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DENMARK’S PEACE AND STABILISATION PROGRAMME FOR THE

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN REGION 2015-2017

CONCEPT NOTE

Ver. 19 August 2014

File no. 46.H.1-6-0-2.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

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Abbreviations _______________________________________________________________ 3

1. Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 5

2. Strategic framework for programming _______________________________________ 6

3. Context analysis ________________________________________________________ 6

3.1. Regional perspective ___________________________________________________ 7

3.2. Relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan ______________________________ 8

3.3. Key findings on Afghanistan _____________________________________________ 9

3.4. Key findings on Pakistan ________________________________________________12

3.5. Tendencies in neighbouring countries _____________________________________15

4. Experiences from the first phase of the programme ____________________________15

4.1. Activities in the first phase 2011-14 _______________________________________15

4.2. Lessons identified _____________________________________________________17

5. Intervention logic _______________________________________________________19

5.1. The strategic thematic and geographic focus ________________________________19

5.2. Component 1: Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Buildning _____________21

5.3. Component 2: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue __________________________22

5.4. Compliance with cross cutting objectives (incl. gender) ________________________22

5.5. Complementarity _____________________________________________________23

5.6. Results framework ____________________________________________________24

6. Budget _______________________________________________________________24

7. Risk management ______________________________________________________25

8. Envisaged management structure __________________________________________25

Annex 1: Updated Process Action Plan ___________________________________________26

Annex 2: Bibliography ________________________________________________________27

Content

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Abbreviations

Af-Pak PSP Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme

ALO The Department for Asia, Latin America and Oceania, MoFA

ANA Afghan National Army

ANA TF Afghan National Army Trust Fund

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

APP Appraisal Consultant

C-IED Counter Improvised Explosive Device

DAC (Register of Overseas Development Assistance by OECD´s) Development Assistance Committee

DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies

DKK Danish kroner

EoD Embassy of Denmark

ENR Department for European Neighbourhood, MoFA

FATA Federally Administrated Tribal Areas

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

HRBA Human Rights Based Approach

KP Khyber Pakhtunkwa

LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

MOD Ministry of Defense

MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOI Ministry of Interior, Afghanistan

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NAP1325 Denmark’s National Action Plan on Resolution 1325

NDU National Defence University (Islamabad, Pakistan)

OECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (see DAC)

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Pgm Programme

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

PPP Pakistan People’s Party

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSF (Danish) Peace and Stabilisation Fund

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PSP Peace and Stabilisation Programme

RDDC Royal Danish Defence College

SIDA Swedish International Development Assistance

tbd To be decided

ToC Theory of Change

TOR Terms of Reference

TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban)

UFT Technical Advisory Services, MoFA

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

WGSS Whole of Government Stabilisation Secretariat

WGSSC Whole of Government Stabilisation Steering Commitee

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1. Introduction

This document presents the conceptual framework for Denmark’s Whole of Government

Afghanistan–Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2015-2017 (in the following referred

to as the Af-Pak PSP). The concept note summarizes the political, economic and security

context. It will also point to a number of thematic programmes and engagements that will be

further elaborated at the programming stage. It will be guided by the Theory of Change

approach.

The programme’s strategic objective is to:

Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region through more capable and accountable

institutions to protect the civilian population and enhanced regional confidence and

reconciliation.

The concept note suggests two thematic components:

1. Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building

2. Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue

The overall value of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme is in 2015-17

suggested to be DKK 335 million.

As part of the Chicago Summit in 2012, where the coalition of contributing countries (3C)

pledged to fund the Afghan Security Forces (ANSF) in the coming years, Denmark pledged to

contribute 100 million DKK per year – 80 million for the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 20

million for the Afghan National Army (ANA). It has been decided that this commitment will draw

270 million from the total value of the Af-Pak PSP. Thus, the resources available for new

engagements amount to 65 million DKK.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan nexus is one of the most complex stabilisation challenges presently

facing the international community. The complicated security situation in Afghanistan has led to

a large international focus and engagement, including from Denmark. The situation is however

also influenced by wider regional dynamics, in particular from Pakistan. The Peace and

Stabilisation programme builds on the assumption that stability needs to be achieved by

addressing stabilisation in a regional context and that stabilisation and economic development

of Afghanistan and Pakistan is a precondition for stabilisation of the wider region.

Needless to say, the Danish interventions are minor seen in an international perspective, but by

focusing the limited resources available – both geographically and thematically and by careful

selection of partners – the programme aims at contributing effectively to the overarching goal of

stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

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2. Strategic framework for programming

The programme design has been guided by the policy paper for Denmark’s integrated

stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world, Denmark’s policy

towards Fragile States “Peace and Stabilisation” and principles from the Danish Defence

Agreement 2013-2017. The policies outline key priorities and principles for Danish cooperation

in fragile states and situations and draw upon the work by the OECD/DAC as well as Danish and

international experience, when focusing on contributing to stabilisation, state- and peace-

building in fragile states through integrated efforts that make use of all the assets available to

the Danish government. In addition, the Danish Government’s development strategy “The Right

to a Better Life” has stability and protection as a focus area.

The Programme has been developed in accordance with Guidelines for the Peace and

Stabilisation Fund (February 2014) and draws on Danida’s Aid management Guidelines

(February 2013) as well as the provisions of the New Deal for engagement in fragile states

which relates to aid effectiveness in fragile states, risk management and the application of the

Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) including gender issues.

The programme is complementary to other Danish funded activities in the Afghanistan-Pakistan

region. This includes support through the Afghanistan and Pakistan Country Programmes (with

development objectives), the Regions of Origin Initiative in Afghanistan (refugees and IDPs) and

humanitarian aid. Furthermore, it draws on long lasting defence experience in capacity building

of institutions and efficient military-to-military cooperation.

This is the second phase of the Afghanistan-Pakistan PSP. A Mid-term review of the first phase

was finalised in November 2013. The broader Peace and Stabilisation Fund was evaluated in

mid-2014. The recommendations of both have been taken into consideration during the

formulation of the concept note. (cf. chapter 4.2.)

Taking into account the overall uncertainty with respect to developments in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, the regional Peace and Stabilisation programme aims at setting out a realistic Danish

programme, maintaining if possible a degree of flexibility and adaptability. With Afghanistan

entering a new phase, including the change of government in mid-2014 and the assumption by

national security forces of full responsibility for the country’s security as of 2015, the planning

base for the programme is inevitably uncertain.

3. Context analysis

This section provides an overview of the context in which the Peace and Stabilisation

Programme is anchored. It describes the drivers of peace and conflict – primarily in Afghanistan

and Pakistan and touching upon Iran and Central Asia.

