Africa china dialogue Launch - report.

AFRICA-CHINA DIALOGUE PLATFORM LAUNCH

REPORT

2 March 2016, Sheraton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Africa–ChinaDialoguePlatform

AFRICA-CHINA DIALOGUE PLATFORM LAUNCH

REPORT

2 March 2016, Sheraton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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REPORT Africa-China Dialogue Platform Launch REPORT Africa-China Dialogue Platform Launch

TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction .........................................................................................................................6

Thematic Areas ....................................................................................................................7

Session I: African-China Engagement for Development: the scope, trends,

opportunities and challenges .........................................................................................9

I. From TAZARA to HUAWEI: Myth & Reality of Technology Transfer in

China-Africa Relations: Li Anshan ............................................................................9

II. The Evolving China-Africa Relations: the Scope, Opportunities and

Challenges: Fantu Cheru .........................................................................................13

III. Chinese Investments in African Agriculture: Impacts, Opportunities

and Concerns: Fatou Mbaye ...................................................................................18

Session II: Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Agriculture:

What role does Chinese OFDI play in Africa? Myths or realities of Chinese

Agricultural OFDI .............................................................................................................22

I. Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres in Southern

Africa: The New Business of Development: Chris Alden ........................................22

II. Environmental Impact of Chinese Investments in Africa’s Agricultural

Sector: Tang Xiaoyang .............................................................................................27

III. Africa-China Collaboration on Agricultural Development: Foreign

Direct Investment (FDI) and Development Assistance: Gedion Jalata .................32

Session III: Making Africa-China Engagement work for Africa’s sustainable

development – The Regional Impact and Beyond ......................................................39

I. Making Africa-China Engagement work for Africa’s Sustainable

Development – The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development

Programme: Diana Oyena Akullo .............................................................................39

II. China-Africa Cooperation in Agricultural Development: Success,

Challenges and Sustainability: Shu Zhan...............................................................45

III.Africa-China Engagement on Infrastructure Development:

Opportunities and Challenges: Witness Simbanegavi ..........................................48

Key Issues Raised and Policy Recommendations ...........................................................54

Common Positions and Policy Pointers ........................................................................54

Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................58

Annex ..................................................................................................................................60

Annex I: Programme .......................................................................................................60

Annex II: Participants .....................................................................................................64

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INTRODUCTIONOn 2nd March 2016 various stakeholders convened at Sheraton Addis Hotel to launch the Oxfam Africa-China Dialogue Platform, with a day-long technical seminar and a high-level diplomatic cocktail reception. Over 100 representatives of governments, the African Union, United Nations, embassies international organisations, civil society and media attended the event. The seminar had an opening and three sessions and interrogated issues around the scope, trends, opportunities and challenges in the Africa-China engagement for development; the role of China in Overseas Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) and sustainable agriculture in Africa; and making Africa-China engagement work for Africa’s sustainable development and assessing its regional impacts.

The opening session of the seminar set the tone on the objectives of the launch and the Dialogue Platform. In his welcoming remarks, Mr. Desire Assogbavi, Oxfam’s Resident Representative to the African Union informed the participants that the Africa-China Dialogue

Platform is a multi-stakeholders platform for both China and Africa aiming to encourage dialogue and influence policies and practices. Mr. Assogbavi further indicated that the fast growing Africa-China partnership is actively promoted and encouraged by African Governments but diversely appreciated and understood by other stakeholders. “This platform - a civil society initiative – will be a multi-stakeholder forum by which we expect to generate knowledge, inform and influence policies and practices … and for the next two years the platform will mainly be focusing on sustainable development goals (SDGs), climate change, agriculture development and peace and security,” he said. He added that the Programme is aimed at encouraging and facilitating a constructive engagement and dialogue of citizens, policy makers, researchers and other stakeholders on the growing partnership between Africa and China.

In her opening statement, Ms. Chan Mayling, International Programme Unit Director of Oxfam Hong Kong, informed participants about the work of Oxfam Hong Kong in Asia

and Africa over the past 30 years, with a funding support largely generated from donations of the Hong Kong general public. She also highlighted how Oxfam Hong Kong has widened its work focus to capture the implications of the growing relationship between Africa and China on sustainable development and poverty alleviation in Africa.

The representative of the African Union Commission Chairperson, Ambassador Jalal Chelba, praised Oxfam for the launch of the Dialogue Platform. Ambassador Chelba noted that the AU values the engagement with China and regards it as an important global player. He underlined that the African Union identifies itself as a people-oriented and people-driven institution. In this regard, the AU established institutions and departments such as Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and Citizens and Diaspora Organizations (CIDO), meant to encourage the involvement of citizens in the integration process. The platform should hence assist in propping an African Diaspora, an important constituency of ECOSOCC, in the dialogue.

The opening session was graced by the presence of Ambassador Kuang Weilin, Head of Mission, China Permanent Mission to the African Union, and Minister Dr. Arkebe Oqubay, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia.

Amb. Kuang Weilin explained at length how the China-Africa relationship was being upgraded to a higher level – as the relationship entered a new stage of development. He recalled the recently held Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg, South Africa, where African and Chinese leaders agreed to a comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership based on five pillars and ten major cooperation plans from 2016 to 2018. The priority areas in this

regard include industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, peace and security. He urged the platform to focus on some of these issues so as to offer valuable ideas and recommendations to the implementation process, which he said was the daunting challenge of the cooperation. “The platform can help identify and straighten up facts on the ground and, take care of wrong perspectives,” Amb. Kuang emphasised.

In his keynote remarks, Dr. Arkebe Oqubay highlighted the reasons why Africa-China relationship is and should be important. Apart from the continent being an important geopolitical player, Africa has over 1 billion people – a large consumer base for China. Equally, the Chinese population provides a huge market for African products. Chinese OFDI to Africa has significantly increased since 2000. At least 50% of infrastructure in Africa over the recent years has been made possible by Chinese firms and financial support. China is a major global player on issues of climate change and in contributing to peace and security. Africa needs China’s support in the calls for the UN reform. Dr. Oqubay said the platform is important in correcting negative media reflection of Africa-China relationship. According to him, the platform should assist in highlighting issues that have to be

From left to right: Mr. Desire Assogbavi, Amb. Kuang Weilin, Ms. Chan Mayling Dr. Arkebe Oqubay

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balanced in the relationship in order for it to improve and work better for Africa.

Dr. Oqubay urged African governments to ensure that they draw up development plans to inform Chinese investment on the continent. He also noted that often times African host governments do not put in place the required legislative framework to accommodate the investment – nor do they have clear plans and programmes that enhance human resource development to ensure skills can be transferred and retained in Africa. He lamented the lack of civilian interest or participation in negotiations of contract. To him, this was partially the reason why the terms of investment agreements do not reflect citizens’ interests. Dr. Oqubay underlined that the Chinese development path is a very interesting ‘University’ that Africans should study and emulate. “Learning from China is absolutely important for Africa… however, Africans should understand that the Chinese context is different and should never be mimicked,” he added.

Thematic AreasPresentations were made focusing on three broad thematic areas.

I. African-China Engagement for Development: the scope, trends, opportunities and challenges.

II. Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Agriculture: What role does Chinese OFDI play in Africa? Myths or realities of Chinese Agricultural OFDI.

III. Making Africa-China Engagement work for Africa’s sustainable development – The Regional Impact and Beyond.

Session I: African-China Engagement for Development: the scope, trends, opportunities and challenges

This session was intended to set the scene on the scope of China’s engagement with Africa more broadly on Foreign Direct Investment, trade and development assistance. Both historical and current trends were analysed. Several issues were raised during the presentations on this panel from Prof. Li Anshan, Director of the Centre for African Studies at Peking University; Prof. Fantu Cheru, Senior Researcher at the African Studies Centre in Leiden; and Ms. Fatou Mbaye, Livelihood Manager at the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD).

I. From TAZARA to HUAWEI: Myth & Reality of Technology Transfer in China-Africa Relations: Li Anshan

There exist three Basic Facts. First, there is development in China-Africa relations; secondly, China’s development and China-Africa cooperation provide an alternative for Africans. They can learn China’s experience of development and carry out the cooperation or not. Thirdly, what China has done in the African continent is a promotion for investment since the infrastructure that China has built in the continent has provided good conditions not only for Africans and Chinese companies

but also for the investment of European and American companies.

Regarding various explanations or misunderstanding of China-Africa relations, one should ask a basic question: “what is the general opinion of African people towards China?” In a recent Pew survey, the African response towards China is most positive. In the Pew Global technology transfer attitudes survey of “Opinion of China” for 2015, African respondents showed a favourable view of China. Among them, Ghana showed the most favourable technology transfer attitude (80%), followed by Ethiopia and Burkina Faso (both 75%) and Tanzania (74%), then Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya (70%), finally South Africa (52%)1. The poll indicates that Africans’ technology transfer attitude towards China is generally positive.

Why Technology Transfer?

This is an important issue for African development yet less studied. What is more, in FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018), African and Chinese leaders put a great emphasis on the issue of technology transfer: “The two sides will place importance on knowledge sharing and technology transfer, and will carry out exchanges in technological innovation policies and the building of science and technology parks and encourage research institutions and enterprises to have intensive cooperation.” (4.5.2)

Definition

What is technology transfer? “Technology transfer is an action that the technology-holder passes the technology of production, management and sale with its rights to others through various ways.” (Huang Jingbo, 2005). In practice, besides technology transfer, China also uses other expressions, 1 “Opinion of China”, technology transfer://www.pew global.org/database/indicator/24/. Accessed on October 27, 2015.

From Right to Left: Prof. Li Anshan, Prof. Fantu Cheru, Ms. Fatou Mbaye and Mr. Kevin May

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such as “technology assistance”, “technical cooperation” and “knowledge sharing”, to express the same action.

Discourse

In the discourse on China-Africa relations, there are two views regarding technology transfer:

1. Trade with China does not appear in general to result in technology transfer and China has seldom or not offered TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER to African countries.

2. Capital goods from China are essential TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER channels that enhance economic growth in Africa, and Chinese companies have transferred technology in various ways.

The case of Tanzania-Zambia Railway: a modern legend

While Western countries and international organisations thought it was an impossible project and declined the request from Tanzania and Zambia, China took up the task. Together with Tanzania and Zambia, China finished the monumental project within the time after overcoming various difficulties and at the sacrifice of 65 Chinese lives. This is the best case of China-Africa cooperation, exemplifying various types of technical assistance and cooperation.

Tanzanian President Nyerere once praised Chinese workers: “These Chinese workers have helped in the establishment of the factory, and are actively training Tanzanians to take over from them.” George Yu, an American scholar who pioneered the study of China-African relations, said with admiration:

“To train African workers and technicians, Chinese workers, technicians and engineers had “a sense of a technical mission”.

Training methods included the following three:

1. To run technical students training in China;

2. To open training class in Tanzania and Zambia; and

3. On-job training in two countries.

In June 1972, 200 students from Tanzania and Zambia came to China, 179 of them finally graduated in September 1975. They were trained in transportation, locomotive speciality, vehicle major, communication major, signal speciality, railway engineering speciality and financial professional. After their return, they played a very important role in their own countries.

The Chinese government also set up Training Classes in Tanzania and Zambia. Various classes were set up in Tanzania, such as communication signal, line-bridge speciality in Mang’ula in 1971, transportation in Mgulani in February 1972, special training classes started in Dar es Salaam and Mbeya. Moreover, TAZARA Training School in Mpika in Zambia started in December 1975. In 1978, classes for internal combustion engine and railway communication began. Altogether, China trained 1257 special talents For TAZARA.

The third way is on-job training. This kind of teaching provided more direct and practical experiences to African workers and technicians. Since this kind of intensive training did not need any special facilities and almost cost nothing, it is the most popular practice in TAZARA. African workers learned different skills such as drilling, assembly and dismantle right on the spot and their work

efficiency was greatly increased. Philip Snow once described that the Chinese workers “preferred to teach without words”, simply because there was a language barrier between them and Africans. “A technician would assemble and dismantle a piece of machinery and encourage his African apprentices to follow suit until they got the procedure right.”2

There were different types of training, such as passing on the knowledge, helping and showing the skill, conducting short lectures, model demonstration, experience sharing, etc.

In the following years, Chinese experts still remained in TAZARA to train various engineers, technicians and administrators and maintained the operation. This technology assistance and cooperation continued until August 9, 1986. George Yu described nineteen types of Chinese technical assistance to Tanzania in seven areas during 1964-1971, including agriculture, culture and social, education and training, health, industry, natural resources, transport and communications, etc.3

There were other Chinese activities of technical assistance in Africa, such as sugar planting in Mali, tobacco planting in Somali, all once claimed impossible by the Europeans.

4 China also promoted agricultural production in Africa.

When Premier Zhou Enlai visited Ghana in January 1964, he put forward the Eight

2 Philip Snow, Star Raft: China’s encounter with Africa, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988, p.163.3 George T. Yu, China’s African Policy: A Study of Tanzania, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, p.115. Philip Snow gave a general survey of Chinese assistance to Africa in a chapter entitled “The Poor Help the Poor” in his book The Star Raft, pp.144-185. He sent me this book as a gift in Hong Kong when I was invited by Prof. Kenneth King to give a speech in Hong Kong University few years ago.4 Philip Snow gave a general survey of Chinese assistance to Africa in a chapter entitled “The Poor Help the Poor” in his book The Star Raft, pp.144-185. He sent me his book as a gift in Hong Kong when I was invited by Prof. Kenneth King to give a speech in Hong Kong University few years ago.

Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to other countries:

1. Aid not unilateral grant, but mutual help;

2. Neither conditions nor privileges to aid;

3. No-interest/low-interest and loan can be prolonged;

4. Aid to help other countries develop independently;

5. To produce quicker result with less investment;

6. To provide the best equipment and materials;

7. To guarantee the recipients to master technology; and

8. Chinese experts should receive the same treatment as local experts in the country, enjoy no privileges.

The principles indicate that the purpose of China’s assistance is helping recipient countries to gradually achieve self-reliance and independent development (Principle 4); China should provide the best-quality equipment and materials of its own manufacture (Principle 6); in providing technical assistance, China shall see the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques (Principle 7). Obviously, this is a Technology Transfer process which contains both provision of technology with equipment and training for personnel, qualified to master the technology. What’s more, during this process, China would send experts to African countries, yet Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities other than local experts of the country (Principle 8).5

Technology transfer is not one-way traffic, but double ways of knowledge sharing.

5 “Zhou Enlai Announced Eight Principles of Foreign Aid,” China Daily, August 13, 2010.

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For instance,

1. Chinese medical team in Africa with medical skill transfer existed from 1963 till now.

2. China also provided technical assistance to African countries’ agriculture.

3. In the Mid-1970s, when China was planning to build a pipeline from the western region to Shanghai, Algeria assisted China in pipeline technology;

4. In 1978-1982, Zaire helped Chinese in learning metallogenic theory, prospection of diamond and the advanced experience of mining.

Why Technological Cooperation?

Technological cooperation is not only an economic endeavour, but also a political task. To unite and fight against the unequal world system is the only way to liberate mankind including the Chinese people; to promote economy growth of the developing countries is the best way to help each other and consolidate the unity.

Technology Transfer after Opening Up (1980s-)

During his trip to Africa in 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang put forward the four principles of China’s economic cooperation and foreign assistance, i.e., Equality and mutual benefit; Effectiveness; Various forms; Common development.

Technology assistance was provided in more diversified and flexible ways. Training personnel is a popular way of Technology Transfer because successful Technology Transfer relies on human resources of both host and home country. Technicians /engineers need to be educated and trained.

