Afghanistan Alternative Livelihood Project Mid-Term Review

Final Draft 11 Dec 2006

Allison Brown, DFID Representative, Team Leader John Dalton, FAO Representative

M. Omar Omar, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food, Representative

October-November 2006

Executive Summary The Alternative Agricultural Livelihoods Programme (AALP) was conceived in 2002, designed in 2003, initially authorized to start in 2004 and finally began implementation in July 2005 with a completion date of December 2007. The problem being addressed by AALP is the widespread economic dependency of the rural population on the production of opium. The Goal of AALP is to contribute to the sustainable elimination of illicit opium poppy cultivation throughout the country, in line with the Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy. The Purpose of AALP is to contribute to national policy through the development of nationally owned alternative livelihood strategies and action plans. The project objectives are to be achieved through

• identifying viable alternative livelihood options, • establishing the institutional framework for improved access to farm and off-farm

income generation opportunities in two pilot provinces and • analysing and disseminating lessons learned.

At the national level, AALP is embedded within the Agricultural Alternative Livelihoods Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAHF) and works with the Extension Directorate in the target districts of the two pilot provinces Balkh and Herat. As a member of the Core Group of the Alternative Livelihoods Working Group (ALWG), AALP is linked with the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) and other national institutions. In the field, AALP works directly with MAAHF and the Ministry of Economy (which is tasked with coordinating development activities at the provincial level) and with a variety of implementing partners from the voluntary and private sectors. The purpose of this Mid Term Review (MTR) is to review and assess the current project status, in particular the extent to which the project inputs so far have contributed towards the expected outputs and whether the outputs are likely to achieve the intended outcomes or purpose of the Project. Based on the findings and the current country context, to make recommendations for any necessary changes in the overall design and orientation of the project and make detailed recommendations on the work plan for the remainder of the project. The MTR was conducted by representatives of DFID, FAO and MAAHF between 30 October and 18 November 2006. The MTR team held meetings in Kabul, Mazar, and Herat. We visited villages in Mazar and in Herat. Findings, conclusions and recommendations

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We find that except for the commendable activities of the CTA as a member of the Alternative Livelihood Working Group, the project will be unable to reach its goals in the 13 months remaining because it is already so far behind in its work and is proceeding so slowly. As a result of the extremely slow startup and difficulty AALP is having with its implementation and communication strategies, the project is unlikely to have any attributable effect on poppy cultivation or on the body of knowledge on ways to reduce poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. At the end, the project will be unable to state that it has had a sustainable impact on livelihoods (there is no time available to demonstrate even basic sustainability). Depending on decisions reached by the project's Management Group (DFID, FAO, MAAHF and AALP) following this report, the project can still play an important and positive role in enriching the strategic and policy debate about CN and AL at the national level. The project could possibly play an important role at the Provincial and District levels if the terms of reference for the provincial offices is completely revised. Specific findings Finding 1. The original project design was flawed conceptually and methodologically and had no chance of successfully meeting its objectives. Finding 2. The revision to the Project Document made in 2005 does not adequately address the flaws in the original project design. Finding 3. The role that the CTA has played on the ALWG assisting the GoA to develop its national AL strategy is commendable but somewhat unstructured. Finding 4. The project has fielded 8 international consultants and 0 national consultants. Finding 5. The project has invested most time to date on activities which the MRT unanimously agree were of limited practical value. Finding 6. The project has delayed field implementation too long. Finding 7. Communication of the findings of AALP's action research to others in the development community and linking these reports to future AALP and GoA activities is critical but the project's communication plan is not yet finalized after 17 months. Finding 8. It is unlikely that the remaining budget can be expended in a useful way in the 13 months remaining. Recommendations

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It is too late in the project to undertake yet another reformulation but the MTR team suggests that the project's Management Group make some difficult decisions very quickly. A project extension should only be considered if significant progress is made in the first quarter of 2007 and there is evident potential to continue. Otherwise the project should be closed on schedule or earlier if desired. We believe that the remainder of the project, if it is to continue, should focus on a program of support activities that inform national strategy and help guide realization of the national strategy at the provincial, district and local level. In collaboration with MAAHF, MRRD and implementing NGOs, AALP should concentrate on building the ALU and moving forward the national Counter Narcotics and community development objectives of MAAHF, Counter Narcotics and Rural Reconstruction by facilitating the flow of information at all levels. To the extent possible under the current competitive situation, the project should strengthen links between MAAHF and MRRD. The MTR team is divided in opinion as to where, how and to what end action research and field implementation should be undertaken. It would be a great loss to some (but not all) stakeholders if the project were to abandon the action research and field implementation components entirely to focus on strategy and policy objectives. It is in the area of strategy formulation where AALP can have the greatest impact in the remaining 13 months. The MTR team does not see how good quality action research and field implementation can be done effectively in the 13 months remaining. If the action research and field implementation components are to be retained, a plan for these activities must be developed with urgency and the objectives of these components must be scaled back dramatically. Recommendation 1. Within the context of the decisions to be taken by the project's management group and regardless of whether all components of the project are retained, AALP must promote and distribute findings of existing consultant reports via participation in national and provincial workshops and other media, and a website. The project's communication strategy requires further urgent development and refinement so that good use is made of the information contained in AALP surveys and reports and the project’s contribution to AL strategy and policy is more effective in the current development context Recommendation 2. As soon as possible (the MTR recommends no later than 31 Jan 2007), AALP should sign MOUs to provide administrative support to Provincial Offices of Economy (or other provincial offices as appropriate). The MTR suggests that in Balkh the project could supply 1-2 technical staff using existing staff if possible; in Herat, Helmund and elsewhere as the Project Management Group (AALP, DFID, FAO, MAAHF) determine. Recommendation 3. AALP should restrict the use of further international consultants.

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Recommendations 4 and 5 are conditional on the retention of the action research or field implementation components. Recommendation 4. If the project is to undertake action research, then the objectives and methodology of the action research component should be developed immediately and the process of signing IP agreement begun before 31 January 2007. The MTR team suggests that the project consider testing a system to monitor and document the progress toward CN objectives resulting from field implementing and sustainable livelihoods initiatives in a range of implementers outside of the project. Recommendation 5. If the project is to undertake field implementation, then as soon as possible (the MTR recommends no later than 31 Jan 2007), AALP must sign a series of IP contracts with NGOs for field implementation.

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... II TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................................... VI ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY .................................................................................................. VII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................................VIII 1. SITUATION............................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1. OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION TODAY ................................................................................................... 1 1.2. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE PROJECT OPERATES .................................................................. 2

1.2.1. Government restructuring......................................................................................................... 2 1.2.2. The agriculture sector............................................................................................................... 4 1.2.3. Many development agencies ..................................................................................................... 5 1.2.4. Limitations on funds available to local government .................................................................. 8

1.3. SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................... 8 2. EVOLUTION OF THE PROJECT DESIGN....................................................................................... 8

2.1. HISTORY ............................................................................................................................................. 9 2.2. DIALOGUE AND CONFLICT AMONGST THE STAKEHOLDERS ............................................................... 12

3. CURRENT STATUS OF THE PROJECT ......................................................................................... 14 COMPONENT 1: INSTITUTIONAL PLATFORM AND OPERATIONAL MECHANISMS, DIAGNOSTIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................. 14 COMPONENT 2: CAPACITY BUILDING AT COMMUNITY LEVEL ................................................................... 16 COMPONENT 3: CAPACITY BUILDING AT NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVELS IN PILOT PROVINCES ............................................................................................................................................... 17 COMPONENT 4: FARM AND OFF-FARM LIVELIHOODS DIVERSIFICATION ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED IN PILOT PROVINCES ............................................................................................................................................... 17 COMPONENT 5: DISSEMINATION OF LESSONS LEARNED............................................................................ 18 COMPONENT 6: STRATEGY AND POLICY ADVICE ...................................................................................... 18 BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 19

4. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................... 20 SPECIFIC FINDINGS ................................................................................................................................... 21 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 22

ANNEX 1. TERMS OF REFERENCE.................................................................................................... 25 ANNEX 2. ITINERARY AND LIST OF PERSONS MET................................................................... 31 ANNEX 3. AALP PROJECT REPORTS................................................................................................ 34

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Abbreviations and glossary AAL Initial abbreviation for the project name AALP Current abbreviation for the project name AL Alternative Livelihoods (used as a technical term in the context of CN) ALWG Alternative Livelihoods Working Group ALU Alternative Livelihoods Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy CN Counter Narcotics CTA Chief Technical Officer, the project Team Leader DFID Department for International Development (UK) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations GoA Government of Afghanistan GTZ German Technical Cooperation MAAHF Ministry of Agriculture Animal Husbandry and Food MCN Ministry of Counter-Narcotics MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development MTR Mid-Term Review NGO Non-Governmental Organization, national and international NSP National Solidarity Programme PDP AALP Project Discussion Papers RALF Research in Alternative Livelihoods Fund (DFID) RAMP Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Agricultural Markets Programme (USAID) UN United Nations considered as a whole UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime USAID United States Agency for International Development

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Acknowledgements

The members of the Mid-Term Review team would like to thank the staff of the AALP project for their help in making our work productive and interesting.

