WorkshopProceedings:AfghanistanRightsMonitor(ARM)

AfghanistanPublicPolicyResearchOrganization

July2018ProjectReport

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AcknowledgmentsAboutThisReportThisworkshopreportcombinestheproceedingsfromtwoworkshopsheldin2017and2018aspartoftheAfghanistanRightsMonitorProject(ARM),fundedbytheDutchMinistryofForeignAffairs.APPROsincerelythanksalltheinvitedguests,theiractiveparticipation,andcontributiontothetwoworkshops.AboutARMThehumanrightsgainsmadeoverthepast16yearsinAfghanistanareincreasinglyunderthreatwitharesurgenceofviolenceanddecliningeconomicgrowthinthecountry.AfghanistanRightsMonitor(ARM)wasdesignedtoaddressthesegapsandcontributetothediscourseandactiononhumanrights.Theprojecthasthefollowingobjectives:

1. RegularmonitoringofthecurrentconditionsoffundamentalrightsinAfghanistanusingasetofindicatorsbasedoninternationallyrecognizedstandardsformonitoringCivic,SocialandEconomicrights.

2. Informed,pragmatic,andconstructiveadvocacymessagingonfundamentalrightsneeds,basedonempiricaldata,anddeliveredbycivilsocietyactors.

3. IncreasedcapacityandresponsivenessofpublicinstitutionstofundamentalrightsneedsofAfghancitizens.

FormoreinformationonARM,see:www.nac-pp.netAboutAPPROAfghanistanPublicPolicyResearchOrganization(APPRO)isanindependentsocialresearchorganizationwithamandatetopromotesocialandpolicylearningtobenefitdevelopmentandreconstructioneffortsinAfghanistanandotherlessdevelopedcountriesthroughconductingappliedsocialresearchandmonitoring,trainingandmentoring,andevaluations.APPROisregisteredwiththeMinistryofEconomyinAfghanistanasanon-profitnon-governmentorganizationandheadquarteredinKabul,AfghanistanwithofficesinMazar-eSharif(north),Herat(west),Kandahar(south),Jalalabad(east),andBamyan(center).APPROisthefoundingmemberofAPPRO-Europe,registeredinBelgium.APPROalsoactsastheSecretariatfortheNationalAdvocacyCommitteeforPublicPolicy(NAC-PP).FormoreinformationonAPPRO,see:www.appro.org.af.FormoreinformationonAPPRO-Europe,seep:www.appro-europe.net.FormoreinformationonNAC-PP,see:www.nac-pp.netContact:mail@appro.org.afWorkshopParticipantsInadditiontoAPPRO’steam,theparticipantsincludedindividualsfromthegovernmentandAfghancivilsocietyorganizations,aswellasfourinternationalexperts.Theparticipantswere(inalphabeticalorder):MohammadHasibAmini,ShawaliAtai,AbdulBasir,DennisDijkzeul,PearlEliadis,AliFarhang,SamiraHamidi,AzamHzhabr,GulalaiKarimi,EngineerSultanAliJavid,RezaKateb,MusaMahmodi,QasimMohsani,AbdulMoqtaderNasir,AbdulMuqtadirNasiri,NaeemNazari,EhsanNiazi,AbdulQadirQadir,AzizRafee,SarhaSafi,RoshanSeran,ElizabethWinter,ParastoYari.SaeedPartoandEhsanSaadatauthoredthisreport.FrontPagePhoto:AtiqRahimiAPPROtakesfullresponsibilityforallomissionsanderrors.©2018.AfghanistanPublicPolicyResearchOrganization.Somerightsreserved.Thispublicationmaybestoredinaretrievalsystemortransmittedonlyfornon-commercialpurposesandwithwrittencredittoAPPROandlinkstoAPPRO’swebsiteatwww.appro.org.af.Anyotheruseofthispublicationrequirespriorwrittenpermission,whichmaybeobtainedbywritingto:mail@appro.org.af

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TableofContents

Background............................................................................................................................5ProgressonBrusselsConferenceCommitments...............................................................................5CommitmentstoHumanRights........................................................................................................6

NeedforARoadmap..............................................................................................................7

LessonsLearnedfromDubaiWorkshop..................................................................................7

KeyFindingsfromSriLankaWorkshop...................................................................................9State-CivilSocietyRelations...........................................................................................................10KeyDiscussionPoints.....................................................................................................................14

PostWorkshopFollowUp.....................................................................................................16

RemainingChallenges...........................................................................................................18

WaysForward.......................................................................................................................18

CalltoActiontoPrepareforGenevaConference...................................................................19

Appendix1:ARM’sRationaleandObjectives........................................................................20

Appendix2:CodingProtocol.................................................................................................21

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Background

TheBrusselsConferenceonAfghanistanininOctober2016wasattendedby75countriesand26internationalorganizations.Attheconference,theinternationalcommunityreneweditssupporttoassistAfghanistaninitseffortstomeetitsnationalpriorities,setoutintheTokyoDeclarationandreaffirmedattheLondonConferencein2014.TheinternationalcommunitycommittedtoapartnershipwiththeNationalUnityGovernmentforprosperityandpeacetowardhelpingAfghanistantoemergeasasecure,prosperous,anddemocraticnationinthetransformationdecade,2015-2024.TheConferencealsorecognizedthatthereremainednumerouschallengesforAfghanistaninitseffortstoprotectthevariousgainsmadesince2001andworktowardafunctioning,accountable,andincreasinglysustainablestate.ThespecificcommitmentsoftheinternationalcommunityforAfghanistan’stransformationdecadefallunderthreebroadpillarsasfollows.

• Afghan-ledstateandinstitutionbuildingasoutlinedintheAfghanistanNationalPeaceandDevelopmentFramework(ANPDF)andtheSelfReliancethroughMutualAccountabilityFramework(SMAF)

• Sustainedinternationalsupportandfundingatornearcurrentlevelsthrough2020withincreasedaideffectiveness,and

• Regionalandinternationalsupportforendingviolencetofostereconomicdevelopmentandimproveregionaleconomiccooperation,andforapoliticalprocesstowardslastingpeaceandreconciliation.

AslaidoutattheConference,thedevelopmentsupporttoAfghanistanwillcontinuetodependontheprincipleofmutualaccountabilityanddeliveringonthecommitmentsmadefrombothsides.

ProgressonBrusselsConferenceCommitments

ImmediatelyaftertheBrusselsConference,British&IrishAgenciesAfghanistanGroup(BAAG)organizedameetingbetweenAfghancivilsocietyrepresentativeswhowerepresentattheconferencewithsomeinternationaldelegatestotakestockofthecommitmentslistedintheJointCommuniqué.Thefollowingwerethehighlightsofthemeeting:• Donorpledgesexceededtheexpectations.• Valuableroleofcivilsocietywasrecognizedbythedonorsandco-hosts,andtheimportanceofcivil

societyinvolvementwasmentionedintheCommuniqué.• CivilsocietyhadlittleinfluenceovertheBCAagenda,indicatingthatadvocacyworkshouldhave

begunmuchearlier• DiscourseattheconferencesoundedasthoughtheinternationalcommunityseesAfghanistanasa

post-conflictcountrywhenitclearlyisnot.• Lackofanti-corruptionbenchmarksinthecommitmentswasaconcern.• Allagreedthatfollow-upwasnecessarytomaintainmomentumanddevelopmechanisms,which

willfacilitateaneffectiveroleforcivilsocietyinrepresentingtheviewsofcitizensandinholdingthegovernmentanddonorsaccountable.

