AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT...

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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AND ARREST WARRANT

I, Brett Kramarsic, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

1. I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assigned to the

Washington Field Office, and have been employed by the FBI for over eight years. I am

assigned to a squad responsible for counterespionage matters including those relating to Cuba

and matters involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. I have been working

in this field since beginning my duties at the Washington Field Office. As a result of my

involvement in espionage investigations and investigations involving the unauthorized disclosure

of classified information, I am familiar with the tactics, methods, and techniques of particular

United States persons who possess, or have possessed a United States government security

clearance and who may choose to harm the United States by misusing their access to classified

information. Further, I am familiar with the strategy, tactics, methods, tradecraft and techniques

of the Cuban foreign intelligence service and its agents. Before working as a Special Agent for

the FBI, I worked for eight years as an electrical engineer for the FBI.

2. As a federal agent, I am authorized to investigate violations of laws of the United

States and to execute warrants issued under the authority of the United States.

3. The information in this affidavit is based on my personal knowledge and on

information provided to me by other law enforcement and counterintelligence investigators

during the course of this investigation. Unless otherwise noted, information provided to me by

other law enforcement personnel does not necessarily reflect my personal observations or

investigation but rather has been passed to me by individuals with first hand knowledge. Since

this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause in support

Case 1:09-mj-00326-JMF Document 1-2 Filed 06/04/2009 of 40

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of a complaint and arrest warrant, I have not included each and every fact known to me

concerning this investigation.

4. This affidavit is submitted in support of an application for a complaint and arrest

warrant charging WALTER KENDALL MYERS (hereinafter KENDALL MYERS) and

GWENDOLYN STEINGRABER MYERS (hereinafter GWENDOLYN MYERS) with

conspiracy to act as illegal agents of the Republic of Cuba and to communicate classified United

States information to the Republic of Cuba in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; acting as illegal

agents of the government of Cuba in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951; and wire fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1343.

5. Under Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, it is a federal criminal offense

for two or more persons to “conspire to commit an offense against the United States.”


for any person other than a diplomatic officer or attaché to act in the United States as an agent of

a foreign government without prior notification to the Attorney General.


for anyone having “devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for

obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or

promises” to “transmit[] or cause[] to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television

communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or

sounds for the purpose of executing such a scheme or artifice to defraud.”

BACKGROUND ON KENDALL MYERS

8. KENDALL MYERS is a United States citizen born in 1937, in Washington, D.C.


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In or about June 1972, he earned a PhD from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced

International Studies (SAIS), in Washington, D.C. He married his wife, GWENDOLYN

MYERS, on or about May 8, 1982. They live in Washington, D.C.

9. KENDALL MYERS was in the U.S. Army from January 1959 to March 1962,

where he completed intensive communications training and served in the Army Security Agency.

10. From in or about 1971 to in or about 1977, KENDALL MYERS was an Assistant

Professor at SAIS in the area of Western European Studies. Thereafter, KENDALL MYERS

continued to teach at SAIS on a part time basis in addition to other employment noted below.

11. From in or about August 1977, through in or about March 1979, KENDALL

MYERS was employed as a contract instructor at the Department of State’s Foreign Service

Institute (FSI), a training and professional development institute for Department of State

employees located in Arlington, Virginia. After living in South Dakota with GWENDOLYN

MYERS from in or about 1979 until in or about 1980, KENDALL MYERS returned to

Washington, D.C. In or about August 1982, KENDALL MYERS resumed employment as a

contract instructor with FSI and held the title of Chairperson for West European Studies. On or

about May 9, 1983, KENDALL MYERS applied for a non-contractor, two-year appointment as a

Training Instructor and Chairperson for West European Studies at FSI. On or about April 15,

1985, KENDALL MYERS was offered a two-year appointment as a Training Instructor and

subsequently, a second two-year appointment as an Education Specialist at FSI, all while serving

in a chair capacity in Western European Area Studies. From at least August 1988 to October

1999, KENDALL MYERS, in addition to his FSI duties, performed work on a periodic basis for

the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).


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12. Starting in approximately October 1999, KENDALL MYERS began working full

time at INR as the Acting Director of the External Research Staff. From approximately July

2001 to October 31, 2007, KENDALL MYERS was a Senior Analyst for Europe for INR. INR

is responsible for drawing on all-source intelligence to provide value-added independent analysis

of events to policy makers at the U.S. Department of State. During his employment at INR in

various capacities, KENDALL MYERS specialized in intelligence analysis regarding European

matters. He also served as a Special Assistant for Analyst Training and Development during that

time frame.

13. On October 31, 2007, KENDALL MYERS retired from the Department of State.

BACKGROUND ON GWENDOLYN MYERS

14. GWENDOLYN MYERS (formerly Gwendolyn Trebilcock) is a United States

citizen born in 1938.

15. In or around 1980, GWENDOLYN MYERS moved to Washington, D.C., with

KENDALL MYERS. She married KENDALL MYERS on or about May 8, 1982. Sometime

thereafter, GWENDOLYN MYERS was hired by Riggs National Bank as an Administrative

Analyst in the Management Information Systems (MIS). In 1986, she was promoted to Special

Assistant to the MIS Division Director.

STATUS OF DEFENDANTS

16. At no time material to this Complaint were defendants KENDALL MYERS or

GWENDOLYN MYERS:

a. duly accredited diplomatic or consular officers of a foreign government,recognized by the United States Department of State;


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b. officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored officials orrepresentatives of a foreign government; or

c. officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored members of the staffof, or employees of, any such officer, official, or representative of aforeign government.

17. At no time did either KENDALL MYERS or GWENDOLYN MYERS provide

notification to the United States Attorney General or the Secretary of State that either of them

was acting as an agent of a foreign government as required by law.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

18. I am aware based on my experience as a Special Agent responsible for

counterintelligence matters relating to Cuba that, from 1959 until 2007, the Republic of Cuba

(Cuba) was ruled by Fidel Castro. Since 2007, Cuba has been ruled by Fidel Castro’s brother,

Raul Castro. Cuba is a communist country. The Government of Cuba is an internationally

recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the

Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in the Permanent

Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the

United States are components thereof.

19. The U.S. Department of State has designated Cuba as a state sponsor of

international terrorism in its State Sponsors of Terrorism List (SSTL). Further, I am aware that

the United States does not currently maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba;

however, the Cuban Interests Section (CIS) of the Swiss Embassy in Washington, D.C., has been

designated as the official representative of the Cuban Government to the United States.


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CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

20. I am aware based on my experience and training that the Cuban Intelligence

Service (CuIS) is a general term encompassing numerous Cuban intelligence and

counterintelligence entities. A primary such entity is the Directorate of Intelligence (DI),

formerly known as the Directorate of General Intelligence (DGI). It is charged with gathering

worldwide intelligence information of interest to Cuba and its allies. The United States was, and

continues to be, a principal target for Cuba’s intelligence gathering.

21. Further, I am aware based on my experience and training that CuIS has a well-

established program aimed at spotting and assessing persons within the United States academic

community who may be suitable for recruitment to serve a variety of roles on behalf of Cuba’s

interests. The most important of these roles is that of agent – that is, a person who is not an

officially recognized employee of CuIS but who is aware that he or she is working for the service

and is willing to engage in clandestine operational activity, including intelligence gathering, at

the direction, and on behalf, of CuIS. An agent-in-place is a recruited agent who occupies a

position or job in which he or she has authorized access to intelligence information of value to

CuIS, including classified information. One such agent was Ana Belen Montes, who was a

senior intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency prior to her arrest and conviction

for espionage on behalf of CuIS in March 2002 before this Court in the case of United States v.

