SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1047 COMMENTARY THE AESTHETICS OF AMERICAN LAW Pierre Schlag TABLE OF CONTENTS I.THE AESTHETIC OF THE GRID ...............................................................................................1055 A.Grids ....................................................................................................................................1055 B.Drawing the Line ...............................................................................................................1055 C.Applying the Law................................................................................................................1058 D.Policing the Law................................................................................................................1059 E.Seduction............................................................................................................................1059 F.Alienation............................................................................................................................1061 G.Classification Mania..........................................................................................................1062 H.Legal Change ......................................................................................................................1065 I.Restraint Anxiety................................................................................................................1066 II.THE ENERGY AESTHETIC .....................................................................................................1070 A.Moving Transformations....................................................................................................1070 B.Law Is on a Mission...........................................................................................................1071 C.Lets Quantify and Commensurate....................................................................................1072 D.Measuring Value ................................................................................................................1074 E.Energy Unbound................................................................................................................1075 F.The Missing Architecture...................................................................................................1075 G.Safe Energy.........................................................................................................................1077 H.Depletion ............................................................................................................................1080 III.PERSPECTIVISM......................................................................................................................1081 A.Switching Grounds/Changing Contexts...........................................................................1082 B.Decentering the Subject ....................................................................................................1083 C.Missing Perspectives..........................................................................................................1085 D.Institutional Perspectivism..............................................................................................1087 E.Stabilizing Perspectives.....................................................................................................1090 F.The Marginalization of Perspectivism..............................................................................1092 IV.THE DISSOCIATIVE AESTHETIC ...........................................................................................1092 A.What Is a Corporation? .....................................................................................................1094 B.What Is Law?......................................................................................................................1095 C.But Is It Law?.....................................................................................................................1099 V.AESTHETICS AT WORK............................................................................................................1101 VI.THE CONTEST OF AESTHETICS ...........................................................................................1105 A.The Battle of the Aesthetics: Grid vs. Energy..................................................................1105 B.The Battle of the Aesthetics: Grid and Energy vs. Perspectivism.................................1106 C.Rightness.............................................................................................................................1107 D.Arrested Dialectics ............................................................................................................1109 SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1048HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 VII.SO WHAT?HOW IT MATTERS ............................................................................................1109 A.The Politics of Aesthetics: Form and Substance.............................................................1110 B.On Being Taken in..............................................................................................................1112 C.The Construction of Self ....................................................................................................1114 D.Pathological Aesthetics .....................................................................................................1115 VIII.CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................1117 SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1049 THE AESTHETICS OF AMERICAN LAW Pierre Schlag No, no, he would say, You are not thinking;you are just being logical.1 Lawisanaestheticenterprise.Beforetheethicaldreamsandpo-liticalambitionsoflawcanevenbearticulated,letalonerealized,the aestheticsoflawhavealreadyshapedthemediumwithinwhichthose projects will have to do their work.2 Thisinsistenceontheaestheticcharacteroflawcaneasilyseem disturbing.Aestheticsisusuallyunderstoodasdelimitedtotheappre-ciationofartandbeauty.3 Hegeldefinedaestheticsastheentire realmofthebeautiful;morespecifically,. . . FineArt.4Kantviewed """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Byron White Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.For suggestions and criticisms on earlier drafts, I wish to thank Adrienne Cohen, Brad Bernthal, Morris Cohen, Chris-tian Caslin, Kevin Doran, Peter Goodrich, Tom Grey, Lakshman Guruswamy, Melissa Hart, Law-renceJoseph,SarahKrakoff,CarolynRamsey,RobRichards,JackSchlegel,DavidSkeel,Jr., Jane Thompson, Phil Weiser, Bert Westbrook, Ahmed White, and Sienho Yee. 1 OTTOR.FRISCH,WHATLITTLEIREMEMBER95(1979),quotedinHOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A THEORY OF JUDGMENT 1 (1987). 2 I am not suggesting a temporal priority for the aesthetic over the ethical/political. See infra section VII.A, pp. 111012. 3 Theviewthataestheticspertainstotherealmsofartandbeautyistheprevailingunder-standing among academic philosophers and, no doubt, legal professionals as well.This quotation from a small encyclopedia of philosophy makes the point:Theexperiencesthatwehavewhenwelistentomusic,readpoetryandlookat paintings or scenes in nature, have a distinctive immediate, emotional and contemplative character, and lead us to describe what we experience in a special vocabulary, and to use terms such as beautiful, exquisite, inspiring, moving and so on.Philosophy employs the term aesthetic to circumscribe this kind of experience. SebastianGardner,Aesthetics,inTHEBLACKWELLCOMPANIONTOPHILOSOPHY229,229 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui-James eds., 1996).This confinement of aesthetics to such delimited precincts is itself the product of a particular philosophical orientation, one that is well entrenched in Anglo-American academic analytical philosophy but by no means universally shared. Anumberofphilosophershaveexpressedfarbroaderconceptionsoftheaestheticandits significance.BenedettoCroce,forinstance,describesaestheticsascruciallyimplicatedinavari-ety of human competencies (including concept formation and intellectual activity).BENEDETTO CROCE,THEAESTHETICASTHESCIENCEOFEXPRESSIONANDOFTHELINGUISTICIN GENERAL 24 (Colin Lyas trans., 1992).John Dewey described the aesthetic as extending beyond boththebeautifulandtheartstoeverydayexperience.JOHNDEWEY,ARTASEXPERIENCE (1934).More recently (and perhaps more relevant to the study of law), it has been argued that the fashionableprimacyofethicsasasourceofpoliticalthoughteclipsesapriormomentinwhich aestheticsgivesshapetopoliticsandpoliticalthought.See,e.g.,F.R.ANKERSMIT,AESTHETIC POLITICS 2123 (1996). 4 G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART 1 (photo. reprint 1979) (F.P.B. Osmaston trans., 1920). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1050HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 theaestheticjudgmentasdetacheddisinterested.5Manythinkers view aesthetic judgments as subjective and ungrounded, impervious to rationalargument.Meanwhile,lawiswritteninafieldofpainand death.6Tosuggestthenthatlawisanaestheticenterprisecaneasily seem cavalier, ethically obtuse, even cruel.We are confronted with the disturbingpossibilitythatlawpaintsitsorderofpainanddeathon humanbeingswithnomoreethicalwarrantorrationalgrounding than an artist who applies paint to canvas.7 I do not dispute in fact, I would affirm these ethical concerns andmoraljudgmentshere.ButthenotionofaestheticsIwishtoin-voke is neither confined to the realm of art nor preoccupied with ques-tionsofbeauty.Mineisabroaderandmorepermissive,thoughalso lessconventional,conceptionofaesthetics.Myuseofthetermdraws onitsGreeketymology(aisthetikos),meaningperceptionorsensation.Inthisconception,theaestheticpertainstotheforms,images,tropes, perceptions,andsensibilitiesthathelpshapethecreation,apprehen-sion,andevenidentityofhumanendeavors,including,mosttopically, law. Theprojectherebuildsuponpriorscholarlyencountersbetween lawandaesthetics.8Virtuallyalloftheseearlierdiscussions,however, rely upon a conventional understanding of aesthetics as the province of beautyandfineart.Theseexplorationshavethusbeenlimitedbythe attempt to find something of beauty in art or in law.9More often than """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 5 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 39 (J.H. Bernard trans., 1951). 6 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 7 The aesthete has a response available here: namely, that a judicial opinion, however beauti-fullycrafteditsprosemaybe,isnonethelessuglyifitdoesviolencetothoseitregulates.This seemsrathertendentious,anattempttoavoidanethicaldifficultybyusingbeautyasacovert vehicle for moral or political judgments. 8 HelpfuldiscussionsoflawandaestheticsincludeDESMONDMANDERSON,SONGS WITHOUTMUSIC:AESTHETICDIMENSIONSOFLAWANDJUSTICE424(2001);ADAM GEAREY,LAWANDAESTHETICS(LegalTheoryToday,2001);LAWANDTHEIMAGE:THE AUTHORITYOFARTANDTHEAESTHETICSOFLAW(CostasDouzinas&LyndaNeadeds., 1999)[hereinafterLAWANDTHEIMAGE];andLAWANDAESTHETICS(RobertaKevelsoned., New Studies in Aesthetics vol. 11, 1992). 