki wrote to Pishdad:

“Almost one month before, for anniversary of dear Mossadeq, we were

going to Ahmad Abad, but at the beginning they prevented our

movement. At last, students said we are going to Dr. Mossadeq’s on.

We did this and put a wreath on his grave from side of socialist society.

Some people were there and police had arrested thousands. Our

colleagues who had not come with Dr. Mossadeq’s son was not allowed

to enter Ahmad Abad. But, students offered flowers and wreath to

Mossadeq’s grave. Iran’s Nation party of Foruhar and socialist society,

were only parties that had brought wreath.” 56

On 4 March 1979, almost one month after Shah’s regime subversion,

More than one million people even by foot reached themselves to Mossadeq’s

grave. This move was not so quite and hidden conflicts, which were forming

slowly, were shown.

The National Movement during Revolution: A short Review

Old forces of the national movement were surprised in the 1979

Revolution. Down falling of the second National Front and suppression of the

Third National front in 1960s caused to disappointment of many front leaders

and activists. Transformation of Shah’s regime from dictatorship to autocratic

281

and despotic one mad impossible activity for movement and following

democratic aims through compromising ways. Some changes led to propagate

Marxist and Islamist ideologies in and out of country and using secret and

forceful tactics were put in struggle with.

Economic development strategy of regime caused a small minority

become richer and depriving of people’s majority. Massive and uncontrol

migration of rurals to cities caused largely gap between existent realities and

Shah’s claims. At the time, even those who had a share of oil revenues were

dissatisfied of regime, one for considering these share as their rights and other

for their anger of a regime which was forcing them to be a party member just

for Shah’s order. Imposing officially American culture for the middle class was

intolerable. The U.S. un-criticizing treat with Shah’s regime escalated

worsening condition. Shah was American puppet in public mentality. Hence,

people were considering America as direct responsible for ethic, cultural,

social, political and economic instabilities.

Moreover, in the world changes were not in the interest of democratic

aims. Romantic, millennium, and promised solutions had more attraction.

Maoism, which had been refusing both America and the Soviet, was seeking

for pure Marxism – Leninism and had a revolutionary face, attracted many

inside and outside Iranians. Many of adherent youth and members of the

second National Front tended to Maoism. The U.S. mistakes in Vietnam

increased its public disgrace and caused revolutionary Marxism and Partisani

war to find adherents in Iran. Unconditional support of America from Israel

and armed struggle of Palestinians accelerated this movement. Specially,

regime had resented religious community from June 1963 and reaction against

anti traditional policies of regime was boosting over the society.

Briefly, huge oil revenues did not use in productive activities. It was

believed that America was trying to destroy the country through Shah’s regime.

282

Bloody suppression of all criticizers and discontents prohibited any

compromising performance in changing way. At this time, revolutionary

ideologies – Marxists and Islamists – had been dominating ideologies.

Authors, lawyers, justice lawyers, government staffs, old leaders of the

National Movement like Sanjabi and Bazargan, created the movement that

began in 1977 and overthrew regime in 1979. The National Front forces were

divided among freedom movement and other human rights group.

Undoubtedly, if Shah was achieving an agreement with these forces (especially

before September 1978) circumstances were other kind. Because, bazzar,

government staffs and the oil company, the pioneer forces in strikes and

providing finance for those strikes, did not want to continue the struggle till

death for an independent country by leadership Sanjabi, or Bazargan. Such a

state could attract unanimity of religious leaders like Ayatollah Shariatmadari

and Ayatollah Taleghani who were after Ayatollah Khomeini reputable.

Even in November and December 1979 that Shah suggested Sedighi

Prime Ministry, if Shah agreed with Sedighi’s suggestion over leaving all

executive powers to cabinet, Iran’s later changes would be another way.

Sedighi did not join the National Front till after revolution. He was a respected

figure and had the ability of doing that if Shah did accept his suggestion, there

was a great chance for succession. On the other hand, when Shapour Bakhtiar

accepted Shah’s suggestion, some weeks had passed and opportunity had gone.

He was not such a famous figure and his leadership in the second National

Front had caused the front activists looked him with suspect. And, because

before accepting Prime Ministry position had not consulted with the National

Front and executive board, he was officially put aside. Therefore, his action in

accepting Prime Ministry position was compromising with Shah’s regime than

a main process towards revolution. One month before, Sanjabi met Ayatollah

Khomeini in Paris and in a declaration considered him as unclaimed leader of

Iran. Later, Sanjabi was criticized for his act, but criticizers ignore the point

that his act was for pressure of activists and the National Front leaders and

283

other revolutionary forces. Most of those who rebuke Sanjabi welcomed the

declaration at the time. 57

The Interim Government of Bazargan which came to power after

revolution victory, had a short life and had been a disable and isolated

government. From beginning, the Islamic Republic party and all Marxist-

Leninist groups stood against it. Maybe, it can hardly claim the provisional

government and been an honourable one. But freedom movement, the National

Front and other groups and national individuals were the only organizations

and society members who were opposing with romantic radicals and

revolutionary justice. Bazargan government resigned in autumn 1979, for

Ayatollah’s Khomeini’s support of taking American diplomats as hostage in

Tehran. Of course, it had resigned in other cases too. Khalil Maleki, from

previous leaders of the National Movement, had passed away in hardship in

July 1969. Allahyar Saleh and Ali Shaygan in 1981 passed away in turn in

Tehran and the U.S. Taleghani and Zanjani died short after revolution.

Bazargan died in Tehranand Sajabi in the U.S. But till myth of Mossadeq is

alive. Disappointment of imaginery Marxists and Islamists has notified old and

new political activists towards principles and traditions of Iran’s National

Front.