During the 1990s, China ran 167 training

programs including 2667 p/t from developing countries, many from African countries. Some trainings were carried out by China alone, some by cooperation with UNDP since 1981. FOCAC emphasises human resource development as Brautigam described China’s training program: “In my travels across Africa between 2007 and 2009, I frequently ran into people who volunteered to me that they had been on training courses in China.” R. Toronka told her experience of a training course in China for African chambers of commerce, found “the course was technology transfer in-depth” and acknowledged the importance of learning from China.

Case Study: Technology Transfer in Huawei

There is a rapid development in the telecommunication sector in Africa ushering in new patterns of Technology Transfer between China and Africa. Huawei, a telecommunication company, set up an example. Huawei has adopted several measures for Technology transfer in Africa, which is closely linked to its global corporate social responsibility program. There are various programs on the African continent. The most notable ones are:

1. “Seeds for the Future”;2. “She Leads Africa (SLA)”Project;3. “SchoolNet Project” etc.

“Seeds for the Future” is a program to help young talents of telecommunication in Africa. It was started in Kenya in 2011 and now carried out in Egypt, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, etc.

With long-term ICT capacity building cooperation, Huawei will help Ethiopia in its future capacity building in education. President Museveni said, “Huawei is a leading global ICT company, and we appreciate Huawei’s contributions to improving ICT

development and bridging the digital divide in Uganda. Looking forward, I hope that Huawei will continue investing in cultivating more local ICT talent, especially with the launch of the “Seeds for the Future” program, to contribute to the long-term development and construction of the ICT industry in Uganda.”

Other Forms of Technology transfer include:

1. China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) signed several agreements with Sudan Ministry of Energy and Mining to train oil specialists and donated money for the purpose (Khartoum Refinery Company).

2. China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) Group built BN Vocational School (BNVS) and cultivated technicians in various fields for Angola.

3. Other projects with Technology Transfer: Lagdo Hydropower Station in Cameroon, Nouakchott technology transfer’s Friendship Port in Mauritania, railway improvement in Botswana, the Gotera Interchange and Light Rail in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia etc.

II. The Evolving China-Africa Relations: the Scope, Opportunities and Challenges: Fantu Cheru

The current research on China-Africa relations fall into two categories. The first is driven by Paranoia i.e., the Chinese Are coming! According to this perspective, the Chinese gorging up Africa’s oil and other resources that the West needs; Chinese under cutting the interest of western business by selling cheap in Africa; Chinese support for undemocratic regimes (as if Western powers

DEVELOPMENT ASSITANCE

INVESTMENT

TRADE

do not do that?). The second perspective is driven by naiveté i.e., China as Africa’s Saviour. According to this perspective China is an alternative to imperialist or colonial powers e.g., interest free loans with no ‘conditionalities’; tariff free access to a range of African products; Chinese investment in the neglected infrastructure sector.

What do we know? China-Africa relations are complex; it involves both benefits and risks. It is too premature to arrive at any conclusion as to whether this relationship is necessarily good or bad. Accesses to a reliable and transparent DATA remain a problem. We need more detailed research both on individual countries; at the level of particular value chains, in order to trace the real impact of China on Africa’s development. The absence of a clear African policy on how to engage China is another problem. There needs to be some strategic thinking on the part of the AU on this to be linked to Agenda 2063. Equally missing is a proper channel for civil society engagement.

Figure 1: Key Vectors of Interactions between Africa and Emerging partners: Trade, Investment and Development Assistance

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Fig. 5: Investment: Value of Chinese investment in Africa (as % of global share)

FIG. 6: Investment: Composition of Chinese investment by sector

FIG. 7: Investment: composition by sector and No. of projects

Fig. 2: The trade relationship between Africa and China has been increasing from time to time.

Fig 3: China’s Top Trading partners to Africa are as follows:

Fig. 4: Trade and investment

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FIG. 9: Composition of China’s Aid, loans and Technical Assistance

RESOURCE BACKED LOANS

Extended to countries that cannot provide adequate loan guarantees. (Angola, DRC, Gabon, Sudan)

CONCESSIONAL LOANS Carries an interest rate of 3.1%, a 4 years grace period, and maturity of 13 yrs. Such loans require that at least 50% of procurement come from China.

INTEREST FREE LOANS Mainly for infrastructure projects and usually written off as debt relief.

BUYERS CREDIT (Exim Bank loans)

Interest rate based on LIBOR. 50% domestic content required for exported goods.

Key aspects of national strategies

Growth and structural change must be achieved through “strategic integration”:

• Long-term vision and national development strategy: Ethiopian government Growth and Transformation Plan I and II can be cited as commendable instances.

• Pro-poor macroeconomic policy: to improve supply capability and international competitiveness. This is achieved through targeted subsidies, lower interest rates; protection of infant industries; exchange rate stability; gradual liberalization to enable national enterprises to build up production capabilities and thus face external competition;

• Business and government strategic alliance: defining the role and responsibility between the private sector, the developmental state and civil society. Joint definition of critical policies on technology, financial, human resources and infrastructure are pertinent.

A regional approach for engaging China

A regional approach necessitates greater policy coordination between African countries within a particular Regional Economic Communities (REC), which may include:

• Regional framework on industrial policy: directing Chinese expansion into areas of national/sub-regional interest; technology and skills transfers, etc.

• Regional platform for infrastructure development: as a basis for mobilizing infrastructure finance from China into co-financing arrangement with the Africa

Infrastructure Facility, the World Bank.

• Common framework on resource extraction and social and environmental responsibilities (e.g., EITI; Kimberley Process; African Mining Vision; Land Policy).

Issues facing FDI in African Agriculture and the new partners:

There are issues facing in African agriculture and the new partner. These are financing gap, technology gap, infrastructure gap, experience-sharing and knowledge/research gap. Most of the time, these issues are interrelated as one issue affect another.

China’s rebalancing: challenges and opportunities

China’s rebalancing has the potential to bring benefits, but it also brings challenges. The challenges include – the move from export-oriented to consumption driven growth model reduces the demand and price of commodities. While the opportunities include – rise in labour cost and appreciation of the RMB will reduce China’s competitiveness. This offers Africa countries an opportunity to attract investment.

How should Africa tap into the ‘new opportunities’?

Develop supportive but ‘strategic’ policies such as:

Lowering of transport costs.

• Elimination of formal and informal barriers that undermine the investment environment.

• Increasing flexibility of labour markets.

• Ensuring effective competition policies.

Perspectives for mitigating the ill-effects of large-scale land investments

Human Rights approach: Investors perspectives: Local civil society perspectives:

-Free, prior and full participation of local communities;

-Protection of environment, based on impact assessment of sustainability of projects;

-Full transparency, with clear enforceable obligations for investors, backed by sanctions;

-Measure to protect human rights, labour rights, land rights

-Distribution of ownership of key assets (land, -processing facilities, etc.)

-Voice (who takes/influence business decisions)

-Risk (how supply, production, market and other risks are shared)

-Reward (how costs and benefits are shared)

-Development by investors of business models to share value added with local producers;

-Negotiation and enforcement of deals that maximize local benefits;

-Scrutiny of contract negotiations by civil society;

-Action by local farmers and NGOs to protect local land rights

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III. Chinese Investments in African Agriculture: Impacts, Opportunities and Concerns: Fatou Mbaye6

Background

Despite much rhetoric, Brazilian, Indian and Chinese investments and aid in African agriculture remain relatively less than generally imagined, especially compared to those of OECD countries and multilateral actors such as the World Bank. The extent of influence is often exaggerated in media reports, especially when it comes to allegations of land grabs. That said, these countries have increased their influence in African agriculture in recent years to become important actors, and this influence is likely to grow in the future.

Investments in African agriculture

It is noted that figures for agricultural investments vary widely according to different sources:

China

According to the Chinese government, China’s total (not just agriculture) direct investment in Africa increased from US$1.4 billion to the US $3.2 billion during 2009-14 and its FDI stocks rose from US$9.3 billion to US$32.4 billion. Figures for agricultural investments vary widely according to different sources. Chinese government figures from 2013 claim that FDI in African agriculture stood at $173 6 This presentation is derived from a study on Chinese, Brazilian and Indian investments in African Agriculture. The study was conducted under ACORD’s Pan Africa Programme supported by Oxfam Hong Kong and it offers new analysis of Chinese, Brazilian and Indian investments in African agricul-ture.

million in 2013, a figure which had risen from $30 million in 2009. Another estimate is that the value of (approved) Chinese investment in farming in Africa was somewhere between $172 million and $488.5 million in 2012.

In terms of the number of projects, Chinese government figures from 2013 claim that China had approved 212 agriculture-related projects (grains, cash crops, animal husbandry, fisheries, forestry, agro-processing and commodity trade) in 37 African countries by March 2013. Of these, 86 were specifically related to farming (production of grains, cash crops or animal husbandry) in 27 African countries. The six countries with the most projects were Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Sudan, Mozambique and Tanzania. Chinese agricultural investment in Africa is occurring in a variety of crops, including sisal in Tanzania, oil seeds and sugarcane in Ethiopia, cotton and tobacco in Zimbabwe, rice production and agro-processing of cotton, rice and maize in Mozambique, and rice in Cameroon. These investments are often complemented and supported by aid efforts of which two key related areas stand out – agricultural technology demonstration centres and training.

According to the government, China has helped train over 5,000 Africans in agricultural technology and management and has provided practical agricultural guidance and training through trilateral agreements with a dozen African countries.

Brazil

With regards to Brazil, despite the avowed interest of the government in agricultural development in Africa, very few private Brazilian firms have invested. Like China, the most significant Brazilian investments in Africa are in petroleum, mining and construction. Brazilian agribusiness still

prefers to invest in lucrative markets in Brazil and neighbouring South American countries. However, agriculture still features more strongly in Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa.

Brazil´s National Development Bank (BNDES) is the principal source of financing for African governments and Brazilian companies and has several mechanisms to finance foreign investments, notably a credit line for Brazilian firms. Financing focuses on Angola and Mozambique and on large companies in the infrastructure, minerals and petroleum sectors. The main Brazilian investment interest in agriculture has been in sugarcane/ethanol, where the Africa office of Embrapa, Brazil’s leading agricultural research institute, has forged a large number of bilateral biofuel cooperation agreements with African countries. Aside from ethanol, Brazil’s engagement in African agriculture tends to be through specific bilateral or trilateral projects (often involving Northern donors) mostly run by Embrapa. Several African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea and Kenya have signed technical cooperation agreements and have begun implementing joint projects with Embrapa.

India

Indian investment in Africa focuses on energy resource extraction, manufacturing, financial services, and infrastructure development, in addition to agriculture. Private companies are the main vehicle for Indian investments in African agriculture and Indian agribusiness is notably involved in selling modern farm technology, such as irrigation pumps, tractors and harvesters and/or investing in large-scale farms or plantations, notably in Ethiopia.

Indian investments in African land have been

explicitly promoted by government policies, especially lines of credit (LOCs) to foreign countries from India’s Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank), which are used by countries to purchase Indian goods and services. LOCs, which are soft loans, have been signed with around 40 African countries, amounting to around $1.2 billion for agriculture-related projects during 2003-12. The largest line of credit approved by Exim Bank outside the Indian subcontinent was a $640 million loan to Ethiopia for its Tindaho sugar project. Increasingly, investments and cooperation are also promoted through the Indo-Africa Forum Summits held by India’s Ministry of External Affairs and the Department of Agricultural Research and Education under the Ministry of Agriculture, which is providing agricultural training to a small number of African students and scientists.

1. Key implications

The report finds that there are some common problems with Chinese, Brazilian and Indian investments in African agriculture. It finds that while some investments are bringing opportunities, others are having adverse consequences on local farmers and that the kind of technology being promoted in Africa tends to be more suited to Chinese, Brazilian and Indian agribusiness interests than to Africa’s smallholder farmers.

Above all, investments and cooperation programmes do not appear to systematically align with the interests of African governments. Neither do they involve African smallholder farmers in project design or implementation.

2. Case studies

The full report contains three case studies of Chinese investments in Africa, investigated by fieldwork in Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania.

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However, for this event, only two case studies were presented.

Case Study 1: The Osukuru fertilizer project in Uganda launched in 2014

In Uganda, research was conducted into the Osukuru fertiliser project, whereby the Guangzhou Dongsong Energy Group, a private Chinese company with assets of over $1 billion, is promoting a US$620 million project to build a fertiliser plant and conduct phosphate mining in the east of the country. The project is expected to employ around 1,000 people and produce 300,000 tonnes of phosphate fertiliser annually - enough to supply Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda. The financial benefits to Uganda of the project are unclear since the Mineral Agreement signed between the company and government has not been made public. Different estimates have been circulating: the Ugandan government was reported to have claimed that the project would ‘generate’ $350 million a year; however, reports in China Daily state that, according to the company, the project will generate an annual net profit of $81 million.

People affected by the project are overwhelmingly subsistence farmers who have small holdings of around two acres. The project’s Economic and Social Impact Assessment states that ‘the major impact [of the project] is the loss of crops and the land itself. Being a fertile area, the persons affected are likely to become more vulnerable as they will lose their source of income’. The project covers 26 square kilometres and could displace up to 1,500 households; some 122 have already been relocated. The project paid compensation according to government standards, which benefited those who used the money to invest in, for example, starting other businesses or in livestock like cows and goats. Yet the relocation process did

not involve providing training on developing alternative livelihoods; thus most people moved in ignorance, without ensuring a reliable source of income to sustain themselves in the future. This has meant that most people have spent their compensation money and now have no alternative livelihood. Community members interviewed also said they were in effect made to sign documents to relocate in an intimidating atmosphere amidst heavy police deployment. Since many more people will be relocated, the project will have an even greater impact on the livelihoods of the people of the area. The project may create over 1,000 jobs, but most community members are likely to be employed as casual labourers only and mainly in the construction phase.

Key Recommendations include that the government and company should:

• Publish the Mineral Agreement for the project, showing its fiscal and other terms.

• Publish details on how much Uganda can be expected to earn from the project.

• Support those already relocated by providing training on financial literacy and business skills to enable them to establish alternative livelihoods.

• Ensure that any future resettlement promotes the free, prior and informed consent of all those affected and provides training to enable people to establish alternative livelihoods.

The government of Uganda should also invest more in ensuring that its extension service is able to provide good advice to farmers on the use of fertiliser. However, it should not

see increasing use of chemical fertiliser as a priority for smallholder farmers; it should also invest in agro-ecological farming.

Case study 2: The China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre in Zambia

The Zambia Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ZATDC) project was officially commissioned in May 2008. Construction work was completed in January 2011. The Centre became operational in 2012 and is situated in Chongwe district near Lusaka and staffed by Chinese nationals. It is managed by the Jilin Agricultural University (JAU) which collaborates with the University of Zambia (UNZA) and the Ministry of Agriculture through the Department of Agriculture. The objective of the ZATDC is to improve the capacity and expertise of Ministry of Agriculture staff, university/college students and small-scale farmers in order to increase crop productivity through trainings and demonstrations. The Centre has so far conducted around 38 training sessions and has trained 718 people. The main training focus of the Centre is in mushroom production.

The research found that the training offered by the Centre was valuable. However, the research found no evidence that small-scale farmers are consulted on what trainings they would like to attend; instead, they are just told by their camp extension officers to prepare to attend trainings that have already been arranged. Trainings are attended by interested individual farmers, and selection is not based on whether farmers are members of a particular cooperative or represent large numbers of farmers. Thus it is not at all clear how or whether farmers being trained will pass on their knowledge to other farmers. Small-scale farmers could be represented at the Centre by a cooperative federation which is likely to be best suited to negotiate

and speak on behalf of farmers. There is currently no such cooperative on the board of the Centre. Of the 718 people trained so far, only 42 are women. This is a low proportion indicating that the Centre has no particular focus on women farmers. Yet women comprise around 65 percent of smallholder farmers in Zambia and are the main producers of food.

The research concluded that the Centre and Ministry of Agriculture should:

• Increase the Centre’s publicity work so that farmers and the agricultural staff at district level are aware of the training programmes on offer.