We would also like to thank the people in Kabul, Mazar and Herat who made time in their busy schedules to meet us.

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1. Situation

1.1. Opium poppy cultivation today Before the year 2000 about 90% of the opium gum produced in Afghanistan came from only three provinces - Kandahar, Helmund and Nangarhar. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, opium poppy cultivation has spread to 25 of the country's 34 provinces, variously supported by a network of opium traders and itinerant harvest labourers, and with the alleged involvement of warlords and some individuals within the government. The illicit trade in opium is a dominant economic force with more than 350,000 households in Afghanistan deriving some or all of their income from the opium trade. Afghanistan’s opium exports are valued at $2.7 billion, more than 52 percent of GDP1 and is estimated to account for about 87% of world production2. The expansion of the illicit economy has negative implications for the emergence of effective governance in Afghanistan. As the international trade in narcotics grows, the rise in the illicit economy is linked with leaky borders and the resurgence of the Taliban, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces. Hostilities in these areas have been ongoing and there is little prospect for peace. Economic development, it is widely argued, will help mitigate these problems and must proceed as quickly as possible. The expansion of poppy cultivation after 2001 is in part a response to a 600% rise in farmgate price in a country with few income generation options for rural people. Poppy is a crop that farmers can consistently grow with minimal irrigation. Poppy cultivation offers a coping mechanism for many rural families because the opium gum is an easily transportable, non-perishable commodity for which there is always a ready market. Opium is an exchangeable source of liquidity, credit and repayment. It is commonly believed that the intense focus of donor aid on areas with poppy cultivation (with correspondingly less attention paid to the economy as a whole) has perversely promoted the expansion of opium production into new areas where farmers are likely to begin growing opium so as to attract similar investments. Many observers now argue that a comprehensive and coordinated integrated development strategy is required to offset the vicious cycle of insecurity, warlordism, weakened government influence, corruption and other aspects of poor governance. The discussion acknowledges that creating a dynamic and effective licit economy in a post-war context will take time and a multifaceted approach. It is further argued that rather than pursuing an approach focused solely on Alternative Livelihoods (AL) for poppy growers, what is needed now is an integrated Counter

1 UNODC (2005) Afghanistan Opium Survey. 2 The 18 November edition of independent newspaper Daily Outlook Afghanistan reported Kenzo Oshima, Japan’s ambassador to the UN and leader of the visiting Security Council delegation, as noting Afghanistan’s opium production in 2006 reached 6,100 tons, a sharp rise of 49% “accounting for 92% of the total world supply.”

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Narcotics (CN) strategy that directs investment across the country. Such a strategy would require that the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) enforce its laws and muster the political will to neutralize the hitherto untouchable opium traders in positions of power. Toward this end, in 2004, the Afghan Government initiated a multifaceted National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) that aims to reduce opium poppy cultivation by 70% by 2008. Afghanistan’s CN efforts are supported by the World Bank, USAID, DFID and many other donors including those contributing to the Narcotics Control Trust Fund recently instituted by DFID. The Afghanistan Alternative Livelihoods Program (AALP) is one of several development activities funded by DFID under its Counter Narcotics (CN) initiative.

1.2. Circumstances under which the project operates

1.2.1. Government restructuring In accordance with the 2001 Bonn Agreement the Interim Administration of Afghanistan was established in Kabul in December 2001. Over the following four years the Afghan government met all the milestones of the Bonn process including holding two Loya Jirgas, approving a new constitution and holding presidential and legislative elections. The Afghanistan Compact was developed at the London Conference of early 2006 and provides a framework for long-term partnership between the GoA and the international community. The Afghan Government will implement its obligations under the Compact through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The investment priorities and strategies of ANDS involve three independent pillars: Security, Governance, rule of law and human rights, and Economic and social development. It also involves eight sectors and 5 cross-cutting themes (Table 1.). Each of the ANDS sectors is supported by a working group, an advisory committee with members from NGOs, donors and government agencies. The long-term goal of the Counter Narcotics theme is to secure a sustainable decrease in poppy cultivation, drug production, consumption and trafficking, with the eventual elimination of narcotics. The MCN is currently preparing the National Drug Control Strategy and implementation plan which will soon be submitted to the CN subcommittee of the Cabinet. The long-term goal of the Counter Narcotics theme is to secure a sustainable decrease in poppy cultivation, drug production, consumption and trafficking, and the eventual elimination of narcotics. In May 2003 the National Drug Control Strategy of Afghanistan (NDCS) was finally approved. This overall strategy includes five inter-related elements:

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• Alternative Livelihoods: provision of alternative livelihoods for those groups involved in poppy cultivation (in agriculture and other sectors);

• Law Enforcement: effective drugs law enforcement throughout Afghanistan; • Judicial Reform: implementation of drug control legislation; • Drug Demand Reduction: through prevention and treatment programmes for

addicts (within Afghanistan and throughout the region); • Public Awareness creation: institutional capacity building and awareness

programmes at various levels.

The Alternative Livelihood Working Group (ALWG) was established in 2003 under the Counter Narcotics Directorate, the forerunner to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN). The Terms of Reference for the ALWG has recently been approved. Table 1. Pillars, Sectors and Themes of ANDS

Pillar 1 Security

Pillar 2 Governance,

Rule of Law and Human Rights

Pillar 3 Economic and Social Development

Sector 1 Infrastructure and Natural Resources

Sector 2 Governance,

Rule of Law and Human Rights

Sector 3 Security

Sector 4 Education

Sector 5

Health

Sector 6 Agriculture &

Rural Development

Sector 7 Social

Protection

Sector 8 Economic

Governance and Private

Sector Development

Gender equity (cross- cutting theme 1) Counter Narcotics (cross- cutting theme 2)

Regional Cooperation (cross- cutting theme 3) Anti-Corruption (cross- cutting theme 4)

Environment (cross- cutting theme 5)

The strengthening of government structures is ongoing. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) is responsible for administering the National Solidarity Program (NSP) initiated in July 2003. The World Bank and other donors support NSP implementation in some 12,000 villages. NSP provides block grants of Afs10,000 (US$200) per family for villages ranging to a maximum of $60,000 per village. The money is used to address the development priorities identified by the village community. Leading international and national NGOs (e.g. UN Habitat, CHA, Care) act as implementing partners for NSP. They are assigned specific districts in each province and charged with facilitating participatory village development planning in conjunction with elected Community Development Councils (CDCs) and focus groups newly organised for this purpose. UNODC is supporting the development of MCN to strengthen its ability to fulfil its mandate to build provincial-level capability in survey, policy and research. Major investments in the CN sector are provided by several donors, in particular the USA and UK.

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The MCN has five regional offices (Departments of Counter Narcotics) located in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar and Balakshan. These offices will be staffed by an Alternative Development expert, a coordinator and a poppy survey specialist whose job will be to monitor CN activities in the region. ALWG sub-groups are to be established in each province to facilitate coordination and capacity building and shift the focus of MNC activities from national to provincial level. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economy is responsible to establishing mechanisms at provincial level for provincial development planning via an elected Provincial Council (PC) chaired by the Provincial Governor and a Provincial Development Committee (PDC) composed of sectoral agency representatives and district governors. The PDC in turn is serviced by sectoral Working Groups with the Provincial Economic Department functioning as the secretariat. Implementation of the initial phase of NSP has generated a range of village development projects which are meant to be reviewed and approved at provincial level. However, from discussions with heads of the Economic Department in Balkh and Herat, the extent that provincial development planning structures are established and functional varies widely. In the immediate post-Taliban period, the young government faced many problems in organizing and staffing its civil service. On the one hand there was a need to give jobs to everyone who supported the right causes. On the other hand, there is the problem that there are far too few Afghans with the skills needed to carry out high-level administrative and policy work. Exacerbating the management headaches is a shortage of cash to pay salaries and benefits for civil servants. Low salaries are one of the factors fuelling corruption. In recent years, there have been attempts made to reform and restructure government by cutting the size of the central bureaucracy and raising government salaries to realistic levels. Effective implementation of the initial restructuring has apparently been limited by funding constraints. A second restructuring is now underway.

