Advantaging Celebrity Marginals: From Public Figures to Public Office
Transcript of Advantaging Celebrity Marginals: From Public Figures to Public Office
Advantaging Celebrity Marginals:
From Public Figures to Public Office
Jeremy Hosein
Senior Honors Thesis
April 2004
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Index of Tables
Table 1.1: House fundraising regression……………………………….18 Table 1.2: Senate fundraising regression Table 2.1: House media hits regression………………………………...20 Table 2.2: House media hits regression model 2 Table 2.3: Senate media hits regression………………………………...22 Table 2.4: Senate media hits regression model 2 Table 3.1: House campaign expenditures regression…………………...25 Table 3.2: Senate campaign expenditures regression Table 4.1: House general votes regression……………………………..31 Table 4.2: Senate general votes regression Table 5: Means in celebrity contests…………………………………...33 Table 6: Legend for regression analysis variables……………………....36
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Table of Contents
I. Introduction……………………………………………….4 II. Framework………………………………………………... 6 III. Methodology…………………………………….................. 7
Empirical Modeling……………………………………………..8 Qualified Candidates..............................................................................9
IV. Findings……………………………………………………...14
Campaign Fundraising and Expenditures………..…………….…..14 Branded Loyalties: Party Leaders and Political Actors……………... 26 The Contender………………………………………………….27 Voters and Celebrities………………………………………….. 29
V. Suggestions for further study...…………………………...….. 32
VI. Conclusion|Winning celebrities……………………………....33
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I. Introduction
om Osborne (R-NE) had already established himself as a home state hero
before running for office. His notoriety was rivaled by Congressmen with
twenty years of experience. As a pro football player, and most notably, one of the most
winningest coaches in college football history, his reputation preceded him. Over his
twenty five year coaching history, he brought three national championships, four perfect
seasons, and was inducted into the College Football Hall of Fame. While coaching, he
earned his Ph.D. in educational psychology at the University of Nebraska. In 2000, 3rd
District Congressman Bill Barrett announced retirement, and Tom Osborne ran for office
against other non-incumbents, former Nebraska Republican Chairman and Secretary of
State John Gale and state Board of Education member Kathy Wilmot.1 Though they had
solid political backgrounds and were probably more qualified for office, Osborne’s
challengers hopelessly lost, with Osborne carrying 71% in the primaries and 82% in the
general election. His first experiences as a House member were less impressive,
however. He drew 39 out of 39 for the freshman office lottery and was unable to attain a
spot on Appropriations. He did, though, receive seats on the Agriculture, Education, and
Resource Committees where he was able to work on farm mentoring programs that
greatly benefited his constituency.
Elections are at the very forefront of a democratic regime. Its practice is a
display of public opinion’s profound impact on government and ensures the sovereignty
of the people. But the elements for qualifying a given candidate for congressional office
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have been the subject of an extensive and healthy debate among political scientists. It has
long been known that voters’ familiarity with a candidate increases a candidate’s
electoral successes. As Gary Jacobson clarifies, “Voters were known to favor candidates
with whom they were familiar (that is, whose names they could recall when asked)…”2
Naturally, celebrities have notoriety with the public, so they would make logical
candidates. Party committees and influential electoral constituencies have always
pursued these viable contenders.
Celebrity contenders still follow basic guidelines in their attempts to gain office.
Although elections are more candidate-centered than anything else, party committees and
PAC’s play an important role in the electoral successes of candidates.3 Any strong
constituency with important political resources will scrutinize political contenders and
what they are likely to accomplish in office if elected. These constituencies, or political
actors, have votes, money, and power; thus, congressmen often cater to these political
actors whether in position-taking or legislation. Constant awareness to this differential4
is just one of the many perpetual activities of a congressman related to elections. Another
is advertising. In an effort to gain notoriety, most political challengers must present their
names en masse to the public5, for the career in office itself is the political commodity6
that they seek.
1 Barone, Michael and Richard Cohen. The Almanac of American Politics 2002. (Washington D.C.: National Journal, 2002). 2 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p32. 3 Ibid, p57. 4 Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. (New Haven: Yale, 1974), p63. 5 This particular activity is negligible in the case of the celebrity candidate, as I will discuss later.