• Conduct follow-up after trainings to evaluate the impact and assess progress among the beneficiaries.

• Involve small-scale farmers and their representatives in the design and implementation of training programmes and ensure that these are focused on the identified priority needs of small-scale farmers.

• Provide transparency on the Centre’s budget.

• Base the Centre’s activities firmly on the priorities outlined in Zambia’s National Agricultural Investment Plan under the CAADP framework.

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Session II: Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Agriculture: What role does Chinese OFDI play in Africa? Myths or realities of Chinese Agricultural OFDI

This session had three Panellists: Prof. Chris Alden, Research Associate at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA); Prof. Tang Xiaoyang, Associate Professor at Tsinghua University; and Mr. Gedion Jalata, Programme Manager of Oxfam International’s Africa-China Dialogue Platform.

I. Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres in Southern Africa: The New Business of Development: Chris Alden7

Chinese agricultural aid in Africa dated back to the late 1950s and still remains an essential part of Chinese contemporary aid towards the continent. Due to the significance of agriculture to economic development and social growth, the sector has always been given special priority by the Chinese government in its aid pledges. The aims and modalities of Chinese agricultural aid in Africa have however undergone substantial changes over the last five to six decades. This is particularly the case with the country’s aid reforms since the 7 Chris Alden acknowledge that the paper was originally co-authored by him and Lu Jiang, Angela Harding, and Ward

Anseeuw

1980s, which began to put more emphasis on aid performance and on serving a wider range of foreign policy objectives.

The Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre (‘the ATDC’ or ‘the Centre’ hereinafter), a flagship project of Chinese contemporary agricultural aid programme in Africa, is a key institutional expression of this transformation of Chinese foreign aid. It combines both diplomatic and commercial goals, involves a diversity of public and private actors, and adopts a complicated operational mechanism. Furthermore, it represents an innovative dimension of Chinese agricultural aid, in that it is a hybrid of different forms of aid programming previously utilised (e.g. farms, agro-technology demonstration/extension stations, experts dispatch), with some of the mechanisms being intentionally designed to avoid problems experienced in the past.

The ATDC project was first proposed at the Beijing Summit of the 3rd FOCAC in 2006. The Chinese government pledged to build 10 ATDCs in different African countries. The number was then increased to 20 during the 4th FOCAC in 2009. By 2012, there had been in practice at least 23 Chinese ATDCs across Africa, with 14 of them having already been transferred to the host governments.

Objectives

According to the official document issued by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture, the objectives of the ATDCs could be seen as three-fold: first and foremost, the ATDCs were launched for diplomatic reasons. The aim is to improve the food security of the recipient countries through the transfer of Chinese advanced agro-technology, and thereby, to consolidate and strengthen the relations between China and Africa. Specifically, the agro-technology transfer is to be realised through the

execution of the four functions of the ATDC: research, demonstration and extension, training, and exhibition. These are also termed by the Chinese government as ‘public-interest functions’ (gongyixing gongneng) for they are all supposed to be non-commercial activities.

Second, the ATDCs also bear some commercial elements. Most prominently, the commercial elements are manifested through the intention of establishing business platforms for Chinese agro-companies, which is termed as a business introduction in our research. Also, similar to the practice of Chinese contemporary aid in general, the ATDC project is accompanied by and expected to promote the export of Chinese agro-equipment and materials, among others.

The last dimension of the ATDC objectives concerns with the sustainable development of the aid project. The sustainability issue derives from China’s decades-long practice of agricultural aid on the continent. As has been widely observed by practitioners and scholars, almost all the Chinese agro-aid projects in the past cannot escape the cycle that: no matter how successful the initial period of the project proved to be, once the Chinese experts left, the project would soon fall into disrepair. Quite often, the reason for this was believed to be the inadequate capability of the aid-recipient countries, particularly in financial, managerial and technical terms, to keep the projects going without external assistance. Against this background, the sustainability issue was brought to the fore in the designing process of the ATDCs. The emphasis on sustainability can be seen from the performance evaluation system of the ATDCs, in which the planning and realisation of sustainable development occupy 45% of the total scores, more than any other indicators.

Actors

As to the actors involved in the implementation of the ATDC project, on the Chinese side, the government incorporates Chinese companies, both state-owned and private, in the management of the ATDCs. This demonstrates an element of government-company cooperation, and, in the case of private firms, a Public Private Partnership model. The Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture at the central level are predominantly involved in the planning, facilitating and supervising the ATDC project. In most cases, each of the ATDC-recipient countries is twinned with one specific province in China, thereby the corresponding provincial governments also play an important role, and notably in encouraging and supporting agro-firms from their own provinces to invest in the twinned African countries. On the recipient side, various counterpart government agencies are involved in the implementation of the ATDC, which vary in the different African countries. No private actors from the host countries are currently involved in the implementation of the ATDCs.

Mechanisms

Each ATDC has three operational stages: Project Construction Stage, Technical Cooperation Stage and Business Operation Stage. The Project Construction Stage normally takes one to two years with full funding from the Chinese government. Then follows a three-year Technical Cooperation Stage when the ‘public-interest functions’ of the ATDCs are to be implemented and funded primarily by the Chinese government as well. Particularly notable here is the final Business Operation Stage. While also in line with the ‘business introduction’ objective, the primary purpose of having this prolonged cooperation period is to ensure

From Right to Left: Prof. Chris Alden, Prof. Tang Xiaoyang, Mr. Gedion Jalata and Ms. Nellie Nyang’wa

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the sustainable development of the ATDC. To counteract the unsustainability problem as experienced in its previous agro-aid projects in Africa, the Chinese government devised the plan to incorporate company actors and to run the ATDCs as a business in the medium-long term. Financially, by developing a market-oriented production based on the ATDCs, it is expected that the profits earned could be used to finance the daily operations, including the realisation of the public-interest functions. In addition, the existence of the Chinese company and its agro-experts would help maintain the managerial and technical sustainability.

Findings

Based on our field research, the following findings are particularly noteworthy.

First, the Chinese agro-technology transfer through the ATDCs proves to be beneficial to the local communities in the host countries. The training courses were carefully designed by the Chinese agro-experts according to the specific needs and actual abilities of the different types of trainees – for instance, the smallholder farmers, technicians, and officials. The participation of the local partners helped overcome the oft-seen language barriers, and thus further improve the effects of the technology transfer. From the feedback perspective, the farmer trainees, for instance, confirmed that the Chinese agro-techniques were useful and could help increase the outputs, sometimes more than doubled, as seen in both the cases of Mozambique and South Africa.

Nevertheless, the impacts of the technology transfer are also to some extent limited, mainly for three reasons. The first problem concerns the training model. In both cases, the majority of the trainees are the smallholder farmers. It is so because the Chinese experts believed

that, by transferring farming techniques to the actual agricultural producers, it would have the most direct results; and indeed, this is true and sensible. However, we find that the potential benefits would have been much increased, both in quality and quantity terms, if the demonstration and training activities of the ATDCs had been connected to the host country’s agro-technology extension system in a more effective way. The fact that the ATDC in South Africa trained and incorporated a few local agro-extension officers who turned out to have played a quite positive role in helping disseminate the Chinese agro-technologies confirmed our point; the ATDC in Mozambique, however, had not seemed to be linked to the country’s extension system in any meaningful way by the time of our fieldwork.

Another problem concerns the post-training application. Even if the technology transfer process per se is successful, it may not necessarily change the livelihood of the farmers, unless they have the enabling environment whereby they can put the techniques into an application. In South Africa, for instance, the heating systems of the fish farms, which were fundamental to apply the techniques the farmers learned at the ATDC, were left broken for months, causing stunted growth of the fish and reduced profits. In Mozambique, although we did not manage to interview the farmers trainees of the ATDC (as they were scattered all over the country), we went to visit a Chinese agro-investment project which involved systematic technical training to the local farmers. As revealed by this case, the techniques taught by the Chinese experts could not be implemented outside the Chinese farm in their own fields, due to a lack of tools and irrigation equipment, thus the training courses had little sustainable effects on the farmers’ livelihood.

A potential challenge also lies in the different farming cultures. It takes time for the African smallholder farmers to learn and get used to the Chinese/Asian way of intensive cultivation. It is also often difficult for the African farmers to stick to it, which is more technically demanding and time-consuming compared to the extensive way of farming that they are more familiar with. This casts some doubts on the sustainability of the technology transfer.

In terms of business introduction, as seen in the cases of Mozambique and South Africa, apart from performing the core function of agro-technology transfer, both centres had started or planned to start market-oriented production activities. More essentially, both of the two Chinese companies involved had either set up separate agribusinesses or had been actively seeking external agro-investment opportunities by using the ATDC project as a springboard. Indeed, available data suggests that at least 8 out of the first 14 ATDCs in Africa have successfully established their independent agribusiness outside the ATDCs. Furthermore, the Mozambican case has demonstrated a greater role of the ATDC as a business platform through providing information and technical support to other Chinese companies and individuals, thus facilitating their investment in Mozambique.

The project sustainability, however, seems to remain as a concern within the renewed aid structure. As shown in the Mozambican case, although the ATDC did make some business attempts, the centre was still not able to achieve financial independence simply by selling the agro-products. This was primarily due to the limited land, capital and human resources it possessed and thus a rather small production scale; indeed, most of the ATDCs are facing the similar constraints. Therefore, it does not seem very likely that

the ATDCs will be able to sustain themselves financially through a business operation. To pursue that, an expansion of investment and production scale is necessary, either based on the Centre or a separate business outside the Centre. This, however, may face challenges on two fronts.

First, how likely is the bolt-on investment to be successful? The question then is translated into another issue about the feasibility and profitability of conducting agribusiness in Africa. According to existing and potential Chinese agro-investors in Mozambique, the difficulties in operating in Africa were far beyond their expectations before they came to the continent, and none of the existing investors had managed to make any profits to date after years of operation. This may cast some doubts on the prospect of the ATDCs’ commercial development in the host countries. Second, even if the company could make good profits, to what extent would the company support the public-interest functions of the Centre financially? Given the fact that there had not been any concrete agreement between the Chinese government and companies that clearly specifies each other’s rights and obligations, it is rather unrealistic to expect the company actors to willingly and automatically fulfil the general public-interest functions of the ATDCs, especially given the generally low- profit margins.

In terms of managerial and technical sustainability, while the immediate danger of project failure does seem to be mitigated with the continuing stay of the Chinese team, potential problems are still visible. For instance, the lack of effective participation of the local partners in the daily management of the ATDCs, compounded by the typical Chinese-dominated structure of management, generates the risk of leaving

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the local partners incapable of operating the Centres independently. Technically, the overwhelmingly farmer-centred training model also makes it less likely for the local agro-technicians to conduct the extension of Chinese farming techniques on their own.

Moreover, we find that the problems mentioned above can be largely explained from two aspects. First, from a policy design point of view, while the multi-objectives of the ATDC would naturally call for a more detailed and delicately designed action plan, the existing policy is very unspecific. Particularly relevant to the point is the design of the Business Operation Stage, which is supposed to be the most innovative part of the ATDC project but in reality, has been full of ambiguities and uncertainties. In addition, full consideration of local conditions and adequate feasibility studies seem to be lacking in certain instances, as seen by the post-training application and farming cultural difference problems as well as the economically unviable prospect of the Business Operation Stage. Moreover, the government-company cooperation model remains largely unstructured.

Second, bilateral interactions between the Chinese government/company actors and their African counterparts seem to be ineffective. The detachment of the technology transfer from the host countries’ broader extension, for example, has something to do with the lack of effective communications between the two sides. The sustainability problem can also be partially attributed to the lack of adequate participation of the local actors in the daily operation as well as the deficiency of joint efforts between the two governments in making plans for the ATDCs’ future development.

In light of this, we find that several things could be done in order to improve the ATDC

performance: (1) The Chinese government may need to develop a more detailed and feasible action plans for the ATDCs’ Business Operation Stage. (2) A more solid arrangement as to the government-company cooperation model needs to be initiated, with a view to institutionalising the companies’ obligations in delivering aid projects as well as the supportive measures that are meant to be taken by the government. (3) All through the planning and implementation of the ATDC project, the Chinese government should encourage a more active participation of their local African counterparts in the process, and make concrete measures to facilitate, for instance, a gradual change from the Chinese-dominated management model into a more co-operative or localised management model.

II. Environmental Impact of Chinese Investments in Africa’s Agricultural Sector: Tang Xiaoyang

General Trend

The economic ties between China and Africa have witnessed rapid and continuous growth for the last decade. Bilateral trade volume has increased from US$ 10.59 billion in 2000 to US$ 210.25 billion in 2013, an increase of twenty times within fourteen years. More recently, Chinese enterprises shifted their focus from trade to investment. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)’s database, there were only 888 enterprises registered to invest in Africa before 2010. However, from January 2010 to January 2015, 2161 firms had registered their outward investments to Africa. That is to say, the number of Chinese investments in Africa

all three focus industries of this study are substantial, extractives is one of the largest categories of Chinese investment, whereas only 7% of Chinese investments in Africa are agriculture-related. Construction is in between, with approximately one-quarter of Chinese investments in Africa in that sector. Chinese Investors are reluctant to invest in Africa’s agricultural sector because it requires huge investment upfront and takes long time to get the return. The deficient supporting infrastructure and high economic and political risk in Africa are also daunting to foreigners. In addition, the social controversies on “land grab” issues alerted Chinese government and Chinese firms when they come to invest. However, caution should be used in interpreting this data with these industries in particular, as these numbers about the number of firms may not correlate with the size of investments (i.e., a giant construction project is still counted as only one investment in this data, despite its large size).

TABLE: Top sectors of Chinese investment in Africa

Industry

% of MOF-COM-reg-istered firms

Wholesale and retail trade 70.9%Manufacturing 47.9%Mining 46.9%Leasing and business service 29.9%Scientific, technical services and geological prospecting 29.2%Construction industry 23.4%Residential services and other services 8.3%

within the past five years more than doubled the total number of investments from the previous twenty years. Correspondingly, the stock of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in Africa also rose from US$ 0.618 billion in 2003 to US$ 26.19 billion in 2013.

The rapid expansion of Chinese investments in Africa has attracted global attention. Policymakers, business people, civil society, and citizens are not only interested in investigating how Chinese investments influence Africa economically and politically, but also are concerned with the impact of Chinese enterprises on the continent’s environment. Africa is well known for its pristine forest and savanna, for the natural life which is still relatively untouched by industrialisation, and for unique but fragile ecosystems which are facing the serious challenge of global climate change. When a large number of Chinese enterprises enter the continent, they are set to alter the landscape greatly through the gigantic scale of construction and operations. Unfortunately, Chinese enterprises do not have a good track record of environmental practice either domestically or overseas. They are often criticised for reckless commercial exploitation without sufficient consideration of social-environmental consequences.

Chinese firms are involved in a range of sectors spanning services, manufacturing, construction, extractives, and agriculture. Based on the MOFCOM database, we know that three industries dominate: over 70% of registered investments involved whole or retail trade, and nearly half of investments involved mining and manufacturing activities. The table below lists the percent of MOFCOM registered investments with activity in each industry. This data helps put the three focus industries of this study in perspective: while

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Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 7.3%Real Estate 4.3%Transportation, storage and postal services 3.7%Hospitality industry 1.8%Information transmission, com-puter services and software 1.0%Electricity, gas and water pro-duction and supply 0.5%Financial industry 0.4%Culture, sports and entertain-ment 0.4%Education 0.2%Health, social security and social welfare 0.1%Water conservancy, envi-ronment and public facilities management 0.1%Public administration and so-cial organisations 0.1%International organizations 0.0%

Environmental Impacts of Chinese Investments

The environmental and social practices of Chinese farms vary across type of investment and countries.