1.2.2. The agriculture sector Agriculture is the dominant sector of Afghanistan’s economy. It employs 80 percent of the country’s population and accounts for more than 50% of its $5.6 billion GDP. With most Afghans dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, maximizing the output of the sector is the key to improving their economic and social condition. However, improving the sustainable productivity and profitability of Afghan agriculture and the livelihood of the multitude of dispersed and isolated communities comprising its 13 million mostly rural population poses an enormous challenge. Afghanistan’s 635,000 square kilometre landscape is dominated by mountainous and desert terrain. Only 12% of the land is arable, predominantly valley floors where agriculture is largely dependent on irrigation. Land ownership and use rights are often

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hotly contended. Only 2% of the country is forested. Access to international markets is constrained because the country is entirely landlocked by six neighbouring countries. During the Green Revolution of the 1970s, Afghanistan received development aid to improve its agriculture productivity. Afghan students enrolled in national and international universities to study agriculture. The country had an Agriculture Extension Service and a system of research stations where new technologies were developed and tested. The Soviet invasion of 1979 initiated 25 years of violence and civil strife. Following the Soviet expulsion a decade later came 7 years of factional conflicts then followed by 5 years of Taliban control (1996-2001). The resulting widespread destruction of peoples’ livelihood assets (their human, natural, financial, physical and social capital) and the disruption of the structures and processes of commerce and government now severely limits Afghanistan’s capacity to develop. The national economic situation has been made even more urgent by severe droughts (2002-03 and 2005-06), widespread crop failures, and food shortages. Rural poverty partly explains the explosion of poppy cultivation in recent years. The key line ministries servicing agriculture are the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAHF), Irrigation, Water Resources and the Environment (MIWRE) and Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). Provincial-level implementation is through a counterpart department for each ministry, whose staffs answer to the provincial governor for the day-to-day implementation of their activities. The institutions serving the agricultural sector have suffered seriously over the past 25 years, both at the centre and in the provinces. This applies particularly to agricultural research, extension and training, fertilizer distribution and institutional credit for agriculture. Research farms are inactive, the seed and fertilizer corporations are not operating and the (Afghan) Agricultural Bank has stopped lending to farmers. Most of the institutions servicing the rural communities are still reminiscent of the Soviet system of the 1980s. At the provincial level, MAAHF is represented by the seven separate Departments of Forestry, Livestock Husbandry, Veterinary Services, Extension, Research, Cooperatives and Agricultural Machinery. These departments can be further broken down into sections (e.g. the Livestock Department in Herat is composed of Extension, AI and Sericulture sections). Most provincial management staff are senior in rank and age. They are constrained by the lack of an operating budget. The cadre of field staff at the district level have very little capacity to provide the much needed services to support village development.

1.2.3. Many development agencies

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A plethora of multilateral and bilateral donors and international and national NGOs and even the international military are actively supporting the rehabilitation and development of Afghanistan. NGOs have become the principal technical service agencies, either on their own account, or as implementing partners of international agencies or donors. As a consequence, there has been a steady transfer of trained people from government staff to the NGOs. The government recognises that during the transition period it will need to work with the NGOs in order to carry out the technical and social tasks that will be part of the national rebuilding process. Each donor agency is competing for very limited counterpart capacity and the majority of development facilitation and delivery in the field is managed and implemented by NGOs. Some recent, ongoing and pending projects and programs include:

1. RAMP: Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (USAID, $145, for 3 years from mid 2003). Composed of 4 components: agricultural technology and market development, infrastructure, rural finance, and institutional capacity building RAMP aimed to improve food sufficiency while increasing the production and sale of agricultural products. It targeted the 13 most agriculturally productive provinces in five regions. RAMP, which closed several months ago, is to be followed by another project, ASAP, which is to begin shortly.

2. USAID-funded ALP (Alternative Livelihoods Program) and the Dairy Industry

Revitalization Project for Afghanistan. These two projects, like other USAID development projects, are focused on resolving technical issues hindering the commercialization of agriculture.

3. PAL: Project for Alternative Livelihoods in eastern Afghanistan (European

Commission, Euro 20M) is being implemented in three eastern provinces (Laghman, Nangarhar and Kunar). The project works at central, provincial, district and village levels, feeding back lessons from the field and participating in policy dialogue. It aims to contribute to the control of poppy cultivation by building the capacity of its newly created District Development Teams and complementing the village development activities of MRRD. Pilot activities in one district in each province will be completed in Feb 2007 when it will expand into some 20 districts in each province. The project has found that farmers in the eastern provinces may progressively move out of opium cultivation as a result of such quick impact projects as roads, electricity, credit and market chains.

4. NSP: National Solidarity Program. Financed primarily by World Bank with

support of other donors, the NSP was launched mid 2003, the initial phase to run for 3 years. Implemented through MRRD, NSP provides block grants to rural communities to remove priority constraints. It has been implemented in a limited number of districts in target provinces by a range of international and national NGOs. These facilitate the election of Community Development Committees in target villages via a process of participatory situation assessment and village

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development planning and prioritisation. Block grants are calculated on the basis of 10,000 Afs ($200) per family for each village to a maximum of Afs 3 million or $60,000 per village.

5. Some of the leading NSP collaborators are UN-Habitat, Care, Agha Khan

Development Foundation (AKDF) and Coordinating Humanitarian Assistance (CHA). These are contracted in target provinces to implement the NSP in specific districts across the country. MAAHF is not involved with the MRRD’s NSP initiatives.

The village Community Development Committees can be mixed or separate gender (on average mixed gender CDCs are reportedly composed of 60% women). Village CDCs within a district are often subsequently organised into geographic clusters on the basis of common location (e.g. a valley) and Area Development Councils are formed on the basis of these clusters. It is expected that the aggregation of clusters into District Development Councils will soon be facilitated.

Clusters of villages may opt to consolidate their block grants towards a significant investment that would serve the entire cluster (e.g. a feeder road, a primary school or irrigation system). However, due to failure of effective coordination across sectors at either central or provincial level there are instances whereby village clusters subsequently regret consolidation when they discover another agency is offering funding for similar activities. However, due to inadequate census data it is unclear how many villages there are, though NSP II is due to soon begin further implementation in additional villages and districts.

6. The US governement-funded Poppy Eradication Program (PEP) is active in seven provinces3, attached to the MCN. PEP does not get directly involved in eradication (which is done by the Afghanistan Eradication Force of the government) but conducts annual pre-planting surveys of farmers about their intentions regarding poppy cultivation intentions. PEP also assists with interagency liaison by collecting provincial-level information on the AL activities of NGOs and government organisations. PEP also implements community outreach programs and information campaigns concerning the new counter narcotics law by targeting village leaders and suras, schools, restaurants, mosques etc using culturally designed messages.

7. DFID is funding the Research in Alternative Livelihoods Fund (RALF), a

competitive research fund for innovative and practicable projects to test and promote alternative livelihood opportunities based on agriculture and natural resource management. Seven projects are currently funded under RALF.

8. FAO has been supporting wheat and cotton research, seed multiplication and

distribution programs for seeds, tools, fertilizers and locust control with varying 3 Badakshan, Nangarhar, Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah and Balkh

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degrees of success. Much of these funds were for emergency activities but there are also activities in long-term rehabilitation including the cultivation and marketing of fruits and vegetables, livestock vaccination campaigns and veterinary services, poultry raising projects for women, milk production and marketing projects, the rehabilitation of irrigation systems and the strengthening of fragile government institutions and services.

9. The initiatives of some private sector groups are also proving effective. A small

Dairy Farmers Association in Herat manages 1200 improved Holstein purebreds purchased by the farmers themselves from Iran at substantial cost and manage their own AI program. Similarly, a private company in Herat is promoting the production, processing and international marketing of saffron.

10. Some leading NGOs, such as Agha Khan Foundation and Catholic Relief

Services, are active in agricultural research and extension. To summarise, Afghanistan is awash with a great diversity of development projects and initiatives and this list could go on and on. These efforts are only poorly coordinated at the central level and essentially not coordinated at provincial and lower levels where governance structures and coordinative mechanisms are only just beginning to emerge.

1.2.4. Limitations on funds available to local government Despite an urgent need to move national budgets down to provincial, district and village level to implement critical reconstruction in countryside communities ravaged by decades of war, Afghanistan’s central ministries manage only very low levels of budget disbursement. In 2005 the Ministry of Agriculture managed to expend only 21% of its budget. While this figure is projected to increase to 35% in the current fiscal year, this higher level is largely achieved via expenditure on construction and renovation of its central offices.

1.3. Summary It is against this intricate, competitive and confused background that AALP must aim to make a meaningful contribution in the limited time available. AALP intends to document, test, and communicate to others the lessons learned from development interventions that are or are likely to be effective against poppy cultivation. With restructuring comes shifts in personnel making continuity of AALP outreach difficult. In the two pilot provinces there is an urgent for AALP need to support a simple process of multi-sectoral area development planning.

2. Evolution of the project design An international debate on poppy control strategy has been underway for many years without resolution. There are many schools of thought on why and how poppy cultivation

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can be reduced or eliminated and the various roles that economic development, interdiction, eradication, civil law, and religious law should play in the effort. Afghanistan presents a special case because the recent rise of poppy cultivation has been so rapid, because drug traffickers are part of power structures at all levels, and because the national government and the national economy are so weak.

2.1. Project history The Afghanistan Alternative Livelihoods Programme (AAL, later AALP) was first discussed between officers of DFID and FAO in 2002, shortly after the Bonn Agreement. At that time it was thought that the UK and other donors intended to provide Counter Narcotics funding in large blocks as umbrella programmes, rather than in small projects, and the figure ₤10 million was mentioned for a comprehensive, long-term Alternative Livelihoods program consisting of a series of sub-projects extending over a range of technical and policy areas. Formal design activities for AAL began in 2003. By then promised support had been reduced to about ₤3-4 million but the designers clearly believed that supplementary funding from multiple sources would follow and that, over time, AAL would become a long-term, amply funded, multi-dimensional rural development activity. The original Project Document (PD) describes a 2.5 year project with an impossibly active inception phase of 9 months. During inception, AAL was to renovate or construct offices in Kabul and several field sites, recruit staff, field consultants, introduce, implement and evaluate new agricultural production packages, and analyze a host of other things. A close reading of the text reveals a design vision that could not possibly reach fruition within the time and budget allotted. To quote the document (page 5-6):

The inception component will be implemented during the first nine months of the project. Its core outcomes will be an established institutional platform as well as operational mechanisms and start of replicable model activities…. Apart from establishing office facilities and [institutional] linkages… the first pilot activities will be initiated in the second half of the inception period of nine months.

