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Uniq: Overstretch Now

USAID budget overstrech now – sequestration and security concerns

Biron 13[Carey Biron, Inter Press Service, “Abrupt U.S. Cuts Could “Devastate” Overseas Development Programmes” February 22 2013 http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/abrupt-u-s-cuts-could-devastate-overseas-development-programmes/]

WASHINGTON, Feb 22 2013 (IPS) - With just a week to go before massive, indiscriminate spending cuts kick in across the U.S. government, policymakers and humanitarian groups are becoming increasingly anxious about the enduring impact the cuts would have on the communities across the globe assisted by U.S.-funded development and aid programmes. “[W]e fear that the U.S. agencies that oversee humanitarian response will be put in an impossible position, choosing between saving lives in one country over another,” 40 humanitarian groups wrote in an open letter to policymakers this week. “We also ask that any additional resources not come from other critical poverty fighting accounts within the International Affairs

budget, which will also be under pressure.” The groups warn that costs for international humanitarian needs have already become “overstretched” due to security concerns in Syria, Mali, Congo and Sudan , as well as ongoing food security issues across the Sahel . In Syria alone, they note, humanitarian-related costs are estimated at 1.5 billion dollars just through June, double the figure since September. Driving these concerns is the suddenly real possibility that a piece of compromise legislation signed into law in August 2011, aimed at forcing Republicans and Democrats to agree to a long-term deal to bring down the

country’s foreign debt, could be enacted starting Mar. 2. Known here as the “sequester”, the process stipulated that if such a deal were not agreed upon by the end of last year, budgets across the federal government would be summarily slashed by 85 billion dollars this fiscal year and 1.2 trillion dollars over a

decade. Most frustrating to economists and other observers is that the sequester does not cover most healthcare-related spending, the source of much of the country’s soaring deficit. Yet because the legislation would become law partway through the current fiscal year, all cuts would have to be done on an expedited basis to meet deadline requirements. While a minor last-minute agreement was struck in late December, it merely pushed off a decision on the sequester. Meanwhile, Democrats, led by President Barack Obama, are insisting that the debt problem needs to be solved by raising additional tax revenue,

while Republicans maintain that the money needs to come solely from lowering government spending. Importantly, the sequester cuts were crafted to be “dumb”, in that neither policymakers nor agency heads would be allowed to aim the cuts at waste or areas of lesser priority. The cuts are also purposefully painful to both Democrats, who typically favour social programmes, and Republicans, who typically favour defence spending. For these reasons, most observers had expected that legislators couldn’t possibly allow the sequester to go through. Analysts, after all, are forecasting an economic contraction of up to 0.6 percent, with ramifications for essentially all U.S.citizens. However, barring further last-minute deals – and Congress is currently on a 10-day break – agencies throughout the states and federal government are currently forced to scramble to plan for what could be one of the most destabilising moves the country has ever inflicted on itself. Cuts cost lives No exemption will be made for overseas spending, despite constituting less than one percent of overall federal spending. Indeed, as reported in a new public poll released

Friday by the Pew Research Center, U.S. respondents preferred cutting “aid to the world’s needy” more than any of 18 other budget options. According to

information released this week by John Kerry, the new secretary of state, the State Department and USAID, the country’s main overseas aid agency,

would need to cut around 2.6 billion dollars from this year’s budget. That would entail chopping 200 million dollars in humanitarian assistance and 400 million dollars in global health programmes. That would include a reduction of 300 million dollars in the budget of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria – this year alone. “Such a reduction would hinder our ability to provide life saving food assistant to 2 million people and USAID would have to cease, reduce, or not initiate assistance to millions of disaster affected people,” Kerry wrote to legislators. He also noted that the cuts would “gravely impede” efforts at reducing AIDS-related and child deaths. “The important thing to understand is that these cuts will cost lives,” said Jeremy Kadden, senior legislative manager with InterAction, an alliance of U.S. NGOs working in developing countries. “We’ve made very significant progress over the past 10 years, with real people improving their lives, and this would set that process back enormously, devastating actual people on the ground.” Sequester cuts would lead to some three million children losing access to the basic education they’re currently receiving, Kadden says. Two million people would also see reductions or outright cuts in food aid, while 600,000 children would lose nutrition assistance. (The group is offering more figures here and here.) According to InterAction estimates, the United States has helped some 400 million people get out of extreme poverty over the past two decades. Last year alone, U.S.

food aid reached around 70 million people. New baseline Despite the fact that the sequester was never meant as policy, its impact would reverberate for years. According to a new article by Tony P. Hall, a former U.S. ambassador to the World Food Programme, the current budget negotiations could prove to be “the most far-reaching for the next decade”. Pointing to the long-term ramifications of even temporarily

halting basic education, nutrition or health programmes, including vaccines, Kadden likewise warns that the impact would be “enormous”. Further, this newly reduced funding could constitute baseline budgets in the future . “If the budget in use at the end of fiscal year 2013 is, say, 5 percent lower than in previous years, and that’s the basis for subsequent years , we’re talking about millions of people who don’t have access to the food, vaccines or basic education they need,” Kadden says. “There are so many places around the world right now that need help, and we need to ensure, first, that we do no harm. Unfortunately, that seems to be the direction we’re heading in at the moment.”

Uniq: Mexican Aid Increasing

Foreign aid to Mexican development is increasing

Casey 12, correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, (Nicholas, “U.S. Shifts Mexico Drug Fight”, 9/17/12, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443720204578000463890865962.html) //LA

MEXICO CITY—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meets her Mexican counterparts at a security summit in Washington Tuesday to discuss the next phase in the drug war: how to train the judges and prosecutors that will be trying suspected drug lords. The Merida Initiative, the U.S.'s $1.9 billion assistance program to Mexico, began mostly as a means to buy military hardware like Black Hawk helicopters for Mexico. But over the past two years, it has entered a new phase, in which purchases for the Mexican military are taking a back seat to measures to mend the branches of Mexico's civilian government. The former director of Colorado's penitentiary system has trained more than 5,000 Mexican prison officials in recent years. Mexican jurists are running mock trials with visiting American judges to prepare for a transition to oral hearings that will replace Mexico's enigmatic closed-door meetings where sentences are handed down. "Different things have come to the fore at different times, but strengthening the rule of law in Mexico is the area that's crucial right now," says Roberta Jacobson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Officials in both countries increasingly believe the root of Mexico's problem lies in creating an honest police force, professional judges and a prison system comparable with that in the U.S. The challenges are harder to measure but will take center stage at the so-called High-Level Consultative Group on Tuesday, where Mrs. Clinton will be joined by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, Attorney General Eric Holder and top officials from Mexican President Felipe Calderón's cabinet. The two sides will also discuss topics ranging from border security to seizing assets of drug cartel members in the U.S. "Our efforts to confront transnational crime on both sides of the border benefited from a clear understanding that we had to multitask," says Mexican Ambassador to the U.S. Arturo Sarukhán. While Mexico has had success at catching criminals, it's had less luck in putting them behind bars—the country has a meager 2% conviction rate for most crimes. A new test came just last week with the capture of Jorge "El Coss" Costilla, the alleged boss of Mexico's powerful Gulf Cartel. He is the 23rd in Mexico's "37 Most Wanted" list to have either been killed or captured under Mr. Calderón; after six years of fighting, the original heads of Mexico's drug gangs are mostly gone. That reality is being reflected in how U.S. aid is being spent in Mexico. Assistance to the Mexican military has nearly collapsed, with counternarcotics and security aid falling from a height of around $529 million in 2010 to $67.5 million planned for next year. Meanwhile money meant for strengthening institutions from law schools to prisons doubled in the last year, to $201.8 this year from $105 million in 2011. Training Mexico to handle its own struggle could be more cost-effective for the U.S.—total aid this year to Mexico is at $330 million, less than half its number 2010—in large part because training police and prosecutors is less expensive than financing a military with big purchases like helicopters. One example both sides are touting has to do with Mexico's courts, which are undergoing a radical overhaul. Unlike the U.S., most trials in Mexico take place in closed proceedings where judges aren't present nor even meet the defendant. Attorneys and witnesses gather in a cubicle where a clerk takes notes and prepares a file, later sent to the judge for a decision. There are no juries.

New aid is coming

Additional aid is being supplied to SyriaRichter 13, correspondent at the Los Angeles Times, (Paul, “U.S. to give $100 million more to aid displaced Syrians”, 5/8/13, Los Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/08/world/la-fg-wn-us-aid-displaced-syrians-20130508) //LAWASHINGTON -- The Obama administration is providing an additional $100 million for humanitarian aid for displaced Syrians, officials said Wednesday, bringing to $510 million the total U.S. aid commitment since the civil war began more than two years ago.¶ ¶ The new aid, which Secretary of State John F. Kerry will announce Thursday during a visit to Rome, will help support 1.4 million civilians trapped by violence within Syria’s borders, as well as refugees who have fled to camps in neighboring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, they said.¶ ¶ ¶ The decision is not linked to White House deliberations over whether the U.S. should provide weapons and ammunition to rebels fighting the government of President Bashar Assad or to growing suspicions that Syrian forces used chemical weapons.¶ ¶ The administration provides some nonlethal aid to the rebels, such as communications equipment, military-style rations and bandages. But U.S. officials fear that arming the insurgents could wind up strengthening extremist militias, including factions linked to Al Qaeda.¶ ¶ The additional aid will help the Obama administration deflect criticism that it is not doing enough to deal with a conflict that has killed nearly 80,000 Syrians and threatens to engulf the broader Mideast region.¶ ¶ The money will be administered by United Nations agencies to help provide food, shelter and healthcare at refugee camps. The aid also will include some cash payments to civilians in Syria. The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian relief for Syrians.

Obama signs off new aid to SyriaLabott 13, CNN correspondent, (Elise, “White House signs off on new aid for Syrian rebels”, 4/9/13, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/09/world/us-syria-aid) //LAWashington (CNN) -- President Barack Obama has signed off on a new package of nonlethal aid for Syrian rebels, U.S. officials tell CNN, signaling his administration is cautiously wading further into the conflict.¶ Officials said the White House approved the package at a meeting of the National Security Council last week.¶ The move reflects what officials describe as a ramped-up effort to change the military balance on the battlefield in Syria.¶ It follows a decision by Obama last month to send food and medicine to the rebels, the first direct U.S. support for the armed opposition.¶ Syrian antiquities looted for gun money Rape as a tool of war in Syria 6,000+ killed in Syria's deadliest month¶ Other agencies have not been briefed on the final elements of the package, which is expected to be detailed at a White House meeting this week.¶ "We have no new decisions on assistance to announce at this point and continue to review every possible option that could help end the violence and accelerate a political transition," said Caitlin Hayden, a National Security Council spokeswoman.¶ Officials said it is expected to include equipment such as body armor, night vision goggles and other military equipment that is defensive in nature, but could be used to aid in combat by Syrian rebels battling forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad.¶ The package being discussed, however, still falls short of the heavy weapons and high tech equipment sought by the rebels.¶ Obama's national security team and members of Congress have repeatedly urged the president to increase the direct aid for the rebels.¶ They argue such a step would strengthen the hand of moderate members of the opposition and make them less reliant on well-armed extremist elements within their ranks.¶ Secretary of State John Kerry has pushed for more aggressive U.S. involvement in Syria since taking office in February.¶ The move comes as Britain and France are leading efforts to lift a European Union arms embargo on Syria. Both have suggested they are prepared to join nations like Qatar is providing the rebels with weapons and are urging the United States to do the same.¶ A push last summer from CIA, Pentagon and State Department leaders was rejected by the White House. At least for now, it remains opposed to arming the opposition, fearing that U.S.-provided weapons could wind up in the wrong hands.¶ The Obama administration has funneled $385 million in humanitarian aid to Syria through international institutions and nongovernmental organizations.¶ In addition, Washington has provided more than $100 million to the political opposition and has pressed them to establish a leadership structure.¶ But the Syrian Opposition Council, the main Syrian opposition group, has roundly criticized the United States for refusing to provide badly-needed support to organize a transitional government and broaden its support inside Syria.