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Section 3

Religion and the National Front

Ayatollah Kashani was a prominent religious figure of the national

movement. Moreover, he was one of the fundamental leaders of the movement,

which later separated and joint opponent camp. Fadaian-e eslam (The Islam

Devotees) who were supporters of the movement at the beginning, after

Mossadeq taking power separate. Following to unsuccessful assassination of

the Shah in February 1948, Ayatollah Kashani was prosecuted for complicity

impeachment and banished from the country; however, he had no role in the

real event. At the same time, Ayatollah Borougerdi sent a telegram for the

Shah, expressed his sadness over the event, and prayed for continuation of his

monarchy. During oil nationalization, Ayatollah Kashani supported it,

Mossadeq, and the National Front through issuing different declarations. He,

also, provided financial helps and organized radical clergies as back and cover

of the Movement. At the time, Ayatollah Borougerdi in Qom and Behbahani in

Tehran remained silent.

On 16 July, following Mossadeq’s resignation and Qavam’s Prime

Ministry, Kashani was the only cleric who stood against Qavam and the court,

whereas, other mujtaheds including Zanjani’s brothers – Haj Seyyed Abolfazl

and Haj Agha Reza – and Seikh Baha’edin Mahalati protected Kashani.

Ayatollah Boroujerdi remained silent and Ayatollah Behbahani’s disagreement

with Mossadeq and his government had been exposed before. In February

1952, discussion over legal power extension that Majlis had given the Prime

Minister put an end with Kashani’s attack on the Prime Minister. Nevertheless,

Boroujerdi and Behbahani kept their silence; perhaps, they were thinking it as

an internal issue of the National Front. On 28 February, when the Shah was

going abroad, Kashani and Behbahani supported the Shah in different and

separate declarations. Both had role in anti-Mossadeq rallies at the day. But,

Qom did issue no official pronouncement, may be, for not lasting the event

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more than hours. In July and August of 1953, Plebiscite of Mossadeq over

dissolving seventeen Majlis caused Kashani and Behbahani’s attack on

Mossadeq and his government, but, again there was no direct pronouncement

from Qom. Only, after returning the Shah from Europe and following the 19

August coup Boroujerdi, personally, sent a telegram for the Shah and

welcomed him. Meantime, Behbahani was so active in intriguing public to

attack Mossadeq’s house in 19 August. According to some recent evidences,

Kashani had an important role in subverting Mossadeq’s government through

taking money from America. Anyway, all three religious leaders were allied

against Mossadeq at the time and took part in his government overthrowing.

The small but active group of the Fadian-e eslam protected them.

Therefore, it can be determined three distinguishable procedures among

religious leaders and activists. Conservatives protected neither the oil

nationalization nor Mossadeq by the leadership of Ayatollah Behbahani. They

were politically in the line of the Shah and Iran’s ruling class. Radicals by the

leadership of Ayatollah Kashani were part of the National Front at first, but

later were divided into two groups; some remained loyal to Mossadeq and

others separated him. Moreover, at last, combatants who were the Fadian- e

eslam supported Mossadeq and oil nationalization until assuming power by

Mossadeq but after his premiership stood against the National movement.

Ayatollah Kashani’s Life

Seyyed Abolghasem Kashani was born in Iran or Mesopotamia in 1881.

He studied near his father who was a mojtahed, too. He, also, had been taking

part in Haj Mirza Hossein Tehrani and Akhund Mullah Mohammad Kazem

Khorasani’s sessions. He received his Ejtehad permit from a Mujtahed in Najaf

named Agha Zia-o Din Iraqi. Later, he became famous for his dissents with

Britain for Iraq’s occupation. 58

During the World War I, Kashani actively

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opposed with Britain for seizure of Islamic lands, as a result he arrested. In

1919, he escaped and came to Tehran.

In 1920s, he found Iranian Ulamma dispersed. Ulama were discontent of

the British and France dominance on the Middle East and Pan-Turanist and

Pan-Iranist policies of Turkey and Iran were a warning for them. They still

considered Qajar dynasty and rulers as their natural allies. But, they had no

integrity on the current events. Najaf was not more credit religious center of the

Shia World and Qom was not the most important at the time. Anyway,

Ulamma accepted the Pahlavi dynasty and implicitly supported it. Kashani

could contact important Tehran Ulamma including Behbahanis, Tabbatabais,

Ashtianis and Khoei, the Friday prayer leader, and Agha Jamal Esphahani, but

his main achievement was contact with Seyyed Hassan Modares. At the time,

Modares was the opposition leader of Reza Khan in the consultative Assembly.

In 1924, both Kashani and traditional religious leaders opposed with

republicanism of the Reza Khan. They were concerned about modernism

revival and decline of religious influence. Furthermore, they had been

concerned of the Soviet’s support of the Reza Khan. Kashani strongly

activated against republicanism of Reza Khan and organized some rallies out of

the Majles. These rallies led to tactical resignation of Reza Khan from Prime

Ministry and leaving republicanism temporarily. 59

The Shah Reza after failure established friendly relations with Qom

Ulama and pretended to being religious and instead achieved gifts and hopeful

messages from Ulamas. Hence, Ulama agreed to transferring monarchy from

Qajar dynasty to Pahlavi dynasty. This was caused to protect of Reza Khan’s

monarchy in the Majles by the present clergies and traditional clergy system

could not do anything against it. Modares, Mossadeq and others who opposed

this issue were left alone. One of the reasons of Kashani and Haeri’s presence

in the Constituent Assembly was this. Subsequent to the Majles vote, the

Constituent Assembly formed to legalize and legitimize transferring monarchy

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from Qajar to Pahlavi. The Constituent Assembly election was not free. Many

of religious figures became members of this Assembly but Kashani and Haeri’s

role were significant and important for they were previous sympathizers of

Mossadeq and opponents of Reza Khan. Haeri Zadeh was member of Modares

Parliamentary group till the Consultative Majles vote for holding the

Constituent Assembly. Later, Haeri Zadeh became the National Front lawyers

and Kashani’s adherence. Kashani and other religious leaders who were not

going to surrender new regime demands were dissatisfied of the current

procedures. According to his hotheaded adherences, he had no anti-Reza Shah

activities and it is an obvious evident of leaving political activities by him in

those era. During Iran’s occupation in September 1941, Kashani who was

suspicious to complicity with Germans, arrested. Following to freedom again

started his political activities until after unsuccessful assassination of the Shah

in February 1948 banished from the country.