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II. Framework
Background Literature. Little scholarly work has been devoted to the celebrity,
progressively following celebrities through all stages of the electoral process. In many
studies, “celebrity status” has been earmarked as an independent variable in candidate
quality or amateurism in elections. The best of these studies is David Canon’s Actors,
Athletes, and Astronauts. Canon does well to address the ambition theory, stating that the
motivations for political amateurs (in which he quantifies celebrities) may differ by their
behavior in running for a Congressional seat. Specifically, he points to ambitious
amateurs and experience-seeking amateurs. He presents excellent evidence of “behavioral
differences both among amateurs and between amateurs and experienced politicians.”7
Canon tries to identify successful amateurs by a “comprehensive theory of ambition and
careers”8 to predict those outcomes. His study fails, however, to analyze variables in the
structural nature of political campaigns including, but not limited to, campaign
fundraising, campaign expenditures, and causal predictors of media attention. Other
scholars present scant attention to the celebrity. Jonathan Krasno and Donald Philip
Green use celebrity as a minor indicator of quality among other quality indicators
(previous congressional run, type of office, professional status).9 Similarly, Alan
Abramowitz uses celebrity as a minor indicator in explaining Senate election outcomes
among other institutional conditions (open seats, national political conditions, challenger
political experience, campaign expenditures). The most robust findings of his study
6 Ibid. 7 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p xii. 8 Ibid. p87.
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indicate that candidate characteristics accounted for Senate electoral successes, with
candidates increasingly relying on personal appeal to grab votes.10 The author’s work was
significant in that it presented a revealing calculus of an individual candidate’s own
appeal to garner the electorate. This significance is underscored in my attempt to find
more specific determinates of electoral success for celebrity candidates only. By the
analysis of the data collected, we may be able to explain relationships within the
structural nature of political campaigns that blitz the celebrity contender during the
electoral process and into public office. We will be able answer some important
intermediate questions as to whether the celebrity has an electoral advantage, costs of
campaigning for the celebrity, and so forth. Are they qualified for public office? How do
they differ from their more politically experienced challenger counterparts? And finally,
do they (celebrities) necessarily have an electoral advantage?
III. Methodology
I restrict my analysis to the 2000 electoral cycle. The players involved in this
model and analyses include the potential celebrity candidate, the incumbent (if one
exists), the challenger(s), party leaders, other political actors, and voters. The model is an
analysis on celebrities from various regions who bid for Congress strategically, either for
an open seat or a contested seat against an incumbent. The collected data includes
campaign funds raised and spent, population totals for each district, primary election
voting results, general election voting results, whether the candidates have any political
9 Krasno, Jonathan S. and Donald Philip Green. “Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections.” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 50, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), pp. 920-936. 10 Abramowitz, Alan I. “Explaining Senate Election Outcomes.” The American Political Science Review. Vol. 82, No.2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 385-403.
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electoral experience, their professions, their party labels, and how often these candidates
were in the media.
We must define some key terms here. “Qualified” candidates refer to competent
and skilled in the legislative processes that govern our institution. A celebrity is any
individual with a nonpolitical basis for being well known, generally with good repute,
popular to the public, and famous in their respected field; i.e. actor, singer, sports figure,
famous family, war hero, etc. One of the dilatory tasks of this research was assigning a
celebrity status to individuals. I coded these values using their professions and Lexis-
Nexis hits to gauge their celebrity extant. Media attention, or how often the contender is
cited in the press, is an appropriate indicator of celebrity status. An incumbent is a
member of a political institution previously elected and holding on to the office. A
challenger is a non-incumbent that is vying for the same seat against the celebrity. Party
leaders refer to members of the respective party in high positions that control the ebb and
flow of party policy, members, and, at times, member policy. These members may be
party whips, chairman of the national committees, the respective leaders in the House and
Senate, and the president. Political actors include PACs, generous high-profile campaign
contributors, and other individuals or organizations that contribute to the electoral success
of a candidate. Voters are members of the electorate who cast votes for a particular
delegate.
Empirical Modeling. I empirically modeled my research by means of statistics.
The aggregate of numbers gathered on campaign fundraising and expenditures, general
vote totals, celebrity status, qualified candidacy (education, occupations, experience in
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prior elected office), were compared with each other. I ran regression analyses with
campaign funds raised, campaign expenditures, media hits, and vote shares being the
dependent variable against all the independent variables to determine the relationship
between the response and predictor variables. I also used frequency and means to find
individual data on independent variables. The relationships among the variables are
given in table format.