• AnimmediateactivitywouldbetheformulationofanActionPlan,whichthetenAfghandelegatesagreedtodiscussindedicatedmeetingsinKabul.Theactionplanwouldincludeadvocacyand

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monitoringactivities.• OutcomesoftheBrusselsConferencewouldbesharedwithwidercivilsocietyinKabulandthe

provinces.• RegardingfuturesystematicengagementwiththeNationalUnityGovernment,itwasnotedthat

whilstplatformstodosoalreadyexist,civilsocietyshouldconsiderhowbesttoshapeandusesuchplatformsinordertoinformandinfluence.Aregularworkingmeetingbetweencivilsocietygroupsandgovernmentministerswassuggested.1

Inaddition,IntegrityWatchAfghanistanexpressedconcernaboutthelackofspecificcommitmentsoncorruption.AccordingtothestatementreleasedbyIntegrityWatchAfghanistanalongwithGlobalWitness:

TheAfghangovernmentanddonorshavemadestrongstatementsonfightingcorruptioninAfghanistan,butamongthe24commitmentstheyhaveagreedinBrussels,thereisonlyonethatrelatestocorruption,inadditiontothebenchmarkonextractives.Thatbenchmarkwasrelativelyweakandunspecific,onlycallingforananti-corruptionstrategytobecreatedandforministriestoreportonimplementationofanti-corruptionactionplans.2

CommitmentstoHumanRights

ThespecificcommitmentsmadeduringtheConferencetopromoteandprotecthumanrightsinAfghanistanmaybesummarizedasfollows.1. Strengtheningtheruleoflawandpursuingjudicialreformtostrengthenstatelegitimacyand

protectthesafetyandsecurityofjudges,prosecutorsanddefenseattorneys.2. EnsuringthatallAfghancitizenshaveaccesstoaformaljusticesystemthatisfairandrespectedin

itsapplicationofthelaw.3. Buildingkeyinstitutionssuchasthepoliceandcivilianpolicing,AttorneyGeneral’sOffice,formal

courtsystem,andprovisionoflegalaid.4. ReducingpovertyinAfghanistanbycreatingemploymentasamainmeansforaddressingchild

malnutrition,foodinsecurity,poorsanitation,andconflictrelatedimpoverishment.5. Protectionandimplementationoftheconstitutionalrightsandinternationalhumanrightswitha

focusontherightsofwomenandchildrenincludingmeasurestopreventviolenceagainstwomenandchildren,forcedorearlymarriage,tortureorilltreatment,anddiscrimination.

6. Recognitionandutilizationofthekeyroleofwomenindevelopment,justice,andpeacethroughcontinuedcommitmenttoprotectandpromotetherightsofwomenandgirls,increasingtheiraccesstohealthandeducationservices,improvingtheircapacityforself-reliance,andexpandingtheiropportunitiesandparticipationinsocial,economic,andpoliticalarenas.ThisincludestangiblesupportforthenewNationalPriorityProgramonWomen'sEconomicEmpowermentandthefundingfortheNationalActionPlantoimplementUNSecurityCouncilResolution1325(NAP1325)onwomen,peaceandsecurity.

1BAAG(October2016).CivilSocietyInputintotheBrusselsConferenceonAfghanistan:SummaryReport.Availableat:http://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/BCA%20report%206Dec16%20final.pdf

2Seeforexample;https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/brussels-conference-afghanistan-commitment-extractives-little-corruption/

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7. RecognizingtheroleofcivilsocietyandmediainAfghanistan'sdevelopmentandtheneedtoincludecivilsocietyinpoliticalprocesses.

8. RecognizingthechallengetoAfghanistanandtheregioninmeetingtheprotractedneedsofdisplacedpeopleandrefugeesandprovidingsupportandassistance,includingenhancingthecapacitiesofAfghancommunitiesandlocalauthoritiestoattendtothemanyneedsofthereturneesandtheinternallydisplacedpersonswhileaddressingtherootcausesofdisplacement.

TheabovecommitmentshavebeenatthecoreofAfghanistanRightsMonitor(ARM),aprojectfundedbytheDutchMinistryofForeignAffairsandimplementedbyAPPROsinceOctober2015,tosupportinformedpolicyandactiononprotectionandpromotionoffundamentalrightsthroughappliedresearch,monitoring,evidence-basedandconstructiveadvocacy,andincreasedcapacityofpublicinstitutionsandcivilsocietyorganizationstocollaborateinachievingcommongoals.SeeAppendix1fortherationaleandobjectivesofARM.

NeedforARoadmap

BrusselsConferencecoincidedwiththecompletionofthefirstyearoftheARMproject.WithreferencetothecommitmentsmadeattheConferenceandthefindingsfromthefirstyearoftheARMproject,APPROorganizedaconsultationworkshopinDubaiduringJanuary14-15,2017tobringtogetherrepresentativesfromcivilsocietyandgovernmentinstitutionstodiscusshowprogresscouldorshouldbemadetowardmeetingfundamentalrightsobligationsoftheGovernmentofAfghanistan.AsafollowupofDubaiconsultationworkshopAPPROorganizedasecondworkshopinColombo,SriLankaduring17-18March2018.UsingthecommitmentsfromtheBrusselsConferenceandtheproceedingsfromthetwoworkshopsinDubaiandSriLanka,thisRoadmapisbeingdraftedtocontributetoeffortsforjointactionandcollaborationbystateandcivilsocietyactorsinmeetingcommitmentsmadeattheBrusselsConference.Specifically,thisRoadmaphighlightsareaswherestate-civilsocietyrelationsneedtobestrengthenedforjointactiononfundamentalrightsthroughstructuredandevidence-baseddialogueonpriorityobjectivessetduringtheBrusselsConference,clarityinrolesandresponsibilitiesofstateandcivilsocietyorganizationsinmovingtowardmeetingtheseobjectives,documentinglessonslearnedintheprocesstoinformfuturejointactionnationalcommitments,andimplicationsforthedialogueonfundamentalrightsduringtheGenevaConferencetotakeplaceduringNovember2018.

LessonsLearnedfromDubaiWorkshop

TheDubaiworkshopcommencedwithapresentationofthefindingfromtheARMbaselineassessmentandresearchandmonitoringcarriedoutin2016.Thepresentationlaidthebasisonwhichtherepresentativesfromcivilsocietyandgovernmentinstitutionsdiscussedkeyaccomplishments,challenges,andwaysforwardforfurtherarticulationofjointactiononmeetingAfghanistan’shumanrightscommitments,renewedattheBrusselsConference.Theparticipantsagreedonalistofthemostsignificant,rights-relatedcommitmentsfromtheBrusselsConferencethatrequiredclosercollaborationbetweenstateauthoritiesandcivilsociety(Table1).