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Describing the full context of the conflicts in the region is a vast study that goes far beyond the

scope of this concept note. Instead this paper refers to credible existing published conflict

analyses that can be consulted for a comprehensive description. One of the most useful of

these is the British study “Understanding Afghanistan”1 published in 2008 that paints a

comprehensive picture of Afghanistan’s conflict and other challenges. Another very useful study

is the ‘Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan’2 produced for SIDA by swede.peace and

Cooperation for Peace and Unity in 2012. This study resulted in identification of a number of

peace and conflict triggers that correlates largely with the key findings of the ‘Understanding

Afghanistan’ research project. Furthermore, the study points to a number of options for

assistance that will contribute to peace and stability and presents the drivers of Peace and

Conflict identified.

Key findings from these and other studies are presented below. Unfortunately it has not been

possible to identify similar official comprehensive studies on Pakistan. A full list of the sources

used is annexed (annex 2).

3.1. Regional perspective

The region demonstrates a complex and negative interaction between poor standards of

governance, low levels of human security and human development, militancy and insurgency,

and poor economic conditions. While there are obvious differences between Afghanistan and

Pakistan, including their relative states of development, the challenges facing the two countries

are in some regards interlinked. The challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan – or the nexus

between the two – cannot be tackled in isolation. Lasting stability depends on successfully

engaging the wider region – countries like India, the Central Asian States, Iran and even China

and Russia as well as taking into account the prominent role of USA in the region. Many of

Afghanistan´s neighbours have recent histories of internal violent conflicts that have spilt over

into neighbouring countries due to the weakness of state and linked with the ongoing conflict in

Afghanistan. The regional situation is also shaped by unresolved issues in and between

Afghanistan and Pakistan, including real or perceived threats to both the territorial integrity and

the internal cohesion of the two countries. Creating more trust between Afghanistan and

Pakistan in particular, and amongst regional actors more generally, is thus of utmost

importance.

1 Understanding Afghanistan – Synthesis Report, University of York, Post-war Reconstruction and

Development Unit (PRDU), for DFID, 2008.

2 Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan, swede.peace and Cooperation for Peace and Unity (produced for

SIDA), 2012.

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The peace process in Afghanistan should be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led, but it is clear that

all regional actors have important roles to play in both facilitating and supporting a successful

peace process and guaranteeing or maintaining any resulting peace agreement. This would

benefit not just Afghanistan, but also the wider region. Increased regional cooperation and

interdependence can play an important role in underpinning a political process by creating

incentives for the region to benefit from more stable countries. Effects would include increased

trade and commercial activities and less need for exorbitant security budgets.

In Pakistan, challenges include reconciliation and reintegration of militants and separatists, the

questions of Baloch separatism and the legal foundation of the Federal Administrated Tribal

Areas in Northwest Pakistan, while struggling with ineffective institutions and growing

intolerance. Pakistan's policies are also affected by long-standing issues and lack of confidence

in its relationship with India.

3.2. Relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan

While being separate states with individual challenges, Afghanistan and Pakistan are pulled

together in a complex of security imperatives that – if not addressed – threatens to further de-

stabilise both states while pulling in other regional actors. Bilateral relations between the two

countries are driven and constrained by a number of sometimes interlinked challenges. Three

will be highlighted here:

Firstly, relations between the two countries are strained by the disputed Pashtun areas and the

controversial border demarcation along the ‘Durand Line’. During the second Anglo-Afghan war,

Afghanistan had to cede parts of Western Baluchistan, Quetta and the bulk of the FATA to

Britain under the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879. This decision however remains contested in

Afghanistan to this day, where it is notably rejected by large numbers of the Afghan Pashtuns.

The second theme to be highlighted concerns the strained relationship between Pakistan and

India and the underlying sense of insecurity which continues to be a dominating factor in

Pakistan. As long as the dispute on the “Durand Line” has not been resolved between the two

countries and as long as the animosity between Indian and Pakistan prevails, Pakistan will

uphold a very strong interest in Afghanistan as a Pakistani rear area; as a source of “strategic

depth”3.

Thirdly, the bilateral relations between the two countries are strained by the vast number of

refugees which Pakistan has hosted from Afghanistan, of whom 1.6 million are still in primarily

3 The concept of “strategic depth” implies that Pakistan in a major conflict with India would wish to have access

to Afghan soil to protect command and force structures from Indian superiority [and Indian alleged attempts to dominate Afghanistan]. The concept thus implies that Pakistan would seek influence in Afghanistan to secure this - leading to deep rooted Afghan distrust in Pakistani motives and intentions.

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in the border regions of Pakistan. Presently Afghanistan receives refugees from Pakistan as a

result of the Waziristan offensive towards militant groups.

Besides these three challenges, relations between the two countries are further challenged by a

number of cross-border destabilising factors.

The lack of effective border management and cooperation is a central issue in the region with

grave implications. The borders in the region, especially the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan

border, are impossible to fully control. In the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan,

radicalisation and lawlessness are widespread, and substantial illegal trade and smuggling,

including weapons and opium, make the situation unstable. Furthermore, Afghan insurgent

groups and Pakistani terrorist groups use the tribal areas – on each side of the border – as safe

havens, conducting recruitment and training in the area. A large proportion of the narcotics

smuggling that finances the Taliban’s activities in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan.

However, Pakistan is at the same time Afghanistan’s most important trade partner making

efficient legal border trade a potentially important booster of development on both sides of the

border.

3.3. Key findings on Afghanistan

Afghanistan has made considerable political, judicial, security, economic and developmental

progress over the past decade. But the gains made are fragile and reversible. Thus, Afghanistan

will continue to be a weak state with some of the lowest human development indicators whose

future will depend largely on the ability of a new president and government to make progress in

negotiating an inclusive political settlement with all major insurgent and militia groups; maintain

security; tackle corruption; bring rule of law and effective governance to its population; and

enact key economic and political reforms.

Afghanistan will increasingly take control of its own affairs over the coming years, as

international presence and influence will be reduced. Yet, even in the most optimistic scenario,

Afghanistan will remain dependent on international financial assistance and prone to outbreaks

of violent conflict. The central government will need to mitigate the threats posed by

insurgency, corruption and the criminalisation of the state and maintain security and service

delivery in sparsely populated rural areas if it is to retain credibility and popular support.

Because of this, a continued and long-term international development effort in Afghanistan will

be needed.