Ana Belen Montes, 01-0568M-01.

22. I have further learned based on my experience and training that CuIS employs

“handlers” in the United States, i.e., persons who maintain some type of personal contact with

agents located in the United States. Handlers receive reporting or information from agents,


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produce tradecraft and communication tools for agents, and sometimes direct and control agent

activities based on instructions the handler has received from CuIS. Handlers could be “legals,”

that is, persons with diplomatic immunity whose affiliation with Cuba is known. Also CuIS

employs “illegals” as handlers, that is, persons whose affiliation to the Government of Cuba is

not publicly disclosed, whose intelligence function is clandestine, and who possess no diplomatic

immunity.

23. I have further learned based on my experience and training that a dead drop is a

location used to pass items secretly between an agent and his or her handler, or between

intelligence officers, without requiring them to meet. The location of the drop is agreed in

advance and it typically involves the use of common everyday items to which most people would

not give a second glance such as a loose brick in a wall, a library book, a hole in a tree, under a

boulder, etc.

24. I have further learned based on my experience and training that a brush pass, pass

or hand-to-hand are terms used to mean a pre-arranged momentary encounter between an agent

and his or her handler, or between intelligence officers, wherein written messages, instructions,

or other items (e.g., a computer thumb drive or a brief case) are quickly and surreptitiously

passed between them as they cross paths. Such encounters may occur in public such as on a busy

street or on the subway.

25. I have further learned based on my experience and training that a personal contact,

contact, or meet are terms used to mean a face-to-face contact between an agent and his or her

handler wherein operational training and details can be discussed.

26. I have further learned based on my experience and training that a parole is a


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password or recognition phrase used between an agent and his or her handler, or between

intelligence officers, to identify each other.

27. I have further learned based on my experience and training that CuIS sometimes

employs husband and wife “paired” agents to achieve its intelligence goals in the United States.

Such CuIS husband and wife “paired” agents were revealed in the investigation of the Miami

network of CuIS agents in the case entitled United States v. Gerardo Hernandez, et al., Cr. No.

98-721-CR-Lenard, and of Carlos Alvarez and Elsa Alvarez in the case of United States v.

Alvarez, 05-20943-CR-Moore, both arising in the Southern District of Florida.

28. I have further learned based on my experience and training that CuIS employs

multiple code names for its agents to safeguard and protect their identities. CuIS also provides

false identity and travel documents for its agents to facilitate clandestine travel and to facilitate

flight from the United States in case of detection.

KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS’s AFFILIATION WITH ANDRECRUITMENT BY CuIS

29. Based on information developed in the investigation, in December 1978,

KENDALL MYERS traveled on “unofficial personal travel for academic purposes” to Cuba for

approximately two weeks. Two other Department of State employees traveled during the same

time frame. KENDALL MYERS indicated in Department of State documents that his travel was

predicated on an invitation from a Cuban government official (hereinafter, co-conspirator “A”)

after co-conspirator “A” had given a presentation at the FSI. According to information I learned

during the investigation, co-conspirator “A” served at the Cuban Mission to the United States

(CMUN) in New York City in the late 1970s and early 1980s. KENDALL MYERS’s guide in


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Cuba, was an official with Cuba’s Foreign Service Institute (hereinafter, co-conspirator “B”).

Based on all of the evidence collected during this investigation, I conclude that KENDALL

MYERS’s trip to Cuba in 1978 provided the CuIS with the opportunity to assess and or develop

KENDALL MYERS as a Cuban agent.

30. Based on my review of past investigations of Cuban agents, recruitment by CuIS

is frequently based on political convictions, ideology, or similar cultural interests. The

investigation has revealed a diary, written by KENDALL MYERS, of his 1978 trip to Cuba. In

his account of his trip, KENDALL MYERS expresses a strong affinity towards Cuba and its

revolutionary goals, and a negative sentiment toward “American imperialism.” Notably,

KENDALL MYERS states:

Cuba is so exciting! I have become so bitter these past few months. Watching the evening news is a radicalizing experience. The abuses ofour system, the lack of decent medical system, the oil companies and theirundisguised indifference to public needs, the complacency about the poor,the utter inability of those who are oppressed to recognize their owncondition. . . . Have the Cubans given up their personal freedom to getmaterial security? Nothing I have seen yet suggests that . . . . I can seenothing of value that has been lost by the revolution. . . . [T]he revolutionhas released enormous potential and liberated the Cuban spirit.

. . . .

Everything one hears about Fidel suggests that he is a brilliant andcharismatic leader. He exudes the sense of seriousness andpurposefulness that gives the Cuban socialist system its unique character. The revolution is moral without being moralistic. Fidel has lifted theCuban people out of the degrading and oppressive conditions whichcharacterized pre-revolutionary Cuba. He has helped the Cubans to savetheir own souls. He is certainly one of the great political leaders of ourtime.

. . . .


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Going through the [Museum of the Revolution in Havana] was a soberingexperience. Facing step by step the historic interventions of the U.S. in toCuban affairs, including the systematic and regular murdering ofrevolutionary leaders left me with a lump in my throat. . . . They don=tneed to try very hard to make the point that we have been the exploiters. Batista was only one of the long list of murderous figures that we thrustupon them in the name of stability and freedom. . . . .

There may have been some abuses under the present regime, life may be morecomplicated by rationing, etc., but no one can make me believe that Cuba wouldhave been better off if we have defeated the revolution. The idea is obscene.

31. The FBI’s investigation has revealed that approximately six months after returning

from Cuba, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS were visited by co-conspirator

“A” in South Dakota, where KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS were living at

the time. During that trip, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS were recruited by

co-conspirator “A” and they agreed to serve as clandestine agents of the Republic of Cuba.

Thereafter, CuIS directed KENDALL MYERS to pursue a job at either the Department of State

or the Central Intelligence Agency.

32. My investigation to date has determined that on or about April 15, 1985,

KENDALL MYERS was offered a two-year appointment as Training Instructor and Chairperson

for West European Studies in FSI, a position that required a TOP SECRET security clearance.

When KENDALL MYERS received his appointment to that position he signed an Oath of Office

in which he swore that:

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreignand domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take thisobligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I willwell and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. Sohelp me God.


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33. I have learned through the investigation that KENDALL MYERS and

GWENDOLYN MYERS possess a number of books relating to Cuba, notably a book entitled On

Becoming Cuban.

CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATION FROM CuIS TO ITS AGENTS VIA SHORTWAVE RADIO

34. Based on my knowledge and familiarity with the communication methodologies

of CuIS, I am aware that, during the time frame described herein, CuIS often communicated with

its clandestine agents operating in the United States by broadcasting encrypted radio messages

from Cuba on certain high frequencies – that is, shortwave radio frequencies. Under this method,

CuIS would broadcast a series of numbers on a particular short-wave frequency. The

clandestine agent in the United States, monitoring the frequency on a shortwave radio, could

decode the seemingly random series of numbers by using a decryption program provided by

CuIS. The series of numbers would then be decoded into cognizable text for use by the agent.

Once decoded, the text of the message could provide the agent with tasking for intelligence

gathering, instructions about operational activities, including communication plans and meets

with CuIS handlers. Similarly, CuIS would broadcast similar messages to its handlers.

35. This shortwave radio communication method was employed by some of the

defendants convicted of espionage on behalf of Cuba in the previously mentioned Hernandez

case in the Southern District of Florida, as well as by Ana Belen Montes and Carlos and Elsa

Alvarez.

36. I have further learned that CuIS broadcasts such encrypted shortwave radio

messages in Morse Code or by a voice reading a series of numbers.