On the positive side, many Chinese farmers in Africa appreciate the relatively unspoiled natural environment in Africa and, drawing lessons from China’s history of environmental deterioration, actively take measures to preserve the ecosystem in Africa. For example, Wanbao rice farm in Mozambique does not use machines to dispel birds like local farmers do. In the farmer’s opinion, local farmers dispel birds because they believe birds eat a large portion of their grains. However, the situation is different for the

Wanbao farmers. A manager Luo Yonghao said, “Our yields are large. What the birds eat is just a very small portion. It is able to achieve better yields because around 70% of birds’ diets are pests, which benefits farming activity”. In comparison, the volume of crops that birds consume is relatively insignificant. In addition, the Wanbao farmer does not use pesticides and instead uses herbicides and a small amount of urea as fertiliser. As the manager Luo Yonghao said, “In China, the use of pesticides caused a vicious circle. Pesticides killed insects, as well as insects’ predators, namely birds. The reduction of birds caused an increase of pests, and made farmers more reliant on pesticides.” Learning from this lesson, the Wanbao farm attaches great importance to maintaining the existing ecological system. Here, there is a voluntary action by firms driven by self-interest, because firms recognise that investment in environmental protection today will mitigate costs in the future.

On the problematic side, a serious threat to Africa’s ecosystem is illegal logging and timber smuggling by Chinese firms. In response to these concerns, the Chinese State Forestry Administration (“SFA”) and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce jointly issued the “Guidelines on Sustainable Overseas Forests Management and Utilization by Chinese Enterprises” in 2009. Chinese officials blame mainly private businessmen for these unlawful activities. This is confirmed by a report from the Center for International Forest Research (“CIFOR”), which has tracked this issue in detail.

In addition, numerous Chinese firms bring vegetable seeds to grow in the companies’ backyards to supply vegetables for their own consumption. It is not uncommon to visit a Chinese factory or construction site in Africa and find a neatly tended plot of land

with Chinese vegetables inside the grounds. There seems to be little regulation or even awareness of this practice on the part of government authorities. Though at a small scale, alien plant-life may cause unexpected disruption of the local ecosystem. This is not to say that all Chinese agricultural innovation is under-the-radar: several Chinese agri-tech companies are promoting new varieties of crops in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Liberia, Madagascar, and other countries, and they at least claim to abide by local legal requirements and procedures for approval.

Regulatory Efforts

Chinese enterprises in Africa are first and foremost subject to regulation by local authorities. From environmental impact assessment to regular environmental inspections, each African country’s legislation and administration set up the regulatory framework that all investors, whether from China or elsewhere, need to follow. Traditionally, China has been a strong advocate of the principle of judicial sovereignty, the notion that outsiders should not interfere in African authorities’ regulation of enterprises in their own countries. In line with its famous ‘non-interference’ foreign policy, the Chinese government has long stressed that Chinese investors overseas should fully abide by local authorities.

However, the rapid increase of Chinese investments in Africa and the accompanying controversies about Chinese enterprises’ environmental practices have brought growing pressure on the Chinese government. Reports on incidents such as the illegal Chinese gold miners in Ghana or the oil spill in Chad tarnished China’s international image. A survey by the Ethics Institute of South Africa showed that citizens of multiple African countries have negative perceptions about Chinese companies. In all aspects, such as

product quality, employment practice, social responsibility, and economic responsibility, respondents had negative views of Chinese companies outnumbered those who held a positive view. In particular, the environmental responsibility of Chinese firms was viewed negatively: 53.9% of the interviewees had negative views, and only 11.1% had positive views. The ballooning amount of complaints among African public and international society must have attracted the Chinese government’s attention. Whether out of concerns about its reputation or for the purpose of securing friendly relationships with African nations, the Chinese government has taken a series of steps lately to address the socio-environmental practices of Chinese enterprises in Africa more actively.

At the end of 2007, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (“SASAC”), the Chinese government agency that owns and regulates central government-owned enterprises promulgated the “Guidelines to the State-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities”. The document emphasises the importance of corporate social responsibility for Chinese state-owned enterprises and asks SOEs to take measures for “constantly improving the ability of making sustainable profits.” Social responsibility is defined broadly as product safety, resource conservation, technological innovation, employee rights, and public welfare. SOEs are asked to establish a communication mechanism to disclose CSR activities and engage stakeholders.

In March 2009, MOFCOM and the State Forestry Administration jointly published the “Guide on Sustainable Overseas Forests Management and Utilization by Chinese Enterprises.” In February 2013, MOFCOM and

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MEP also jointly published the “Environmental Protection Guide for Outbound Investment and Cooperation.” These documents require Chinese enterprises not only to abide by forestry and environmental protection laws of the country in which they are doing business but also to conduct environmental assessments and create an environmental management plan. Chinese enterprises are encouraged to engage in green procurement, recycling, and local community activities.

In addition, Chinese business associations of various sectors have issued or are working on CSR guidelines for the outbound investments in their sectors. In September 2012, China International Contractors Association released the “Guide on Social Responsibility for Chinese International Contractors” to “establish a benchmark of social responsibility” for construction firms and to encourage them to operate overseas contracting projects in a more responsible way. Regarding environmental protection, the guide gives instructions on four aspects: environmental management, resource saving, waste and emission reduction, and ecological protection. On October 2014, the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters issued the “Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments.” The guidelines acknowledge that mining may have a significant impact on the environment and requires that Chinese firms develop appropriate plans and conduct regular assessments.

Though these documents cover a wide range of CSR topics, notably, these Chinese texts are “Guides” or “Guidelines” rather than laws and regulations. Therefore, they operate more as suggestions and lack the binding force that laws have. Language-wise, these guidelines rarely employ the

imperative “shall” and instead often use the term “encourage” for environmental and social-protection actions. All the guidelines emphasise that Chinese businesses should respect and abide by local laws in the country of investment. Consequently, the guidelines are written in rather general terms, with no specification for investment types or risk levels of investments. The guidelines presume that companies will find specific regulations in their host countries and decide their behaviours correspondingly.

Challenges Ahead

Yet, this general orientation has been problematic in the African context. African countries’ environmental regulations are not always well established. Indeed, some foreign investors can make use of loopholes in legislation and administration to lower environmental treatment standards ‘legally.’ Under such circumstances, the principle of abiding by local regulations may sound like empty words. Moreover, Chinese firms on average have limited knowledge of local laws. As Weiqian Yang, a Chinese lawyer in Ghana, said, “Chinese companies are not used to looking into laws to find their behaviour standards. They believe that money is the lubricant which can get everything done.” To some extent, this is a continuation of common business normal, private-sector behaviour in China, where connections with officials are often more important than laws. In the Yang’s opinion, Chinese managers only vaguely knew the local regulations vaguely, and few of them had a precise understanding of the legal system and its requirements. One reason for this situation is the lack of Chinese legal professionals working in Africa. In fact, among over a thousand Chinese interviewed by the authors across sixteen African countries during last seven years, Yang in Ghana was the only Chinese lawyer

who was a licensed lawyer in an African country encountered. This entrepreneurial culture of considering money rather than laws is an impediment to Chinese investors and keeps them from carefully studying and obeying local regulations.

In spite of the practical difficulty of applying these guidelines to Africa’s reality, the promulgation of the guidelines did demonstrate the Chinese government’s and the industry’s pro-active attitude regarding socio-environmental impact, with a particular emphasis on environmental issues. Not only do all the guidelines mention environmental responsibility, but as described above, two major documents are dedicated to environmental protection. As Radavoi and Bian observed, the Chinese government tends to detach the environmental issues from those of workers’ or human rights, because transnational regulations of environmental practices are less controversial politically and are perceived to be more feasible to implement. The release of five guidelines within seven years was a promising start for China to regulate its extraterritorial corporations. However, the implementation challenges show that mere guidelines from the Chinese government are not sufficient. Putting effective changes into practice requires more actions and more stakeholders.

Besides, most Chinese firms see environmental and socially-oriented activities as a cost centre rather than profit-generating investments. Hence, their spending on CSR, environmental protection, and other such activities are generally sporadic. They do not see it as part of their core competence and do not think that related investments help their business.

However, as Chinese investments cover a broad range of countries and sectors in Africa, compliance with social and environmental

standards and willingness to invest beyond minimum standards vary as well. Generally speaking, however, there is a divide between large state-owned companies and small private businesses. The larger companies (with a capital of over USD 10 million), most of which are state-owned enterprises, pay more attention to socio-environmental issues, whereas the smaller private business often evades government control and sometimes unscrupulously pursue profit at the cost of environmental and social concerns. As an official in the Chinese Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) said, “Large state-owned enterprises are doing fine with CSR. They have the capacity and awareness to do it. The small private companies are more problematic, especially the mining and timber traders. They cause damage to Africa’s environment and are very difficult to manage.”

There are three reasons for this gap. First, large companies usually have long-term investment horizons. Hence, they have a stake in creating a friendly investment environment in the host country, whereas private businesses can be short-term focused, moving to another country if the investment environment sours due to environmental or social damage. Secondly, large companies are often scrutinised more closely by the authorities and by the public. Thus, quite a few of them have dedicated CSR departments and more sophisticated attitudes towards socio-environmental issues. In contrast, smaller private companies are more inclined to solve problems that arise in an ad hoc manner, or ‘under the table.’ Thirdly, Chinese embassies in each country regularly contact and visit the larger companies, but have no capacity to track smaller companies, with the exception of crisis situations.

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III. Africa-China Collaboration on Agricultural Development: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Development Assistance: Gedion Jalata8

Africa is endowed with abundant natural resources. The continent has about 12 % of the world’s arable land, of which 60 % uncultivated. Moreover, only 7% of the arable land is irrigated compared to 40 % in Asia. Smallholder farmers account for most of the cultivated land and a sizable share of agriculture production, for instance, more than 75% of the total agriculture outputs in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Uganda are produced by smallholder farmers with average farm sizes of about 2.5 ha. Agriculture remains the mainstay of most economies in Africa accounting for an average 30% of Africa’s total GDP. The sector also employs about 65-70 % of Africa’s labour force.9 This makes the sector key for food security, employment, growth and development in the continent. Agriculture led growth has the largest impacts in reducing poverty as demonstrated in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Ghana.

Challenges of Agriculture Development in Africa

The Agriculture sector has not witnessed impressive growth due to a combination of factors such as: lack of political will to support the sector, price risk and non-conducive policies, low attention given by international development partners, climate change related challenges such as increased soil degradation, salinization of irrigated areas, challenges in infrastructure development and market access, low agriculture research and 8 Mr. Gedion Jalata spoke on his personal capacity as a researcher, not on his official capacity for OI-AU9 ECA. 2014. Frontier Markets in Africa-Misperception in a Sea of Opportunities. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.14

development in Sub-Saharan Africa, which stands half of what India spends and a quarter of what the US spends, and considerable financing requirements (11 billion per year for agriculture outputs expansion) while the continent is losing 50 billion per year because of illicit financial flows in trade mispricing alone.

China-Africa Partnership: Trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Development Assistance

The top five African countries main exports to China are mineral products (55%), base metals (4%), precious stones and metals (3%), textile and clothing (1%), and other unclassified goods (26%). Moreover, China is trying to increase imports from least developed African countries by allowing agricultural products to enter duty-free to its market. Accordingly, African agricultural product export to China is increasing from time to time albeit it is marginal in the current trade relationship. See figure I on Africa’s main export to China.

Source: World Trade Atlas, 2014.

On the other hand, Chinese exports to Africa are

high-value manufactured goods. In particular transportation equipment, machinery, and electronic products account for half of the exports. Other export products are textile and clothing, footwear and plastic products.

Chinese FDI is also increasing from time to time in Africa. Official China White Paper indicated cumulative FDI in Africa at end of 2012 totalled $22 billion. The recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in December 2015, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, unveiled that China’s investment in Africa increased to $ 32.35 billion in 2015 with over 3000 Chinese companies operating across the continent. The principal target of Chinese FDI in Africa is the construction sector followed by transportation, storage and postal service, manufacturing, mining, finance, leasing and business services, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and others. Agriculture constitutes a very minimal percentage i.e., 4.1% in Chinese

foreign direct investment stock in Africa. China is also developing 7 economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa; two in Zambia, two in Nigeria, and one each in Mauritius, Egypt and Ethiopia. Chinese investment in African countries is backed by China-Africa Development Fund, which invested around $ 3 billion and Special loan for the Development of African Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) funded by the China Development Bank.

As the overall trend indicates Chinese FDI is growing faster than Western FDI. Nonetheless, Chinese FDI to Africa is in a small percentage of its global FDI i.e., only about 4 percent. China’s FDI in Africa mainly distributed in Algeria, Zambia, Kenya, Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, Central Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Egypt. See figure II below on composition of outward Chinese FDI stock in Africa (2014).

Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2014: 99.

Figure II: Composition of Outward Chinese Industrial Distribution FDI Flows in Africa in 2014 (in %)

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Chinese development assistance to Africa as well is another important feature of Africa-China cooperation. China has been providing development assistance in different sectors of the African economy. The most notable ones are infrastructure, telecommunication, energy generation and supply, manufacturing and industry as well as the agriculture sectors. In this regard, China provided $ 14.4 billion of development assistance, half of which was provided to 51 African countries through more than 2,500 development projects, with a total of approximately $ 7.5 billion. Moreover, in the recent FOCAC, noted above, China pledged to give $60 billion as a development fund (in various kind of support) to African countries i.e., loans, preferential loans, export credits, concessional foreign aid loans ($35 billion); China-Africa Development Fund, (CAD Fund for equity investment, $5 billion); small and medium enterprise (SME) credit line ($5 billion); grants and zero interest loans ($5 billion); and a new China-Africa Cooperation Fund with $10 billion to African countries. The trends in the past six FOCAC since 2000 reflect huge financial commitments from China to Africa. Furthermore, China provided $ 3 billion to South-South Climate Change Cooperation Fund and an additional $ 2 billion to aid developing countries to implement Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

At the recently held Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 2015, leaders agreed to a comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership based on five pillars and ten major cooperation plans from 2016 to 2018. The priority areas in this regard include agricultural modernisation and food security, industry partnering and industrial capacity cooperation, infrastructure development, energy and natural resources, ocean economy, tourism, investment and economic cooperation, environmental protection and tackling climate change, peace and security

cooperation among others.

China-Africa Collaboration on Agriculture Developments

It is important to note that China has been involved in Africa agriculture almost half a century. Nonetheless, it was in most recent years i.e., after the zero-tariff policy that the Chinese government adopted in subsequent FOCACs (2003 and 2006) for least developed African countries and some products coming from Africa, agriculture export (noon-food items such as cotton, hemp, silk, and oilseeds) from Africa to China increased.

China’s FDI in African agriculture is also increasing fast in particular in breeding improved seeds, planting grain and cash crops, and processing agricultural products. For instance, it grew from US$30 million in 2009 to US$82.47 million in 2012. Chinese agriculture support to African countries comes in both monetary and in-kind forms to support food production, breeding, storage and transport, infrastructure development and etc. Financing services for the agriculture sector comes from Chinese banks. Since 2006, China has built more than 40 agricultural demonstration centres in Rwanda, the Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Ethiopia and some other countries. The country has also sent agricultural technology team to provide policy consulting, teach practical techniques and train local staff.

In general, agriculture played a central role in China’s own economic development and sharing these experience has been a consistent priority in China’s engagements in Africa. Chinese cooperation for the sector in Africa focused on technocratic and capacity building interventions as well as providing hybrid seed, which is influenced by China’s own domestic development experience.

Challenges in Agriculture Cooperation

Chinese support to the agriculture sector by any standards i.e., trade relation, investment and development cooperation is very low. Critics also argue that Chinese development assistance and foreign direct investment may have potential food security conflict between China and African countries. Evidence on the ground, however, indicates that Chinese farms in Africa are producing solely to the local market or to export to global markers.