An inclusive political settlement. Weak parties and political movements, with many

intellectuals not engaging, leave the political game to traditional strongmen accustomed to

zero-sum games and violent means. The pursuit of a ‘grand bargain’ would prove unsettling for

northern militias, in particular, who had initially been privileged in the first post-Bonn (after

2001) systems of governance. Presently there is a challenge of establishing a ‘national unity

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government’ after the presidential election in 2014. The ambition is political inclusiveness

where the two presidential camps might agree to a new formula of power sharing.

In addition, sustainable progress within security, economic development and social inclusion is

likely to be difficult without a political settlement with the Taliban. The process of dialogue and,

eventually, negotiation over power-sharing is and should remain led by the Afghan government.

Insecurity will remain a concern. The conflict in Afghanistan has entered a new phase. As the

international troops withdraw, it is now increasingly a contest between the insurgents and the

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The contemporary conflict within Afghanistan involves

a growing and diverse group of fighters representing several factions and numerous interests

and motives. The widespread perception, however, that all attacks aim to achieve the overthrow

of the State is unfounded, and it appears likely that many insurgent leaders, including some

among the Taliban, see their interests best served by incorporation into the government. In all

transitional areas there is a variety of unfinished business that may result in further violence

post-2014. Historical feuds and unresolved grievances are worsening after having been, in some

cases, temporarily contained by the presence of international troops. Similarly, clashes among

pro-government actors may become more frequent. Also mistreatment of Afghans at the hands

of their own security forces, operating with less supervision from foreign troops as well as

pervasive corruption and injustice, breeds resentment that feeds the insurgency. Finally, despite

its rhetoric, Pakistan has not yet produced credible evidence that the politics of supporting

“good Talibans” (= Talibans operating in Afghanistan) and their safe havens in FATA has been

changed to a politics of zero-tolerance against any insurgency. In June 2014 Pakistan launched

a large scale operation in North Waziristan with the aim of clearing the area of militant groups

and leading to government control. However, despite fierce fighting and the disruption of

insurgent command structures it is very likely that the bulk of the fighting force of the Pakistan

Taliban (TTP) though fractured and degraded - and not the least the Haqqani network may have

dislocated elsewhere in the region, leading to unchanged hostile responses by Afghanistan –

especially in Kandahar and Kunar – with an eminent risk of worsening cross-border relations.

US have recently announced total troop withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of 2016, but

remain committed to support the ANSF financially together with other nations that pledged at

Chicago in 2012.

Afghan forces suffered record casualties in 2013 and retreated from some locations in the face

of rising insurgency but maintained the tempo of their operations in most parts of the country.

Afghanistan still has no shortage of young men joining the ANSF, offsetting the rising number of

those who opt to leave them or abandon their posts (see paragraph on youth bulge below). The

government remains capable of moving supplies along highways to urban centres. ANSF

cohesiveness, or lack of it, may prove decisive in the coming years, and Paktia notwithstanding,

only minor reports emerged in 2013 of Afghan units fighting each other.

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However, this will not stop the Taliban and other insurgent groups, such as the Haqqani

network, from pushing for such gains, however. The rising number of attacks show that the

insurgents are able to motivate their fighters in the absence of foreign troops, shifting their

rhetoric from calls to resist infidel occupation to a new emphasis on confronting the “puppets” or

“betrayers of Islam” in the government. The emerging prominence of splinter groups such as

Mahaz-e-Fedayeen is a further indication that the insurgency will not lack ferocity in the coming

years. For the first time, the insurgents inflicted almost as many casualties on Afghan security

forces in 2013 as they suffered themselves, and several accounts of battles in remote districts

suggested the sides were nearly matched in strength. There are concerns that the balance could

tip in favour of the insurgency, particularly in some rural locations, as foreign troops continue

leaving. Thus, continued support to ANSF is crucial.

Rule of law is one of the three pillars of a government that is accountable to its population.

Rule of law is also a prerequisite for development in many other sectors of state. For instance,

without a functioning justice system (police, prosecutor, court etc.) compliance with human

rights obligations by the government is void. In Afghanistan this rings especially true with

regard to the rights of women making the capacity building of rule of law institutions essential in

promoting gender equality in the long term. Rule of law also plugs into the capacity building of

the security sector and the two areas are interlinked. For instance, support to the functioning of

the Afghan National Police is essential in order to ensure their ability as first responders at a

crime scene which in turn is essential for any possible prosecution in court. This is crucial in any

attempt to counter the insurgency in Afghanistan and consequently in creating long term

stability in the country.

Human rights remain challenged as violations of human rights in general and women’s rights

in particular are daily occurrences. Hence, there is need for support of civil society organisations

which work to promote the human rights situation. The needs and interests of women must be

more fully addressed. In some areas – such as justice, safeguarding women’s rights, as well as

the rights of other marginalised groups – it will require training and monitoring to ensure the

rule of law. The Afghan government and the international community must support equitable

justice, access to social services and the amplification of empowering customary messages while

ensuring accountability through consistent quantitative as well as qualitative monitoring of

women’s evolving position. One critical step in tackling this epidemic of violence could be the

engagement of more women in the police and judiciary and the taking of tangible steps to

protect and empower women – not only relying upon the family to provide protection.

The present-day Afghan State continues to struggle to gain legitimacy. The credibility and

success of the transition depend as much on strengthening democratic and accountable

governance in Afghanistan at all levels, as on the capability of the security forces. The goal of

the present international support for ANSF is to strengthen the accountability of the security

forces, including by reducing corruption and mismanagement, and thereby enhancing the

legitimacy of the Afghan government.

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There is increasing concern about the negative short to medium term fiscal situation caused by

substantially lower rates of economic growth and the economic effects of the ISAF withdrawal.

This situation is troubling given the close relationship between economic growth, revenue

mobilisation (i.e., taxation), governmental legitimacy, political stability, development and

security.

3.4. Key findings on Pakistan

Pakistan, the world’s sixth most populous nation, is today at the crossroads of the pressing

issues of terrorism, extremism, development and democracy. As a nuclear armed, pivotal state,

Pakistan’s stability and governance, and its relations with neighbouring Afghanistan and India,

has consequences not only for the region, long afflicted by strife and poverty, but for the

international community. Likewise, global geopolitics and regional developments also impact

Pakistan and influence the country’s ability to establish peace and stability.

Despite being created in 1947, Pakistan is still wrestling with establishing a coherent political

unity, strengthening its political institutions and ensuring state control over the entire territory.

Pakistan is in a crisis over its own identity, constantly debating whether it is fundamentally an

Islamic country, or if it has an identity broader than the religious core, which will also allow

other minorities and beliefs to fit into the system.

