Africanagenda 16 2

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page 8 photo: Heads of state at AU summit

African Agenda is published six times a year by Third World Network (TWN) Africa.TWN is an international network of groups and individuals who seek greater articulation of the needs and rights of the peoples of the Third World, especially marginalised social groups, a fair distribution of the world’s resources and forms of development which are ecologically sustainable and fulfil human needs. TWN Africa is grateful to Oxfam-NOVIB, Development

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COVER

Africa 50 years on, from unity to union………........................... page 5

Financing Africa's integration…………....................................... page 11

Africa's gender agenda 50 years on………................................... page 14

Emerging trends in political violence in Africa…........................ page 17

Africa strives to move from neo-colonial mining mode…….... page 20

Turning West Africa into a free Migration

and Trade Zone….............................................................................. page 23

DEVELOPMENT

Subsidies and GM crops back on food policy menu……......... page 25

The ironic return of the Portuguese to Africa……..................... page 27

INTERNATIONAL

Thatcherism and Africans: beyond the revisionist history….... page 29

The battle of Cuito Cuanavale………........................................... page 32

ENVIRONMENT

Senegal's uphill battle to control fishery sector…........................ page 34

SOCIETY

FESPACO 2013 honours African women……........................... page 35

BOOK REVIEW

My first coup d'etat, a book by John Dramani Mahama…........ page 37

Contents

AFRICA'S efforts at meeting its develop-ment challenges over the years through thevehicle of the Organisation of African Unity(OAU) now rebranded the African Unionhas continued to be elusive. The major bat-tle won by the OAU is that of decoloniza-tion-a prime objective of the OAU-- as cur-rently all its 53 members are no longercolonies of European powers. Beyond that,various attempts at unity, economic orpolitical have not made enough inroads inthe last 50 years.

At the birth of the Organisation ofAfrican Unity, OAU, 50 years ago, talk wasawash of how it signaled the rebirth ofAfrican civilization and the drive towardsAfrican unity. These came on the heels ofresurgent Pan-Africanism across Europe,the Americas, the Caribbean and mainlandAfrica that contributed to the independ-ence struggle of African states. Most of theleaders of the independence struggle inAfrica, Kwame Nkrumah, Sedar Senghor,Jomo Kenyatta, Modibo Keita among oth-ers could identify with one strand or theother of Pan-Africanism. Africa's independ-ence was for them a stage to re-launch thefamed historical civilisations of Africa aswell as work towards a united Africa.

Right from the beginning the kind ofunited Africa and how to achieve it becamea bone of contention among the emergingAfrican leadership. An immediate UnitedStates of Africa was the answer to some, forothers a gradual process culminating in theUnited States of Africa was a better option(See page 5, Africa 50 years on from unityto union). 50 years after, African unity is yetto be achieved. On the eve of the transfor-mation of the OAU to AU, a new develop-ment programmed christened, NewPartnership for Africa's Development,NEPAD, was touted as the instrument forthe 'renaissance' of Africa. A decade andmore after NEPAD and as we celebrate 50years of the OAU/AU there is talk about'renaissance' again. How many times wouldAfrica be reborn before it is able to face itsdevelopment challenges head on? Have theearlier births been stillborn, abortive or falsestarts?

Of course all has not been negativeover the 50 years lifespan of the OAU/AU.The Regional Economic Communities(RECs), which are to be the building blocks

of the united Africa seem to be working,though at snail pace and with varyingdegrees of progress. (See page 23, TurningWest Africa into a free migration and tradezone). Financing the African unity projectis one major hurdle yet to be cleared asmany countries fail to pay up their levies.The result is the return to near control ofAfrica's development path by foreign'donors' who invariably tend to have someleeway on the policy space of African coun-tries. On taking over last year as AUCommission's chairperson, Dlamini-Zumabemoaned the fact that nearly all of theAU's programmes are funded largely by for-eign donors. Indeed, over 97% of pro-grammes in the AU are funded by donors,including even staff salaries. How can theAU for that Africa progress under such cir-cumstance? Proposals to offset this debili-tating financial situation are not in shortsupply (See page 11, Financing Africa'sintegration).

Gender has also become topical in theAU, a departure from the OAU era whennot much attention was paid to the issue. Asif to buttress the point, the current chair ofthe AU Commission as well as six out of itsten commissioners are all women. (Seepage 14, Africa's gender agenda 50 yearson). This does not however, guarantee thatgender issues will become prominent in theworkings of the African Union as mostoften appointment of women to prominentpositions, has tended to become an easyalternative to dealing with gender issues. Asimple affirmative action of ensuringwomen take up positions in AUCommission does not address deep-seatedgender challenges that hinder socialprogress in Africa. The gender agenda ofthe AU should not therefore be limited toappointing more women to positions with-in the AU Commission and member coun-tries, it should include ensuring that genderprotocols are not only ratified but alsoimplemented in the member countries touplift the living standards of women on thecontinent.

Various declarations and commit-ments continued to be made by heads ofstate and government to gender equalitybut the situation in most AU member stateshas not changed much over the last 50years. In their declaration at the 50th

Anniversary commemorative summit,African heads of state and government haveonce again reaffirmed their commitment to'greater unity', 'determination' to build anintegrated, prosperous and peaceful Africadriven by its citizens and representing adynamic force, including those of equalitybetween men and women' among others.Nice words, ever repeated and have notmeant much over the years.

Another promise is the promotion andharmonizing of the teaching of African his-tory to advance the African identity. Goodidea but the challenge here is how to ensurethat the kind of history promoted mustreflect the African reality. Ongoing effortsshould be intensified and implemented assoon as possible to address age-old 'histori-cal misinformation' that has passed asAfrican history and has done harm toAfrica's esteem in the world. The repair ofthe damage inflicted on the African psychethrough centuries of a 'history' that reducedthe self-esteem of the African thereby mak-ing him feel subordinate to other races islong overdue.

After reaffirming their 'common des-tiny', 'shared values' etc the declarationended on a rather disappointing note bypushing to 2063 the unity agenda termed,'Continental Agenda 2063' by which timethey say 'through a people-driven process'they will realise the vision for 'an integrated,people-centred, prosperous Africa at peacewith itself.'

At this rate African unity will not beachieved not even in the envisaged half-cen-tury proposed. The rest of the world is notwaiting for Africa. An Africa, whose close toone billion population if united can changenot only the development fortunes of itspeople but also that of the rest of the world.The Continental Free Trade Area, the freemovement of goods and people across thecontinent are immediate and initial build-ing blocks that must be implemented assoon as possible if Africa is to make anyheadway in overcoming its developmentchallenges. Mere lip service expressed inplatitudes of 'fast tracking' integration willnot help bring integration and the fruitsthereof for the suffering, marginalized andpoverty-stricken peoples of Africa.

EDITORIAL

4 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.2

Africa still yearns for renaissance

AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.2 5

COVER

Africa 50 years on from unity to union

THE desire for a united Africa, just after theindependence of some African countries inthe 50s resulted in the formation of variousgroupings. The two dominant groups werethe Casablanca Group and the MonroviaGroup. The Casablanca Group was infavour of a politically united federation ofAfrican states immediately whereas theMonrovia Group wanted a looser alliancebased on gradual economic cooperation. Inthe end, on 25th May, 1963, in AddisAbaba, the Ethiopian capital, 32 independ-

ent African countries brought into beingthe Organisation of African Unity, OAU, acompromised institution.

50 years on the OAU now transformedinto the AU has not got any closer to achiev-ing either an economic union nor has itblossomed into a loose federation ofAfrican states. The fundamental challengesof whether total political unity or an eco-nomic union would best suit the interests ofAfrica still persist. At its Summit in 2007 inAccra, Ghana to commemorate Ghana's

50th Independence Anniversary the issuewas touted as the Grand Debate that was tofinally settle the issue between the 'gradual-ists' and the 'instantists'. Unfortunately, thedebate was not to be. So Union governmentof Africa once more slipped by and as thenPrime Minister of Lesotho, PakalithaMosisii put it, 'integration should be grad-ual, rather than precipitous. It must be evo-lutionary rather than revolutionary.'

True political and individual differ-ences may have prevented OAU from

As the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, transformed itself to become the African Union, the

challenges that dogged the Pan-African attempt at unity at its birth 50 years ago this year have

lingered, writes * Cornelius Adedze.

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Emperor Haile Selassie - pioneers of African unity

reaching its goal of unity but the primaryaim of decolonizing the continent is one ofthe major achievements that the organisa-tion can boast of. By the close of the 70smost of Africa was independent save forNamibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.South Africa, the last colonial bastion wasfreed from the clutches of Apartheid Rule in1994. Beyond decolonization however, var-ious attempts at unification not just as aUnited States of Africa but through cooper-ation in various ways have not been fullyachieved.

Specialised agencies like the PanAfrican News Agency, Pan-AfricanTelecommunications Union, Pan-AfricanPostal Union, Union of African NationalTelevision and Radio Organisations havebecome dormant if not moribund. TheOAU limped on as African countries strug-gled from one challenge to the other foreconomic survival from the 70s onwards,battered by both the effects of the Cold Warand later Structural Adjustment. The initialdifferences on the way forward for AfricanUnity became more pronounced as eachcountry and its leadership looked moretoward their individual country's 'survival'rather than that of the collective Africanstate.

Just like in the founding and earlystages of the OAU, some African leadersstepped up to pursue the 'unity' agenda indiverse ways. Unfortunately unlike thefounding years when one could count onthe likes of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana,Nasser of Egypt, and others to hold the fortfor those calling for 'unity' as soon as possi-ble, by the 70s these 'progressive voices' hadbeen silenced, through coup d'etats ordeath. The 'gradualists' like Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, Senghor ofSenegal, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia thenheld sway.

The 70s thus saw a slowdown in theattempts at political unity of Africa and waspunctuated by the effects of the Cold Waras African countries got caught up in theWest and East war of ideology and domina-tion. The fault lines of the Organisation ofAfrican Unity were made sharper in thisperiod as members were divided along theideological lines of Capitalism andCommunism no longer along lines ofimmediate and gradual political unity ofAfrica.

Africa's efforts at integration have thusbeen largely influenced and dictated byindividual leaders who called the shots due

to their economic or political hold over oth-ers. With the worsening economic situationin most African countries the solution to itas suggested by some was the strengtheningof regional economic blocs that should bethe building blocks of a futuristic unitedAfrica. They took a leaf from the blossom-ing European Union. Thus the era ofregional economic communities, RECs,began. On the heels of these came suchseminal efforts as the Lagos Plan of Actionand eventually the Abuja Treaty that calledfor establishment of institutions like theAfrican Central Bank, the African MonetaryFund, the African Court of Justice and inparticular, the Pan-African Parliament. TheAbuja treaty reiterated the strengtheningand consolidation of the RECs as the pillarsfor achieving the objectives of an AfricanEconomic Community and finally a Unionof African states.

In pursuit of these objectives the OAUfrom 1999 initiated a series of extraordinarysessions aimed at achieving economic andpolitical integration of the continent. FourOAU summits were critical in this. Thesewere:

• The Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999) (Decision to establish an African Union taken)

• The Lome Summit (2000) (Adoption of the Constitutive Act of the Union).

• The Lusaka Summit (2001) (The road map for the implementation of the AU drawn)

• The Durban Summit (2002) (Launch of the AU and convening of the 1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union).

The Sirte Summit was spearheaded bythe late Libyan leader, Muammar Gadhafi

who thought that the time was due for therealisation of the United States of Africa, adream of some of the founding fathers ofthe Organisation of African Unity. His radi-cal ideas for an immediate implementationhowever, as usual met with resistance fromthe 'gradualists' and skeptics who doubtedhis intentions and saw in him an ambitionto become leader of a united Africa, just likeothers before him saw Nkrumah as an over-ambitious leader seeking to becomePresident of a united Africa.

Gadhafi's plan of actualising the initialdreams of a united Africa with a single army,a common currency and trade and travelfreedom, was thus shot down. Indeed thisproposal led rather to further divisionswithin the OAU as once again a watereddown version resulted in the formation ofthe African Union. For some the objectivesof the African Union are more comprehen-sive and attuned to the current needs of thecontinent than those of its predecessor, theOAU. The transformation of the OAU tothe AU also coincided with the introduc-tion of NEPAD, the New Partnership forAfrica's Development, sponsored by thelikes of Thabo Mbeki (then President ofSouth Africa) and Abdelaziz Bouteflika ofAlgeria. This new development paradigm, aneo-liberal, Western-sponsored effort wasdiametrically opposed to Gadhafi's propos-als that relied more on Africa's own home-grown efforts at development.

The NEPAD agenda which 'killed'Gadhafi's ideas could not also survive andthus threw Africa back into finding outanother approach to unity and develop-ment. The regional economic communitiesare themselves at varied levels of integra-tion. Some have made some progresswhereas others are still a long way offachieving their objectives. In the meantime,Africa continues to be riddled with social,economic, and political challenges that theAfrican Union given its current status isunable to resolve. Top on the list are thecivil strifes in Somalia, DRC, and Maliamong others that the African Union is atpains to deal with. In Mali, the regional eco-nomic community, ECOWAS, could notdeal with the situation until France bull-dozed its way through. In Somalia, wherecivil war has raged on since the 90s, the AUhas found it an intractable situation thoughit has some forces there. Will the much-talked about African Standby Force havestood up to these situations?

A new deadline of 2015 has just been

COVER


“The initial differences on the

way forward for African Unity

became more pronounced as

each country and its leader-

ship looked more toward their

individual country's 'survival'

rather than that of the collec-

tive African state.”

7AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.2

COVER

issued the five regions - East, West, Central,North and Southern Africa - to developtheir own standby brigades with military,the police and civilian components. For aforce whose idea was mooted 50 years agoat the founding of the OAU the new dead-line speaks volumes of Africa's prepared-ness to confront its challenges. This is the

third time that a new deadline has had to beissued.

The African Union backed AfricanStandby Force's (ASF) operationalisationwas planned for 2008, pushed to 2010, then2013 and now to 2015. There are doubts byexperts as to whether the force will be oper-ational by then.

Economic cooperation has not faredbetter either. Free movement of people andgoods thereby facilitating trade amongAfrican countries is also a big challenge.Apart from infrastructural challenges(which NEPAD was to address), policy har-monisation and implementation remainmajor obstacles although with varyingdegrees in the various regional economiccommunities. Trade among African coun-tries though on the increase remains smallas compared with trade with the rest of theworld. Just about 10 percent of Africa'simports are from Africa with close to 90 per-cent from outside Africa. Should Africa signthe Economic Partnership Agreement,EPA, with the European Union, it is likelytrade among African countries will furtherdwindle as Africa would be swamped withEuropean goods and services.

Africa's quest to work together to con-

front the threat that globalisation poses it is

also at risk as foreign 'partners' seem to have

taken over the policy direction of the

African Union. Some of these foreign part-

ners have become more or less consultants

to the AU thereby directing its policy whilst

others underwrite its expenditure.

50 years of the OAU/AU may have

chalked some successes from decolonisa-

tion to efforts at uniting the continent but

unless the teething problems that were

pushed aside in the organisation's founding

years are dealt with, the ghosts of that peri-

od would continue to haunt and dog the

continent's attempts at unity.

* Cornelius Adedze is editor, African Agenda.