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37. I have learned through this investigation that KENDALL MYERS and

GWENDOLYN MYERS maintain in their possession in their apartment an operable shortwave

radio of the same make used by CuIS agent Ana Belen Montes. The radio was manufactured

between approximately 1983 and 1986.

38. I have learned through this investigation that KENDALL MYERS knows Morse

Code.

THE UNDERCOVER OPERATION

39. On or about April 15, 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated an

undercover operation. The purpose of the undercover operation was to convince KENDALL

MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS that they had been contacted by a bona fide Cuban

intelligence officer and, in the course of their ensuing discussion and relationship, ascertain the

scope, nature, and substance of KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS’s clandestine

activities on behalf of CuIS.

40. During the afternoon of April 15, 2009, an undercover source of the FBI (“UCS”)

approached KENDALL MYERS in front of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International

Studies (“SAIS”) on Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., in Washington, D.C. The UCS told

KENDALL MYERS that a named CuIS intelligence officer (hereinafter co-conspirator “D”)

“sent me to contact you.” The UCS continued that he did not want to “bother” KENDALL

MYERS or take “too much” of his time, but that he had “instructions to contact” him and “to get

some information . . . and [KENDALL MYERS’s] opinion” because of the “change that is taking

place in Cuba and the new administration.” The UCS said that co-conspirator “D” sends “his

regards,” offered KENDALL MYERS a cigar, and congratulated him on his birthday.


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KENDALL MYERS agreed to meet the UCS later that evening at a nearby hotel, after

KENDALL MYERS was done teaching a class at SAIS. KENDALL MYERS volunteered that

his wife, GWENDOLYN MYERS, could join them. The UCS agreed.

The April 15, 2009, Meeting

41. Following the conclusion of KENDALL MYERS’s class on the evening of April

15, 2009, the UCS met with both KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS for a drink

in a hotel lounge, located in Washington, D.C. The meeting lasted approximately one hour.

During the meeting, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS accepted written tasking

from the UCS. The tasking solicited KENDALL MYERS’s views and opinions of various

Executive Branch personnel with backgrounds in, and responsibility for, Latin American policy.

KENDALL MYERS agreed to provide the requested information at a scheduled meeting with the

UCS the following day. Further, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS made the

following statements during their April 15, 2009, meeting with the UCS:

• KENDALL MYERS asked the UCS, “So how is everybody at home?”, referringto Cuba.

• KENDALL MYERS stated that they were last in Cuba “ten years ago.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated “we’ve been meeting in third countries” and that thelast such country was Mexico “like three years ago, [or] four years ago.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed that the last meeting was in Guadalajara,Mexico, “a while ago.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated to the UCS “[l]et me explain something . . . which isimportant for us and . . . could be important to you. When I left the StateDepartment, one of the reasons . . . I was gonna leave anyway. . . I was going toleave in 2008. . . . But I clashed with . . . the assistant secretary who was my boss.. . .” KENDALL MYERS stated that, as a result of that clash, he felt“uncomfortable [and] more or less threatened . . . So I’ve been very cautious


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about reestablishing contact because I didn’t want to, uh, implicate you . . .”

• KENDALL MYERS stated, “we have been very cautious, careful with our movesand, uh, trying to be alert to any surveillance if there was any.” KENDALLMYERS further stated that he “think[s] that has passed. . . [b]ut we still need to becareful . . . .”

• In response to a statement by the UCS that co-conspirator “D” had told the UCSthat KENDALL MYERS was “the only agent that received by . . . Morse Code,”KENDALL MYERS responded, “yes, that’s right.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed that she and KENDALL MYERS still hadthe radio they had used to receive messages and named the manufacturer.

• GWENDOLYN MYERS stated that “you gave us the money to buy” the radio “ahundred years ago and it still works beautifully. . . . Although I haven’t listened toit in a while.”

• KENDALL MYERS acknowledged that it “would be nice” to travel to Cuba “inthe near future.”

• KENDALL MYERS indicated that they could sail to Cuba on their sailboat andthat “they already ha[ve] the charts . . . the maps . . . a cruising guide” to do so.

• Later, KENDALL MYERS stated that “our idea is to sail home.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated to the UCS concerning lifting the United States travelban to Cuba, that “[y]ou don’t want all those Americans . . . believe me, thoseNorth Americans, you don’t want them.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated that “[t]he trouble with this country, there’s just toomany North Americans.”

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed traveling to Cancunfor “meetings.”

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed meeting at ChichenItza in the Yucatan with someone they nicknamed “Sandy” because he had “dyedhis hair blonde.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS stated, “[w]e have nicknames.” KENDALL MYERSconfirmed, “We have nicknames, we never use their real names, even the doublenames.”


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• When told that co-conspirator “D” was now the UCS’s boss, KENDALL MYERSstated, “[he] has gone up? . . . Well, good. He’s wonderful . . . Give him ourlove.”

• When asked by the UCS who “Peter” was, KENDALL MYERS stated, “Peter wasjust a cover name . . . It’s the name that is used in the Internet . . . in the emails . . .There’s no . . . we never knew a Peter.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated that “it’s an honor for us” to meet the UCS. KENDALL MYERS further stated that “we’ve been a little nervous . . . and . . . Ithink you should tell them that . . . we’ve been nervous because, because wedidn’t want to hurt them . . . We were worried . . . .”

At the conclusion of the meeting, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS agreed to

meet with the UCS the following day at a different hotel so they could respond to the tasking.


42. On April 16, 2009, the UCS met with the KENDALL MYERS and

GWENDOLYN MYERS in a hotel room located in Washington, D.C. The meeting lasted

approximately one hour. During the meeting, KENDALL MYERS responded to the tasking

provided by the UCS on the previous day. They were also instructed by the UCS in the use of an

email account for future communication with the UCS. Further, during the April 16, 2009,

meeting, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS made the following statements:

• KENDALL MYERS acknowledged the UCS’s use of water-soluble paper to takenotes during the meeting and indicated that he knew what it was.

• KENDALL MYERS refused the UCS’s offer of a drink of Scotch while he wasanswering questions in response to the UCS’s tasking of the previous day, noting,“no, no, that’s okay . . . while I work, you know.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS recalled, and both her and KENDALL MYERS agreedto use in future meetings with the UCS, a parole (or pass phrase) that KENDALLMYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS had used previously.

• KENDALL MYERS agreed to provide the UCS information at the next meeting


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concerning the Trinidad and Tobago Summit of the Americas.

• KENDALL MYERS declined the UCS’s suggestion to identify any of his studentswho “could be useful for us.” KENDALL MYERS stated, “[u]nlikely . . . I don’ttrust any of them.”

• Near the conclusion of the meeting, KENDALL MYERS asked the UCS to “sendspecial greetings . . . and hugs . . . to everybody . . . and to all of our friends.” KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS then listed individuals theybelieve were located in Cuba, including “two very old friends,” co-conspirator“A” and co-conspirator “B.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS acknowledged that a code name used for her inmessages was “123.”

• KENDALL MYERS acknowledged that a code name used for him was “202.”

• KENDALL MYERS discussed his first trip to Cuba in December 1978 andprovided details on how he and GWENDOLYN MYERS were recruited to workfor CuIS by co-conspirator “A” six months later, in 1979, while they were livingin South Dakota.

• KENDALL MYERS agreed that they should change the location of the nextmeeting with the UCS to a different hotel for reasons of “security.”

At the conclusion of the meeting, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS agreed to

meet with the UCS again on April 30, 2009, at a different Washington, D.C. hotel.