9 Thus,legalthinkerssometimesinvokenotionsofbeautywhentheyspeakofthewell-craftedopinionorthewell-drawnstatuteorwhentheymakeromanticreferencestotheartof law and its virtuosity. See, e.g.,Robert A. Ferguson, The JudicialOpinion as Literary Genre,2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990).But these claims about the beauty of law are few, far between, andappropriatelylocal.SeeKarlLlewellyn,OntheGood,theTrue,theBeautiful,inLaw,9U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 227 (1942) (noting pointedly that beauty has been slighted in law).Others look-ingforanaestheticoflawhavetendedtofocusonthosemomentsinlawthatseemmostakinto thefineartsforinstance,theimageofJustitia.See,e.g.,DennisE.Curtis&JudithResnik, ImagesofJustice,96YALEL.J.1727(1987)(describingthehistoricalvariationsinthepictorial representationsofJustitia);MartinJay,MustJusticeBeBlind?TheChallengeofImagestothe Law, in LAWANDTHEIMAGE, supranote8,at19 (same).Some thinkers use fine art for in-stance,musicasananalogytoshedlightontheorganizationoflaw,itsinterpretations,and performances.See,e.g.,SanfordLevinson&J.M.Balkin,Law,Music,andOtherPerforming SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1051 not, the result has been a moral idealization of aesthetics or a romanti-cization of law (or both).10Almost always, the attempt to acquaint law withaestheticshasforcedthelatterintoasubordinateorsubsidiary role.11 Therewillbenoneofthathere.Therewillbenoidealizationof aestheticsandnoromanticizationoflaw.Moreover,thepresumption thattheaestheticsoflawistobeexploredwithaneyetofindingmo-ments of beauty or fine art will simply be dropped.12 WhatIamafteristhedescriptionofthoserecurrentformsthat shape the creation, apprehension, and identity of law.What is at stake isanattempttorevealtheaestheticswithinwhichAmericanlawis cast.Here, I describe four such aesthetics: Inthegridaesthetic,lawispicturedasatwo-dimensionalareadi-videdintocontiguous,well-boundedlegalspaces.Thesespacesare dividedintodoctrines,rules,andthelike.Thosedoctrines,rules,and the like are further divided into elements, and so on and so forth.The subjects,doctrines,elements,andthelikearecastasobject-forms.Theyexhibitthecharacteristicfeaturesofobjects:boundedness,fixity, andsubstantiality.Theyhaveinsidesandoutsidesthatareseparated bywell-markedboundaries.Theresultingstructurethegrid feelssolid,sound,determinate.Lawisetchedinstone.Thegridaes-theticistheaestheticofbright-linerules,absolutistapproaches,and categorical definitions. In the energy aesthetic, law is cast in the image of energy.Conflict-ingforcesofprinciple,policy,values,andpoliticscollideandcombine in sundry ways.Precedents expand or contract in accordance with the pushandpullofpolicyandprinciple.Legalrules,principles,policies, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV 1597 (1991) (book review).Or the graphic arts for instance, the works ofMondrianareusedtoilluminatetheaspirationsoflaw.SeeLauraS.Fitzgerald,Note,To-wards a Modern Art of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 2051 (1987). 10 For instance, legal thinkers envelop the aesthetics of lawwithin the classic consolingnarra-tives of reason, morality, or political redemption.See, e.g., RONALDDWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE passim(1986).Ortheyselectivelyascribeapleasingaesthetictoahighlyromanticizedvisionof law.See,e.g.,JAMESBOYDWHITE,HERACLESBOW:ESSAYSONTHERHETORICAND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985). Notalldiscussionsoftheaestheticsoflawaregivenovertothemoralidealizationofaes-theticsortheromanticizationoflaw,however.DuncanKennedysworks,forinstance,eschew bothtendencies.See,e.g.,DUNCANKENNEDY,ACRITIQUEOFADJUDICATION(FINDE SICLE) (1997). 11 To the extent that the considerable scholarship in law and literature deals with aesthetics, it isgenerallyinanincidentalandtangentialmanner.Forarecentsurveyofthevariousap-proachestolawandliterature,seeGUYORABINDER&ROBERTWEISBERG,LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000). 12 MyaccountofaestheticsisperhapsclosesttotheconceptionsdevelopedbyAdamGearey, DuncanKennedy,andDesmondManderson.SeegenerallyGEARY,supranote8;KENNEDY, supra note 10; MANDERSON, supra note 8. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1052HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 andvalueshavemagnitudesthatmustbequantified,measured,and compared.Movement and flux are the orders of the day. Intheperspectivistaesthetic,theidentitiesoflawandlawsmutate in relation to point of view.As the frame, context, perspective, or posi-tion of the actor or observer shifts, both fact and law come to have dif-ferentidentities.Accordingly,thesocialorpoliticalidentityofthele-gal actor or observer becomes the crucial situs of law and legal inquiry. Inthedissociativeaesthetic,identitiescollapseintoeachother.Nothingiswhatitis,butisalwaysalreadysomethingelse.Anyat-tempttorefertoXisfrustrated,aseventhemostminimalinquiryre-vealsthatXisanunstableglomming-onofmanyotherthingsthat cannotbesubsumedorstabilizedwithinanyonething.Thecrucial contributionsoftheprioraestheticsthegrid(anditsfixedidenti-ties),energy(anditsquantifiablemagnitudes),andperspective(andits identifiablerelations)haveallcollapsed.Nodeterminableidenti-ties, relations, or perspectives survive. Theseaestheticsarelegal,notinthesensethattheyareexclusive to law (they are not).13Rather, they are legal in the sense that they are instancedinthetraditionallegalmaterials,theusualcanonicaltexts, sites,andscenesoflaw:appellateopinions,rules,doctrines,andthe like.Theyareintegratedaesthetics14intheweaksensethateachisa prototypical coalescence of Images and schemas,15 Rhetorical forms,16 Metaphors and other tropes,17 Perceptual modes and sensibilities,18 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 13 NoraretheyexhaustiveoftheaestheticsthatcanbediscernedinAmericanlaw.Theydo, however, strike me as the most important. 14Acaution:totheextentonecomestoseeAmericanlawintermsofthelateraesthetics,it will become more difficult to identify distinct aesthetics. 15 Seegenerally,e.g.,LAWANDTHEIMAGE,supranote8(exploringtheroleofimagesand icons throughout the law). 16 Seegenerally,e.g.,PETERGOODRICH,LEGALDISCOURSE:STUDIESINLINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 85124 (1987) (describing the ways in which law is a rhetori-cal enterprise). 17 Seegenerally,e.g.,ANTHONYG.AMSTERDAM&JEROMEBRUNER,MINDINGTHE LAW18992(2000)(explaininganddemonstratingthewaysinwhichmetaphororganizesthe constructionoflaw);STEVENL.WINTER,ACLEARINGINTHEFOREST:LAW,LIFE,AND MIND(2001)(describingthecognitiveandmetaphoricalpatternsanimatingAmericanlawand jurisprudence). 18 Seegenerally,e.g.,ThomasC.Grey,HeartheOtherSide:WallaceStevensandPragmatist LegalTheory,63S.CAL.L.REV.1569(1990)(usingWallaceStevensspoetrytodescribehowit feels to be a pragmatist). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1053 Dramatic tensions,19 Sensory impressions,20 and Emotions and feelings.21 Eachaestheticcombinesaspectsofthesedifferentphenomena.Anaestheticthuscutsacrosssomeofourfamiliaracademicdivisions: linguistics,psychology,literarycriticism,andthelike.Anaestheticis identifiableassuchinsofarasitexhibitsacertaincharacteristiccoher-ence that recurs throughout laws empire. Butthereisnothingabsoluteaboutthis.Indeed,thevariousaes-thetics combine in all sorts of ways; they merge, envelop, and subsume eachother,yieldingallsortsofhybrids.Nolegaltextorthinkerisa pure example of any of the four aesthetics. Alegalaestheticissomethingthatalegalprofessionalbothunder-goesandenacts,mostoftenautomatically,withoutthinking.Wecan choosetodeployanaestheticinthisorthatmoment.Butbyand large, the aesthetic operates through us choosing us, enacting us, di-recting us.Meanwhile, as the aesthetics do their work, law happens. Inshapingourapprehension,experience,andcreationoflaw,the aestheticsleavetheirmarks.Indoingso,theybringwhatwecalllaw into being.Indeed, the aesthetics have an important ontological effect: theyfashionlawasapresence,anidentity,somethingthatisthere, that we have, that we can reflect upon, and over which we can argue. Thelegalaestheticsalsocallforthandenactdifferentkindsofpro-fessional selves, oriented in different ways to the thinking and doing of law.Alegalaestheticisthusconstitutiveofthetasksat handandthe alreadylaunchedprojectsofanalreadyengagedlegalself.As Itryto show,theaestheticshelpshapethecognitive,emotive,ethical,andpo-liticalpreoccupations,goals,values,andanxietiesoflegalprofession-als. Alloftheseaestheticsareinstancedincontemporarylaw,buteach can also be seen as having reached an advanced condition at a particu-larperiodinAmericanlegalhistory.Forinstance,themostobvious expressionofthegridaestheticisthescientificjurisprudenceofthe turnofthetwentiethcentury(roughly18701920).Theenergyaes-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 19 Seegenerally,e.g.,RobinWest,JurisprudenceasNarrative:AnAestheticAnalysisofMod-ern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985) (using Northrop Fryes archetypes of literary form to analyze various jurisprudential approaches). 20 Sight and sound are the most important sensory markers in law.Touch, taste, and smell lag farbehindunless,ofcourse,lawextendsallthewaytothecrackofthepolicebatononthe suspectsheadorthesmellofsweatinlockup.ThelawinthisCommentarywill,asitdoesfor mostlegalprofessionals,stopsomewhatarbitrarilyshortofthesuspectsheadandlockupsem-pire.See infra section IV.B, pp. 109598. 21 Seegenerally,e.g.,THEPASSIONSOFLAW(SusanA.Bandesed.,1999)(collectingessays on the descriptive and normative role of emotion and emotionalism in law and lawmaking). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1054HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 thetic is most visible in early twentieth-century legal realism and in the explicitlynormativeandeconomicapproachestolawofthemid-twentiethcentury(19201990).Perspectivismachievesitsmost prominentexpressionincriticallegalthought,identitypolitics,and postmodern jurisprudence (1980?).As for the dissociative aesthetic, it isaspecterofdissolutionthathauntsalltheseaesthetics.Althoughit emergesfrom time to time, the dissociative aesthetic does not and can-notlast.Atanyrate,forpurposesofexposition,Irelyprincipallyon thesehistoricalexamplestoevokeanddescribetheaesthetics.It wouldbeamistake,however,toequateanaestheticwithajurispru-dence.22 These preliminary statements about the aesthetics of law are bound toseemellipticalandsketchy.Inpart,thatistobeexpectedofanin-quiry into any aspect oflife socloseto us, so pervasively implicated in thewaysinwhichweperceive,think,andultimatelyare.Manydiffi-cultiesattendtheenterprisepursuedhere.23Someofthemcanbere-solvedthroughtheelaborationofthevariousaesthetics.Othersre-emergemuchlater,notasdifficulties,butasinterestingcomplexities withinwhichwethinkanddolaw.Butsomedifficultiescannotbe eliminated:thesearetraceabletotherecognitionthatlawandselfare shaped by different nonfungible, incommensurable aesthetics.There is adissonancethatresultsfromthisrealization:themoreprofoundthe realization, the greater the dissonance. Mineisitselfanaestheticproject:anattempttoawakeninthe readerasensitivityforandarecognitionofthedifferentaestheticsof law.Icannotdefinetheseaestheticsorprovetheirexistence,butI canshowhowitfeelstoenactorinhabitaparticularaesthetic.AndI can try to show how these aesthetics matter. Whatiscalledforfromthereaderisacertainimaginativeempa-thy, a certain letting go.One must try to imagine what it is like to op-eratewithinorthroughaworldoflawconstructedintheseaesthetics.Thisprojectwillbesuccessfultotheextentitenablesthereaderto recognizethevariousaestheticsoflawandtheirinfluenceonlawand legal professionals including most especially herself or himself. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 22 It would also be a mistake to forget that these aesthetics are, in a variety of guises, far more ancient than their relatively recent manifestations in the parochial precinct of American law. 23 Here are a number of such difficulties: Theproblemofreflexivity:WhatistheaestheticusedinthisCommentary,andwhaten-ables/justifiestheuseofthisaesthetictodescribeandexploretheothers?SeeinfraPartV,pp. 110104. Theproblemofrightness:Whichaestheticistherightone,anddoestheaesthetictakeon law preclude the possibility of being right in the first place?See infra section VI.C, pp. 110709. The problem of essentialism: Does the attempt to describe distinct aesthetics effectively deny the multiplicity and mutability of different forms in law?See infra p. 1087.SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1055 I.THE AESTHETIC OF THE GRID Inthegridaesthetic,lawisframedasafield,aterritory,atwo-dimensional space that can be mapped and charted.This jurispruden-tialmappingoccursthroughthesubdivisionoftheterritorialspaceof lawintovariousparts:contracts/torts.Eachpartissubdividedinto subparts:negligence/intentionaltorts.Thesearethensubdividedinto even smaller subparts.This process continues until a mysterious point isreachedwherelawgivesoutandallthatremainsarequestionsof fact. A.Grids One effect of this relentless partitioning is that law is stabilized and objectifiedintoanorderlyfieldofclearlydelineated,neatlybounded, perfectly contiguous legal conceptions and propositions. Bywayofexample,considerthefirstpageofChristopherColum-busLangdellsseriatimsix-partarticle,ironicallyentitledABriefSur-veyofEquityJurisdiction.Langdellwrites:Rightsareeitherabso-luteorrelative.Absoluterightsaresuchasdonotimplyany correlativeduties.Relativerights aresuchasdoimplycorrelativedu-ties. . . .Relativerights,aswellastheircorrelativeduties,arecalled obligations.24InLangdellsvision,thecategoriesareneatlydeline-ated such that no category overlaps with another. The appeal of the grid is its stability, predictability, and uniformity.Thereisanaestheticherethatpromisesanenduringanddefinitive chartingofthelegalworld.Everylegalconcepthasitsowndistinct andboundedplace,andeveryplaceisoccupiedbyadistinctand bounded legal concept. B.Drawing the Line Inthisaesthetic,onepreeminenttaskoftheappellatejudge,and evenmoresothelegalacademic,istolocatetheaddressesoflegal concepts bydeterminingprecisely where they belong within the juridi-calsubdivisions.25Ifthisoversightisproperlyperformed,therewill benoconfusionoflegalconcepts.26Clarity,consistency,andcoher-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 24 C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 55, 55 (1887). 25 DuncanKennedydescribesthisasakeyfeatureofclassicallegalthought.DuncanKen-nedy,TowardanHistoricalUnderstandingofLegalConsciousness:TheCaseofClassicalLegal Thought in America, 18501940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3, 68 (1980). 26 As one commentator put it: Thecreationofasystemproperlydesignatedasscientificrequires:(a)theexpres-sionofallthecomponentelementsorconstituentsofthewholesubject;(b)aclassifica-tionoftheseinaccordancewithanappreciableprinciplewhichconstitutesaguideto thearrangement.Theresultisnecessarilyaformalandvisiblepicturedisplayingthe wholeasanarticulateorcoordinatebodyinwhicheachpartisseeninrelationtothe SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1056HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 encewillbesatisfied.Everything,asLangdellpromised,shouldbe found in its proper place, and nowhere else.27 Often, this requires multiple classificatio ns,asthegridaestheticreplicatesitselfinternally,subdividinginto eversmaller,moreprecise,moreexactdeterminations.28Onecan imagine how Langdell might have reorganized this very Commentary: I.THE AESTHETIC OF THE GRID A.Grids B.Drawing the Line 1.Classification 2.Squaring One Thing With Another (a)On being correct (b)On being incorrect (i) Etc. etc. etc. (ii) Etc. etc. etc. (A)Prong a (B)Prong b Langdell, of course, was there long before us.And he doesnt need todoanythingtothisCommentarytohavehisway:We(youandI) aredoingitforhim.Manyothersbeforeushaveaswell.Here,for example,isatabledrawnbyaNewYorkjudgebentonprovidinga ratherelaborateclassificationoftheparts,subparts,andsub-subparts of law.29 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" wholeandthepartsappearinreciprocalrelationtoeachotherthisisasystem.There is no isolation; there is organization. Inasystemoflawsubjectedtosuchtreatmenttherecanbenorealconflictsasto identical matter . . . . JamesD.Andrews,Jurisprudence:DevelopmentandPracticalVocation,25YALEL.J.306,307 (1916) (emphasis added). 27 C.C.LANGDELL,1ASELECTIONOFCASESONTHELAWOFCONTRACTS,atix(Bos-ton, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1879). 28JamesB.Thayer,forinstance,wasquiteconvincedoftheneedformoreprecise,morespe-cific definitions: Letusnowtrytofindsomedefinitionoffact,andajustdiscriminationbetween fact and law.To define fact is, indeed a perylous chose, as they say in the Year Books; andsomepersonsthinkitunnecessary.Itiscertainlytruethatthetermiswidelyused inthecourts,muchasitisusedinpopularspeech;thatistosay,inatentative,literary, inexactway;andtherearethosewhowouldletallsuchwordsaloneandnotbother aboutprecision.Butasourlawdevelopsitbecomesmoreandmoreimportanttogive definitenesstoitsphraseology;discriminationsmultiply,newsituationsandcomplica-tions of fact arise, and the old outfit of ideas and phrases has to be carefully revised. JamesB.Thayer,LawandFactinJuryTrials,4HARV.L.REV.147,15051(1890)(footnote omitted). 29 Rodenbeckusedthesekindsofchartsthroughoutthebookasthestructureofexposition. ADOLPH J. RODENBECK, THE ANATOMY OF THE LAW passim (1925). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1057 FIGURE 1: RODENBECKS SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE LAW30 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 30 Id. at 274.As Rodenbeck put it in his preface: My only hope is that in its present form [the book]maystimulateaninterestinthesubjectofthescientificarrangementofthelawandmay lead to a classification that can be accepted as a basis for a scientific statement of the law.Id. at vii (emphasis added). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1058HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 All of this, of course, requires work.(Rodenbecks chart31 goes on like this for several pages.) Whilethegriddoestakeaprodigiousefforttocreate,oneofits greatvirtuesforbothjudgesandacademicsisthatitenablesmi-crothought.Theboundedspace,thedefinedconcept(torts,common carriers,whatever)isisolatedandcanbetreatedasdiscretesubject matter.Thiscreationofdiscreteareasenablesadivisionoflabor(I teach torts) and specialization (I am an expert on the law of common carriers).Itallowsthesegmentationofdiscretepartsfromwhat might otherwise look like a seamless web. Notonlydoestheimageofthegridspatializelaw,butitalsoen-ablesthelegalthinkertotreatlegalconceptsasmaterialobjects.The conceptsbecomethematerialobjectscontainedwithintheparticular subdivisions,thepartsandsubpartsthatmakeupthelaw.32Whatis importanttoappreciatehereisthatthisgridvisionisnotsimplya consciousconceptualstrategy.Itisanaesthetic:lawisapprehended, is experienced as already divisible in this way.Once the grid has been established,thecharacteristicroleofthejudgeandtheacademicisto applythelawtothefactsandtopolicetheboundariesofthe grid.33 C.Applying the Law Inthegridaesthetic,applyingthelawisthecrucialoperation throughwhichthejudge(orotherdecisionmaker)reachesalegalcon-clusion.Thisactofapplyingthelawcastsboththelawandthe factsasdistinct,alreadyknownobjects.Theonlythingthatremains inreachingalegalconclusionisforthejudge(orotherdecisionmaker) simply to place the one (the grid) upon the other (the facts) and to take note of the results. Indeed, Justice Roberts described the judicial role in just this way: WhenanactofCongressisappropriatelychallengedinthecourtsasnot conformingtotheconstitutionalmandatethejudicialbranchoftheGov-ernmenthasonlyoneduty,tolaythearticleoftheConstitutionwhich """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 31ForRodenbecksperfectedpictorialoutlineofthelaw,seeid.at27375.Foradescription oftheencyclopedicworkrequiredtoestablishandfillsuchclassifications,seeJohnHenry Schlegel,LangdellsLegacyor,theCaseoftheEmptyEnvelope,36STAN.L.REV.1517,1519 (1984) (book review). 32 As late as 1927, Kocourek, for instance, thought it a novelty to recognize that a legal rela-tion is entirely a matter of concepts and not of material objects.ALBERTKOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 234 (2d ed. 1927). 33 Forasophisticateddefenseofborder-patroljurisprudence,seeLouisMichaelSeidman, PublicPrincipleandPrivateChoice:TheUneasyCaseforaBoundaryMaintenanceTheoryof Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 104446 (1987). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1059 isinvokedbesidethestatutewhichischallengedandtodecidewhether the latter squares with the former.34 Academics also engage in applying the law.But academics are in apoorpositiontoapplythelawtothefacts.(Theyhavenofacts.)Still,theaestheticgestureendures.Itistransposedontootherarti-facts.Hence, legal academics oftenapply the theory to the doctrine or they apply a foreign discipline to the law.35The names of the artifacts may have changed, but the verb remains the same. D.Policing the Law Anotherprincipalroleofthejudgeinthegridaestheticistopolice the grid.He is supposed to monitor the various borders to ensure that the grid remains gapless, determinate, and nonoverlapping.To the ex-istinggrid,newcasesmustbeadded.Inthelegalacademy,thetradi-tionallegalacademicpatientlyawaitsnewjudicialopinionstoinsert intohisparticulargrid(contractsorsecuredtransactions).Hehopes that the new cases will work only incremental change, so as not to dis-ruptthestructureofhisgrid(andtriggeramassivearchitecturalreno-vationinhisnotes).Ortothecontrary,hehopesthatthenewcase lawwillruintheexistinggridsothatanewgridwillberequired, namely his own. Thisborder-controljurisprudenceisattendedbycertaincharacter-isticaestheticconcerns.Thegridthinkerispreoccupiedwiththe properlocationandmaintenanceofboundaries:Wheredowedraw the line?Will the line hold?How do we avoid the slippery slope?Arethedistinctionssufficientlyclearandprecise?Furthermore,cer-tainaestheticrequirements(notunlikethoseofnormativelegaltheory oranalyticaljurisprudencetoday)mustbeobserved.Manyofthese virtuescanbeseenasrelatedtothispolicingfunctionandtotheaspi-rationalimageoftheperfectgrid.Precision,exactitude,andclarity describetheattributesofperfectlyformedboundaries.Consistency, coherence,andcomprehensivenesscanbeseenasvirtuesofaperfect arrangement of contiguous sectors of law clearly marked on a plane.36 E.Seduction Thereisacertainpleasurethatmanyofusexperienceinworking withinthegrids.Itisthepleasureofmakingargumentsthatareei-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 34 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (emphasis added). 