For years, the political scene has been tormented by widespread corruption and nepotism, a

political unwillingness to actually address the underdeveloped social and educational functions

and an increasing gap between energy demand and supply with severe consequences for

private households, the industry, and thus the economy. Add to these widespread terror

activities by insurgents and militant organizations operating from Pakistani territory both

domestically and likely also in neighbouring states.

In 2013, for the first time since the establishment of the state 67 years earlier, Pakistan

witnessed after an uninterrupted election term a transfer of power from one civilian government

to another. A new single-party government, the PML-N, came to power on a political platform

promising to bring electricity to the people, improve the economy, provide education to all, and

eradicate extremism through a process of dialogue. It also vowed to improve relations with

India and Afghanistan.

The armed forces and the army in particular, are a dominating political and economic factor

that has exercised military rule in almost half the life time of Pakistan. The armed forces

accounts for around 1/4 of the economy, and the army is still seen to have a defining role when

it comes to Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. The army perceives itself as the custodian of

the state, and it is arguably still the most respected institution in Pakistan. However, at the

same time it is widely acknowledged that there is a need to ensure civilian and political control

over an army that today literally governs itself.

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While the former government of Pakistan lead by PPP, the Pakistan People’s Party, and General

Kayani, the former Army Commander, over time developed an understanding of the role of the

army as the external protector of the nation. This may have changed since the present Pakistan

Muslim League (N) government took over in May 2013. The government decided to arrest the

former military dictator, general Musharraf, for high treason and thereby openly disrupting the

de facto immunity of army officers' actions – much to the discontent of the army. Secondly, the

new government’s attempts to negotiate a political settlement with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP)

have not provided viable results. At the same time, the army has taken heavy casualties in its

fight against the insurgency but with no mandate to respond militarily to this increase in

attacks. The previous year has therefore deepened the ditch between the Pakistani government

and its army. This in turn will most likely postpone a genuine civilian control of the armed forces

of Pakistan as envisaged by the current presidency of the country.

The security situation continues to be very volatile, particularly in the areas bordering

Afghanistan. The withdrawal of foreign combat forces from Afghanistan as well as developments

in US-Pakistan relations are major factors. The on-going military operation in FATA and its

possible outcomes could also be seen as potentially contributing factors in the volatile security

situation. Extremist militants in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa, sectarian violence against shias and Baloch insurgency in Balochistan, target

killing in Sindh and presence of hard core Jihadis in Punjab are unpredictable and they all fuel

an unstable overall security situation.

For decades, the Pakistani state cultivated radical, militant groups as regional foreign policy

instruments. Some of these have increasingly become an internal menace. Most militant groups

have their headquarters in the FATA, provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan –

areas which have never been brought fully under the state’s control.

Several attempts to establish peace accords between Pakistan and insurgent groups within the

last decade have failed. The latest attempt of a peace process in the spring of 2014 never

reached to the level of substantive negotiations. The breakdown of talks was succeeded by a

large-scale military operation with the purpose of bringing the area of North Waziristan under

control and with a vision to abolish the archaic tribal rule in all of the areas. The Post Crisis

Needs Assessment – Pakistan’s main peace-building and development strategy for the border

region – foresees long term interventions up to 2020 to reinstate peace.

Insecurity will most likely continue to be a serious threat to the civilian livelihood in the tribal

belt and it is expected to continue to inspire violence in the larger urban areas. The public

insecurity is linked to the militant movements since the militant activities of these seem to be

funded from criminal activities having severe consequences for the economic development of

Pakistan.

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The situation in Pakistan is thus precarious. On the one hand, legal and state reform promoting

involvement of the people in decision-making and enhancing mechanisms for accountability

have been introduced. On the other hand, these initiatives are still to bear fruit in a situation

where state finances face increasing instability.

One of the more successful fields have been that of rule of law where commitment by the

government supported by international donors leads toward a strengthened judiciary system.

Likewise substantial efforts are done to support the roles of the law enforcement agencies by

introducing new legislation, training and equipment that intend to decrease the trust deficit

between Law enforcement and the citizens. The rule of law will continue be one of the most

important areas for governance and the parliament needs to show decisiveness and political will

in order to mainstream the society.

The conflict in the border areas continues to destabilise the country and the region. In relation

to stabilising Afghanistan, an obvious and major challenge to border management is mitigating

the impact of trafficking in opiates and related precursors. Managing the border with

Afghanistan is difficult, but disrupting the illegal economy that spans the border is crucial for

conflict prevention both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is important to recognise that, due to

the porosity of this frontier, Pakistan’s other borders – the coast, Iran, India and China – are, de

facto, Afghanistan’s borders and can to some degree be considered relevant in a stabilisation

context.

There is a marked difference between human rights in principle and in practice. Most

international conventions have been ratified, albeit with some delays. Translation into national

legislation is taking place with important achievements in recent years, not least in relation to

pro-women legislation. Yet implementation lacks behind. The situation on the ground is

characterized by extra judicial killings and forced disappearances, violence against women and

honour killings, sectarian attacks against shias and other minority groups, child labour,

continuous threats to human rights activists and investigative journalists leaving an impression

of a state with growing intolerance.

Humanitarian needs are always there in the country. Pakistan has hosted over 5 million

refugees from Afghanistan, of whom 1.6 million are still in the country. Major military

operations in 2009 against militants in parts of KP and in 2014 in FATA have resulted in further

substantial population displacements, damage to private and public infrastructure, and loss of

assets and livelihoods. Such operations have continued and give rise to important movements

of internally displaced persons (IDPs), so currently there are more than one million IDPs of

which many have been displaced for years, often with bleak prospects for returning home in the

short term.

In summary, developments in Pakistan over the coming years are expected to have great and

direct impact on regional peace and stability.

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3.5. Tendencies in neighbouring countries

Three Central Asian republics share a border with Afghanistan, namely Turkmenistan,

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. For these Central Asian states the two main challenges of the

Afghanistan-Pakistan security complex are spread of Islamic fundamentalism and narcotics. The

regimes in the three republics are heavily engaged in fighting fundamentalism, but it is widely

assumed that local and national authorities to some extent profit from the transit of narcotics.

Addressing these transnational challenges and controlling external borders is a common priority

for the Central Asian republics and Afghanistan.

Iran has deep cultural and historic connections to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran’s foreign

policy towards the region and Afghanistan and Pakistan is driven by a number of factors

including: the international and regional play of power; the common problems with regard to

narcotics trafficking, terrorism and refugees; and access to energy. The antagonistic relationship

with the US has caused Iran to feel pressured by the sizeable US military presence in the

region. Iranian policy is characterised by realpolitik rather than export of the Islamic Revolution.