43. The UCS met with KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS in a hotel

room, located in Washington, D.C., during the day on April 30, 2009. The meeting lasted

approximately three hours. During the meeting, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN

MYERS received, and were trained in the use of, an encryption device for purposes of encrypting

future email communications with the UCS. Further, during the April 30, 2009 meeting,

KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS made the following statements:


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• Upon first meeting the UCS, KENDALL MYERS exchanged with the UCS theparole agreed-upon during the April 16, 2009 meeting.

• Asked by the UCS if he had “detected [any] enemy activity,” KENDALL MYERSresponded “No.”

• KENDALL MYERS delivered a “four point” message that he requested the UCSsend. The message included the following four points:

(1) KENDALL MYERS noted that he and GWENDOLYN MYERS were“delighted to have contact again. We really have missed you. And you,speaking collectively, have been a really important part of our lives and wehave felt incomplete. I mean, we really love your country, ... and thepeople and the team are just important in our lives. So we don’t want tofall out of contact again.”

(2) KENDALL MYERS noted that he and GWENDOLYN MYERS “reallylike retirement. It gives us a chance to be with each other more. It givesus a chance for me to concentrate on teaching. And it gives us a chance tosail.”

(3) KENDALL MYERS stated that he and GWENDOLYN MYERS “don’tthink we are able to do the work again. . . we’re a little burned out. . .welived with the fear and the anxiety for a long time . . . and still do.”

(4) KENDALL MYERS stated that he and GWENDOLYN MYERS “wouldlike to be a reserve army. . . ready when we’re needed. I will begin aprocess of re-getting back in contact with . . . my old contacts . . . work onnew ones. . . to be able to react if the situation gets dangerous or we hearsomething that makes us worried, that we think you should know. . . .But Ithink, honestly, we don’t want to go back into . . . the regular stuff . . . .”

• KENDALL MYERS acknowledged working with CuIS for 30 years.

• GWENDOLYN MYERS stated that KENDALL MYERS joined in 1978 andKENDALL MYERS confirmed that he really didn’t start working until 1981.

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS acknowledged meeting a co-conspirator “A” in South Dakota in 1978.

• KENDALL MYERS stated that CuIS asked him to work at either the Departmentof State or the Central Intelligence Agency. GWENDOLYN MYERS stated thatthey both preferred the Department of State because KENDALL MYERS is “not a


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very good liar.” KENDALL MYERS continued “you had to be a good liar to pass[the polygraph at CIA].”

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed traveling toTrinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Jamaica for personalcontacts (i.e., operational meetings).

• KENDALL MYERS confirmed a personal contact in Italy.

• KENDALL MYERS discussed another personal contact in Prague whose name“we never learned . . . and explained to us, Cuba . . . It was incredible. . . wenever learned his name, never saw him again.” GWENDOLYN MYERS addedthat the individual explained “what we were getting into . . . he was, incredible.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated that he was given a leather jacket by anotherindividual during one of their first personal contacts and that he still had it.

• GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed a personal contact with co-conspirator “B” inFrance.

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS referred to a former CuISintelligence officer as “GOD.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS informed the UCS that there were numerous personalmeetings in New York City. KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERSinformed the UCS that they thought meetings in New York City were dangerous.

• KENDALL MYERS stated that “we had contacts here a lot.” “Some” werepersonal meetings, and “some just passes.”

• KENDALL MYERS said that they had contacts more often than every sixmonths.

• GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed that the country in which they felt the mostcomfortable for a personal contact was in Cuba, noting “once we got there . . . weknew we were okay.”

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS agreed that the most secureway to transmit information to illegal agents was “hand-to-hand.” GWENDOLYNMYERS stated that this was because “you can always back off if you want. . . andthe person we were meeting would understand.”

• KENDALL MYERS remarked that he “didn’t like dead drops . . . because you


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lose control of it.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS further stated that her favorite way of passinginformation involved the changing of shopping carts in a grocery store because itwas “easy enough to do.” She further stated that she “wouldn’t do it now. Nowthey have cameras, but they didn’t then.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated that his least favorite method for transmittinginformation “is that goddamn telephone system. . . . We wouldn’t do it.” GWENDOLYN MYERS stated “we did it once, never again, we threw it away.”

• KENDALL MYERS further stated that he believed that the “telephone system”was responsible for Ana Montes’s detection and apprehension.

• KENDALL MYERS stated that the “best way” to take information out from hisjob was “in your head.”

• KENDALL MYERS told the UCS that he removed information from theDepartment of State by memory or by taking notes. GWENDOLYN MYERSadded that he kept his notes locked in his office safe.

• KENDALL MYERS stated that “I was always pretty careful. I, I didn’t usuallytake documents out.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS reminded KENDALL MYERS that he did removedocuments from the Department of State and that GWENDOLYN MYERShandled the documents “page-by-page” and then KENDALL MYERS “slippedthem . . . back in.” KENDALL MYERS stated that “usually I wouldn’t leaveanything at home.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated he would return any documents he had taken home tohis office the next day.

• KENDALL MYERS stated that he and GWENDOLYN MYERS had bookendsthat were used as a concealment device at their home.

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS informed the UCS that theyput the written instructions the UCS had given them at the last meeting inside anold book in their home.

• GWENDOLYN MYERS informed the UCS that KENDALL MYERS wouldtransport documents home in “official envelopes” in a briefcase so that “if youopened it, it looked the same.” KENDALL MYERS stated that “in my case, I had


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to, uh, experiment . . . different ways of doing that.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated that he got information from a certain United States government agency “all the time” and stated “that was my job.”

• In response to a question asking whether he had ever delivered information toCuIS that was classified more than SECRET, KENDALL MYERS replied “Oh,yeah. . . Oh, yeah.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated “I have great admiration for [Cuban spy] Ana Montes. She’s a hero. . . But she took too many chances. . . in my opinion. . . . She wasn’tparanoid enough.”

• KENDALL MYERS said that “the funny thing is, of course, some of the stuff Isupplied, [Ana Montes] supplied. There was duplication . . . Because I read thestuff that she gave.” GWENDOLYN MYERS continued “which is terrificbecause what they got was verified . . . from two different places.”

• Referring to Ana Montes, GWENDOLYN MYERS stated, “She was not paranoidenough . . . . But she loved it, she did what she loved to do.” KENDALL MYERScontinued, saying, “we have a great admiration” for Ana Montes.

• In response to a question posed by the UCS as to whether it was possible thatthere was another Ana Montes inside the United States government, KENDALLMYERS responded, “Well, I hope so.” GWENDOLYN MYERS responded, “Ihope so. I hope so. Yeah.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS stated with regard to Ana Montes: “I envy her beingable to love what she was doing, and say what she was doing and why she wasdoing it. . . .’cause I can’t do that.”

• KENDALL MYERS acknowledged that they had received “lots of medals” fromthe government of Cuba.

• KENDALL MYERS stated that the “best one was meeting Fidel. . . Oh, that waswonderful.” KENDALL MYERS stated that he and GWENDOLYN MYERSmet Fidel Castro in a small house where they were staying and he spent a wholeevening, lasting approximately four hours, talking with them. “Sandy” (a handler)was also present.

• KENDALL MYERS stated “Fidel is wonderful, just wonderful.” GWENDOLYNMYERS continued: “He’s . . . the most . . . incredible statesman in . . . a hundredyears for goodness sakes.”


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• KENDALL MYERS stated they met with Fidel Castro around New Year’s Day in1995 and that they had gone through Mexico to Cuba while traveling under falsenames. GWENDOLYN MYERS traveled to Cuba under the name of“Elizabeth,” and KENDALL MYERS traveled under the name of “Jorge.”

• KENDALL MYERS acknowledged previously receiving false documents tofacilitate clandestine travel, but that they had “got rid of everything.”