THE AIMS OF THE OAU:

• To promote the unity and solidarity of African States;

• To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a

better life for the peoples of Africa;

• To defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;

• To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

• To promote international cooperation.

THE AIMS OF THE AFRICAN UNION:

• Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the

peoples of Africa;

• Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its

Member States;

• Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;

• Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the

continent and its peoples;

• Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of

the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

• Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

• Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and

good governance;

• Promote and protect human peoples' rights in accordance with the African

Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights

instruments;

• Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its

rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;

• Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural

levels as well as the integration of African economies;

• Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living

standards of African peoples;

• Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future

Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the

objectives of the Union;

• Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all

fields, in particular in science and technology; and

• Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable

diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

“Just about 10 percent of

Africa's imports are from

Africa with close to 90 percent

from outside Africa. Should

Africa sign the Economic

Partnership Agreement, EPA,

with the European Union, it is

likely trade among African

countries will further dwindle

as Africa would be swamped

with European goods and

services. “


COVER

AU Commission Chair Heads of state at AU summit

Children’s choir Adult’s choir

AU Commission Executive Council Former heads of state

AU @ 50 Summit in pictures


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Former Zambian leader Kenneth Kaunda Ghana’s President John Mahama

Media at closing press conference Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta

Artwork commemorating anniversary Delegates at AU at 50 summit

AU @ 50 Summit in pictures


AssemblyThe Constitutive Act is very specific about thefunctions and powers of the Assembly as thesupreme organ of the AU comprising of Headsof State and Government. South Africa has par-ticipated in the development of the Rules ofProcedure for the Assembly, and the sameprocess has taken place at SADC level.

Executive CouncilThe Executive Council is a meeting of Ministersof Foreign Affairs or other Ministers chargedwith the responsibility of dealing with the AU.The issues discussed by the Executive Councilwill have to feed into the Assembly.

Permanent Representatives

CommitteeThe Permanent Representative Committee iscomposed of Permanent Representatives andother Plenipotentiaries to the Union. This struc-ture was not formally recognised under theOAU, even though the Ambassadors do meet onan ongoing basis. The PRC, amongst otherthings, will work closely with the Commission;be involved in the process of nomination andappointment of Commissioners; look into theselection and appointment of consultants andfollow-up on the implementation of Summitdecisions. The work of the PRC will feed into theExecutive Council.

CommissionThe Commission will be based at theHeadquarters of the AU and will be headed bythe Chairperson of the AU. The Chairperson

will be assisted by a Deputy Chairperson andCommissioners, as well as other members ofstaff.

Specialised Technical

CommitteesThere will also be Specialised TechnicalCommittees (STCs) established within theSecretariat and headed by Commissioners. TheSTCs will deal with issues such as RuralEconomy and Agricultural Matters, Monetaryand Financial Affairs, Trade, Customs andImmigration Matters, Science, Technology,Transport, Communications, Education,Culture, amongst other things.

Pan-African Parliament (PAP)The Protocol establishing the Pan AfricanParliament was adopted in 2000 during theOAU Summit in Lomè, Togo. The Protocol isnow open for signature and ratification. So far 21member states have signed and three have rati-fied. Article 22 of the PAP protocol provides forthe Protocol to enter into force after deposit ofthe instruments of ratification by a simple major-ity of the member states.

Though the Constitutive Act of the AfricanUnion does not elaborate on the functions andpowers of the Pan African Parliament, theProtocol provides that, for the first five years ofthe Parliament's existence, it will have advisoryand consultative powers only.

Economic, Social and Cultural

Council (ECOSOCC)The Lusaka OAU Summit requested theSecretary General to submit to the 76th

Ordinary Session of Council, i.e. July 2002, areport on ECOSOCC with recommendationson structure, areas of competence, criteria forselecting members of ECOSOCC, relationshipbetween ECOSOCC and African regionalNGOs and professional groups, ECOSOCC'sRules of Procedure and its work programme.This is one organ of the AU that will provide forcivil society participation. The Lusaka Summitdecision on ECOSOCC directs that memberstates will have to decide on the structure, func-tioning, areas of competence selection criteria,Rules of Procedure and work programme of theECOSOCC.

Court of JusticeThe Constitutive Act of the AU provides for theestablishment of the Court of Justice and for aProtocol on its statute, composition and func-tions. It is still unclear what the exact functionsand powers of the Court will be, and whether itwill have jurisdiction over states or nationals.The functions and powers of the Court will beelaborated upon in a Protocol, which will clarifywhat the impact on domestic legislation will be.

Financial InstitutionsArticle 19 of the Act provides for the establish-ment of financial institutions whose rules andregulations shall be defined in protocols relatingthereto. The implications of hosting theseorgans will only become apparent once the rele-vant protocols have been concluded. The institu-tions are:

• The African Bank

• The African Monetary Fund

• African Investment Bank

COVER

Organs of the African Union

Factfile OAU/AU25 May 1963: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central

African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), D R Congo, Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, Tanzania (Tanganyika), Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zanzibar (Later joined Tanganyika to become Tanzania).

13 December 1963: Kenya13 July 1964: Malawi16 December 1964: ZambiaOctober 1965: The Gambia31 October 1966: Botswana, Lesotho

August 1968: Mauritius24 September 1968: Swaziland12 October 1968: Equatorial Guinea19 November 1973: Guinea-Bissau11 February 1975: Angola18 July 1975: Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique,

São Tomé and Príncipe29 June 1976: Seychelles27 June 1977: DjiboutiJune 1980: Zimbabwe22 February 1982: Saharan Arab Democratic Republic

(Western Sahara)

June 1990: Namibia

24 May 1993: Eritrea

6 June 1994: South Africa

Admission dates of member states


COVER

THE idea of innovative financing for organ-izations like the African Union is not new asthey have been ongoing since 2001. Theactual idea emanated from a summit inLusaka, Zambia in 2001. In conceiving of

the AU, the Heads of State andGovernment of the AU appreciated the factthat they needed to pursue the idea of a newsource and mechanism to finance the AU.In doing so, they realized that there were

limitations to the existing financing mecha-nism. To this end, they authorized theCommission of the African Union to under-take studies, with the assistance of experts,to identify what one AU press release ofDecember 2010 calls “alternative modali-ties of funding” the programmes of thethen-OAU.

Currently, the African Union funds arepredicated on two sources of financing:member states contributions and partner'scontributions. It is conceivable that themajor constraint associated with these twosources constrain the AU from implement-ing its integration agenda. At no time hasthis become as important as now when theeffects of the 2008 financial crisis are affect-ing Africa in different ways. As a conse-quence, AU policymakers believe it is high-time the AU got its act together by imple-menting the decisions of the LusakaSummit.

AppealThe Lusaka Appeal is contained in

Decision AHG/Dec.160(XXXVII), whichreads as follows:(1)The Conferenceauthorizes the Secretary-General to:(i)Explore the possibility of mobilizingextra-budgetary contributions from mem-ber states, OAU partners and others;(ii)Undertake studies, with the assistance ofexperts, to identify alternative modalities offunding the activities and programmes ofthe OAU, bearing in mind that the Unioncannot operate on the basis of assessed con-tributions from member states only, and tomake appropriate recommendations there-on.” It goes on to list challenges, whichinclude funding that fluctuates and is “pal-try”; funding sources that are limited and“are not diversified and remain permanent-ly uncertain”; the “largely inadequate” and“unstable” funds that are given to the AU,and which are not given “in real-time”.

It finally concludes that “the one andonly solution allowing Africa to meet all

Skeptics of continental integration too often claim that institutions like the African Union and

the RECs will never get far because apart from the political will, they do not have resources.

While this kind of criticism is valid, one can also readily dismiss it against the face of efforts by

institutions to resolve it, contends *Emmanuel Bensah.

Financing Africa's Integration

Imposing Chinese-built and donated AU Headquarters


these challenges lie in Africa making avail-able to the AU and its organs, their ownresources that are stable, substantial andmore or less permanent; and hence theLusaka Appeal of July 2001

As one might expect, the implementa-tion of the Lusaka Appeal has been fraughtwith challenges, which include, for example,country delegations. Most often than not,the experts working on the Appeal are notthe same ones from one meeting to anoth-er; and the government changes in coun-tries also change with every government,inevitably taking with them vital informa-tion that would have been necessary asinput for the implementation.

This trend has inevitably derailed the“virtually-permanent achievements” of pre-vious meetings, with each new delegationwanting to make its mark on the proposedinstruments.

The encouraging news is that a deci-sion was adopted at the 15th ordinary ses-sions of the Assembly of the AU inKampala, Uganda, in July 2010, and thatdecision reflects the firm political will of theHeads of State and Government to finalizethe issue. Furthermore, the political willexpressed by Heads of State andGovernment in the Kampala Decisioninvites experts as well as the ministers, totruly address the issue and make clear, con-sensual and concrete recommendationsvery much-needed for innovative financingto make the impact it so needs for Africanintegration.

ContentionOn the back of this critical debate is a

source of contention among policy-makersover how the AU sources its funds. In anOctober 2012 report entitled “A Streamcannot rise above its source: Financing ofAfrica's Regional Integration”, the five-pageanalysis (written by the Executive Directorof the CCP-AU Janah Ncube and PolicyAnalyst with the Open SocietyFoundation's AU Advocacy ProgramMaureen Akena), offered a fairly succinctview of what is happening with the AfricanUnion's finances; what are the challenges tothe financing, and what models exist thatcan inform a change.

The July 2012 summit approved the2013 budget of the AU, which totalsUSD277 million, with contributions as fol-lows: the AU member states pay 44% of thebudget (122.8 million), with donors payingno less than 56% of the budget, or 155.3

million. That said, the total operational costof USD117.4 million is covered by theMember states. With respect to the pro-grams budget, member states pay 3%, withthe donors footing a whopping 97% of thebudget.

According to the authors, programcosts for key institutions, such as the Pan-African Parliament(PAP); the HumanRights Commission (ACHPR); the AfricanCourt (AfCHPR); NEPAD PlanningCommission Agency (NPCA); theCommission on InternationalLaw(AUCIL); the Anti-Corruption Boardand the Committee on the Rights andWelfare of Children (ACRWC) are all paidfor by external donors! There is no alloca-tion at all from member states towards thelatter, which has the mandate to promoteand protect the rights of children in Africa. There is no gainsaying “he who pays thepiper calls the tune”, which is the appropri-ate sub-heading for the section in the reportexplaining the dominance of donors in theoperationalisation of the AU's work. Thereport states “while it is commendable thatthe operational costs are wholly covered byAU member states, it is quite disturbingthat the integration and development agen-da for this continent is being paid for by for-eign resources.”

Inevitably, it can only prompt the ques-tion of who really is in control of the AU.Even if donors, because of the global eco-nomic downturn, were able to come upwith 42% of what was expected from themin mid-2012, does that substantial sum notlead the AU member states beholden tothem

Bottom line is that the AU often has towait on external funding before being ableto respond to conflicts that require peace-keeping missions. Given all that is happen-ing in Mali; Somalia; Eastern DRC andGuinea Bissau, it is very likely most of thefunding will from donors. The report couldnot have put it better when it states “we can-not champion our African solutions whenwe can't pay for them.” While it may seemcommon-sense for some, it seems not-so-much for African policymakers who oftengo, cap-in-hand, to donors and the West toask for technology transfer and “assistance.”

Before we answer that, it is importantto first explain who is actually paying thefunds at the AU. The truth is both shockingand funny: five countries-paying $16millioneach-pay 66% of the AU member statescontribution. These are South Africa;

Nigeria; Libya; Egypt; and Algeria. Thisinevitably means that the 34% of AU mem-ber states contributions are paid by a shock-ing and whopping 48 African countries.

The report maintains that by mid-2012, only 11(20%) of the 54 memberstates had fully-paid their contributions;with 19 countries owing for the current yearand 24(44%) having arrears from previousyears.

With these execrable statistics, how onEarth do African policymakers expect theAfrican Union to operate? These are funda-mental questions that need answering. Theregional economic communities seem tooffer an answer.

SourcesThe original study by the Commission

of the African Union proposed no less thaneight scenarios of innovative financingsources. These sources are to be structuredaround: (a) tax on imports; (b)tax on rev-enue from hydrocarbon exports; (c)tax oninsurance premiums; (d)levy on airlinetickets; (e) involvement of the private sec-tor through sponsorship and other forms ofsupport; (f) the sale of items and otherproducts carrying the African Union sym-bol. However, as a consequence of a seriesof expert meetings and ministerial confer-ences, the Commission's choice was limitedto the following main components orinstruments: (i) levy on imports from therest of the world; (ii)levy on airline tickets;and (iii)levy on insurance policies.

In order to obtain a greater insight intohow these three instruments are used inlevying taxes for some of the AU's regionaleconomic communities, we need to turn tothe cases of the Economic Community ofCentral African States(ECCAS);UEMOA/CEMAC; and ECOWAS.

Truth be told, ECOWAS, UEMOA,ECCAS and CEMAC are the only RECsthat have been implementing the levy onimports from non-member countries withsome degree of success

In ECCAS, the levy is called the *com-munity contribution for integration(CCI)*. Consumer goods, originating fromthird countries, imported by member statesare subject to the CCI. Products that areexcluded from the field of taxation are prod-ucts originating from the Community andimported goods under “suspensive customsregimes”.

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These amounts collected under theCCI are deposited into an account openedon behalf of ECCAS at the Central Bank ofeach of the 15 member countries ofECCAS. In addition, a central account forECCAS is also opened at the Central Bankof the country, which hosts the headquar-ters - as in the case of the cash account inLibreville, Gabon.

On the plus side, if the CCI is well-implemented and all countries have a sur-plus in the ECCAS account opened in theircentral bank, it is the entire region that isstrengthened.

According to the AU's “Bulletin onFridays”, these two organizations imple-ment fully the Community levy system.One of the major reasons for this is becausethey are both customs unions, which facili-tates the implementation of this measure.

The levy rate in UEMOA is 1%. As aconsequence, the levy rate in the membercountries of UEMOA is 1.5%, broken downas follows: (i)1% for UEMOA; (ii)0.5% forECOWAS countries.

In ECOWAS, as in ECCAS, the com-munity levy is placed on taxable value ofgoods imported into the Community fromthird countries and marketed for consump-tion. The following are exempt from thecommunity levy: (i)aid, grants and non-repayable subsidies for a state, public corpo-rations and state-approved charities;(ii)goods imported from third countriesthrough financing provided by foreign part-ners, subject to a provision exempting suchproducts from all tax levies; (iii) goodimported by firms under the existing taxsystem at the date of entry into force of thisProtocol; (iv) the goods having beencharged the community levy under any pre-vious tax regime.

ECOWAS Community levies are pred-icated on: (i) CIF (cost insurance freight)value at the port of landing for imports bysea; (ii) the CIF value of imports by land atthe point of entry into the customs territoryof the Community; (iii)the customs valueat the port of landing (APOD) for importsby air; (iv)the market price list of therespective goods.

Based on the import value of importedgoods, the customs requires the importer(who is also from the private sector) toissue two cheques: one in favour ofUEMOA(1%) and the second in favour ofECOWAS(0.5%). The Customs Services inturn deposit the cheques received fromimporters to the accounts of UEMOA and

ECOWAS, which have been opened at theCentral Bank of each state.