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Table1:HumanRightsCommitmentsofBrusselsConference• StrengtheningRuleofLaw• AccesstoFormalJustice• AccesstoEducation• AccesstoHealth• MigrationChallengesandFactors• AccesstoEmployment• FoodSecurityandMalnutrition

• AccesstoSafeDrinkingWaterandSanitationWomenRights,specifically:WomeninFormalJusticeSystem,WomeninPeace,Women’sAccesstoHealth,EducationandEmployment

• Children’sRights• RightsofInternallyDisplacedandReturnees• RoleofMediainDevelopment

Source:SelectedforthisreportfromconferenceproceedingsTheparticipantsfurtheragreedthatthebestwaytomoveforwardwouldbetoestablishthefollowinginformationforeachcommitment:• Mostrelevantactors• Mostrelevantfactors(includinglegislationandfunding)• Mechanismsforstate-civilsocietyinterfaceThelogicofthisapproachwasthateffectingchangewouldhavetobebasedonpriorknowledgeoftherelevantactors,factors,andmechanismsfordialogueandcollaboration.TheapproachwasappliedtoonecommitmentfromtheBrusselsConference,“StrengtheningRuleofLaw”,duetoshortageoftime,withtheagreementthattheparticipantswouldworkcloselywithAPPROincarryingoutthesameexerciseforallthecommitmentslistedabove.UnderRuleofLaw,theparticipantsidentifiedtherelevantactors,factors,andmechanisms(Table2).Table2:Actors,Factors,andMechanismsinRuleofLaw

Actors Factors- MinistryofJustice- MinistryofInterior- AttorneyGeneral’sOffice- Courts- Parliament- AfghanistanIndependentBarAssociation- Media- PoliticalParties- Variouscivilsocietyorganizationswitharuleoflaw

mandate

- GeneralInsecurity- Impunity- LegalIlliteracy- LackofSufficientCapacityamongFormalJustice

Personnel- GeneralFailuretoImplementLaws- LackofAccountabilityinFormalJusticeSystem- Corruption- AbuseofPower- Conservatism,preventingadherencebyJustice

OfficialstoFormalLaws

MechanismsComplaintsHandling

CourtsSocialAuditsofCourts’Functions

FormalConsultationsOmbudsmen

Giventhemulti-facetedchallengesoftheformallegalsystemandthemultiplicityofactorsandfactors,itwasdecidedtonarrowthefocusfurtheronthechallengesassociatedwiththeappointmentofjudgesandotherseniorofficials.Insodoing,however,andgiventhelevelofdetailneededforanelaborate

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roadmap,itwasnotpossibletofullyanalyzetherolesoftheidentifiedactorsandtheinfluencesofthefactorsintheappointmentprocessoridentifythemechanismsthroughwhichissuesrelatingtoappointmentscouldbediscussedbetweencivilsocietyandgovernmentauthorities.TheparticipantsagreedthatAPPROwouldfurtherdeveloptheapproachandconvenefollowupmeetingsinKabultomoveclosertohavingaroadmap.WhiletheDubaiworkshopdidnotresultinaroadmap,anumberofkeylessonswerelearnedintheprocessasfollows:1. Withoutasystemic(“wholesystem”)approach,itisatbestdifficult,andimpractical,todevelop

strategiesandroadmapstowardmeetingoverarchingobjectivessuchasthoseunderSMAForothersimilarframeworks.

2. Singleissue-ismisnotanadequateapproachforresolvingcomplex,multi-facetedissuessuchruleoflaw,genderequality,orcorruption.

3. Themostpractical,butdifficult,approachfordevelopingpathwaystowardmeetingSMAF’soverarchingobjectivesistocombinelessons1and2,above,andbreakdowneachobjectiveintoitsconstitutivecomponents–withoutlosingsightofthefullpicture–andprioritizewhichcomponentorcomponentstoaddressbasedonurgency,practicality,andtherisklevels(personalsecurity,financial)associatedwiththechangebeingsought.

Toaddressthischallenge,itwasdecidedthatAPPROwoulddevelopastandardapproachbasedontheabovethreelessonsandtestitduringthesecondworkshopofARMinColombo,SriLankainMarch2018.

KeyFindingsfromSriLankaWorkshop

TofollowupontheDubaiWorkshop, APPROpartneredwiththeNationalAdvocacyCommitteeforPublicPolicy(NAC-PP)forwhichAPPROactsasthesecretariat.Therationaleforthispartnershipwastherealization,whileARMwasbeingimplemented,oftheneedforcloserstate-civilsocietyinteractionsbasedontrustandmutualaccountabilityaspreconditionsofeffectivelyprotectingandpromotingfundamentalrightsinAfghanistan.TheSriLankaWorkshopwasheldduringMarch17-18,2018.Forbettermanagementoftheproceedings,itwasdecidedtofocusonthreeministriesandtheirsectors.ThesewereMinistryofPublicHealth(MoPH),MinistryofEducation(MoEd),andMinistryofRefugeesandRepatriations(MoRR).Presentattheworkshopwererepresentativesfromthethreeministries,IndependentDirectorateofLocalGovernance(IDLG),OfficeoftheChiefExecutive,AfghanistanIndependentHumanRightsCommission(AIHRC),ChairandDeputyofNAC-PP,arepresentativefromtheEuropeanDelegation–Afghanistan,arepresentativefromOxfamAfghanistan,threenationalNGOswithmandatesonhumanrights,andtwointernationalexpertsonhumanrightsandstate-civilsocietyrelations.Duringtheworkshoptheparticipantswereaskedtoidentifythemainchallengesfacedinpublichealth,education,andmigration–giventhepresenceofrepresentativesfromtherelevantministries(MoPH,MoEd,andMoRR).Table3providessummariesofthesechallenges.

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Table3:MajorChallengesinPublicHealth,Education,andMigrationPublicHealth Education Migration

- Shortagesofdoctors,nursesandmidwives

- Shortagesinthenumberofstandardhospitalbuildings

- Lowqualitymedicine- Preventivehelp(including

mothers’deathandchildcare)- Lackofmental/psychological

care- Mistreatmentofpatientsby

healthstaff- Corruptioninserviceprovision

- Shortagesinnumberofprofessionalstaff,particularlyfemaleteachers

- Inadequateaccesstoschoolinremoteandruralareas

- Problemsincurriculum- Poverty- Harassmentofschoolgirls- Lackoftransparencyinthe

ministry- Budgetallocationnotbasedon

assessmentofneeds- Teachinginmothertonguenot

beingdoneadequately- Lackofincentivestoworkin

remoteareas

- Lackofbasicfacilitiesforadequatelivelihoods

- HighnumbersofreturneesfromEurope

- Ethnicandreligiousconflicts- Forcedmarriages- Lackofjobsforeducated

youth- Resentmentofeducatedyouth

insomecommunities- Non-acceptanceinhost

communitiesaftermigration- Lackofawarenessofrisksin

illegalmigrationandconsequencesofillegalmigration,personallyandprofessionally

TheparticipantswerethendividedintothreegroupsunderPublicHealth,Education,andMigrationwitheachgroupbeingconvenedbytheministryrepresentativefromtherelevantministry.Anumberofrecommendationsweregeneratedbyeachgroup,usingtheactor/factor/mechanismsapproachoutlinedunder“LessonsLearnedfromDubaiWorkshop”(above),onhowtoovercomethechallengesidentifiedforeachareasoffocus(Table3).Thediscussionsonhowtooperationalizetherecommendationsmadebyeachgroupevolvedintoaheateddebateabouttheroleofcivilsocietyindevelopment,roleofgovernmentindevelopment,andobligationsbyeachsidetowardtheother.Thenextsectionprovidesthehighlightsofthedebateonstate-civilsocietyrelationsinAfghanistanbetweenstaterepresentativesandcivilsocietyrepresentatives,withinterventionsbythetwointernationalexperts.