Chinese agricultural investment in Africa focused on agricultural technology and seed cultivations through demonstration parks. Hybrid rice is a central technology for dissemination in these parks. Such rice is stronger and more productive than their parent stock yet they have limitations i.e., they have to be purchased again and again from MNCs as they do not reproduce the genetic traits of their parents.

Chinese agriculture support did not investigate the economic dynamics such as markets, transportation or distribution, or the institutional chain required for the support of hybrid rice rather focused on technical transfer by demonstrating, teaching and repairing.

There is also a huge gap not only in communication between Chinese experts and African counterpart but also in agriculture between China and Africa i.e., Chinese farmers use intensive agriculture while African farmers use shifting cultivation depends on fallow systems, which may create misunderstanding between the two.

Leveraging China-Africa Cooperation for Agriculture Development

In spite of the aforementioned challenges, agriculture is an emerging area for China’s

engagement in Africa and there seems a bright prospect for the sector for the following reasons:

• As Africa needs China, China also needs Africa for the reason that Africa’s resources, including its land, low-cost resources, and labour and market connections are vital for agri-business and trade plans.

• African countries can share experience from Chinese smallholder agricultural policy and institutional capacity through development cooperation efforts.

• Agricultural development assistance is considered as complementary to Chinese growing interest in energy and mineral exploitation. As the director of China, farm Agribusiness Corporation commented: “China should offer to combine exploitation of other countries’ resources with the help for their agriculture”

• The competition between China and other emerging economies such as Brazil as vividly seen in their involvement in the agriculture sector in Mozambique and Ghana influence China to enhance its agriculture support to African countries.

Deepening China-Africa Partnership in the Agriculture Development

• African agriculture is at a turning point with growing momentum to transform. Bringing agricultural transformation and scaling up agricultural productivity is the sole responsibility of Africans. To bring development in the continent requires consistent and broad-based growth spearheaded by the agriculture sector accompanied by dramatic improvements in infrastructure, governance and other social indicators. Political will,

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determination and commitments are, thus, timely and pertinent to develop and use the agricultural sector as an engine of economic transformation in Africa.

• This, however, does not mean that Africa does not need a hand of solidarity to address its poverty and to develop its own potential for agricultural productivity and transformation as well as feeding its ever increasing population. Africa needs to draw pertinent lessons on agricultural development from emerging economies of China, India and Brazil by investing more of its own resources into agricultural science, agricultural education and research as well as technology.

• It is important to recognise that the agriculture sector in China was not developed through development assistance rather through a combination of market reforms, trade and foreign direct investment. Various kinds of development assistance, likewise, did not significantly help African countries to transform their agricultural sector. In this regard, each African country must recognise the importance of the agricultural sector for economic development and develop sound agricultural sector policy and strategy i.e. pro-poor, pro-rural, and a consistent policy that focuses on productivity-based staple crop-led agricultural development as well as a policy that links the effect of agriculture with industrialization, and request China and other emerging powers to support its policy.

• As rightly indicated by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese foremost reformist leader, agriculture development relied on policy first and on science and technology second. Accordingly, agricultural productivity enablers for small holder’s

farmers such as technology adoption, input-output markets, access to finance, policy environment, institutional and human capacity building must be provided by the government. Public investment including in irrigation, rural infrastructure and research and development to accelerate agricultural productivity with special attention to smallholder and women is badly needed. Strengthening national, sub-regional and continental capacities to generate and manage knowledge that supports evidence-based planning and evaluation of CAADP is crucial.

• There is a debate whether Chinese agriculture model can be replicated in Africa or not, which is fashioned based on Chinese own experience. It is important to note that success in agriculture crucially depends on the indigenous scientific capacity to generate new technology that suit the specific context both in the continent and each African country. It is important, for instance, to recognise that neither rice nor wheat, which spearheaded the Green Revolution in Asia, is of importance to Africa. This is mainly for the reason that the continent’s output for each is only 2 percent of world production. Rather major crops in Africa such as millet and sorghum, which constitute 40 % and 18 % of world production; yam, plantain and cassava, which represent 95 %, 70 % and 44 % of world production must be given priorities both in the African green revolution but also in Chinese agricultural development assistance to Africa.10

• This indicates that ensuring a food

10 Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). 2013. Afri-ca Agriculture Status Report: Focus on Staple Crops. Ken-ya: Smart Printers. P. 6

• secure and prosperous Africa in a sustainable way require a unique Green Revolution. This can be done by increasing agricultural productivity through investments in research and technology, infrastructure, as well as providing the enabling environment for the private sector, including farmers to promote agribusiness. It will also require rethinking agriculture to involve a value chain approach from the supply or production side to demand or the consumption side.

• There are huge financial gaps to transform the agriculture sector in Africa as noted above. In this regard, diverse actors in the agriculture sector in Africa must be encouraged to be involved. These are farmers as the main financier, followed by public investments, which are vital for overcoming challenges, and foreign private and public investments. Smallholder agriculture has enormous potential to make a significant contribution to economic development and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is the largest single source of economic livelihoods, employing up to 80 % of the rural population.

• This must be supported by agriculture policy and development intervention. Indeed, the Green Revolution in Asia was state-driven; market-mediated and used small-farmer based strategy. To fill the financing gap for agriculture sector in Africa foreign direct investment inflows through foreign private companies is seen as an important resource. Furthermore, employing different innovative financing approaches for agricultural development in Africa is also vital. This can be done using private and public sector investments as well as through public-

private partnership.

• It is also important to understand the nature of Chinese development cooperation to Africa i.e. strategic, planned and long term goal. In this regard, China is getting benefits from its agricultural support to African countries. First of all, Chinese technicians are gaining tremendous know-how on the nature of African agriculture and able to influence subsequent developments in the continent. Second, through its investment Chinese companies derive revenues from the agriculture infrastructure support to African countries.

• Chinese development cooperation is based on a request from the recipient country following its strategic policy priorities, and recipient country strong bureaucracy to execute policies as well as pledges made at FOCAC every three years. Following FOCAC pledge individual African country is expected to negotiate further to get its portion from the pledge. The ‘One China’ policy, which required countries to recognise Taiwan as part of the mainland China is still a requirement for African countries to get development assistance from China. African countries, therefore, need to develop their agriculture sector policy and strategy accordingly and leverage Chinese engagement in the agriculture sector.

• African countries are also expected to strengthen its bureaucratic capacity to implement policies successfully. African countries may also draw lessons from the previous failures of Chinese agricultural development as the country had similar difficulties in transforming the agriculture sector for sometimes back. Indeed, the agricultural sector reforms it still on-

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going in China.

• As noted above there is a huge systemic difference between China and Africa agriculture. In this regard, the Chinese government must do a lot in supporting its companies and agricultural experts develop a deeper understanding of African rural culture, society and history. Furthermore, to support the low research and agricultural development centre in Africa, Chinese development assistance in agriculture research and development through demonstration centre across Africa is highly encouraged and appreciated. Nonetheless, this must be with active participation from the locals in particular on agriculture project design and implementation.

• Finally, Chinese support in the agriculture sector should be on how the agriculture sector may have rapid development in terms of foreign exchange earnings, export diversification, employment generation, and linkage effects. In this regard, China must scale up its agriculture development assistance to Africa in particular by promoting agro-processing industrial parks, meat processing, value addition on agricultural products, and leather and leather products as well as supporting agricultural value chain in Africa.

Session III: Making Africa-China Engagement work for Africa’s sustainable development – The Regional Impact and Beyond

This session discussed the future for Africa-China engagement and areas that are needed for new research. Panellists discussed how, in going forward, Chinese OFDI could work for Africa’s sustainable development. They looked at both African Union frameworks and new policy aspirations that were defined at the 6th FOCAC. Panellists include Diana Oyena Akullo, a Policy Officer at the African Union Commission, Amb. Shu Zhan, Research Fellow at the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University and Dr. Witness Simbanegavi, Research Director at the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC).

I. Making Africa-China Engagement work for Africa’s Sustainable Development – The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme: Diana Oyena Akullo

Introduction

In 2013, the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States at the 50th Anniversary of the establishing of the OAU/AU adopted a Solemn Declaration, which amongst others pledged their commitment to making progress in Africa in the next 50 years in the following eight key areas:

§ African Identity and Renaissance.• Struggle against Colonialism and

Self-Determination.• Pursuing the Integration Agenda.• Social and Economic Development.• Peace and Security. • Democratic Governance.• Determining Africa’s Destiny.• Africa’s Place in the World.

The Assembly directed that the AUC with support from AfDB, UNECA and NEPAD guide the process of translating these ideals into reality through a people-driven Agenda to realise the AU Vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the world”. Agenda 2063 was thus developed to this effect and currently the endorsed framework for Africa’s inclusive growth and socio-economic development within the next half-century. It seeks to discover, harness and protect Africa’s resources for the benefit of all Africans. Agenda 2063 is thus defined by:

(1) The Vision of the AU, the Solemn Declaration and the Peoples’ Aspiration.

(2) The Transformation Framework with clear Goals, Targets, Implementation Arrangements, and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework as well as the Resource Mobilization Strategy.

(3) The Plan 10 year medium term plan over the 50 years.

The Value Addition of Agenda 2063

Agenda 2063 should be seen as a new phase in efforts by Africans to catalyse the development of the continent to strengthen African integration and unity. It aims to build upon the achievements and draw

From Right to Left: Diana Oyena Akullo, Amb. Shu Zhan, Dr. Witness Simbanegavi and Ms. Sipho Mthathi

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the adoption of the Maputo Declaration. AU Member states adopted CAADP and agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 per cent of national budgets in order to increase annual Agricultural GDP growth by at least 6 percent.

In 2014 marked the 10th anniversary since CAADP was adopted. Within its first decade,

it’s evident that 50 out of 54 countries are using the CAADP framework in their agricultural transformation planning. 2014 was also significant as it was declared it the Year of Agriculture by the AU Heads of State and Government. The map of the continent below indicates the different stages at which countries stand with the CAADP implementation.

lessons from earlier efforts such as the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty and the NEPAD to address new challenges faced by the continent, in the short, medium and long-term. Agenda 2063 also provides the coherence and coordination platform for rationalisation and integration of all on-going continental development initiatives for the attainment of the aspirations of Africa’s Citizenry. It is a source of inspiration and basis for the development of national and regional sustainable development plans. The guiding principle, therefore, is continuity of actions, drawing appropriate lessons and building upon what has worked in the past.

The ten-year implementation plan covers

the context, purpose and foundation and preparation process. It situates the plan within the context of Agenda 2063 and highlights its foundations as the AU Vision, the AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration and the Seven African Aspirations with the purpose for its preparation as to providing a common results framework for Africa’s socio-economic transformation within the first ten years of the 50- year horizon. The Goals and Priority Areas look at the current development situation in the seven aspirational areas and provide the selection, which forms the basis for the framework of the plan. It also provides a snapshot of Africa in 2063 when all the set goals and targets have been attained.

The development of CAADP can be traced to 2003 when the AU made agriculture one of its core pillars of development through

Structure of the results framework for Agenda 2063

A number of programmes and projects have been identified for moving Agenda 2063 in its first ten years of implementation. The following section will focus the on one the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as one of the key flagship programmes of Agenda 2063.

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is an African framework within which the AU Member States plan and implement agriculture-led investment plans and programmes to enhance food and nutrition security, eliminate hunger, reduce poverty and accelerate economic growth in the continent.

demand in food for the urban growing population.

Current CAADP Implementation Status

The progress with CAADP implementation and the development in the continent, in general, show a paradox. Africa is currently among the fastest growing in the world and agriculture is also growing along with it. Despite this progress, Africa is also the most food insecure continent in the world with a quarter of its population categorised

as undernourished. The overall outlook further indicates that Africa is at the centre of mega global trends such as experiencing high population growth rate, increased urbanisation and adverse effects of climate change and agriculture remains at the nexus of these trends. Africa will need to sustainably increase its agricultural productivity to meet the increasing population as well as rising

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Given the above, its further CAADP has now become a powerful tool for advocacy in asserting the strategic importance of agricultural transformation in Africa since its adoption to address Africa’s paradox and future outlook. Due to the instrumentality of CAADP, it is now popular and credible to talk of agricultural development as a priority which wasn’t the case before. Moreover, CAADP is an African-owned and led strategic agenda making it even more crucial that Africa member States align their planning processes to it.

Recent developments

In June 2014, the Heads of State and Government (HS&G) of the African Union during the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, from 26-27 June 2014 adopted a Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods (Doc. Assembly/AU/2(XXIII) (hereafter the “Malabo Declaration”). The Malabo Declaration adopted the seven key commitments comprising the 2025 vision and goals of Africa Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation (3AGT) as obtained in the figure below:

(i) Recommitment to the Principles and Values of the CAADP Process.

(ii) Commitment to Enhancing Investment Finance in Agriculture.

(iii) Commitment to Ending Hunger in Africa by 2025.

(iv) Commitment to Halving Poverty by the year 2025, through Inclusive Agricultural Growth and Transformation.

(v) Commitment to Boosting Intra-African Trade in Agricultural commodities and services.

(vi) Commitment to Enhancing Resilience of Livelihoods and Production Systems to Climate Variability and other related risks.

(vii) Commitment to Mutual Accountability to Actions and Results

The AU Heads of State and Government further called for an expedient process for the translation of these commitments into results, and specifically, tasked the AUC and NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) to develop an Implementation Strategy And Roadmap (IS&RM) that facilitates translation of the 2025 vision and goals of Africa Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation into concrete results and impacts, and report to the January 2015 Ordinary Session of the Executive Council for its consideration.

Why the Implementation Strategy and Roadmap

The Implementation Strategy and Roadmap are about Implementation, Results and Impact in response to the Malabo Declaration. It is also about committing to a Results Framework and bi-annual review of progress and performance, i.e. commitment to action and to accountability. In this context, CAADP’s catalytic role is to prioritise strengthening and aligning implementation capacity in

community, national, regional and continental structures and institutions. Through the CAADP Result Framework, Africa has defined priority results areas representing the change in the next ten years in tandem with Agenda 2063 Ten-Year Implementation Plan discussed earlier. These priorities include:

a) Reform of agriculture systems in terms of systemic ability to delivery.

b) Strengthening systemic capacity to Implement and deliver results.

The Implementation Strategy and Roadmap are thus meant to guide the making of choices in terms of a set of actions to (a) delivering expected results and impact, based on (b) strengthened systemic implementation capacity as set in the Malabo Commitments

and CAADP Results Framework. It will further serve as a to stimulate and guide impact on; institutional execution capacity linked to a set of factors including organisation effectiveness and efficiency in resource use; management skills; decision-making system; learning & adapting, enabling policy practice (aligned to implementation), alliances and partnerships for implementation. The Implementation Strategy and Roadmap will also help address challenges such as misalignment in organisational strategies and roles, the discrepancy between continental commitments and national-level follow-up actions and lack of clarity and coherence in the translation of political vision into action and deliverables. The strategic action areas are summarised in the figure below:

The guiding principles for the CAADP framework will be informed by the following:

• Implementation (committing and using resources) fully a national level responsibility.

• Clearly defined implementation architecture - (a) implementation entities (mapping of institutions

and constituencies implicated); (b) specific responsibilities / systemically accountable for and (c) implementation linkages and relationships (leverage; interests; catalytic, etc…).

• National - Regional value loop that leverages resources at the required

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level.• Clarifying action by the countries and

hence support actions by continental and regional institutions (synergies, complementarities and subsidiarity).

• Accountability /accountable institutions central.

• Investing in institutions and in People.

• Leadership and champions will motivate action towards achieving the Malabo objectives.