35 See generally Seidman, supra note 33. 36 Compare Albert Kocourek, Classification of Law, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q.REV. 319, 336 (1934) (stat-ingthatcriteriaofeconomy,clarity,convenience,andcompletenessshouldgovernclassification), withJohnStick,FormalismastheMethodofMaximallyCoherentClassification,77IOWAL. REV. 773, 79394 (1992) (arguing that theories should be evaluated in terms of intelligibility, clar-ity, comprehensiveness, elegance, coherence, and predictive value).SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1060HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 ther right or wrong, and if right, unassailable.It is the enjoyment that somethinkersgetinhavingprovedthatsomethingisindubitable, not subject to revision. Besides,thegridthinkerisworkingonthemonumentoflaw.It may be that his contribution is just a humble bit of chisel work on one smallsection,butstillhecarvesitinstone,andinknowingthelaw (allwithinhissubjectmatterjurisdiction),heisthemasterofhiscor-nerofthegrid.37Avisionoflawascastinstoneallowsthegrid thinkertobelievethatinhisthinkingandwriting,heisproducing something that will endure. Then, too, there is themagisterialdetachmentafforded by the grid.Thelegalselfisleftoffthegrid.Aswillbeshownlater,thisomission leadstoaestheticandjurisprudentialproblems,butitalsoyieldsposi-tivevaluesforthegridthinker.Beingoffthegrid,thejudgeoraca-demiccanbeholdlawfromafigurativelydetachedanddisinterested position:Histasksaremerelytoapplythelawandpoliceits boundaries.His detachment allows him to be ostensibly neutral.He isremovedfromresponsibilityfortheworldlyconsequencesofhisac-tions. Inlaw,thisdetachmenthasacertainappeal.Lawdealswitha lotofdirt.38TheFrenchlegalintellectualPierreLegendre,forin-stance, claims that lawyers are refuse collectors and that the law is a dumpingground.39CharlesFried,forinstance,endorsesthepicture oflawyers,notasthearchitectsofsociety,butasitsjanitors.40Fit-tingly enough, Dworkins jurisprudential hero, the superhuman Hercu-les, turns out to be a stable boy charged with cleaning the Augean sta-bles.41Thesecolorfulimages,whilelessthanflatteringtothelegal profession,arenonethelessapt.Lawyersgetthemessesthatnoone elsenottheparties,notthesocialworkers,notthelegislatures hasbeenabletoresolve.Lawyerscleanupthedirt.Washedincyni-cal acid, laws empire is societys mess. Understandably,therecurrentcontactwithsocietaluntidinesselic-its in legal professionals a desire for an antiseptic law.The grid can be """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 37 The gendered aspect of the grid aesthetic is hard to miss.See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1993). 38 Lawyers know this.For a bracing and refreshingly candid, if bleak, account of the lawyers world,seeLAWRENCEJOSEPH,LAWYERLAND(1997).SeealsoPierreSchlag,Jurisprudence Noire,101COLUM.L.REV.1733(2001)(exploringthedissonancebetweenthenoirishcharacter of law practice and the idealized law of the academy). 39 PIERRELEGENDRE,LEMPIREDELAVRIT:INTRODUCTIONAUXESPACES DOGMATIQUESINDUSTRIELS49(1983),quotedandtranslatedinPETERGOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 27576 (1990). 40 CharlesFried,JurisprudentialResponsestoLegalRealism,73CORNELLL.REV.331,333 (1988). 41 For a description of some of Herculess other talents, see DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 23940, 313, 37980. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1061 seenasanattempttoshieldthelawyer,thejudge,andthelawitself fromcontamination.Inthislight,thegridcanbeseenasanattempt to ward off contamination.42The most prestigious precincts of law are themostantiseptic,themostclearlymarkedofffromthemess.The prototypeisthefancycorporatelawofficeonthethirty-eighthfloor, wheretheethereal,perfectlytypedwordsofimpeccablydressedattor-neysproducehighlymediated,largelyunseeneffectsonthemessy fleshofhumanitybelow.Attheextreme,clientobjectivesarereached simplybyrearranginghighlyabstractedandtechnicalwordsona page:thelawyerneednotandoftencannotseethematerialimplica-tions of the work he is doing. Boththeappellatejudgeandtheacademiccanbecomeentranced withmaintainingorperfectingthegridattheexpenseofattendingto itsworldlyimplications.Thisistheallureoflawcastasgeometry.43

Thisistheformalistorientationparexcellence:thedominanceofcon-cern with maintaining the proper form and order of law in terms of its own criteria.44 F.Alienation Manythinkers,however,areputoffbythegrid.Forthem,the gridaestheticisrigid,intransigent,andinflexible.45Andinareversal ofthegridthinkersimageofthegridassolid,itscriticsviewitasin-substantial,ethereal,ungrounded,disconnectedfromanysignificant reality.46 Meanwhile,thedetached,disinterested,andneutralgridthinkeris seenascold,aloof,uncaring,lackingincompassionevenmisan-thropicorvaguelysadistic.Thegreatindictmentofthegridthinkers (whetherwarrantedornot)isthattheyareobsessedwithmaintaining """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 42 In this context, policing the grid involves not only attending to its axes, but also cleansing it ofimpurities(lawworksitselfpure)andprotectinglawfromexternalcontamination(the autonomyoflaw).Indeed,keepinglawsempirecleanisanenduring,evenifsubterranean, trope in law. 43 See GOODRICH, supra note 39, at 27576. 44 The extreme here is law as a formal end in itself.For one sophisticated defense of such for-malism,seeErnestJ.Weinrib,LegalFormalism:OntheImmanentRationalityofLaw,97YALE L.J. 949 (1988).See also infra note 47. 45 Thosefamiliarwith the rules versus standards dialecticwill recognize the vicesandvirtues ofthegridascharacteristicsalsopresentthere.See,e.g.,FREDERICKSCHAUER,PLAYINGBY THERULES:APHILOSOPHICALEXAMINATIONOFRULE-BASEDDECISION-MAKINGIN LAWANDINLIFE(1991);LouisKaplow,RulesVersusStandards:AnEconomicAnalysis,42 DUKEL.J.557,55960(1992);DuncanKennedy,FormandSubstanceinPrivateLawAdjudica-tion, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1710 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379,38396(1985);KathleenM.Sullivan,TheSupremeCourt,1991TermForeword:TheJus-tices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 5694 (1992). 46 This is one of the most common aesthetic reactions of legal realists to the aesthetics of legal formalism.See,e.g.,FelixS.Cohen,TranscendentalNonsenseandtheFunctionalApproach,35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 (1935). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1062HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 theaestheticofthegridregardlessofitseffectsonrealworldtrans-actions.47Thegridthinkersaresaidtocaremoreabouttheirlaw than about what this law does to human beings.48 Nonetheless,thegriditselfdoesnotinspireanystrongnegative emotionalreaction.49Inpart,thisisbecausetheaestheticvulnerabil-ityofthegridliesinitspretensions:thegridisoffputtingmostlybe-causeitisseenaspufftakingitselfforstonework.Inthatsense,the gridproducespuzzlementorinvitesridiculeratherthananystrongre-actionsuchascontemptorhatred.Thereis,however,anotherreason thatthegriddoesnotinduceastrongnegativereaction.Thegrid,in itsdetachmentanddisinterestedness,representsitselfasemotionally barren.Its negative affect is alienation. Asaestheticsgo,thegridissimple.Ithastheappearanceofbeing enduring.Itcananddoes,however,breakdown.InAmericanlaw, theaestheticvulnerabilityofthegridcharacteristicallyappears(and reappears)inconnectionwiththreerelatedproblems:theproliferation ofclassificationschemes,theproblemoflegalchange,andtheanxiety of judicial restraint. G.Classification Mania Oneoftheironicbyproductsoftheefforttopoliceandmaintain the grid is that this activity ends up producing a plurality of grids a multitudeofdifferentclassificationschemes.Theproliferationofsun-dryclassificationschemesintheearlytwentiethcenturywasintense.""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 47 Thisaccusationformstheethical-emotionalgistofamainobjectiontowhatispejoratively calledformalism.Whatisconsideredrepellentisthedesiretomaintainlawsorderattheex-penseofthelivinghumanbeingscompelledtobearitsmarks.Formalists,ofcourse,canalways respondthatitispreciselytheirconcernforhumanbeingsthatleadsthemtoinsistonthemain-tenanceofproperlegalform.Fromthesidelines,onemightaddthattheinsistenceonproper formisageneralfeatureofanyapproachtolaw,includingcontextualism,narrative,andpost-modern jurisprudence.Everyone insists on proper form (notably, their own).The unflattering diagnosis of legal formalism above parallels claims that the aestheticization ofpoliticsisatthecoreoffascism.WALTERBENJAMIN,TheWorkofArtintheAgeofMe-chanicalReproduction,inILLUMINATIONS217,24142(HarryZohntrans.,SchockenBooks 1986) (1968) (describing fascism as the aestheticization of politics, the creation of politics as public spectacle). 48 This is one of the mainthemesofthe legal realists. See,e.g., Felix S.Cohen,The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5, 1824 (1937); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 123637 (1931). 49 Thereare,ofcourse,strongemotions(suchashatredandanger)thatattachtoaforceful impositionof thegrid. Applying the law and policingthe law arenotgentleactivities byany means.FelixCohen,anearlycriticoflegalformalism(andperforceofthegrid),wasoneangry young man.See Cohen, supra note 46.But such a strong reaction does not seem to be a reaction so much to the grid aesthetic per se as to its coercive imposition or hegemony.SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1063 Infact,classificationitselfbecameasubjectofinquiry,controversy, and of course, ultimately classification itself.50 Oneproblemposedbythemultiplicationofclassificationschemes issimple:Whathappenswhensomelinesofdivisioninonescheme sometimes register in some other set and sometimes not?Which classi-fication scheme enjoys priority over the other or are they coequals? In an otherwise completely forgettable 1934 article on legal classifi-cation,AlbertKocourekconfrontedpreciselythisproblem.51Hede-velopedoneclassificationschemeforjuridicalconceptssuchasinten-tion,negligence,malice,fraud,accident,andmistake.Healso developedanotherclassificationschemeforlegalsubjectmatterssuch aschattels,intangibles,performances,andrelations.Obviously,there wassomerelationbetweenthetwo.Asheexplained:[W]henwe cometothetaskofassigninglegalrulestothesevariouslineardivi-sions,wewillfindthatcertainideasoccurforalldivisions;andthat certain other ideas less fundamental occur in two or more divisions but inlessthanall.52ThismeantthatKocourekcouldnotdrawaneat grid.Instead, he offersa rather inelegant picture, which lays out hori-zontaldivisionsnexttoverticaldivisions.Thispictureisthevisual confessionthattheaxesofthelawdonotalwaysintersect,notonthe planenoranywhereelse.Kocoureksdrawingisagraphicadmission thatsomespacesinthegridareempty,thatcoherenceisasometimes thing.The comprehensive order of a gapless subdivision of legal space is gone.53 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 50 SeeROSCOEPOUND,OUTLINESOFLECTURESONJURISPRUDENCE16390(5thed. 1943).Despitehisevidentprowessatclassification,Poundexpresseddoubtsabouttheextrava-gantexpectationsastowhatmaybeaccomplishedthroughclassificationoflaw.RoscoePound, ClassificationofLaw,37HARV.L.REV.933,938(1924).Poundbelievedthatclassification schemeswerenotentirelyuseless,butcouldserveafewmodestjurisprudentialgoals.These,he dutifully classified: Classificationisashapinganddevelopingoftraditionalsystematicconceptionsandtra-ditional systematic categories in order to organize the body of legal precepts so that they maybe:(1)Statedeffectivelywithaminimumofrepetition,overlapping,andpotential conflict,(2)administeredeffectively,(3)taughteffectively,and(4)developedeffectively for new situations. Id. at 944 (emphasis omitted). 