The traditional religious leadership in Qom prohibited political activities

for religious leaders instead of objection to Kashani’s exile. Perhaps its reason

was Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s unconcern towards political activities. In addition,

Seikh Abdolkarim Haeri, the Boroujerdi’s teacher, was not desire to politics.

Indeed, Qom leaders’ decision in 1948 over preventing interference in Political

affairs was negation of Kashani acts and implicit support of the Shah. Even,

later refusing of Boroujerdi in supporting Oil nationalization was in accordance

with policy of traditional religious leadership system. Otherwise, Ayatollah

Behbahani had no doubt in expressing his political ideas if it was necessary.

He had been known as a mediator between Tehran ruling class and religious

system of Qom clergies. In a letter to Behbahani, Boroujerdi had written before

his death in 1950, had issued verdict (Fatwa) against land reforms. 60

But, he

was not a political and combatant leader. Kashani’s attitudes can be considered

and described radical against conservative attitude of Bourojerdi which was a

kind of silence. These are two different views but not towards politics.

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Kashani reacted against clergy’s decision in Qom and non-interference

in politics and in a declaration, which published in Beirout, objected to the

constituent Assembly decision on abdication power of dissolving parliament to

Shah and warned about Iran-Britain oil agreement. Then, he was chosen as

deputy of Terhran constituency however, he did not present in the mentioned

Majles. In June 1950; he was allowed to return Tehran, he issued some

pronouncements in protecting of Oil nationalization. In addition, Mossadeq

read two letters of his addressing deputies in the Majles. At the time, Kashani

was just a prominent religious leader who supported the National Front and Oil

nationalization. Boroujerdi, Behbahani and other significant religious leaders

all remained silent on the Oil issue. 61

But after Razm Ara’s assassination, they came in. Ayatollah Mohammad

Taghi Khonsari, Sheiykh Bahae-din Mahallati, Seyyed Mahmood Rohani,

Sheikh Abbas Ali Shahrudi and Seyyed Mohammad Reza Kalbasi in protection

of oil nationalization issued declarations. 5 Mahallati was more active than

others and stood till the end. Zanjanis brothers were supporters of the National

Movement from the beginning. These two brothers were famous Mujtaheds of

Tehran. Seyyed Mahmood Taleghani, Seyyed Jafar Ghorvi, Seyyed Zia-Din

Haj Seyyed Javadi and Jalali Musavi were clergy’s deputies of the seventeenth

Majles.

Fadaian-e eslam

This ardent Islamic activist had been attempting for establishing an

Islamic government in Iran and was showing a strong unanimity with Egyptian

Muslim Brotherhoods. Seyyed Majtaba Mir lohi who later became famous as

Navab Safavi, was Fadaian leader. Vahidi brothers, Ibrahim Karim Abadi,

Abdollah Karbaschian were also among leaders of this group. Terror was their

main weapon. They had no official connection with Qom, but they kept in

touch with second rank religious leaders of Qom. Then, they shot Dr. Hossein

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Fatemi and injured him. After Mossadeq event and active participation in the

coup for the Shah, again in 1955 embarked on assassinating Hossein Ala, the

then Prime Minister, which was unsuccessful. This caused to prosecution of

“Fadaian” and some of them were executed, too. Kashani was also under

control for sometime. Cleric system of Qom did nothing for both Fadaian and

Kashani. The Fadaian-e eslam, at first, supported Mossadeq and the National

Movement and Oil nationalization policy, but after assuming premiership by

Mossadeq, they cut off with Mossadeq and Kashani. 6 Their difference was for

ideological and theoretical issues. Fadaian was following an Islamic revolution

while Mossadeq and Kashani had no belief to it. Kashani’s response and

reaction to establishment an Islamic polity was quite brief:

“[British exploiters] are restoring another tactics to weaken our fighting.

These days, I receive signed letters and they ask me why we do not

prevent alcoholic drunks, why we do not send off women from offices

or why we do not order them to veil. Authors of these letters are direct

British agents or has some personal interest or are foolish.” 63

Fadaian, also, was speaking directly to Mossadeq and Kashani.

Fadaian’s leader announced their opposing with Kashani and Mossadeq’s

policies as follows:

“I made clear this point during visit with Kashani…. That our duty is

imposing Islamic laws, but Kashani brought some excuses and my

words and views had no impression on him…then we told Kashani:

your attitudes are not religious and your life way doesnot look like

religious people. You should change your attitudes and your children

should regulate Islami laws but he did not accept my words....there is no

doubt for me that our dear brothers in jail [seven Fadaian were arrested

after assassination of Razm Ara] has been kept in jail by Dr. Mossadeq

and Kashani and the National Front order…..” 64

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During all prime ministry of Mossadeq, Fadaian kept on their attacking

to Mossadeq, Kashani, Baghaei and other important leaders of the National

Front. They considered Kashani as British agent and claimed he had some role

in financial misuse. Even after confronting of Kashani with Mossadeq in

February 1952 and confronting with the National Movement after March 1952,

Fadaian did not close him. In June 1953, there were some rumors over

cooperation of Fadaian with Kashani, but they denied it in a declaration and

named their leader “Hazrate Navabe Safavi”. Meanwhile, they called Kashani

just as “Kashani” and through it contempt him.

Therefore, in the beginning of Mossadeq government, Qom was quiet.

Kashani and other radical Mujtahedin was supporter of government. Fadaian

called Mossadeq “liar” and were threatening him to assassinate. 65

Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh

Abdolghadir Azad, one of the dissent Front members in the fifteenth

Majles, two months after Mossadeq’s premiership clashed with the National

Front. But others like Makki, Baghaei and Haeri Zadeh stayed later times in

the front. It is not accidental that they along with Kashani clashed with

Mossadeq, because they believed not following Mossadeq and they all were

basic leaders of the movement after Mossadeq. In the sixteenth Majles,

Baghaei was the second deputy of Tehran after Mossadeq, so, generally he was

considered as Mossadeq’s substitution and second leader of the National Front.