State-CivilSocietyRelations

TheissueofmutualaccountabilitybetweenstateauthoritiesandcivilsocietyorganizationswasbrieflyraisedduringtheDubaiworkshopinearly2017.InperiodthatfollowedandleadinguptotheColomboworkshop,ARM’sactivitiestendedtoheavilyconcentrateonstate-civilsocietyrelationsinthearenaoffundamentalrightsinAfghanistan.Duringthesameperiod,thepublicdiscourseinAfghanistanonstate-civilsocietyrelationsbecamemoreconfrontational–partiallyduetoastatementbyPresidentAshrafGhaniaboutthelackofaccountabilitytothegovernmentbyNGOsthatwerebeingfundeddirectlybytheinternationaldonorcommunity.SubsequentstatementsbythePresidentgaverecognitiontoworkbysomeNGOsandsoftenedtheconfrontationalstanceofthegovernmentregardingNGOs.However,thePresident’smisgivingsaboutlackofaccountabilitybyNGOsappeartorepresentawiderperceptionamonggovernmentofficialsofNGOsactingaseithercompetitorsforinternationalfunds,orspoilersofthegovernment’seffortstomanagedevelopmentefficientlyandeffectively.

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Withthisbackground,theinternationalexpertswereinvitedtogivepresentationsbasedontheirexperienceandknowledgeofstate-civilsocietyrelationsandtheroleofNGOsindemocracies.PearlEliadispresentedfindingsfromVoices-Voix,anon-partisancoalitionofCanadiansandCanadianorganizationscommittedtodefendingcollectiveandindividualrightstodebateanddissent.3ThefindingsfromresearchconductedbyVoices-Voixwerepresentedasfollows.

Aworldwithoutcivilsocietyisadarkspace.TheworkandactivitiesbytheSouthAfricanCampaigntoDismantleCorporatePower,thewasterpickersinIndiaandColumbia,anti-violenceandanti-drugmovements,andthemovementofmothersinpursuitoffindingtheirlostchildreninSouthAmericahaveallbeen,tosomeextent,againstthegovernment,militaryinstitutions,othergovernmentsandinsomecasesagainsteachother.Civilsocietyincludesnon-profit,peacefulandvoluntaryinstitutions,associations,religiouscenters,youthgroups,unofficialunionsandacademicentities.Inmanycountriesgovernmentestablishesinstitutionsforpropagatingitsviewsofficiallyandunofficially.Ifwehaveanopen-mindedapproacheveninstitutionsestablishedbythegovernmentmaybepartofcivilsociety.Keydistinguishingcharacteristicsofcivilsocietyorganizationsarenormsandstandardsconsistentwiththecommongoodandwelfareofsociety,includingaclearcommitmenttohumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms.Thesecharacteristicsallowustoreasonthatorganizationssupportingviolenceorgenocide,suchastheKUKLUXKLANorganizationintheUnitedStates,arenotpartofcivilsociety.Civilsocietyorganizationswiththesecharacteristicsoftentakepartindiscussionsonnormsandpracticesandadvocateforchangeinthepublicsphere.Thesetypesofactivitiessometimesannoygovernments,particularlywhengovernmentsaretargetsforcriticismandadvocacybycivilsociety.Forexample,governmentshavereactedwithhostilitytocivilsocietyonsuchissuesasglobalaidformaternityhealth,abortionrights,andserviceprovisionsforimmigrants,resultinginlimitationsbeingimposedbygovernmentsoncivilsocietyorganizationsandtheiractivities.Theterm‘enablingenvironment’wasusedforthefirsttimein1990inresponsetothequestionofwhysociallyusefulorganizationsandprojectsfail.Thetermhasbeenusedinevaluationofinternationaldevelopmentprogramming.However,thetermcanalsobeusedasatoolforassessingmodesofnationalgovernanceandevaluationofstate-civilsocietyrelations.Thepurposeinthisapplicationofthetermistoestablishwhetherornottheoperatingenvironmentisconducivetoindependent,unrestrained,andlegalexistenceofcivilsocietyorganizations.InmostdevelopedcountriessuchasCanadaandScandinaviancountries,civilsocietyactivitiesconstitutebetween7-10%oftheGDP,whilegovernmentssupportcivilsocietyorganizationsasprovidersofsupplementaryservicesandviews,withsignificantimpactsonsocialandeconomicwelfareindicators.Historically,theideaofenablingenvironmentforcivilsocietyhasbeenfocusedonthreeareas:

• Fundingframeworkforcivilsocietyorganizations• Involvementofcivilsocietyindevelopingpublicpolicy• Mannerinwhichdialoguebetweencivilsocietyandgovernmenttakesplace.

Itiscommonforgovernmentsinlessdevelopedcountriesnottoprovidefinancialassistancetocivilsocietyorganizationsandaccusecivilsocietyorganizationsofreceivingfundsfromforeignsources(e.g.,India,Egypt,Afghanistan).Themaincontentionsbetweenstateandcivilsocietytendtobeconcentrated

3FormoreinformationonVoices-Voix,see:http://voices-voix.ca/en/declaration-2016

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inhealth,education,andrefugeeaffairssectors.GovernmentsarguethatasNGOsreceiveforeignfundingtheyunderminethelegitimacyofthegovernment.Oneresponsebyproponentsofcivilsocietytothischargeisthatifthegovernmentattractsforeignfundsforinvestmentinthecountrytopromoteprivatesectordevelopment,NGOsshouldhavethesamerightinattractingfundstosupportnon-profitactivitiestobenefitmarginalizedgroupsorcausesandinpursuitofthecommongood.Inademocracy,thegovernmentisobligedtoprotecttherightofcivilsocietyorganizationstoconsultandholddialoguewithstakeholders.Somecivilsocietyorganizationscooperatewithgovernmentwhileotherscriticizeandconfront.Inallcasesthegeneralunderstandinginademocracyisthatthereshallbenothreat,damage,revenge,persecutionorprosecutionofcivilsocietyorganizationsbythegovernmentoritsagencies.Registrationofcivilsocietyorganizationsshouldbemerelyatechnicalissueandinformationoncivilsocietyorganizationsshallnotbeprovidedtothesecuritysectorunlesscivilsocietyorganizationscommitcrimesorundertakeillegalactivities.However,wemustnotethatonproblemsrelatedtoimmigrationgovernmentsareclosingdoorstocivilsocietywhilewewitnessaclimaxofcivilsocietyleaders’prosecution,defundingandderegistrationofcivilsocietyorganizationsforwhatappearstobepoliticalreasons.Deregisteredcivilsocietyorganizationsbecomeisolatedandwillnothaveaccesstoofficialsandnetworksofotherorganizations.Receivingfundawillalsobecomeverydifficultforthem.Membersofcivilsocietyarebeingprosecutedandinsomecasesgotoprisonandbecomesubjectedtomistreatmentandeventorture.Allthishappensbecausecivilsocietyworksforfreedomofspeechandassembly,equalityofwomen,rightsofhomosexuals,advocacyforHIVvictims,andrightsofimmigrantsormerelyduetohavingdifferentpoliticalperspectives.Amaturesocietyisasocietyopentocriticismwithastrongcivilsocietyinvolvedinthepolicymakingprocessand,byextension,thepoliticaldiscourse.Inotherwords,policyisaformofpolitics.Inademocracy,civilsocietymusthaveitsvoiceandanestablishedpositioninsociety.Civilsociety’srighttohaveindependentvoiceandtherighttodisagreewithgovernmentpolicyandapproachfromtimetotimeisfundamentaltomaintainingdemocracy.