51Kocourek, supra note 36. 52 Id. at 342 (emphasis added). 53 Kocoureksvisualizationoftheproblemandhissolutionarealsolessthanconsonant,but elaboration here would require a considerable digression. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1064HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 FIGURE 2: KOCOUREKS PLANE54 ManyofKocourekscontemporariesexperiencedrelateddifficul-ties.As they encountered multiple discordant classification schemes in sundry fields, many lost faith in the grid.55As the number of different classificationschemesmultiplied,itbecameapparentthateachofthe schemesstemmedfromdifferentconcerns,interests,andvalues.56Ul-timately,thisisthekindofaestheticbreakdown/insightthatleadsto the energy aesthetic and perspectivism.57 Because distinction and classification are among the few operations permitted within the grid aesthetic, grid thinkers tend to do these a lot.""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 54 Kocourek, supra note 36, at 344. 55 Goneaswellwasthenineteenth-centuryhopeofuniversalclassificationbasedontheidea of freewill.See Pound, supra note50, at 94244(arguing that purportedly universal classifica-tion schemes in which law is deduced from the idea of free will or a fundamental datum of lib-ertyorpersonalityarealldeterminedbythehistoryofclassificationandarenothingbutat-tempts to give theoretical justifications for practical necessities). 56 Forexample,injurisprudence,therearethosehoarydisputesabouthow,whether,andifit ispossibletodefinelaw.SeeGlanvilleL.Williams,InternationalLawandtheControversy Concerning the Word Law, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 146 (1945). 57 See infra Parts IIIII, pp. 107092. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1065 Gridthinkerssometimeshaveatendencytosubdivideanddistinguish endlessly.Gridthinkingcanthusspinoutofcontrol.Inthenameof greaterprecision,clarity,andrigor,gridscansometimesdevelopinto extraordinarilyintricateconstructionswithnoobvioususe-valueto anyoneotherthanthosewhoareinvolvedinrefiningthegrid.Dis-agreementcanoccuratlevelsofexcruciatingdetail.Inonesense,this is a disciplinary defense mechanism: so long as grid thinkers are preoc-cupiedwithtinydisputes,thebigpictureremainsincontestablein-deedbeyondview.58Atthesametime,however,thisisapathology: thegridanditscustodiansbecomeincreasinglyinsularanddivorced fromotherenterprises,sothatwhenarealityprincipleisfinallyen-countered, it is in the form of a crisis. H.Legal Change Itisanold,andapparentlypersistent,question:ifthecourtsareto findbutnotcreatelaw,thenhowdoeslawchange?59Foralawcast intheimageofthegrid,thisquestionisaesthetictrouble.Thegridis inert.Itdoesnotmove.Toapprehendorrepresentthelawinterms ofthegridworksfinesolongasthereisnoneedtorepresentmotion, change,oraction.Butonceitbecomesnecessarytorepresentlawas dynamic,theimageofthegridisinadequate.Thisisanaestheticdif-ficulty,onethatgivesrise(repeatedly)tomoresubstantiveorpoliti-cal questions about the authority or legitimacy of judicial change. There are four obvious aesthetic solutions to this problem: First,onecanremainloyaltothegridaestheticandsimplydeny thatlawchanges.Apparentexamplestothecontrary,ofcourse,may presentaproblem,butthesenonconformingjudicialdecisionscan simplybedismissedaspathologicalnotreallylaw.Thevulner-abilityofthisaestheticsolutionisthat,inthefaceofaccelerating change,onemustrejectanincreasinglylargenumberofjudicialdeci-sionsaspathological.60Attheextreme,whatgridthinkersdescribeas pathological turns out to be what everybody else calls law. A second solution is to supplement the grid with some aesthetic de-vicethatenableslegalchange.Itisnotclear,however,howthis wouldbeaccomplished.Vectorsonthegrid?Arrowsacrossthesec-tors?Fromwhere?Inwhatdirection?Notethattheaestheticdiffi-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 58 Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997). 59 SeeRoscoePound,TheProgressofLawAnalyticalJurisprudence,19141927,41HARV. L. REV. 174, 174 (1927) (noting that all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the conflict-ing demands of the need of stability and of the need of change). 60 Imagine, by way of example, the number of precedents that would have to be declared inva-lidunderJusticeThomassostensiblyoriginalistunderstandingoftheCommerceClause.See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1066HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 cultyhereliesnotinrepresentingchangeonthegrid;61therealdiffi-cultyisthattherepresentationofchangeonthegridimpugnsitsfun-damentalaestheticintegrity:thesemblanceoforder,stability,and fixity.Torepresentchangeonthegridwouldbeanaestheticadmis-sionofjurisprudentialproblems,nottheresolutionoftheseproblems.The aesthetic inadequacy of the grid in representing change is reflected insubstantivejurisprudentialproblems.Indeed,thisinadequacy underlies many of the impasses of contemporary legal theory.62 Athirdoptionistosupplementthegridwithsomeoff-gridmecha-nism to enable change.But this solution also corrodes the aesthetic in-tegrity of the grid.It is, in itself, a demonstration that the grids repre-sentation of law is neither comprehensive nor universal.It is, in short, an admission that law is not just a grid. Afourthaestheticpossibilityissimplytoallowchangesinthegrid tooccurcovertly.Butthissolutionalsoimpugnstheaestheticinteg-rityofthegrid.Itiseffectivelyanadmissionthatsomeunknowable sourcecan,atanytime andforreasonsleftunstated,disrupttheorder ofthegrid.Insubstantiveterms,itamountstoadeclarationthatthe rationalorderingoflawcanbeupsetbysomeunknownexogenous force.Thereis,ofcourse,nothingwrongorimpossibleinsuchavi-sion.It is, however, inconsistent with the perceived virtues of the grid aesthetic: comprehensiveness, stability, clarity, and the like. Noneofthesefoursolutionsisaestheticallysatisfactory.Indeed, theycanbeseenassymptomsofdecline.Ironically,toevenposethe problem of legal change is already to weaken the grid.63 I.Restraint Anxiety Inasmuchasthegridcannotsatisfactorilyrepresentforce,motion, or action, the grid is incapable of ensuring that judges will follow it.If lawisinertlikeanobjectandstaticlikeastructureandifthelegal selfisleftoffthegrid,thenhowdoeslawrestrainorcontrolajudges decision?Such a law has no force or authority.64 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 61 Notealsothatonecouldjuxtaposegridstoindicatechange.Forinstance,onecouldcom-pare the West Publishing Company grid for constitutional law from 1920 with a similar grid from 1990.This juxtaposition would certainly reveal quite a few changes, but it would not reveal how these changes were produced.The sources and agencies of change would remain a mystery, some-thing that had occurred off the grids. 62 There are some aesthetic resolutions, though these will compromisethe grid and its virtues.For a discussion of such efforts, see section II.G, pp. 107780, below. 63 The problem of change surfaces again and again among judges and legal thinkers.The ob-vious solution that law is itself already changing demands a more elaborate aesthetic. 64 Foucaultnotesthatiflawweresimplyaregistertobeconsulted,itwouldhavethesolidity of external things and as such could be followed or not.Such a law for Foucault would lack the forceandprestigetocommandrespect.MICHELFOUCAULT,TheThoughtoftheOutside,in2 AESTHETICS,METHOD,ANDEPISTEMOLOGY147,157 (JamesD.Faubioned.,Robert Hurley et al. trans., 1998). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1067 Insofarasthegridlocateslawindiscretelegalartifactsobject-formssuchascases,holdings,statutes,principles,values,policies,etc. thequestionmayarise:whatistheconnectionbetweenthesearti-factsandjudicialdecisionmaking?Inthespacedemarcatedbythe term connection, the unsavory prospect arises that judges may fail to applytheobjectivematerialsoflawcorrectly.Inourcontemporary idiom, the fear is that they may impose their personal values through their decisions. Forthegridthinker,thisprospectcanleadtoanobsessiveconcern withquestionsofjudicialrestrainthowbesttoconstrainerrant judges.65Thisquestionbedevilsthegridthinkerbecausethejudgeis leftoffthegrid;sheescapesrepresentationandthuscontrol.Asare-sult,thesearchisontofindsomethingthatwillconstrainthejudge.Thisdilemmaisexpressedinavarietyofclassicjurisprudentialprob-lems:judicialreview,judicialrestraint,indeterminacy,andthelike.Theattempttorestrainthejudgeyieldsakindofquixoticjurispru-dence:therepeatedeffortstofindasourceofconstraintfounderbe-causelegalthinkersdonthavemuchunderstandingofwhoorwhat theyaretryingtoconstrain.66Indeed,whatlittleliteraturethereis pertaining to the psychology, the institutional pressures, and the politi-calpreferencesofjudgestendstobeslightedinbothlegaleducation and legal scholarship. Noneofthesedifficultiesshouldbeunderstoodtoimplythatthe gridhasvanishedasanimageoflaw.Onthecontrary,thegridaes-thetic continues to shape law and legal thought in the twenty-first cen-tury.67LarryKrameraptlydescribesthecontinuedholdofbox-thought.As he recently put it: [M]odern recognition of the inherently political nature and structure of law stillacceptsthefundamentalpremisethatlawcanandshouldbesepa-rated from politics.Law is, if you will, the part of politics that is supposed tobelefttocourtsandjudges.Placingsomethinginalawboxthus shiftsourexpectationsandassumptionsaboutauthoritytointerpret.If theConstitutionislaw,thenitisthosewhowouldarguethatcourts """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 65 SeegenerallyJ.M.Balkin,IdeologyasConstraint,43STAN.L.REV.1133,1142(1991)(de-scribing the problem of the rogue judge). 66 Theeffortsmadetofindsomemediationthatwilllinktheobject-likelawofthegridwith thesubjectknownasthejudgearenumerousandsomewhatvague:goodjudgment,craftsman-ship,situationsense,interpretivecommunities,formsoflife,practicalreason,orsomeothersuch theoreticalunmentionable.Theradicalunderspecificationofthesecheerymediations,ofcourse, makesitpossibletogivelesscomfortingaccountsofthemediation:politics,power,violence,and the like.See infra p. 1111. 67ThepointisgraphicallydemonstratedinJ.M.Balkin,TheCrystallineStructureofLegal Thought,39RUTGERSL.REV.1(1986)(deployingdecisiontreestodescribecontemporarylegal doctrine). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1068HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 shouldnotbeitsauthoritativeexpositorwhobeartheburdenofjustifying what amounts to an exception to our normal practice.68 Thegridaestheticissedimentedinourrepresentationsandprac-ticesoflaw.Andthereismuchinourjurisprudencestaredecisis, controllingcasedoctrine,respectfortradition,settledexpectations, custom,andthelikethatrequiresattentiontoandrespectforthe legalpast.Infact,notonlydotheoldformsrulefromthegrave,but much of their substance is still around as well.69 As one example, consider that much of contemporary legal research andlegalthoughtstillbearsthemarksoftheWestdigestsystema systeminauguratedinthelatenineteenthcentury.70TheWestdigest systemisadeeplylayerednumericalindexingsystemthatallowsre-trievalofcaselawintermsofasystematichierarchyofcategories.71