Finally, in ECOWAS, it is important toknow how these funds are used. First, thefunds go to the regular budget of theCommunity and its institutions', such as theWest African Monetary Institute and theECOWAS Regulatory Electricity Authority(ERERA). The funds exclude the budget ofthe Cooperation, Compensation andDevelopment Fund; (ii)the budget to com-pensate revenue losses suffered due to tradeliberalization; (iii) the financing of develop-ment activities; and (iv)any other allocationdecided by the Authority or the Councilincluding the capital increase of theECOWAS Fund.

TaxEven after all this good news on financ-

ing African integration, the story is notquite over - as exemplified by discussions onmore levies. In this specific proposal, whichis also known as “a citizen tax”, the idea is toget this levy to involve “all African citizens”through insurance subscriptions: automo-bile and real estate. Heath insurance isexempted.

The “solidarity tax” is so-namedbecause most of the tax is supposed to comefrom G8 and G20, and can be applied toflights leaving Africa and with destinationsin Africa; flights departing from Africa withdestinations outside Africa, with theCommission of the African Union propos-ing US$2 for short distances, and US$5 forlong distances.

Truth be told, ECOWAS member stateSenegal has been doing this for a while. Inthe country, the tax applies only to flightsdeparting from airports in the country.Collection of the levy is done through IATAfor all airlines associated with it. At itsmonthly payment operations, IATA paysthe share due Senegal into a bank account(escrow account) held with the BNPParibasThe bottom line is that even as cheap andconditional loans may have dried up fromthe Breton Woods Institutions, through theLome-based ECOWAS Bank forInvestment and Development (EBID),West African countries, can easily obtainfunding to finance both its private and pub-lic sector initiatives.

Formerly known as the ECOWASFund, EBID is the principal financial insti-tution of ECOWAS. With its holding com-pany operating through its two subsidiaries-

the public-sector-focused ECOWASRegional Development Fund (ERDF) andthe private-sector-led ECOWAS RegionalInvestment Bank (ERIB has), EBIDremains the financing bank of NEPAD proj-ects in the region. In so many ways, it is theEuropean Investment Bank counterpart inthe ECOWAS sub-region, and has beenaround since the inception of ECOWAS in1975.

Observers of the sub-region believeEBID has, in many respects, been a trail-blazer in the sub-region in the way it hasmaintained a consistent brief of fosteringgreater integration in the sub-region amongits member states - especially in the light ofthe conflicts that mired the sub-region inthe early nineties. So focused has it been infacilitating sub-regional integration that in2004, in conjunction with the AfricanDevelopment Bank, it set up a ConflictPrevention Fund, which is indeed managedby EBID.

LevyMeanwhile, ECOWAS has recently

agreed on the creation of a 1.5 per centCommunity Integration Levy which scopeand operationalisation would be the subjectof further regional reflection as part of themechanisms to enable the region cope withthe challenges of implementation of thenew tariff regime.

According to Ecowas, the levy will seekto replace the two existing community levyregimes in the region comprising theECOWAS Community levy and the coun-terpart Community Solidarity levy for theUEMOA.

In conclusion, when one reflects onthis, can one not really say we need to con-tinue depending on donors, or is it perhapsnot time to re-consider that fallacy of need-ing an “aid-exit” plan to woo investors andso-called FDI? If African policy-makers canget past this mindset - and it is possible forthe sub-region to do this, as exemplified bythe instrumental role the Ecowas Bank forInvestment and Development is playing inthe sub-region - then the sky will certainlyoffer itself as the proverbial limit on seedfunding for continuing the narrative ofAfrican integration which continues to bewritten summit after summit.

* Emmanuel Bensah is CommunicationsOfficer, TWN-Africa.


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Africa's gender agenda50 years on

The July 2012 election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the position of Chair of the African Union

represented not only a milestone in the continental body's history, but it also an affirmation that

African women occupying leadership positions had come a long way since the Organization of

African Unity was established 50 years ago, writes *Pauline Vande Pallen.

AT the time of independence, despite beingpart and parcel of the different liberationstruggles and being members of parliamentin a number of countries, and holding min-isterial positions in countries like Ghanaand Guinea, there was no similar effort toensure women's voices were heard at thecontinental level with the establishment ofthe OAU. And whereas voices such as Dr.Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were posing

questions such as “What part can thewomen of Africa and the women of Africandescent play in the struggle for Africanemancipation?”, the Charter of the OAUhad no reference to women or the roles theycould play, or how the institution couldsupport their advancement or addressissues of gender equality.

The situation is different today. Therehas been a greater recognition of and atten-

tion to the role of women in Africa's inte-gration and development processes. TheAfrican Union, successor to theOrganization of African Unity has taken adifferent stance on gender issues focusingon both the institutional mechanisms thatfocus on gender as well as actively ensuringwomen have leadership roles in the organi-zation. For the main institution promotingAfrica's integration, 50 years of engaging

AU Commission Chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuna


with various actors particularly, civil societygroups and organizations has resulted in anumber of positive changes with regards toraising the profile of gender and genderissues in Africa's international institutions,and through the institutions to Africancountries.

When the Organization of AfricanUnity was established in 1963, the mainimpetus for the Heads of State champi-oning the formation of the body was toamong others solidify political and eco-nomic links in order to “consolidate thehard-won independence as well as the sov-ereignty and territorial integrity of ourstates and to fight against neo-colonialismin all its forms”. To do this the organizationaimed to “harness the natural and humanresources of our continent for the totaladvancement of our peoples in all spheresof endeavor”.

The role of women in this grandscheme for Africa was little mentioned. Infact there was not one mention of womenor gender equality in the Charter establish-ing the OAU, and despite the efforts byAfrican women's groups and organizationsfor the organization to advance the genderequality issues, it took the OAU 29 years toset up the Gender and DevelopmentDirectorate, GDD.

ImpactIt was one thing however to set up the

Gender Directorate and another to make iteffective. Even after the Gender andDevelopment Directorate was set up itsimpact on the organization was minimal.The GDD was essentially hampered in itsability to carry out its work by a number ofweaknesses. Insufficient human and finan-cial resources were major challenges. Inaddition the layers of bureaucracy that ithad to work through limited theDirectorate’s ability to both attract neededfunding and to develop and undertake pro-grammes that addressed gender gaps.

The OAU also had a dismal recordwhen it came to women in leadership posi-tions. Up until the time the OAU was suc-ceeded by the AU there were few, if any,women in leadership positions. The weak-nesses of the OAU on gender equalityissues gave it little leverage in calling on itsmember states to address issues of gender.

When the OAU was succeeded by theAfrican Union in 2002, it adopted a differ-ent approach to gender issues. Unlike theOAU, which, as a consequence of its time -

the post-colonial period, and the height ofthe East-West superpower divide - was allabout establishing the continent as a power,a force in its own right, the African Union(AU) came into being when neoliberalglobalization was at its height. Ostensiblypart of its response to the current politicaland economic global outlook was to set outmight be described as a more people-cen-tric approach, seeking among others to pro-mote democratic principles and institu-tions, encourage the participation of vari-ous constituencies and promote good gov-ernance principles.

Women have been a key constituencyin Africa's development and right from itsestablishment the AU has recognized theneed to engage with women. The promo-tion of gender equality is one of the princi-ples set out in the Constitutive Act. Thusthe AU seeks to build “partnerships“between governments and all segments ofcivil society, in particular women ...”.

EffortLike the OAU, the AU has established

a gender unit, the Women, Gender andDevelopment Directorate (WGDD).However, unlike the OAU, there has beenan effort to support the work of the WGDD.Located in the office of the Chairperson ofthe AU Commission the WGDD has politi-cal support to carry out its mandate ofmainstreaming gender, undertakingresearch and advocacy and building capaci-

ty on issues of gender within the AU and itsorgans (including the regional economiccommunities - RECs) as well as withinmember states.

Since its establishment the WGDDhad a role in a number of positive initiativeson gender equality championed by the AU. In 2003 African Heads of State and

Government adopted the Protocol to theAfrican Charter on Human and People'sRights on the Rights of Women, theMaputo Protocol. The Protocol whichwent into effect in 2005 is a landmark in thepush for gender equality in Africa althoughnot without controversy. It seeks to combatdiscrimination and violence againstwomen, as well as promote and ensure therights of African women.

As of January 2013, 46 of the 53 mem-bers of the AU have signed the Protocol, 36countries have ratified it and there are 4countries that have neither signed nor rati-fied the instrument. The WGDD has,together with African women's rightgroups, been engaged in advocacy for vari-ous government to ratify a the Protocol

The African Women's Decade is an ini-tiative spearheaded by the WGDD.Launched in 2010, the decade is expectedto review progress made towards attaininggender equality and women's empower-ment. It is also expected that concreteactions to accelerate progress on the goalswill be identified as well as measures toincrease and secure funding for genderequality and women's empowerment pro-grammes would be taken. Over the ten yearperiod, themes to be focused on willinclude, fighting poverty and promotingeconomic empowerment and entrepre-neurship; agriculture and food security;environment and climate change; financeand gender budgets and women in decisionmaking positions.

Already the AU has made an effort toincrease the number of women in decisionmaking positions particularly in the AUcommission based on the principle of gen-der parity. Currently six of the ten AUCommissioners are women, holding portfo-lios such as Trade and Industry, HumanResources, Science and Technology andRural Economy and Agriculture. Therehave been steps taken to ensure the genderparity principle holds true at the level ofheads of divisions and eventually through-out the Commission and the other arms ofthe AU albeit with different levels of suc-cess.

Yet despite the positives chalked by theAU in advancing the gender equality andwomen's empowerment agenda, there stillremain a number of challenges that not onlyimpact the effectiveness of the institution'sown gender programme, but also impact itsability to influence member states on theiron gender programmes.

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“There have been steps taken

to ensure the gender parity

principle holds true at the

level of heads of divisions and

eventually throughout the

Commission and the other

arms of the AU albeit with

different levels of success.”

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Two of the critiques of the erstwhileGender and Development Directorate ofthe OAU was it was poorly staffed and itwas far removed from the executive arm ofthe organization. The layers of bureaucracythat it had to muddle through made it diffi-cult to attract the needed funding. It can beimagined that bridging these layersinformed the decision to locate the Women,Gender and Development Directorate inthe Office of the Chairman of theCommission. Yet the WGDD continues tobe constrained by the lack of sufficienthuman and sufficient financial resources tocarry out its programmes.

There are similarities with nationallevel gender focused institutions. In Ghanafor example, the Ministry of Women andChildren's Affairs recently given a new des-ignation as the Ministry of Gender andSocial Protection, was one of the least bud-geted for ministries. Its budgetary alloca-tion was but a fraction of what other min-istries received and much of that wasdependent on donor inflows.

Yet while there are similarities there arealso dissimilarities.

With the exception of Rwanda which inactual fact is the only country in the worldin which women have a majority in parlia-ment, and Mozambique and South Africawhich have a high percentage of women in

parliament, African countries continue todo poorly in terms of women in governance.Women continue to be on average less than20% of the parliament, far less than the rec-ommended 30% threshold. Leadershippositions in African continues to be maledominated. Only two of Africa’s presidentsare women - President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia and President Joyce Bandaof Malawi. A number of governments havemade efforts to appoint women to highpositions - in Ghana Justice GeorginaWood is Chief Justice and the 4th mostimportant person in the land. In NigeriaNgozi Okonjo-Iweala is the Minister ofFinance.

Women continue to confront multiplechallenges in making it to the governmenttable. Systemic prejudices often mean thatthe entry barrier to public life is raised high-er for women than men.

The discussion on the progress ofAfrican institutions and gender equalitycannot be without an acknowledgement ofthe role of African women's rights organiza-tions and groups. Groups like FEMNETand Femme Africa Solidarite to name justtwo have championed the cause of Africanwomen's rights at the regional and conti-nental level, offering support to the GDDand the WGDD as well as bringing pressureto bear on governments to bring about the

necessary changes promoting women'sequality and empowerment.

A look to the future isn't as bright asone might wish. The global financial andeconomic crisis has negatively impactedgender equality and women's empower-ment efforts at various levels. States contin-ue to grapple with less money for many ofthe sectors that women participate in eco-nomically, and which have impacts on theirwell being such as health. How this willimpact on continental inititatives like theAfrican Women's Decade remain to beseen.

For African women's groups who havebeen the force behind many of the conti-nent's gender agenda initiatives, the globalfinancial and economic crisis has manifest-ed in a fall in available funding. Many organ-izations are facing funding challenges, nega-tively impacting their ability to undertakeadvocacy at the different levels. Pushing thegender agenda forward in the coming yearsis likely to be a challenge.

In that there is little that has changed.Advancing gender equality goals continuesto be an uphill battle for Africa, Africanwomen's groups and African institutions.

* Pauline Vande Pallen is Gender ProgrammeOfficer, TWN-Africa.

Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf Women fetching water


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THIS year, 2013, marks the 50th anniver-sary of the formation of the Organisation ofAfrican Unity (OAU), predecessor to theAfrican Union, founded to promote theunity and solidarity of African states and toaccelerate their efforts at achieving a betterlife for Africans.

Attempts at unifying Africa remainwork in progress at best but African leadershave declared 2013, the “Year of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance” topromote “an integrated, prosperous andpeaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens

and representing a dynamic force in globalarena”.

Year-long activities are planned to facil-itate and celebrate African narratives ofpast, present and future to energize Africa'sone billion population to use their “con-structive energy to accelerate a forwardlooking agenda of Pan-Africanism and ren-aissance in the 21st century”.

A number of issues and events havehelped define Africa (rightly or wrongly),how Africans see themselves and how therest of the world perceives the continent

over the last five decades. Two of suchissues are poverty and political violence per-petuated especially on Africans by fellowAfricans and by extension external powers.While the focus of this article is the emerg-ing trend in political violence it is worthstating that with both China and India rap-idly pulling ahead in the economic transfor-mation of their societies, especially in thelast two decades, poverty is now regardedlargely as an African problem, never mindthat there are many more poor people inIndia alone than the whole of Africa.

Emerging trends in politicalviolence in Africa

Political violence tied to electoral competition is on the rise right across countries in Sub-Saharan

along with a contest over livelihood resources. These pose major threats to the wellbeing of the

continent's population and its young democracies, writes *Kwesi W. Obeng.


The causes and motivation for politicalviolence are immense. Central to any analy-sis of violence in politics is the question ofpower. The patrimonial and embeddedrent-seeking politics practiced across Africain which political leaders essentially retaintheir grip on political power by distributingpublic resources, contracts and jobs tocronies have been noted as a major sourceof tension in African politics. Again the gen-eral lack of distinction between the person-al and public and between individual andthe state compounds the opaqueness ofAfrican politics and its linkage to politicalviolence. In too many cases, power holdershave treated state resources as personalresources as many office- holders perceivepublic office not so much as a privilege toserve the people but an avenue to extractand accumulate personal wealth.

Political violence is perpetuated byboth state (including the army and police)and non-state actors such as criminals,rebels, para-military and guerilla groups).

True, warfare and even mass massacres- as in Rwanda in 1994 and Sierra Leoneand Liberia in the 1990s -have been centralto Africa's post-independence experience.About two-thirds of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced armedconflict since independence but politicalviolence is by no means exceptional toAfrica.

RecordAvailable records including leading

political violence datasets such as theArmed Conflict Database from the UppsalaConflict Data Programme and the PeaceResearch Institute of Oslo show that incomparison to other regions of the world,notably Asia, Africa is neither the leader inthe frequency nor duration of such majorforms of political violence. Asia leads inboth frequency and duration of major formsof political violence.