Thesecondcontributiononstate-civilsocietyrelationswasmadebyDr.SarahPugh,withtheexampleofSouthAfrica.Thefollowingisasummaryofthiscontribution.

ThecasestudyconductedonSouthAfricaaspartoftheresearchcomponentoftheARMprojectfocusesonpublichealth,education,refugeerights,andadministrativecorruption–allofwhichareveryimportantforAfghanistan.ThekeyinformantsinterviewedforthisresearchweredrawnfromtheSouthAfricanParliament,civilservants,andcivilsocietyleaders.Theywereallveryexcitedtosharetheirknowledgeandlearningwithrespecttostate-civilsocietyrelationsinSouthAfricawiththeirAfghancounterpart.SouthAfricaiscountrythat24yearsafterApartheidisstillsufferingfromdifferentformsofconflict.Apartheidwasarace-basedsystemgoverningSouthAfricafrom1948to1994.Thefirstdemocraticelectionswereheldin1994andthenewconstitutionwasapprovedin1996andwelcomedbytheworldbecauseofitscleardemocraticprinciples.Despitethisinitialmomentumandsuccess,todaythecountryisstillstrugglingwithinequalityinthedistributionofwealth,unemployment,poverty,violenceagainstwomenandimmigrants,andwidespreadcorruption.CivilsocietywasveryactiveduringApartheidalthoughunderpressurefromthegovernment,thesecretservice,militiaandpolice.ThefactthatcivilsocietystoodcollectivelyagainstApartheidviewedbymanyasthemainfactorthatcausedtheApartheidregimetocollapseandbecomereplacedbyaregimewithdemocraticideals,alargepresenceofcivilsocietyinthegovernment,andthecommitmentto

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fundamentalrights,ledbyNelsonMandela.WiththeAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)beingelectedtoformagovernment,civilsocietyorganizationsandactivistsbecamecalmerbecausetheirfavoriteorganization,ANC,andindividualscametopower.Soon,however,civilsocietyfeltthatthegovernmentwasoutofstepwiththeircollectivedemandsonsuchissuesasaddressingthewidespreadofHIVand,increasingly,persistentpovertyamongtheblackmajorityofthepopulation,andhighlevelsofpettyandgrandcriminalactivities.Facedwiththesetrends,manycivilsocietyorganizationsandactivistsresumedtheiractivitiestopursueandfightforfundamentalrightsinpost-ApartheidSouthAfrica.SincethecontexthadchangeddramaticallyfromApartheidtoademocraticallyelectedgovernment,theneedwasfeltimmediatelybymanycivilsocietyorganizationsforprofessionalizationinpolicyandprogramimplementation,monitoringandevaluation,andadvocacy.Anotherrealizationbycivilsocietyduringthepost-Apartheidperiodwasthatinternationalfundsweredirectlygiventothegovernmentwithcivilsocietyleftlargelyoutofthisarrangement.Inresponsetothisexclusion,civilsocietydefineditsownapproachandmandateregardinghowtoengagewiththegovernment.Thisnewapproachcanbedefinedashavingthreedifferentbutrelatedelementsof:

• Cooperationwiththegovernmentandprovidinghelp• Peacefuldemonstrationsandgroupobjectionstoissuesaffectingcivilsociety,and• Usingtheformallegalsystemforcontestinggovernmentdecisionsoractions.

Cooperatingwithandhelpingthestatewasguidedbycivilsociety’ssubstantialexperienceandexpertisegainedasakeyplayerduringthetransitionfromApartheidtodemocracy.Civilsocietywassignificantlyinvolvedincreatingtheconstitution,ensuringthattheconstitutionhadclearprovisionsforeconomicandsocialrights,accesstoinformation,andjudiciaryprotection.Moreover,anumberofgovernmentalorgansweredesignedtoconveythevoiceofcivilsocietyingovernmentaldiscussionanddecisionmakingplatformssuchastheNationalEconomicCouncilandtheAnti-corruptionNationalCouncil.Despitetheseconcreteexamplesofcooperation,itcannotbeassumedthattheselectionofcivilsocietyindividualsforworkingwithgovernmentauthoritieswasrepresentativeofthepopulationatlarge.Onekeyoutcomeoftherelationshipbetweencivilsocietyandstateauthoritieswasthefoundingof“Chapter9”institutions,semi-governmentalinstitutionsestablishedasprescribedintheConstitutionasindependententitiesaccountabletoSouthAfrica’sNationalAssembly.ExamplesofChapter9institutionsaretheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission,PublicProtectorsandCommissiononGenderEquality.HumanRightsCommissionisresponsibleformonitoringandreportingonthegovernment’sworktoaddresseconomicandsocialrightsofthecitizens.PublicProtectorsmayinspectanypublicentityandreportonperformanceoftheseentities.PublicProtectorsmanaged,forexample,toreportonPresidentJacobZuma’smisuseofpowerdespiteallthreats.Twoexamplesofthesecondapproach,peacefuldemonstrationsandgroupobjections,arethepeerreview,amechanismforaddressingeconomicandsocialrights,andsocialauditbasedoncivicactioninIndia,fortrainedlocalcommunityindividualstoactasauditorstoassesstheperformanceoflocalgovernmentandholdthemaccountable.TheCoalitionforSocialJusticewasformedafterviolenceagainstimmigrantstoidentifythecausesandaddressthemusingsocialaudittoolandaccesstoinformationrelatedtohygienecontracts.Theevidencecollectedwashandedovertopeople’srepresentativesforfurtheraction.Athirdexampleisobjectionexpressedthroughorganizeddemonstrations.DemonstrationshavealonghistoryinSouthAfricaasakeyinstrumentofprotestunderApartheid.Amongcivilsocietyactors,theviewsaredifferentabouttheuseofdemonstrationtoinfluencethestate.Somefeelthatdemonstrationsaregooddrawinggovernmentattentiontoissueswhileothersarguethatdemonstrationsunderminetherelationshipbetweencivilsocietyandstateauthorities.

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TheotherapproachofusingtheformallegalsystemtoengagewithstateauthoritiesbasedontheprovisionsoftheConstitutioniseffectiveonlywhenthereisareasonablyindependentandtransparentjusticesystem,suchasSouthAfrica’s.Normally,thisapproachisthelastresortforcivilsocietybecauseitistime-consuming,costly,andcausessignificantdamagetomutualtrustbetweenstateandcivilsociety,makingitgenerallymoredifficultforcivilsocietytoengagethegovernmentusinglessconfrontationalapproaches.Thereisalsothedangerthatdecisionofthecourtisignoredduetolackofcapacityorresources.