Qualified candidates. Clearly, in any given congressional race, there are better
candidates than others. Peverill Squire offers some conditions that qualify these
contenders.11 First and foremost, those with previous political experience, specifically
challengers who have held elected public office in the past naturally have traits that
characterize the quintessential candidate, requiring the political savvy and personal
appeal that draws votes. Some of these characteristics include “physical attractiveness,
oratorical and organizational skills, and telegenic appeal.”12 All of these were found to
be positively associated with thermometer scores and voting. Individuals with previous
electoral success have demonstrated these qualities by virtue of their previously holding
public offices.
How do celebrities fit into this framework? Depending on their background, they
indeed possess many of the same qualities as skilled, experienced office-holders. By
virtue of their celebrity identity, they have mass personal appeal with the public. Also,
celebrities possess certain qualities that make them more eligible for candidateship than
the average citizen. For instance, John Glenn (D-OH) was the first man to orbit the
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moon. His immortalized exploits provided him with electoral benefits. Similarly, Tom
Osborne possessed a strong curriculum vitae that provided and harbored electoral
benefits. Apart from previous political experience and celebrity status, we can determine
if there are other factors that may constitute a good, effective candidate such as
education, leadership roles, experiences from previous occupations, and recruitment and
training by party organizations.
Next, I adopt David Cannon’s understanding of political amateurs. In my analysis
of celebrity candidates, they are, by nature, amateurs to political office-holding. Cannon
categorizes amateur political candidates into two groups: ambitious amateurs who are
serious about winning a seat, and experience-seeking amateurs who run for their own
private utility. Those experience-seeking amateurs may run for several reasons including
the experience for another electoral bid in the future or simply for the thrill of the chase.
As Cannon mentions, these candidates have little hope of winning.13 It is my contention
that all celebrities who run are ambitious amateurs. Cannon, like Roderick Banks and
Jeffrey Kiewiet, argue that amateur motivations in running for office are based on
whether or not it is an open-seat contest and the presence of strong or weak candidates;14
however, I intend to suggest moreover that individuals who are leaving their profession
as entertainers, astronauts, or athletes for whatever reason, make decisions to enter a
House or Senate race utilizing rational choice from the beginning and have utility
tradeoffs that are greater than the average candidate. The experienced officeholder will
11 Squire, Peverill. “Candidates, Money, and Voters: Assessing the States of Congressional Elections Research.” Political Research Quarterly. Volume 48, Issue 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 891-917. 12 Ibid. 13 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p30.
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enter a race that he thinks he can win;15 I believe celebrities follow this same logic, for
these powerful challengers have more to lose if they do not succeed in their bid for office.
A display of their eagerness for office is shown that of the 36 celebrities running in 2000,
most were able to fundraise money comparable to other serious contenders for the seat
and 31 ran under a major party label.16 Also, deference is given here to the political
ambition theory for celebrities, but that does not entirely explain their reasoning for
running for office. Running for office for these ambitious celebrities is unique in the
sense that they forego their celebrated professions for public office while most
challengers seeking public office either retire from their private sector jobs or leave in
pursuit of an office-holding position; however, the public naturally scrutinizes celebrities’
motivations and their campaigns closely versus other races. The opportunity costs for
celebrities running for office are high. The decision to leave showbiz for public office
could potentially damage both career paths in the occasion that the personality loses.
This is often the case with more politically experienced challengers as well. As one
commented, “’If I lose, my political future is demolished. You can’t afford a couple of
losses, so this could be the last hurrah for me.’”17 While media exposure is naturally
higher in the case of celebrity elections, this type of media exposure can affect the
14 Ibid. 15 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p153. 16 On the Senate side, celebrities were a little more diverse on their party labels, but still most were either Republican or Democrat. Also, because of restrictions to information, some of their campaign funds raised and spent were unavailable. 17 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p37.
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outcome of that race.18 Thus, strategic maneuvering and self-perception on the part of
celebrities is a necessity.