Historically, there have been shifts inpolitical violence on the continent. Overthe last half century, there has been a shiftfrom the anti-colonial wars, to proxy wars ofthe Cold War era, to what some academicsdescribe as “reform” (representing theNRM regime of Uganda's YuweriMuseveni) and to 'warlordism' as exempli-fied by warlords in both the Liberian andSierra Leonean civil wars of the 1990s.

The struggle for independence and theCold War served different kinds of violence.The superpower rivalry of the Cold War, for

example, triggered and funded the bittercivil wars in Angola and Mozambique forexample. In Angola, the United States alongwith its western allies and then apartheidSouth Africa armed Jonas Savimbi'sUNITA against the Marxist MPLA regime.In Mozambique too, the US and other west-ern countries and the South African regimeengineered and armed RENAMO to battleanother Marxist administration, FRE-LIMO. Although they have ended, thesewars remain some of Africa's longest andbitter conflicts.

Presently there are over a dozen low-level insurgencies on the continent. Theseinclude the separatist movement in theCaprivi Strip in Namibia, the Lord'sResistance Army in northern Uganda, BokoHaram in Nigeria, Casamance insurgencyin Senegal, Cabinda separatists in Angola,Tuareg and Al Qaeda affiliates in northernMali, Somalia, Ogaden insurrection inEthiopia, several armed groups in Chad,Central African Republic and Congo DR,Darfur region in Sudan and insurgencies inAfrica's newest state, South Sudan.

PatternsWhile there is an obvious consistent

decline in warfare and large-scale masskilling of civilians including genocide in thelast decade, other forms and patterns ofpolitical violence are emerging or are re-emerging in Africa. Of the two most impor-tant of these re-emerging forms of politicalviolence one is closely tied to electoral com-petition and the other linked to livelihoodresources.

From Kenya to Nigeria, Malawi toMadagascar, Ghana to Uganda, Cameroonto Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire to Guinea andfrom Senegal to Zimbabwe election relatedviolence have claimed thousands of lives,homes and businesses. These conflicts havethe tendency of setting back the economicrecovery process as they seem to reoccurwith each election cycle in the various coun-tries.

In many countries on the continent,electoral competition is generally pursuedas a zero-sum game and political opponentsare subjected to intimidation and harass-ment, violent displacement and even death.That winner of an election gets to controlnearly every aspect of the state system rais-es the spectre of violent contestation ofelectoral outcomes.

A number of factors may account forthe high levels of political violence associat-

ed with the electoral process in Africaincluding not least the deeply entrenchedinformal patronage systems, politics ofexclusion, mal-governance and socio-eco-nomic uncertainties of losing politicalpower especially as most African constitu-tions concentrate power at the centre.Weak electoral institutions, election fraudand the general opaqueness of the electionsand rules governing the electoral process in

some countries could also be attributed tothe levels of violence associated with elec-toral contests in Africa's young democra-cies.

The massive “third wave of democrati-zation” that swept across the continent inthe 1980s and 1990s was expected to endthe circle of senseless violence and intro-duce a more transparent and predictableelection of leaders and development of gov-ernance institutions on the continent. The

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The brutal killing of about 1,500 peo-ple following the disputed presidential elec-tions in 2007 in Kenya perhaps marked awatershed in this new trend of political vio-lence in Africa connected to electoral con-tests.

Assassination of high ranking politicalfigures and their supporters have character-ized Nigerian elections in recent years. InGhana, a razor thin victory by one of the

promise of peace dividend has truly beenshort-lived. In some countries, it nevermaterialised. Zimbabwe and Congo DR areexamples. two major political parties nearlyturned violent in 2008. Results of the 2012presidential polls are currently been con-tested at the country's Supreme Court. TheNPP is contesting the declaration of theNDC candidate and former vice president,John Mahama as president of the country.Civil society groups and policy research

institutions have warned of the possibly ofviolence breaking out especially in theGreat Accra Region, Ashanti Region andthe volatile Northern Region whicheverway the Supreme Court verdict goes.

Raila Odinga, former Prime Ministerand the defeated candidate of the Orangecoalition in the March 2013 Kenyan presi-dential election challenged the results at thecourts. Kenya's Supreme Court treated with

dispatch and upheld the verdict of theElectoral Commission which declaredUhuru Kenyatta as the winner of the polls.Calm has since returned to the country andwidespread outbreak of violence related tothe March elections are not expected.

Kenya and Ghana, historical trend set-ters in Africa may yet be setting a precedenton the contestation of disputed electionresults through clearly laid down proce-dures, the courts, rather than the resort to

violence on the streets with guns, machetesand sticks. The payoffs from electoral vio-lence in Africa are huge including access tojuicy and high profile public jobs and con-tracts and so it remains to be seen if othercountries will follow this precedent.

But of course other forms of politicalviolence also matter, not least those linkedto livelihood resources. Indeed, the widelyreported electoral violence cases in Coted'Ivoire, Kenya and Zimbabwe all hadaccess to land (or the lack of it) at the core.

As climate change takes its toll onAfrica's vulnerable landscape - leaves itswatersheds and rivers dry and the extractiveindustry renders its most arable landsuncultivable, and the lack of reinvestmentof even the minimal income from mininginto industries that will outlive the mines,contestation over livelihood resources suchas land and water are set to intensify.

Already the science shows that givenAfrica's geo-physical characteristics anddepth of lack and poor quality of infrastruc-ture, the continent will suffer the worst con-sequences of a global climate change unlikeany other region of the world.

Africa cannot afford to slip up on tack-ling both political violence associated withelections and threats posed to livelihoodresources from various sources.* Kwesi Obeng is Assistant Editor, AfricanAgenda.

“The payoffs from electoral

violence in Africa are huge

including access to juicy and

high profile public jobs and

contracts and so it remains to

be seen if other countries will

follow this precedent.”


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AS the African Union marks 50 years sinceits establishment, one question that lingerson the minds of its people is the extent towhich the continent has “broken out” of thecolonial approaches used to extract naturalresources from the continent, with particu-lar reference to mineral resources. A relatedquestion is the extent to which these vastresources have contributed to structuraltransformation or otherwise on the conti-nent.

The vastness of the continent's mineralresources - though declining since they are

finite - is not in question, after luringEuropean colonialists into Africa some cen-turies ago. Thanks, though, to new discov-eries - as Africans have not been adequatelyinformed of the types, quantities and quali-ties of the various minerals in their land -the continent continues to retain its globalposition as a major producer and exporterof mineral resources in addition to hosting arelatively bigger chunk of proven reserves ofvarious mineral resources (see Table 1below).

The modus operandi for the exploita-

tion/extraction of mineral resource on thecontinent has largely not changed afterEuropean colonialist were “politically”returned over five decades ago. This is inspite of recent (from 2008 upwards) movesby African governments to break out of themining “enclaves” operative in variouscountries with the adoption of the AfricanMining Vision (AMV) by AU Heads ofState and Governments in February 2009.The search for and control of raw materials,including mineral resources, is probably themost important incentive for European

Africa strives to move fromneo-colonial mining mode

The Africa Mining Vision as an example of the 'breakout'-from the mining enclave, a neo-colonial

enterprise, to the transformative industry through the struggle to control its natural resources

writes *Alhassan Atta-Quayson.


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penetration and eventual partitioning of theonce vibrant continent of Africa. With thismotive, mining activities were undertakenwith the overarching aim of extracting rawmaterials to power foreign economies indiverse ways. Consequently, as countriesfell under European political control, sowere their rich and vast mineral resources.The approach for extracting mineralsresources, under these circumstances is notdifficult to describe: high capital intensity,dominance of imported inputs, payments ofscanty rent to traditional authorities, littleor no attention to environmental manage-ment, disregard for human rights, no con-sideration for local enterprise developmentand development of linkages, and exporta-tion minerals produced in their raw form.

ModelThis model stands in contrast to the

approach of extracting mineral resources,and their use thereof, in Africa on the eve ofthe colonial period. The cases of gold, ironand copper illustrate this point. Prior to thearrival of European colonialists, west andsouthern Africa were major exporters ofgold to the rest of the world. Modern dayGhana, previously referred to as GoldCoast, was for several years the leading pro-ducer of gold in the world.

The case if iron and its related productsis even more telling. Yatenga in modern dayBurkina Faso, where there existed about1500 smelting furnaces in production, epit-omizes how vibrant pre-colonial mining inAfrica was and its strong linkages with therest of local economies. The quality of ironore and related products made in Yatengaand several other places across the length

and breadth of the continent meant thateven in the face of European imports, localiron ore production survived into early 20thcentury. Finally copper production inAfrica, from ancient Egypt through parts ofNiger, Mauritania and central and southernAfrica also highlights the continent's min-ing credentials prior to the current colonialmining models that dominate African min-ing. in all these pre-colonial mining activi-ties, production processes that were strong-ly associated with other economic activitiescovered prospecting, mining, smelting andforging in indigenous ways.

CosmeticThe colonial model of mining has

largely remained, although there have beensome minute cosmetic changes over time.In the aftermath of the ouster of Europeancolonialist, African government decided totake control of their mines as well, noting itsrelevance - jobs, income and foreignexchange - but failed. While that failure isnot in much dispute, causes for the failurecontinue to be subject of debate.

Critical voices in Africa point fingers atthe nature, design and performance of glob-al metals market and the US' pegging of hercurrency against gold value (price) therebyfixing gold price for some time. These cir-cumstances determined the amount of rev-enue earned by African government andproportion that could be re-invested inmining activities. Those revenues werehighly volatile and often at the low ends ofthe range. This had obvious implications onre-investment, recruiting and keepingexpertise and skills, and research - key fac-tors of success in mining. Yet others are

quick to point to corruption,inefficiency and lack of foresightin the sector after African govern-ment begun taking control of themines.

By the early 1980s, mining inmost countries in Africa hadnearly collapsed along with direchallenges that many Africaneconomies were facing aroundthat time. These circumstancesforced African leaders to producea policy whose implementationhad a lot of promise for industri-alization and economic transfor-mation. This policy was theLagos Plan of Action (LPA). TheLPA had some thought on howAfrica's vast natural resources(including minerals) could con-

tribute to structural transformation. Itsimplementation would have clearlyimproved Africa's economic circumstanceand more importantly broken the morewidespread colonial mining enclaves on thecontinent. Unfortunately the policy did notsee the light of the day. Instead, internation-al financial institutions (particularly WorldBank and International Monetary Fund),having emerged as lenders to Africaneconomies around that time reconstitutedthemselves into economic planning agen-cies and in mid 1980s prescribed policiesfor African governments. These policieswere contained in the Economic ReformProgrammes (ERP) and StructuralAdjustment Programmes (SAP) that chal-lenged the LPA and more importantlydeliberately opened up African markets tothe detriment of local production. Withregards to mining, governments were askedto divest and rather concentrate on provid-ing “enabling environment” to attract for-eign investors. Besides onerous incentivespackages (largely fiscal) offered, minesowned and controlled by governmentswere “handed over” on a silver platter toforeign miners.

The ERP and SAP succeeded in

attracting investment to the mining sector

but failed in addressing the key issue of

transforming mineral resources into sus-

tainable and all-inclusive development.

Consequently Africa's mineral resources

have not contributed positively to structur-

al transformation. Regrettably, some con-

flicts on the continent have been linked to

extraction of mineral resources.

Mineral Resources African % African Rank African % of African Rank

of World in World World Reserve in World

Platinum Group of Metals 54% 1 60+% 1

Phosphate 27% 1 66% 1

Gold 20% 1 42% 1

Chromium 40% 1 44% 1

Manganese 28% 2 82% 1

Vanadium 51% 1 95% 1

Cobalt 18% 1 55+% 1

Diamonds 78% 1 88% 1

Aluminium 4% 7 45% 1

Also Ti (20%), U (20%), Fe (17%), Cu (13%), etc

Table 1: Some Leading African Mineral Resources (2005)

Source: The Africa Mining Vision (2009)


COVER

In many parts of Africa, destruction oflivelihoods to pave way for large scale mineshas been a major source of conflicts as com-panies hardly pay “adequate” and “prompt”compensation to affected farmers andlandowners, as required by many statuteson the continent. Various forms of pollu-tion, especially water pollution, anddestruction of properties (due to blasting)have also emerged as major contributoryfactors to mining related conflicts on thecontinent.

In the past few years, the failure of the

mining regime to produce fair returns tovarious stakeholders (especially govern-ments) has also become a major source ofcontention and now resulting in what hasbeen variously described as “resourcenationalism”. These weaknesses are illus-trated by how recent mining boom liftedmining profits through the roof and leftAfrican governments with disappointingshare. As communities go through variouschallenges in containing capital intensivelarge scale mines and general public fail tobenefit from mining because of continuedutilization of colonial mining model,African governments now feel the bruntfrom the receipt of inadequate financialbenefits.

These circumstances have persuadedAfrican government to rethink operativemining model. Seminal about this rethink-ing process was the adoption of the AMVand the processes initiated since thentowards the realization of the vision. Thevision rightly acknowledges that “Africa'sefforts to transform the mining sector awayfrom its colonially-created enclave features

have so far met with very limited success”. The AMV thus set out its primary pur-

pose as offering “a framework for integrat-ing the sector more coherently and firmlyinto the continent's economy and society”.Whereas the AMV is viewed as a break-through as far as the thought of transform-ing mineral resources into sustainable andall-inclusive development is concerned,challenges and hurdles still remain in theway of realizing the vision. Whiles emergingparallel initiatives such as the NaturalResources Charter and the EuropeanUnion's Raw Materials Initiative could chal-lenge the realization of the AMV, of moreimportance is how African governmentscan “walk the talk”. The regulatory frame-work must change to be AMV-compliantfollowing required changes in national min-ing policies, mining contracts must be rene-gotiated, and Africans, particularly thosewith responsibilities must change theirways.

* Alhassan Atta-Quayson is ProgrammeOfficer, Third World Network-Africa.

“Whereas the AMV is viewed

as a breakthrough as far as

the thought of transforming

mineral resources into sustain-

able and all-inclusive develop-

ment is concerned, challenges

and hurdles still remain in the

way of realizing the vision.”

South African miners on demonstration


Turning West Africa into a FreeMigration and Trade Zone

By Tamba Jean-Matthew III

WEST AFRICA is still the freest region inAfrica in terms of citizens' movement eventhough The Gambia and Cape Verde havelately introduced relatively stiff arrange-ments for entry and residence of Ecowas cit-izens on their territories.

Over 100 million of the estimated 350million of the region's citizens live freely inother countries thanks to efforts by theEconomic Community of West AfricanStates (Ecowas) which is making impres-sive headways to guarantee the free move-

ment of persons and goods in the region. Among the nationals that have widelymigrated in the region are Guineans,Liberians, Sierra Leoneans and Nigerianswho have been pushed into migration duemainly to civil wars or bad governance.

In spite of the Ecowas protocols thatdiscourage restrictions on citizens move-ments in the region, foreign residents in theGambia require a fee of about US$100 for athree-month permit while Cape Verdeinsists on clearly identifying the alien host

inviting a guest to the Island country due topressure especially from Nigerians to createa new safe haven there.