KeyDiscussionPoints

1. AkeydifferencebetweenSouthAfricaandAfghanistanisthatinSouthAfricathelegacyofconflictsunderApartheidcontinuestodefinecivilsociety’sapproachtoandrelationshipwiththegovernment,wherebycivilsocietyisrelativelyopentocriticismwhileitcollaborateswithandconfrontsthegovernment.Acommonlanguageandmentalityregardingstate-civilsocietyrelationshasbecomeinstitutionalizedinSouthAfricaandusedindiscourseonissuesofconcerntothecitizens.Incontrast,Afghanistan’scivilsocietyorganizationsareyoungandemergeddueneedsverydifferentfromthoseoftheirSouthAfricancounterparts.Priorto2001,thereislittleornohistoryofactiveengagementbetweenstateauthoritiesandcivilsocietyorganizations.Inaddition,theNGOsthatemergedinAfghanistanafter2001areentirelydependentonforeignfundingwhilehavinglimitedinterfacewithgovernmentauthorities.

2. InSouthAfrica,civilsocietyorganizationshavebeenabletousetheformallegalsystemtocompelthegovernmenttodealwiththeirgrievancesbasedonlegalgrounding.Thisapproachhasbeensuccessfulfortwomainreasons.First,SouthAfricancivilsocietyorganizationshaveaverystrongsenseofownershipoftheirgovernment.Second,theSouthAfricanlegalsystemislargelyfreeofcorruption.InAfghanistan,theexistenceofNGOshasbeenlargelydespitethegovernmentwhilethelegalsystemisfraughtwithwidespreadcorruptionandthusnottrustedfordeliveringfairjustice,thereformsoftheformallegalsystemsince2015notwithstanding.

3. GiventheexperienceofcivilsocietyorganizationsinSouthAfrica,itiscrucialforAfghancivilsocietyorganizationstodesigntheirengagementwithstateauthoritiesandadvocacybasedonevidenceandfullknowledgeofconstitutionalandlegalrights.Itisequallyimportantforcivilsocietytolookforopportunitiestotakeselectedgrievancesthroughtheformaljusticesystemandmonitorandprotecttheprocesstoensurefairplaybyjusticeofficials.Akeyoutcomeofthisapproachislikelytobeconfrontingcorruptioninthejusticesystem.

4. OneofthekeysuccessesofcivilsocietyinSouthAfricainshapingpublicopinionandinfluencinggovernmentdecisionmakingisthestrategicuseofthemedia.Relationswithindependentmediaandpublicizingfundamentalrightsissuessuchasanti-corruptionandgenderequalityhavebeenveryusefulforcivilsocietyorganizationsinSouthAfrica.

5. Civilsocietyanditsorganizationsareprotectedbyinternationallaw,thoughitisadvisableto

observenationallawstotheextentpossibleandonlyusetheprotectionunderinternationallawasalastresort.Inaliberaldemocracy,thegovernmentisaccountabletothepeople–notviceversa.Whenacivilsocietyorganizationisregisteredwithgovernmentauthorities,itissubjecttopayingtaxesbutitisaccountableforitsactivitiestoitsmembers,notthegovernment.

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6. Chapter9InstitutionssuchasPublicProtectorsinSouthAfricaandsemi-governmententitiessuchastheIndependentHumanRightsCommissioninAfghanistanareveryvaluableforcivilsocietyandgovernmentandcanactasabridgebetweencivilsocietyandstateauthorities,particularlyifneithersidehasanythingtohide.

7. Civilsocietycanusedifferenttoolsandstrategiesforinteractionwithgovernmentdependingonthe

natureoftheissue.Sometimesallthreeapproachesneedtobeusedtohavemaximumimpact.Inusingthesetoolsandstrategies,accesstoinformationiskeytoenablingcivilsocietytoperformitsactivitieslegallyandeffectivelyandallowingforlocalinvolvementofcitizensinsocio-economicdevelopment.

8. Theideathatcivilsocietyshallbeaccountabletogovernmenttakespeople’srelationswith

governmenttoadifferent,andunhealthy,level.Civilsocietyisamechanismformakingthegovernmentaccountable,thoughoftenthisisnotrecognizedbygovernmentsinreality.Ademocraticgovernmentiscommittedtohumanrightsandcivilsocietyiscommittedtothewellbeingofsocietyanditsmembers.ThisisthepositionthatmanyofcivilsocietyorganizationshaveallovertheworldandAfghanistanshouldbenoexceptiontothis.

9. ManyAfghanNGOsinAfghanistanavoidpayingtheirfulltaxes,whilemanyofthesameNGOs

criticizethegovernmentforitsfailuretotacklewidespreadcorruption.ThishasledtoawidelysharedresentmentofNGOsamonggovernmentofficials.Theargumentforone-wayaccountabilityfromgovernmenttocivilsociety,andnotvice-versa,iscontingentontheassumptionthatcivilsocietyactswithinthelimitsofthelaw,particularlyinfulfillingbasiccivicdutiessuchaspayingitstaxes.

10. AnexampleregardingcorruptionandmisappropriationoffundsbyNGOsistheearthquakeinHaiti

in2010whenlargeinternationalNGOssuchasOxfam,SavetheChildren,andCAREspentaroundtwobilliondollarsbutthreequartersofthisamountwasspentwithoutaccountability,withanefforttoaccountfortheexpendituresonlyin2016.ThisresultedinachangeintherelationshipbetweendonorgovernmentsandtheseNGOs,withthegovernmentimposingstricterrulesforfinancialreportingandaccountabilityofNGOS.Giventheseexamples,itwouldbelegitimateandmorallyprudentforgovernmentstotakecivilsocietyorganizationstoaccountthroughtheformaljusticesystemwhencivilsocietyorganizationsbreakthelawbymisappropriatingfunds.

11. Whenanorganizationreceivesfundsfromthegovernmentoranyothersource,theorganization

mustreporttotheproviderofthefundsonhowitusesthefunds.Forexample,inCanadaNGOsreceivefundsfromthegovernmentforimmigration-relatedissues.TherecipientNGOsareaccountabletothegovernmentforeverysingledollartheyspend.Atthesametime,thisdoesnotmeanthatbecausetheseNGOsreceivegovernmentfunds,theyshouldalwaysagreewithgovernmentpolicy.Accountabilitymustbemutualinfundsmanagementbutnotforpoliticalopinions.Thegeneralruleinademocracyisthatpeoplehaveelectedthegovernmentandsothegovernmentshallbeaccountabletopeople.

12. Akeychallengeincollaboration,cooperation,andcoordinationbetweengovernmentministriesin

AfghanistanandimplementingNGOsisalackoftransparencybyNGOsinrevealingthefundingtheyhavereceivedforimplementingprojectsandprogramsinareaswheretherelevantgovernmentministrieshavealsoplannedactivitiesandallocatedresources.WheretheseNGOsareforcedbytherelevantministriestorevealtheirfunds,asaconditionofworkingwithgovernmentonsame

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activities,therearemajordiscrepanciesbetweenhowthegovernmentandNGOsbudgetforsameactivities,withNGOsallocatingupto80percentoftheirfundstoadministration,highsalaries,security,andotherformsofunproductivebudgetlines.Giventhisdiscrepancy,itisunderstandablethatgovernmentministriesresentNGOswithwhomtheyhavetocollaborate.