Such was the case for Hillary Clinton in New York’s 2000 Senate race. These
celebrities will seek to maximize their utility when deciding to run for office. For
instance, as ambitious amateurs, celebrities assume a high probability of winning, thus
their impetus to enter a race is already greater than those who are experience-seeking and
is equivalent to veteran officeholders who are deciding to run. For instance, using Hillary
Clinton as an example:
EU = (PW * UW) + (PL * UL)
As an ambitious amateur, she gauges her probably of winning (PW) at 70% over Mayor
Rudy Giuliani. Her utility from winning is a modest 10. Thus, her probability of losing
(PL) is 30% and her utility from losing (UL) is -10. Therefore,
(.60 * 10) + (.30 * -10) = 3
Assuming that 0 marks indifference either way, a positive value will denote a preference
to run since rational choice assumes that the player will weigh costs and benefits of each
option and then determine the biggest payoff. Mrs. Clinton should apply this expected
utility model to winning the primary in New York in order to win the Democratic
nomination. While she is ambitious, she is also strategic at the same time and will apply
the same model to winning the general election. Because any campaign for office is
dynamic with opinions and voter perceptions changing, Mrs. Clinton may reevaluate her
ability to win. For instance, how might Mrs. Clinton’s perception of winning have
18 Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press), p177.
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changed when Rudy Giuliani dropped out and Congressman Rick Lazio stepped in? We
can use Bayes’ Rule to answer this question. “Bayes’ Rule states that an initial belief, or
prior probability, is changed to an updated belief, or posterior probability, based on the
observation of conditional events.”19 The formula for Bayes’ Rule is as follows:
p(C | O) = [p(O | C) * p(C)] / [p(O | C) * p(C) + p(O | ~C)* p(~C)]
where C is the “condition” and O is the “observation”, and | is “given.” We are trying to
find the probability that Mrs. Clinton wins (C) given (|) that Mayor Giuliani does not run
(O). Given our prior belief that Hillary Clinton will win the race p(C) = 60% and also
given that if Giuliani does not run (Congressman Lazio runs), Mrs. Clinton’s belief that
her probability of winning (p(O|C)) is 90% and that her probability of not winning given
Lazio runs (p(O | ~C) is 10%, should she still run?
[(.90) * (.60)] / [(.90) * (.60) + (.10) * (.40)] = .93
With her updated belief that she has a 93% chance of winning, we find that it is still in
her interest to run. Her utility to run in the general election is as follows:
(.93) * (10) + (.07) * (-10) = 8.6
The purpose of this analysis is to show the strategic nature of the ambitious
amateur. Because of their greater utility tradeoff, they must carefully consider the
possibilities of winning and losing in their bid for congress. Had a stronger candidate
Republican candidate entered the race during before the primary, this could have easily
altered Mrs. Clinton’s perception of winning the race, and she might have dropped out.
19 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Principles of International Politics. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2000),
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IV. Findings
Campaign Fundraising and Expenditures. One of the most important resources
necessary to communicate with voters is money.20 It buys access to the media, which in
turn provides advertising for the challenger to gain publicity; however, for the celebrity
challenger, money may not be needed to gain this publicity. By nature of their celebrity,
the electorate knows who they are. As Squire states, “The more money a challenger has
to spend, the better able is he or she to increase his or her name recognition, and to give
the voters reasons to prefer him or her to the incumbent.”21 This statement can be
modified to include any challenger versus a celebrity as well. Like a challenger going up
against an incumbent, there is substantial difficulty in challenging a celebrity, albeit an
amateur one. Significant questions are raised then: How much does a personality need to
spend? Or, how much less do they need to spend compared to an average challenger or
incumbent? For instance, here are the campaign funds raised for Tom Osborne in 2000.
Tom Osborne (R): 2000 Election Cycle
PACs $0 0%
Individuals $442,209 90%
Other Sources $51,147 10%
Total Contributions $493,356 100%
Source: opensecrets.org
p335. 20 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p58. 21 See footnote 7.
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Although it was highly anticipated that Tom Osborne would win the election, he
nevertheless campaigned hard, traveling 60,000 miles and created an extensive grassroots
campaign. Osborne’s decision to reject all PAC donations did not hamper him at all.
Rollie Reynolds (D): 2000 Election Cycle
PACs $250 2%
Individuals $12,756 92%
Other Sources $913 7%
Total Contributions $13,919 100%
Source: opensecrets.org
Rollie Reynolds was Osborne’s closest competitor, winning 16% of the vote share in the
general election. He did accept PAC donations, but was largely unsuccessful in doing so,
mainly because Democrats had little chance of winning the seat in this largely
Republican-leaning district, and that Osborne was the challenger. The discrepancy in
fundraising and expenditures was large and illustrates the difficulty of raising campaign
money, particularly against an incumbent.