Below is a conceptual framework of interactions at various levels in contributing to the continental agenda for agricultural growth.

and benchmark as well as facilitate, guide and compel alignment and harmonisation of strategies and programmes by all players and stakeholders

Linkages between Malabo Declaration, Implementation Strategy and Roadmap and the CAADP Results Framework

The implantation strategy and roadmap define a set of Strategic Action Areas (SAAs) based on national and regional plans to enable results i.e., CAADP Results Framework, the main tool for measuring the progress of performance in achieving Malabo Declaration commitments and targets and informs the review of national and regional plans through learning from results.

II. China-Africa Cooperation in Agricultural Development: Success, Challenges and Sustainability: Shu Zhan

China-Africa cooperation in agriculture development for the past 60 years with some success is facing the challenge of sustainability. Chinese entrepreneurs are still learning how to invest abroad, especially in Africa, agriculture included. From my personal experience in 6 countries in Africa, 3 key points that Chinese coming to Africa need to learn: Africa-led cooperation; alignment with African Industries of different trades; mutual learning and experience sharing.

As countries across Sub-Saharan Africa grapple with the challenges of sustaining high levels of economic growth, plunging commodity prices and the effects of climate change, revitalising agriculture must become a priority

on the continent. A vibrant, sustainable and resilient agriculture sector is vital for sub-Saharan Africa’s economic future. Or, as Dr. Agnes Kalibata, the President for the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the former Minister of Agriculture for Rwanda wrote, “agriculture is poised to drive a new era of inclusive economic growth for Africa.”11

President of AfDB, Akinwumi Adesina recently said, “there is absolutely no reason why Africa is a net food-importing region, spending over $35 billion importing food. Africa must feed itself, and Africa must become a global powerhouse in food and agriculture. With 65% of all the arable land left in the world to feed 9 billion people by 2050, Africa will have to feed the world.”12 Farming is the primary source of food and income for Africans and provides up to 60 percent of all jobs on the continent.

The continent is bursting with potential: at 200 million hectares, sub-Saharan Africa is home to nearly half of the world’s uncultivated land that can be brought into production. Africa uses only 2 percent of its renewable water resources compared to 5 percent globally. Together with abundant resources, including a resourceful, enterprising youth population, strategic investments in agriculture can unleash virtuous growth cycles.

Agricultural cooperation between China and Africa lasted more than 60 years; China has provided many African countries with technical assistance in agricultural and related industries, e.g. building irrigation and conservancy project, setting up agricultural extension centres for

11 Agnes Kalibata, Africa: Out of the Poverty Trap, Into a New Age for Africa’s Family Farms - allAfrica.comhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201602222640.html12 Akinwumi Adesina, Africa’s Five ‘High 5s’, Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, February 21, 2016 http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/keynote-speech-delivered-by-af-rican-development-bank-group-president-akinwumi-a-ade-sina-at-the-africa-2016-business-for-egypt-africa-and-world-conference-in-sharm-el-sheikh-egypt-on-febru-ary-21-2016-15404/

The Roadmap for implementation are composed of Strategic Actions Areas with corresponding specific Sub Actions with Milestones to be achieved within; Short-term (2015), Medium-term (2016 – 2020) and Long-term (2021 – 2025).

CAADP Results Framework

The AU Commission has gone on to develop a CAADP Results to measure progress with implementation of identified priorities to realise the Malabo Declaration Commitment on Mutual Accountability for a systematic regular review process to be undertaken on Biennial Review basis. The CAADP results framework is for measuring results at the country level. It will also serve as a guide to; examine and align

the goals and targets (results and impact) and associated performance indicators in the National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs)’ help the country to refine and focus set performance targets of the NAIPs; rally unity of purpose around a common national agenda and deliverables; and examine and refine, strengthen and align existing national level tools and systems for monitoring, evaluation, and facilitating learning and strengthening accountability.

The CAADP Results Framework will effectively provide priority areas, targets and indicators which define “CAADP implementation support” at Level 3 in the Results Framework; and serve as the central “yardstick” to standardise

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training local farmers to master high-yield agricultural skills, cultivation for high yield of seed. I learned that, however, when the Chinese government gave funding, the projects can carry on; when the government weaned, those projects were closed. The Chinese agricultural extensions directed with higher yields on farming demonstrations, but failed to launch large-scale production, has yet to fundamentally help in most African countries to solve the problem of food security.

African farmers need new technology—higher-yielding, more resilient food crops that deliver bountiful harvests. New techniques are beginning to boost yields in rice and cocoa, among other crops. Second, African farmers need more electricity, more irrigation, and better infrastructure that links them to lucrative regional food markets. Third, sound policies that do not discriminate against the farm sector. Women produce the bulk of food in Africa, and yet they are largely locked out of the land ownership, access to credit, and productive farm inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides, and farming tools. Further, they are often bypassed by extension services, limiting their productivity.

China will prioritise support for Africa’s agricultural modernization in its cooperation with Africa in the new era, with increased input and expanded cooperation to help African countries resolve the development problem of this basic industry that has a bearing on their national economy and people’s livelihoods as well as economic independence. China is willing to share its experience and technology in agricultural development with African countries and supports their efforts to improve their agricultural technology and techniques to produce and process agricultural, livestock and fishery products. This will help them build an agricultural value chain and increase independent grain production capacity to boost food security, enhance the competitiveness

of cotton and other speciality industries in the world, generate more income and improve the livelihood of farmers. China will improve and continue to carry out agricultural technology extension (demonstration is the fancy word which I am reluctant to follow) projects in Africa.

I would say, sending more agricultural vocational training teacher teams, rather than sending senior agricultural expert teams, to expand the scale and effect of skill and experience sharing in agricultural management and technology. China will build and improve bilateral mechanisms for agricultural cooperation with Africa, give play to the strengths and roles of each side, and strengthen supervision and evaluation of cooperation projects to increase the quality and level of cooperation. China will encourage and promote China-Africa trade in agricultural products. It will encourage and support Chinese enterprises to engage in crop farming, grain storage stock-breeding and fishery, and invest in the processing of agricultural products in African countries, helping create more jobs for local people, increase the added value of local products and generate more foreign-exchange income, and boosting Africa’s agricultural modernization. China will also help African countries promote irrigation techniques, effectively use water resources, and improve their capacity to prevent floods and combat droughts.

China will follow the principle of wider consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, to ensure development for all, by all and of all. Before, when China was asked to join other countries for trilateral or multilateral cooperation in Africa, we would say these projects should be to the need of Africa, agreed and participated by Africa. In drafting our second Africa Policy Paper, we change it to the principle of Africa-proposed, Africa-agreed and Africa-led.13 Although the policy paper says on trilateral 13 China “will strengthen coordination and cooperation with other countries as well as international and regional organi-

and multilateral cooperation in Africa, it is the principle that China-Africa cooperation should follow first and foremost. And I notices that a few weeks ago, one of the Chinese officials used this principle for furthering China-Africa cooperation in public health.

Chinese work together with Africans for the re-industrialization in Africa. And there are 3 keywords in such cooperation. The first word is Ownership (主主), African owned, or Africa-lead cooperation. The most important change here is Africa-led, as one of African friend said to me that, “all partners are welcome on board, however, since the project is in Africa, we Africans should be the drivers.” Otherwise, outsiders do not know when to speed up and where to turn around.

Expediting industrialisation and agricultural modernization is the basic orientation chosen by African countries. Since those have the best understanding of Africa should be African countries, the nations’ outside Africa should respect and uphold the development paths and ways of governance chosen independently by African nations, respect and support their endeavours to promote economic and social development and improve their people’s lives should be respected. From a long-term perspective, Africa will enhance its self-development capacity and establish its own industrial system; therefore, local capacities must be actively fostered and integrated into project planning. We learn this lesson China’s own catch-up development.

The Second is Alignment (主主) that is to form a synergy between our respective development strategies, to link up/connect the development strategies of African zations on the basis of the “Africa-propose, Africa-agreed and Africa-led” principle ...” China’s Africa Policy(2015) Part II, China’s second Africa policy paper - China.org.cn http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-12/05/content_37241677.htm

nations and that of China, to share benefits of development through mutual consultation and joint collaboration. Building inclusive economies calls for collective efforts which are crucial for benefits shared by all, building partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in mutual consultation and show mutual understanding.

The third is to share an experience of agricultural development (分分). While transferring skill/technologies and production capacity needed by Africa, we should always make sure this cooperation caters to Africa’s actual needs.

African nations now hope to achieve industrialization and improve their capability for self-driven development. In the past a few decades, development partners offer some agricultural extension projects according to the presumed need of Africa. For example, some African agriculturalists believe that smallholder agriculture is the next engine of economic transformation for Africa, while the development community focusing instead on commercial farming, which is irrelevant to four out of five farmers on the continent. Large scale planting may unlock the potential of agriculture, however, may not be enough to revive rural areas, and in particular, create jobs for hundreds of millions of Africans.

We also need to avoid repeating the mistake of a one-size-fits-all approach to this question. Chinese have a saying that the sweet orange becomes the sour orange when transplanted north of the Huai River with only similar leaves but the taste changes from good to bad with the environment, for the soil, is different. The latest World Bank report warns that anaemic recovery in emerging markets will weigh heavily on global growth prospects. Its 2016 growth forecast for sub-Saharan Africa stands at 4.2 percent, up from 3.4 percent in 2015. Food production in sub-Saharan Africa

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needs to increase by 60 percent over the next 15 years to feed a growing population. Africa’s food and beverage markets are buoyant and expected to top $1 trillion in value by 2030.

III.Africa-China Engagement on Infrastructure Development: Opportunities and Challenges: Witness Simbanegavi

The infrastructure financing landscape for Africa is rapidly changing with developing economies, particularly China, India and the Gulf states, playing an increasingly important role. The combined resource flows (including trade and investment) of these countries to Africa are now comparable in scale to the official development assistance (ODA) from OECD countries or to capital from private investors.14 China is by far the largest player. Indeed, China has become very important to Africa – absorbing about 20% of Africa’s total exports and supporting infrastructure development. Africa faces an infrastructure gap of about USD 90bn per year, with the largest deficits found in power and roads.15 Africa’s transport infrastructure is a bottleneck to growth as it restricts movement of goods and people. Rapid urbanization and surging trade levels have intensified the need for new road, rail and airport infrastructure to meet the demand. Notwithstanding these challenges, Africa has been growing rapidly over the last two decades, with at least 6 of the 10 fastest growing countries being in Africa.16

African policy makers are cognisant of

14 Foster, Vivien; William Butterfield; Chuan Chen; and Nataliya Pushak (Eds.) (2009).“Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Fi-nancier for Sub-SaharanAfrica”; The Wold Bank.15 Foster, Vivien and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia (Eds.) (2010). “Africa’s infrastructure:A Time for Transformation”, The World Bank.16 IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2012.

the constraints to growth imposed by inadequate infrastructure, and have prioritized infrastructure projects to anchor economic growth and development. This is enunciated in the African Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).17 This commitment has paved the way to increased investment in infrastructure. In 2012, there were over 800 active infrastructure projects across Africa, worth over USD700bn. Of these, 41% related to transport and 37% to power.18 Chinese corporations are major actors in infrastructure financing and/or construction across the continent.

China – A Global Powerhouse

The growing importance of China in Africa should not be surprising, particularly if one considers the size and structure of the Chinese economy. China is the second largest economy in the world after the USA in real GDP terms. When adjusting for purchasing power, China is the largest economy in the world.19 However, China is still a middle-income country. China has experienced rapid growth over the last thirty years. For instance, China produced less than 3% of global manufacturing output by value in 1990, and this share has grown to about 25% by 2015.20 Such fast paced growth meant that China had to source raw materials from outside, and Africa has increasingly become a major source for such raw materials. China is now considered the global manufacturing powerhouse, having overtaken the United States of America in 2011 to become the largest producer of manufactured goods.21 Figure 1 below shows the trajectory of Chinese manufacturing up to 2020.17 1 See http://pages.au.int/infosoc/pages/program-infra-structure-development-africa-pida18 Ernst &Young (3013). Africa Attractiveness Survey19 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014.20 The Economist (2015). Made in China? March, 2015.21 Eloot, Karel; Alan Huang; and Martin Lehnich (2013). “A New Era For Manufacturing in China”, McKinsey Quarterly, June 2013.

Figure 1: Global manufacturing shares

Source: Global Insight, 2009

China is a major investor in Africa. Its cumulative investment stock in the manufacturing sector in Africa grew by 10 percent year-on-year to USD2.4 billion as at the end of 2011.22 Manufacturing investments accounted for 15 percent of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in 20133. Chinese manufacturing investments in Africa should continue to grow due to the fact that (1) real wages are rising in China, threatening competitiveness and (2) policy shift in China towards domestic consumption driven growth. These two factors provide opportunities for industrial gradient transfer to Africa. Of course, Africa would have to compete with other potential destinations for these industries. In addition, Chinese corporations will continually search for new markets, and as argued below, Africa provides a ready and growing market for manufactured goods.

22 Xinhua. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/30/c_134369394.htm

3. Africa – A potential global powerhouse

Africa has registered impressive (and somewhat resilient) growth over the last 2 decades, in part fuelled by commodities. For an extended period, 6 of the world’s 10 fastest-growing countries were in Africa. As at October 2015, four of the ten fastest growing countries in the world are in Africa.23 Africa is endowed with natural resources, including oil, gas and other precious minerals. It should be pointed out however that some of the fastest growing African countries are not commodity driven; e.g., Ethiopia. In addition to being resource rich, Africa has several other advantageous attributes that make it an attractive investment destination. Among these is the rising population, indicative of greater market potential; a growing middle class, who present a huge untapped market, particularly for manufactured goods, and a youthful and increasingly educated population, which presents not only a skilled

23 These are Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. See at IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015.

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and productive labour force, but also a robust future market. Indeed, Africa is the most youthful continent in the world. In addition, governance has improved remarkably in the region. These attributes suggest that Africa has a lot to offer to global partners, including China. Although Africa has great potential, it faces significant challenges. Among these are:

• High unemployment /underemploy-ment, particularly among the youth.

• Rapid urbanisation, which has resulted in the supply of infrastructure and other amenities (e.g., housing) and employment opportunities failing to keep up with the demand. The result is the prevalence of urban slums and pockets of extreme poverty within major cities.24

• Commodities are a major driver of growth (and trade with China). Dependency on commodities creates vulnerabilities to countries as commodities are subject to booms and busts.

• Agriculture and manufacturing have generally performed poorly, which explains the high poverty rates in the region. Agriculture has the greatest potential (in short to medium term) of lifting people out of poverty and fostering structural transformation (World Bank, 2014).

Africa’s infrastructure challenges

Africa faces challenges with all forms of infrastructure – energy, transport, logistics, water, telecoms, etc. Africa’s infrastructure gap stands at USD90 billion per year. However, African governments and private sector are 24 Urbanization in Africa has been rapid, with the urban pop-ulation increasing from 14.7% in 1957 to 37.2% in 2000 (UN, 2002).

only investing about USD40 billion per year, leaving an infrastructure financing gap of over USD48bn per year.25 (Figure 2). In particular, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) ranks consistently on the bottom of developing regions in access to infrastructure services.26 Transport infrastructure challenges potentially limit intra-African trade, and thus inhibit regional integration.