Foreign aid is already going to Egypt Plumer 13, Plumer is a reporter at the Washington Post writing about domestic policy, particularly energy and environmental issues, “The U.S. gives Egypt $1.5 billion a year in aid. Here’s what it does.”, 7/9/13, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/)wp/2013/07/09/the-u-s-gives-egypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-heres-what-it-does///LAThe biggest policy debate roiling Washington right now is whether to continue America’s annual $1.5 billion aid package to Egypt. After all, Egypt just had a coup in which the military ousted the country’s elected president, Mohammed Morsi. Doesn’t that warrant a response?The Obama administration says it prefers to keep aid flowing to Egypt for now — for stability’s sake. “It would not be in the best interests of the United States to immediately change our assistance program to Egypt,” said White House spokesman Jay Carney. Yet some key members of Congress are calling for a cutoff. “We need to suspend aid to the new government until it does in fact schedule elections and put in place a process that comes up with a new constitution,” said Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.).¶ So here’s a quick primer on the situation — what we actually give Egypt, why we send so much aid, and under what circumstances we might cut it off. What do we actually give to Egypt? Between 1948 and 2011, the United States has given Egypt about $71.6 billion in bilateral military and economic aid. That’s more than we’ve given to any other country over that time frame save for Israel.¶ A recent report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service lays out the details. The biggest chunk is military aid, averaging about $1.3 billion per year since 1987, with much of that military equipment. For instance, Egypt plans to acquire 1,200 M1A1 Abrams Battle tanks from the United States. The components are jointly manufactured in both countries and shipped to Egypt for final assembly. This year, the United States is also shipping 20 F-16 fighter jets overseas. Plus there’s money for border security along the Sinai Peninsula.¶ Egypt also gets a few special financing provisions, says CRS, including the ability to deposit its funds at an interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The nation also gets to engage in cash-flow financing to pay for military equipment, a special provision not available to most recipients, and one that allows Egypt to negotiate bigger arms purchases.¶ On top of that, Egypt received about $250 million last year in economic aid, money that goes toward health, education, as well as democracy programs. (In past years, the United States also funded big USAID infrastructure projects in sanitation, communications, and so forth. But that was scaled back in the 1990s.)¶ Obligatory pyramids shot. (Simon Denyer/The Washington Post)¶ Can you put those numbers in context? In fiscal year 2011, the United States handed out about $49 billion in military and economic aid all told. Egypt got about $1.5 billion — the fourth-largest recipient after Israel ($3 billion), Iraq ($2.1 billion), and Pakistan ($1.7 billion).¶ On Egypt’s end, the assistance plays an out-sized role in the budget. No one knows the exact numbers, but by one one count, “U.S. military aid covers as much as 80% of the Defense Ministry’s weapons procurement costs.” (In 2011, a Cornell economist estimated that U.S. aid made up one-third of Egypt’s broader military budget.) Why do we give Egypt so much aid? Since the late 1970s, U.S. policymakers have justified the aid as a way to stabilize the region and promote its interests. Here’s CRS laying out the official line: “Interests include maintaining U.S. naval access to the Suez Canal, maintaining the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, and promoting democracy and economic growth within Egypt, the region’s largest Arab country.” More recently, the Obama administration has insisted that aid to Egypt is crucial to avoiding broader problems. “A hold up of aid might contribute to the chaos that may ensue because of their collapsing economy, said Secretary of State John Kerry in January. “Their biggest problem is a collapsing economy.” (If it seems odd that military aid would be so crucial to Egypt’s economy, consider this: The Egyptian military is utterly gigantic, one of the largest in the world, “controlling between 10 and 30 percent of the economy and employing hundreds of thousands of Egyptians.”) Is Egypt’s economy really in such bad shape? Yes. For more on that, read this interview with Caroline Freund, who notes that Egypt’s economy isn’t growing nearly fast enough to provide jobs for everyone. That’s certainly not the whole reason for Egypt’s crisis. But without big structural reforms, it’s hard to see turmoil in the country from subsiding. Have lawmakers ever wavered on giving aid before? Yes. In 2012, after Egypt elected Mohammed Morsi, who hailed from the Muslim Brotherhood, some lawmakers started to worry that Egypt would no longer see eye-to-eye with the United States, especially on topics like Israel. The relationship “has never been under more scrutiny,” said Rep. Kay Granger (R-Tex.), a key lawmaker in charge of foreign aid funds. In the end, Congress put a few conditions on further aid. The 2012 appropriations bill, for instance, included language specifying that Egypt wouldn’t receive any aid until the Secretary of State certified that the country was living up to its end of its 1979 treaty with Israel. Isn’t the United States supposed to cut off all military aid after a coup? In theory, yes. The Foreign Assistance Act, first passed back in 1961, says so quite clearly: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.” But the U.S. government has long been flexible on this provision. As my colleague Max Fisher detailed at length, “while the U.S. often does follow this law, it tends to ignore or bypass it when it sees key national security interests at stake – which may well apply in Egypt.”For instance, the Obama administration was slow in cutting aid to Honduras in 2009 after a coup there. And George W. Bush got a waiver to reinstate aid to Pakistan in 2001, even though then-leader Pervez Musharraf had pretty clearly come to power in a military coup.So what’s the debate now? On

the one hand, there are experts and politicians who don’t think the United States should be in the business of backing a military coup. “Morsi was a terrible president,” said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) “Their economy is— is in terrible shape, thanks to their policies, but the fact is the United States should not be supporting this coup and it’s a tough call.” On the other, there are those worried that severing military aid to Egypt will create instability. “Cut off all aid immediately and you will take an economy that is already floundering and probably drive it into chaos, and that is not in anyone’s national security interests,” said Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) At this point, the White House is still declining to call what happened in Egypt a “coup.” “I’ll be blunt — this is an incredibly complex and difficult situation,” said Carney. Many political scientists have said what happened in Egypt is clearly a coup, but the White House is trying to avoid cutting off aid. What would happen if we did cut off military aid? Probably not much at first. Military aid to Egypt for 2013 was already disbursed back in May, and there likely wouldn’t be another round of funding until next spring. But cutting off aid would certainly reshape the U.S.-Egypt relationship — and mark a big break from the past 65 years.

Aid is ineffective

USAID is ineffective – it lacks human and financial resourcesFrumin 09, Fellow of International Affairs for the Council on Foreign Relations, (Amy B., “Diagnosing USAID”, April 2009, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64663/amy-b-frumin/diagnosing-usaid) //LAThe former U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administrators J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios ("Arrested Development," November/December 2008) explain that despite the U.S. government's having elevated the status of development to be on par with defense and diplomacy, USAID has been so emasculated over the last several decades that it is not an effective member of the triumvirate of U.S. national security strategy tools. The only solution the authors see is a wholesale reform of the institutions of foreign assistance, including making USAID an independent department, creating a National Security Council position focused on foreign assistance, and unifying all sources of foreign assistance under USAID. Reform is needed. However, as a former USAID field officer in Afghanistan, I propose a less Washington-centric reform strategy. From Washington's political and strategic perspective, it does not make sense to elevate the bureaucratic status of USAID when there is so little faith in the organization to begin with. The authors themselves claim USAID is dysfunctional. Congress demonstrated its lack of confidence in USAID by increasing the Department of Defense's allocation of official development assistance funds from 3.5 percent to 21.7 percent between 1999 and 2005. In that same period, USAID's share of official development assistance decreased from 65 percent to less than 40 percent. Prioritizing bureaucratic reform in Washington also does not make sense from a national security perspective. In a world of unconventional modern warfare, fragile states characterized by corruption and poverty are now the enemy, and reconstruction and development are the tools to combat them. Because USAID cannot carry out these tasks effectively, the military has been charged with doing more of them. Piling another mandate that requires an entirely new skill set onto an overstretched military not only distracts it from its main task of fighting wars but also underutilizes the organization established to address these issues: USAID. The United States cannot afford to wait until Washington works through the political tangle of reforming foreign assistance to make USAID more functional in the field. After decades of scrutiny and downsizing, USAID has become an anemic organization, with a fifth the number of staff it had in the 1960s and a fraction of the agility and autonomy it had when it was better funded. Reform should begin by giving USAID the human and financial resources it needs to succeed in the field. Of course, political will is required to make these changes, and that will must come from the president's office.

USAID commits fraud – Haiti proves that it withholds funds meant for development assistanceMarion 13, correspondent for the International Committee of the Fourth International ICFI, (John, “Report exposes fraud of US aid to Haiti”, 7/2/13, ICFI, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/02/hait-j02.html) //LAOn June 18, the US Government Accountability Office released a report criticizing USAID’s handling of aid to Haiti in the more than three years since 2010‘s catastrophic earthquake. Of the $1.14 billion of aid approved by the US Congress in the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act, $651 million was allocated to projects run by USAID (the United States Agency for International Development). The GAO audit found that, as of March 31, 2013, USAID had disbursed only $204 million (31 percent) of these funds and obligated $89 million more for various projects. In other words, 55 percent of the original $651 million is still sitting in US government coffers. Among the underfunded USAID projects is the construction of new homes for Haitian workers. Out of 15,000 that were planned, only 2,649 have been built. USAID blames the shortfall, in part, on the Haitian government’s insistence that the new houses have flush toilets, instead of more “traditional” waste systems. In its response to the audit, USAID did not explain why it won’t spend additional money on houses or why it didn’t plan for adequate sanitation in a country which has been wracked by cholera. As of the end of May, the cholera epidemic introduced into Haiti by UN troops had killed 8,100 people and sickened more than 650,000. The epidemic, which fluctuates in intensity, is likely to get worse during this summer’s rainy season. Of the reduced number of houses built, the GAO states bluntly that officials “noted that USAID would commit no further funds to housing construction.” The United States government as a whole has disbursed far less aid money than it pledged after the earthquake. In February, the Center for Global Development reported that the US had disbursed $2.25 billion of its total pledges of $3.85 billion, or less than 60 percent. The CGD report went on to state that “with very little data and few evaluations, it is nearly impossible to track who has received the $2.25 billion that the US government has disbursed.” A February 2013 interview with author Jonathan Katz by NPR offered a partial answer to the question: after the earthquake, “the Pentagon [was] writing bills to the State Department to get reimbursed for having sent troops down to respond to the disaster.” The USAID funds were intended all along to bolster the interests of international capital. The three projects