It is no secret that campaigns are fueled by money. When the tap runs dry, a
candidate often has no other choice than to drop out. In Gary Jacobson’s elegant study
on the effect of campaign spending, he states, “…campaign money is crucial to
challengers…”22 Money’s utility in a campaign allows a challenger to reach voters. He
finds that campaign spending has a bigger payoff to challengers at a certain level than
incumbents, and often times, Senate challengers become as well known as the
incumbents in a race. Jacobson also found evidence of diminishing marginal returns after
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a certain amount spent, so the effect of expenditures may not be so linear. Another
limitation is the dynamic nature of spending across states. An election in Nebraska will
not cost as much as an election in New York. The wide variation in state populations is
not controlled for in my study. I do not entirely discount the effects of campaign
spending; instead, I give more attention to recognition of the candidate quantified by
media coverage. Senate challengers are often higher quality challengers and possess a
higher amount of media coverage than House challengers. As we already stated before,
familiarity with the voter is an important stepping stone for a seat, but what about a
celebrity who already retains voter recognition by virtue of his celebrity? What effect
does the personality have on campaign funds raised and spent?
In the House, celebrities did not perform well in raising money against their non-
celebrity counterparts and particularly against those with previous electoral experience.
The interrelational effect of the non-celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits (the number of cited
references enjoyed by non-celebrities in the media) did offer a significant positive
correlation with fundraising, producing $675 in campaign funds per hit in the media.
Among those included in non-celebrity hits are contenders with electoral experience, an
often quantified variable of the quality candidate, who received a significant advantage
over other challengers in raising money.23 We must therefore maintain that Tom Osborne
22 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p153. 23 Inclusion of the electoral-experienced candidate within the “noncelebhits” variable may reflect disproportionate campaign fundraising for those experience-seeking amateurs and also may not be accurate indicators of fundraising ability for those experienced candidates. This is also the case for the Senate findings.
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was an anomaly whose success in raising campaign funds was not equally shared by his
celebrity counterparts.
In the Senate24, we find that being a celebrity is insignificant to raising campaign
money. This may be explained by the nature of many Senate races. Since the seats are
fewer and highly contested, candidates often enjoy more media attention, so celebrity
status becomes less significant as other candidates enjoy media coverage as well. The
interrelational effect of the celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits (the number of hits enjoyed by each
celebrity) display that celebrities perform just as well or even better than their
counterparts, earning over $31,000 per instance of media attention. The interrelational
effect of non-celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits demonstrate that non-celebrities earned nearly
$6000 per hit of media attention.
24 See table 6 for definition of regression analysis variables.
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Table 1.1 House Fundraising Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.
Interval Celeb 47669.8 118180 0.40 0.687 -184106.8 to
279446.4 Celebhits 1472.489 907.9367 1.62 0.105 -308.1712 to
3253.15 Noncelebhits 675.7478 73.6971 9.17 0.000 531.2118 to
820.2838 Electexp 634357.5 25434.59 24.94 0.000 584474.7 to
684240.2 Constant 61160.18 13722.98 4.46 0.000 34246.44 to
88073.92 Table 1.2 Senate Fundraising Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.
Interval Celeb -1623571 1625002 -1.00 0.319 -4821819 to
1574676 Celebhits 31142.95 4901.907 6.35 0.000 21495.26 to
40790.63 Noncelebhits 5847.162 903.8586 6.47 0.000 4068.233 to
7626.091 Electexp 1711813 705697.7 2.43 0.016 322894.1 to
3100731 Constant -270072.7 323964 -0.83 0.405 -907682.2 to
367536.8
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Next, we look at the variables earning those contenders media attention. What
factors contribute to a receptive media? I control for incumbents with Lexis-Nexis hits
over 1000 for a more accurate gauge of all challengers in the election year. In the House,
there is a significant positive relationship for celebrities, producing more Lexis-Nexis hits
for those contenders who are celebrities. Those with elected experience, however, earn
more hits than celebrities. The most significant variables in this analysis25 that provide
the most media attention for candidates are campaign spending and winning. The more a
candidate spent on his campaign, the more media attention he attracted and effectively, if
a candidate wins the election, he receives more media attention than those who do not.