Makki was elected as the first deputy of Tehran in the seventeenth Majlis.

Haeri Zadeh was not as young and famous and publicist as them, but he was an

old leader, a religious figure who was familiar with Kashani from some

previous decades. They simultaneously separated Mossadeq and for similar

reasons but their reasons were not religious.

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Dissents of Makki and Baghaei with Mossadeq started from July 1957.

At the time, Mossadeq unseated general-major Zahedi in the accusation of

disloyalty or ignoring his orders on the day of Harriman’s entrance to Tehran,

as a result some were injured and killed. Mossadeq got shocked when Baghaei

and Makki said they knew Zahedi as a better candidate for Premiership if any

event had been occurring. 66

This difference appeared for Matin Daftari.

Senator Ahmad Matin Daftari was Son-in-law and nephew of Mossadeq and a

prominent law professor. In the Reza Shah era, he was the justice Minister and

Prime Minister for a while. While, the Reza Shah could not tolerate any

independent thought or act, the Allied Forces arrested Matin Daftari, Kashani,

Zahedi and some others, because they were suspicious to having relation with

Germany. A document shows Matin Daftari used his influence on Mossadeq to

control Khuzestan governor to help the ex-oil company at the time of ousting.

Later, Mossadeq had to apologize the Khuzestan governor, Amir Alaei, for his

orders to him, because his orders were based on information that Matin Daftari

had been sending secretly to him. Those days, Makki was in Abadan and

Baghaei was publishing relevant document in “Shahid”. According to this

document, AIOC wanted Matin Daftan to monitor Amir Alaei’s actions and

operation and Matin Daftari did so. Mossadeq sent the governor from Abadan,

the ousting place to Ahwaz despite of frequent recommendation of Amir Alaei.

It had been discovered from documents in the Sedan house. Nevertheless, other

lawsuits and accusation of Baghaei to Matin Daftari is not serious. 67

After some months, it became obvious that Matin Daftari was going to

New York as a member of Iran’s delegacy along with Mossadeq to attend in

the Security Council session. Baghaei threatened of not going with them if

Matin Daftari would come with delegacy. But, Khalil Maleki asked Baghaei to

talk to Mossadeq in private. Mossadeq told Baghaei his selection was for his

wife pressure. Baghaei surrendered but none of them convinced.

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Discussion over government appointments gradually made their relation

vague. Makki and Baghaei was discontent of appointing Morteza gholi Bayat

as director of INOC and Dr. Fallah as director of Abadan refinery. Bayat was

Mossadeq’s relative and ex-Prime Minister was famous and publicity despite

Baghaei and Makki’s view. Bayat was not member of the National Front and

after the coup; he was retained in his position, and took part in talks, which led

to Consortium Oil Agreement. But, Fallah was suspicious to cooperation with

the ex-company. Appointment of Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar as deputy of the Labor

Ministry had some debates. Bakhtiar in this position made two serious

mistakes. Baghaei and Makki insisted on him as a British agent but this claim

was baseless. There is no document on Kashani’s disagreement with these

appointments, but he had also some challenges with Mossadeq over these

appointments.

Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh, the dissent minority deputies of the

fifteenth Majles, expected better behavior of Mossadeq. Because, they started

the oil talks in Majles, they encouraged Mossadeq to take leadership of the

movement. They were his colleagues not his followers or puppets. But, they

saw all new members of Iran’s party were benefiting. They did not try to solve

the problem but stood against Mossadeq and made him force to consult with

others. However, Mossadeq was not as flexible as they expected but they also,

were quarrelling. Baghaei was more significant than two others were. He was

son of Agha Mirza Shahab Kermani, the great leader of Kerman in the

Constitutional Movement. He was naturally Kerman deputy in the Majles. He

was prior in politics and intelligence from his dissidents in Iran’s Party. He was

an adorable and cute leader who had undefeatable morale. He had a strong

rhetoric and was completely dominant on Farsi language and culture.

Physically, he was powerful and was not following wealth and power.

Nevertheless, instead, he was proud, obstinate and was using any instrument to

disgrace others for reaching a goal. His main complain of Mossadeq was for his

domineering behavior but he, himself could not tolerate dissidents beliefs. 68

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Disagreements and challenges were in the National Front leadership

from before, but before the 21 July revolt, it had not been appeared. According

to Dr. Fatemi, Sanjabi went on the verge of struggle with makki. On 9 July,

Baghaei sent a secret letter to leaders of Zahmat Keshan Party. He had spoken

of a betrary and powerful group, which had influenced inside the movement for

Dr. Mossadeq’s ignorance. Thus, the Party leadership decided to talk with Dr.

Mossadeq and gave him ultimatum. Those betray group, which Baghaei was

speaking, of them was the Iran’s party leaders and Shaygan. Dr. Fatemi, also,

was of this group because Baghaei considered him as British agent. 69

Both Kashani and Baghaei as the leader of the Zahmat Keshan Party had

important roles in events after Mossadeq’s resignation in July 1952. Kashani

asked for a mass strike and refused any agreement with the Shah and Qavam.

Baghaei emphasized the National Front representatives wouldn’t be satisfy

except returning Mossadeq as Prime Minister, and Zahmat Keshan Party

organized rallies in Tehran. However, it has been exaggerated of these groups.

But, we cannot say that Mossadeq could return without these attempts.

Mossadeq had backed with great and large support of masses, because after

some months, we see Kashani could not affect people against Mossadeq.

Mourning for the 21 July martyrdom had not still been ended that first rush of

Kashani to Mossadeq started. He asked Mossadeq about reasons of appointing

general-major vosugh, Nosratollah Amini Araki and Dr. Akhavi to

governmental positions. According to Kashani all of them were disqualified,

and threatened to go out of Tehran or possibly Iran and it showed seriousness

of conditions. Mossadeq replied that they were working without salary and

Amini Araki has been a prominent member of the Cabinet office.