audited by the GAO were the housing construction program, an industrial park for garment manufacturers near the northern city of Cap HaÏtien, and a new port to ship goods manufactured there. According to the GAO report, fully 33 percent (5,000 out of 15,000) of the houses planned by USAID were to be built near Cap HaÏtien. The remainder were to be in Port-au-Prince and the coastal city of St. Marc, just to its north. Of the 2,649 houses that were actually built, nearly 1,800 are near the Caracol Industrial Park (CIP), which in turn is situated near Cap HaÏtien. According to the GAO audit: “in part, USAID’s program aimed to support the Haitian government’s goal of decentralizing economic growth outside of Port-au-Prince by increasing the housing stock in communities near the industrial park planned for northern Haiti.” On this same note, a January 2011 State Department strategy document—released less than a year after the earthquake killed more than 300,000 people—stated that the “changing distribution of Haiti’s population may offer a window of opportunity to develop new development corridors.” Furthermore, according to the strategy document, “the USG has elevated development alongside diplomacy and defense as core pillars of American power.” The industrial park is expected to provide one million square meters of factory space, most to be used in the manufacture of textiles, paint, and clothing. The State Department’s strategy document bemoaned the decline in underpaid Haitian textile jobs after the 1994 coup against Jean-Bertrande Aristide and the subsequent economic embargo of Haiti: “in the late 1980s, the industry employed an estimated 80,000 urban residents, mostly women; today its workers number only about 25,000.” Undaunted, the State Department writes that “Haiti’s proximity to the US market is complemented by a competitive labor force and trade preferences that make Haiti an attractive sourcing location for garments.” It notes that, in 2009, clothing exports accounted for 10 percent of Haiti’s GDP. Most workers at the new industrial park “are projected to receive the minimum wage,” according to the GAO. It estimates 37,000 permanent jobs earning in aggregate $150 million per year, or $4,054 per worker. It is hard to imagine how such a wage would pay even a subsidized rent or mortgage for a new house. In addition, those fortunate enough to get a house will be dependent on either the CIP or the new port for jobs. USAID blames cost overruns in the home construction program on the Haitian government’s request for flush toilets and bigger houses than originally planned. As planned, each house was to be 275 square feet, with Haiti asking for 450. Because of the drastic cut in the number of homes actually built, the number of people to be housed was reduced dramatically. USAID originally expected between 75,000 and 90,000 people to live in the new houses, but now estimates that only between 13,200 and 15,900 will fit into those actually built. Using the low end of this range, 13,200 people in 2,649 houses results in an average of five per house. A 250 square foot house would give each of these people a space equal to five by ten feet. The electric infrastructure built so far with USAID funds is also inadequate. GAO found that, as of 3/31/13, the 10-megawatt power plant for the industrial park was 89 percent complete, while planned infrastructure for residential distribution was only 10 percent complete. It also found that the US government is reluctant to share the garment industry’s profits with the Haitian government. In response to a Haitian proposal to charge a $260 fee on each container coming into the country—with the proceeds to be used for social programs—USAID’s “port feasibility study concluded that such a government surcharge would make the project financially infeasible. In its audit, GAO takes USAID to task for arrogance and incompetence, noting the lateness of its congressionally-mandated reports and the fact that of all USAID funds spent so far, the cost category with the highest disbursement rate is “Operating and Other Expenses;” that is, overhead. Of the industrial center’s planned port, which has not gotten past the stage of a Feasibility Study, GAO reports that “according to USAID officials, USAID has not constructed a port anywhere in the world since the 1970s, and USAID does not have a port engineer or port project manager among its direct-hire staff.” No explanation is offered for why the project wasn’t assigned to an agency with more experience.

USAID lacks proper oversight and wastes millionsKrepp 13, homeland security, transportation, and energy expert who began her career as an active duty Coast Guard officer in 1998. After September 11th, Ms. Krepp was part of the team that created the Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (Denise, “USAID - Waste and Mismanagement Exposed”, 7/8/13, The Maritime Executive, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/USAID--Waste-and-Mismanagement-Exposed-2013-07-08/)//LAThe U.S. Agency for International Development does not have the oversight capability to implement the Administration's proposed changes to the current food aid program. The agency has been repeatedly criticized by numerous inspector generals for mismanagement. This mismanagement has cost the American taxpayer millions of dollars. The Administration should focus its attention of fixing existing problems instead of changing the current international food aid distribution structure and giving USAID more money to lose. During a visit to a Dakar, Senegal food security expo last month, President Obama told attendees that U.S. taxpayer money used for food aid was not being wasted; rather, it was being used to help feed families. He then thanked USAID Administrator Raj Shah for all the great work he has done. The President's comments came a day after the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction blasted USAID for “ineffective program oversight.” Special Inspector General John Sopko initiated an investigation into the USAID

Southern Regional Agricultural Development program in 2012 after he received numerous complaints. In August 2011, the agency awarded a $70 million cooperative agreement to a non-profit organization to implement the agricultural program. The Special Inspector found several instances of waste and mismanagement. As a result of this poor oversight, U.S. taxpayer dollars were spent on unnecessary costs and equipment that may have been unused or stolen.The Government Accountability Office has also expressed concerns about USAID's management skills. The agency was tasked in 2010 with providing technical assistance and training to Afghan civil servants. In a 2011 report, GAO determined that success of the program couldn't be determined because of “weaknesses in USAID’s performance management frameworks, such as lack of performance targets and data (that) prevent reliable assessments of its results.” GAO recommended that USAID clean up its management processes. On June 7, 2013, the USAID Office of Inspector General released a report regarding the agency's partner-country and local organization assessments program. The OIG found that the agency did not sufficiently establish oversight roles for the assessment process. In addition, the OIG criticized the agency's Chief Financial Officer's Risk Management Team for little quality control and recommended that the CFO become more involved in the program. USAID disagreed with this recommendation stating that direct oversight should come individual in-country missions rather than the CFO in Washington, DC. An agency's CFO is a very important person. This individual is responsible for ensuring that agency funds are properly expended. In the case of USAID, the Associated Press reported earlier this year that the agency's former CFO and General Counsel are under investigation by its IG and the Department of Justice. The January 24th article also states that a USAID IG memo revealed evidence that the USAID Deputy Administrator may have interfered with the investigation. Before taking on any additional responsibility, USAID Administrator Shah should clean up the internal workings of his agency. This process should include improving oversight over existing programs such as those in Afghanistan and other war torn areas of the world. Cleaning up these programs will minimize waste and fraud. These changes will also maximize taxpayer resources – something, no one will disagree with.

USAID suffers ridiculous delaysBrookland 12, Brookland is a Devex global development reporter based in Washington, DC. She has worked as a humanitarian reporter for the United Nations and as an investigative journalist for News21. Jennifer holds a bachelor's in foreign service from Georgetown University and a master's in journalism from Columbia University and in international law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School. She also served for four years as an Air Force office. (Jennifer, “In USAID procurement, a game of stop-and-go”, 8/29/12, Devex, https://www.devex.com/en/news/in-usaid-procurement-a-game-of-stop-and-go/79023) //LAWhen Betsy Bassan created the Panagora Group a year and a half ago, she envisioned her small business playing an active role in addressing health and development problems worldwide. She had all the necessary experience, as vice president at a major development company, project director at a large nongovernmental organization and president of a leading professional association for aid practitioners. In the previous eight years, Bassan had won five large global health contracts with the U.S. government and more than a dozen other awards for the company she worked for. Now she was striking out on her own.And she had nothing to do. None of the six contracts she bid on last spring have been awarded.“As a new business that’s really, really hard,” Bassan said. “And as a small business, it’s a killer.” Delays in awarding contracts and grants don’t just cause headaches for small NGOs and consultancies, but also large implementing partners. And it is having a real impact on development, both at headquarters and in the field, as aid groups risk losing money, talent and even credibility, and needed programs get canceled or never get off the ground. For years, the U.S. Agency for International Development has been known for its particularly cumbersome procurement process and frequent delays in awarding field work. But over the past few years, delays have become worse, some implementers say. In wide-ranging interviews with executives of small and large nonprofit and for-profit implementing partners of USAID — several of whom spoke to Devex on the condition of anonymity out of anxiety for their ongoing business with the U.S. government — concerns were raised that USAID Forward, the agency’s ambitious reform project meant, among other things, to streamline procurement, might actually be exacerbating the problem, at least in the short run. USAID officials we spoke with, including Deputy Administrator Don Steinberg, acknowledged procurement delays but insisted that USAID Forward is not to blame. As Devex has previously reported, many implementing partners question USAID Forward’s controversial initiative to provide more funding directly through local companies and NGOs — a fact that may cloud some of the debate around procurement delays. Whatever the reason, USAID now takes more than 1.5 years to award its largest and most complex programs via what is called an indefinite quantity contract. Its goal is to reduce procurement action lead time to 268 days for overseas contracts, agreements and D.C.-based IQCs, and to 327 days for more complex IQCs.By comparison, it takes the Australian Agency for International Development an average of 166 days to award a tender valued above 500,000 Australian dollars (about $526,000) and 120 days for a competitive grant, according to an AusAID

spokesperson. The Japan International Cooperation Agency takes 75 days to award large-scale projects and 45 for small ones. The U.K. Department for International Development has pledged to award contracts within 120 days except in the most complex cases.Procurement speed varies by country and project, of course, and USAID has awarded some contracts quite swiftly. But as fiscal 2012 draws to a close and the agency rushes out huge amounts of money at the last minute, questions have grown loud again about funding delays and whether USAID is able to ensure an orderly rollout of aid projects.What causes procurement delays? Every bilateral donor must deal with the cyclical game of waiting for funding to be allocated and then trying to spend it all responsibly and in a timely fashion. Procurement delays throughout the year often give way to an outpouring of money at the end of a fiscal cycle, as government officials try to avoid giving the impression that they might as well have made due with a smaller budget. That’s especially true in Washington. The U.S. Congress has become so partisan that lawmakers struggle to pass annual appropriations bills, instead opting for short-term extensions of the existing budget. The budget is supposed to be passed by Sept. 30, the last day of the fiscal year. But that hasn’t happened in a while, and for fiscal 2012, Congress did not pass a budget until mid-December, after passing five temporary budget extensions. The delay gave USAID less time to develop acquisitions strategies, solicit bids and proposals, evaluate responses and award funding, according to Alan Chvotkin, executive vice president and counsel at the Professional Services Council, which advocates for U.S. companies pursuing global development business. After Congress appropriates money, it falls upon the White House Office of Management and Budget to make the funds available — a second potential holdup. And then there’s USAID.The agency is still understaffed, most observers say — even after hiring more than 105 new contracting officers in the past few years. And with several large IQCs coming to an end in the past year, USAID procurement officers have been under a lot of pressure to find ways to spend foreign aid dollars. Adding to that pressure is the new training that’s needed to get staff up-to-date on procurement reform and new reporting requirements for the agency’s partners in the field. The learning curve is particularly steep for USAID’s young recruits — 60 percent of field staff, for instance, has been on the job for five years or less, according to Steinberg — even though the agency tries to match them with more seasoned colleagues. All of them, though, have to adapt to reforms that are part of USAID Forward, including the need to update acquisition and assistance plans every quarter and, starting in October, to catalog online some of the 40 steps that are part of a standard procurement. Although USAID officials deny that these reforms have caused delays — they are meant to streamline procurement and reduce lead time, after all — implementing partners are not so sure. “I think they are in a very difficult situation,” Plan USA President Tessie San Martin said about USAID. “They are asked to redesign the procurement rules and processes and not slow down procurement actions. It’s hard to do both.” The end-of-the-year rush. Funding appropriated by the legislature usually must be spent by a set date, typically the end of the fiscal year, which for the U.S. government is Sept. 30. As a result, USAID and other agencies tend to rush out procurements in the last quarter of the fiscal year, making August the busiest month for proposal writers and recruiters in Washington. But USAID has other options for handling leftover funds. The agency may extend or expand certain existing agreements, for instance — a practice that “happens every year,” according to one procurement expert with nearly three decades of experience. “Who wants to go back into the general kitty when you could dump it in a contract and hold it?” she said. “I’ve had $11 million dumped into a contract before, with no work plan and no budget, just to hold it.” The agency might also waive the competitive bidding process, a move that requires justification. Some recent waivers have been for relatively small amounts of money, but others are significant, and USAID appears to have considerable leeway — regulation allows the agency to “award without competition when it is critical to the objectives of the foreign assistance program,” when an organization has unique capabilities or relationships within a partner country, or when it’s for a small grant that won’t last more than one year. It can also “limit competition to a selected group of applicants when it is necessary for [the] sake of efficiency.” Extensions to existing agreements can be awarded without justification. For critical priority countries like Pakistan, Iraq and Sudan, this means up to $20 million can be awarded without competition. There seems to be little debate in Washington aid circles about such funding extensions — unsurprising, perhaps, since the money tends to go to experienced USAID implementers inside the beltway. And although a case can be made for extending successful projects, the agency may miss out on innovative partnerships beyond the usual suspects.Another way for USAID to award funding is through cooperative agreements, which can’t be protested and, some implementers argue, are easier to write, faster to award and require less monitoring. USAID officials deny relying increasingly on cooperative agreements. The agency had “no bias one way or the other,” Steinberg said. USAID decides which vehicle to use based on the underlying intent, Steinberg insisted: A contract is supposed to directly benefit the U.S. government, while an agreement or grant should transfer value to the recipient. Since cooperative agreements prohibit the exchange of fees, for-profit companies tend not to bid and these projects tend to go to nonprofit organizations. But several for-profit implementing partners we spoke with argue that some cooperative agreements the agency has solicited would have been better suited as contracts. USAID awarded a $400 million Afghanistan infrastructure project with a small development component as a cooperative agreement to nonprofit International Relief and Development in 2007, for example. The debate between for-profit and nonprofit USAID implementing partners stretches back decades, and the pendulum has swung back and forth with successive