This is an expected outcome, for when the runner wins the primary, the race tapers down
to fewer candidates who receive more media attention in the final stretches of the
campaign. Another analysis26 was done to distinguish between celebrity spending and
non-celebrity spending. Here, it is evident that the celebrity campaign spending does not
produce a significant correlation with media attention. This may point to celebrities
already possessing media attention and thus have diminishing returns on campaign
spending for that media attention. Non-celebrities, in fact, were able to earn more results
per dollar than celebrities.
25 Refer to table 2.1
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Table 2.1
House Media Hits Regression Model 1 (lexishits2000)27
Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf. Interval
Celeb 30.32172 14.68265 2.07 0.039 1.525572 to 59.11786
Campaign_Exp 5.46e-05 4.09e-06 13.33 0.000 4.66e-05 to 6.26e-05
Electexp 38.03659 6.986727 5.44 0.000 24.33396 to 51.73921
Won 68.78571 7.663882 8.98 0.000 53.75502 to 83.8164
Constant 30.5432 2.38595 12.80 0.000 25.86379 to 35.22261
Table 2.2
House Media Hits Regression Model 2 (lexishits2000)
Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf. Interval
Celeb 16.9352 29.46282 0.57 0.565 -40.84778 to 74.71819
Celebspend 4.42e-05 4.6e-05 0.96 0.337 -4.6e-05 to 1.344e-04
Noncelebspend 5.13e-05 7.0e-06 7.33 0.000 3.76e-05 to 6.5e-05
Electexp 25.7179 11.83388 2.17 0.030 2.509077 to 48.92671
Won 77.00351 12.94759 5.95 0.000 51.61047 to 102.3966
Constant 48.29687 4.029382 11.99 0.000 40.39438 to 56.19936
26 Refer to table 2.2 27 Controlling for those with hits over 1000, notably includes incumbents.
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Senate outcomes painted a much different picture for the celebrity.28 There was a
negative relationship between the celebrity and media attention. The variables producing
the positive relationship were campaign spending, electoral experience, and whether the
candidate won, producing many more hits in the media than in the House. To explain
this discrepancy from the House, I point out again that Senate contenders were more
likely to possess characteristics that made them higher quality candidates than many
candidates running in the House which may discount the celebrity factor for those who
ran in the Senate. Also, the highly visible nature of Senate contests and fewer candidates
enable the media to focus more attention on each candidate which may also detract from
the value of being a celebrity. The second analysis29 shows that celebrity spending had a
slightly significant effect on the number of hits received, but non-celebrity spending still
earned more media attention, confluent with the House outcomes.
28 Refer to table 2.3 29 Refer to table 2.4
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Table 2.3 Senate Media Hits Regression Model 1 (lexishits)30
Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf. Interval
Celeb -28.79036 53.90199 -0.53 0.594 -134.9323 to 77.35157
Campaign_Exp 1.33e-05 2.55e-06 5.23 0.000 8.30e-06 to 1.83e-05
Electexp 190.4614 28.12999 6.77 0.000 135.0688 to 245.854
Won 190.9799 44.34659 4.31 0.000 103.6542 to 278.3057
Constant 65.84498 11.14117 5.91 0.000 43.90617 to 87.7838
Table 2.4 Senate Media Hits Regression Model 2 (lexishits) Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.
Interval Celeb -85.62172 89.78052 -0.95 0.341 -262.3258 to
91.08232 Celebspend 2.42e-05 9.57e-06 2.53 0.012 5.38e-06 to
4.31e-05 Noncelebspend 1.66e-05 3.43e-06 4.86 0.000 9.90e-06 to
2.34e-05 Electexp 232.5303 43.24317 5.38 0.000 147.4201 to
317.6406 Won 244.0741 60.79755 4.01 0.000 124.4137 to
363.7345 Constant 117.9297 18.00134 6.55 0.000 82.49989 to
153.3596
30 Controlling for those with hits over 1000; notably includes incumbents.
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My next analysis details how media exposure might affect campaign spending in
the House. A significant positive correlation is found between the interrelational effect of
non-celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits and campaign spending, suggesting that for every instance
of media attention, celebrities here spent $665. Also important is the electoral experience
of the candidate, which presents a strong correlation to campaign expenditures. As noted
in the fundraising analysis above, the ability of the electoral-experienced candidate to
raise money also indicates that he has more to spend, as the data below dictates. The
interrelational effect celebrity factor here was insignificant, suggesting a weak correlation
between celebrity exposure in the media and campaign expenditures in total. I explain
this by the ability of House celebrities to attract media attention by virtue of their
celebrity; therefore, their campaign expenditures need not be at the degree of their other
experience-seeking or electoral-experienced counterparts.