13. InAfghanistan,adistinctionmustbemadebetweenNGOsthatconductresearch,capacitybuilding,

andpolicyanalysisandNGOsthatbuildschools,clinicsandroads.Sincetheprovisionofinfrastructureandbasicservicessuchashealthandeducationaretheresponsibilityofgovernment,NGOsinvolvedintheseareasshouldnaturallyaccounttothegovernmentfortheiractivitiesforbettercoordinationandefficiency.However,NGOsinvolvedinresearch,policyanalysisandadvocacymustnotbeexpectedtoaccounttothegovernmentfortheiractivitiesintheseareas.Therefore,inthecontextofAfghanistantheuseoftheterm“NGOs”mustcarryaqualifiertodistinguishbetweenNGOsthatdelivergovernmentalservices,e.g.,healthandeducation,andNGOsthatconductresearchandadvocacy.

14. Theissuesoflegitimacyandcorruptionamongcivilsocietyorganizationsarenotissuesspecificto

Afghanistan.Inmanycountries,therearecasesofNGOsreceivingmoneyfromvarioussourcesthatdisappearsthroughcorruptionandmisappropriations.TheseoccurrencesmustnotbeusedastheexcusetopersecuteandprosecuteNGOsingeneral,sinceNGOsareamainpillarfordemocracy.

15. InsomecountriessuchasCanada,NGOsreceivemoneyfromthetradeunions.In2015the

governmentdemandedthattheannualreportsfromthetradeunionsmustcontaindetailsonNGOsthatreceivedfundfromthem.Thiswasagainstinternationallaw.TradeunionsandNGOscontestedandthegovernmentsubsequentlylosttheelections.

16. Inadvocacy,thereneedstobeabalancebetweenpressureandcooperationwiththegovernment,

particularlyinAfghanistanwherethegovernmentispreoccupiedandalmostfullyconsumedwithconcernsaboutsecurity.EveninthedifficultoperatingenvironmentofAfghanistan,itisnecessarytoacknowledgethegovernment’sconcretestepstowardbettergovernanceandaddressingfundamentalrights.

PostWorkshopFollowUp

Inpreparationforthisreport,APPROconsultedwithAfghancivilsocietyorganizationsandinternationalagenciesandorganizationswithmandatesonAfghanistantoprovideasynthesisofactivitiessinceBrusselsConferenceinlate2016todocumentactivitiesandfollowupprogresstowardmeetingthecommitmentsmadeattheconference.Thefindingsfromtheseconsultationsaresummarizedinthissection.4SubsequenttotheBrusselsConference,consultationmeetingswithcivilsocietyorganizationswereinitiatedbyUNAMAandBAAGinKabulandintheprovincestofollowuponprogresstowardthecommitmentsanddeliverablesofSelfReliancethroughMutualAccountabilityFramework(SMAF).Therewasageneralrecognitionthatdonorcommunitywasnotsatisfiedwiththeslowpaceofprogress

4SeeAppendix2forthecodingprotocolusedfortheinterviewswithkeyinformants.

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bytheAfghangovernmentinimplementingthecommitmentslaidoutinBrusselsJointCommuniqué.5Therewasalsorecognitionthatincreasedinsecurityanditspoliticalimplicationscouldhavebeenamajorpreoccupationofthegovernment,andattheexpenseofattendingtoBrusselsCommitments.6ThesixcommitteesformedduringthefollowupmeetingsagreedtomonitortheprogressonSMAFdeliverables.Thesecommitteeswerefocusedonruleoflaw,anticorruption,Citizens’Charter,women,peaceandsecurity(WPS),servicedelivery,andimplementationofNAP1325.ApartofthecollectivemandateofthesixcommitteeswastodevelopanactionplanformonitoringactivitiestowardmeetingSMAFdeliverables.ThereisarangeofchallengesassociatedwithmonitoringactivitiesrelatingtoSMAFdeliverables,however.First,SMAFdeliverablesarebroad,makingthetaskofdevelopingSMARTindicatorsnearimpossible.7Second,someoftheprogramsunderSMAFhadalreadystartedbeforetheBrusselsConference,makingitdifficulttoidentifywhichactivitiesorprojectsweredirectresultsofattemptstoimplementSMAFcommitments.Third,thereisagenerallackoftechnicalexpertiseinfieldofmonitoringandevaluationamongCSOs,includingCSOmembersofthesixcommittees.8State-civilsocietyrelationsinAfghanistanaregenerallyconsideredassymbolicwithoutaclearlydefinedmechanismforthetwosidestointeractandcollaborate.State-civilsocietyinterfaceismostlylimitedtointernationalandnationalconferences.Typically,thereisaninvitationfromthegovernmentforCSOrepresentation,inresponsetowhichafewCSOsregularlynominatethemselvestorepresentcivilsocietyatlarge.ThemannerinwhichthishandfulofCSOsmonopolizestheprocessofrepresentationisamajorconcernforthevastmajorityoftheexcludedCSOsandcausefordissatisfactionandalienationformost.9Anothermajormisgivingaboutstate-civilsocietyinteractioninAfghanistanisthatinteractionstendtobemoresymbolicortokenisticthanconsequential.TheCSOsthatmanagetoincludethemselvesinconsultationprocessescomplainthattheirrecommendationsareinvitedpriortomajornationalandinternationaleventsbutthatnoeffortismadeaftertheeventstofollowthroughontherecommendations.10ThisfailuretofollowupalsoappliestoSMAFdeliverablesandfollowupactivitiesthatneedtobeinitiatedbythegovernment.11Atthesametime,thereisrecognitionbycivilsocietyofthevalueofotherinitiativesbythegovernmenttoworkmorecloselywithcivilsociety,particularlythe“OpenGovernancePartnership”,topromoteandeffectbetter,moreinclusive,governance.12

5KI-F-KAB-CSO-1,KI-M-LON-CSO-36KI-M-LON-CSO-37ThiscertainlywastheexperienceduringtheDubaiworkshoporganizedaspartoftheARMprojectinJanuary2017.

8KI-M-KAB-CSO-2,KI-M-LON-CSO-3,KI-M-KAB-CSO-5andKI-M-KAB-CSO-69KI-F-KAB-CSO-1,KI-F-KAB-CSO-4,KI-M-KAB-CSO-6,KI-F-KAB-CSO-9,andKI-M-KAB-CSO-1010KI-M-KAB-CSO-2,KI-M-KAB-CSO-1011KI-F-KAB-CSO-1,KI-M-KAB-CSO-3,andKI-M-KAB-CSO-512KI-F-KAB-CSO-1,KI-M-KAB-CSO-2,KI-M-LON-CSO-3,KI-F-KAB-CSO-4,KI-M-KAB-CSO-6,KI-F-KAB-CSO-7,KI-M-KAB-CSO-8