Figure 2: Africa’s infrastructure needs

Source: AfDB

4. China-Africa economic cooperation

China’s engagement with Africa has grown substantially over the past two decades. As Chinese FDI to Africa has grown, so have trade flows between Africa and China. China is now Africa’s largest export market destination – about 20% of Africa’s total exports (Sun, 2014). At present, however, the trade is “unbalanced”, with Africa exporting primarily commodities. Also, Africa’s trade with China 25 Foster, Vivien and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia (Eds.) (2010). “Africa’s infrastructure: A Time for Transformation”, The World Bank.26 Brixiova, Zuzana; Emelly Mutambatsere; Cecile Ambert; and Dominique Etienne (2011). “Closing Africa’s Infrastructure Gap: Innovative Financing and Risks”, Africa Economic Brief, Vol.2 Issue 1, April 2011. AfDB.

is small relative to China’s total (global) trade – about 5%. In 2011, China’s investment in Africa was a mere 4.3 percent of its global total, compared to China’s investment in Asia (60.9 percent), Latin America (16 percent) and Europe (11.1 per cent) (Sun, 2014). This suggests that there is scope to deepen China-Africa economic ties. Chinese FDI in Africa is largely going into construction/infrastructure, manufacturing and resources extraction.27

Ethiopia and Rwanda are among the African countries whose manufacturing sectors are major beneficiaries of Chinese FDI. Interestingly, these two countries are among the fastest growing African countries, and are not commodity dependent. FDI also provides scope for technology transfer and technology spill-overs. Chinese FDI should strengthen economic ties between Africa and China, as it embodies Chinese technologies, and creates opportunities for exporting back to China. Africa should thus leverage Chinese FDI in its structural transformation efforts – building competitive manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Example – China investments in Africa’s transport infrastructure. As noted above, infrastructure is central to Africa’s inclusive growth agenda and China is a major partner to Africa in the development of infrastructure. Many countries have had several projects financed and /or built by the Chinese. Examples include Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo.28 In Kenya for example, several road projects were financed by China (Table 1). Financing and construction of the standard gauge railway line from Mombasa to Eldoret is undertaken by China.29 Likewise, the Chinese have financed 27 Mary-Francoise Renard (2011). “China’s Trade and FDI in Africa”, AfDB Woking Paper Series.28 Schierem, Richard and Alex Rugamba (2011). “Chinese Infrastructure Investments and African Integration”, AfDB Working Paper Series.29 Onjala, Joseph (2016). “Deepening China - Africa Cooperation: Implementation Mechanisms and Financing

and overseen various projects in the energy sector in Kenya.

Options for three Networks and Industrialization in Kenya”.

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China investments in Kenya’s road transport infrastructure

Table 1: Chinese-financed Infrastructure Projects in Kenya - Road Transport

Year of Commitments Status Project Description

Chinese Financing

Commitments6/05/1994 Completed Technical Asst Ph.II-Gambogi/Serem

Road48,573,101.29 RMB

6/12/1999 Completed Shamakhokho-Kipsigak road 1 50,000,000.00 RMB

16/07/2001 Completed Shamakhokho-Kipsigak Road 2 50,000,000.00 RMB

24/04/2002 Completed Shamakhokho-Kipsigak Road Project3 50,278,653.00 RMB

15/12/2008 Completed Nairobi Eastern and Northern Bypass

Project

108,000,000.00 USD

18/12/2009 Completed Nairobi-Thika Highway Improvement

Project

1,068,000,000.00 RMB

1/12/2011 On-going Kenya Nairobi Southern Bypass 183,600,000.00 USDSource: Onjala (2016)

• What are the financing options for building the three networks? How to ensure value for money for Africa and avoid over-indebtedness?

• How to leverage the three networks to facilitate regional integration in Africa? What should African governments do to align these projects to national and regional strategies, for instance, PIDA? How will/should the African Union be involved in the three networks project?

• What role will the three networks play in deepening the China-Africa cooperation? What complementary policies should be undertaken (by Africa or China or both) to ensure industrial gradient transfer from China to Africa?

5. China-Africa cooperation: Some challenges

While there are significant benefits flowing from the infrastructure cooperation between China and African countries, there are some grey areas worthy of further research to bring better understanding to both China and Africa, and to help inform policy. First, financing of infrastructure by Chinese Banks is rather complex. In particular, the financing is usually a combination of concessionary loans and commercial loans. There appears to be a deliberate policy by the Chinese government to conflate foreign aid, direct investment, service contracts, foreign trade 6 and export. As a result, it is not only difficult to assess China’s aid contribution30, but also to assess the true cost of a financing deal.

Relatedly, Chinese Banks usually tie financing to Chinese corporations, requiring that Chinese contractors undertake the project.31 This makes it difficult to properly assess the real cost of a project as tying may impose additional costs. Tying means that competitive bidding is restricted to Chinese corporations, which may create scope for bid rigging; and that the borrower is tied to Chinese technology. Such practices potentially reduce the beneficial impacts of Chinese investments/development assistance. There in a need therefore to properly document such practices and evaluate their full impacts on partner countries.

Tying of financing to Chinese contractors has the effect of crowding out local contractors, thus restricting development of local capacity. This impinges on sustainability and has debilitating impacts on infrastructure

30 Onjala, Joseph (2016). “Deepening China - Africa Cooperation: Implementation Mechanisms and Financing Options for three Networks and Industrialization in Kenya”.31 Schierem, Richard and Alex Rugamba (2011). “Chinese Infrastructure Investments and African Integration”, AfDB Working Paper Series.

maintenance. Another concern is the observed tendency by Chinese firms, who initially come to execute large infrastructure projects, to start competing for local projects. Given their skills and capacity, they easily crowd out local firms. Several major public/private construction projects in Kenya are undertaken by Chinese firms. Some of these contractors import unskilled labour from China (e.g., wheelbarrow pushers).32

Yet another concern is that in some cases or for some countries, infrastructure loans are tied to commodities. While there may be sound rationale for this approach (sovereigns with no credit capacity), the concern is about the opaqueness of these arrangements as they are hardly, if ever, made public; the challenges with valuation (price setting) at negotiation stage as these are forward looking arrangements; and the ability of the African policy makers to fully monitor such arrangements to ensure that the extraction will not exceed the agreed volumes. It is difficult to correctly determine value for money in such infrastructure financing arrangements.

32 Onjala, Joseph (2016). “Deepening China - Africa Coopera-tion: Implementation Mechanisms and Financing Options for three Networks and Industrialization in Kenya”.

During his visit to Africa in 2014, the Chinese Premier pronounced on a new and ambitious partnership on transport infrastructure development – the so-called Three Infrastructure Networks Project – road, rail and air transport infrastructures. This project, if well executed, should go a long way to narrow Africa’s infrastructure gap, and address transport infrastructure bottlenecks in the region. There is potential to leverage these projects to build local supply industries and well as skills. As these projects get rolled out, questions ought to be asked (and answered) on, among other things, the following:

• How can African policy makers leverage the three networks infrastructure projects to foster structural transformation of their economies?

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KEY ISSUES RAISED AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Common Positions and Policy Pointers

• China and Africa have had a historical relationship and share many similarities - both have a great civilisation, a history of occupation and striving for better life and harmonious world. The relationship is complex, as it is still evolving; it is too premature to arrive at conclusions on whether the relationship is necessarily good or bad. China’s increasing engagement with Africa has the potential of resulting into dependency. This raises the need for Africa to be ‘smart’ in tapping into the opportunities offered by this engagement and ensure it benefits from the engagement. China has a comprehensive Africa policy while Africa has not developed one. Africa should also devise a coherent strategy of engagement that emphasises on policy coordination between African countries and also at Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and African Union (AU) levels.

• Africa similarly needs visionary leadership in order to fully benefit from its cooperation with China. Governments, investors and NGOs on the continent should promote transparency, appropriate

technology, alignment of investment initiatives with African priorities, and an involvement of local communities/farmers to improve delivery on China agriculture investment on the continent.

• Africa should tap into new opportunities by developing supportive/strategic policies that lower transport costs, eliminate formal and informal barriers that undermine the investment environment, increase the flexibility of labour markets and ensure effective competition policies.

• Africa-China cooperation should also be linked to agenda 2063. Cooperation should be extended to social and cultural practices for Africans to enhance their attitudes on factors such as work endurance and good workmanship. There is a need for clear mechanisms for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) engagement in the cooperation.

Technology Transfer

• The two sides attached importance to knowledge sharing and technology transfer and plan to exchange in technological innovation policies and the building of science and

technology parks, but transparency, monitoring and accountability of the cooperation seem weak.

• There is a perception when analysing the current cooperation that trade with China doesn’t appear in general to result in technology transfer (TT) and that China has rarely offered TT to African countries – yet there are many examples to the contrary, for instance, Tazara railway, Zambia and Tanzania, Ethiopian – Djibouti electrified railway, Lagdo hydropower station in Cameroon and the Nouakchott’s friendship port in Mauritania.

Information/Knowledge gap

• According to ACORD’s findings, the recent figures from the Chinese government pledged investment in agriculture in Africa at $700 million while other estimates also project Chinese investment in farming on the continent in 2012 alone to be somewhere between $172 million and $488.5 million.

• Chinese investments, as it is also the case with Brazil and India investment in Africa do not seem to be aligned with African governments and smallholder farmers’ priorities. According to the ACORD’s findings, there are also cases where these foreign investments had led to the relocation/disruption of livelihoods of local communities – who are often poor and ignorant. There is a need for more detailed research on individual countries, at the level of particular value chains to understand the real impacts of China on Africa’s development.

Agriculture Investment and Development Cooperation

• There are not so many Chinese farms in Africa, the existing ones are small (<1000 ha) but there is strong interest in Africa’s agricultural potential. An assessment of Chinese investment distribution in Africa by sector indicates that investment in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery only accounted for 7.3% of total investment.

• Chinese cooperation on Agriculture in Africa, by any standard – be it trade, investment and development assistance – is low. Agriculture is the main-stay of most economies in Africa; the sector accounted for 30% of Africa’s total GDP and employed 65-70% of Africa labour. Chinese agriculture model can provide lessons to Africa but the success in agriculture on the continent crucially depends on the indigenous scientific capacity to generate new technology and specific contexts.

• In the recent past (2006-2009) China built agriculture technology demonstration centres in at least 14 different countries. It has also sent agricultural technology teams to provide policy consulting, teach practical techniques and train local staff. Chinese agricultural support to Africa come in both monetary and in – kind, such as supporting food production, breeding, storage and transport, infrastructure development etc. and funding comes from Chinese banks.

Challenges and Opportunities

• There was a concern about any dispute resolution mechanisms available

Some of the seminar participants

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in the case of conflict with Chinese investment. However, it was noted in the discussion that there is very few legal redress for bringing overseas investors to court because such laws may not even exist in national law (for instance, not even in the democracy like the US). Nevertheless, it is an area of concern.

• There is an absence of sustainable evaluation of investment projects. African governments should link foreign investments with national priorities in agriculture. Often times, host countries were too eager to attract foreign investment and compromised interests of smallholder farmers.

• There is often a challenge to bring in the voice of communities in national government’s negotiation for foreign direct investment. It is important to advocate for greater transparency in the negotiation and engage communities in the process.

• Africa-China cooperation in infrastructure development has both potential and challenges. Among challenges is the tendency of China to mix and combine foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. This makes it hard to assess China’s aid contribution.

• Instead of using local capacities, even for less-skilled work, China insists on having large numbers of Chinese workers on Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Tying execution to Chinese corporation and labour limits the development of local capacities.

• Although agriculture cooperation is often discussed in FOCAC meetings, it’s a very complicated conversation. Learning and experience sharing

must be an important feature of Africa-China partnership.

• There have been some challenges as well as opportunities in Africa-China agriculture cooperation. Africa failed to launch large-scale agricultural developments.

• Infrastructure financing is a challenge as it usually involved large amounts – management of such resources often tends to be a huge challenge. Africa is not one country, thus it may not be appropriate to have a strategy for China and Africa. The engagement with China should also be country-specific.

Agenda and Framework Harmonisation

• The Africa-China cooperation in agriculture needs to be aligned to the Continental Agricultural transformation agenda whose flagship mechanisms are CAADP and Agenda 2063. CAADP is a framework implemented in all AU member States for implementing agriculture-led investment plans and programmes for enhancing food and nutrition security, eliminate hunger, reduce poverty and accelerate economic growth.

• CAADP being a common framework will enable the alignment of resources in the Africa-China cooperation in agriculture. The cooperation will then be aligned to the strategic areas in implementation strategy and roadmap for obtaining the CAADP vision, focusing on already identified priority areas. Agricultural cooperation is a key component in China’s support to Africa under FOCAC.

• Technical support and technology transfer are provided through

agricultural demonstration centres. Most African countries prefer development cooperation as compared to aid. However, there is a gap in ensuring the agricultural demonstration centres are aligned to Africa’s context. One reason is that the Chinese agricultural officials didn’t know Africa well. Africa needs help to increase yield not to increase scale. It is important to ensure that China’s agricultural extensions support meets with the needs of African farmers and local Africa context.

• There is a need for Africa-China cooperation at continental level in agriculture and infrastructure to be aligned to CAADP and Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and other Programmes of the African Union. Therefore, the ball is in Africa’s court and Africa must ask China to align to African priorities rather than the vice versa.

• African countries should develop strategies, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to inform their interaction with China, for instance, what China can do for Africa, and what China can’t. Africa development should be African-led. It may be important not to ask what China can do for Africa, but what Africa can benefit from China in the partnership.

• African countries must use the Africans living in China to learn more about China. AU should have principles or a strategy for engaging with China as well as other countries.

• Related issues that affect China-Africa relationship in agriculture development such as infrastructure development, water and sanitation, climate change (how China and

other partners like US help climate related challenges), agro-processing and value addition on agriculture products must be investigated.

• Africa should develop a mechanism to monitor, evaluate and create accountability system. How can Africa-initiated, Africa-owned and Africa-led programmes be made possible? Is there any space for African governments and African union? What are the principle guidelines of the African Union’s engagement with China? What are the modalities/ methodology to engage with China? Can the AU develop a guiding framework for its member states engagement with partners?

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CONCLUSION China’s interests in Africa have grown over the years and China is now a major economic player in Africa. For instance, China is now Africa’s largest export destination, taking in about 20% of Africa’s exports. While Africa currently contributes a minuscule share in China’s total global trade, the growing Chinese FDI into Africa and the infrastructure development partnerships are set to change that. China is one of the largest infrastructure financiers and developers in Africa.

In line with this growing partnership, Oxfam International Liaison office to the African Union launched the Africa-China Dialogue Platform (ACDP) in March 2016. The Platform aims to encourage and facilitate a constructive engagement and dialogue of citizens, policy makers, researchers and other stakeholders on the growing partnership between Africa and China, especially the current situation, challenges, and ways forward relating to Africa-China partnership.

The seminar marking the launch of the platform brought together different ideas and opinions on the issue of Chinese Agricultural engagement in Africa, and beyond. It also helped shape the direction of the new programme, by uncovering opportunities, unforeseen circumstances, challenges and ways forward. Participants shared insights and practical suggestions as to how China, as an emerging world power and a long-time supporter of Africa’s development, can play constructive and effective roles in promoting sustainable development in Africa, especially in economic cooperation-trade, investment and development assistance- in Africa, and more importantly, bring the fruits of development to communities and the poor in Africa.

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) provides a robust mechanism for Making Africa-China Engagement Work for Africa’s Sustainable Development since it’s a common framework for streamlined Agricultural Development and Investment Plan allows alignment of resources with this plan. Any mutual cooperation between Africa and China would be based on the CAADP vision 2025. The cooperation must also be aligned to the strategic areas in Implementation Strategy and Roadmap for obtaining the CAADP vision and on one or more of the already identified priorities through rigorous multi-sector consultations.

Embarking on the experience of the Chinese agriculture sector it was indicated that it did not develop through development assistance rather through a combination of market reforms, trade and foreign direct investment. In order to fill the financing gap for the agriculture sector in Africa foreign direct investment inflows through foreign private companies is seen as an important resource. In the meantime, it was underlined that bringing agricultural transformation and scaling up agricultural productivity is the sole responsibility of Africans. There were also conversations and consensus that while China knows what it wants from Africa, African governments have yet to develop a coherent strategy on how to engage China and other new partners from a stronger and better-informed platform thus, the burden of proof is on African governments themselves.