Thisgridplaysanimportantroleinthelocationandretrievalofcase law.72It helps determine what counts as relevant case law as well as whatdoesnot.73Overtime,relianceontheWestdigestsystemleads toagrid-dependencewhoseeffectsgowellbeyondtheorganizationof researchstrategies.TheWestsystem,byvirtueofitsubiquity,en-trenchesandreinforcesamodeoflegalthoughtthatisperforcegrid-like, objectivist, and hierarchical.Indeed, one might say that the prac-ticeofcasecrunchingandtheauthorityoflinesofcasesowemuch toWestPublishingCompany.Obviously,theWestdigestisneither originarynorclosed.Still,thereisanimportantfeedbackloophere: the West grid offers up the case law it then classifies. ItisimportantnottooverstatethesignificanceoftheWestsystem, particularlyinlightofcomputersearchservices.ButWestwasthere first and the entrenchment of its grid will not soon be overcome. TheWestgridishardlytheonlygridintown,however.Thelaw schoolcurriculumremainslargelygrid-like.Thentherearethegrids ofstudentstudyaidstheoutlinesanddecisiontreeslaidoutinGil-berts,Emanuels,Barrons,andthelike.Thepictureofknowledge presentedinthesestudyaidsisthatofamassive,highlydifferentiated grid.Onesupposesthatthispicturehassomerelation(presumably,a """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 68 LarryKramer,TheSupremeCourt,2000TermForeword:WetheCourt,115HARV.L. REV. 4, 10 (2001) (emphasis added). 69 Cf. F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 1 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1963) (discussing the enduring influence of the forms of action in property law). 70 ForabriefhistoryofthegenesisoftheWestdigestheadnotesystem,seeJohnDoyle, WESTLAW and the American Digest Classification Scheme, 84 LAW LIBR. J. 229 (1992). 71 Id. at 234. 72 Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer Age,88LAWLIBR.J.338,341(1996)(notingtheimportanceoftheWestdigestsysteminthe shaping of American law). 73 Onenoxiouseffectisthatthegridcaneffectivelyleadalegalprofessionaltooverlookcase lawthatfallsoutsidetherelevantheadnotecategoriesbutmayinfactbemorerelevanttoher case.Doyle, supra note 70, at 253.SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1069 strongone)toanotherimportantdeterminantoflegalaesthetics namely,theimageoflawenforcedinthefinalexam.74Surely,notall examquestions(ormodesofgrading)callfororrewardagrid-like viewoflaw.Buttheclassicissue-spotterbegsforaresponsedriven byanoutlineordecisiontree.75Andconventionalpoint-system grading tends to reward that kind of approach. Noristhegridconfinedtolawschoollowculture.Thegridaes-theticcontinuestoflourishinthehighcultureofthemostethereal academicprecincts.Forexample,recentdebatesinanalyticaljuris-prudenceabouttherelativestrengthsandweaknessesofsoftpositiv-ism,positivepositivism,negativepositivism,inclusivepositivism,and exclusivepositivismdisplayanextremedegreeofconceptualsubdivi-sion.76 Ratherstrikingly,evenpostmodernlegalthoughtexplicitlydeploys thespatialimageofthegrid,ofmultiplespacesinafield.Theplural-ism so characteristic of the postmodern sensibility is accommodated on the grid through the notion of overlap.77For instance, Santos, a noted postmodernthinker,describeslegalpluralismintermsofmaps.78

Indeed,Santoshasevenarguedthatsincemodernismisplottedin temporalmetaphors,postmodernthoughtoughttousespatialmeta-phors.79Whatisstrikinghereisnotthatpostmodernthinkerswould resorttospatialmetaphorsperse,80butthattheywouldresortspecifi-callytoagrid-likeconceptionofspace.Thisinvocationofthegrid yields an odd postmodern reinstitution of law as discrete object-forms. Insum,thegridissowellentrenchedasoneofourimagesoflaw thatitcannotbediscardedinanyrepresentationoflawdestinedfor usebylegalprofessionals.Itiseasytoderidethegridaesthetic,but whateveritsfailingsornavet,itexhibitsacertainaestheticcoher-ence.Llewellyn,evenasheridiculesLangdell,testifiestothiscoher-ence: """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 74Foranintellectuallyseriousanalysisofthestructureofthelawschoolexam,seeRICHARD MICHAELFISCHL&JEREMYPAUL,GETTINGTOMAYBE:HOWTOEXCELONLAW SCHOOLEXAMS(1999),whichprovidesanextendedexcursionintolegalreasoningunderthe guise of exam preparation. 75See id. at 5586 (describing forks in the facts and forks in the law). 76 For a helpful introduction to these debates, see Brian Bix, Patrolling the Boundaries: Inclu-sive Legal Positivism and the Nature of Jurisprudential Debate, 12 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1999). 77 SeeSallyEngleMerry,LegalPluralism,22LAW&SOCY.REV.869,870(1988)(defining legal pluralism as two or more legal systems that coexist in the same social field). 78 BOAVENTURADESOUSASANTOS,TOWARDANEWCOMMONSENSE:LAW,SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 420 (1995). 79 Id. at 400. 80 Itwouldseemdifficultevenasthissentencetakesshapetoavoidspatialmetaphors and images altogether. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1070HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 Therules,andtheconcepts. . . aretostandtogether;theyaretomerge intomajesticharmony;theyaretobeastructure.Structuredbeautybe-comes thus the esthetic goal an intellectual architecture, clean, rigorous; aboveall,carriedthroughinsharpchiselingtobodyoutthepredeter-minedplan,ineveryvault,ineachline,intoeachangle. . . .Langdells amazingtheory. . . isnotonlythemostfamiliarAmericanexample,but theonemostcleanofline,mostbaldofeye-deflectingcover. . . .Nothing couldbemoresimplystated,morerigorouslythought,moretightlyinte-grated . . . .81 Onecanmakefunofthegrid,butnonethelessitremainspartof thearchitectureofthecurriculum,theorganizationoftreatisesand studyaids,thestructureofbriefs,thelayoutoflawreviewarticles, andtheformattingofthelegalmind.Itisintheframeworkofhigh normativetheoryandeveninthestructuralistmomentsofcritical thought.Moreover,itwillnotgoawaysoon:totheextentthatour legalrealitiesaresociallyandcognitivelysedimentedinthisaes-thetic,thereisnowaytotakecognizanceoftheserealitieswithoutat least a momentary genuflection to the grid. II.THE ENERGY AESTHETIC Theenergyaestheticleavesthestasisofthegridbehind.Instead, energybecomesthedominantmetaphorandimageforlaw.Energy anditsmanifestationschange,transformativechange,reform, progress,progressivelegalchangebecometherulingmotifs.The implicit premise is that the law and the legal profession are on the move.Law is pictured as an arrow pointed to the future.82 A.Moving Transformations Asthelawisreconfiguredfromagridintoenergy,itissetinmo-tion.Henceprecedentshavedirection;theypassfromonejuridical constellationtoanother.Likeplanetsormeteors,precedentshave gravitationalpullorgravitationalforce.83Policiesandprinciples conflict.Theyarecastasvectors(ontheblackboardandelsewhere) thatpushandpullthelawinvariousdirections.Inthemorechaotic imageryofcriticallegalstudies(cls),thepolicies,principles,anddoc-trines contradict one another.84 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 81 . . . more fascinatingly absurd to teach.Llewellyn, supra note 9, at 228. 82 Of course, it could be that it is always the same arrow frozen in place, never leaving and never arriving, and always pointing at the same future.See infra section II.H, p. 1080. 83 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111, 113 (1977). 84 See,e.g.,DuncanKennedy,TheStructureofBlackstonesCommentaries,28BUFF.L.REV. 205,21011(1979)(describingBlackstonesCommentariesasaseriesofstructuresforthedenial of contradiction). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1071 Causationcomestoreplaceconceptualistlogicasthesourceofen-tailmentsandconnections.Thejudicialopinionisnolongermerelya setoflegalpropositions(subdividedintoholding,obiterdicta),buta legalforceinthesocialworld.85Particularlyinthelegalrealistcos-mology,precedentsandlawsarereconfiguredascauses,effects,ante-cedents, and consequences.86 B.Law Is on a Mission In the scholarly literature, law becomes an interpretive enterprise, tryingtobecomethebestitcanbe.87Oritbecomesadriveforeffi-ciencyaforcethatimposesitsinexorabletransaction-cost-reducing,Kaldor-Hicks-market-replicatinglogicononelegalsubject afteranother.88Lawisonamissionpropelledbyitsownmoving principles,policies,andvalues.Theseareactiveforcesthatcanvari-ously Predominate, Override, Require, Extend, Contract, Constrain, Direct, Promote, Achieve, Deter, Advance, and Perform all sorts of other moving actions. Notsurprisingly,theenergyaestheticanditsinvocationofphysics imagerymass,weight,push,pull,force,etc.areconduciveto socialengineeringanditsmorescholarlyincarnation,functional-ism.Thedecisionsofindividualjudgesareseenasoccasionstopre-scribe directives for the organization of society.89 Thegreatappealoflawasenergyisthesensationthatthingsare happening:Lawisonthemarch.Itisprogressing.Wealthisbeing """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 85 For a polemical justification of this switch, see Cohen, supra note 46, at 84247.Cohen is so forceful in his arguments that he overstates his case.Jeremy Waldron argues that precedents and ruleshavemeaning,notjustbywayofconsequence,butbywayofpropositionalsystematicity.JeremyWaldron,TranscendentalNonsenseandSystemintheLaw,100COLUM.L.REV.16 (2000). 86See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 46, at 84247. 87 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 413. 88 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW passim (5th ed. 1998). 89 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 15 (1984). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1072HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 maximized.Accidents are being deterred.Reform is on the way.The kettleisboiling.Legalprofessionalsfeelthattheyarepartofanen-terprisethatisgoingsomewhereordoingsomething.Lawhaspower; itscharged.Andthelegalprofessionalcanbeenergizedbythis power.90Eventhelawstudentcanbeempoweredwhensheisasked inclasswhatthecourtshoulddo,whatthelawshouldbe.Compared tothehumbleanddutifulchiselingofthegridthinker,thisisagrand image of law. But what does the judge or the legal academic do with all this con-flictandcollisionallthisenergy?Indeed,oncethelawispictured asenergy,itsidentityisverymuchinquestion.Energycantakeall sorts of forms, some more explosive than others. C.Lets Quantify and Commensurate Insofarastheconflictingforcesofprincipleandpolicyshapelaw, judicialdecisionmakingarguablyrequiresanassessmentoftheirrela-tivevalues.Withintheenergyaestheticandwithintheprofession generally,thisisoneofthedominantimagesofthejudicialtask.At itsmostmundane,theimageisofthejudgeweighingconflictingcon-siderations, a contemporary incarnation of Justitia with her scale. Theimageoflawasaseriesofconsiderationsthatneedtobe weighedissoprevalentandseemssonaturalthatonecouldeasily overlooktheunderlyingaestheticatworkhere:theimageoflawas quantum.Inordertoloosentheholdofthisimage,onecanask:Just howisitthatlawcanbepicturedasquantifiableinthefirstplace?And why is this an appealing way to apprehend law at all? Still,thevisionoflawasquantumis everywhere:Legalprofession-als routinely argue that This consideration outweighs . . . This factor overrides . . . The consideration is substantially greater than . . . The degree of . . . Etc., etc., etc. Inassessingtheimportanceoffactors,considerations,values,and interests,legalprofessionalsroutinelystrivetoevaluatetheminterms ofintensity,weight,scope,andburden.Fromconstitutional means/endsteststotortspolicyanalyses,theenergyaestheticpresents law as a question of degree: how much will this rule advance this state interest, or that policy? """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 90 Hence,theclsreferencestobeingenergized.PeterGabel,ThePhenomenologyofRights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 158788 (1984). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1073 Amongjudges,oneofthemostprevalentresolutionsofthetension istheattempttobalancetheconflictingconsiderations.91Inthisap-proach,alloftheinternallyconflictingenergiesoflawmustbeconsid-ered,evaluated,assessed,andmeasuredtodeterminewhichwillpre-vail (and by how much). Itistruethat,asamatterofpositivelaw,balancingtestsarenot nearlyasubiquitousascommentatorsseemtothink.Indeed,Richard FallonpointsoutthattheSupremeCourtrarelyemploysfull-outbal-ancingtestsinconstitutionallaw.92Atthesametime,however,bal-ancingisextremelycommonasamethodormodeofthought.Judges balance their way to allsorts of legal regimes multifactor tests, pro-phylactic rules, per se rules, and so forth. Balancingoftenappearsaestheticallyincompleteandintellectually unsophisticated.93Itssuccessesorfailuresdependcruciallyuponthe intelligenceandsensitivityoftheparticularjudgewhoactuallydoes the balancing work.Balancing effectively defers to the judge the reso-lution of the key difficulties.She must decide what values to attach to thevariousinterests,considerations,andfactors.94Thisexercisein valuationcanbeaformidabletaskbecauseitisoftenunclearhowthe various factors can fit on the same scale.95Then too, the very articula-tionofthetermstobebalancedagainsteachotherskewsthejudg-ment to be made.96Not surprisingly, in some cases, the balance struck canseemsoprecariousthatifoneweretoreversethecourtsbalanc-ing exercises, the opinion might still be just as persuasive.97 Forsome,balancing(inanyform)willseeminadequate,adhoc, unprincipled,andincoherent.Instead,somemoreintellectuallyre-spectablemethodmustbeusedthatwillreducethemultiplicityof forces, values, and the like to some common metric or scale. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 91 ButseeRichardH.Fallon,Jr.,TheSupremeCourt,1996TermForeword:Implementing theConstitution,111HARV.L.REV.54,76(1997)(notingthatSupremeCourtJusticesdisfavor balancing in constitutional law because it seems insufficiently law-like). 92 Id. at 150. 93 See Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALEL.J. 1, 45 (1987) (criticizing balancing as an unacceptable foundation for the exercise of judicial review).Judgesare likely to have somefaith in theirownprofessional capacities.By contrast, legal academics are likely to be less enthusiastic about balancing. 94 Forasustaineddiscussionofproblemswiththemechanicsofbalancing,seeT.Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 9721005 (1987). 95 Thisisthedifficultyintryingtodeterminewhetheraparticularlineislongerthanapar-ticularrockisheavy.BendixAuotoliteCorp.v.MidwescoEnters.,486U.S.888,897(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 96 See infra pp. 10751077. 97 One can try to do this with just about any balancing case.For instance, in the famous pro-ceduraldueprocesscase,Mathewsv.Eldridge,424U.S.319(1976),theopinionoftheCourtis not obviously any less plausible if one inserts a not at each of the Courts crucial determinations aboutthe fourfactorsat stake (private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, valueof additional safeguards, and government interest).SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1074HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 D.Measuring Value InAmericanlaw,thetwomostsuccessfulattemptstoarticulatea unitarymetricderivefromutilitarianismandmicroeconomics.98Both ofthesejurisprudentialapproachespromisetotranslateallvaluesinto a common metric: the util99 or the dollar (including dollar equivalents).Theunitarycurrenciesofbothutilitarianismandmicroeconomics makeitseemasifanythingandeverythingcanbetranslatedintothe twocurrencies.Accordingly,bothapproachesappeartoprovideara-tional technique to assess value. Asbetweenutilitarianismandmicroeconomics,thelatterseemsto provideamorereliablemethodofascertainingvalue.Utilitarianism, whichrequiresameasurementoftheamountofhappinesspeoplede-rive,requiresagreatdealofculturalguesswork.Bycomparison,mi-croeconomicsgivesatleasttheimpressionofastructuredtechnique forquantificationandmeasurement.Inpart,thissenseofreliability (itfeelsrigorous)hastodowiththepatterningofeconomicsitselfon the image of physics.100 But the appeal of microeconomics as a commensuration mechanism hasothersources.Becausesomanyofthevaluesatstakeareoften monetizedinanactualmarket(orinanalogousproductmarkets), framesofcomparisonarereadilyavailable.Andasmarketsincreas-inglycolonizecustoms,habits,andotherformsoflife,microeconomics willcorrespondinglyappeartohaveagreaterholdonsocialandeco-nomic realities. Thegreatproblemformicroeconomiccommensurationisoneof socialperceptionorsocialrecognition.Concedingforthetimebeing thatitiscoherenttospeakofindividualpreferencesintermsofdollar valuations, what is lacking in microeconomics is a method by which to ascertainactualdollarvaluationsbyindividualsinnoncommodified settings.This is not merely a problem of making correct guesses about dollarvaluations.Aswillbeseen,itisalsoanaestheticproblem theanalogueofthewhatdowebalance?difficultydiscussed above.101 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 98 Attemptstoformulategrandnormativetheoriesthatgovernentirefieldshavebeenfarless successful.Andamongthejudiciaryandthebar,theyaregenerallyviewedasIcarusjurispru-dence. 99 Whileitwouldbefundamentallywrongheadedtoassimilatemicroeconomicstoutilitarian-ism,theydoexhibitacertainaestheticaffinity.KennethBurke,thegreatAmericanrhetorician, forinstance,notesthatJeremyBenthamsutilitarianphilosophyofvaluesisframedwithinthe metaphorofprice,theactivityofaccounting,andtheidealofarithmetic.KENNETHBURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 194 (3d ed. 1954). 100 SeePHILIPMIROWSKI,MOREHEATTHANLIGHT:ECONOMICSASSOCIALPHYSICS: PHYSICSASNATURESECONOMICS(1989).Thissharedaestheticenableseasytranslationbe-tween the disciplines of economics and law. 101 See supra p. 1073. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1075 E.Energy Unbound Whateveritsdifficulties,theenergyaestheticisseductive.Itoffers theallureofchange,movement,progress.Inaword,itisdynamic.Andinsofarasoneispartofacurrentofenergy,thereisamanifest excitement to this vision. Sometimes, legal professionals devote activities to the unleashing of thisenergy.Intheacademy,clsisperhapstheparadigmaticexample of energy unbound.Hence, adherents of cls once dedicated themselves to liberating subjective potential.102The point was to advance a vi-sionofanindividualwhoexpressesandaffirmsherpersonhoodby burstingfreeoftheconstraintsimposedbythereifiedstructuresofso-ciallife.103InDuncanKennedysphraseubiquitousinclscircles of the 1980s the point was making the kettle boil.104Cls was try-ingtoliberatecontradiction,alienation,desire,irony,double-ness,despair,ecstasy,andyearning.105Correspondingly,cls thinkersdisplayedanintenseallergicreactiontoany(grid-like)at-tempt to contain, constrain, thingify, or reify this energy.106 Theprospectofenergyunboundislatentintheenergyaestheticit-self.Unrestrained, the energy aesthetic portends a potential maelstrom oflegalactivity.Notsurprisingly,attemptsaremadetochannelthe actionindesireddirections.Butcollisionandcontradictionremain livepossibilities.Andwithallthisaction,motion,andenergy,con-tainmentcanbecomearealissue.Withoutsomesortofcontainment, the release of energy might produce chaos. F.The Missing Architecture Thegreatproblemfortheenergyaestheticcomesdowntothis:the energy aesthetic is only coherent if it has a structure, but in none of its substantiveincarnations(balancing,lawandeconomics,cls)canit provide one. Inbalancing,theissuearisesintermsofwhatdowebalance?Somesortofframe(somekindofgrid)isnecessarytohelpdetermine what needs to be balanced.Otherwise, balancing can yield any and all conclusions,dependinguponwhatisplacedonthescale.107Thediffi-cultyiswellillustratedinJusticeStevensswryobservationinafree-domofspeechcasethatfewofuswouldmarchoursonsanddaugh-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 102 JamesBoyle,ThePoliticsofReason:CriticalLegalTheoryandLocalSocialThought,133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 745 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 103 Id. at 742 (emphasis added). 104 Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1984). 105 KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 345. 106 SeeGabel,supranote90,at1590;Gabel&Kennedy,supranote104,at36(complaining about cls critiques being turned into a cluster of pods). 107 See Aleinikoff, supra note 94, at 97778. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1076HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 tersofftowartopreservethecitizensrighttoseeSpecifiedSexual Activities.108ButifinsteadofSpecifiedSexualActivities,weab-stractedtosexualspeechorexpressiongenerally,theconclusionmight bedifferent.Theproblemis:whatistobebalanced?Thedifficulty hereisnotthatonewillnecessarilyfailtocomeupwithananswer; the problem is that the energy aesthetic alone cannot furnish one.The energyaestheticisnecessarilyparasiticuponsomeextrinsicstructure (forexample,thegrid).109Anotherwaytoputitisthatthereisno such thing as balancing in the air. The same problem arises in law and economics, though it is seldom noticed.Inorderformicroeconomicanalysistoyieldrecommenda-tionsforwealthmaximization,itmustnecessarilyinvokesomenotion of who wants to trade what and with whom.110 More specifically, the economist has to know how the product mar-ket should be defined and who counts as a potentially interested party.Sometimes,makingthatdeterminationwillberelativelyeasybe-causethereareexplicitexchangesregisteredonamarket(oraclosely analogousmarket).Butmostoftheinterestinandimportoflawand economicsconcernsthosehypotheticalmarketsinwhichtransaction costs make explicit exchanges impossible.In those markets, the econo-mist has to make some guesses regarding both the product market (the stakes) and the interested parties (the players). Thequestionis:whatallowshimtodoso?111Posner,inhistrea-tise,usescommon,statutory,andconstitutionallawregimestoframe hismarkets.Theproblem,ofcourse,isthatthelawsdefinitionsof theplayersandthestakeshavenotbeenvettedforefficiency.112One could,ofcourse,usecommonsensetodefinetheplayersandthe stakes,butcommonsensealsohasnotbeenvettedforefficiency.One could use empirical research surveys, for instance to try to ascer-tain the players and the stakes.But while that sort of work might well revealpreferences,itwillnotfurnishmuchofabasisforconverting those preferences into dollar amounts. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 108 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 109 Aleinikoff, supra note 94, at 97375. 110 Inthetypicalillustrativepedagogicalexamplesofcropfieldsandtramwaysorautomobile drivers and pedestrians, these aesthetic difficulties are not particularly acute.But these examples are misleading for precisely that reason.Ronald Coase suggests as much.R.H. Coase, The Prob-lemofSocialCost,3J.L.&ECON.1,43(1960)(endorsinghismentorFrankH.Knightsstate-mentthatproblemsofwelfareeconomicsmustultimatelydissolveintoastudyofaestheticsand morals). 111 For an extended discussion, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 167987 (1989). 112 Economicanalysiscouldpresumablyprovidesatisfactoryevolutionaryaccountsofhowle-galrulesinspecificsettingsapproximateefficientdefinitionsoftheplayersandthestakes.Such an encyclopedic undertaking would be interesting. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1077 Havingsaidallthis,itisobviouslypossibletohaveintelligentand helpful conversations about the identities of the players and the stakes.Thepointhereisamodestone:aestheticjudgmentswillnecessarily featureatsomepointinthatconversation,113andeconomicanalysis alonecannotgeneratethoseaestheticjudgments.Somethingmoreis neededtoprovidethemissingarchitecturethedefinitionofthe players and the stakes.114 Thatleavesempiricalresearchwiththedauntingtaskofrevealing theidentitiesofthe(potentially)interestedpartiesandwhattheywish totrade.Sofar,however,thisworkremainsunderdevelopedrelative totheambitionsoflawandeconomics.Asitstands,theoverwhelm-ingmajorityoflawandeconomicsworkissimplyparasiticoncom-mon sense or legal definitions of the market.115 Thesameproblemariseswithintheclsdeploymentoftheenergy aesthetic.Incriticallegalstudies,theproblemisexperiencedinpoliti-calterms.Afterthedemystification,thedeconstruction,andsoon, whathappensnext?116Whataretheconnections,ifany,betweencls critiquesandleftism?Topushfurther:whatisleftism?117Intheir moreperspectivistmoments,clsthinkerscanlivewithindeedwill eveninsistuponthisclash.118Butformanythemythofprogress, the allure of transformation, and the cause of change die hard. Puttingthecomplexitiesaside,theimportantpointhereisasimple one:balancing,microeconomics,andclssharecertaindifficulties.Thesedifficultiesaretraceabletotheircommonaesthetic.Thereisa missingarchitectureinalltheseapproaches,onethattheenergyaes-thetic alone cannot supply. G.Safe Energy Oneaestheticresponsetothismissingarchitectureistoinvokea gridaesthetictocontainallthismovementandenergy.Buttheinvo-cationofthegridimageryisnotentirelysatisfactory:Thereisanarbi-trariness in determining where to cut off the action.The characteristic """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 113 See Coase, supra note 110, at 43. 114 None of this, of course, is offeredhere to suggest that economic analysis is useless or wrong oranythingofthesort.Itistosuggest,however,thatthepersuasivenessofanyspecificmicro-economic analysis will depend on the extent to which its aesthetic presumptions are controversial. 115 Forelaboration,seePierreSchlag,AnAppreciativeCommentonCoasesTheProblemof SocialCost:AViewfromtheLeft,1986WIS.L.REV.919,93343.Foranargumentthatthis characteristicconceptualparasitismleadstowrongheadedeconomicanalysis,seeSchlag,supra note 111, at 167687. 116 Foradiscussionofthisquestion,seeRichardMichaelFischl,TheQuestionThatKilled Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779 (1992). 117 Foradiscussionofleftisminthecontextofmodernism/postmodernism,seeKENNEDY, supra note 10, at 33964. 118 Id. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1078HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 grid anxieties return in full force.Where do we draw the line?Will thelinehold?Butnowthattheenergyaestheticisunleashed,these grid problems become more acute.119 Withtheadventoftheenergyaesthetic,ithasbecomepermissible, indeedentirelylegitimate,topushandpulljudgesopenlythroughthe invocationofpolicyandprinciple.Theresultingtensionispalpable.The stasis of the grid is pitched against the dynamism of energy the immovableobjectagainsttheirresistibleforce.Thereisaquestionof hierarchy.To state it crudely: do the object-form categories of the grid (rules,doctrines)delimitthereachoftheforcesofenergy(principles, policies), or is it the other way around?A great deal of scholarly effort hasbeenandcontinuestobedevoted,explicitlyornot,tothisprob-lem.The goal is to combine the twoaesthetics in some pleasing or co-herent arrangement. Perhapsthebestknowntheoreticalattempttomediatethetension was H.L.A. Harts distinction of a core of settled legal meaning from a penumbra of uncertainty.Hart illustrates his solution with a hypo-theticalthathassincebecomefamous.120Hartarguesthattheordi-nanceNovehiclesintheparkappliesclearlytosomevehicles (automobiles) and not so clearly to others (bicycles).121The automobile falls within the core of settled cases, the bicycle within the periphery. Hartsaestheticresolutionwaslessanoveldevelopmentthanan expressionofanaestheticstrategyalreadyinusebythecourts.122

With or without Hart, the notion of a settled core and an uncertain pe-ripheryappearsinallsortsofotherwaysthroughoutdecisionallaw.Thecoresaretheso-calledeasycases.Fromthecore,policiesand principlesradiateoutward,butonlysofarastheirscopeorreach ororbitpermits.Onthemargins,wehaveemanations,123pe-numbras,124 twilight zones.125 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 119 Foradiscussionofthisprobleminthecontextofjudicialreview,seeSeidman,supranote 33, at 104252. 120 ForHartsframingofthehypothetical,seeH.L.A.Hart,PositivismandtheSeparationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). 121 Id. 122 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (But the law allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in order that the objectmaybesecured.).Forahelpfuldiscussionofthepenumbrametaphor,seeBurrHenly, Penumbra: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987). 123 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 124 E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)(Thelawisnotindifferenttoconsiderationsofdegree.Activitieslocalintheirim-mediacydonotbecomeinterstateandnationalbecauseofdistantrepercussions.Whatisnear andwhatisdistantmayattimesbeuncertain.Thereisnopenumbraofuncertaintyobscuring judgment here.(citation omitted)). 125 YoungstownSheet&TubeCo.v.Sawyer,343U.S.579,637(1952)(Jackson,J.,concurring) (recognizingazoneoftwilightinwhichthePresidentandCongressmayhaveconcurrentau-thority or in which the distribution of authority is uncertain). SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 2002]THEAESTHETICSOFAMERICANLAW1079 Harts solution displays a certain aesthetic cleverness.In one sense itisavariationonthegridakindoffuzzygridwithblurred boundariesattheperipheries.Inanothersense,itisavariationon lawasenergyacenteringofenergyintermsofdensitiesknownas cores. Still,despitethisclevernessanddespitetheevidentpopularityof thecore/peripheryimageamongjudgesandlegalacademics,Harts solutionremains,insomerespects,aestheticallyunsatisfying.Forone thing,heresolvestensiononlybyreproducingitatahigherlevelof abstraction.Isthereaclearboundarybetweencoreandperiphery,or isthereapolicy-likefudgingofthetwo?IfonereadsHartsarticle closely, it seems that hedoes answer this question.But ironically, it is preciselytheanswerhegivesthatundoesthesolution.Itseemsfrom Hartsoriginalarticlethatheprivilegesthecore(thegrid).Thispref-erence is nosurprise, given that Harts original aimwas to sustain lin-guistic formalism against the advent of fuzzy policy reasoning.126 Anotherwell-knownattemptatreconciliation,occurringsomewhat laterinthetwentiethcentury,wasRonaldDworkinsefforttointe-grateanumberofdifferentjurisprudentialconsiderationsintoanos-tensiblyunitarytheoryoflaw.Specifically,Dworkintriedtoyokeen-ergy(politics)withobservanceofthegrid(theauthorityofthe institutionallegalmaterials)andaestheticdeterminations(coherence, fit,andintegrity)inacrypto-Gadamerianjurisprudentialhermeneu-tic.127Dworkin portrayed law as the relentless effort to articulate each terminlightoftheotherssoastomakelawthebestitcanbe.He pressedhisclaimsforaperfectequilibrationatabreathtakinglyethe-real level of abstraction. Butthereinlaytheaestheticdifficulty.Dworkinachievedhisele-gantsolutiononlybyclimbingtoanexceedinglyrarefiedlevelofab-straction,leavingonetowonderwhatpossibleearthlyrolehisresolu-tion could play.Dworkins jurisprudence often seems like pure energy nevertouchingtheground,alwaysspinninginonitself.Thejuris-prudentialhermeneuticbecomesdiaphanousasthelawworksitself pure (that is to say, empty). Harts and Dworkins efforts at mediation between grid and energy illustratetheuneasytensionbetweenthetwo.Dworkinsenterpriseis """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 126 Notsurprisingly,Hartistypicallyunderstoodinjustthisway.SeeThomasD.Eisele,The ActivityofBeingaLawyer:TheImaginativePursuitofImplicationsandPossibilities,inLAW ANDAESTHETICS,supranote8,at177,191(notingthatHartcommitsustotheviewoflawas object, specifically, the view of law as rules).Lon Fuller, Harts archetypal antagonist, criticizes bothHartandjurisprudencepreciselyfortreatinglawasapieceofinertmatteranditscon-stituentwordsasconstantinmeaning.LONL.FULLER,THEMORALITYOFLAW123(2ded. 1969);LonL.Fuller,PositivismandFidelitytoLawAReplytoProfessorHart,71HARV.L. REV. 630, 669 (1958). 127 See Cover, supra note 6, at 1610 n.24. SCHLAG-BOOKPROOFS10/17/0512:48 PM 1080HARVARDLAWREVIEW[Vol.115:1047 seduced by the spin of its own energy, while Harts efforts are weighed down by the cores of his metaphors.In both cases, the mediations col-lapse as each thinker champions one aesthetic over the other. H.Depletion Wehavealreadyseenhowtheenergyaestheticisthreatenedbyits ownexplosive,uncontrollableforce.Ironically,itisalsothreatened with exhaustion: the expenditure of energy leads to its depletion.128 Policiesandprinciplesthatoncemovedstaticdoctrineorinert precedentsbecomethemselvesincorporatedwithinthe(static)doctrine orthe(inert)precedent.Aspoliciesandprinciplesgaintheauthority ofjudicialrecognitionincaselaw,theybecomefrozeninplace words without force. Thepointisperhapseasiesttoseeinthecaseofbalancing.When balancing first gained credibility as a decisionmaking procedure, it was thoughtthat,incontrasttocategoricalrules,thisnewapproachwould compeljudgestothinkhardaboutthereasonsfortheirdecisions.129

Afterafewdecadesofbalancing,however,thetechniqueisoftenre-ducedtoaroutineandmindlessprocess,acommitmenttoasafeand ironicallyinvariantmiddleoftheroad.130Oddly,theinstitutionof multifactorandbalancingtestsasreigningdoctrineeffectivelydefuses the energy aesthetic.The same thing happens with principles, policies, and values.As these become juridically recognized and integrated into thelaw,thechangestheyoncepromisedbecomeinstitutionalized.131

Yesterdayspolicyanalysisistodaysformulaandtomorrowsmind-less incantation.132 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 128 Consistentwiththisaestheticpoint,courtsandcommentatorsoftenspeakoftheneedto preservethecapitalofthecourtthatis,toavoidwastingresourcesoninefficientorineffec-tualdecisions.Theassumptionisthatthestockofenergyisfinite.Forajudicialarticulationof