administrations. But some procurement experts we interviewed insisted that the reliance on cooperative agreements is on the rise because of their relatively less onerous award process. The number of health sector RFPs was about the same as the number of RFAs in 2009, and the amount spent on grants and cooperative agreements was within 5 million of the amount spent on contracts. Those numbers have since diverged sharply. Last year, $2.77 billion worth of work was awarded in health under assistance grants, and just $216 million under acquisition contracts, according to Bassan. “A cooperative agreement gives much, much, much less work in terms of the actual approval actions, so that is a very attractive mechanism,” Bassan said. The effect on implementers: Whatever USAID Forward is to blame or not, the consequences of the agency’s current procurement sluggishness are not insignificant. Delays affect NGOs and businesses which must respond to a slew of solicitations at once, forced to eschew some opportunities or put in a less-than-best effort on several at a time. In turn, USAID suffers from less competition, or lower-quality proposals. It also has less time itself to do an effective quality review and selection process, especially if the fiscal year deadline to award funds is looming. When USAID publicly forecasts a bid, potential partners often take the time and money to travel to the country, conduct interviews and connect with local organizations, gather a team of experts and recruit key personnel. That can cost more than $60,000, according to one longtime development practitioner familiar with private-sector development consultancies. If solicitations that were based on expiring funds are not awarded by the end of the fiscal year, they will be canceled — ho harm, no foul, one might say. But because it isn’t made public which agency funds are due to expire and which can carry over into the next year, bidders take all those pains to prepare for projects they’ll never implement. When an award takes much longer than expected, research grows outdated, conditions in the field change, and staff is lured away by more concrete offers. After repeated delays, consultants and local staff might become hesitant to work with partners who seem to string them along, preferring more reliable employment. One expert recently demanded to be put on a development contractor’s payroll for one year as a precondition to signing on for a project, a proposal recruiter told Devex. He was sick of being hired for projects that never got off the ground and turning down other work in the meantime. This story illustrates the challenges aid groups face in times of funding delays. Organizations lose credibility when the programs they prepare for don’t come to fruition. Often, they must watch talented local staff leave in search of more reliable opportunities — especially painful if the organization had already invested in training. “We have to scramble around to find cash to pass to our sub-organizations so they can keep their doors open because they don’t have that kind of money available,” said one business development expert. “The local organizations that are getting direct funding do not have the resources to wait these kinds of things out.” Larger nonprofits that have alternative funding sources sometimes take the risk of going ahead with work on the assumption that USAID’s money will come through. But several aid practitioners told Devex that it’s not unheard of for projects funded solely by USAID to be delayed so long that no one can cover the gap between awards, and work has to come to an abrupt stop. The future of USAID procurement: Despite its best intentions to speed things up and streamline the procurement process, improvement may not be in the immediate forecast. Actually, it could get worse, according to Chvotkin of PSC. The next fiscal year begins Oct. 1 and Congress has yet to pass appropriations for foreign affairs, including USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corp. USAID will likely be under a continuing resolution for at least a few months, allowed to spend money at the same rate as fiscal 2012, but not in a good position to make long-term funding decisions. The results of this year’s presidential election could prove significant. If Mitt Romney is elected, analysts expect the new president to try to cut foreign aid and reshape the way USAID does business. Finally, there is the possibility of mandatory across-the-board federal government spending cuts later this year — the so called “sequestration” — which was enacted as part of last year’s debt ceiling compromise. This sequestration would likely see USAID’s budget slashed by around 8.5 percent, according to InterAction President Samuel Worthington. The Office of Budget Management will report to Congress by Sept. 8 on the actual amount due to be cut. Unfortunately, the people who make development happen won’t know the situation until it’s upon them, if authors who wrote a white paper for the American Bar Association’s Federal Procurement Institute are correct. They wrote that, “Individual contracting officers and their customers, the program managers, will generally be among the last to know what funds will be available for what programs.”

Aid is ineffective and experiences structural programsGarvelink and Tahir 12, Ambassador William J. Garvelink is a senior adviser with the Project on U.S. Leadership in Development at the The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Farha Tahir is program coordinator and research associate with the CSIS Africa Program.( William and Farha, “Getting the Right Response to Food Shortages in the Sahel”, 7/16/12, http://www.hunger-undernutrition.org/blog/usaid/)//LAA bleak narrative of 16 million people on the brink of starvation in West Africa’s Sahel region has captured headlines. But the brewing food crisis has been overstated, and the headlines fail to identify the core causes of food insecurity and malnutrition in the region. The international community has been and seems again to be content to provide massive amounts of food aid and deal with the symptoms rather than address the underlying cause of this crisis: lack of community resilience. The real crisis in the Sahel is one of persistently high rates of acute malnutrition, an issue that has affected the

region’s residents for decades and cannot be addressed with emergency food assistance alone. It’s true that the picture is not a good one: poor harvest, higher food prices, and malnutrition are in fact evident in certain areas. While all experts agree that some targeted food assistance is required, food aid should be minimized, realizing that it plays only a palliative role and could disrupt markets. Food aid fails to address the fundamental problems. Agricultural production in the Sahel is on the increase and markets are functioning. While inadequate rainfall distribution did delay harvests and create some production deficits, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) estimates that this year’s production will be sufficient to meet the region’s food requirements.¶ The more pressing issue is a resilience deficit, the same issue that loomed during the 2005 crisis when the international community focused on food distribution. That decision disrupted local markets and failed to prevent what we’re seeing today. The causes of this resilience deficit range from matters of cultural practice to larger development challenges, including lack of access to safe water, inadequate health care and nutrition, and poor sanitation. Chronic malnutrition in children is region wide, affecting an estimated 40 percent of those under five years of age. In fact, the Sahel has some of the highest child mortality rates and the highest child acute malnutrition rates in the world. Placing the current situation in this context demonstrates that it is not an aberration but a larger development challenge.¶ The situation in the Sahel is about chronic food insecurity that requires a focus on long-term food production and malnutrition rates. The classification of an emergency, therefore, looks very different in the Sahel than in other parts of the world.¶ The source of the overcompensation in the Sahel is clear. The international community was severely criticized last year for what were deemed inadequate efforts to combat the drought/famine in the Horn of Africa, particularly for its delayed response. But the Sahel is not Somalia. And the Sahel is not facing a famine. Responding late to one crisis and responding inappropriately to the next suggests that something is broken. Something is wrong with the international response networks that have been designed to facilitate appropriate responses to food emergencies. The international community hesitated when FEWS warned in 2010 of a famine in Somalia, and tens of thousands suffered. Today, despite cautions by FEWS and others, donors and NGOs are again considering tactics that will not resolve the problem. The challenges of the Sahel suggest the time is right for a reexamination of how the international community makes assistance decisions about the world’s food crises.

Energy Aid Increasing (Aff)

Energy aid trades off with national security – energy aid will increase by 14.3 millionRogers 12, REPRESENTATIVE MIKE ROGERS (R-AL)Rep, (Mike, “Hearing of the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee Subject: "FY 2013 Budget for the State Department" Chaired by: Representative Kay Granger (R-TX) Witness: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Location: 2359 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:00 a.m. EST Date: Tuesday, February 29, 2012, Federal News Service, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ //LAREP. ROGERS: From the instability in the Middle East to the economic crisis in Europe, to the evolving challenges in the Asia- Pacific region, there's no question that you're serving during a very critical period of history. World events often remind us that our country, our freedom, our way of life remain at constant risk. In recent years we've also seen a different kind of threat to our independence, emerging in our escalating fiscal crisis here at home. This committee has been front and center and been given the chore of addressing the very real security threat, as the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs described it, posed by out-of-control Washington spending and trillion-dollar deficits now four years in the running. Last year -- last calendar year -- this committee worked to restore transparency, austerity, tough oversight to the appropriations process and we succeeded in reducing discretionary spending by some $95 billion compared to fiscal year '10. That's not happened since World War II, and I'm very proud of our committee's work in that respect. A tough chore. While I share your interest in supporting key national security priorities, I am concerned that the State and foreign operations request of 54.7 billion (dollars) is an increase of nearly 2.6 percent above fiscal '12. Even while the proposed Department of Defense budget is being reduced by the administration, State and USAID continues to rise in their request . In addition to the many valid budget concerns expressed by Chairwoman Granger and Nita Lowey, I would also like to add our shared concern about our country's energy security to that list . Even though the State Department has said, quote, "Energy security is vital to U.S. national security," quote, "The department continues to rattle off excuses for delaying the Keystone Excel pipeline." While the State Department is pushing back on a viable energy option that would also create jobs in the U.S., the budget proposes to bump up funding by $5.4 million for the newly created Bureau of Energy Resources , and to increase aid to other countries by 14.3 million (dollars) to help them address their energy challenges. I find that a bit ironic in view of the decision on the pipeline here.