Iran prefers a stable Afghanistan and an Afghan government receptive to Iranian influence. The

Taliban is viewed as a threat also to Iran's own security and therefore Iran does not want the

Taliban to regain a dominant role in Afghanistan. Although Iran and Pakistan have a common

interest in a relatively stable and economically viable Afghanistan, they distrust each other’s

intentions and conduct in the country.

4. Experiences from the first phase of the programme

4.1. Activities in the first phase 2011-14

The programme objective of the first phase of the Peace and stabilisation Fund (PSF)

programme was:

Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by supporting efforts to build capable

and accountable security and justice sectors and supporting regional confidence-building.

The first phase has been focused on three mutually supportive tracks for Danish engagement in

the region;

Component 1: Capacity development of security forces to enhance security and stability, with

the objective to: Capacity of security forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan enhanced to undertake

security related assignments.

Component 2: Law and Order & Criminal Intelligence, with the objective to: Capacity of police,

military and border officials enhanced to improve law enforcement and crime prevention.

Component 3: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue, with the objective to: Support confidence

building and enhance regional cooperation towards reduced tensions and increased stabilisation

in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

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Table 1: Phase-one components and sub-components

Objective Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by supporting efforts to build capable and accountable security and justice sectors and supporting regional confidence

Component 1. Capacity development of security forces to enhance security and stability.

2: Law and order and criminal intelligence 3: Regional reconciliation and Dialogue

Immediate objective

Capacity of security forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan enhanced to undertake

security related assignments

Capacity of police, military and border officals enhanced to improve law enforcement and crime prevention

Support confidence and enhance regional cooperation towards reduced tensions and increased stabilisation in the Afghanistan-

Pakistan region

Sub-component

1.a - Capacity

Building of Afghan

National Security

Forces and Structures

1.b - Civil-military Relations

2.a - Regional Academy

for Security Analysis and

Training (Dhaka)

2.b - Counter-IED Training and Support

(Pakistan)

2.c - Maritime security

2.d - Border management and regional Counter

Narcotics

2.e UNDP office in Helmand

3.a - Track II Regional Confidence Buliding

3.b Support to National and

Regional Reconciliation

3.c Women, Peace and Security

Project ANA Trust Fund

- Commanders Pool (Helmand)

Dhaka Regional Academy

C-IED Maritime security project

(1) UNODC Pakistan Country Programme

UNDP office in Helmand

(1) Dialogue with Iran (SIPRI)

(1) Salaam Support Group (UNAMA)

UN Women Pakistan

- Civil-military engagement

(2) UNODC Afghanistan Country Programme

(2) India-Pakistan and India-Pakistan-Afghanistan (University og Ottawa)

(2) Istanbul process/Heart of Asia Confidence Building Measures on Counter Narcotics and emergency response

1) Cooperation between RDDC and NDU

(3) UNODC Iran Country Programme (closed)

2) Support for EU-donated C-IED vehicles

(4) UNODC Regional Programme

(3) DIIS/ Chatham house joined seminar in London on regional conflicts

3) Exchange of military personnel

(5) UNODC Inter-regional Drug Control (Vienna)

(4) Increase analutical capacity of DIIS regarding stability, security and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan

(6) UNODC NATO-Russia project

(7) OSCE Border project Tadsjikistan

Exc. Agency DK Military/ ANA TF

MoD/NDU tbd UK MoD MoD UNODC/OSCE MFA Multiple UN Women

Country Afghanistan Pakistan Bangladesh/ Regional

Pakistan Pakistan Pak./Afgh./ Iran/Reg Regional Afghanistan/ Regional/(Pak)

Pakistan

DK Mgt. MoD MoD EoD/ASI EoD/MoD EoD/MoD EoD/ENR ASI EoD+

Budget (mill.) 85 2 7 15 + 0,75 1 37 4.75 12.25 5

DAC/Non-DAC §12 Non-DAC

§12 Non-DAC DAC §12 Non-DAC §12 Non-DAC

DAC DAC DAC DAC

17

4.2. Lessons identified

The draft overall evaluation of the PSF recommends to use a Theory of Change approach in

programming. Furthermore, it recommends having a stronger strategic focus and consequently

a reduction in the number of non-coherent activities under each component/sub-component of

the programme. The evaluation also recommends securing unallocated funds and adequate

human resources in order to maintain the flexibility and effectiveness of the PSF.

A midterm review in November 2013 undertook an assessment of the PSF-Afghanistan-Pakistan

programme with regard to relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and programme management

and monitoring. It should be noted that the support for LOTFA was not part of the review, as

this activity in phase one was funded on a separate budget-line outside the Af-Pak programme.

On relevance, the assessment showed that the programme provides a foreign policy tool that

allows for engagement in a very uncertain and fragile context. By doing so it becomes relevant

to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the other recipient countries in the region; as well as to Danish

interests in managing the drawdown in Afghanistan and in reducing threats emanating from the

region.

On coherence, the review found that most of the programme´s implementing options are

organised along recipients' national lines due to lack of cross-border cooperation structures. This

challenges coherence and leads to activities to promote cross-border cooperation being add-ons

to a focus on building national capacities.

The Review Team found it positive, for example, that in Pakistan the military engagement on

Counter-IED capacity is tied together with the civilian police engagement on crime scene

investigation (UNODC). Similarly, in Afghanistan there is a positive relationship between support

for civilian border management (UNODC) and support for critical capabilities in the ANA (ANA-

TF). One could assume that the same conclusion could have been drawn in regard to LOTFA if

this programme had been included in the review.

The Review Team identified four opportunities to increase relevance and coherence of the

portfolio:

Investigate opportunities to support regional cooperation through Pakistan’s Counter-

IED Organisation, such as by sponsoring students from other countries to train there.

(followed-up: extending of existing Counter-IED project to include maintenance and

spare parts for donated equipment has been initiated and is under development.

Simultaneously, potential for Counter-IED efforts during the 2015-17 programme is

being explored.)

Consider support to female officer participation in ANA training. (Is followed-up:

Establishing and funding of facilities for female instructors and cadets at Afghan Army

Officer Academy in Kabul is underway.)

18

Explore whether the law enforcement sub-programme of UNODC’s Regional Programme

requires funding. (Is followed-up: Subsequently the programme was funded.)

A more explicit disaster response and gender-related programming, which may be done

through the cooperation with existing partners. This could be done by focusing some

UNODC support on gender and justice, by including disaster response into funds for

military capacity-building, or gender into military or law enforcement exchanges.