Successful interventions were to be replicated in multiple locations across the country and continue so long as needs existed. Lessons learned in the AAL programme would inform national development and CN strategies. Capacity building at national, provincial, local and village levels would be simultaneous. Women would be empowered and the project was also to establish a "coordination and lessons sharing facility" that sounds rather like a library.

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The expectations of the project designers were farfetched, given the difficulty of working in Afghanistan. None the less, the project agreement was signed with a 1 September 2004 starting date at a cost of ₤3.75 (approximately US$6.83 million) and an implementation period of 30 months. As commonly happens in UN-managed activities, fielding the CTA and project staff was greatly delayed. The CTA did not arrive till mid-2005. Meanwhile, project procurement was begun using a temporary manager. By mutual agreement between project signatories, the official project start date was eventually moved to 1 July 2005 with a proposed completion date of the end of the year 2007. By mid-2005, however, the country situation was greatly changed over 2002-3. The three most important changes that affected project design were that the security situation had deteriorated, particularly in the southern provinces, poppy had spread rapidly to to regions where it had previously been, at most, a minor crop, and donor-funding initiatives had proliferated. Upon his arrival, the CTA questioned a number of assumptions made in the original PD, in particular the geographic focus of activities. Although the original PD does not specify a project location, in the months before the CTA arrived there had been a decision made that the project should be based in Nangahar and Badakshan, provinces which were centres of poppy cultivation. These areas, while remaining major poppy areas, are now also places of high security risk, and poppy cultivation has spread into many other provinces. There are two arguments against undertaking large-scale CN activities in unstable locations. The first and most important is that project staff face extraordinary risks. The areas of highest poppy concentration today are also, by and large, areas where the insurgency is most serious. While the original PD acknowledges that security concerns might be an important limit on programme activity, the document is largely silent on what those limits might mean and how they were to be handled. The past few years have seen NGO and development contractors' staff killed while undertaking purely humanitarian (non-CN) activities in the war zones and today, development agencies find that work in several southern provinces must be restricted to local NGOs. In some other places that are slightly less dangerous, the ability of expatriates and locals to work and travel is greatly constrained by security considerations. The second argument against working in high poppy areas is that, as mentioned earlier, this is thought to encourage opportunistic spread of poppy by farmers hoping to receive CN money for "cessation" of poppy cultivation. The reasons for the rapid expansion of poppy cultivation are widely discussed and variously attributed and need not form a major portion of this report. The attribution of a causal relationship between the concentration of development inputs in poppy-growing areas and the expansion of poppy cultivation to non-growing areas has been widely referenced but this effect has not been quantified. None the less, it remains a plausible scenario that has been documented in

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other countries. CN projects are obliged to avoid interventions that promote opportunistic drug crop cultivation. The revised PD, signed at the end of 2005, sets the much more modest project (a programme in name only by this point) in Herat and Balkh provinces with Helmund mentioned as a possible third location (though this was already a major area of insurgency). The inception phase was reduced to 6 months and did not have an overly active agenda. The abbreviation of the project name had, by this time, become AALP. The updated project design is somewhat ambiguous. Its purpose is "to contribute to national policy through the development of nationally owned alternative livelihood strategies and action plans" through the implementation of 6 inter-related and complementary components (see list below) that would achieve 15 outputs.

1. Institutional platform and operational mechanisms, diagnostic research and analysis

2. Capacity building at community level 3. Capacity building at national, provincial and district levels in pilot provinces 4. Farm and off-farm livelihoods diversification activities implemented in pilot

provinces 5. Dissemination of lessons learned 6. Strategy and policy advice

These components can be conceptually divided into

1. Policy and strategy support activities: Components 1-3, 5-6 2. Action research: Part of Component 1 3. Field implementation with farmers: Component 4

The action research program of the original AAL programme was intended to test field interventions to contain and reduce poppy production in the context of traditional production areas. It reinforced conventional thinking that active growers are the problem and that growers must be discouraged from producing poppy through direct interventions in their location. Interventions focused primarily on poverty as the cause of poppy cultivation (rather than poverty as one of several causes of poppy cultivation) and were structured under an assumption that a rapid economic development intervention will reduce or even perhaps solve the poppy-cultivation problem. The revised AALP takes into account the findings of years of research that shows that farmers factor many things into their decision to cultivate poppy. Certain of these, such as threat of bodily harm and a weak national government, are beyond the scope of a development project to address. However, others, such as drug debt, lack of markets, poor agriculture productivity, illiteracy, and poor health, are certainly development issues that could be addressed by a CN project.

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AALP, which sometime seems to conceptually merge Action Research and Field Implementation, proposes an agenda of field operations that support the action research agenda in an effort to determine and address the underlying causes of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. As such it is rightly focused on expansion areas of poppy cultivation. AALP proposes (in discussion, not in the text of the revised PD) to test interventions (Component 4) in villages in Herat and Balkh that have long grown poppy, don't grow poppy and have only recently initiated poppy cultivation. This is a reasonable approach but given the short duration of the project it is unlikely that the results of any intervention will be visible. Unfortunately, the project design does not adequately spell out how it will undertake the action research agenda nor how the results of field interventions will be measured given the projects' short duration. Despite the evident hard work on the part of the writers, the new PD is not clear on the methodology of its approach. Far too many of the outputs discussed in the PD are, in fact, inputs, under the technical protocols of logframe development. The MTR team believes that one of the main reasons the revised PD is weak is that conflicts in approach among the project stakeholders were not resolved during the reformulation process. These conflicts are evident to us and we submit that the project will not function well so long as these conflicts persist.

2.2. Dialogue and conflict amongst the stakeholders Consideration of the dialogue among DFID, FAO, AALP staff, the GoA in its many forms and the villagers themselves is helpful to understanding the problems AALP faces at this mid-point. Each of these stakeholders wants something different and it seems, from the discussions held during the MTR, that the project cannot satisfy all the demands being made on it. DFID is keen on the strategic and policy aspects of the project. The agency focuses on the importance of the project's five strategy and capacity building components and seems to consider the action research a way to test and replicate lessons learned elsewhere in Afghanistan as well as those generated within the project. DFID seems more interested in a scientific approach to the action research component, though frustrated with the slow speed of project implementation. FAO is keen to build on the successes of the SALEH project and is not overly concerned that AALP is moving slowly. The agency considers a no-cost extension of the project to be a normal administrative adjustment when there is money remaining at the end of the assigned project implementation period. FAO is not scientifically inclined, preferring to promote a "softer" human-capital development approach.

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The GoA at the national level expresses frustration that the project has so little to show for 17 months effort. Government officers are facing pressure from provincial offices to get things going in the field. AALP's long and elaborate Livelihoods Survey was poorly understood and seems redundant to government officers who need to show rapid returns on investments of scarce time and manpower. Provincial officers are overworked people with too few resources to do the job properly. They are under pressure from many directions to focus on poppy elimination in their provinces when, in fact, poppy might not be the most important issue in their minds. Provincial officers who are cognizant of the protocols for dealing with donors are reluctant to criticize AALP but their frustration with the project came out in their discussions with the MAAHF MTR team member. District officers are waiting for something to happen in the villages AALP surveyed. They did not understand the survey. They have not received any information about survey findings and they are under upward pressure from villagers and downward pressure from the provincial government to implement activities for which they have very few resources. District officers look to AALP as a source of money and technical assistance at the village level. Afghan villagers have been participants in the development aid game for much of the past half century and they expect a development project to give them something in return for the time and effort they expend. The AALP Livelihoods Survey was a major effort for them, taking several days away from productive work to answer boring questions (many of which have been asked many times before). As a result villagers expect the project to provide money and activities in each village that was surveyed. In this they are supported by District and Provincial officials. The project is thus pulled in many directions. It is not helped by the weakness of the project revision. It might help here to describe, in broad strokes, the main issues facing project staff. Development theory at this point in time is trying to accommodate two arguably incompatible philosophies which can be generally described as reductionist and humanistic. (Also, loosely called "holistic". Confusingly, the word "holistic" is also is used by both camps to mean the synthesis and integration of science and arts that is supposed to be the centre ground.) A humanistic approach to rural development is based on the assumptions that:

• Complex situations must be dealt with through complex interventions. • Villages are made up of individuals with individual histories and needs and this

history is interwoven with a unique local history and village-level cultural. Thus villages must be considered to be more different from each other than alike and each village, must be addressed as a discrete entity.

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The reductionist approach is based on the assumptions that:

• Complex situations can be dealt with by tackling one or two issues at a time. • Village problems, when properly described across properly developed scales, tend

to be similar enough to each other that generalized approaches can be appropriate provided the implementers are aware of and sensitive to differences across locations.