AT PEPFAR

No trade-off – USAID budget doesn’t include PEPFARCCGA 11[Chicago Council on Global Affairs, May 2011, “Strengthening USAID: A Timeline of Recent Events” http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/GlobalAgDevelopment/Report/GADI_Occasional_Paper_Strengthening_USAID.pdf]May 31, 2011 - Agricultural development has historically been a significant component of U.S. foreign aid. While in the 1980s 25 percent of U.S. foreign aid went to agriculture, that number dropped to six percent by 1990 and was a meager one percent by 2008.1 As U.S. support for agricultural development has declined, so has the capacity of USAID to deliver agricultural assistance. In 1997, USAID ceased to be an independent agency with the Administrator reporting to the President and was folded into the State Department.2 In 2006, the Secretary of State created a Foreign Assistance Bureau within the State Department (State/F) to more closely align the

USAID budget and activities with the State Department’s diplomacy objectives, ending USAID’s budget autonomy. While President G.W. Bush increased the foreign aid budget significantly, the aims of USAID’s development work were anchored in the President’s National Security Strategy. Furthermore, President Bush’s signature development initiatives, such as President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ( PEPFAR ) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), were placed outside of USAID.

PEPFAR has pushed out more important health programs and is the root cause of status quo overstretchO’Hanlon 9[Barbara O’Hanlon, Hewlett Foundation, April 2009, “USAID’s Funding Decisions on Reproductive Health and Family Planning” http://www.hewlett.org/uploads/files/USAID_FPRH_Funding_Decisions_-_OHanlon_April_2009.pdf]Many USAID staff interviewed for this paper described the negative impact of PEPFAR on its other health programs. As one USAID

staff person interviewed stated, “PEPFAR has had a tsunami effect across the Agency” (direct communication). First, PEPFAR funds have overwhelmed other health programs like RH/FP, child survival and maternal heath. The great sums of PEPFAR funds have further skewed USAID’s and Missions’ budgets, creating dramatic funding imbalances (see Figure 5). Second, the

management and reporting requirements for PEPFAR, for example the annual Country Operating Plans, have become the dominate focus of USAID staff both at headquarters and in the field. Moreover, USAID staff must spend their time on PEPFAR program management to the detriment of their other programs.

Reform Fails

Reform won’t go far enough fast enoughFrumin 9[Amy Frumin, International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, “Diagnosing USAID” March/April 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64663/amy-b-frumin/diagnosing-usaid]The former U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administrators J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios ("Arrested Development,"

November/December 2008) explain that despite the U.S. government's having elevated the status of development to be on par with defense and diplomacy, USAID has been so emasculated over the last several decades that it is not an effective member of the triumvirate of U.S. national security strategy tools. The only solution the authors see is a wholesale reform of the institutions of foreign assistance, including making USAID an independent department , creating a National Security Council position focused on foreign assistance, and unifying all sources of foreign assistance under USAID . Reform is needed. However, as a former USAID field officer in Afghanistan, I propose a less Washington-centric reform strategy. From Washington's political and strategic perspective, it does not make sense to elevate the bureaucratic status of USAID when there is so little faith in the organization to begin with. The authors themselves claim USAID is dysfunctional. Congress demonstrated its lack of confidence in USAID by increasing the Department of Defense's allocation of official development assistance funds from 3.5 percent to 21.7 percent between 1999 and 2005. In that same period, USAID's share of official development assistance decreased from 65 percent to less than 40 percent. Prioritizing bureaucratic reform in Washington also does not make sense from a national security perspective. In a world of unconventional modern warfare, fragile states characterized by corruption and poverty are now the enemy, and reconstruction and development are the tools to combat them. Because USAID cannot carry out these tasks effectively, the military has been charged with doing more of them. Piling another mandate that requires an entirely new skill set onto an overstretched military not only distracts it

from its main task of fighting wars but also underutilizes the organization established to address these issues: USAID. The United States cannot afford to wait until Washington works through the political tangle of reforming foreign assistance to make USAID more functional in the field. After decades of scrutiny and downsizing, USAID has become an anemic organization , with a fifth the number of staff it had in the 1960s and a fraction of the agility and autonomy it had when it was better funded. Reform should begin by giving USAID the human and financial resources it needs to succeed in the field. Of course, political will is required to make these changes, and that will must come from the president's office.

DOS control and agriculture are alt causes to USAID successCCGA 11[Chicago Council on Global Affairs, May 2011, “Strengthening USAID: A Timeline of Recent Events” http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/GlobalAgDevelopment/Report/GADI_Occasional_Paper_Strengthening_USAID.pdf]May 31, 2011 - Agricultural development has historically been a significant component of U.S. foreign aid. While in the 1980s 25 percent of U.S. foreign aid went to agriculture, that number dropped to six percent by 1990 and was a meager one percent by 2008.1 As U.S. support for agricultural development has declined, so has the

capacity of USAID to deliver agricultural assistance. In 1997, USAID ceased to be an independent agency with the Administrator reporting to the President and was folded into the State Department.2 In 2006, the Secretary of State created a Foreign Assistance Bureau within the State Department (State/F) to more closely align the USAID budget and activities with the State Department’s diplomacy objectives, ending USAID’s budget autonomy. While President G.W. Bush increased the foreign aid budget significantly, the aims of USAID’s development work were anchored in the President’s National Security Strategy. Furthermore, President Bush’s signature development initiatives, such as President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), were placed outside of USAID. Yet the events of the past two years show that the tide may be turning. On the agricultural assistance front, President Obama’s inaugural promise - “To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish…” - launched a renewal of the global agricultural development agenda. This assurance has translated into a series of policy actions: at the G-8 meeting in L’Aquila, Italy, in July 2009, the United States pledged to invest $3.5 billion in food security and agricultural development over three years; the initiative to fulfill this pledge, Feed the Future, was formally launched by the Secretary of State in May 2010 and was highlighted as a signature program when President Obama issued the first-ever Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) for Global Development in September 2010. Simultaneously, the resurgence of attention to agriculture has been echoed with calls to strengthen USAID’s capacity to serve as an innovative development enterprise. In the aforementioned PPD, the President reaffirmed the nation’s “moral obligation and national security interest in providing assistance” to the hungry and designated USAID as the lead development agency.3 The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) reiterated this designation. Since these announcements, USAID has launched significant internal shifts and changes, including the USAID FORWARD reform effort and the formation of two new Bureaus, one for Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL) and another for Food Security (BFS). The breadth and depth of these changes have been impressive. Likewise, the pace of change has been remarkable. When The Chicago Council released its Renewing American Leadership in the Fight Against Global Hunger and Poverty report in 2009,

the picture was dismal. As an agency, USAID was still grappling with its new State Department mandated priorities to promote “peace and security” – with the goal of “reducing widespread poverty” added in as a result of complaints from the development community.4 This coincided with a decline in staffing for USAID in general, as illustrated by the decline in total U.S. personnel direct hires from about 7,000 in 1965-1970 to just

above 2,000 in 2000-2005. To reverse this negative trend and improve USAID’s ability to deliver agricultural development assistance, The Chicago Council made two specific recommendations: restore the leadership role of USAID and rebuild USAID’s in-house capacity to develop and administer agricultural development assistance programs. The study’s Leaders Group warned that if USAID’s leadership role in agricultural development was not restored, other initiatives and efforts were likely to falter. Now, since 2009, it appears that many of the report’s recommendations—including the prioritization of agricultural development funds, improved leadership and staff capacity at USAID, and improved interagency coordination—have been incorporated into the Administration’s international development plans and policies.

Reform is slow – Feed the Future and Congressional backlashCCGA 11[Chicago Council on Global Affairs, May 2011, “Strengthening USAID: A Timeline of Recent Events” http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/GlobalAgDevelopment/Report/GADI_Occasional_Paper_Strengthening_USAID.pdf]As mentioned at the outset of this paper, the aforementioned developments should be commended, but they should also serve as a reminder that overall USAID reform and Feed the Future have only just begun. According to Administrator Shah, "At the end of the day, what we’re trying to do is create kind of commercially viable agriculture sectors in these countries to eliminate the fact that every time prices do spike a little bit, it creates a lot of

unrest and a lot of human suffering."29 Creating commercially viable agriculture takes time, and Feed the Future is a program designed for long-term results; its full impact may take a decade or more to bear fruit. Sustaining Congressional enthusiasm through changing political environments will likewise be a challenge. In Administrator Shah’s testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 16, 2011, he noted that the Administration’s FY 2012 budget outlines significant cuts by eliminating bilateral development assistance in 11 countries and closing USAID missions in three, cutting development assistance for at least 20 countries by half, and reallocates funding and staff toward priority countries and initiatives.30 He also justified the funds requested for Feed the Future, “For the $1.1 billion we are requesting for bilateral agricultural development programs, we will be able to help up to 18 million people in up to 20 countries—most of them women—grow enough food to feed their families and break

the grips of hunger and poverty.” Less than a month after these FY 2012 discussions, Congress passed the FY 2011 budget, which cut Foreign Operations funds to $31.3 billion - a $3.5 billion reduction from FY 2010 and a $5.1 billion reduction from the FY 2011 request.31 State/USAID Development Assistance funding will continue at roughly the same level as FY 2010 – however the actual FY 2011 numbers reflect a 15 percent cut to what the

President put forward in his FY 2011 request. The change in House leadership and the federal budget deficit situation make prospects for increases to U.S. foreign assistance funding uncertain. Is USAID sufficiently reinvigorated and strengthened to carry out the Administration’s ambitious development agenda? Only partially, but efforts over the past two years have been a promising start. As early as November 2010, Administrator Shah expressed optimism about changes within USAID. “I'm happy to say the tide is turning; USAID has reestablished a policy bureau, introduced a new science and technology division, and ramped up its hiring of development professionals to levels we haven't seen in over a decade.”32

Administrator Shah has also indicated that Feed the Future is a flagship effort for USAID and a key plank in the administration’s global development strategy, but, “We have to be honest about the stakes involved…Our credibility rests on its success.”33 Feed the Future and USAID are faced with high expectations and high stakes.