• In responding to a question regarding how they might escape “from the States,”KENDALL MYERS stated that they did not need false travel documents to crossthe border because “we’re sailing there.” GWENDOLYN MYERS added “we’vealways said we’ll just come on a boat. . . . we’re not taking a train, or plane or,you know.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS stated that they could also go to Canada because they“could fly from Canada . . . to Cuba. . . . [W]e could, even with our US passports,travel to Cuba [from Canada]. . . . They won’t turn us down in Canada.” KENDALL MYERS agreed that he “would go to Canada. . . . Or we can just sailacross.” GWENDOLYN MYERS added “well, then we have our place to live [onthe sailboat]. Nobody has to put us up, we have our own place to live there. . . . Imean, we wouldn’t be a burden.”

• When the UCS indicated that he was going to send information concerningKENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS “to Cuba,” GWENDOLYNMYERS stated “[b]e sure and tell them we love them.” KENDALL MYERSadded “[w]e don’t wanna lose them. . . [w]e’ll be members of the reserve army.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS informed the UCS that KENDALL MYERS would be agood teacher at a School of Intelligence in Cuba, adding, “so when can we come?” KENDALL MYERS agreed “that I could see doing. . . [t]hat I would like to do.”

• During a demonstration and training by the UCS in the use of an encryptionprogram for future email communications between the UCS and the MYERS,GWENDOLYN MYERS stated “isn’t that fast. Those guys are getting good.” KENDALL MYERS added that the encryption program was “better than 2005.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS asked the UCS to “clean” the UCS’s computer after hedemonstrated the encryption program to her. KENDALL MYERS said “[s]he’sparanoid.” GWENDOLYN MYERS agreed, “I’m paranoid.”

• GWENDOLYN MYERS informed the UCS that she would not use her owncomputer to send an encrypted email message to the UCS. KENDALL MYERSadded “[w]e go to Internet cafes.”


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• KENDALL MYERS explained that after he returned from a trip to China in 2006,he encountered problems with a supervisor at INR, noting that “made us verycautious.”

• KENDALL MYERS told the UCS that he and GWENDOLYN MYERS “got alittle paranoid” that his boss at INR put him on a “watch list”and “thought itwould be unwise for us to be going to Mexico for contacts at that point.”

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS stated that they had receivede-mails “asking for a meeting in Mexico” but the MYERS “kept saying nobecause [they] were worried” and “thought it was too dangerous.”

• KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS related to the UCS that theirlast personal contact was in Guadalajara. KENDALL MYERS said he thought themeeting was in December 2005.

• When asked by the UCS if the “last meeting . . .in 2005" was “the end,”KENDALL MYERS responded “there has been no end . . . There doesn’t need tobe an end.” GWENDOLYN MYERS added, “it’s continuing.”

• KENDALL MYERS said that, after that last meeting, “we’ve had lots of e-mails.”

• At the conclusion of the meeting, KENDALL MYERS asked the UCS, “So whendo you want to meet again?”

• After agreeing on a date and location for the next meeting, KENDALL MYERS,GWENDOLYN MYERS, and the UCS agreed on a visual signal and parole to beused at the next meeting.

• After the UCS indicated that the next meeting “will be our last meeting, okay?,”GWENDOLYN MYERS responded “well, maybe, maybe six months from now,we can do it again.”

• When asked by the UCS if they were “happy,” KENDALL MYERS responded“[w]ell, my only unhappiness is that we won’t be seeing enough of you.”

• KENDALL MYERS stated “it was our life.” GWENDOLYN MYERS added,“[i]t is our life, it still is. . . But we, we can’t do it that much. . . . [W]e don’t wantto make a mistake. We don’t wanna screw up.”

• At the conclusion of the meeting, GWENDOLYN MYERS stated “[w]ell, we sureare happy to meet you.” KENDALL MYERS added, “we have mixed feelings. . .


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we want to have contact. . . but we’re burned out. . . it’s a full-time job.” GWENDOLYN MYERS added, “and it still is because we haven’t let it go. . . it’sstill always on our minds, always. . . . So it’s not retiring. . .”

• KENDALL MYERS continued: “It’s forever. . . You know, it’s like Fidel . . . It’sforever.”

At the conclusion of the April 30, 2009, meeting, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN

MYERS agreed to meet the UCS again on or about June 4, 2009 at a different Washington, D.C.,

hotel.

CuIS CLANDESTINE SHORTWAVE RADIO BROADCASTS RELATED TOKENDALL MYERS AND GWENDOLYN MYERS

44. The FBI collects high frequency messages from CuIS in Cuba to Cuban officers

and their agents abroad, to include illegal agents operating within the United States. Among

other high frequency messages broadcast by CuIS that the FBI has collected, I am aware that the

FBI has identified messages that it has determined were broadcast to a handler of KENDALL

MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS, hereinafter, co-conspirator “C."

45. The messages sent to co-conspirator “C” contain many references to standard

CuIS tradecraft, including mentions of passes, visual signals, personal contacts, dead drops,

counter-surveillance techniques, danger signals, clandestine communication techniques and

plans, coded messages, and code names referring to KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN

MYERS.

46. Further, the message sent to co-conspirator “C” make multiple references to Cuba.

For example,

• A message sent on or about February 15, 1997, to co-conspirator “C” describesCuban reactions to a “gringo” project to democratize Cuba.


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• A message sent on or about March 26, 1997, to co-conspirator “C” describesCuban reactions to the Helms-Burton Act which imposed sanctions against U.S.companies doing business with Cuba.

• A broadcast sent on or about January 29, 1997, to co-conspirator “C”congratulates the actions that the co-conspirator “C” has carried out in the “heartof the enemy” and proclaims them a “tribute to Marti,” which I believe is areference to Jose Marti, a Cuban national hero.

47. Among the messages sent to co-conspirator “C” was a message sent on or about

December 18, 1996, in which co-conspirator “C” is instructed to show an interest in a tumor on

the shoulder of agent “E-634.” Medical records collected during this investigation demonstrate

that on or about December 27, 1996, just nine days after this message was sent, GWENDOLYN

MYERS had a medical procedure to remove a tumor from her shoulder.

48. On or about November 26, 1996, CuIS sent an encrypted shortwave radio message

to co-conspirator “C” instructing co-conspirator “C” to take advantage of an upcoming pass (or

brief exchange of information) with an agent to see “the area of the new residence” and to study

the location of intercepting “123.” During the April 30, 2009, meeting with the UCS,

GWENDOLYN MYERS acknowledged that a code name used for her was “123.” Further, the

investigation has determined that KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS moved to a

new residence as of January 1, 1997, just one month after this message was sent.

49. On or about February 26, 1997, CuIS sent an encrypted shortwave radio message

to co-conspirator “C” informing co-conspirator “C”of a specific tasking sent by another

intelligence officer, referred to as “GOD,” to the agents concerning the collection of information

of interest to CuIS. During the April 30, 2009, meeting with the UCS, KENDALL MYERS

stated that one of the intelligence officers with responsibility for them was referred to as “GOD.”


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50. On or about March 22, 1997, CuIS sent an encrypted shortwave radio message to

co-conspirator “C” instructing co-conspirator “C” to make a personal contact with “634” to train

on use of an Iomega data storage device. As stated previously, a December 18, 1996 message

indicated that “E-634” had a tumor on the shoulder, and medical records collected during this

investigation demonstrate that on or about December 27, 1996, just nine days after this message

was sent, GWENDOLYN MYERS had a medical procedure to remove a tumor from her

shoulder. Further, the FBI’s investigation has revealed that KENDALL MYERS and

GWENDOLYN MYERS possess an Iomega device in their residence.