With regard to the partnership and how the continent operates in this context, few examples were raised where it was imperative for African Governments to promote certain policies to ensure proper engagement, these include: transparency, involving providing a publicly-accessible detailed annual report

of all their cooperation projects in Africa; reviewing the appropriateness of Chinese technology transfer by making China’s agricultural technology demonstration centres subject to independent review, assessing how useful they are to African agriculture, especially smallholder farmers; ensuring that foreign investment and cooperation programmes are aligned with national interests and integrated into wider policy-making by being brought under the general framework of donor/government relations and not stand outside this; and ensuring that smallholder farmers are involved in the design and implementation of investment and cooperation projects by China. Such participation should be a requirement in all projects, notably large-scale land investments and technology programmes.

The Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC) projects have demonstrated a real effort of the Chinese government trying to deliver its agro-aid pledges in Africa in the FOCAC era (since the 2000s) and with a particular concern as to avoiding problems experienced in China’s earlier agro-aid practice (1960-90s). Yet, given the difficulties identified, it remains to be seen to what extent this new programme could be able to overcome ‘old problems’ and thus virtually benefit the recipient countries. It’s a promising sign for China, as an emerging power/donor, to start engaging with international development in a more active manner, but much still needs to be done to make this ‘new business of development’ work and possibly lead to a true win-win scenario.

The challenge for Africa is how to extract commensurate benefits from this economic cooperation. This calls for clarity of purpose on the part of African policy makers on what

benefits they could potentially derive, and at what cost. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the business practices by the Chinese financiers (e.g., tying of loans to Chinese contractors) reduce the beneficial impacts of China-Africa cooperation in infrastructure. Similarly, the practice of tying financing to natural resources creates opaqueness and makes it difficult to assess the true cost of financing. These issues are complicated as there may be merits to the approaches adopted by the Chinese financiers. There is, therefore, a need for more research to understand the conditions under which such arrangements would likely be beneficial, and to better inform policy makers both in Africa and in China.

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ANNEXAnnex I: Programme

Technical Seminars (9:00 – 16:00)

MC – Gedion Jalata, Programme Manager, Africa-China Dialogue Platform, Oxfam International

8:30 – 9:00 Registration of Participants

Morning I Welcome and Introduction to the Programme

9:00 – 9:45

Opening Ceremony

Chair

Mr. Désiré Assogbavi, Resident Representative, Oxfam International Liaison Office to the African Union

Speakers

Ms. Chan Mayling, International Programme Unit Director, Oxfam Hong Kong

Ambassador Kuang Weilin, Head of Mission, China Permanent Mission to the African Union

Ambassador Jalal Chelba, Representative of the African Union Commission/ Head, Civil Society Division of AUC

Dr. Arkebe Oqubay, Minister, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia

9:45 – 10:15 Group Photograph and Coffee Break

Morning II Africa-China Engagement for Development: the Scope, Trends, Opportunities and Challenges

10:15 – 11:30 Setting the scene for scoping China’s engagement with Africa, especially in the areas of foreign direct investment, trade and aid. What do historical trends tell us about this engagement? What are the latest trends? What are the opportunities and challenges that we have learned from the past that will allow us to plan for Africa’s future development? How can this engagement support our common interest in reducing extreme poverty and improving development prospects for African citizens?

10:15 – 11:30

Moderator

Mr. Kevin May, Programme Manager, China and the Developing World Programme, Oxfam Hong Kong

Speakers (15-20 mins each)

Prof. Li Anshan, Director, Centre for African Studies, Peking University

Prof. Fantu Cheru, Senior Researcher, African Studies Centre, Leiden

Ms. Fatou Mbaye, Livelihoods Thematic Manager, Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD)

Q & A (30 mins)

Morning III Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Agriculture: What Role does Chinese OFDI Play in Africa? Myths or Realities of Chinese Agricultural OFDI in Africa

11:30 – 13:00 The agriculture sector is critically important if Africa is to deliver food security for its citizens. It is central to Africa’s development path, currently generates 40 percent of Africa’s gross national product (GNP) and constitutes 40 percent of Africa’s exports and 70-80 percent of its employment. Agriculture is also a sector that has seen decades of declining investment.

While African governments have committed to meet the target of investing at least 10% of their national budgets to boost agriculture (Malabo Declaration) private investments can also play a constructive role. Trends in foreign direct investment in agriculture deserve attention, especially with the BRICS countries’ interests in

Africa. In this regard, China has a long history of engagement in Africa’s agriculture. Under its Go-Out policy and growing economic relations with Africa through FOCAC and other China-African initiatives, speakers will be invited to present their views on what could be the future impact on communities of Chinese FDI in Africa’s agriculture sector? What would be best practices to share or lessons for improvement?

Moderator

Ms. Nellie Nyang’wa, Oxfam International Regional Director, Southern Africa Region

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11:30 – 13:00


Prof. Chris Alden, Research Associate, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)

Prof. Tang Xiaoyang, Associate Professor, Tsinghua University

Mr. Gedion Jalata, Programme Manager, Africa-China Dialogue Platform, Oxfam International

Q & A (30 mins)

13:00 -14:00 Lunch Break

Afternoon I Discussion on Making Africa-China Engagement Work for Africa’s Sustainable Development – The Regional Impacts and Beyond

14:00 – 16:00 All to discuss future for Africa-China engagement and areas needed for new research. This is to encourage a free-flowing discussion among governments, researchers, CSOs, and other stakeholders on the way forward.

The discussion may include making Chinese OFDI work for Africa’s sustainable development (with reference to the African Union’s policy agenda on Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), and the post-2015 SDGs text). Are there new policy aspirations from the Sixth FOCAC on China-Africa cooperation that will provide the most benefit for African citizens?

What role should the African Union take to guide China’s increasing economic engagement in Africa, especially in agriculture, that would fit in with the AU’s Agenda 2063 goals for African development priorities?

Moderator

Ms. Sipho Mthathi, Executive Director, Oxfam South Africa


Ms. Diana Oyena Akullo, Policy Officer in the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture of the African Union Commission

Ambassador Shu Zhan, Research Fellow, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University

Dr. Witness Simbanegavi, Research Director, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)

Open Discussion Time for Participants (1 hour)

16:00 Coffee Break

Official Launch of the Africa-China Dialogue Platform and Diplomatic Reception (17:30 –

19:00) 17:30 – 19:00 Welcome Remarks

Chair

Mr. Désiré Assogbavi, Resident Representative, Oxfam International Liaison Office to the African Union

Speakers

Ms. Sipho Mthathi, Executive Director, Oxfam South Africa

Ambassador Kuang Weilin, Head of Mission, China Permanent Mission to the African Union

Ms. Chan Mayling, International Programme Unit Director, Oxfam Hong Kong

Cocktail Reception and Networking Session

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Annex II: Participants

Abderrezzaq BENBARA

Embassy of Algeria

Diplomatic Attaché: [email protected]

Abdurahman Elabd

Embassy of Libya

Counselor: [email protected]

Zerihun Berhane

AAU, CAFOS

Assistant prof: [email protected]

Xu Tau

CCTV

Reporter: [email protected]

Abebe Aynete

EIIPD

Researcher: [email protected]

Abubakar

Embassy of Chad

[email protected]

Allo Asgedom

Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the AU and UNECA 1st Secretary: [email protected]

Amb. Aggrey Shitsama

Embassy of Kenya

Deputy Head of Mission: [email protected] [email protected]

Amb. Ahmed Baba

Saharawi Embassy

Deputy Head of Mission: [email protected]

Amb. Kuang Weilin

Chinese Mission to AU

Ambassador: [email protected]

Amb. Susan Sikaneta

Zambia Embassy

Head of Mission: [email protected]

Amb. Winpeg Moyo

Embassy of Zimbabwe

Deputy Ambassador: [email protected]

Amb. Albert. R. Chimbindi

Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe


Amb. Wahide Belay

Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA: [email protected] / [email protected]

Andre Zentra Ventura

Embassy of Angola

Minister council: [email protected]

Anne-Béatrice Bullinger

Embassy of Switzerland in Ethiopia


Ayenew H/Selassie

Daily Monitor/Fortune

Freelancer: [email protected]

Amb. Ismael Koroma

Embassy of Sierra Leone

Deputy Ambassador: [email protected]

Amb. Bruce Shepherd

New Zealand Embassy

Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the African Union: [email protected] / [email protected]

Amb. Lineo Palime

Lesotho Embassy


Zoe Tiller

Embassy of Australia

Second Secretary: [email protected]

Betty Wangozi

AU NGO Desk Officer

[email protected] / [email protected]

Zulfikar Kilic

Turkish Embassy

Commercial Counselor: [email protected]

Carl Le Roux

Embassy of South Africa

Counselors: [email protected] / [email protected]

Christian ASSOGBA

Senegal Embassy

First Counselor: [email protected]

Yesmirach Kebede

NRC

Res. Rep: [email protected]

David Omozuafoh

UNDP APRM & Governance Assessment

Programme Advisor: [email protected]

Dawit Teshale

Ethiopian Economic Association

Assistance Researcher: [email protected] , [email protected]

Diana Akullo

AUC Policy Officer

[email protected]

Doris Mpoumour

Save the Children

Director: [email protected] Yohannes

IPSS

[email protected]

Dr Yann Bedzigui

ISS

Researcher: Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis

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Dr. Adama Ekberg Coulibaly

United National Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

Chief, Food Security, Agriculture & Land: [email protected]

Dr. Bartholomew Armah

UNECA

Chief Renewal of Planning Section: [email protected]

Dr. Iyorlumun J. Uhaa

UNICEF

Representative to the AU and UNECA

Dr. Kidist G/Selassie

AAU

Lecturer: [email protected]

Yonas Adaye Adeto

IPSS

Associate Academic Director: [email protected]

Dr. Mohammed Hassen

AAU

Lecturer [email protected]

Dr. Robert Afriyie

Embassy of Ghana

Deputy Head of [email protected]

Dr. Stephen Bainous Kargbo

UNIDO

Industrial Development Officer: [email protected]

Dr. Tesfaye Tafesse

AAU

Department Head: [email protected]

Dr. Getachew Zeru

IPSS

Lecturer: [email protected]

Yonas Tariku

IPSS

PHD Programmes Coordinator: [email protected]

Elalem Hamza

Mauritania Embassy

First Counselor: [email protected]

Emilie Brückmann

Embassy of France

Second Counsellor: emilie.brü[email protected]

Witness Simbanegani

AERC

Director of research: [email protected]

Eshete Tilahun

MOFA Ethiopia

Director: [email protected]

Fatou Mbaye

ACORD

Livelihood Manager: [email protected]

Fantu Cheru

Leiden University,

Professor: [email protected]

Fathya Aboubakar

Embassy of Djibouti

Third Secretary: [email protected]

Frida Baidiman

Embassy of Sweden

Political Officer: [email protected]

Felipe Dononso

Head of Delegation of the ICRC Delegation to the AU

Getachew Sahlemaria

AAU

Teaching: [email protected]

Habtu Mulata

Compassion TS

[email protected]

H.E Amb. Mark Sawers


[email protected]

H.E Amb. Naimi Sweetie H. Aziz

Embassy of Tanzania

[email protected]

H.E. Alfredo Miranda

Embassy of Mexico

[email protected]

H.E. Amb. Bass Abal Abasse

Islamic Republic of Mauritania

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary: [email protected]

H.E. Amb. KIM Moonhwan

Embassy of South Korea


H.E. Amb. Osman Keh Kamara

Embassy of Sierra Leone


H.E. Amb. Afonso Malhdiro

Embassy of Portugal


H.E. Amb. Elman Abdullayev

Embassy of Azerbajan


H.E. Amb. Jacek Jankowski

Embassy of Poland


H.E. Amb. Promise Sithembiso Msibi

Embassy of Swaziland


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H.E . Amb. Juan M. Rodriguez

Cuba Embassy


[email protected] / [email protected]

H.E Amb. Albert Yankey

Ghana Embassy


Haile Mariamu Tebeje

Huaweet Technologies N.W. Tech

[email protected]

Hayat Yakob

Pharma Line Pharmaceutical

General Manager: [email protected]

Jacob Horsfall

Embassy of Nigeria


Joseph Chinyemba

Zambia Embassy

First secretary (Economic and Trade): [email protected]

Joseph Rudufus

JRS

Rep: [email protected]

Julie Crowley

Embassy of Canada

First Secretary (Political-African Union) : [email protected]

Kedir Shemsu

World Food Programme

[email protected]

Khota Dau Aleer

Embassy of South Sudan

[email protected]

Libertina Kautwima

Embassy of Namibia

First Secretary: [email protected]

Mayling Chan

Oxfam Hong Kong

International Programme Director: [email protected]

Melanie Teche

AFDB

Climate Change Specialist: [email protected]

Mohamed Hassen

CAFOS

Assistant Prof: [email protected] Nfono Magana Ada

Equatorial Guinea Embassy

Administrative Attaché: [email protected]

Major General Abebe Teklehaimanot Kahsay

School of Federalism Studies

Director: [email protected]

Marilyn Nolufefe Dwabayo

South African Embassy

Deputy Permanent Representative: [email protected]

Mohammad Halawani

Egyptian Embassy


Amb. Mohammed Baba

Embassy of Saharawi Republic

Deputy Ambassador

Mutsa Mangezi

ICRC

Deputy Head of Delegation of the ICRC Delegation to the AU: [email protected]

Najla Awat

Embassy of Sudan


Nicholas Matatu

International IDEA

[email protected]

Nolawi Melakedingel


Senior Policy Analyst: [email protected] [email protected]

Yonas Bekele

[email protected]

Nellie Nyangwa

Oxfam

RD-SAF: [email protected]

Odomoro Mubangizi

Society of Jesus

Director: [email protected] Preclík

Czech Embassy

Political section: [email protected]

[email protected]

Peter Zwart

New Zealand Embassy

First Secretary Development: [email protected]

Prof. Chris Alden

LSE/SAIIA


Prof. Tang Xiangay

Tsinghua


Prof. Herman Musahara

OSSREA

Acting Executive Director

Prof. Li Anshan

Peking University


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REPORT Africa-China Dialogue Platform Launch

R Venkatesan

Embassy of India

First Secretary (Pol): [email protected]

Raheemat Momodu

ECOWAS Liaison Office to AU

Head: [email protected] / [email protected]

Rahel Seife Hassen

Senior Diplomatic Assistant of the ICRC Delegation to the AU: [email protected]

Taddese Asffaw

Hidasie Telecom

General Manager: [email protected]

Ruth Abraham

Ireland Embassy

Liaison: [email protected]

Thabo Chuake

Embassy of South Africa

Counselors: [email protected]

Saban Ugur

Turkish Embassy

Second Secretary: [email protected]

Santino Dut Deng

Embassy of South Sudan

Diplomat: [email protected]

Shu Zhan

Zhejiang University

Senior Researcher: [email protected]

Sarah Bukar-Godwin

Embassy of Nigeria


Selma Malika HENDEL

Embassy of Algeria

Minister Council

Senait Afework

African Trade Policy Center/UNECA

Communication Assistant: [email protected]

Sohn Sung- Young

South Korea


Solomon Gofie

Addis Ababa University

Political Science Department: [email protected]

Sam Wei

ZTE Corporation

Terminal Business MD: [email protected]

Stephen Kirimi

Life and Peace Institute

Regional Programme manager: [email protected]

Solomon Mebrie

AAU

Asst. Professor: [email protected]

Victoria Watkins

British Embassy

Political Section: [email protected]

Oxfam International Liaison Office to the African Union Bole Airport Area TK Building #2, 6th floor, Suite #602Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia Tel.: +251 11 661 1601 Fax: +251 11 661 2795 Email: [email protected]

Contact Person : Gedion JalataE-mail: [email protected]

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Africa china dialogue Launch - report.

Government & Nonprofit

Transcript of Africa china dialogue Launch - report.