Ecowas' moves to protect its citizenshave not been lacking. The regional bloc forinstance established a Brown Card schemeway back in 1982 to guarantee to the vic-tims of road accidents a prompt and faircompensation of damages caused by non-resident motorists from Ecowas memberstates visiting their territory. The bureauestablished in member states carried out

COVER


investigations and settlements of claimsarousing from accidents incurred by BrownCard holders.

Besides Ecowas, a non- governmentalinitiative called 'Borderless' has been mak-ing strides for people and businesses to ben-efit by making regional economic integra-tion a reality.

Among 'Borderless' aims is to fostercompetitive trade in West Africa by reduc-ing barriers to trade, streamlining proce-dures, attacking corruption and facilitatingthe movement of goods and people willlower costs, create jobs and generate morerevenue for government and more incomefor people.

These initiatives by state and non-stateactors have in many ways encouraged andpromoted trade among member countriesin spite of some bottlenecks, like the prolif-eration of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)which are arguably one of the main stum-bling blocks to cross border trade not onlyin West Africa.

NTBs have been defined as a variety ofrules and regulations that slow cross-bordertrade by imposing quotas, embargoes andlevies. These restrictions are non-tariff innature, meaning that no tax or duty is paid.And it is when neither tax nor duty is paidand no official receipt issued that makes thephenomenon illegal and corrupt.

PledgesIn spite of pledges by many govern-

ments to curtail the phenomenon throughthe work of anti-corruption commissions, itis still commonplace to see mischievouscustoms officials or other men in uniformextorting money from traders for goodstransported across borders through officialcheckpoints. Billions of dollars are lost eachyear as a result of this nefarious practiceaccording to statistics.

Some critics have argued that is due tothis weakness that the European Union isseeking to obtain over 70 percent of theregion's markets while the United States iskeen on its African Growth andOpportunity Act (AGOA) which providetariff-free import into the US for thousandsof products from some 37 African nations. But lately, the some African Civil societyactivists in West Africa have been warninggovernments in the region over the high riskof opening over 70 percent of the subregion's market to the European Union. The alarm was sounded in Dakar ahead of athree-day meeting of a regional ministerial

monitoring committee of Ecowas thatobtained in Accra in February this year.

The ECOWAS monitoring committeeis directly responsible for conducting nego-tiations of the Economic PartnershipAgreement (Epa) with the EuropeanUnion.

The activists acting under the Platformof Civil Society Organizations of WestAfrica on the Cotonou Agreement insistedthat there should be no new concession toopen up the region's market to theEuropean Union beyond 70 percent.

They insisted that openning up theregion's markets to the European Unionbeyond 70 was “economically unsustain-able”.

Besides mineral resources like iron ore,bauxite, timber, diamonds and gold, theWest Africa region also exports cash cropsincluding cocoa and coffee as well as otheragricultural produce like mangoes, greenbeans and banana.

The Dakar-based civil society organisa-tion warned the ministerial monitoringcommittee which mainly comprises ofnegotiators “against any violation of themandate given by the region's heads ofstate”.

MandateThe activists recalled that the

Conference of Heads of State of Ecowashad mandated regional institutions to setthe maximum threshold of opening themarket to the EU by 70 percent.

They explained that even though thenegotiators in the region had complied withthe mandate, the European Union wasalways insisting on the opening up of themarkets by at least 80%.

But the civil society activists counterargue that opening up the market beyond70 percent could impact negatively onemployment, growth and householdincomes in the region.

Among other things, the ministerialmonitoring committee discussed currenttrade negotiations and progress made onEcowas' Common External Tariff, exam-ined the offer of market access as well asother outstanding issues.

The EPA is presently negotiating for areduction of trade barriers between the EUand the countries of the African, Caribbeanand Pacific regions.

By all indications, the intention thatEcowas and 'Borderless' have for WestAfrica is for instance to make it possible for

a truck carrying rice from a port in Ghana toarrive in Burkina Faso in three days insteadof nine; for people crossing from Togo intoBenin to do so in 10 minutes instead of onehour and for an exporter to pay a truckingcompany just to cover the costs of labor andfuel to send a load of shea nuts to port with-out adding US$250 to pay bribes at check-points along the way.

Arguably, it is their intention to seeWest Africa competing in internationalmarkets more successfully, increase exportsand create jobs, make businesses becomemore productive and raise incomes whilereducing consumer prices and for millionsof people who spend up to 80% of theirincome on food to enjoy food security.

COVER

“Among 'Borderless' aims is to

foster competitive trade in

West Africa by reducing barri-

ers to trade, streamlining pro-

cedures, attacking corruption

and facilitating the movement

of goods and people will lower

costs, create jobs and generate

more revenue for government

and more income for people.”


DEVELOPMENT

Subsidies and GM cropsback on food policy menu

Once put on the backburner, the issue of subsidies and GM crops are back on the agenda of

many countries as captured in the following report by *IRIN.

FOOD has become expensive and seemsset to stay that way, so growing more of ithas become both a necessity and an attrac-tive investment.

But the trend has also put contentiousissues like agricultural subsidies and geneti-cally modified (GM) crops on the menuonce again.

IRIN talked to some of the leadingfood security experts on the emerging issueshighlighted in, among other new reports,the 2012 Global Food Policy Report by theInternational Food Policy ResearchInstitute (IFPRI).

Countries like Malawi, caught in a trapof cyclical droughts, have provided subsi-dized fertilizer to boost food production buthave come under attack for promotingunsustainable support to their farmers.

" The position of donors on fertilizersubsidies is quite scandalous, given what ishappening in their own countries," saysPeter Hazell, a leading agriculture expertwho has worked with the World Bank andIFPRI.

A drought in the US and fluctuatingfood prices have led policy-makers thereand in the European Union (EU) to rethinkprotection and support for their farmers.

The US Farm Bill governs agriculturepolicy and is updated every four years, butthe 2008 legislation was extended toSeptember 2013.

The proposed bill recommends anexpanded insurances programme with newcrop insurance subsidies so farmers receivemoney when income from certain cropsfalls below a targeted level, and sets target

prices for crops that trigger payments whenrevenues fall for several consecutive years atmuch higher levels than before.

The EU has done away with exportsubsidies that supported the disposal of sur-plus production abroad, but its EUCommon Agriculture Policy ensures highlevels of direct support to farmers and pro-tects its own markets.

Jim French, policy advisor to OxfamAmerica, says the organization "does notobject to a nation's right to invest in andprotect its agricultural interests", but subsi-dies can "sometimes distort both the marketand production in ways that impact globalhunger and poverty rates", and notes thatsome of the proposals in the new US FarmBill "included moving back to subsidies".

DEVELOPMENT


Agriculture expert Steve Wiggins, ofthe Overseas Development Institute(ODI), says if rich countries are providingsubsidies, it does not mean poor countriesshould emulate their bad example.

He argues that subsidies in rich coun-tries "do not prevent any African govern-ment from providing decent rural accessroads, from funding research and extension,maintaining competitive exchange rates,and so on". It is export subsidies that affectfarmers in Africa, but poor countries canprotect themselves from cheap imports byimposing tariffs.

Hazell points out that subsidies havehelped countries like Malawi. "Perhaps theright lesson for Africa is not that subsidiesare always bad, but that they need to bedesigned and implemented in more target-ed ways that include a built-in exit strategy,"and address financial viability.

These developments have promptedexperts and activists to call for reviving thestalled Doha round of talks at the WorldTrade Organization (WTO), which was toconsider subsidies, tariffs and trade distor-tion in agriculture.

OutrageThe US Congress adopted a clause in

its 2013 agriculture budget bill that effec-tively bars the department of agriculturefrom any attempt to halt planting or har-vesting a GM crop, even if the call comesfrom the judiciary, sparking outrage. Indiaimposed a 10-year moratorium on field tri-als of GM crops in 2012.

Organizations like Greenpeace andactivists worldwide welcomed India's deci-sion, but the IFPRI report describes it as asignificant setback to food policy, and main-stream scientists argue that GM crops offera way out of deepening food insecurity asgrowing conditions like the weather andwater become compromised by climatechange.

IFPRI researchers P K Joshi andDevesh Roy note that the moratorium, "notbased on scientific logic, will have negativeeffects on frontier research and demand-driven technology generation".

The adoption of the US clause, nick-named the "Monsanto Protection Act", wasdescribed by Greenpeace as a "sad day fordemocracy and the future of our food".Mark Bittman, a food writer for the NewYork Times, cites interviews with the Unionof Concerned Scientists stating that GMcrops purported to be weed- and insect-

resistant are actually failing.There is no reliable proof that GM

crops are harmful to human beings. "That'snot the same thing as saying that the poten-tial isn't there for novel proteins and otherchemicals to generate unexpected prob-lems," Bittman writes, "which [is] why weneed strict, effective testing and regulatorysystems."

The debate on GM crops is polarizedbetween supporters and those who think itwill have long-term impacts on biodiversity,possibly health, and lead to a takeover offood production by corporations likeMonsanto. This has also been the case inAfrica, where some countries have bannedGM maize as food aid.

Per Pinstrup-Andersen, 2001 WorldFood Prize Laureate and the author of abook on the politics of GM food, describedIndia's moratorium as "nonsensical", andsaid it "reduces India's efforts to assure sus-tainable food security for its population".

He is among the mainstream scientistswho prefer to be open-minded on GM tech-nology and believe that while it might notbe the panacea to climate-proof plants, it isa tool with some potential to ensure foodsecurity in the coming decades.

Regulation"The regulation of the use of improved

crop varieties in the United States is bestdone by the relevant agencies within thefederal government, and not by the judici-ary," he told IRIN. "Lack of understandingand insufficient knowledge among somejudges are likely to result in erroneous deci-sions."

Hazell, who also backs the mainstreamview on GM technology, likens the currentsituation to the state of computer science inthe early 1960s.

"While the critics were still obsessedwith problems of mainframe computers, theindustry was busy developing laptop andportable computers that transformed notonly the industry, but also the world.

Let's hope that something similar hap-pens with the plant sciences, otherwise weare going to see a lot more famines and

deforestation in the years ahead. None ofthis is to say that we don't need soundbiosafety regulation, but that should bebased on science and national priorities, notdriven by the misinformed anti-scienceviews of a few international NGOs.

Historically, farmers and countriesalike have relied on yields to measure pro-ductivity, but in the past decade - total fac-tor productivity (TFP) - which takes intoaccount fixed factors like land, labour, capi-tal, and the cost of direct inputs like fertiliz-ers, has been gaining ground.

Alejandro Nin-Pratt of IFPRI says thismethod "is straightforward, as is the ratio oftotal output over total input, in other words,how much output is being produced by unitof total input."

Hazell agrees that TFP "is a bettermeasure... than yield, which just capturesthe productivity of land. TFP growthimproves with new technologies and invest-ments like irrigation that raise the returns tofixed factors."

WomenHe points out that "one reason why

farmers in Africa remain so poor is becauseagricultural growth there has been drivenlargely by increases in the cropped area andfarm labour, with very little growth in TFP."FAO's 2011 annual report focused on therole of women in agriculture, signalling anew trend. Since then, the US Agency forInternational Development, IFPRI, and theOxford Poverty and Human DevelopmentInitiative have even developed an index tomeasure women's empowerment in agricul-ture.

"The West makes gender equality anend in itself, and this can be counterproduc-tive in many cultures," Hazell says. "There isevidence that empowering women farmers,especially in Africa, is important ... But thiscalls for practical and well-focused interven-tions that take account of local socioeco-nomic context, not for the construction ofnational gender empowerment indices thatbecome goals in themselves."

ODI's Wiggins insists the goal shouldbe, "All girls in school until they are 16, atleast... taking care of children before 36months, and making sure they are properlynourished."

Ruth Meinzen-Dick, IFPRI seniorresearch fellow, says there is a lack of rigor-ous evaluation of approaches that haveworked to empower women in agriculture.They have launched a Gender, Agricultureand Assets Project (GAAP) to conductassessments.

“It is export subsidies that

affect farmers in Africa, but

poor countries can protect

themselves from cheap

imports by imposing tariffs.”


DEVELOPMENT

WHEN the Portuguese abruptly endedtheir colonial rule in the Southern Africanstates of Angola and Mozambique in 1975,it was a spectacle of drama and savagery.Bitter about losing power to blacks in themidst of fierce guerrilla war, they embarkedon a sustained scorched earth policy in theirwake, destroying any infrastructure theycould, including pouring concrete intodrainage systems to block them, just so thenew black governments - whom they con-sidered 'communists' - would inherit coun-tries in a state of ruin and dysfunction. Andthey left en masse. Ironically, nearly fourdecades later, the Portuguese are escapingthe biting economic environment in Lisbon

and headed for the former colonies. Andthey are doing so in thousands.

Both Angola and Mozambique havewitnessed an increase of between 30-40 percent in Portuguese arrivals over the pastthree years. Mozambique alone received120 000 young Portuguese professionals,investors and other fortune-seekers in 2011.In Angola, nearly 40 per cent of registeredcompanies are owned by the Portuguese,way ahead of Chinese firms at 19 per cent. Whereas Lisbon is reeling under heavy debtand an economy that shrunk by 3 per centlast year, both Angola and Mozambique areflush with cash from natural resources,especially oil and minerals. Angola's econo-

my grew by nearly 10 per cent in 2012,pushing it into third place in Africa, afterNigeria and South Africa. Mozambiquegrew by an average 7 per cent last year, asubstantial figure if one considers that with-in the same period the Eurozone regioncontracted by 0.5 per cent.

The ironic return of thePortuguese to Africa

Nearly four decades ago, the Portuguese fled their former colonies in Africa deliberately

whatever they could but they are now returning en masse as the economic crisis in Portugal

hits a new low, writes *Wallace Chuma.

“Both Angola and Mozambique

have witnessed an increase of

between 30-40 per cent in

Portuguese arrivals over the

past three years.”

Heads of state of Portuguese-speaking countries


DEVELOPMENT

The picture gets evenmore interesting when onelooks at the flow of invest-ment between Portugal andits former colonies. Whereasin the past the natural patternwas a unidirectional flowfrom Lisbon to Africa, tableshave been turned. Angola,for example, now controlsclose to 4 per cent ofPortugal's stock exchange,while the African country'sstate-owned oil companySonangol enjoys a 12 percent stake of BCP, Portugal'sbiggest private bank. A tenthof Portugal's biggest mediacompany, Zon, is owned byIsabel dos Santos, daughterto Angolan PresidentEduardo dos Santos.

But there is anothertwist of irony in all this.While both Mozambiqueand Angola are registeringsignificant economic growthand providing new opportu-nities to hordes ofPortuguese and Chineseinvestors, professional work-ers and others, the local pop-ulations of the two countriesaren't quite as lucky. Theunemployment rate inAngola is 26 per cent, and inMozambique it stands at 27per cent. This is way too high even when com-

pared to ailing Portugal's 16 per cent.Despite being Africa's biggest oil exporter,Angola is still considered one of the poorestcountries on earth, ranking 148th on theUN Human Development Index.Mozambique fares even worse, ranking172nd. In fairness, both countries sufferedyears of protracted and devastating civilwars after independence and only startedgrowing within the past 10 or so years,thanks to the global (especially Chinese)appetite for natural resources. It wouldtherefore be nigh impossible to reverse thedamage that lasted for decades within only afew years. Basic infrastructure such asschools, clinics and roads that weredestroyed during the wars are still to be fullyrestored in many parts of both countries.