USAID is underfunded and most of the funding gets drained into the military and emergenciesTomkins 10[Jenny Tomkins, member of the In These Times Board of Editors, “Reforming Foreign Aid” August 4 2010, http://inthesetimes.com/article/6201/]The ‘three pillars’ theory The U.S. development community is optimistic that substantial changes to America’s aid system are at hand. And for good reason: President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have both been explicit about the need for reform and commissioned comprehensive reviews of U.S. development

policies and practices. Clinton has repeatedly stated her commitment to making defense, diplomacy and development “three equal pillars” of U.S. foreign policy, recognizing that they must work in concert if they are to serve U.S. interests. “Development was once the province of humanitarians, charities, and governments looking to gain allies in global struggles,” Clinton said in January. “Today it is a strategic, economic and moral imperative–as central to advancing American interests and solving global problems as diplomacy or defense.” Under the Bush administration, critics say USAID lost its capacity to undertake and monitor major projects, most of which were farmed out to private-in some cases for-profit–organizations. To strengthen the agency, Clinton has requested increases to USAID’s budget and increased the agency’s staffing. And in July 2009, she instituted the first-ever State Department Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), intended “to define the capabilities we need and then match resources with priorities.” The review is expected to be released early this fall. Obama, meanwhile, has pledged to double U.S. foreign assistance and modernize it. He promised to “elevate, streamline and empower a 21st century U.S. Development Agency,” and last year began a cross-governmental review of development policy, the Presidential Study Directive on Global Development. He tapped National Security Advisor James Jones and National Economic Development Council Director Lawrence Summers to oversee the effort. Strikingly absent from this cross-governmental panel was the director of USAID, because at the time there wasn’t one: Rajiv Shah wasn’t confirmed as the agency’s administrator until January 7. Although the lateness of Shah’s appointment may have damaged the impetus for development reform, critics regard his eventual confirmation as another good omen. Reform advocates admire Shah’s commitment to development and his experience outside the beltway. A medical doctor, Shah came to USAID from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, where he was in charge of agricultural development programs. Reform vs. reality But

some observers think Shah will have a hard time preventing development assistance from being subsumed by emergencies, such as Haiti, and the exigencies of national security . (Just days after his confirmation, Clinton assigned Shah to oversee the

country’s Haitian earthquake response.) Despite recent intimations of significant changes, the reality of longstanding U.S. spending habits is daunting. First, there is the challenge of making the three equal pillars concept a reality. Many consider Clinton’s pillars talk merely a rhetorical flourish, given that the United States currently spends 12.5 times more on defense ($688 billion

for the Department of Defense in 2010) than on diplomacy and development combined . Even if Congress approves the proposed budget increase to

$56.8 billion for the State Department and foreign assistance, much of the development portion will go to support wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to buttress military operations in Pakistan. Another source of inequality is that USAID is not a cabinet-level agency (like the

Defense Department) but instead resides within the State Department. Also, any current or future strengthening of USAID has to be understood in the context of just how weak the agency has become. Under the Bush administration, it saw its share of the country’s “official development aid”

(ODA) budget shrink from 60 to 40 percent. Congress, meanwhile, has routinely overwhelmed its budget with earmarks and disperses foreign aid among a dizzying array of government departments , agencies and offices. Finally, USAID continues to operate under the antiquated Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which dates back to USAID’s founding under President John F. Kennedy. The FAA is a source of frustration and anger among development experts, and reforming it is the central goal of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN), which brings together development professionals and organizations, and lobbies to change how Washington conceives of and delivers foreign aid. According

to former USAID directors, the FAA burdens USAID with excessive and meaningless reporting. It also contains “buy American” provisions that are costly, and cumbersome, development professionals say. Congress is beginning to act. In April 2009, Reps. Howard Berman (D-Calif.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) introduced the Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009. More than 120 legislators are now co-sponsors. Meanwhile, Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) advanced the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act out of committee in November 2009. It has more than 20 co-sponsors, but has not yet been scheduled for debate on the Senate floor. While

conceding that USAID won’t secure a cabinet-level appointment any time soon, MFAN is working to make sure that what it calls “the Grand Bargain” becomes part of development reform. MFAN member Nora O’Connell, of Women Thrive Worldwide, says this would require Congress to agree to have less say in crafting development agency budgets. In return, USAID and other agencies would become more accountable for project outcomes. “This is hard for the political system” says O’Connell, because it doesn’t fit with political needs or timelines, and would also entail authorizing more long-term projects. What MFAN co-chairs Rev. David Beckmann of Bread for the World and Dr. George Ingram, former deputy assistant administrator of USAID, last year called the “unprecedented momentum created at all levels of government” has yet to crystallize into actual change.

Reform Bad

USAID Forward makes things worse – delays funding processMaeder 12[Anina Maeder, MicroDinero, “USAID: delayed funding and current reforms” September 3 2012, http://www.microdinero.com/index.php/english/nota/5242/usaid-delayed-funding-and-current-reforms]Aid practitioners have been criticizing USAID, the U.S. Agency for International Development, for its severe delays in the funding process. There are concerns that the current reform project, USAID Forward, will exacerbate the problem . According to investigations of the

international development social enterprise Devex, USAID may take up to 1.5 years to award its most complex funding via an IQC

(indefinite quantity contract). These procurement delays are a serious issue for various reasons: First of all there is the real world impact on development. Programs get cancelled or not even started. This makes organizations lose credibility, personnel and of course resources —not only the lost USAID award, but also the capital invested in the bidding process and project preparation. Delays can also change conditions in the field and leave research outdated . The 2011 reform project USAID Forward aims to improve the speed of procurement. It emphasizes new partnerships, innovation and a persistent focus on results. The reform states: "It gives USAID the opportunity to transform its agency and unleash its

full potential to achieve high-impact development." However, USAID partners are concerned that the necessary staff training of the agency to familiarize them with the reformed procedures will lead to more delays and complications in the process . It is hard to redesign a process without slowing it down at the same time.

Misc

- this could be a solvency advocate for a conditions cp as well

US aid is useless unconditionally – Pakistan proves only fuels corruption, disincentives democracy and funds are ineffectiveIbrahim 09, Belfer Center Discussion Paper, International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School, (Azeem, “US Aid to Pakistan – US taxpayers have funded Pakistani corruption”, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf) //LAThere is widespread agreement that aid to Pakistan has not been spent effectively over the past decade. There is less agreement over how to fix it. This paper contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it provides the most comprehensive survey of the publicly available information on U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001 to provide an evidence base on which recommendations can be based. Second, it suggests three ways to improve aid to Pakistan, by proposing three principles which should underlie any conditions which are attached to future aid. They are:1) Cooperate to Reduce Obstruction, Sanction to Reduce Opposition—Conditions should only be imposed to prevent clear harm to explicitly expressed U.S. intentions (such as Pakistan spending funds on nuclear weapons). Other outcomes, however desirable, (such as requiring Pakistan to shut madrassahs which encourage extremism), should be achieved through cooperation, not conditionality. 2) First, Do No Harm—It will be counterproductive to use conditions to micromanage specific positive outcomes by institutions beyond U.S. control—that would be to invite failure. Rather, conditions should focus on preventing harm (i.e. preventing Pakistan moving in the wrong direction, such as reducing civilian oversight over the military budget, for example).3) Put Conditions Only on How the Aid is Spent—Pakistan and its electorate are acutely sensitive to the perception that the country may be being bullied or bribed. Some argue that this speaks to the necessity of not imposing any conditions. This is equivalent to arguing that Pakistan’s sensitivity licenses it to more years misspending a large proportion of U.S. aid money. A more logical response is to draw a distinction between how Pakistan spends the aid funds and general Pakistani actions which do not directly relate to how Pakistan spends U.S. aid. The most important aspect of this paper is the recommendation that conditions should only be tailored to the actual use of the funds themselves (apart from conditions preventing Pakistan from moving in the wrong direction). The funds should not be used as leverage to impose positive collateral requirements on Pakistan. Underlying these conditions is the recognition that conditions will never be effective unless Pakistani sensitivities to them are properly understood and taken into account. After all, they will determine how Pakistan reacts. The United States must also recognize that conditionality is only part of the solution; conditions are not an appropriate means to achieve all the outcomes which the United States seeks. For each, Congress should look into the various options, excluding sanctions, which it has available to it, in a hard-headed way. The United States must not provide Pakistani institutions with incentives to act counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future. It has done so in the past. But until the spring of 2009, no comprehensive overview of the full funding to Pakistan was possible as the figures were kept secret. Those figures, as well as a full analysis of what is known about how they were spent, can now be evaluated. The available information paints a picture of a systemic lack of supervision in the provision of aid to Pakistan, often lax U.S. oversight, and the incentivization of U.S. taxpayer–funded corruption in the Pakistani military and security services. The author believes that this is the first attempt to present an overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, evaluate it, and present recommendations on how to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and lessons are learned.20U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption Since 1951, the United States has given significant funding to Pakistan. Since September 11, 2001, U.S. funding has been intended for the following five purposes: to cover the extra cost to Pakistan’s military of fighting terrorism; provide Pakistan with military equipment to fight terrorism; to provide development and humanitarian assistance; covert funds (such as bounties or prize money); and cash transfers directly to the Pakistani government’s budget. Pakistan one of only four countries to receive direct cash transfers. Between 2002 and 2008, this “thank you” to Pakistan for help in fighting terrorism cost the U.S. taxpayer $2,374,000,000. By its nature, these cash transfers became Pakistani sovereign funds, precluding U.S. oversight. Since 2001, there have been significant concerns over the funding: • The United States has not been transparent about the funds. Until 2009, information has been either hidden from the public or released in a form too aggregated to allow for effective public oversight. Those who have seen the agreements on how funds are to be spent say they have lacked concrete benchmarks, sometimes even concrete figures, and were too vague to be effective.• The United States misused development funds. Operating costs were high, too much of the aid was ineffective, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs have been hampered by insufficient resources and security concerns.• There was a lack of agreed strategy for use of funds. Aims for the military aid were poorly defined, and many of the agreements on how funds were to be spent were inadequate.• The United States had inadequate procedures for checking

how Pakistan spent the funds. U.S. Embassy staff in Pakistan were not required to check how the Pakistani military actually spent U.S. funds, the Pakistani army insisted that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)—where much of the money was to be spent—were too dangerous to visit, making sustained oversight there impossible; the United States has not been able to check Pakistani army records on how the money was being spent; the procedures in place to check how Pakistan spent the money were inadequate, and the decision to give Pakistan funds in the form of reimbursements made adequate oversight impossible.• U.S. funds disincentivized democratization by giving the military a disincentive to submit to civilian control, increasing its independence from government, and ignoring evidence of profiteering from military budgets. • The Pakistani military did not use most of the funds for the agreed objective of fighting terror. Pakistan bought much conventional military equipment. Examples include F-16s, aircraft-mounted armaments, anti-ship and antimissile defense systems, and an air defense radar system costing $200 million, despite the fact that the terrorists in the FATA have no air attack capability. Over half of the total funds—54.9 percent—were spent on fighter aircraft and weapons, over a quarter—26.62 percent—on support and other aircraft, and 10 percent on advanced weapons systems. • There is also clear evidence of corruption within the Pakistani army. The United States provided $1.5 million to reimburse Pakistan for damage to Navy vehicles which had not been used in combat, $15 million for the Pakistani army to build bunkers for which there is no evidence that they exist, and about $30 million for Pakistani road-building for which there is no such evidence either. Fifty-five million dollars was provided for helicopter maintenance for the entire national helicopter fleet which was not performed. Pakistan continued to receive around $80 million per month for military operations during ceasefire periods when troops were in their barracks. U.S. officials visiting the FATA found Pakistani 21U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption Frontier Corps units poorly equipped, one reporting that he saw members of the Corps “standing… in the snow in sandals,” with several wearing World War I–era pith helmets and carrying barely functional Kalashnikov rifles with “just 10 rounds of ammunition each”. At one point, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf himself complained that Pakistan’s helicopters needed more U.S. spare parts and support, despite reports from U.S. military officials that the United States had provided $8 million worth of Cobra parts over the previous six months.“The great majority” of the Coalition Support Funds given by the United States to reimburse Pakistan for counterterrorism operations was reportedly diverted to the Ministry of Finance, with only $300 million reaching the Army in the financial year ending 2008. This is evidence of corruption at the highest level. The result is that, after eight years of funding, many Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment such as sufficient ammunition, armored vests, and shoes. For many years, U.S. officials ignored clear evidence that the military was not using U.S. funds to further U.S. foreign policy objectives. • Pakistani counterterrorism failed until 2009. During the years 2001 to mid-2009, significant parts of the FATA were under Taliban control, and according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, al Qaeda has reconstituted a safe haven in the FATA. Tellingly, when the Pakistani army did launch an effective operation in Malakand in mid-2009, it was primarily in response to public pressure within Pakistan, not U.S. aid. Sadly, it seems that Pakistan’s military and security services have for many years been a black hole for U.S. funds. They have enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning of Pakistani institutions and the country’s ability to fight its extremist enemies and provided already kleptocratic institutions with further incentives for corruption. Many of the incentives for Pakistani army corruption are longstanding, institutional, and remain in place today. Preventing this performance from recurring will require changes to the oversight system such as the use of experts and the creation of a dedicated monitoring group as described below. But that will not be sufficient. It will also require an understanding that conditionality is just one of the items in the toolbox available for getting aid right and an understanding of how and when it should be used, to which this paper contributes.