Humanistic practitioners describe reductionist development as being wickedly oblivious to the larger context. Reductionists describe humanistic development as inevitably shallow, overly expensive, and lacking in verifiable results. AALP's field model, as explained by the CTA, is primarily a rather humanistic approach. But AALP has a clearly stated action research agenda, and a very limited timeframe. Research, by its very nature, must define its hypotheses, explicate its methods, aim for reliability and replicability. AALP's action research and field programs do none of these. There is no statement of how interventions will be selected, how participants will be selected, what criteria will be used to evaluate success, and how lessons learned are to be derived. The project is not positioned to conduct even the simplest research given the lack of preparation the MTR team has observed and the openly non-scientific bent of FAO and the CTA. The logframe accompanying the revised PD does not explain what the project intends to do in the action research program. The logframe is written in the UN style which confuses inputs with outputs. The logframe does not have any measurable outputs or indicators of success. Reading the logframe does not sense a vision of what the project aims to accomplish and how aims to do it. This lack of vision is a great weakness that, in the opinion of the MTR team, has lead to many of the implementation delays now evident.

3. Current status of the project During the initial 6 months of the project, the "inception phase", substantive work was delayed while the Project Document was revised. During the inception phase, no field implementation was undertaken while the CTA concentrated on writing the new project document. He also worked on the ALWG. Thus, implementation of large segments of the project have been underway since 1 January 2006. Progress on each of the six components and a budget analysis are presented below.

Component 1: Institutional platform and operational mechanisms, diagnostic research and analysis Institutional platform

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At the central level the project has build a good base upon which to contribute to the institutionalization of alternative livelihoods within the Ministry of Agriculture. In the past few months, AALP has contributed to the establishment of the Alternative Livelihoods Unit (ALU) within MAAHF and the development of its mission statement. The ALU is currently engaged in processing project proposals for the recently-established Anti-Narcotics Task Force and it has also been assigned to incorporate alternative livelihoods into the Ministry’s portion of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, thereby furthering the national objective of ‘mainstreaming’ the Alternative Livelihoods approach to CN. The CTA also participates in the Alternative Livelihoods Working Group within the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. The ALWG is reportedly proving a useful mechanism for communicating different approaches and perspectives, sharing lessons and coordinating activities. Operational mechanisms In the 10 months since completion of the inception phase, the project has established functional offices within the central MAAHF in Kabul and in its Departmental offices in the capital of the two pilot provinces identified during inception (Balkh and Herat). AALP has hired technical and support staff in good time considering local constraints. Even though there have been some resignations in recent weeks, the project can be considered to be fully staffed. Diagnostic research and analysis The project has used 8 international consultants and 0 national technical consultants to complete a wide range of surveys, case studies and associated Project Discussion Papers (PDPs) relating to alternative livelihoods and counter narcotics including the following:

• collaboration with UNODC in a survey of farming systems and agricultural livelihoods in the context of opium poppy cultivation in Balkh and Herat provinces that provided insights into factors contributing to farmers decisions to cultivate opium.

• A detailed socio-economic survey of 11 rural communities in Balkh and 21 in Herat using the Sustainable Livelihoods approach4.

• Consultants reports of investigations of agricultural, horticultural and livestock market chains and facilities for processing, regional marketing and microfinance, opportunities for value adding and agro-processing, gender issues, opium and alternative livelihoods in the illicit economy of Afghanistan, capacity building in Herat and Balkh provinces and opportunities for aquaculture and fisheries.

• A series of PDPs on marketing prospects for key commodities including livestock, vegetables, fruit and nuts. These PDPs provide valuable

4 For more information on the sustainable livelihoods approach see http://www.livelihoods.org/newuser.html

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guidance on processing or value-adding opportunities and market chain deficiencies.

• A series of PDPs on a range of cross-cutting issues including management of debt and credit; opportunities for on-farm and off-farm income generation; shortcomings in productive and social infrastructure; capacity development and training; managing local institutional development; and the coping strategies of rural communities.

• Case studies (write up on-going) into edible oil processing and marketing in Balkh and household poultry production.

• Farmer interview surveys and data collection in Balkh on a range of crops and calculation of crop gross margins5.

These survey and consultant reports, discussion papers and case studies contain a wide range of useful information and insights into the socio-economic conditions and surrounding environment currently confronting target communities in Afghanistan. However, it must be said that these reports seldom reference very much of the extant work on local issues that has been written in the past 5 years. The MTR team was struck by the narrow range of sources from which information was gathered as evidenced by the reference and methodology sections of these reports. The information compiled by the project must now be made available to stakeholders to inform the design, implementation and evaluation of alternative livelihood and capability building interventions in Afghanistan. A communication strategy detailing the collation, summarization, packaging, release and distribution activities is currently under preparation. The MTR team feels that this strategy is long overdue. For good use to be made of information contained in AALP surveys and reports, the draft communication strategy that was shared with the MTR urgently requires further development and refinement to serve the current development context.

Component 2: Capacity building at community level At the time of the MTR, the only activity conducted in this component is a cross visit by selected farmers from surveyed villages in Balkh to villages in Herat to inspect local sericulture and saffron production. This activity was reportedly received with enthusiasm and achieved the impact normally expected from this type of interaction (i.e. farmers teaching farmers). There seem to be no other activities that have progressed beyond pre-planning stage. It is too early to assess AALP on gender issues and gender mainstreaming. Thus far the project has developed good relationships with local NGOs concerned with women's issues. There is nothing to suggest that the project's commitment to the well-being and empowerment of women will falter.

5 Gross margins analysis completed for wheat, rice, maize, cotton, flax, tomato, melon, sesame, carrot, mungbean, cauliflower, eggplant.

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Component 3: Capacity building at national, provincial and district levels in pilot provinces There have been no project activities to date that could generate real outcomes in this component. The project has established and staffed project offices within the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAHF) in Kabul and in the two pilot provinces. It has also assisted the establishment of an Alternative Livelihoods Unit (ALU) within the central office of the MAAHF and supported the preparation of its Mission Statement and Terms of Reference. The ALU has recently been invited by the Minister to incorporate alternative livelihoods into the Agriculture Ministry’s contribution to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy thereby providing AALP an opportunity to assist in ‘mainstreaming’ an AL approach in the everyday work of MAAHF. The capabilities of the MAAHF’s provincial offices of Agriculture, Extension, Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services are very limited due to limited staff, equipment, transport and operating budget. Some government and NGO staff at the provincial and district level helped AALP conduct the livelihood survey in selected villages in Balkh and Herat. These staff also participated in livelihood analysis workshops conducted in each province and thereby gained some insights into socio-economic survey methodologies and the living conditions rural communities must confront. When the survey results are released, this hands-on experience should help make the survey results more meaningful. A training needs assessment workshop was conducted with all 32 extension technicians covering the 14 districts in Balkh, though no subsequent trainings have been organized to date.

Component 4: Farm and off-farm livelihoods diversification activities implemented in pilot provinces At this mid-point in project implementation there has been no activity in this component and none is yet properly planned. The project intends to contract capable and experienced implementing partner NGOs to undertake this component in 2007. In each province the mission discussed possible AL activities and modes of operation with experienced NGOs AALP has identified as potential implementing partners including CoAR (Coordination of Afghan Relief) and AWEC (Afghan Women Education Centre) in Balkh and CSR (Catholic Relief Service) in Herat. Each of these NGOs had contributed a staff member to the AALP livelihoods surveys. It is unclear what criteria will be used to select villages or whether the list of potential implementing partners is yet complete. However, the project has assumed responsibility for a poultry distribution activity province in collaboration with The Green Leaf Organisation, a local NGO involving 42

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villages in 4 districts in Herat. Three of the surveyed villages produce poppies. The poultry activity has been modelled on an earlier FAO poultry distribution activity previously implemented in the province. It is particularly relevant following the widespread slaughter of village poultry in an effort to control bird flu. In this activity, groups of village women participants, who came from subgroups of the village population identified as female-headed households, recently returned household, and poor households, were selected with the assistance of the traditional village shuras. These women were trained in the basics of poultry husbandry. Distribution of birds together with an initial supply of feeds was imminent following the mission’s visit. Participants indicated that maintaining adequate supply of good quality feeds was a longer term concern6. Regardless of its value to the women of Herat, it is unclear how the poultry project fits into the AALP implementation program because the project bears no relationship to the Livelihood Survey. While 10 of the villages in the poultry activity were surveyed by AALP, the survey results have only just been released and they have not been communicated to the government of Herat, the implementing NGO or the villages. The iterative planning processes that the project espouses were not part of the poultry project. (While participatory methods were certainly used in the poultry project design, the fact that this was a poultry activity rather than an activity to address some other village-identified need.)

Component 5: Dissemination of lessons learned The project is about to undertake this component and is currently developing a communications strategy to guide the process whereby the wealth of information AALP has collected will be disseminated. This communications strategy is long overdue. It is vitally important that this information is disseminated to all key stakeholders and collaborating partners as soon as possible. However, the information gleaned from AALP studies and reports must first be extracted and packaged as key messages. This extraction has not yet begun.

Component 6: Strategy and policy advice This is the core component of AALP. However, the efforts of the project in this component are stymied by the conflicts among the stakeholders discussed earlier. Some initial activities have been implemented (e.g. participation in the establishment of ALU, contribution to the discussion of AL at the Ministry level, participation in ALWG). However, AALP has been unable to generate outputs from Components 4 and 5 that can serve as inputs to this component. Nor has AALP been able to synthesize lessons learned

6 The MTR team, who subscribe to the view that securing an adequate feed supply should precede animal interventions, shares the women's concern.