But this does not take away the realitythat the newfound wealth in Angola and

Mozambique is not beingfairly shared by the citizensand therefore has not beenable to pull the most vulner-able groups out of poverty.As young Portuguese profes-sionals find an El Dorado inboth Maputo and Luanda -the capitals of Mozambiqueand Angola, respectively -more than two thirds of peo-ple in both countries still liveon less than US$ 2 a day andare therefore consideredextremely poor.

The inequalities aremore pronounced in Angolawhere the President and hisinner circle boast of billionsof investments in Portugaland other offshore destina-tions, while only marginallyinvesting in their own peopleand in their own post-warcountry. The brutal irony isthat, according to mediareports here, most of theyoung Portuguese immi-grants are not intending tostay in Africa for long.They're in it to make money,and once done they willjump into the next flightback home.

For local nationals withno immediate connection to the rulingelites in both countries, the fruits of the newwealth from oil and minerals remain a pipedream. And they have very few, if anyoptions. This skewed distribution of wealthextends beyond just Angola andMozambique. Despite the growing wave ofresource nationalism across Africa, in thewake of the spiralling global price of naturalcommodities, there are still shocking levelsof inequality within countries. Only a tinyfraction of the local populations - fromSouth Africa to Ghana, from Nigeria toZambia - can really claim to be benefittingin meaningful ways from the surge in miner-al and metal prices in Africa.

* Wallace Chuma, a senior lecturer in film andmedia studies at the University of Cape Town,South Africa.

“While both Mozambique and

Angola are registering signifi-

cant economic growth and

providing new opportunities

to hordes of Portuguese and

Chinese investors, professional

workers and others, the local

populations of the two coun-

tries aren't quite as lucky. The

unemployment rate in Angola

is 26 per cent, and in

Mozambique it stands at 27

per cent. “

President Dos Santos of Angola


INTERNATIONAL

MARGARET Thatcher became the PrimeMinister of Britain in 1979. She hadbecome the Prime Minister of Britain at amoment when she set out to restore theacceptable face of capitalism and to slowdown the decolonization of Africa. Duringthe period of her leadership she had exhibit-ed such boldness in her strident defense ofprivatization and denationalization that shetook on the intellectual and political forcesthat supported social democracy.

Thatcher was mortal like everyone elseand she joined the afterlife on April 8, 2013.When the news was first reported, therewere street parties in England. This was amanifestation of the opposition to her poli-

cies. Glenda Jackson, the Labour Memberof Parliament spoke for many when, in adebate about the legacies of Thatcher in theParliament, she reminded fellow membersthat the period of Thatcher was one 'wheregreed and selfishness were seen as virtues.'

Since her passing, the internet andmainstream media have been awash witharticles and information rehabilitatingThatcher, eulogizing her as one of theworld's best leaders and reformist. Thisseems to be, however, a response to the bar-ing of the true Thatcher image on the inter-national stage since she was unceremoni-ously removed as leader of the party in1990. The Thatcher rehabilitation project

stretches from the conservative media andscholarly circle in the UK to the right wingsection of American politics as well asHollywood. Many of the sectors of theBritish left that had been writing books onThatcherism in the eighties disappearedafter the collapse of the former SovietUnion. Hence, many younger progressivesdid not know of the debates in 'MarxismToday' on the essence of Thatcherism.However, for the African population inBritain and overseas, there was no loss ofmemory about the role of Thatcher in inter-national politics. The collective memory ofAfricans was that she had been a stridentracist. Yet, Margaret Thatcher has been

Hagiographic obituaries and analysis of Margaret Thatcher in the US and UK seek to revise

the reality that not only was Thatcher a divisive politician but her government laid the ideologi-

cal foundation for the rampant neo-liberalism alongside, racism, militarism, imperialism that

exist today writes *Horace Campbell.

Thatcherism and Africans:beyond the revisionist history

Thatcherism and Africans:beyond the revisionist history

INTERNATIONAL


eulogized by none but Richard Dowden ofthe Royal African Society, who on the veryday the former prime minister passed,claimed that 'Mrs. Thatcher played a pivotalrole in the ending of Apartheid.'

These efforts to rehabilitate her,crowned with the pomp and ritual of a semistate funeral cannot cover up her true lega-cy. There were enough commentaries toremind the world of her ideas that equatedbeing British with whiteness. No amount ofsanitizing her image can delete her view thatNelson Mandela and the AfricanNationalist Congress were terrorists.

When the massive rebellions in Britainhad shown her that the Africans residing inBritain would resist her policies, she dugdeep into the ideas of Enoch Powell andthen assaulted the independent workingclass organizations, especially theMineworkers Union. The British Left hasnot yet awoken from her assault on ideas ofdecent health and housing for all. Thisassault at home was accompanied by theembrace of the neo-fascist regime ofGeneral Pinochet in Chile, the apartheidregime in South Africa and the most con-servative factions the United States politicalclass. It was this alliance that rehabilitatedthe very conservative ideas of FrederickHayek and Milton Friedman. These ideashave now been given the label of neo-liber-alism.

EmpireAs an unabashed defender of empire,

Margaret Thatcher had hoped that heralliance with Ronald Reagan and the neo-conservatives would roll back the strugglesfor self-determination internationally. Thefreedom struggles in Africa discredited herallies such as brutal rebel leader JonasSavimbi of Angola and MangosuthuButhelezi of South Africa and today the pri-vate military networks of her heirs are beingexposed as the wars of imperial dominationcome to naught. The Thatcher era is dyingand the left and progressive forces are learn-ing that they have to be bold and audaciousin promoting the alternatives toThatcherism.

Margaret Hilda Roberts had been borninto the ranks of the utilitarian liberals fromthe insecure shop keeping strata of Britainin Grantham, Lincolnshire on 13 October1925. She matured within an environmentwhen Britain had been degraded by the war,the competition from other imperial cen-ters and anti-colonial rebellions. As a mem-

ber of the middle class that craved upwardmobility, Margaret Hilda Roberts marriedDennis Thatcher, an up and coming busi-ness person who was described as an 'adapt-able businessman with the values of thecolonial era.' Dennis Thatcher possessedthe requisite income to give legitimacy tothe aristocratic airs that Margaret Robertslater exuded. Her spirit embodied the venalattributes of selfishness and enrichmentregardless of the social costs. These are thequalities that are now associated with thelegacy of Margaret Thatcher. She had beenenamored by the conservative ideas ofFredrick Von Hayek on individual libertyand keeping the government out of theeconomy. When she became the leader ofBritain in 1979 she implemented a set ofideas that set in motion the policies of pri-vatization, liberalization and support forprivate capitalists. She championed thekind of consolidation of ruling class powerthat set aside all limits on the private accu-mulation of wealth. It was the energy thatshe brought to the enterprise of denational-izing state property and her ruthlessnessthat led to her name being associated withan -ism. As one socialist paper summed up,'Her political talents, such as they were,consisted of the nasty cunning and ruthless-ness of the social climber.'

PoliciesAs Prime Minister, she implemented

policies of greed, ruthlessness, military inva-sions and crude enrichment for a few alongwith subservience to U.S. imperialism.These are the attributes in politics that istoday associated with Thatcherism. On thewhole, the British progressive intellectualscapitulated to the ideas of imperialism andracism and this capitulation had a devastat-ing effect on the British academy and onEuropean Politics. It is this capitulation thatensured that Thatcherism continued evenwithin the ranks of the British Labour partyand Tony Blair was correctly called aThatcherite. Thatcherism had reversed thesocial democratic gains of the British work-ing people in such magnitude that the lead-ers of the Labour party, Tony Blair andGordon Brown, continued with the policiesof deregulation and speculation that con-centrated and centralized wealth in the Cityof London.

When Richard Dowden, Director ofthe Royal African Society, wrote thatMargaret Thatcher had played a pivotal rolein the ending of apartheid, he was carrying

out an exercise of manipulating the histori-cal record of the role of Thatcher as anopponent of the decolonization process.Dowden had distorted so much of that his-tory that it is worth recalling for some of theyounger readers the ways in which the PanAfrican diplomatic networks outmaneu-vered Margaret Thatcher in the strugglesfor independence in Southern Africa.

When Margaret Thatcher had becomethe British Prime Minister in May 1979, thewar of independence in Rhodesia hadreached a critical stage. With the support ofMozambique and other frontline states thefreedom fighters of Zimbabwe had placedthe Rhodesian armed forces on the defen-sive. These freedom fighters received diplo-matic and political support from the worldwide anti-racist movement.

Michael Manley of Jamaica, JuliusNyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaundaof Zambia provided the diplomatic supportfor the Zimbabweans within theCommonwealth. Nyerere had convincedPresident Jimmy Carter of the UnitedStates to support the diplomatic efforts toend the war. Thus, when MargaretThatcher went to her first CommonwealthConference in Lusaka (August 1-7, 1979),she was confronted with a Commonwealththat supported negotiations to end therebellion of Ian Smith.

The British intelligence and the Britishsettlers had convinced the British rulersthat the freedom fighters were terroristsand Britain should take a hard line againstthem. This Thatcher did. Hence, when theLancaster House Conference was called inLondon to hammer out the terms for anindependence constitution, Britain sidedwith the Ian Smith regime. The numerousstalemates in these negotiations were onlybroken by the intervention of PresidentJimmy Carter.

Margaret Thatcher and theConservatives supported Bishop AbelMuzorewa who had joined forces with thesettlers. The Conference agreed on thebasic features of ceasefire, demilitarization,elections and the new government forZimbabwe. Thatcher believed the Britishand South African intelligence agencieswho had assured her that Muzorewa wouldwin the elections. Millions of pounds werethrown at the Muzorewa group and at theend of the electoral process, the peoplevoted for genuine independence. BishopMuzorewa won three seats and the alliancebetween Robert Mugabe and JoshuaNkomo acceded power.


Margaret Thatcher was angry and shewas inspired by the fact that her husbandDennis Thatcher had invested heavily inSouth Africa.

After the independence of Zimbabwein April 1980, the frontline states turnedtheir attention to the decolonization ofNamibia and the ending of apartheid inSouth Africa. Margaret Thatcher receivedsupport for her hard line pro-apartheidideas at the end of 1980 when RonaldReagan became President of the UnitedStates. There was mutual agreementbetween Washington, London and Pretoriathat there would be no meaningful inde-pendence for Namibia, and through thework of Bill Casey of the CIA there wasincreased support for the anti-communistforces internationally.

Margaret Thatcher was designated asthe core errand person for this mission ofcoordinating the 'freedom fighters for capi-talism.' The documents of the discussion ofAlexander Haig who was the first Secretaryof State of Reagan has left for the record thehard anti-communist line adopted by theReagan administration and Thatcher. Inher view, she had been tricked by Manley,Nyerere and Kaunda at theCommonwealth Conference in Zambia in1979 and she along with Haig and PikBotha (the Foreign Minister) of SouthAfrica had agreed that there would be no'red flag over Windhoek.'

TerroristBy this was meant that the freedom

fighters of the South West Africa People'sOrganization (SWAPO) would never cometo power in Namibia because they werecommunists. Thatcher and theConservatives supported the famous link-age clause that linked the independence ofNamibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troopsfrom Angola. It was during this period thatthe US and Britain supported the overt sup-port for apartheid under the banner of 'con-structive engagement.' Under this policy,freedom fighters such as Nelson Mandelawere labeled as terrorists and anti-commu-nist hardliners such as Jonas Savimbi andOsama Bin laden were hailed as FreedomFighters.

During her period as Prime Minister,Margaret Thatcher made two trips toNigeria. The political class of Nigeria had

been compromised by all forms of financialactivities that the CIA was able to pressurethis leadership despite the fact that the peo-ple of Nigeria had made a firm stanceagainst apartheid. Thatcher had traveled toNigeria in January 1988 at the height of theBattle of Cuito Cuanavale to promoteBritish business and to seek the diplomaticengagement of Nigeria with Jonas Savimbi.The first aspect of her mission was success-ful to the point that the compromised mili-tary and political leaders deepened theirengagement with Thatcherism and senttheir children to schools in Britain whilemaintaining their massive capital flightfrom Nigeria to Britain. This class alsointernalized the ideas of the conservatism ofThatcher.

On the second aspect of her trips toNigeria, she was less successful. TheNigerian military, despite their conser-vatism could not openly support JonasSavimbi. Though Savimbi made a trip toNigeria to visit the dictatorship in thenineties, travelling from Cote d'Ivoire, itwas after the moment when his interven-tion in Nigeria could change the course ofhistory in Southern Africa. MurtalaMohamed had in 1975 declared that Africawas the center piece of Nigerian foreignpolicy and he had defied Henry Kissingerand stood with the freedom fighters inAngola and Southern Africa. In continua-tion of this Murtala Mohamed legacy,Nigeria, on many occasion challenged theneo-imperial foreign policies of the British,the French and the US across Africa.

AlliancesBut Murtala Mohammed's life was cut

short by a coup that has raised questionsabout military sections and their alliancewith Western imperialism. MargaretThatcher, as the emissary for the neo-con-servatives in the USA was sufficiently awareof that section of the Nigerian military andwas working hard to win the support of thatsection of the military for Angola

After the South Africans were decisive-ly defeated in the battle of Cuito Cuanavalein 1988, Crocker intervened to save thecomplete collapse of the front of racism andparticipated in the negotiations aboutNamibian Independence.

As stated above, Dennis Thatcher hadinvested in South Africa and opposed theliberation struggles of Africans. However,the anti-apartheid struggles had taken such

deep roots inside Europe and the UnitedStates that although the political leadershipin the USA and Britain were Conservativethere was a popular Free South Africa cam-paign in Europe and North America. InBritain, the International Defence and AidFund for Southern Africa (IDAF) was ananti-apartheid organization that workedhard to educate the British working people.

During the diplomatic struggles overthe future of white supremacy in SouthernAfrica, Margaret Thatcher took a hard lineand equated support for freedom fighterswith support for communism. It was in thisperiod when Dick Cheney and the neo-con-servatives in the USA labeled the ANC aterrorist organization. Thus, when con-fronted at the Commonwealth Conferencein Vancouver in 1987 over the future of thepolitical settlement in South Africa,Thatcher referred to Mandela and the ANCas 'a typical terrorist organization.' It wasreported then that she and herConservative allies held that 'Anyone whothinks that it is going to run the governmentin South Africa is living in cuckooland.'

Thatcher was wrong on this score andthe victory of the freedom struggles wascrowned by the release of Mandela and theprocess to put to an end, white minorityrule in South Africa.

As Thatcher received her last rites,there is now a new awareness of the massivedislocation engendered by Thatcherism.The opposition to neo-liberalism is growingall over the world as there is a clear aware-ness that there must be an alternative tocapitalism. As the capitalist crisis deepensinside Europe and the rise of racist attacksseek to mobilize the white workers on thebasis of white supremacy, the traditions ofBrixton and the Black marching throughLondon after the New Cross fire has sent asignal that the Black Working peoples willmake an alliance with the progressive whiteyouth in fighting neo-fascism. One of thegreat challenges is for the revived left to bebold and audacious in promoting newforms of politics and new forms of organiza-tion to give meaning to the ideas of peaceand social justice for all.

*Horace Campbell is Professor of AfricanAmerican Studies and Political Science atSyracuse University.

INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL


THIS year marks the 25th anniversary of akey event in the struggle for African libera-tion from European colonial rule: the Battleof Cuito Cuanavale. In that remote town insouthern Angola in March 1988, the armyof apartheid South Africa was defeated by aPan-Africanist alliance that included tens ofthousands of Cuban volunteers. Their vic-tory forced South Africa's racist rulers toenter into negotiations that led to theunbanning of anti-apartheid organizations,the release of Nelson Mandela, the inde-pendence of Namibia, and ultimately free-dom for South Africa. Although prevailing

historical narratives about the end ofapartheid ignore the significance of this epicbattle, its central role has been emphasizedby Mandela himself.

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale markedthe culmination of more than a decade ofSouth Africa's war against Angola. In themonths leading up to Angola's independ-ence from Portugal on 11 November 1975,the South African Defense Forces (SADF),with covert assistance from the UnitedStates, invaded Angola to prevent thePeople's Movement for the Liberation ofAngola (MPLA) from assuming power.

The apartheid regime was threatened by theprospect of another free African nation,espousing socialism no less, on its borderssince South Africa occupied neighboringSouth-West Africa (present-day Namibia).At the time, the South West Africa People'sOrganization (SWAPO) waged an armedstruggle for independence in Namibia whilein South Africa the mass antiapartheidmovement kept the regime on the defen-sive. Clearly, South Africa's white minorityrulers felt under siege, though somewhatemboldened by support from the UnitedStates.

The Battle ofCuito Cuanavale

By Dennis Laumann*

The skyline of Luanda, Angola’s capital


INTERNATIONAL

Closely observing events from acrossthe Atlantic, the Cuban government unilat-erally (in other words, without the knowl-edge of the Soviet Union) decided todefend Angola's sovereignty after theMPLA leadership requested help fromHavana. As the SADF pushed through theAngolan interior towards the capital ofLuanda, Cuba launched Operation Carlota,named in honor of an African woman wholed a slave rebellion in 19th century Cuba.Thousands of Cuban soldiers along withvital military equipment were transportedon improvised merchant vessels and pas-senger planes from the Caribbean toCentral Africa, a reversal of the voyages ofthe ships that carried Angolans to slavery inCuba in prior centuries. By late March1976, the allied MPLA and Cuban fighterssuccessfully drove the SADF out of Angolainto South-West Africa, a shocking defeatfor the apartheid regime and an inspirationto South African youth who led the historicSoweto Uprising in June that same year.

Over the next decade, South Africa'sracist rulers sought to destabilize Angolamainly through support of its proxy UNITA(the Portuguese acronym for the NationalUnion for the Total Independence ofAngola). Together with the United Statesthrough its Central Intelligence Agency, theSADF trained and armed UNITA and coor-dinated its campaign of terror against theAngolan people. Whenever the Angolanmilitary, assisted by Soviet and Cuban advi-sors, struck against UNITA, the SADF car-ried out air strikes and ground invasions toprotect its Angolan mercenaries. As a result,two southern Angolan provinces were effec-tively occupied by the SADF thus extendingthe apartheid system from South Africathrough South-West Africa into Angola.

In July 1987, the Angolan armyadvanced on UNITA's camps in southeast-ern Angola. On the verge of being crushed,UNITA was rescued by the South Africanswho attacked from their bases in South-West Africa that October. The situationquickly turned dire for the Angolan militarywhich retreated into a defensive position atCuito Cuanavale. Once again, Cuba quicklyanswered the call for aid and resumed directcombat operations in Angola, dispatchingtens of thousands of volunteer troops andits most critical and advanced arms tosouthern Angola. The ensuing battlegrouped together all the main protagonists

in the Angolan war: the armies of liberation- Angola, Cuba, and SWAPO (with mem-bers of the African National Congress(ANC) of South Africa serving in intelli-gence capacities) - against the forces ofimperialism, South Africa and UNITA,backed by the United States.

The SADF repeatedly tried to captureCuito Cuanavale in early 1988 but weresuccessfully repelled. While the battleraged, the allied Cuban, Angolan, andNamibian forces, their MiG 23s assuring airsuperiority, launched a counter-offensivetowards the west, advancing on Namibia,liberating the South African-occupiedprovinces of Angola, and forcing the SADFto retreat from their positions. After failingto take Cuito Cuanavale, losing the territo-ry it occupied, suffering heavy losses, andfacing growing resistance to the waramongst its base of white minority support-ers at home, the SADF announced its with-drawal from Angola in April 1988. The fol-lowing month, the apartheid regime agreedto negotiations which took place through-out the year with Angola and Cuba on oneside of the table and South Africa and theUnited States on the other. The rest, as theysay, is history: the ANC along with its mainally the South African Communist Partywere unbanned on 2 February 1990;Mandela was released from prison on 9February; and Namibia regained its inde-pendence on 21 March.

While the apartheid regime tried tospin its defeat in Angola as a tactical retreat- and even a win -newspapers in SouthAfrica and the United States depicted theBattle of Cuito Cuanavale as a victory forthe Angolan/Cuban/Namibian alliance.More recently, former SADF commandershave acknowledged they were humiliatinglydefeated and outwitted by their opponents,signaling out the brilliance of Fidel Castrowho directed his troops in a commandroom across the ocean in Cuba. To thosewho fought against the apartheid regime,there never was any doubt who won the bat-tle. As ANC/SACP leader Ronnie Kasrilsrecently argued in an 25th anniversaryassessment, “. . . the acid test [of the Battleof Cuito Cuanavale] is the outcome - whichwas the end of apartheid.”

It is imperative that scholars andactivists reassert the importance of theBattle of Cuito Cuanavale not only for thesake of historical accuracy but also to honor

the memory of those who fought and diedfor the liberation of southern Africa. CuitoCuanavale was the largest military con-frontation on African soil since the SecondWorld War Allies-Axis battles in NorthAfrica. It marked the beginning of the endof white minority domination in southernAfrica, the dismantling of the apartheid sys-tem, and the total liberation of Africa fromEuropean occupation. It shattered the mythof white supremacy that was the ideologicalfoundation of the apartheid regime and theentire European colonial project. It was aprofound demonstration of Pan-Africanism, what scholars lately call “reversediaspora,” as over 50,000 Cubans returnedto the land of their ancestry to rid the conti-nent of racist rule. Finally, it was a testamentto internationalist solidarity as revolution-ary Cuba, always cognizant of the historicdebt it owes Africa, sent its best forces andmaterials to fight against apartheid, leavingitself vulnerable to attack by the UnitedStates while expecting and receivingabsolutely nothing in return for its sacri-fices.

In a speech to tens of thousands in theCuban city of Matanzas in July 1991,Mandela praised the contributions of Cubato African liberation declaring:

We have long wanted to visit yourcountry and express the many feelings that we have about the Cuban revolution,about the role of Cuba in Africa, southernAfrica, and the world.

The Cuban people hold a special placein the hearts of the people of Africa. TheCuban internationalists have made a contri-bution to African independence, freedom,and justice, unparalleled for its principledand selfless character . . .

Your crushing defeat of the racist armyat Cuito Cuanavale was a victory for thewhole of Africa!

Today, visitors to Freedom Park inPretoria will see included on the list of anti-apartheid martyrs the names of the over2,000 Cubans who lost their lives in Angola.There is no greater authority than thosewho suffered under apartheid, includingMandela himself, on the question of the sig-nificance of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

* Dennis Laumann is Associate Professor ofAfrican History at The University of Memphisand author of Colonial Africa, 1884-1994(Oxford University Press, 2013)[email protected]


RIGHT groups and the new Senegaleseauthorities are determined to save an esti-mated 4 billion dollars of loss annually as aresult of illegal fishing.

But a string of difficult factors areapparently blurring the government'sresolve as Senegal faces alarming food inse-curity due to dwindling fish stock.

Among the constraints is the issuanceof dozens of “unconventional” licenses toforeign fishing companies by ex-PresidentAbdoulaye Wade's regime. The licenseswere condemned by Green Peace and even-tually revoked by the incumbent govern-ment.

Barely a month after President MackySall came to power, he imposed a six-monthban on mechanized fishing by foreign com-panies to allow the fish population toreplenish.

But analysts interpreted the move as aclever way to keep the 29 foreign fishingcompanies aloof while the legitimacy oftheir licenses was examined.

While the licenses are being suspendedand new regulations drawn to govern re-issuance of licenses, Russians and SouthKoreans have been making frantic efforts towoo the Senegalese government.

In December 2012, the Russian gov-ernment expressed interest in undertaking“big-scale” fishing in the waters of severalAfrican countries including Senegal inexchange for 160 million dollars and freeuniversity scholarships.

The Senegalese News Agency quotedthe Russian embassy in Dakar as saying thatthe Russians, apart from promising scholar-ships, would also provide vehicles, con-struction material and office equipment.

The targeted countries are Morocco,Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau andNamibia.

The Association of Russian Fishermencurrently operating in several West African

countries said they targeted 400,000 tons offish mainly sardines and mackerel.

But before the advent of the new gov-ernment, Greenpeace had signaled that 44giant Russian trawlers were illegally exploit-ing” fish resources within Senegal's mar-itime borders.

The international watchdog explainedthat the vessels had the capacity of harvest-ing about 250 tons each per day and were“dangerously threatening to deplete thefishery resources” in the Senegalese waters. Interestingly, Greenpeace accused the for-mer government of protecting the Russianvessels “in outright disregard for interna-tional maritime laws and agreements” andthreatened retribution.

The fishery ministry retorted that mostof the Russian vessels were only plying thewaters to conduct surveillance missionagainst illegal trawlers.

But Greenpeace counter argued thatRussian trawlers were also caught fishingillegally in Gambian and Mauritanianwaters.

Fish is one of Senegal's main food itemsand the sector is among the leading incomeearners and employment providers liketourism and groundnut production.

Another constraint that Senegal facesin attaining food self-sufficiency like manyother countries in the sub region, is the dif-ficult dialogue over its food exports includ-ing fish, mangoes and green beans.

In February 2013, civil society activistsin West Africa warned governments in theregion over the high risks that could obtainfrom opening over 70 percent of the subregion's market to the European Union.

The alarm was sounded ahead of athree-day meeting of a regional ministerialmonitoring committee of Ecowas that washeld in Accra.

The monitoring committee is directlyresponsible for conducting negotiations of

the Economic Partnership Agreement(Epa) with the European Union.

The Platform of Civil SocietyOrganizations of West Africa on theCotonou Agreement, insisted that thereshould be no new concession to open up theregion's market to the European Unionbeyond 70 percent.

Opening up the region's markets to theEuropean Union beyond 70 is “economical-ly unsustainable”, the Dakar-based civilsociety organisation insisted.

In a statement, the activists warned theministerial monitoring committee whichmainly comprises of negotiators against anyviolation of the mandate given by theregion's heads of state.

The activists recalled that theConference of Heads of State of Ecowashad mandated countries in the region to pegthe opening up to the EU market to 70 per-cent.

The activists explained that eventhough the negotiators had complied withthe mandate, they could yield to theEuropean Union's pressure to open up to itsmarkets by at least 80%.

“Opening up to the EU market beyond70 percent could impact negatively on foodsecurity, employment, GDP growth andhousehold incomes in the region”, theactivists maintained.

Agriculture, animal husbandry andfishery accounts for the livelihood of over80 percent of the food needs of the estimat-ed 350 million inhabitants in the WestAfrican sub region.

But in spite of the importance of agri-culture, animal husbandry and fishery to theeconomies of the region, productivityremains low while the local produce faceless competition both on the local and for-eign markets, says Rougillatou Diagne Ndirof the Agricultural Productivity Programmein West Africa.

Senegal's uphill battle tocontrol fishery sector

By Tamba Jean-Matthew III

ENVIRONMENT


DJAMILA Sahraoui [Yema: Best Image,Special Mention for Actress and SilverÉtalon], Apolline Traoré [Moi Zaphira:Mariama Ouédraogo-Best Actress]; PocasPascoal [Por aqui tudo bem: EuropeanUnion Award]; … This is how the roll call

looks like when it comes to women's per-formance in the feature film category at the23rd edition of the biennial Pan AfricanFilm and Television Festival ofOuagadougou (FESPACO), in BurkinaFaso. It comes as no surprise to many for

women to be highly acknowledged. This isbecause the role of women in cultural activ-ities has long been recognised on theAfrican continent, and indeed globally. Thevarious awards, publicity, and funfair thatfollowed this unprecedented recognition isequally not astonishing as women continueto make giant strides in the highly maledominated industry.

According to the Burkina FasoMinister of Culture and Tourism, BabaHama, the Festival theme, “African Cinema& Public Policy in Africa,” for this year istimely for the promotion of culturalexchanges to ensure that decision-makersand stake-holders found cutting edge poli-cies to support the development of theAfrican and the diasporan film industries. Itwas equally opportune and significant thatthe prestigious festival decided to honourwomen and paid them the tribute theydeserve in the movie industry. In doing this,as a result, came the big innovations.

The biggest tribute to women was inthe fact that for the first time in its 44-yearhistory, the festival had a woman, Mrs.Alimata Salambéré as the Guest of Honour.Mrs. Salambéré, a cultural and communica-tion expert was one of the founding mem-bers of FESPACO. She chaired theFestival's organizing committee in 1969and since then has also extensively engagedin women related activities. The guestcountry, Gabon's delegation was led by herfirst lady, Sylvia Bongo Odimba. Moreover,as a novelty in FESPACO's history, all offi-cial juries were headed by distinguishedworking professional women from theAfrican continent and the diaspora. Thechairperson for the full length film jury wasEuzhan Palcy (from Martinique) the firstblack woman director to be produced by amajor Hollywood studio (MGM) and thefirst woman to win a French academyaward.

The renowned Kenyan filmmakerWanjiru Kinyanjui headed the short filmsjury, and the documentary film categorywas headed by Osvalde Lewat, the awardwinning Cameroonian filmmaker. Theprominent scholar of African women in cin-ema studies, Beti Ellerson, headed the dias-poran film jury and Jackie Motsepe, theGeneral Manager International ContentAcquisition and Co-productions of theSouth African Broadcasting Corporation(SABC) headed the Video and Televisionseries jury.

Significantly, not only did women head

SOCIETY

FESPACO 2013 Honours Women

By Joyce Osei Owusu and Francis Gbormittah.

SOCIETY


the juries, but they also constituted themajority on some of the panels. These nov-elties, mentioned above indeed markwomen's admittance and integration intothe cinema world. Some have argued thatthe focus on women was taken overboard,however we must not forget that women arecapable just like men and so “there is no rea-son why they should be underrepresented,”noted Michel Ouédrago, the GeneralSecretary of FESPACO. Burkina FasoMinister of Culture and Tourism BabaHama also stated that “when women areengaged the battle is won in advance.”

It is interesting to note that women'sparticipation was not limited to the rolesnoted above. At the level of entries for thevarious competitive categories, women sub-mitted films and videos, just as they did in2011. From the festival's records, it is clearthat since the 19th edition of the festival,women have made steady progress in partic-ipation and the number of awards won. Forinstance, women have been crowned as lau-reates for the Oumarou Ganda Award.Furthermore, in 2005, Fanta Regina Nacrowon best screenplay with La Nuit de laverite, and Apolline Troare won best origi-nal score with her film Sous la clarté de lalune. Despite the foregoing, women werestill underrepresented compared to theirmale counterparts. The apparent backlashof the deliberate campaign to give womenthe place they deserve in the African movie-industry at FESPACO 2013 is highlightedin an interview with Victoria Kawesa, aUgandan based in Sweden, and a boardmember and representative of CinemAfricaat the Festival. According to her, a maledirector from Senegal thought the move byFESPACO to focus on women was comicand tragic. For him it didn't make a differ-ence if men or women were in charge. In thesame way, gender didn't matter if the filmswere directed by men or women. Needlessto say, showcasing women is only a smallpart of the process; women exhibiting theirtalent and being judged according to thequality of their work are even more signifi-cant. Accordingly, it is appropriate to con-sider the awards won women's in this year'sFESPACO.