Further implementing partners could be asked to present plans to integrate human

rights and gender-relevant indicators into their monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

(Is followed-up: As a response to this recommendation UNODC were asked to present

proposals including a gender angle. This has proven difficult.)

On effectiveness, the review stressed the importance of going through a programme planning

process that also produces appropriate measuring tools. The lack of a completed log-frame

framework or a similar resource and result based framework in managing results made it

difficult to assess to what extent the PSF Af-Pak programme were achieving its objectives and

required the review team to consider effectiveness by reference to high-level trends.

The review noted that a number of activities did not proceed in line with commitments and

plans. Given the uncertain context within which the programme was to be implemented it

concluded that such rate of implementation would most probably have been considered a

success if formulated at the inception phase and it confirms the importance of having a broad

scope of tolerance in interpreting success of a stabilisation programme.

On management and monitoring, the review acknowledges the challenges linked to the

inter-ministerial nature of the programme. At the programme management level, the review

finds that partners in the Steering Committee appear to have developed mutual trust and a

good report, which leads to coherence in the understanding of the direction of the programme,

allowing for a relatively smooth decision making process. At the lower levels, management and

administration of the implementation has been light. Management was also looked at in the

evaluation of the broader PSF. The general conclusion was that management is under-resourced

and that a M&E system needs to established.

As mentioned LOTFA was not part of the mid-term review as the Danish funding was channelled

to UNDP/MoI out-side the Af-Pak PSP. LOTFA underwent a general evaluation in 20124 and in

reaction to a corruption case also an evaluation of the management structure5. Overall, the

review concludes that the continued performance of LOTFA in meeting its primary goal of

remuneration speaks to its success in addressing an important component of security sector

4 Evaluation of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, phase V, by ATOS for UNDP, 2012.

5 Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, Management Review, 2012

19

reform. On the other hand, developing essential governmental capacity in MOI remains limited

and is an area of potentially increasing salience as the withdrawal of foreign troops progresses.

Regardless of the consensus ultimately reached on this issue, the need for close and active

management of an initiative such as LOTFA which operates in both challenging and sensitive

contexts should not be underestimated. Also the importance of donors refraining from bilateral

micromanagement is underscored. Continued, reliable and not least multilateral funds are

needed.

5. Intervention logic

5.1. The strategic thematic and geographic focus

At the programme level the objective is to

Contribute to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region through more capable and accountable

institutions to protect the civilian population and enhanced regional confidence and

reconciliation.

The change logic that informs the choice of thematic objectives and geographic focus within the

PSP is outlined below at the programme level. It is a logic that builds on lessons of the effect of

the various engagements that were implemented under the first phase of the Af-Pak PSP and it

reflects changes in Denmark’s approach to the region as the engagements are evolving. An

underlying premise for selection of engagements has been to ensure the increased geographic

and operational focus that the review has called for, by consolidating and building on well-

functioning engagements.

Specific Theory of Change (ToC) for each of the engagements will be developed in the

programme formulation and included in the programme document. Preferably this will be done

in consultation with the involved partners.

There is a Danish political interest in a stronger regional approach as a means to promote a

sustainable stabilisation of the region. As noted in the context analysis, the region demonstrates

a complex and challenging interaction between poor standards of governance, low levels of

human security and human development, militancy and insurgency, and poor economic

conditions. While there are obvious differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including

their relative states of development, it is assumed that the challenges facing the two countries

are in many regards interlinked. It is also the assumption that the challenges in Afghanistan and

Pakistan – or the nexus between the two – cannot be tackled in isolation.

The primary Danish strategic interest in the region is stability. Reaching a political solution to

peace and enhancing regional trust will contribute to sustainable results.

20

From a strategic perspective Denmark will in the coming programme phase emphasise

consolidation in Afghanistan of the already achieved security and stabilisation. In the present

situation, where the international military engagement is downsized, it is essential to ensure

that the Afghans are capable of taking responsibility for protecting their own population from

insecurity and lawlessness.

Denmark will further support the Pakistani law enforcement agencies' ability to meet

international standards and commitments as well as ensuring the trust of the population in their

own agencies.

Further sustainability is essential. To that end building up the capacities of the Afghan and

Pakistani governments to administrate and implement Rule of Law is needed and their

respective national ownerships a prerequisite.

Finally, Denmark is committed to adhere to international commitments on cross cutting issues

as gender and other human rights. And to fulfil the pledges given on support for security forces

in Afghanistan (see below).

Based on the above context analysis, lessons identified, and principles for the PSF it is

suggested that phase II of the regional Afghanistan-Pakistan Stabilisation Programme will focus

on two thematic components with each a number of objectives:

Component 1: Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building, with the objectives to:

a) Improve the capacity of security forces

b) Enhance Law and Order

c) Improve institutions with the view of protecting the civilian population

Component 2: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue, with the objectives to:

a) Enhance the environment for a political solution in Afghanistan

b) Reduce tensions between actors in the region.

The first phase of the programme included activities in five countries; the second phase will only

have interventions in two countries. This choice is made as a follow up on the recommendation

by the evaluation team to a more focused approach, as there are limited funds for new

programming, and furthermore as a consequence of the lack of results on previous projects in

Iran and Bangladesh. The project in Central Asia has been taken over by another funding

mechanism.

During the period of the first phase of the Afghanistan-Pakistan programme, there were also

activities funded by PSF that were outside the fund´s Af-Pak programme. Under phase two, all

of the PSF engagements will be brought together under the Af-Pak PSP II. As such the second

phase of the programme will largely consist of activities that have already wielded results.

Furthermore, the new phase will emphasise coherence and bring together a portfolio of similar

21

activities. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of including wider regional

engagements should this be deemed opportune at a later stage.

The individual components will be elaborated in the programme formulation. Possibilities of

cooperating with strategic partners will be pursued in order to establish coherence and effective

use of limited resources by teaming up with carefully selected bilateral partners. This approach

will give Denmark a platform for dialogue with the host nations and with our strategic partners.

The following considerations will be guiding the programming team:

5.2. Component 1: Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution

3.6. Building

Engagement in both Pakistan and Afghanistan will be relevant to pursue the objective of

improving capacity of security forces, enhance law and order and improve institutions. A long-

term financing of the Afghan security forces is needed and the Afghan government will not be

able to cover these costs in the foreseeable future. In 2012 at the NATO summit in Chicago

Denmark contributed actively in creating the foundation for long-term financing of the capacity

building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – including both the police and military

forces. The international donors pledged contributions of more than USD 1 billion in the period

2012-17. Denmark pledged to support the ANA with DKK 20 million and the ANP with DKK 80

million per year in the years 2015-17. These pledges will be part of phase two of the PSP. The

contribution for ANA will be channelled through the ANA Trust Fund (ANA-TF) to capacity

building while the contribution to the police will be channelled through the Law and Order Trust

Fund (LOTFA) in Afghanistan which is by and large used for police salaries.