Interestingly, the celebrity variable displayed a negative correlation with
campaign spending in the Senate. Celebrities’ presence in the media had a significant
affect on their campaign expenditures, as did their non-celebrity counterparts, and, to a
lesser extent, those with electoral experience. It is important to note, however, that
former first lady Hillary Clinton had a skewing affect on the data, as her campaign
expenditures totaled over $29 million, a few standard deviations away from the mean of
$197059 for the celebrity candidate. This variance is one of the limitations of this
particular analysis given the varying expenditures totals across the states. Both the
celebrities’ and the non-celebrities’ presence in the media produced a significant positive
relationship with campaign spending. This relationship may suggest that their presences
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in the media compel both types of candidates to spend more toward media attention since
it is evident that spending produces a net flow of media attention. Also, consistent with
the previous analysis on campaign fundraising, the celebrity variable by itself produced a
negative relationship with campaign expenditures. The explanation here is a bit elusive,
but I suggest that the celebrities in the Senate posed no real advantage versus other
contenders, and their ability to spend campaign money is predicated on their ability to
raise money. Controlling for Mrs. Clinton, we may suggest that the Senate celebrity
candidate was not as successful in raising and spending money as their counterparts.
Again, considering that the celebrity candidates were running against higher quality
candidates than in the House, this can account for the negative relationship between
celebrity status and campaign expenditures.
25
Table 3.1 House Campaign Expenditures Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error t P>t 95% Conf.
Interval Celeb 48550.62 119500.2 0.41 0.685 -185815.2 to
282916.4 Celebhits 1569.637 918.0795 1.71 0.087 -230.9158 to
3370.19 Noncelebhits 665.4195 74.52039 8.93 0.000 519.2689 to
811.5701 Electexp 575791.6 25718.73 22.39 0.000 525351.6 to
626231.6 Constant 59269.2 13876.28 4.27 0.000 32054.8 to
86483.6 Table 3.2 Senate Campaign Expenditures Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error t P>t 95% Conf.
Interval Celeb -1615676 1634004 -0.99 0.324 -4831640 to
1600287 Celebhits 30846.93 4929.06 6.26 0.000 21145.8 to
40548.06 Noncelebhits 5664.654 908.8654 6.23 0.000 3875.871 to
7453.437 Electexp 1599445 709606.8 2.25 0.025 202833.1 to
2996058 Constant -253410.8 325758.5 -0.78 0.437 -894552.2 to
387730.6
26
Branded Loyalties: Party Leaders and Political Actors. In our candidate-centered
electoral system, political parties have increasingly taken a backstage to the individual
vying for office. However, backstage does not mean out of sight. Candidates, especially
amateurs, rely on party organizations and other political actors in the process of running.
Party organizations are good sources to obtain backing for logistics, campaign money,
and support. Sometimes, these party organizations supply the candidate as well. GOPAC
was the Republican Party recruitment mechanism.31 Its purpose is to draft viable
candidates to the party, hold workshops and focus groups to align the party with a
coherent party message along with its newly recruited members. It also trains its recruits
in campaigns and issue advocacy. This party machinery had vast successes with the
Republican influx in 1994 and undoubtedly again this past election year. Examples of
GOPAC’s powerful influence include convincing some office-holders to retire, others to
go into office, and convincing high-profile financial backers to support certain
candidates. J.C. Watts (R-OK), former star quarterback at the University of Oklahoma
and professional football player and now head of GOPAC, elicited the help of Gingrich’s
GOPAC to win a House seat in 1994.32 According to David Canon,
Celebrity amateurs have been recruited by party officials, especially in Senate races, yet these cases are typically limited to races against popular incumbents or to the minority party that does not have a large pool of experienced politicians. When there is a good chance of defeating an incumbent, or if the seat is open, amateurs often must run against a party favorite in the primary.33
31 Davidson, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek. Congress and its Members. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), p59. 32 See footnote 1. 33 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p71.