Using “Civil affair” expression by Mossadeq caused Kashani’s

followers especially Hassan Ayat set forth big conspiracy theory of Mossadeq,

Qavam Britain and Freemasonry for preventing religion and religious leaders’

interferences in politics. Anyway, this theory is baseless. It is obvious that

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Mossadeq was going to have no interpretations about merits of his appointees.

There is no evidence of Mossadeq’s intention to put aside religious or

ideological persons from political participation. Kashani was elected as the

Majles speaker by Mossadeq, however, two individuals of the Front leaders

were nominated for the position (Mo’azami-Shaygan). Kashani’s threat was

just for not saying three appointments. Baghaei was not discontent of these

appointments but just wanted to show Mossadeq his power through intriguing

Kashani. 70

Kashani and Mossadeq had difference at least in one case. Some

months before, two sons of Kashani, Seyyed Mohammad and Seyyed

Abolmaali, nominated themselves for the seventeen Majles election, but none

of them was elected. Even, one of them had not reached to legal age like

Mossadeq in the first era of Majles. Main complain of Kashani over state

appointments was for appointing major-general Mohammad Daftari as director

of Customs and unseating Dr. Mahmood Shervin and director of pious

foundation. Daftari was Mossadeq’s relative and Kashani and Bahaei

contempted him as director of police Head quarters. Ousting Shervin was a big

stroke for Kashani. Ahmad Zirak Zadeh, the Iran’s party leader, had plotted his

ousting. Zirak Zadeh was so active in distribution of governmental posts

among his friends and colleagues of Iran party.

Division in the Zahmat Keshan Party

Baghaei confessed later of his hurry for exposing difference between

Mossadeq and Kashani after 1952. Baghaei was hospitalized for cure and

treatment in September for one month. Whether it has been true or not, he

found a chance for consulting with confident leaders of the Zahmat Keshan

Party and main dissidents of Mossadeq like Lieutenant-general Zahedi. Other

members of Zahtmat Keshan by leadership of Khalil Maleki got the point and

awarded. Maleki’s colleagues had no fear of rebuking Mossadeq government;

meanwhile, they regarded challenging with government as a loss for whole of

the National Movement.

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Following to abortive discussions and debates between Baghaei and

Maleki, a meeting was held on 9 October in order to examine differences.

Baghaei understood very soon he was in minority, so left the meeting and

resigned from the party. Four days later, some thugs and Islam Mujahedin

(Kashani’s activists) rushed the Zahmat Keshan party office. At the time, the

third force was formed. Baghaei retook his resignation and became leader of

remained persons. Three days before, major-general Hejazi and three brothers

of Rashidian were arrested in the accusation of help to a foreign embassy for

subverting government. Zahedi was engaged, too but because was a senator

had Parliamentary immunity and government could not arrest him.

Subsequently, Iran stopped its relation with Britain. None of previous, dissident

groups in the fifteenth Majles and Kashani had any direct contact with foreign

powers.But, based on evidences all-perhaps except Makki-allowed America

and Britain to subvert Mossadeq’s government.

At first, Baghaei hid differences inside Party and pretended to being

leftist of Maleki and other activists of Zahmat Keshan party. 71

Baghaei had not

visited Mossadeq from August and soon started his attacks against government.

Baghaei had rushed combination of new cabinet, especially appointing of

major-general Vosugh and Daftari. Then, he discussed over prosecution of

Qavam and social security proposal. Proposal of social security posed after

arresting Hejazi and Rashidian brothers in order to boost public order and

social security. However, Kashani and Baghaei attacked the proposal but set

forth not serious reasons. It is unfair if we call Mossadeq government a broken

one, because we have ignored its enterprises. There was freedom of the Press in

his government in which British Press also was not as free as it. Brothers of

Rashidian continued their anti-government activities without any punishment.

American Embassy was arranging an anti-government revolt; the Tudeh Party

was severely following to disgrace the government; thugs attempted on Prime

Minister twice in a day and nobody accused. The Police Headquarters’ director

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was robbed and killed and main charged –major-general Zahedi- sat down in

the Majles and stayed safe of prosecution. According to Mossadeq

Government clashed with the biggest empire on the world. Nobody like

Baghaei and his party were insisting on effective performing of law.

It can be easily proved that attacks of someone like Baghaei, Kashani

was for that Mossadeq had not behaved like their desire. Otherwise, there was

no basic difference. It would be a big mistake if we consider their difference as

an ideological one. No one of famous leaders of the Front had defended land

reforms as Baghaei. Moreover, Kashani had no opposition with reforms while

conservative cleric did not like him. Flexibility of Iran’s party leaders towards

the Tudeh Party for they had not recognized and known them as Baghaei and

Maleki. Baghaei cannot be forgiven, because even in the case of Qavam’s

prosecution, he was going to resent Mossadeq. He knew if Mossadeq had not

prosecuted, Qavam was not for relative considerations. It was tens of years

that Mossadeq had not seen Qavam and his brother Vosugh. In 1946,

Mossadeq embarked on a strong conflict against election fake by Qavam and

decided to leave politics in objection to those fakes and Qavam’s win. Of

course, public feelings had been aroused for martyrdom of 21 July against

Qavam but Qavam had done no illegal thing and the main reason of Mossadeq

in prohibiting Qavam’s prosecution was this.

Hence, principally there was a contrast in Bahaei’s performance. On the

one hand, he was insisting on Qavam’s punishment, was rebuking Mossadeq’s

government for its ignorance, and on the other hand was opposing with social

security proposal. This contradictory is solving when we know his goal in both

cases has been irritation of Mossadeq’s government. Practically, legal

affirming of this proposal postponed until March 1953 just for Baghaei’s

disagreement and after in July it was substitute with limits and powers law of

social security commission. 72

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According to this law, all suspicious persons to sabotage had to be

delivered to security commission and if they were recognized guilty, they could

be tried in ordinary courts. If commission verdict would be approved by the

court, too, guilty would be accused to 6 to 12 months jail or banish to a part of

country. Accusation of Baghaei just is correct in the case of establishing

Information and Security organization of the country (SAVAK), but word

“security” has been used in both. Baghaei used any chance at the time or later

to show intention has been counted as a crime in the law of Mossadeq. While,

it was not so and action of some to a plot was crime. Kashani’s attack to this

proposal meant supporting Baghaei. Their reasoning were not proportionate to

the case. Nevertheless, their attack to Mossadeq was for their resentment of

him.