Conditional aid is the only effective mechanism to see reformIbrahim 09, Belfer Center Discussion Paper, International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School, (Azeem, “US Aid to Pakistan – US taxpayers have funded Pakistani corruption”, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf) //LAFinally, conditionality is essential if the humanitarian aid is to reach its intended recipients. The fact that aid for education and “worldly”, as opposed to religious, comprehensive study programs can help to mitigate the spread of militancy among younger generations is widely acknowledged among U.S. policymakers. But too much of the aid allocated to this purpose over the previous eight years has not been effective. There are various reasons for this, such as security concerns hampering the ability to target the aid correctly, the use of foreign contractors resulting in enriching neighboring countries, and a misguided focus on tangibles such as school buildings at the expense of intangibles such as better quality teaching.81 Given this, it is essential to put a coherent distribution mechanism in place for non-military aid. Even regarding this as a condition is misleading. It is a precondition for its being worthwhile to give the aid in the first place.

Uniq: Border Security Now

US assists Mexico border through Merida Initiatives - Mexican Border Security is receiving 234$ millionSeelke and Finklea 13, Clare Ribando Seelke is a Specialist in Latin American Affairs and Kristin M. Finklea is Analyst in Domestic Security, (Ribando and Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond”, 6/26/13, Congressional Research Service, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/210921.pdf) //LA

Brazen violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security and governance in some parts of Mexico, a country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and $500 billion in annual trade. Although the violence in Mexico has generally declined since late 2011, analysts estimate that it may have claimed more than 60,000 lives between December 2006 and November 2012. The violence has increased U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States. U.S.-Mexican security cooperation increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and Central America first funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border , and (4) building strong and resilient communities . As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to intensify its anticrime efforts and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Inaugurated on December 1, 2012, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a shift in focus toward reducing violent crime in Mexico. Peña Nieto has begun to adjust the process and priorities of U.S.-Mexican efforts, adjustments which President Obama has pledged to support. The Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through which Mérida training and equipment requests are coordinated and intelligence is channeled. The Mexican government is requesting increased assistance for judicial reform and prevention efforts, but limiting U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence operations. As the Peña Nieto government fleshes out its security strategy, Mérida programs are likely to be adjusted in order to support those efforts that align with U.S. priorities. The 113th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative and related domestic initiatives, but may also consider supporting new programs. From FY2008 to FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in Mérida assistance for Mexico, roughly $1.2 billion of which had been delivered as of April 2013. The Obama Administration asked for $234.0 million for Mérida programs in in its FY2013 budget request and $183 million in its FY2014 request. Congress may wish to examine how well the Mexican government’s security strategy supports U.S. interests in Mexico. Congressional approval will be needed should the State Department seek to reprogram some of the funding already in the pipeline for Mérida, or shift new funding to better align with Mexico’s new priorities. Should disagreements occur between Mexican and U.S. priorities, Congress may weigh in on how those disagreements should be resolved. Congress may also debate how to measure the impact of Mérida Initiative programs, as well as the extent to which Mérida has evolved to respond to changing security conditions in Mexico. Another issue of congressional interest involves whether Mexico is meeting the human rights conditions placed on Mérida Initiative funding.

Misc

Christy and Moore 13, Patrick Christy and Evan Moore are senior policy analysts at the Foreign Policy Initiative (Patrick and Evan, “Don’t Let Sequestration Cut Foreign Aid”, 2/27/13, US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/02/27/dont-let-sequestration-cut-foreign-aid) //LA

Much attention has focused on how looming sequestration cuts will harm national defense, but few people understand how sequestration's March 2013 onset will also hurt U.S. foreign assistance programs that advance America's security, prosperity, and global leadership. Under sequestration, spending on international affairs (a major component of which is U.S. foreign assistance) will be   slashed  not only by roughly 5.3 percent in fiscal year 2013, but also by as much as $50 billion over the next decade—roughly what the United States spends on diplomacy and development in a single year. It's important to remember that America's commitment to foreign assistance reflects not only the nation's moral character, but also its strategic and economic interests.  First, foreign assistance promotes national security by helping to fight the causes of terrorism, stabilize weak states, and promote regional-level security and global stability. To take a key example, foreign assistance is playing a crucial role in America's larger struggle to combat conditions that can spawn terrorism—namely, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption—by promoting economic development, good governance, and transparency in the Middle East and South Asia. Second, foreign assistance promotes prosperity and self reliance by encouraging economic development and private enterprise in aid-recipient countries, as well as opening and developing international markets for the United States.  For example, South Korea—which was a leading benefactor of U.S. foreign assistance after having been devastated in the Korean War—is now America's seventh largest trading partner, a vibrant democracy, and a significant donor of foreign assistance. Third, foreign assistance advances America's moral values and humanitarian interests by saving lives, fighting poverty and hunger, combating infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, promoting education, and bolstering democratic institutions. For example, President George W. Bush launched the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003 to battle the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa. In conjunction with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis, PEPFAR has achieved real and objective results. Foreign assistance—properly understood—is neither national bribery nor altruistic charity, but rather strategic investment. As Paul D. Miller, a former director for Afghanistan in the National Security Council under Presidents Bush and Obama who earlier served as an Army reservist in Afghanistan, wrote: Foreign aid helps countries whose interests align with our own increase their capacities. The United States gives money to help select countries—not the entire world—improve specific abilities, like their ability to provide public security, defend their borders, or buy and sell goods.... Aid is hard power. It is a weapon the United States uses to strengthen allies [and partners] and, thus, ourselves. To be clear, the goal of results-driven foreign assistance is to help America's partners become self reliant. While it is true that certain development programs faced challenges in the past, Washington has increasingly embraced new—and arguably revolutionary—reforms over the last decade to make foreign assistance even more transparent, accountable, and more effective. Yet, despite significant reforms, foreign assistance is still frequently misunderstood. As Sen. Marco Rubio has   noted, even though foreign assistance comprises roughly 1 percent of total U.S. government spending,… there's this urban legend out there that somehow, if we just eliminated foreign aid, we'd have all the money we need to wipe out our debt. Foreign aid is very small. It's a significant number of dollars, no doubt about it, and one dollar of waste is too much.  But if you wiped out all the foreign aid in the world, you wouldn't notice it in terms of the debt conversation. However, if you completely wiped out U.S. foreign assistance, you would notice the severe and likely irreparable damage to America's security, prosperity, and global leadership. In addition to harming U.S. diplomacy and international development, sequestration cuts will further undermine America's ability to address the challenges of the 21st century. That is because current law will slash $500 billion—in addition to the $487 billion that is already being cut by the Obama administration—from defense spending over the next decade. Indeed, Pentagon leaders have repeatedly warned that near-term budget reductions will severely restrict the military's ability to adequately protect America's economic and security interests. This will have a major impact on global security. As Marine Corps Commandant General James F. Amos recently warned in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee: [A] fiscally driven lapse in American leadership and forward engagement will create a void in which old threats will be left unaddressed and new security challenges will find room to grow. There should be no misunderstanding …[S]equestration will have a deleterious effect on the stability of global order, the perceptions of our enemies, and the confidence of our allies. If the United States is to remain a global leader in the 21st century, then it is   critical  that leaders in Washington work to sustain investments in foreign assistance, diplomacy, and national defense. As the ongoing French intervention in Mali has demonstrated, unstable territory can quickly become a safe-haven for extremist groups. The truth is that a robust and strategically-applied foreign assistance budget—in

conjunction with a strong military—can bolster America's capacity to respond to critical global events. Allowing sequestration to occur, however, would undermine both America's strategic interests and its values.

Thumpers

Thumper – General

2014 budget makes trade-offs inevitableNPQ 13 [Nonprofit Quarterly, Rick Cohen, “The Nonprofit Significance of U.S. Foreign Assistance in the USAID FY2014 Budget” May 2 2013, http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/22225-the-nonprofit-significance-of-u-s-foreign-assistance-in-the-usaid-fy2014-budget.html]The twelve accounts that comprise the humanitarian and development assistance budget of USAID will be $20.4 billion if the President’s FY2014 budget is approved as-is. Out of a $3.77 trillion dollar budget, foreign assistance of this sort would be slightly more than 0.5 percent of the total budget of the federal government. Together, the Department of State and USAID would get a total of $47.8 billion, down from $51.1 billion in the FY2013 Continuing Resolution, again a piddling share of the total budget, roughly 1.3 percent.

To the President’s credit, there are some areas of increased funding in foreign aid and some notable areas of cuts : ·A small increase in global health funding to $8.3 billion, up from $8.1 billion in FY2012, with significant attention to malaria ($670 million for the President’s Malaria Initiative)

·A mix of commitments for work through international organizations—an increase in the U.S. payment for the United Nations budget to $617 million, up from $568 million in FY2012; an increase in funding for the Inter-American Development Bank from $75 million to $102 million; but a cut from $30 million to $24 million for the African Development Foundation·Nearly a doubling for international disaster assistance to $2.04 billion ·A decline in economic development assistance, from $6.14 billion in FY2012 to $5.45 billion in FY2014

·A cut in economic assistance to the troubled Palestinian areas of Gaza and the West Bank from $395 million to $370 million, and a cut of $43 million in aid to sub-Saharan Africa·A new commitment of $580 million for a new Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund to “support…political reform, free

and fair elections, democratic institutions, transparent and accountable government, transitional justice, open markets, and inclusive growth”

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is slated to get $898.2 million if President Obama’s budget is approved. Within that number, $676.2 million is slated for MCC compacts with Liberia, Morocco, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, but the MCC staff acknowledge that total isn’t enough to fund all five in addition to Benin, El Salvador, Ghana and Georgia, all in the midst of developing their compacts, and at least three of them slated to suffer cuts from sequestration, notwithstanding whatever gets approved in the FY2014 budget.

Thumper – Haiti

Haiti thumpsCassata 6-25 [Donna Cassata, Associated Press, June 25 2013, “Report finds USAID spending on aid and housing in Haiti is 30% of what was promised” http://canadahaitiaction.ca/content/report-finds-usaid-spending-aid-and-housing-haiti-30-what-was-promised]WASHINGTON -- The U.S. government had ambitious plans to help earthquake-ravaged Haiti where more than three-fourths of the

population lives on less than $2 a day - construction of 15,000 homes in the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Disputes over land rights, inaccurate estimates and higher costs have forced the U.S. Agency for International Development to drastically scale back those plans and left members of Congress questioning whether American tax dollars are delivering the help first promised after the Jan. 12, 2010 earthquake. The Government Accountability Office, in a report released on Tuesday, found that as of March 2013 the agency had disbursed only 31 percent of $651 million despite the

government's insistence that it was committed to Haiti's reconstruction. The GAO also found that " a substantial amount of progress on project activities remains to be completed ." Instead of 15,000 homes for 75,000 to 90,000 beneficiaries, the agency plans to build 2,649 homes for some 13,200 to 15,900 beneficiaries. In fact, the agency is expected to build 906 houses and non-government agencies and other partners are on tap to construct 1,743 homes.