Women won 11 out of about 35 awardsincluding jury special mentions, represent-ing a decent 31.4% of total prizes. In the fea-

ture film category, Djamila Sahraoui(Algeria) with Yema won the Silver Stallion,the Best Image, and Special Mention forActress (Djamila Sahraoui); ApollineTraoré's (Burkina Faso) Moi Zaphira wonthe Best Actress (Mariama Ouédraogo);and Pocas Pascoal (Angola) won theEuropean Union Award with her film All isWell. In the documentary category, NadiaEl Fani and Alina Isabel Pérez (Tunisia)won the first prize with their inspirationalfilm No Harm Done, and Pascale Obolo(Cameroon) won the second prize withCalypso Rose, the Lioness of the Jungle, apromotional film of culture through music.The Bronze Poulain was won by NadineOtsobogo of Gabon with her short filmDialemi. The only prize in the Diasporancategory, the Paul Robeson Award, went toMariette Monpierre's (Guadeloupe) Elza'sHappiness. The first prize in the televisioncategory was swept away by SamanthaBiffot (Gabon) with her series, The Eye ofthe Town. In the schools documentary cat-egory, the first prize was won by AminaMamani-Abdoulaye (IFTIC, Niger) withHawan-Di.

With the exception of the FictionFeature Video Digital category, womenreceived awards in all the other areas in thecompetition. African women have longbeen known to work in the domain of docu-mentary filmmaking. Hence it was a greathonour that their hard work was rewarded.The quality of work presented by women atthis year's festival was very impressive.Pascale Obolo spoke of her creative abilityas a woman reflected in her film, CalypsoRose, as “innovative visual writing forAfrican cinema.” This goes to support thefact that women's quest to be given recogni-tion isn't unbefitting. The relevance of thethemes women worked on in their films,generally, can't be exaggerated: they were allabout the age-old repression and suppres-sion that culture and life in general imposeson them.

It's worth noting, however, that theGolden Stallion, the award for the Best Filmat the Festival went to the Senegalese, AlainGomis' Tey (Today), which follows the last24 hours in the life of Satche, the protago-nist before he dies. In FESPACO's history,Gomis is the first Senegalese filmmaker towin the Golden Stallion (Stallion of

Yennenga) though Senegal has producedsome of the distinguished filmmakers onthe continent, namely, Ousmane Sembène,Djibril Diop Mambéty and Safi Faye. TheSilver Stallion as noted previously went toDjamila Sahraoui's Yema, from Algeria.Yema, Sahraoui's second feature film is apost-Algerian civil war drama that focuseson “the theme of women and resilience inrepressive times.” The Bronze Stallion wentto Moussa Touré's La Pirogue which tellsthe story of a group of thirty Senegalesemen who set sail for Spain on a fishing boatto seek greener pastures.

The general excitement of women par-ticipants in FESPACO 2013 was over-whelming and altogether infectious. Thiscould be seen all over the Festival's loca-tions and side attraction venues such as cin-emas, cafés, street jamborees, shopping cen-tres and lobbies of the Pacific Hotel andAzalai Hotel Independence. Besides thefandom, the networking and exchanging ofideas among women was lively and encour-aging. It must be recognised that the offi-cial-three-feature-entry for women in 2005,was maintained in 2013. It therefore givesus the hope that this achievement can onlybe improved upon in the future, especiallywith the huge encouragement womenreceived at this year's festival.

In his closing speech, MichelOuédrago, the General Secretary of FESPA-CO outlined positive changes Africancineastes should expect in the future. Henoted that official competition will beopened for diasporan films and that therewill also be an avenue for films on digital for-mat to officially compete at the Festival.Cash Prizes for feature film competition hasnot been left out: the 1st prize has beenraised from CFA 10,000,000 to CFA20,000,000; 2nd prize from CFA 5,000,000to CFA 10,000,000; and 3rd prize fromCFA 2,500,000 to CFA 5,000,000.

Looking over these cash prizes, onecannot help but say: it's a good time to be afilmmaker in Africa. It is therefore our hopethat women filmmakers will continue towork hard in order to take advantage ofthese exciting initiatives in the most excitingof times. Nadine Otsobogo puts it forceful-ly thus: “women must do, not to try to dotheir best.” And that, indeed, is both a clari-on call and an encouragement to Africanwomen in film.


BOOK REVIEW

On February 24 1966, a coup d'etat tookplace in Ghana that overthrew the govern-ment of Kwame Nkrumah, first president ofGhana. There ensued the descent into whatJohn Dramani Mahama calls in his book,'The Lost Decades.' This is the period inwhich Africa witnessed economic stagna-tion, a period in which Africa's period of lib-eration which was marked by its ascendan-cy in the arts and literature went intodecline. It was the period of Africa's braindrain.

Mahama's intentions, as stated in theintroduction, include to explore the diversi-ty that exists in Ghana in the face of the ten-dency to depict Africa in monolithicallynegative terms; to display the differenciesthat exist between Northern and SouthernGhana; and to highlight the 'vibrant life' ofthe urban areas; to show the contrastbetween it and traditional life of the villages.

John Mama's narration of hisencounter with the coup and the militaryintrusion into civilian life with each succes-sive coup d'etat is very succinct. Son of acabinet minister, he was suddenly confront-ed with a situation when his father had beenbooted out of his official residence, himselfin prison, his assets frozen. After this, therewere to be three more coups d'etat.

In My First Coup D'etat, the various sto-ries in the narrative are pieced together in amore 'fluidly circular than strictly linear'manner, weaving the personal story ofGhana's president with the experience ofthe country at large into a yarn that is atonce entertaining and informative.

One of the results of globalization andthe ICT revolution has been a rapid declineof interest in reading culture. Listening tothe conversations of Ghanaian youth thesedays, one is likely to hear them arguingabout the UEFA Champions league. If not,the conversation is likely to turn on theplethora of adverts of the myriad opportu-nities for school leavers and graduates in themany organisations springing up today,short courses on this and that, to put it sim-ply, young people in the country find them-selves labouring under the pressure to sur-

vive. In the academic world, syllabi regular-ly revised to de-emphasize the relevance ofarts and social science subjects. One victimof these trends is an ever increasing igno-rance about the basic facts of national life, ofcontemporary history.

To be sure, the newspapers are repletewith features that bemoan the fact thatyoung people of today have no knowledgeor interest in their past. They are lacking inbasic patriotism. The writers of such fea-tures are dismissed as 'old school.'

The coming of My First Coup d'etat byJohn Dramani Mahama is timely in that itfills a glaring vacuum of deterioration in thereading culture of the nation. To be sure,this down-turn in reading culture is global.Coming from a just- elected president,however, it is bound to draw immenseattention.

The book spans a five decade period,from Ghana's independence. It is an autobi-ographical account, written in the simplestlanguage, interwoven with Ghana's con-temporary history, regime by regime. Bythe time one finishes reading the book, itcould have been about any one of sub-Saharan African countries, covering thesame period.

John Mahama was born into a relative-ly privileged family. The colonial authori-ties of the then Gold Coast are on record ashaving as their official policy, the preserva-tion of the then Northern Territories as alabour reserve for recruiting workers for therailways and the mines. When they decidedto ease up on this policy a little, it wasthanks to John's father being from a royallineage that he got to go to school.Apparently, the symbiosis between thecolonials and traditional authority was stillat work. Even then, it was not withoutresistance from the family of E.A. Mahama.The colonial District Commissionerapproached Mahama's great grandfatherknown by his chiefly title Soma Wura tovolunteer one of his children to be educat-ed. After much coaxing and arm twisting,E.A. Mahama was chosen after the consentof his father, another chief, the Gbemfu

Wura. After formal education, E.A.Mahama was certified as a trained teacher.On Ghana's attainment of independence,E.A. Mahama became a member of parlia-ment and later a minister of state

It was against this background thatJohn Mahama enjoyed education at someof the select institutions in Ghana up to ter-tiary level.

The book details political happeningsall over the world. It mentions the anti colo-nial struggle in Zimbabwe in 1967 and theexecution of Che Guevara in the same year,the attainment of independence ofMauritius, Swaziland and EquatorialGuinea in 1968, and the assassination ofMartin Luther King in the same year. Muchof the book is devoted Ghana's place in'Memories from the lost decades of Africa'as the book is sub-titled. InterspacingMahama's recollections from his earlychildhood, adolescence, and early man-hood through the university years is thepolitical history of Ghana from KwameNkrumah to the NLC days, the regimes ofBusia, Acheampong, Akuffo and Rawlings.

What the book deals with in greaterdetail is Mahama's growing up years. Here,the reader gains valuable insight into thesocial organisation of Gonja society, ethni-cally based inequalities within Ghanaian

A book by John Dramani Mahama

Review by Kwao Tordzro

MY FIRST COUP D'ETAT

“The book spans a five decade

period, from Ghana's independ-

ence. It is an autobiographical

account, written in the sim-

plest language, interwoven

with Ghana's contemporary

history, regime by regime. By

the time one finishes reading

the book, it could have been

about any one of sub-Saharan

African countries, covering the

same period.”


society, not to mention the childhoodpranks of John and his siblings. Even inrecounting his first teenage love affair,Mahama deftly sheds light on the reluc-tance of officials, in this case, employees ofthe Ghana Commercial Bank to be postedto the Northern region, a deprived part ofthe country.

A whole chapter is devoted to theSimpa event, which was celebrated everymonth during full moon at a time whenthere was no electricity which providedyoung people an opportunity for courtship.Here, unlike purely traditional occasions,highlife music and foreign music was playedby a brass band. James Brown music wasprominent. The importance of the conduc-tor of the band, known as the conductay inthe community is highlighted.

In Mahama's Northern Ghana, differ-ent religions existed peacefully side by side.There were the Muslims. There were thesyncretic Churches too, like the Church ofCherubim and Seraphim, who unlike theorthodox churches, used African musicalinstruments. There was, of course, animismwhich is at the heart of all African religionthroughout the country. Among the Gonja,even non- Muslims were in the habit of giv-ing their children Islamic first names. Therewas the practise of leaving food outside assacrifice for the gods, who on pain of beingwhipped must not be seen by the humaneye.

Among the cultural practices that MyFirst Coup d'etat educates the reader is thenaming ceremony. One learns about theperiod of sequestration of the newly- bornchild when it is known as a saando if it is aboy and a saanpaga if it is a girl. At namingceremony, the wanzam or itinerary barber isseen shaving of the hair of the baby if it is agirl and circumcising it if it's a boy.

In Northern Ghana, as in other parts ofthe country, there are different factors thatdetermine the name given to the child. Thechild may be named according to the day ofthe week on which it is born. It may benamed according to whether it is a twin or ifit is born after a sibling who did not survive.It may be named after a forebear hoping itmy inherit attributes of that forbear whichwere admired.

In his case, John Mahama was namedDramani, after his paternal grandfather. Forthat reason, his uncles and Aunts called him

'Nnana,' meaning 'My Grandfather.' Havingstarted school John Mahama's brothers hadChristian names imposed on them by theirheadmaster. When it came to his turn it wasMahama's elder brother John who suggest-ed the name John, because he said it sound-ed 'nice.'

If Mahama's personal story is whatcasts light on the trials and tribulations ofthe country at large, it is in the telling of thatstory that Mahamas skill as a story tellerlends credibility to the facts in the narrative.Accounts of his and his brothers' childhoodpranks as they surprised their rural relativeswith ice water, the way the rural folk used tomarvel at the electric light in their house areimmensely effective as in an unobtrusiveway, they tell their story of the Northern-Southern, rural-urban divides in Ghana.

The story of Alice, John's first love, theinnocence of a teenager in which that storyis told belies the subtle skill of story tellerwho at the same time managed to tell usabout the reluctance of officials of theGhana Commercial Bank to be posted tothe Northern Region, a tendency that per-sists up to today.

Frozen Fire and Oracle74, CooleyHigh, Chickinchi, Tony Marvis and BobMiracles and Frisky Papa all belong to theperiod of young students who held up thebanner of youthful music in the seventies.Enough to remind people of Amartey akaChickinchi, the renowned bass player whocomposed the tune title Sakora Koose.Here and in other places, Mahama shows heknows how to inspire nostalgia.

There is something of the prosaic-poet-ic in Mahama. Frozen Fire, the resilience ofSumaila, who stuck to the school band untilnotwithstanding his lack of musical skill, hegot to play the shekere in his own distinctstyle that earned him a permanent place inthe band. There is a subtle hint is that thename of the band signifies the pent-up emo-tions of a society that has been put on holdfor the meantime.

In a sense, the story of My First Coupd'etat is told as if the political history ofGhana during the 'lost decades is merelyincidental to John Mahama's growing up.But that could be deceptive. John's experi-ence at the hands of the soldiers after theoverthrow of Kwame Nkrumah is sympto-matic of many Africans during the period.The proscription of individuals connected

with the overthrown Convention PeoplesParty from participation in party politics isalso something witnessed all over the conti-nent. Thereafter, the impermanence of any-thing civilian is repeated in the form of mil-itary takeovers followed by civilian regimeswhich are but brief interludes. All the while,momentous events are taking place, on onlyon the African continent but also among theAfrican diaspora. Sylvanus Olympio,Patrice Lumumba, Tafawa Balewa MartinLuther King, Malcolm X and AmilcarCabral are all assassinated.

If these were years of gloom, whatcould the youth do but take refuge inmusic? So they did to the sounds of JamesBrown, Otis Redding, Jackson Five, FelaAnikulakpo, Hedzolei, Uhuru Dance Bandand Geraldo Pino and the Heartbeats.

Meanwhile Mahama's education couldnot go on untouched by the influences ofthe times. In secondary school, under thetutelage of one of his tutors called Wentum,he began to lean towards the leftist politicaltendencies of the times. This continued inhis university years when he joined aMarxist study group. Marxist political econ-omy brought his thinking into conflict withthe practice of his own father who hadbecome the owner of a rice mill after hispolitical career came to an end, an employ-er and thereby, an exploiter of the labour ofthe working man, according to John'snewly-acquired ideas of classical Marxism.

It is understandable that as the storycovers the childhood, adolescent and earlymanhood years, it should be told from thepoint of view of a narrator of such a period.However, with the help of hindsight, thediscerning reader expects some thorough-going analysis of the political and economicpolicies of Nkrumah's regime and those thatfollowed his overthrow in order to shedlight on changes that took place on theGhanaian and African scene after Mahama'sfirst coup d'etat, thereby explaining the rea-sons for Africa's descent into 'the lostdecades.' The reason for some of the unan-swered questions has been Mahama's stated'need to protect people's privacy withoutdamaging the integrity of the story.'

As the book states, Mahama is present-ly at work on his second book. Hopefully,that will provide the occasion for theanswers to such questions.

BOOK REVIEW

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Africanagenda 16 2

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