Completing Gap in the National Front

Struggle and differences inside the Front on extension of Prime Minister

Power led to a full confronting in January 1952. Powers that Majles had given

the Prime Minister was not the kind of urgent powers that would require

suspending part of the constitution. Majles had given power to Mossadeq to

legislate and implement some laws within 6 months and at the end of this time,

parliament had the right of approving of refusal. In January 1952, Mossadeq

asked Majles to extend it for one more year. At the time, Majles was active and

all sessions were holding regularly. Baghaei, Haeri Zadeh and Makki despite

their previous support strongly opposed the bill. Meantime, Kashani was

selected as the Majlis speaker and legislative branch head in order to adjust his

attitudes towards government. But again, he was refusing taking part in the

Majles sessions. In a letter, he addressed Majles speaker commission and

asked them to refuse posing the bill in the Majles, because he believed it had

contradictory with the Constitution. Members of the speaker commission

respectfully wrote him could not do this. At last, the bill passed by Majles. 73

Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh clashed strongly with it, but because, voting

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for the bill was accompanied with confidence vote for government it was

approved. Regarding bazzar and Majles dissents with Kashani, he decided to

stop his opposition for a while. A visit was done between him and Mossadeq

but it was not effective in settling disagreements.

Traditional cleric of Qom and Behbahani in Tehran did not interfere in

Kashani-Mossadeq argument but their dissents with legal powers were obvious.

They made failed Mossadeq’s attempts in changing official position of

custodianship; however, Kashani was supporting Mossadeq in this case. They

also opposed to discuss women enfranchisement. Mossadeq and Kashani asked

left faction of the National Front not to insist on women enfranchisement

perhaps Qom cleric and ruling class of the court misused it against the Front

and government. Zahmat Keshan, third forces were trying to achieve women

enfranchisement. Khalil Maleki defended it within three articles titled “Women

rights, who are half of human being” Following this another articles was

published in the same newspaper. Representatives of “Pioneering women

Movement” dependent to the third force visited with Mossadeq. Mossadeq

emphasized for them, their demand could not be done at the time. 74

In mid of February of 1952, it was seemed that cleric leaders and

religious community of pro-national Front did not pay attention Kashani and he

had been retired. Perhaps, Rohani and Shahrudi had showed him unanimity

secretly. Mahalati, Zanjani brothers and Taleghani were supporting the national

movement. Kashani’s failure in harmonizing religious figures with himself

was important. Among present clergies in Majles no Mujtahed was present.

From the second Majles, it was like this, but, if these clergies were backing

Mossadeq in Majles, he would have a huge force. Jalali, Angji, Haj Seyyed

Javadi, Shabestar; and Milani were with the front and movement. Shams

Ghanat Abadi was Kashani’s speaker from the beginning, but he left Kashani at

the time of Zahedi, too. Kashani, increasingly had relation with traditional

clerics and conservative religious men in Qom but he did not belong to them.

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This point was also correct about Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh. Related

news about the Shah’s impending journey in 28 February was an important

watershed. Shah himself decided on this journey but it was as if Mossadeq had

been forced him to leave the country. Perhaps, Kashani was not engaged in

these affairs but Ayatollah Behbahani most possibly was engaged. Rallies

against Mossadeq and attacks of thugs to the Prime Minister house could not be

a self-stimulate event, but Kashani and Baghaei had thought Mossadeq was

going to send Shah out of the country sent their thugs. At the day, Kashani

wrote two letters in Shah’s backing and published two declarations, also. Some

parts of one of declaration are following:

“O’ people! Be aware! Our publicity and democrat Shah is going to

leave the country for betrayal decision of somebody ….aware if Shah

goes whatever we have will go with him. Arise and don’t let Shah goes.

Ask him to change his view. Today, our lives and independence depends

on Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – not anybody else-.” 75

It has been said that Behbahani was engaged in these affairs but it is not

certain. If, we just rely on documents, we see he and his circle had been quite

for a while. Indeed, they had been drastically activating against government.

For instance, Mohammad Taghi Falsafi a famous preacher who was telling

Behbahani’s view – had begun his activity against government from many

times before. In one of preaching sessions, when he rushed Mossadeq in the

Shah Mosque present people in the meeting aroused and he forced to escape.

This event was related to some time before appearing gap in the National Front

and even before the 21 July Revolt. Anyway, Behbahani did not remain quiet

on 28 February and along with Sheikh Bahaedin Noori (later Ayatollah Noori)

visited Shah and speech for people anti-Mossadeq. From the day onward,

Behbahani’s activity against government became more open and public and

Qom’s engagement in the cases became more evident.

300

In April 1953, brigadier-general Mahmood Afshar Toos, the Police

Head quarters head, had been robbed and was murdered in a cave out of

Tehran. Four retired brigadier –generals were prosecuted in this relation.

Baghaei who was deeply engaged in this regard, was not arrested for his

Parliamentary immunity. Zahedi sat down in Majles before arresting. At the

time, Kashani was Majles speaker, however was not presenting in Majles. This

time, he presented in Majles, kissed Zahedi, and said him he could stay in

Majles until he would desire and his presence would be auspicious. Then, he

recommended Majles staffs to cure their senior guest. Sometimes, it has been

said that Kashani – Mossadeq stalemate started from the time Mossadeq

decided to dissolve Majles and referendum. Definitely, this view is correct.

Now, it was obvious the clerics of Qom and Kashani were active against

Mossadeq’s government. During next months, rumors were heard over

impending coup. Mossadeq decided to dissolve Majles and holding new Majles

through referendum in July and August. His close advisors and friends

prohibited him of doing so. Kashani and Behbahani announced his decision

inconsistent to the Constitution and considered it religiously unlawful. Of

course, Mossadeq’s decision was improper but it was not on the contrary with

the constituent. Now, Kashani had put himself inside religious conservatives.