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from years of development work in Afghanistan and several decades of work in CN to serve as inputs to this component. AALP's communication strategy will have to be refined and polished if the project is to establish credibility with provincial and national stakeholders. An alternative to waiting to learn from the projects' activities, the project could also choose to boost its support efforts to the various government offices at all levels to improve their capacity to plan, manage and implement the national development and CN agenda.

Budget considerations One measure of how well a project is doing is the closeness of fit between budgets and expenditures. On this measure, AALP is not doing well, although FAO management systems have caused part of the problem. As mentioned earlier, FAO was unable to field a CTA in good time. It appears that the CTA was not asked to include a budget revision in the revised PD. Instead, the original project budget was simply modified slightly and given new dates. The FAO budget reporting system is a "draw down" accounting system and thus is not well suited to rapid analysis of expenditure patterns during a short MTR. At the end of each fiscal year unused funds are carried forward into the next year and the previous year's budget is reduced to match the actual disbursement. The FAO project management system does not require that the CTA prepare detailed forward budgets based on the workplan and thus the MTR cannot compare projected with actual disbursements except in the coarsest way. The results of this analysis are presented in the table below. Overall, the slow progress of AALP is reflected in the slow disbursement of funds. Disbursements in Fiscal Year 2004 appear to be nil although it was reported that procurement began in 2004. Expenditures in 2005 were only $555,345 and as of the most recent report (15 October 06), the project had spent only about 32% of its 2006 budget. Table. Project budget and expenditure

Project budget and expenditure (shaded areas represent the revised PD) Year Original budget Revised budget Disbursed * % 2004 (4 months) 915,937 0 0% 2004 (0 months) 0 0 NA 2005 (12 months) 3,361,134 NA 2005 (6 months) 3,361,134 555,345 1.6% 2006 (12 months) 2,237,677 NA 2006 (12 months) 3,458,285 1,121,140 32%* 2007 (2 months) 317,001 NA 2007 (12 months) 2,818,118 - - Total 6,831,748 6,831,748 2,367,410 35%

* Most recent figures available 15 October 06

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A closer examination of the budget report reveals what is already known about the project: only about 1/3 of the "contracts" line item has been spent. The only expenditures from this line has been for construction and renovation of office space, website design, data analysis, the poultry activity mentioned above and some cotton extension activities. The project seems not to have been asked to prepare a projected budget for 2007 that outlines how the remainder of the budget will be spent. Thus it is difficult for us to judge whether the project's assessment of future costs is reasonable. Regardless of how the disbursement is organised, in its final year the project will not be able to make good use of the large amounts remaining. That is, although the project might perhaps be able to write appropriate IP contracts for the $1,399,530 remaining in the contracts line, the resulting activities will not have enough time to have much impact and the project will be unable to reach any valid or reliable conclusions. The MTR team does not believe that a no-cost extension would help very much in this regard; even an additional year is not likely to produce much in the way of replicable results. Summary: Within the limits presented by the FAO accounting system, the MTR team finds no reason to question expenditures to date but the MTR cannot form any firm judgment about the appropriateness of forward budget planning because the information is not readily available. The MTR suggests that a routine financial audit at project closeout would be appropriate.

4. Findings, conclusions and recommendations This MTR sets out to determine whether AALP will be able to accomplish its tasks within the time allotted. The MTR concludes that the project will not be able to do very much in the 13 months remaining because it is already far behind in its work and is proceeding so slowly. As a result of the extremely slow start-up and difficulty AALP is having with its implementation and communication strategies, the project is unlikely to have any attributable effect on poppy cultivation or on the body of knowledge on ways to reduce poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Thus, at the end, the project will be unable to state that it has had a sustainable impact on livelihoods (there is no time available to demonstrate even basic sustainability) and the project is unlikely to have had an attributable impact on the reduction of poppy cultivation. Depending on decisions reached by the project's Management Group (DFID, FAO, MAAHF and AALP), following their review of this report, the project can still play an important and positive role in enriching the strategic and policy debate about CN and AL at the national level. The project could possibly play an important role at the Provincial

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and District levels if the terms of reference for the provincial offices is completely revised.

Specific findings Finding 1. The original project design was flawed conceptually and methodologically and had no chance of successfully meeting its objectives. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 above. Finding 2. The revision to the Project Document made in 2005 does not adequately address the flaws in the original project design. As discussed in Chapter 2, the revised Project Document does not make a convincing case for its proposed mode of operation. The logframe included with the revised PD is inadequate. Among other faults, the logframe does not include measurable indicators of project progress and success. Finding 3. The role that the CTA has played on the ALWG assisting the GoA to develop its national AL strategy is commendable but somewhat unstructured. The newly established Government of Afghanistan faces human resource weakness at all levels. Where competent civil servants can be found they are either grossly overworked or they leave government service for other organizations or the private sector to escape the prevailing poor working conditions and low salary. AALP's ability to provide resources to support government efforts in these early years is invaluable. This being said, however, the MTR notes that the project's internal strategy for providing this support is not well articulated and the project has been slow to devote resources toward assisting the GoA to develop the capacity to plan and implement rural development activities that further CN goals. The conflicts about project design and approach outlined in Section 2.2. are likely to be the source of much of the delay. Finding 4. The project has fielded 8 international consultants and 0 national consultants. It was not within the scope of this MTR to examine the reasons why AALP has been unable to field national consultants. The shortage of qualified national consultants is a known problem in Afghanistan but this issue is considered important by the GoA. Finding 5. The project has invested most time to date on activities which the MRT unanimously agree were of limited practical value. In particular the Livelihoods Survey was misconceived and mismanaged and is not seen to be of significantly greater value than other kinds of needs assessments. The MTR

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suggests that existing documentation from other sources, perhaps supplemented by strategic-but-limited data-gathering efforts, might have been sufficient for AALP's needs. Alternatively, the Livelihoods Survey in selected villages might well have been a short-duration activity which simultaneously resulted in concrete data and a community owned work plan that informed subsequent AL/CD interventions by the project, possibly in collaboration with other AL and CD projects. Overall, the Livelihood Survey and the PDPs that have been generated do not represent integrative reviews of existing literature and practice and are thus less useful than they might have been. Finding 6. The project has delayed field implementation too long. Chapter 3 discusses these delays in detail. The few activities which have been done seem haphazard and unfocused, in part owing to the weaknesses in the revised Project Document and the lengthy delay in finalizing the Livelihoods Survey. The MTR finds that much of the technical consultants' work that was not location specific could have been completed during the Inception Phase. Some of the other assignments carried out by international consultants could have been done by local NGOs. Finding 7. Communication of the findings of AALP's action research to others in the development community and linking these reports to future AALP and GoA activities is critical but the project's communication plan is not yet finalized. Finding 8. It is unlikely that the remaining budget can be expended in a useful way in the 13 months remaining. It is beyond the scope to his MTR to examine project expenditures in great depth. We note that the project is expending funds too slowly. Construction activities which the project has undertaken seem appropriate.

Recommendations It is too late in the project to undertake yet another reformulation but the MTR team recommends that the project's Management Group make some difficult decisions very quickly. A project extension should only be considered if significant progress is made in the first quarter of 2007 and there is evident potential to continue. Otherwise the project should be closed on schedule, or earlier if desired. We believe that the remainder of the project, if it is to continue, should focus on support activities that inform national strategy and help guide realization of the national strategy at the provincial, district and local level. In collaboration with MAAHF, MRRD and

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implementing NGOs, AALP should concentrate on building the ALU and moving forward the national Counter Narcotics and Community Development objectives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Counter Narcotics, and Rural Reconstruction by facilitating the flow of information at all levels. To the extent possible under the current competitive situation, the project should facilitate collaboration between MAAHF and MRRD. The MTR team is divided in opinion as to where, how and to what end action research and field implementation should be undertaken. It would be a great loss to some (but not all) stakeholders if the project were to abandon the action research and field implementation components entirely to focus on strategy and policy objectives, but this is the area where AALP can have the greatest impact in the remaining 13 months. The MTR team does not see exactly how action research and field implementation can be done effectively in the 13 months remaining. If the action research and field implementation components are to be retained, a plan for this activities must be developed right now and the objectives of these components must be focused only on what is achievable. Recommendation 1. Communication Within the context of the decisions to be taken by the project's Management Group and regardless of whether all components of the project are retained, AALP must package, promote and distribute findings of existing consultant reports via participation in national and provincial workshops and other public fora, and a website. AALP must expand its local network to include national NGOs and international organizations working in the sustainable livelihood sector. The project's communication strategy requires further urgent development and refinement so that good use is made of the information contained in AALP surveys and reports and the project’s contribution to AL strategy and policy is more effective in the current development context These key messages will need to be tailored and packaged to suit each group of stakeholders and collaborators. At national level these will include: MAAHF (via the ALU) and MRRD, MCN, MOE and other ministries as well as DIFID, FAO, USAID, WB and other donors (via the ALWG). In each province: the Governor and his Provincial Council, the Provincial Development Council and various ministry Departments, potential implementing partners and other NGOs. Since the assimilation of information and lessons learned concerning effective AL implementation should continue through and beyond the end of the project, AALP’s communication strategy will need to be both iterative and progressive. Initially it should disseminate simple key messages developed from completed surveys and consultancies. Subsequently, complex messages based on lessons learned from a wide range of sources within and external to the project can be introduced.