Denmark has urged the UN for a stronger regional presence in Afghanistan, including in the

south as part of phasing out the military presence Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team

(PRT), where Denmark has had a very active role in previous years. A stronger UN presence will

ensure the consolidation of already made progress and normalisation in the direction of a more

traditional and long-term development model for cooperation between the Afghan authorities

and the international community. The UN has agreed to this and has among other initiatives

established an office in Helmand that will support development of legitimate government

structures in one of the most fragile border regions of Afghanistan. By this it will contribute to

improve the framework conditions for stability and reconciliation, both locally and regionally.

Denmark has co-funded earmarked activities at the UN office in Helmand in 2013-14 within i.e.

building up law and order institutions. It is the intention to consider continuing the funding in

the coming programme phase.

Following the suicide attack on the Danish Embassy in 2008, the Danish government decided to

increase the Danish Development Assistance to Pakistan in order to proactively combat the

effects and causes of violent extremism and to secure that a nuclear power such as Pakistan will

not pose a serious security threat to the region and the world in the future. The activities

22

envisaged in the second phase of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace and Stabilisation Programme

go hand in hand with activities under the country program thus enhancing the effect and

promoting sustainable results.

As the context analysis on Pakistan shows the Pakistani military holds considerable influence in

all spheres of Pakistani society while maintaining links also to opposing military groups in

Afghanistan. Accountability of state entities is a major challenge in Pakistan, including for the

Pakistani security forces. It is the assumption that exposing the Pakistani military and police to

Danish methods can create entry points for change. In the first phase of the PSP a number of

pilot projects have been aiming at establishing mutual trust and has explored possible areas for

cooperation. These options need to be examined further during the programme formulation.

In relation to border management it is crucial for conflict prevention – both in Pakistan and

Afghanistan – to address the Challenge of the illegal economy that spans the border. As outlined

in the context analysis a wider focus on other borders – the coast, Iran, India and China – may

offer interesting prospects in terms of positively impacting on illicit economies and conflict in

Afghanistan. The identification of possible activities will be explored in the programme

formulation.

5.3. Component 2: Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue

An overarching political agreement achieved through dialogue and reconciliation constitutes an

important element of a lasting solution to the challenges in Afghanistan. The programme will

continue to support the Afghan peace and reconciliation process, which aims at forging a

solution at a central level between the various groupings in Afghanistan. To that end it is

suggested to positively consider extending the funding for the Salaam Support Group, while

other existing and new engagements in wider regional trust building measures and

reconciliation must be examined during the programme formulation. In this context it should be

considered how and where the role of women in establishing stability can be enhanced.

5.4. Compliance with cross cutting objectives (incl. gender)

The programme will mainstream gender and human rights considerations across its

components, and focus on supporting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution

1325 on Women Peace and Security.

Denmark’s National Action Plan (NAP) on Resolution 1325 (2008) is a Whole-of-Government

document prepared jointly by MFA, MOD and the Ministry of Justice, and provides reference

points for the PSF programme. It stresses the prevention, protection, and participation of

women.

The decision on funding activities and reporting will be held up against these standards. As

examples, in Component 1 facilitating training of female officers in ANA or capacity building

rapid deployable disaster teams in Pakistan for the benefit of children and women might be a

possibility. In Component 2 based on experience with the ongoing Track II support, a male bias

23

in participation is to be expected. The NAP 1325 foresees that achieving gender equity will

require a two-pronged approach that combines gender mainstreaming with women specific

activities. Accordingly, the suite of Track II activities will include the women specific dialogue

through UN Women Pakistan to promote the participation and voice of women in the discussions

shaping the kind of reconciliation necessary.

5.5. Complementarity

Obviously Denmark cannot address all the issues affecting security and stabilisation of the wider

Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The PSP builds on international and ongoing Danish and

international efforts and activities to the wider region.

In Afghanistan, the Danish combat military engagement since 2001 is terminated by the end of

2014. The last couple of years there have been a gradual transition towards support and

training. The non-combat activities is expected to continue for a period, but at a considerably a

lower level. On the civilian side Denmark has contributed with development assistance to

enhance state building and social and economic development. Humanitarian aid has been used

for alleviating crises – regardless of whether they are natural or inflicted by the armed conflict.

The Danish police force has been seconding officers either bilaterally to ANP training

programmes or to the European police mission (EUPOL).

In Pakistan, Denmark has established a close partnership with UK and efficient working relations

with other main actors within the field of Counter-IED giving Denmark a seat at an influential

table. Similar links are being built up within training activities and support for law enforcing

agencies in Pakistan. Denmark also initiated a development programme in 2010 with a purpose

of contributing to poverty alleviation through stabilisation and peace building, improved

livelihoods and service delivery, strengthened democratisation, and enhanced human rights and

gender equality. The Pakistan programme includes a civil society component focused on human

rights NGOs and media organisations. It also supports stabilisation and early recovery in

Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan through the World Bank and UNICEF. In addition

Denmark supports countrywide humanitarian assistance and Denmark has recently started to

focus more on building stronger commercial ties which will help create growth, jobs, and

ultimately contribute to stability.

The Peace and Stabilisation Programme is complementing these other engagements. PSP is

used for consolidating some initiatives – especially on the security forces in Afghanistan, while

new paths are explored in regard to regional reconciliation, dialogue and Danish-Pakistani

military cooperation within the field of law enforcement and to a certain extent also in limited

military cooperation. The flexibility and swift approval procedures of new engagements aide the

possibility to pursue new openings for supporting stabilisation.

In addition the Afghanistan-Pakistan programme will be complementary to other international

efforts or in some cases part of a basket funding of joint programmes. The latter is true for both

24

the funding of ANA-TF and LOTFA. The funding activities of the UNDP-Helmand regional office is

closely coordinated with UK which funds other activities in the same office.

5.6. Results framework

The recent evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund underlines the importance of

strengthening Denmark’s approach to results-based management in its stabilisation

engagements.

The coming programme planning process will produce appropriate measuring tools. Having said

this it should be acknowledged that the volume of the programme will not make it possible to

measure any outcome at the meta level. In other words this programme will be a small – but

hopefully important – contribution to the wider stabilisation of the region, but it will not be

measurable at that level. It is therefore the intention to develop a resource and result based

framework that will measure results at the engagement level.