Kashani and clerics in Qom remained quiet during the 16 and 17 August coup.

Behbahani had a significant role in organizing thugs in the 19 August coup.

Recently, some evidences have been found that indicates Kashani had received

some money through Ahmad Aramesh from Americans with the goal

overthrowing Mossadeq government. These evidences are quite strong but are

not definite. 76

In 1979, exchanged letters between Mossadeq and Kashani at those days

were exposed by one of Kashani’s family member who claimed had been a

messenger between them. Kashani after some complaints of Mossadeq asked

him to be united and confront with the coup. But it is not clear; he was talking

301

of which coup. Mossadeq wrote in reply that, “your letter was received

through Mr. Hassan Agha Salemi. I am being supported by the people, End.”

There are doubts in correctness and credit of these letters. Some criticizers say

why Kashani’s letters, which has been in his hand script, has been remaining

near his family. Mossadeq letter is also in his way of writing, although it has

been typed. 77

It can be understood from the letter that Kashani was not

engaged in the 19 August coup and it is not reasonable. On 18 August, the

Shah’s coup against Mossadeq remained abortive during two days before. If,

Kashani’s mean had been the next day coup, it shows he knew about

impending affair and ascertained his information about the coup. Rationally, it

seems Kashani has wanted to have a role in full win of Mossadeq over the 16

and 17 August coup. There is no doubt, that traditional cleric had favorable

view towards the coup. Ayatollah Boroujerdi welcomed the Shah after his

returning to the country and left quietness. The next day, the “Islam Devotees”

called the coup Islamic Revolution in their publication and wrote:

“Yesterday, Tehran was shivering under manly walks of the army forces

and Muslims. Mossadeq, the old blood sucker monster, had to resign

for Muslims pressure…..all state centers were captured by Muslims and

Islam army.” 78

Two weeks later, Kashani announced in an interview that Mossadeq has

done a great betray and deserved death. 79

Qom clerics, Kashani and Islam

Devotees performed unanimously but this alliance prolonged a short time.

Other clerics and religious community by the leadership of Zanjani brothers

and Taleghanee in cooperation with the National Front Parties organized the

National Resistance Movement against the coup.

Cleric system used the coup and some years passed in this way until the

Shah embarked on land reforms and tried to make the power inclusive in his

hands and his challenges with clergies began. Cleric who had helped

302

establishment of the conservative regime again started their silence and let the

ruling class to purge with Mossadeq, the National Front, Communism, Baha’iat

and other enemies of Islam. Therefore, cleric reinforced its stance among

property owners without losing their traditional position in bazaar. However,

some parts of bazaar threatened to not paying Sharei payments to Qom.

Kashani was the full looser; meanwhile cleric of Qom did not accept him. He

lost his position among bazzar and could not achieve a position among property

owners. Neither Kashani nor Mossadeq could organize opponents against the

coup regime. Mossadeq was in jail and Kashani had lost his publicity. “The

Islam Devotees” had not any social position or power from the first that loose

it. That regime which helped them to assume power demolished them.

There were nobody to fight with Mossadeq except Kashani, Baghaei

Makki and Haeri Zadeh. It can be claimed that Kashani without Baheaei’s

backing could never fight against Mossadeq. Personality figures had important

role in these events. Haeri Zadeh was not as much as three other dependent to

principles, his publicity was less than others and after separated them and

waited for Zahedi’s help. Dissent of Makki with Mossadeq was not so much

deep and rooted. After the coup, he was surprised more than others were.

Kashani was seeking respect and according to him, Mossadeq’s contempt

behavior had resented him. He had a brave soul, which could lead him to last

point of sequestering. Baghaei had grown this attitude of him more, otherwise,

Kashani never quarreled with Mossadeq. Therefore, role of Baghaei both in

making and boosting gulf in the National Front and was a basic and pivotal

ones. Once in Parliamentary debates, Baghaei stimulated himself to Nazi dog

which bites both friend and enemy, and really it was true. At last, these three

made themselves resented than others. If Mossadeq were more accommodating

with them, the Front would not be lost too much. Once, Baghaei had wished

Mossadeq would appreciate individuals like him. This is true, but I wish he

would appreciate Mossadeq and his attempts.

303

Reference

1. Jalil Bozorgmehr “Mossadeq dar dadgah Tajdid Nazar Nazami” Tehran 1986, p

45-8

2. Jalil Bozorgmehr , ed “Mossadeq dar Mahkameh Nazami” ( Tehran : 1990 ) ,Vol I,

p 6

3. ibid p 47

4. ibid Vol I, p 264

5. ibid Vol I pp.378-85, and Vol II, p 649-54

6. ibid Vol II pp 778-9

7. “Mossadeq dar dadgah Tajdid Nazar Nazami” pp 27-39

8. “Mossadeq dar Mahkameh Nazami” Vol II pp.17-19

9. I dar dadgah Tajdid Nazar Nazami” pp 58-62

10. ibid p523

11. “Mossadeq Memoirs” Mohammad Mossadeq, (Tehran: Almi 2006) Ed Eleventh

p387

12. ibid 392

13. ibid 402

14. “Mossadeq Memoirs” Vol II, chapter 10, and Hassan Sader “Defa Dr.Mossadeq

az Naft” Tehran 1979 Jams Bill, The Eagle and the The Tragedy of American –

Iranian Relations (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989) , 53-7 and also

see Mark Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah; Building a Client State in

Iran ( Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1991), 65-9.

15. Homa Katouzian “Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” (Tehran 1981) and

Fardoosi magazine “Khaterat zendan” Khalil Maleki 1956.

16.Hoshang Asfandyari Shabi “Iran politics and Religious Modernism”

(London,Tauris,1990) Vol .I, chapter 4.