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Recommendation 2. Support for provincial-level CN activity As soon as possible (the MTR recommends no later than 31 Jan 2007), AALP should sign MOUs to provide administrative support to Provincial Offices of Economy (or other provincial offices as appropriate). The MTR suggests that in Balkh the project could supply 1-2 technical staff using existing staff if possible; in Herat, Helmund and elsewhere as the Project Management Group (AALP, DFID, FAO, MAAHF) determine. Recommendation 3. External technical assistance AALP should restrict the use of further international consultants. Recommendations 4 and 5 are conditional on the retention of the action research and field implementation components. Recommendation 4. Action Research The objectives and methodology of the action research component should be developed immediately. The MTR team suggests that the project consider testing a system to monitor and document the progress of its own IP contracts and lessons learned in implementing AL in collaboration with NSP implementers. Recommendation 5. Field Implementation Field implementation: As soon as possible (the MTR recommends no later than 31 Jan 2007), AALP must sign a series of IP contracts with NGOs for field implementation.

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Annex 1. Terms of Reference

THE ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMME (AALP)

GCP/AFG/036/UK

Mid-Term Review Mission

TERMS OF REFERENCE

BACKGROUND

The Alternative Agricultural Livelihoods Programme (AALP) started on 1st July 2005 and will be completed on 31st December 2007; comprising and inception phase of 6 months and an implementation period of 24 months.

THE PROBLEM The basic problem being addressed by AALP is the widespread economic dependency of the rural population on the production of opium. Word-wide experience shows that the sustainable elimination of opium poppy can only take place in the context of a long-term commitment to rural income generation and poverty reduction. This broad approach involves the threat of eradication combined with access to alternative (low risk) sources of income within a stable and enabling environment, including effective governance, food security and access to essential social, financial and technical services.

AALP OBJECTIVES The Overall Goal of AALP is to contribute to the sustainable elimination of illicit opium poppy cultivation throughout the country, in line with the Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy. The Purpose of AALP is to contribute to national policy through the development of nationally owned alternative livelihood strategies and action plans. This will be achieved through identifying viable alternative livelihood options, establishing the institutional framework for improved access to farm and off-farm income generation opportunities in two pilot provinces and analysing and disseminating the lessons learned.

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK At the national level, AALP is embedded within the Agricultural Alternative Livelihoods Unit (AALU) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAHF) and works with the Extension Directorate in the target districts of the two pilot provinces (Balkh and Herat). As a member of the Core Group of the Alternative Livelihoods

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Working Group (ALWG), AALP is linked with the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) and other national institutions. In the field, AALP works directly with MAAHF and the Ministry of Economy – which is tasked with co-ordinating development activities at the provincial level - as well as with a variety of implementing partners from the voluntary and private sectors.

THE PILOT AREAS One of the key issues facing counter narcotics activities in Afghanistan is that, over the past decade, the growing of opium poppy has spread from a few “core” provinces to virtually all provinces in the country. The current policy of targeting the bulk of alternative livelihood investment in the main opium poppy growing areas risks encouraging farmers in the rest of the country to move into opium poppy production in the hope that this action will also attract alternative livelihoods funds. Consequently, AALP is focusing field activities on two pilot provinces (Herat and Balkh), which are peripheral to the core opium poppy growing areas, where opium poppy production has fluctuated or increased in recent years. This approach is intended to increase the impact of relatively limited resources. Furthermore, the reduction of opium poppy cultivation is generally easier to achieve in those areas where it is grown on a relatively small scale and has only been introduced recently, than it is in core areas where the crop is well-established and is grown on a large scale. In these provinces, the main target groups and ultimate beneficiaries include small farmers, landless labourers and vulnerable groups, involved in opium poppy cultivation.

THE STRATEGY AALP focuses on six broad themes Diagnostic research and analysis includes, investigating the underlying dynamics of opium poppy production within the wider context of the rural economy; and studying the impact of alternative livelihood programmes aimed at reducing the opium poppy economy and promoting broad-based rural development. The work is implemented in co-operation with local partners, including MAAHF staff, and local service providers as part of AALP’s experiential capacity-building approach. Capacity building at community level focuses on improving the ability of communities to identify, formulate, implement and monitor alternative livelihood activities as well as strengthening the capacities of service providers to deliver services to community organisations in response to their needs Capacity building at district, provincial and national level involves strengthening MAAHF capacity to design, supervise and monitor the implementation of alternative

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livelihoods activities, including mainstreaming, and to provide support services; as well as capacity building within the AALU of MAAHF at the national level. Identification and initiation of farm and off-farm livelihoods diversification seeks to create and/or support private-public sustainable business opportunities, which, subsequently, can be expanded Analysis and dissemination of lessons learned includes the development of counter-narcotics appraisal methodologies and the analysis, documentation and dissemination of the lessons learned. Strategy and policy advice seeks to elaborate alternative livelihood strategies, make strategic recommendations on key policy issues and ensure that they are nationally owned. Semi-annual progress reports have been submitted to DFID on a regular basis.

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION To review and assess the current project status, in particular the extent to which the project inputs so far have contributed towards the expected outputs and whether the outputs are likely to achieve the intended outcomes or purpose of the Project. Based on the findings and the current country context, to make recommendations for any necessary changes in the overall design and orientation of the project and make detailed recommendations on the work plan for the remainder of the project.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION The mission will assess the following: i) Relevance of the project to development priorities and needs; ii) Quality, clarity and adequacy of project design including specification of

targets, specification of institutional relationships, identification of beneficiaries and prospects for sustainability;

iii) output progress and achievements towards development objective; iv) appropriateness of project approach by component;

v) major issues in terms of project management structure, resource allocation and

implementation;

vi) gender and development issues in on-going and planned activities;

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vii) relevance of the project in the current policy/reform environment and GoA’s counterparts priorities;

viii) potential project impact in the medium term; and measuring the results the

project has achieved to date

ix) Geographical focus

Based on the above analysis the mission will draw specific conclusions and make proposals for any necessary further action by Government and/or FAO/donor to ensure sustainable development, including any need for additional assistance and activities of the project prior to its completion. The mission will draw attention to any lessons of general interest. Any proposal for further assistance should include precise specification of objectives and the major suggested outputs and inputs.

METHODOLOGY The evaluation mission will: i) review relevant documents; ii) organize/attend meetings and interview relevant counterparts in MAAHF; iii) organize and interview other relevant Ministries; iv) meet with key donors, NGOs and relevant development projects in the sector; v) undertake a field visit and meet with relevant counterparts in both Herat and Balkh provinces; vi) conduct a participatory workshop in Kabul with key partners for reviewing the project’s outputs and implementation approach; vii) and draft a report and discuss with the Government of Afghanistan, FAO and DFID . COMPOSITION OF THE MISSION A tripartite mid-term review of project will be carried out by the Government of Afghanistan, the donor Government and FAO in October 2006, after about fifteen months of implementation, to review progress and make recommendations/adjustments. The organisation, terms-of-reference and exact timing and place of the review will be decided in consultation between FAO and the recipient and donor Governments.

The mission will comprise: an independent consultant and staff from DFID and mission members representing Government of Afghanistan (MAAHF) and FAO. The mission members should among themselves cover the following essential qualifications:

• Knowledge and work experience in alternative livelihoods • Knowledge and work experience in livelihoods, rural development, and /or

agriculture policy and strategic planning • Knowledge and work experience in opium poppy supply reduction and of

rural/agricultural development in a drugs environment

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• Knowledge and work experience in capacity building and community development with government structures and NGOs

• Experience with project/programme monitoring and evaluation • Broad understanding of Afghanistan’s development and counter-narcotics

policies and the national development context • Work experience on alternative livelihoods/rural development and opium

poppy supply reduction in Afghanistan Mission members should be independent and thus have no previous direct involvement with the project either with regard to its formulation, implementation or backstopping. They should have experience of evaluation.

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TIMING

The review will take place in October 2006. The overall duration will be approximately 21 days: Six days for the literature review and evaluation work at MAAHF in Kabul, eleven days for conducting a workshop and undertaking field visits to Herat and Balkh provinces, and four days for drafting the final report. ORGANIZATION OF THE MISSION

FAO and DFID will be responsible for the contractual aspects of their own mission members. The Government will also nominate its own member. All the information necessary for the review will be provided by the AALP Project and FAO. Logistics and organisation aspects will also be the responsibility of the AALP Project and FAO.

REPORTING

The mission is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government, the donor or FAO. The report will be completed, to the extent possible, in the country and the findings and recommendations fully discussed with all concerned parties and wherever possible consensus achieved. The evaluation mission will produce an evaluation report largely following the FAO Evaluation Report outline. Among other issues, the report will address: i) output progress and achievements towards development objective; ii) appropriateness of project approach; iii) major issues in terms of project management structure, resource allocation and implementation; iv) relevance of the project in the current policy/reform environment and GoA’s counterpart priorities; v) potential project impact in the medium term; and vi) lessons learned; The report should include a summary of conclusions and clear recommendations to enhance project implementation. Apart from contributing to the independent report of this tripartite mission, the DFID consultant should also submit an evaluation report, based on the DFID format, of no more than 20 pages highlighting similar issues to evaluation mission report. The mission will also complete the FAO Project Evaluation Questionnaire. The consultant, with other members of this review mission, bears the responsibility for finalization of the report, which will be submitted to Government of Afghanistan, DFID and FAO within two weeks of mission completion. The partners will comment and endorse the final report.