Among the problems causing delays and cost increases was acquiring the land titles to build as well as the Haitian government's demand that the homes have flush toilets. One difficulty was that before the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti had no wastewater treatment plants. Since then, a temporary facility has been constructed at one location and a permanent plant built near the capital city of Port-au-Prince though it's unclear whether the facilities can serve the homes. The earthquake displaced some 2 million people, killed about 230,000 and injured 300,000.

Congress voted to provide $1.14 billion in reconstruction funds, including $651 million for the agency , which provides U.S. economic and humanitarian assistance worldwide.

Thumper – Pakistan

USAID in Pakistan thumps – expenditures will continue to growMahmood 12[Javed Mahmood, Pakistan Observer, “USAID to spend $800m in 5 Pak major sectors from next year” November 15 2012, http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=182399]Thursday, November 15, 2012 - Islamabad—The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would spend about $800 million in different development projects in Pakistan in the financial year 2013 that has started from the 1st of Oct 2012. The USAID has targeted five major sectors — economic growth, energy, education, health and community infrastructure development, with the mission to promote stability and prosperity in the

country. Jock Conly, Mission Director of the USAID Programme in Pakistan, disclosed this in an interview to Pakistan Observer. Virginija Morgan, Country Head of the USAID Programme facilitated the Pakistan Observer’s interview in the USAID’s office in the US Embassy. Ms Morgan and Matthew Boland, Deputy Spokesperson of the US Embassy, Islamabad, were also present during the interview. Below is the detail of the interview. Q: For how long you have been in Pakistan and heading the USAID programme? A: I came to Pakistan in June this year to work with the USAID Programme as the Mission Director. Q: What motivated you to head the USAID programme in Pakistan and how is your experience of working in this country? A: I am here to make efforts to achieve the key goals of the US Congress of making Pakistan a stable, peaceful and prosperous country. Pakistan is a key ally of the United States because of its strategic location in the region. Stability, prosperity and peace in Pakistan are essential for the United States so that this country could play its role in the regional development, peace and security. In 1989-90 I had been working in Pakistan. In 2012 my boss (global head of the USAID Programme) asked me to join the programme in Pakistan and I happily accepted this offer. Q: How do you see the culture and people of Pakistan? A: The people and the culture of Pakistan are very nice. I like the people of Pakistan and their hospitality. Q: What are the key objectives of launching the USAID projects in Pakistan? A: The United States want to see peace, prosperity and stability in Pakistan. That’s why the US government had engaged the USAID in Pakistan and allocating millions of dollars every year for different development projects. To achieve these goals, we have targeted five major areas _ economic growth, energy development, health, education and community

infrastructure. These are the areas that need proper focus and financial support for development. Q: How much amount is being spent in a year on the USAID projects in Pakistan? A: We are seeing an increase in the amount of expenditure on the USAID projects as several projects are at an advanced stage of completion that require more expenditures. In Financial Year 2013, a huge amount of $800 million would be utilized for the development of the USAID projects in Pakistan . Earlier, the annual quantum of expenditures on the USAID project was less than this amount. Q: Any new sectors/areas being included in the upcoming projects? A: We have short-listed five key sectors in the USAID programme that I have mentioned earlier. We select a new project from within these five areas after consulting the stakeholders. Once the new project gets all the mandatory approvals, we start work on it immediately.

to protect borders; ensure the safety of transportation systems; protect critical infrastructure; identify persons who would do harm; and respond to prevent, mitigate, react to and recover from acts of terror.¶ Our increased investment in homeland security really isn’t much of a departure from Raytheon’s focus prior to 9/11, but it represents a strategy to accelerate our growth by applying a commercial model for product development and solution delivery. Our focus has always been to support those who defend us, so support of our military and security agencies remains at the core of Raytheon’s mission.¶ Many technologies and solutions we have developed for use by the military have also proven to be very functional in the homeland security environment. We build and integrate systems for persistent surveillance, command and control, target detection and tracking, intelligence collection and analysis, and effects for the physical and cyber battlefields of our defense customers. We are increasing our focus on applying those core competencies to the hardest problems of homeland security agencies, and we are bringing them to market in a one-to-many business model. Respecting they are often moving rapidly, dealing with a swiftly evolving threat, and are budget constrained, we model, simulate and visualize solutions for each customer, offering off-the-shelf components that are quickly tailored to their needs and built with open standards.¶ Among the priorities of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security are cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection. How has Raytheon stepped up its presence in these areas, and what do you see the future holding in these key arenas?¶ We certainly have stepped up the pace of our investment, development and acquisitions in the cybersecurity domain. In history, some of the greatest revelations in science have come from “outsiders” – those not constrained in their thinking by a discipline’s or an industry’s standard paradigms.¶ I am proud of and excited by the innovations being developed and brought to the cybersecurity market by Raytheon engineers – brilliant technologists not constrained by the paradigms of the information technology industry. Their way of thinking – about sensors, effects, command and control – has produced amazing results on Raytheon networks and computing devices.¶ I can say little about the newest of these solutions at this time because intellectual property protections are still being enacted, but suffice it to say we have compelling offerings for the U.S. Comprehensive National Cyber Initiative. And our investment has been steady, as illustrated by our acquisitions of BBN Technologies, Telemus Solutions, SI Government Solutions, and Oakley Networks; mixing the DNA of these cyber firms with that of Raytheon’s legacy intelligence and information systems

capabilities has produced an exciting range of opportunities for us and our customers.¶ In fact, much of your professional background over the past more than 20 years has been in information technology systems. How does your own IT background fit in with Raytheon’s strategy, and the integration of IT systems?¶ Prior to joining Raytheon, I spent several years working with government agencies to re-engineer operations using commercial-off-the-shelf software and managed services. At Raytheon, I am working with our businesses to apply similar commercial business models to bring our superior technical capabilities to a wider range of customers. We’ve also applied concepts from business process engineering to help security agencies develop solutions using the right mix of policy, processes, people and technology.¶ IT is always a part of those solutions. The “rubber meets the road” at the level of the men and women who are charged with the protection of our country and our people; the engine that powers them is information, and IT is the key to giving them the right information at the right time. ¶

Let’s focus, if we may, on border security. What specifically is Raytheon doing in the border security arena, and, if you can, could you please provide a bit of a glimpse into the future?¶ For years, we’ve been known for border security capabilities including radar and other persistent, mobile and re-deployable air, ground and maritime surveillance systems such as RAID [Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment]. Our radar systems are deployed in the air and on the sea, protecting the aerial and maritime routes to our shores and borders. Many of our systems are deployed and in use by our military forces overseas as well as in the United States.¶ We also produce and integrate intelligence capabilities, aerial platforms, communications interoperability and even nonlethal force protection systems, such as our directed energy systems known as Active Denial and Silent Guardian. We enable the rapid integration and risk assessment of passenger, visa applicant or cargo data. We enable the identification of radiological isotopes in a container. And we enable actionable intelligence and force multiplication through command and control systems, such as Athena for maritime and Border View for land borders.¶ We are growing our border security business in three ways: By focusing our abilities on the unsolved problems in border security; By packaging more of our solutions for lower cost repeatability and a one-to-many commercial business model; and By growing our international business.¶ We recognize that it is the operators, those who have lived the challenges of securing our nation’s borders, who are the experts in the principles, strategies and tactics of their missions, but we also understand that they don’t always have the best and most recent information and awareness regarding the technological “art of the possible.” Scientists and engineers invent, design and create the “art of the possible,” yet they are constantly seeking a greater understanding of the mission requirements so that they might develop and deploy the right tools more quickly to make the job of the operator safer and more effective.¶ In order to close these “knowledge gaps” as quickly as possible, Raytheon has brought together experts from the operational environment and joined them with our scientists and engineers. We are improving our connectivity and information-sharing efforts with the men and women “on the line,” and we are seeking to continue to open new opportunities for dialogue. Our commitment is to improving our own understanding of real-world mission requirements while simultaneously informing, educating and updating operators on existing and developing capabilities.¶ We do not assume that technology is the starting point, or even the final answer to meeting the requirements of a border security mission, particularly in a country that may be just beginning the process of developing a border security force. Border security, in the domestic or international markets, requires a mix of capabilities that take into account operational challenges, threats and the organizational maturity of agencies charged with the mission. While certain solutions may include tactical infrastructure such as fences and roads, a trained and well-equipped workforce, facilities, vehicles, intelligence and technology, in the end our job is to partner with the customer to determine the best mix of these capabilities and to facilitate the deployment of that mix to achieve mission success.¶ In the future, you will see us bring to market more solutions precisely fitted to the operational constraints of border security agents – solutions intended to enable them to reconcile sometimes contradictory objectives, such as moving passenger vehicles through a port of entry in seconds while scanning every vehicle for hidden personnel and contraband. ¶ Raytheon obviously recognizes the importance of events such as the Border Security Expo, to be held this year April 28 and 29 in Phoenix, with Raytheon serving as corporate event sponsor. How can functions such as the Border Security Expo play a role in bringing together the efforts of public and private sector?¶ The Border Security Expo in Phoenix is an outstanding example of an opportunity for border security agencies and industry to communicate and learn from one another. I believe the key to the real success of these types of events is open dialogue that goes beyond the formal speeches and seminars and opens informal opportunities for industry and government to “compare notes.”¶ At the upcoming event, I would

encourage industry to have its engineers and scientists attend along with their business development teams. The engineers and scientists will benefit from listening to the government agency representatives explain their missions, strategies, tactics and challenges, and they should seek opportunities to ask direct questions about operational requirements and what the operators believe they need to accomplish their goals.¶ Frequently, when questioned about functional needs, an operator may indicate he or she wants a particular tool, but when an open dialogue uncovers the underlying operational requirement behind the requested tool, engineers are just as frequently able to offer superior suggestions based on new capabilities. This usually results in an exchange of ideas that leaves both parties better informed and more likely to develop and deploy the right tools for the job.¶ I would also encourage government and agency representatives in attendance to stay beyond the limits of their specific assignment or speeches, visit exhibits and make themselves available for informal conversations. I encourage agencies, to the degree possible within their operational constraints, to send some of their field operators to the events in addition to the agency leadership.¶ When visiting the display booths, operators shouldn’t feel that they have to simply pass through the vendor booths and look at the products on display. They should ask industry representatives to provide views of what is on the horizon, and they should feel encouraged to suggest changes or adaptations to existing products to meet specific mission needs. Again, it’s about discovering the art of the possible.¶ It has definitely been a privilege to have this opportunity to chat with you, and I look forward to seeing you in April in Phoenix. Is there anything else you would like readers of Maritime & Border Security News to know concerning your views on the topics we’ve discussed?¶ Just that I feel honored to have the opportunity to work in an industry that was built upon defending and protecting America. I’ve had the opportunity throughout my career to work with some of the finest and most dedicated people in the world in the public service as well as private sectors. I believe that serving and protecting our country and its people is an honorable and exciting mission, and I’m energized every day by the possibility that what we are doing will save lives and will protect our way of life.