17. Naser Ghashghaei “Salhay Bohran” Tehran 1989, Vol IV

18. Homa Katouzian “Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” (Tehran 1981), preamble.

304

19. “Asnad Nehzat Moghavomat Melli Iran” (Document of Iran National resistance)

(Tehran,Nehzat Azadi Iran,1984) Vol, II . pp 201-2

20. ibid Vol II, III.

21. ibid Vol II, pp 707-13

22. ibid Vol II, pp 466,471

23. Mahdi Bazargan “Modafeat” (Paris, Modares Press) pp 106-7

24. Qarani’s interview whit Iran Farda magazine, April 30, 1979

25. Homa Katouzian, Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran (London: I.B.

Tauris , 1999 ), 400-3 and Kamran Dadkhah, “Iran’s Economic Policy during the

Mossadeq Era,” Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis ( November 2000)

26. Barry Rubin Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 81-94 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 103-8.

27. “Nabard Zendagi” Vol, I, No 10, June 1956, pp 1-15

28. Socialists Society of manifest of Iranian Freedom Movement, Tehran, September

1960

29. Shahabi “Iran politics and Religious Modernism” Vol .II

30. Mahdi Bazargan “Modafeat” (Paris, Modares Press, 1971) p136

31. Homa Katouzian , Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran ( London : I.B.

Tauris , 1999 ) pp 403-6, and Dilip Hiro , The Iranian Labyrinth : Journeys through

Theocratic Iran and Its Furies ( New York : Nation Books, 2005 ) 64-70.

32. Maziar Behrooz, “Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran,” International

Journal of Middle East Studies (August 2001):363-82; Homa Katouzian “Political

Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” (Tehran 1981), preamble

33. Homa Katouzian “Problems of Democracy and the Public Sphere in Modern

Iran,” Commparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (1988 );31-

37.

34. “Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki”

35. Mahdi Bazargan “Modafeat” p.169 and “Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” pp

72-9

36. Ali Akbar Siasi “Past of a life” (London, politic, 1988) p 285-6 and Mahdi

Bazargan “Modafeat” p167 and Kayhan, January 22, 1963

305

37. Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” pp. 137-49

38. Khat Asli Jabhe Melli (Tehran, November 1962)

39. “Notghha va Maktobat Dr.Mossadeq” Speeches and Writings of Dr.Mossadeq in

fifth, sixth, fourteenth and sixteenth Majles periods (1969-1970) in 10 volumes, Vol,

X, pp. 1-3

40. Shahrough Akhavi, “The Role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949-1954,” in

Mussadiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, 91-118, see also Akhavi, Religion and

Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy state Relations in the Pahlavi Period (Albany

State University of New York Press, 1980), 60-72

.

41. Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” p. 465

42. ibid p. 476

43. Iran Azad magazine, No 54, July 1988

44. Mahdi Bazargan “Modafeat” p.185

45. “Notghha va Maktobat Dr.Mossadeq” Speeches and Writings of Dr.Mossadeq

,Vol, X, p 4-6

46. ibid p10-13

47. ibid p 26

48. ibid p 37-8

49. ibid p. 43-9

50. ibid p. 74-6

51. Jabhe, No 83, June 1985

52. ibid p88

53. Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” p. 482

54. Parkhash , July 1977

55. “Notghha va Maktobat Dr.Mossadeq” Vol, X, p. 195

56. George Mcghee,’’ Recollections of Dr. Mussadiq,” in Mussadiq, Iranian

Nationalism and Oil, 342; Mark Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah;

Building a Client State in Iran ( Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1991), 87-9

306

57. Nikki R. Keddie , The Roots of the Revolution : An Interpretative History of

Modern Iran ( New Haven , Conn.: Yale University Press , 1981 ), 119-32; Kenneth

Pollack , The Persian Puzzle : The Conflict Between Iran and America ( New York :

Random House , 2004 ) , 48-50.

58. “Rohanit va asrar fash nashodeh” (Iran, Qom, 1979) pp 7-56

59. M. Dehnavi “Majmoah Maktobat Ayatollah Kashani” (Tehran,chappakhsh, 1981)

Vol I; “ Ayatollah Kashani: Precursor of the Islamic Republic?’’in Religion and

Politics in Iran; Shiism from Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki R.Keddie ( New

Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1983),98-104.

60. Religion and Politics in Iran; Shiism from Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki

R.Keddie (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1983),122-35. See Stephen

Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (

Hoboken N.J. John Wiley & Sons, 2003).see also Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup

The struggle for the control of Iran ( New York : Mc Graw- Hill, 1979).

61. Shahrough Akhavi, “The Role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949-1954,”in

Mussadiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, 101-112, see also Akhavi, Religion and

Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy state Relations in the Pahlavi Period ( Albany

State University of New York Press, 1980),87-96.

62. “Rohanit va asrar fash nashodeh” (Iran, Qom, 1979) pp 88-96

63. ibid p132 and Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki”

64. Taraqi magazine, May 13, 1951

65. Homa Katouzian , Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran ( London : I.B.

Tauris , 1999 ), 299-300

66. “Mossadeq Memoirs” Vol II

67. Homa Katouzian, p 302

68. Baqaei “Dar Peshgah Che Kasi, va Ankeh Goft Nah” (Newjersi, Rafizadeh, 1984)

chapter 7

69. Gholamreza Najati “Jonbesh Melli shodan Naft” (Tehran,1986) Defaait

Dr.Fatemi.

307

70. Baqaei, chapter 7

71. Shahed, October, 14, 15 and 16, 1952

72. Baqaei, chapter 7 and Shahed, June 1953

73. Kayhan and Niroy Seaom, November and December 1952

74. M. Dehnavi “Majmoah Maktobat Ayatollah Kashani” (Tehran,chappakhsh, 1981)

Vol III, p 192

75. Abdolhossain Moftah “Rasti birang ast” (Paris, 1983); and Kayhan, February 28,

1953

76. Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, ed. Mark Gasiorowski and

Malcolm Byrne (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004), chapter 13

77. “Rohanit va asrar fash nashodeh” (Iran, Qom, 1979), pp 185-7

78. Nabard Malat, August 20, 1953

79. Kayhan, September 14, 1953