Reports should be presented in hard and electronic copies (3 copies of each).

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Annex 2. Itinerary and list of persons met

Date Day Name Position Organisation

30-10-6 Monday Khaista Rahman Yousefzai AALP Policy Officer AALP, Kabul

Shams Ur Rahman Khugyani AALP MER Officer AALP, Kabul

Mohammad Omari Omari Director, Board of Specialists Ministry of Agriculture

Anthea Kerr Alternative Livelihoods Advisor DFID

Serge Verniau Country Representative FAO, Kabul

David Hitchcock Lead Technical Unit FAO, Bangkok

Karim Merchant Chief Technical Advisor SALEH Project

Abdul Waheed Rahimi Deputy Team Leader SALEH Project

31-10-06 Tuesday Ghulam Mustafa Jawad Deputy Minister Ministry of Agriculture

M. Saboor Shirzad Director Alt. Ag. Livelihoods Unit Ministry of Agriculture

Syed Hedayatullah Hashmi National Capacity Building Officer AALP

Prem Sharma Senior Projects Operations Officer FAO, Kabul

1-11-06 Wednesday Stephane Sourdin Alternative Livelihoods Advisor UNODC, Kabul

Doris Buddenberg Country Representative UNODC, Kabul

Joanne Trotter Head of External Relations AKDN, Kabul

Hans Schmid PAL Strategy Advisor GTZ/MRRD, Kabul

2-11-06 Thursday Nabi Hussaini Director of Alternative Livelihoods MCN, Kabul

Adbul Baqi Omari Deputy Director of Alt.Livelihoods MCN, Kabul

Mark Henning Programme Manager – Agriculture Joint Dev. Assoc., Mazaar

3-11-06 Friday Lal Mohammad Durani AALP Regional Field Co-ordinator AALP, Mazar

Mohammad Akbar AALP Deputy Field Co-ordinator AALP, Mazar

Sayed Azim Ahmadi AALP Administrative Assistant AALP, Mazar

4-11-06 Saturday Kateb Shams Director DAAHF DAAHF, Mazar

Ghulam Nabi Sediqi Manager CoAR (Coord. of Afg. Relief)

Ghulam Nabi Faqiri Director Counter Narcotic

Zabihullah Akhtari Head of Technical Services Provincial Govt., Balkh

Mohammad Faqiree Director, MCN, Balkh MCN, Mazar

Mohammad Zia Advisor MCN, Mazar

Stephen Landrigan Researcher

5-11-06 Sunday Mohammad Karim Governor Sholgara District

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Saber Bai and Elders Chief and Shura Bodana Qala Village

Larisa Wardak and Sediqa Manager and Surveyor

AWEC (Afghan Women Education Center)

6-11-06 Monday Mohammad Taib Provincial Extension Officer DAAHF, Mazar

Najiba and Habiba Surveyors Agriculture Department

Lutf Rahman Lutfy Provincial Coordinator UNODC

Mir Shafiddin Mirzad FAO Regional Co-ordinator FAO, Mazar

Marta Barbosa International Advisor Poppy Elimination Program (PEP)

Abdul Rashid Hanify Manager Alternative Livelihood (PEP)

Haji Abdul Rahman Director Ministry of Economy, Mazar

7-11-06 Tuesday Travel day

8-11-06 Wednesday Mohammad Asef Nikzad AALP Regional Field Co-ordinator AALP, Herat

Mohammad Yousaf Jahed AALP Deputy Field Co-ordinator AALP, Herat

Sayed Azim Ahmadi AALP Administrative Assistant AALP, Herat

9-11-06 Thursday M.Ismail Hayderzada Director of Agriculture Department Herat DAAHF

Bashir Ahmad Ahmadi Provincial Extension Officer Extension Department

En.S.Ali Mansoori Director Economic Department

En.A.Wakil Sadiqi Sadiqi Coordinator Director MRRD Department

Ziaudin Paiman FAO Regional Co-ordinator FAO, Herat

10-11-06 Friday Dr Karima Coordinator Monitor OBS Field Visit to Karokh

Dr.Rasool Coordinator Monitor OBS Field Visit to Karokh

11-11-06 Saturday Paul Hicks CRS Country Representative CRS, Herat

Bryan Rhodes CRS SME Programme Manager CRS, Herat

Kamal Battacharia CRS Regional Advisor CRS, Herat

Aude Saldana CRS Programme Manager CRS, Herat

Wolfgang Titterroff CRS Livestock Consultant CRS, Herat

Abdul Jallil Sadiqi Head of Office WDOA

Dr. Nazir .A. Ghafoori Head of Office RAADA

Ab. Ghafaar Hamidzay Program Manager Hamid Zay Company (Safron)

12-11-06 Sunday Travel day

13-11-06 Monday Linda Aines Consultant Business and trade specialist

Scott Braunsweig Advocacy Director CARE International

14-11-06 Tuesday Scott Braunsweig Advocacy Director CARE International

Team meeting

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15-11-06 Wednesday Raz M. Dalili Executive Director Sanayee Development Foundation

Beth Dunford ALP Director USAID

Preliminary debrief FAO Preliminary debrief DFID

16-11-06 Thursday Debrief DFID, FAO, MAAHF

17-11-06 Friday David Mansfield Opium researcher

18-11-06 Saturday Ghulam Mustafa Jawad Deputy Minister Ministry of Agriculture

Ahmad Walid Afzali Chief Program Officer Sanayee Development Foundation

19-11-06 Sunday Depart Kabul

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Annex 3. AALP Project reports As of 26 October 2006 1. Project Discussion Papers (PDPs) 1 Opium and the Illicit Economy in Afghanistan – Raphy Favre 2 Licit Livelihoods in an Opium Economy: Alternative Livelihoods in Afghanistan 3 Development of the Oilseed Sector in Balkh Province – Stephanie Gallat 4 The Potential for Aquaculture Development in Afghanistan – Simon Funge Smith 5 Opportunities for On-Farm Income Generation 6 Opportunities for Off-Farm Income Generation 7 Shortcomings in Productive Infrastructure 8 Shortcomings in Social Infrastructure 9 Capital and Recurrent Inputs for Crop and Livestock Production 10 Capacity Development and Training 11 Managing Local Institutional Development 12 Coping Strategies 13 Management of Debt and Credit 14 Managing Diversity and Pluralism 15 Prospects for Livestock Marketing 16 Prospects for Vegetable Marketing 17 Prospects for Fruit Marketing 18 Prospects for Nut Marketing 19 Financing Seasonal Crops 2. Case Studies Case Study 1: AALP / UNODC Village Survey Herat Province Case Study 2: AALP / UNODC Village Survey Balkh Province Case Study 3: Edible Oil Processing and Marketing in Balkh Province (Underway: Data analysed, report writing started) Case Study 4: Household Poultry Production (Underway: Data analysis nearing

completion) 3. Consultant’s Reports Raphy Favre: Opium and Alternative Livelihoods in the Context of the Illicit

Economy in Afghanistan. October 2005. Draft (2 Volumes) Ilaria Sisto Gender Issues in Afghanistan. December 2005. Tooriali Wesa Capacity Building Programme in Herat and Balkh Provinces. May

2006.

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Simon Funge Smith Aquaculture and Fisheries in Afghanistan. June 2006 Tim Ekin: Assessment of Agricultural, Horticultural and Livestock Market

Chains and Facilities for Processing Agricultural Products (Including Storage) in Bamyan, Balkh and Herat Provinces of Afghanistan. June 2006 (4 Volumes)

Ralph Houtman Regional Marketing and Microfinance. July 2006 Stephanie Gallat Opportunities for value-addition and agro-processing in Balkh

Province, Afghanistan. August 2006 Barbara Adolph Livelihoods Systems Analysis. First Mission Report. 18 March -

13 April 2006. Barbara Adolph Livelihoods Systems Analysis. Second Mission Report. 13 May - 8

June 2006. Barbara Adolph Livelihoods Systems Analysis. Third Mission Report. 21 June - 18

July 2006. Barbara Adolph Balkh Livelihoods Systems Analysis Training Workshop. 26 – 30

March 2006. Barbara Adolph Herat Livelihoods Systems Analysis Training Workshop. 4 – 9

April 2006. Barbara Adolph Livelihoods Systems Analysis Training Manual. April 2006. Barbara Adolph Herat Livelihoods Systems Analysis Synthesis Report. October

2006. Draft. Barbara Adolph Herat Livelihoods Systems Analysis Village Reports. October

2006. Draft. (20 Volumes) Barbara Adolph Balkh Livelihoods Systems Analysis Synthesis Report. October

2006. Draft. Barbara Adolph Balkh Livelihoods Systems Analysis Village Reports. October

2006. Draft. (11 Volumes)

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