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RemainingChallenges

DifficultyinMonitoringSMAFDeliverables:SMAFdeliverablesaretoobroadforservingasthebasisonwhichtodevelopspecificactivities,theimplementationofwhichcouldbemonitoredusingaccurateindicators.Also,thereisnoinformationsharingmechanismforthegovernmenttoreportonachievementsandchallengesintheimplementationofSMAFdeliverables.LackofExpertise:ThereisalackoftechnicalexpertiseamongNGOsindesignandimplementationofmonitoringandevaluationsystems,thereislittleappreciationorpracticalusebythegovernmentofthesteadilyrisingvolumeoffindingsfromappliedresearchandmonitoring,andthereisamisconceptionofadvocacyamongcivilsocietyorganizationsandthegovernment,asbeingaboutcivilsocietybatteringthegovernmentonitsfailingswhilethegovernmenthastodefenditself.Insecurity:Thegovernment’sprogressonSMAFandsimilarothercommitmentsisslow,toalargeextentbecauseofthedeterioratingsecuritysituation.PoorState-CivilSocietyInteractions:State-civilsocietyinteractioninAfghanistanisexclusivetoahandfulofNGOsandtendstobesymbolic,andhasnotresultedintheemergenceofmechanismsforconstructiveandongoingdialogue.Thereisalackofformalandtransparentmechanismsforconsultationandengagementofcivilsocietyinpolicyprocesses.CorruptionAmongNGOs:Non-paymentoftaxesandotherformsofcorruptionamongNGOsisamajordeterrentfortheNGOstobetakenseriouslybytheGovernmentofAfghanistan.NegativePerceptionofNGOs:NGOsinAfghanistanarenotheldinhighesteemduetothenascenceofNGOsinAfghanistan,receivingfundingfrominternationaldonors,andwidespreadcorruptionamongNGOs,InterfaceAmongCSOs:LackoftrustandcollaborationamongcivilsocietyorganizationsandcompetitionbyNGOsinjockeyingforaplaceinthefewconsultationeventsthatoccur,deprivesthegovernmentanditsinternationaldonorsfromreceivingmultipleviewsfromcivilsocietyandunderservesthepublic.Lackofaccesstoinformation:TheAccesstoInformationLawof2014hasyettobeenforcedbygovernmentagenciesorfullyutilizedbycivilsociety.IffullyimplementedtheAccesstoInformationLawcanactasapowerfultoolfortransparencyandaccountabilityinstate-civilsocietyrelations.

WaysForward

SharingTechnicalKnowledge:TherearemanyNGOsinAfghanistanwithexpertiseinappliedsocialresearch,monitoringandevaluation.TheseNGOsshouldworkcloselywiththegovernmenttodevelopspecific,measurable,attainable,realistic,andtime-bound(SMART)objectivesandSMARTindicatorsasthemeansthroughwhichtomonitorandevaluateactionbygovernmentandcivilsocietyinmovingtowarddeliveringonSMAFcommitments.

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Security:ThesecurityconditionsarenotlikelytochangeintheshorttomediumtermandthustheresponsibilitytomeetSMAFobjectivesorsimilarcommitmentscannotrestwiththegovernmentonly.Thisfactmustberecognizedbythepublic,NGOs,andinternationaldonors.Thepublicneedstobemadeawareofthelimitstoexpectationsofthegovernment.NGOsmustfindawayofsupportingthegovernmentinitsgenuineeffortstoeffectpositivechange.Internationaldonorsmustalsoreducetheirexpectationsofwhatthegovernmentcando,whilesupportingNGOsinfindingwaysofsupportingthegovernmentwithoutcompromisingtheirroleasavoicesofcivilssociety.EvidenceBasedAdvocacy:CivilsocietyinAfghanistancontinuestolackcapacityinevidence-basedadvocacy,crucialinmakingconvincingandundeniabledemandsforgovernmentactiononitshigh-levelcommitments.Effortsshouldbemadetoutilizein-countryexpertiseforcapacitybuildingonappliedresearchforpolicyandevidence-basedadvocacy.InclusivenessinState-CSOInteractions:Theprocessofstate-civilsocietyinteractionwillremainvulnerabletomonopolizationbyopportunistnationalNGOsaslongasthegovernmentremainsunawareabouttheextentandtypesofactivitiesundertakenbyNGOsinAfghanistan.ThefirststepforincreasinginclusivenessisforthegovernmenttotakestockoftheactivityareasofallNGOsandworktransparentlytoincludetheminthevariousformsofconsultation.ConstructiveandInformedEngagementbetweenStateAuthoritiesandCivilSociety:CSOsneedtostructureandinstitutionalizetheircoordinationeffortsamongthemselves,butalsotodevelopclearengagementstrategieswiththegovernmentbasedonevidenceandrecognizedcompetenceinagivensector.Inthisrespect,effectivemechanismswouldincludecivilsocietysector-basednetworksthatpooltogetherorganizationswithspecificexpertiseofagivensectortoaddresskeysectoralneedsanddevelopconcertedapproachestoconstructivelyengagethegovernmentinthemakingandimplementationofpolicy.InformationSharingandTransparency:Informationsharingbythegovernmentimprovestheimageofthegovernmentandincreasestrustinthegovernmentbycivilsociety.LegalinstrumentssuchasAccesstoInformationLawandinitiativessuchasOpenGovernmentPartnershipshouldbothbeappliedtoSMAFdeliverablestoreportonperformanceandseekinginputfromcivilsocietytoeffectimprovements.IncreasedTrustbetweenCSOsandGovernmentMinistries:SMAFshouldbeviewedbyallpartiesasanopportunityforcreatingforumsthroughstateauthoritiesandcivilsocietycarryoutsystemicandsystematicproblemidentification,searchforpossiblesolutions,anddecideonallocationofresponsibilitiesandmutualaccountabilitymechanisms.

CalltoActiontoPrepareforGenevaConference,November2018

APPROandNAC-PPwillconveneaonedayeventinKabulduringAugust2018asaforumtodiscusspossibleapproachesformaximizinginputfromcivilsocietyfortheGenevaConferenceonAfghanistan,scheduledforNovember2018.TheoutcomeofthiseventwillbeacommuniquétobedistributedtonationalandinternationalstakeholderspriortoandduringtheGenevaConference.

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Appendix1:ARM’sRationaleandObjectives

ByallaccountsAfghanistanhashadmajordifficultiesinmeetingthecommitmentsithasmadeatvariousconferencesonAfghanistan.NewandinnovativeinitiativesneedtobedevisedtoincreasecollaborationbetweenstateauthoritiesandcivilsocietyonmeetingAfghanistan’scommitments,particularlyinprotectingandpromotingfundamentalrights.AfghanistanRightsMonitor(ARM)ispremisedontherecognitionthatinstitutionalizationoffundamentalrightsinAfghanistan’ssystemofgovernancemustfilterintotheeverydaypracticesofbothgovernmentandcivilsociety.ThespecificareasofactivityforARMare:1. RegularmonitoringofthecurrentconditionsoffundamentalrightsinAfghanistanusingasetof

indicatorsbasedoninternationallyrecognizedstandardsformonitoringCivic,SocialandEconomicrights.

2. Informed,pragmatic,andconstructiveadvocacymessagingonfundamentalrightsneeds,basedonempiricaldata,anddeliveredbycivilsocietyactors.

3. IncreasedcapacityofpublicinstitutionsandresponsivenesstofundamentalrightsneedsofAfghancitizens.13

ARMisfundedbytheDutchMinistryofForeignAffairs,throughAPPRO-Europe,tobeimplementedbyAfghanistanPublicPolicyResearchOrganization(APPRO).FormoreinformationonAPPRO-Europe,see:www.appro-europe.net.FormoreinformationonAPPRO,see:www.appro.org.af.

13FormoreinformationonARM,see:http://www.nac-pp.net/category/afghanistan-right-monitor/

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Appendix2:CodingProtocol

KI=KeyInformantM=MaleF=FemaleCSO=CivilSocietyOrganizationKAB=KabulLON=LondonExample:KI-M-KAB-CSO-1(KI=Keyinformant,M=Male,KAB=Kabul,CSO=CivilSocietyOrganization,1=Sequence)