Given the nature of the programme – piloting new initiatives – it is to be expected that a

number of the results are process outcomes rather than measurable impacts. Also it should be

acknowledged that several of the engagements will be funding activities through multilateral

organisations or multidonor baskets. In compliance with good donor practice the M&E will in

those engagements be jointly agreed and formats will be those of the coordinating body or

implementing agency. When joining these funding arrangements Denmark will demand that the

M&E are appropriate and satisfies our requirements. If not – appropriate M&E tools will be

developed in dialogue – in some cases as part of the engagement.

6. Budget

Table 2: Preliminary commitment budget with indicative amounts per component.

Funding streams

Total Non-DAC DAC

Overall budget 335 85 250

1) Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building 322 85 237

Afghanistan - Capacity Building of Afghan National Security Forces1

62 62

Afghanistan – Law and Order, UN in South Afghanistan, Border management2

229 229

Pakistan – Rule of Law, Security Sector and Institution Building 31 23 8

2) Regional Reconciliation and Dialogue 13 0 13

3) Unallocated 0 0 0

1. Of which 60 million DKK is committed to ANA

2. Of which 210 million DKK is committed to LOTFA (disbursement 80 mio/yr though)

25

7. Risk management

A Risk Management Matrix presenting significant risks identified will be developed as part of the

programme formulation.

Improving risk management in fragile and transitional contexts is high on the international

agenda and a priority for Denmark. The political and security context in the Afghanistan-

Pakistan region is fluid and unpredictable. This means that the challenges and risks facing the

programme will change over the implementation period. Recognising this, and based on lessons

learned from the on-going phase, the approach to programme delivery should be designed to:

Mitigate programmatic risks to an acceptable level. It will be important to routinely

incorporate lessons learned in the course of delivery.

React to emerging and changing political and security risks and alter the way in which

the engagements are delivered according to the changing operational context.

Ensure that implementing partners have anti-corruption checks and balances in place.

Ensure that agreements with implementing partners state their responsibilities to

immediately report in cases where Danish funds are misused or if these are being used

in manners incompatible with Danish international human rights commitments.

8. Envisaged management structure

The programme will be managed under the guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund

(February 2014).

The overall management responsibility for the programme on behalf of the Danish Government

rests with the Whole of Government Stabilisation Steering Committee (WGSSC), which

comprises members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister’s office, Ministry of Defence

and Ministry of Justice. The Whole of Government Stabilisation Secretariat (WGSS) functions as

the secretariat to the Steering Committee.

WGSS has a cross cutting role in providing advice, helping formulation of programmes, and

securing learning between all the regional/thematic programmes.

The specific division of labour in the day-to-day management of activities and budgets including

monitoring of the overall programme is to be determined during the programme formulation.

This also goes for programming of unallocated funds. As a point of departure the embassy in

Islamabad will manage and monitor the activities in Pakistan. As part of a progressive leaning of

the embassy in Kabul the future management of activities in Afghanistan will mainly be

undertaken by the Asia department (ALO) in MFA HQ and to a minor degree at the embassy in

Kabul.

The monitoring will include monitoring of programme and component risks as well as output

indicators and success criteria.

26

Annex 1: Updated Process Action Plan

10 Date Responsible

Draft concept note finalised 18st August ALO (MoFA), Int.Dep (MoD),

embassies in Islamabad and

Kabul

Discussion in WGSSC 27th August WGSS

Financial frame agreed to by the

government´s Coordination

committee (K-udvalg)

September WGSS

Revised Concept note 15th September ALO (MoFA), Int.Dep (MoD)

TOR for programming mission +

short listing of 3 consultants

15th – 22nd September UFT (MoFA) + ALO (MoFA),

Int.Dep (MoD), WGSS

Tender bids 30th September Consultants

Evaluation of tender bids from 3

consultants

1st October UFT (MoFA) + ALO (MoFA),

Int.Dep (MoD), WGSS

Prepare programming mission 20th – 31st October Consultant

Programming Mission 3rd -14th November Consultant + (MoFA) + MoD

ToR Appraisal 11th November UFT (MoFA) + ALO (MoFA),

Int.Dep (MoD)

Appraisal Consutant (APP) - Single

Sourcing

15th November UFT (MoFA)

Draft Pgm Document 21st November Consultant

Consultation (written) 24th – 28th November ALO (MoFA), Int.Dep (MoD)

Pgm Document Final Draft 1st – 12th December Consultant

Appraisal preparation 5th -16 January 2015 UFT/ appraisal Consultant

Appraisal Mission 19th – 30th January UFT/ appraisal Consultant

Appraisal Final Document 2nd -13th February UFT/ appraisal Consultant

Pgm Document finalisation 16th-20th February Consultant (Programming or

Appraisal)

Approval Late February WGSSC

Recommendation to the Ministers

for Development Cooperation and

for Defence

Mid March WGSS on behalf of WGSSC

Financial committee appropriation April MoFA

27

Annex 2: Bibliography

Afghanistan

Understanding Afghanistan – Synthesis Report, University of York, Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), for DFID, 2008

Understanding Afghanistan - A strategic conflict assessment of Afghanistan, PRDU, 2008 Understanding Afghanistan – a Political Economy analysis, PRDU, 2008. Strategic Conflict Analysis of Afghanistan, swede.peace and Cooperation for Peace and

Unity, 2012

Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Feinstein International Center, Tufts university, 2012

Afghanistan´s Insurgency after the Transition, International Crisis Group, 2014 Conflict and peace capacities, 2014. Internal UNDP paper. Peace offerings - Theories of conflict resolution and their applicability to Afghanistan,

Matt Waldman and Thomas Ruttig, Afghanistan Analysts Network

Afghanistan: European Union Strategy 2014-16, 2014

Pakistan

”Verdens farligste land? – Pakistan mellem militærherredømme, ekstremisme og

demokrati”, Jochen Hippler, translated to Danish by Ellekær, 2013

Regional aspects and dialogue

Prospects for peace and stability in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Regional Dialogue Background Paper No. 1, Nasser Saghafi-Ameri, June 2011

Regional Politics and The Prospects for Stability in Afghanistan, Sunil Dasgupta, 2013

Security and Political Developments in Afghanistan in 2014 and After: Endgame or New Game, Vanda Felbab-Brown (pp 23-25 on regional factors)

Strategies and policies

PSF Guidelines, February 2014Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement In Fragile And Conflict-Affected Areas Of The World

Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme for Afghanistan/ Pakistan 2011-2014 Danish Afghanistan Plan 2013-14 Danish framework Programme for Pakistan 2013-16 (not published on the web). Also

look at Note for the grant committee. The Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 (Danish only)