51. On or about April 1, 1997, CuIS sent an encrypted shortwave radio message to co-

conspirator “C” informing co-conspirator “C” that “202” had informed CuIS that he was “in the

process of a clearance.” During the April 30, 2009, meeting with the UCS, KENDALL MYERS

acknowledged that a code name used for him was “202.”

KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS’s OVERSEAS TRAVEL FORPERSONAL CONTACTS WITH CuIS HANDLERS AND REPRESENTATIVES

52. In the April 30, 2009, meeting with the UCS, KENDALL MYERS and

GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed traveling to Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Brazil, Ecuador,

Argentina, and Mexico for personal contacts or meetings. I have corroborated this travel based

on a review of Department of State travel records and law enforcement travel databases.

Specifically, these records demonstrate that KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS

undertook the following non-work related foreign travel:

January 2002 Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago

December 2002 Kingston, Jamaica

July 2003 Mexico City, Mexico


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December 2003 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

July 2004 Quito, Ecuador

December 2004 Puerto Vallarta, Mexico

July 2005 Buenos Aires and Iguazu, Argentina

December 2005 Mexico City and Oaxaca, Mexico

53. In addition to corroborating the April 30, 2009, statements of KENDALL

MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS concerning third-country meetings with their CuIS

handlers, based on my experience and training, this pattern of travel is also notable as it began

shortly after the arrest of Ana Montes in September 2001. I assess that CuIS began meeting with

KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS outside the United States in third-countries

because it believed meetings with the MYERS in the United States posed too much risk to its

intelligence officers following the arrest of Ana Montes.

KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS’s 1995 CLANDESTINE MEETINGWITH FIDEL CASTRO IN CUBA

54. During the April 30, 2009, meeting with the UCS, KENDALL MYERS and

GWENDOLYN MYERS confirmed traveling to Cuba via Mexico in 1995 around New Year’s

Day to meet with Fidel Castro. Based on a review of Department of State travel records and law

enforcement travel databases, I have confirmed that KENDALL and GWENDOLYN MYERS

did travel to Mexico in the first week of January 1995. Not surprisingly, there is no record of

their travel to Cuba. KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS stated in the April 30,

2009, meeting that they used false names when they traveled to Cuba in 1995 (i.e.,

GWENDOLYN MYERS traveled under the name “Elizabeth” and KENDALL MYERS traveled

under the name “Jorge”). KENDALL MYERS never disclosed to the Department of State any

post-1978 travel to Cuba as he was required to do under Department of State policy.


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55. The FBI’s investigation has also revealed that KENDALL MYERS and

GWENDOLYN MYERS possess a Cuban travel guide which was published in the mid-to-late

1990s.

KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS’s CONTINUED CLANDESTINE E-MAIL COMMUNICATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CuIS

56. During the April 30, 2009, meeting, KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN

MYERS stated that they had received e-mails “asking for a meeting in Mexico” but the MYERS

“kept saying no because [they] were worried” and “thought it was too dangerous.” During the

April 15, 2009, meeting, KENDALL MYERS stated that the name “Peter was just a cover name .

. . It’s the name that is used in the Internet . . . in the emails . . . There’s no . . . we never knew a

Peter.”

57. The FBI’s investigation has identified the e-mails to which KENDALL MYERS

and GWENDOLYN MYERS were referring to in the April 15 and April 30 meetings. The e-th th

mails are from a “Peter Herrera.” They are sent from Mexico to the MYERS’s home e-mail

account. In the first e-mail, sent on or about December 22, 2008, “Peter” purports to be a

Mexican art dealer and tells the MYERS that “I still keep my collection of art pieces for my best

customers, just tell me when you are ready to pick them up next year.” On or about December

29, 2009, both KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS responded jointly to this e-

mail. In their response, they told “Peter” that they were “[d]elighted to hear from you and to

learn that your art gallery is still open for us. We have not yet made travel plans for the new year

but will get back in touch with you as soon as we have done so.” The e-mail is signed “Kendall

and Gwen.”


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58. On or about March 16, 2009, “Peter” e-mailed again, saying “[i]f you are

interested in some special art pieces from our art gallery just let me know when you are ready to

pick them up.” On or about March 27, 2009, both the Myers responded by e-mail saying “[y]our

art pieces are stunning! If only we could visit to see them in person. However, our schedules do

not allow for a trip to Mexico at this time. We very much appreciate you remembering us.

Please keep us informed of your future shows.” They signed the email, “The Myers.”

59. Other than the above e-mails from “Peter,” the FBI has identified no other e-mails

to either KENDALL MYERS or GWENDOLYN MYERS inviting them on trips to Mexico.

Based on the statements of KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS during the April

15 and April 30 meetings with the UCS, their prior admitted operational travel to Mexico, andth th

the stilted language used in the e-mails which is consistent with talking in code, I assess that the

“Peter Herrera” e-mails are from a representative of CuIS requesting that KENDALL MYERS

and GWENDOLYN MYERS go on operational travel to Mexico.

KENDALL MYERS’s ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTINFORMATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

60. During the April 16, 2009 meeting with the UCS, GWENDOLYN MYERS and

KENDALL MYERS stated that they were recruited by co-conspirator “A” in 1979. In the April

30, 2009, meeting, KENDALL MYERS acknowledged that he did not start working until 1981.

In that same meeting, KENDALL MYERS stated that he had been asked by CuIS to work either

at the Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency. GWENDOLYN MYERS stated

that they both preferred the Department of State because KENDALL MYERS “is not a good

liar.” KENDALL MYERS agreed that “you had to be a good liar to pass [the polygraph at the


“Classified” information is defined by Executive Order 12958, as amended by Executive Order1

13292, and their predecessor orders, Executive Orders 12356 and 12065, as information in anyform that: (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or under control of the United States government;(2) falls within one or more of the categories set forth in the Order; and (3) is classified by anoriginal classification authority who determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably couldbe expected to result in damage to the national security. Where such unauthorized release couldreasonably result in “serious” damage to the national security, these orders require that theinformation be classified as “SECRET.” Where such damage could reasonably result in“exceptionally grave” damage to the national security, these orders require that the informationbe classified as “TOP SECRET.” Access to classified information at any level may be furtherrestricted through compartmentation in “SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION”(SCI) categories.

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CIA].”

61. Government records corroborate these statements. Specifically, Department of

State records demonstrate that KENDALL MYERS applied for a position with the Central

Intelligence Agency on or about September 1, 1981. Department of State records demonstrate

that KENDALL MYERS resumed employment as a contract instructor at the Department of

State’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in or about 1982. Further, on or about May 9, 1983,

KENDALL MYERS applied for a non-contractor, two-year appointment as a Training Instructor

and Chairperson for West European Studies in FSI. Department of State records show that

KENDALL MYERS was offered that position on or about April 15, 1985.

62. Department of State records demonstrate that KENDALL MYERS received a

TOP SECRET security clearance on or about March 27, 1985, a clearance which was required1

for his two-year appointment as Training Instructor and Chairperson for West European Studies

at FSI. In or about September 1999, his security clearance was increased to TOP SECRET/SCI

just prior to KENDALL MYERS beginning to work full time at the Department of State’s

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). During his employment at INR, KENDALL


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MYERS had daily access to classified information through computer databases and otherwise.

KENDALL MYERS maintained his TOP SECRET/SCI clearance until his retirement on October

31, 2007.

63. My investigation to date has determined that on June 12, 1985, KENDALL

MYERS signed a Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement in which he acknowledged,

in part:

Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligation contained in thisAgreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. .. . I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information,special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United StatesGovernment.

I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning thenature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to befollowed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosingthis information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand thoseprocedures.

I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure,unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by mecould cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantageby a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge [classified]information unless I have officially verified that the recipient has been properlyauthorized by the United States government to receive it, or I have been givenprior written notice of authorization from the United States GovernmentDepartment or Agency last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure ispermitted. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws andregulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in thetermination of any security clearance I hold; removal from any position of specialconfidence and trust requiring such a clearance; or the termination of myemployment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that grantedmy security clearance or clearances. . . .

In addition, I have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized disclosure ofclassified information by me may constitute a violation or violations of United


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States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections. . . . Section 783(b),Title 50, United States Code . . . .

64. Employing substantially the same language as that quoted in the paragraph above,

KENDALL MYERS acknowledged these same obligations and duties in a Classified Information

Nondisclosure Agreement which he signed on or about April 30, 1991.

65. My investigation to date has determined that at no time during his employment

with USDS was KENDALL MYERS ever authorized, directly or indirectly, to deliver,

communicate, or transmit sensitive or classified information to agents, officers, or employees of

CuIS or any other hostile foreign intelligence service.

66. My investigation to date has determined that at no time was GWENDOLYN

MYERS ever granted a security clearance by the United States government.

KENDALL MYERS’s REPEATED VIEWING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RELATED TO CUBA

67. During the April 30, 2009, meeting, when the UCS asked KENDALL MYERS

whether he had ever delivered information to CuIS that was classified more than SECRET,

KENDALL MYERS responded “Oh yeah. . . Oh, yeah.” KENDALL MYERS stated that the

“best way” to take information out from his job was “in your head.” KENDALL MYERS told

the UCS that he removed information from the Department of State by memory or by taking

notes. GWENDOLYN MYERS added that he kept his notes locked in his office safe.

68. An analysis of KENDALL MYERS’s classified Department of State work

computer hard drive reveals that from August 22, 2006, until his retirement on October 31, 2007,

KENDALL MYERS, while employed at INR, viewed in excess of 200 sensitive or classified

intelligence reports concerning the subject of Cuba. Of these intelligence reports, more that 75 of


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these reports made no substantive mention of countries within KENDALL MYERS’s area of

responsibility as an employee of INR. Of these reports concerning Cuba, the majority were

classified and marked SECRET or TOP SECRET.

KENDALL MYERS’s FALSE STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS

69. The FBI’s review of KENDALL MYERS’s Department of State security file

reveals a plethora of knowingly false statements by KENDALL MYERS whose goal by these

statements is plainly to conceal the fact that he and his wife are conspiring to be, and in fact

were, illegal agents of the Republic of Cuba who were providing sensitive and classified United

States government information to CuIS, a hostile foreign intelligence service. Specifically:

• On or about May 9, 1983, in response to a question on a Department of State“Statement Regarding Actions on Behalf of Foreign Principals” submitted byKENDALL MYERS as part of his application for a two-year appointment as aTraining Instructor and Chairperson for West European Studies at FSI askingwhether he was or ever had been an agent, representative or otherwise acted for aforeign principal, KENDALL MYERS answered “No,” when, in truth and fact, asKENDALL MYERS well knew, he was an agent of CuIS. The form also notifiedKENDALL MYERS of his legal obligation to report such a foreign agentrelationship to the Justice Department.

• On or about November 21, 1989, in response to a question appearing on Form SF-86, Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions, asking KENDALL MYERS to list anypersonal or continuing contacts he had had with a national of a communistcountry, KENDALL MYERS listed no such contacts, when, in truth and fact, asKENDALL MYERS well knew, he had had both personal and continuing contactswith nationals of Cuba, a communist country.

• On or about January 31, 1996, during a security interview conducted in Arlington,Virginia, in response to a question posed by an agent of the United Statesgovernment, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he did not have any regularcontact with foreign nationals, when, in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERSwell knew, he had had regular contact with Cuban foreign nationals.

• On or about December 29, 2000, in response to a question appearing on Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, asking whether KENDALL


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MYERS had had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments(embassies or consulates), or its representatives, other than on official UnitedStates government business, KENDALL MYERS falsely answered “No,” when,in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had such contacts withrepresentatives of Cuba.

• On or about February 13, 2001, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that no one in hisimmediate family was subject to any foreign influence, when, in truth and fact, asKENDALL MYERS well knew, his wife, GWENDOLYN MYERS, was an agentof CuIS.

• On or about February 13, 2001, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he has always acted asto indicate a preference for the United States over a foreign country, when, in truthand fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had acted so as to indicate apreference for a foreign country over the United States as he was an agent of CuISwho was providing CuIS with sensitive and classified United States governmentinformation.

• On or about February 13, 2001, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that there was not anyother information that he knew that could suggest a conflict of interest or be apossible source of embarrassment to him, the Department of State, or the UnitedStates, when, in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, his status as anagent of CuIS created a conflict of interest with his employment with theDepartment of State and would be a possible source of embarrassment to him, theDepartment of State, or the United States if it were publicly disclosed.

• On or about February 13, 2001, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he was not engaged inactivities that posed a conflict with his security responsibilities or that wouldcreate an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information,when, in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, his activities andstatus as an agent of CuIS posed a conflict with his security responsibilities as anemployee of the Department of State and increased the risk of the unauthorizeddisclosure of classified information.

• On or about February 13, 2001, during a security interview conducted in


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Washington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he could not think ofany issue omitted from his interview that might impact on his suitability foremployment or eligibility for access to classified information, when, in truth andfact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had concealed and omitted from hissecurity interview the material fact that he and his wife, GWENDOLYN MYERS,were agents of CuIS.

• On or about November 24, 2006, in response to a question on SF-86,Questionnaire for National Security Positions, asking whether KENDALLMYERS had had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments(embassies or consulates), or its representatives, other than on official UnitedStates government business, KENDALL MYERS falsely answered “No,” when,in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had had such contactswith representatives of Cuba.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he had no relatives,including his spouse, who are or were connected with any foreign government, toinclude intelligence or security services, when, in truth and fact, as KENDALLMYERS well knew, his wife, GWENDOLYN MYERS, was an agent of CuIS.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he has not hadunauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of aforeign intelligence service and he has no knowledge or suspicions of ever being atarget of interest of a foreign intelligence service, when, in truth and fact, asKENDALL MYERS well knew, he had such unauthorized associations withrepresentatives of CuIS and that he himself was an agent of CuIS.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he has not performedor attempted to perform duties, or otherwise acted, so as to serve the interests ofanother government in preference to the interests of the United States, when, intruth and fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, as an agent of CuIS, he hadperformed such duties and otherwise acted so as to serve the interests of thegovernment of Cuba in preference to the interests of the United States.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the United


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States government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he has not deliberatelyomitted, concealed, or falsified relevant and material facts from any personnelsecurity questionnaire, personal history statement or similar form used to conductinvestigations, determine employment qualifications, or determine securityclearance eligibility or trustworthiness, when, in truth and fact, as KENDALLMYERS well knew, he had repeatedly made material misstatements andomissions on personnel security questionnaires to prevent the Department of Statefrom discovering the material and relevant fact that he was a clandestine agent ofCuIS.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he has not deliberatelyprovided false or misleading information concerning relevant and material mattersto an investigator or security official in connection with a personnel, security, ortrustworthiness determination, when, in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERSwell knew, he had repeatedly made material misstatements to governmentinvestigators and security officials in connection with a security determination toprevent the Department of State from discovering the material and relevant factthat he was a clandestine agent of CuIS.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he had notdemonstrated a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of anywritten or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency, when,in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had repeatedly violatedhis Classified Information Non-disclosure Agreements.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he had not committedunauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive information, when, in truth andfact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had committed unauthorizeddisclosure of classified or sensitive information when he clandestinely providedsuch information to representatives of Cuba.

• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he had not performedany service, whether compensated, volunteer or employment, with any foreigncountry, when, in truth and fact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had servedas a clandestine agent of CuIS.


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• On or about January 9, 2007, during a security interview conducted inWashington, D.C., in response to a question posed by an agent of the UnitedStates government, KENDALL MYERS falsely stated that he could not think ofany issue omitted from the interview that might impact on his suitability foremployment or eligibility for access to classified information, when, in truth andfact, as KENDALL MYERS well knew, he had concealed and omitted during theinterview the material fact that he was a clandestine agent of CuIS.

KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS’s VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 AND 951

70. Based on the facts set forth above, I submit there is probable cause to believe that

WALTER KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS, did conspire with each other and

with others, to act as illegal agents of the government of Cuba and did so act in the United States

as agents of the government of Cuba without prior notice to the Attorney General in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951.

KENDALL MYERS’s SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

71. Further, based on false statements set forth in paragraph 69 above, I submit there

is probable cause to believe that KENDALL MYERS engaged in a scheme and systematic course

of conduct with intent to defraud the Department of State and the United States, and to obtain

property of the U.S. Department of State and the United States by means of false and fraudulent

pretenses and representations, and in fact caused those entities to lose property, i.e., money in the

form of salary payments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

72. Based on Department of State records and interviews conducted during this

investigation, I know that starting on or about April 15, 1985, KENDALL MYERS obtained a

two-year appointment as a Training Instructor and Chairperson for West European Studies at the

Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute, a position for which he received a salary of


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$38,852 on an annual basis. Starting in or around October 1999, KENDALL MYERS obtained

a full-time position at INR as Acting Director of the External Research Staff, a position for which

he received an annual salary of $82,014 in 1999, increasing to $93,308 in 2000. Later, in July

2001, KENDALL MYERS obtained the position of Senior Analyst for Europe in INR, a position

for which he received an annual salary of $96,325, which increased to $131,996 at the time of his

retirement in October 2007.

73. Department of State records demonstrate that each of these jobs held by

KENDALL MYERS were positions of special confidence and trust requiring access to highly

sensitive classified national security information prepared by members of the intelligence

community, including information classified at the TOP SECRET level. Accordingly, on or

about March 27, 1985, prior to entering service on his two-year appointment as a Training

Instructor and Chairperson for West European Studies at FSI, KENDALL MYERS was required

to obtain, and did obtain, a TOP SECRET security clearance from the Department of State.

Department of State records further establish that KENDALL MYERS security clearance was

increase to TOP SECRET/SCI in or about September 1999, just prior to him beginning work

full-time in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. KENDALL MYERS maintained his TOP

SECRET security clearance until his retirement on or about October 31, 2007.

74. Department of State records further establish that each of KENDALL MYERS’s

false statements and omissions delineated in paragraph 69 above were made by KENDALL

MYERS during the course of his initial background security investigation or subsequent re-

investigations to determine his suitability, or continued suitability, for access to TOP SECRET

information. The standard by which a prospective or existing federal employee’s request for a


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security clearance is adjudicated is whether the grant of access to classified information to the

individual is “clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.” See Executive Order

No.10450, §§ 2 and 7; 5 C.F.R. § 732.203. Based on interviews conducting during this

investigation, I know that a critical part of the security clearance adjudication process is the

answers given by the individual seeking a clearance to questions on a security questionnaire as

well as to questions at an oral interview conducted by a government investigators. As

KENDALL MYERS plainly knew, and as the FBI has been informed by Department of State

representatives during this investigation, if the truth had been known that, while he was an

employee of the Department of State, he and his wife, GWENDOLYN MYERS, were,

themselves, clandestine agents of CuIS and/or had committed unauthorized disclosures of

classified United States government information to CuIS, then KENDALL MYERS’s eligibility

for a TOP SECRET security clearance would have been denied, his security clearance revoked,

and his employment with FSI and INR terminated.

75. Department of State records further establish that from on or about April 15,

1985, through October 31, 2007, as a result of the aforesaid materially false, fraudulent and

misleading pretenses, representations, and promises, KENDALL MYERS received at least

$1,735,054 in moneys (in the form of salary payments), funds, and property from the Department

of State and United States Government for the benefit of himself and GWENDOLYN MYERS.

76. The FBI’s investigation has revealed that, in the District of Columbia, having

devised the above-described scheme to defraud, for purpose of executing and in order to effect

the scheme to defraud, KENDALL MYERS did knowingly cause to be transmitted by means of

wire communications in interstate and foreign commerce, certain writings, signs, signals, and


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sounds, specifically,

• On or about April 14, 2005, an electronic transfer of $2,148.41, representingKENDALL MYERS=s U.S. Department of State salary, was transmitted from agovernment account in Kansas City, Missouri, to a Riggs National Bank accountcontrolled by KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS and located at1101 15 Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005;th

• On or about May 12, 2005, an electronic transfer of $2,148.41, representingKENDALL MYERS’s U.S. Department of State salary, was transmitted from agovernment account in Kansas City, Missouri, to a Riggs National Bank accountcontrolled by KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYN MYERS and located at1101 15 Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005; andth

• On or about December 7, 2006, an electronic transmission of KENDALLMYERS’s security questionnaire was sent from the U.S. Department of State,2210 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20520, to the Bureau of DiplomaticSecurity located at 1801 North Lynn Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

REQUEST FOR SEALING

77. Because the investigation is continuing and disclosure of some of the details of

this affidavit may compromise subsequent investigative measures to be taken in this case, may

cause suspect(s) to flee, may cause suspect(s) to destroy evidence, or may otherwise jeopardize

the investigation, I respectfully request that this affidavit be sealed until further order of the

Court.

CONCLUSION

78. Based on the facts set forth above, and on my experience and training in

investigating cases involving violations of federal law and other experienced agents with whom I

have consulted, there is probable cause to believe:

• that at least in or about 1979 and continuing until the present, in the District ofColumbia and elsewhere, WALTER KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYNSTEINGRABER MYERS, did conspire with each other and with others, (i) todefraud the United States and the Department of State, by impeding, impairing,


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obstructing, and defeating the Department of State’s lawful government functionsof control over its information and ability to protect classified information againstunauthorized disclosure; (ii) to act as an illegal agent of the government of Cubain the United States without prior notice to the Attorney General and Secretary ofState, as required by law; (iii) to communicate, as an employee of the UnitedStates and the Department of State, to a person whom such employee knows andhas reason to believe was an agent and representative of a foreign government,namely the Republic of Cuba, information the employee had reason to know hadbeen classified under the authority of the President of the United States and by theSecretary of State as affecting the security of the United States, in violation of 18U.S.C. § 371;

• that at least in or about 1979 and continuing until the present, in the District ofColumbia and elsewhere, WALTER KENDALL MYERS and GWENDOLYNMYERS did act as illegal agents of the government of Cuba in the United Stateswithout prior notice to the Attorney General and Secretary of State, as required bylaw, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951; and

• that at least in or about September 1981 to on or about October 31, 2007, in theDistrict of Columbia and elsewhere, WALTER KENDALL MYERS andGWENDOLYN MYERS did devise and intend to devise a scheme and artifice todefraud the United States Department of State and to obtain monies and propertiesbelonging to the United States Department of State and the United StatesGovernment by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses,representations and promises in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

___________________________BRETT KRAMARSIC, Special AgentFederal Bureau of Investigation

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS _____DAY OF JUNE, 2009.

___________________________________UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT...

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