27
Party officials often strategize on Congressional races, especially if there is much
at stake; i.e. a thin line between the majority and minority in the House and Senate. They
may send a personality to run against a popular opposite party candidate, or a popular
analogous candidate depending on the circumstances. There are, of course, costs
attributed to eliciting help from such organizations. During an important vote on a salient
issue, party leaders expect a vote along partisan lines. The incentive exists insofar that
the candidate relies on the party machinery for election. Nevertheless, it is an important
to note their relationships with party leaders in office in order to find determinate
motivations for their seeking office. Going further, in recent years, controversy has
sparked over money’s irrefutable link to the efficacy of a candidacy. On March 27, 2002
House Resolution 2356, better known as the McCain-Feingold/Shays-Meehan campaign
finance bill, was signed into law by President Bush. It can be argued that the constraints
on soft money, or the unlimited transferal of funds into political parties’ accounts,
increased pressure on candidates to look for party support when edifying a bid for
Congress. In my analysis, I attributed party support after a candidate wins the party’s
primary, thus, if they received votes in the general election, I assume party support. In
the House, an overwhelming 88 percent34 of celebrities had party support. In the Senate,
60 percent35 had party support.
The Contender. Pertaining to the political candidates vying for office (celebrity,
incumbent, challenger) only, Joseph Schlesinger theorizes that there are aggregate
patterns of political careers. His ambition theory suggests that if the House was filled
34 30 out of 34 celebrities had party support in the House.
28
with three-fourths of individuals who served on their state legislatures, experienced
political candidates will attempt to move up the political hierarchy by starting at state
legislatures.36 David Canon suggests that this theory needs must include political
amateurs. “The increasing incidence of nonofficeholding candidates reduces the utility of
a theory that focuses only on incumbents” and that the theory “must be broadened to
encompass the behavior of [political] amateurs.”37 If there is a political career ladder,
what percentages of congressmen follow it? Does it affect celebrities? Observing past
experiences of these political contenders, what are the celebrities’ own career ladders? In
effect, do the two ever mesh? Keeping in mind the prior assumption used to
operationalize the celebrity as an individual who receives notoriety by nonpolitical
means, I discounted observations where political careers and celebrity meshed. It is
important to mention, however, that an incumbent may have become a celebrity by virtue
of his tenure in public office. For instance, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani
is widely regarded as a hero who triumphed during his term, enjoying wide public
support after September 11 and appearing on news media outlets frequently, not to
mention guest appearances on television programs (Saturday Night Live, among others).
Although no other incumbents may reach celebrity of this magnitude, they may have
established a positive repute with their voters and thus may deserve a celebrity mark. In
order to maintain consistency and reduce randomness in my findings, though, I only
observe celebrities within their respective industries outside of politics. Referring back to
35 6 out of 10 celebrities had party support in the Senate. 36 Schlesinger, Joseph A. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p20. 37 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p xiv.
29
the career ladders of contenders, I observe those of high quality candidates in the Senate:
24 percent38 of contenders previously held a position with elected experience and in the
House, 29 percent39 did. However, previous elected experience is not the only indicator
of quality. There were higher ratios of celebrities in the Senate (Of the candidates in the
Senate, 3.4 percent40 were celebrities, and in the House 1.8 percent41 were celebrities) as
well as businessmen, attorneys, and those with experience in the political arena. My data
offers no suggestions that political ladders of any sort affect the motivations of celebrities
in running for higher office. The career path of the celebrity does not often cross into the
political realm. I contend that celebrities use their personalities to propel them into the
public eye and eventually to their desired public office as viable candidates without
seeking previous elected experience to do so. The celebrities offered in my analysis
stayed within their respective enterprises, though celebrities such as Hillary Clinton may
have found it easier to utilize her position as former first lady to earn her Senate seat,
before entering a contest.
Voters and Celebrities. Voting behavior is a strongly controversial topic for
scholarly debate. But “among the most consistent findings produced by studies of
congressional voters over the past generation is that simple knowledge of who the
candidates are is strongly connected to voting behavior.”42 Voters do vote for celebrities
and they are elected into office, as evidenced by the data. So, how do celebrities market
themselves effectively for electoral success? Moreover, what is the appeal of sending a
38 70 candidates out of an overall 290. 39 558 candidates out of an overall 1900. 40 10 celebs out of 290. 41 34 celebs out of 1900 candidates.
30
celebrity into public office? According to Jacobson’s elegant survey of congressional
voters and their behavior, “a plurality of positive comments about candidates of all kinds
have to do with personal characteristics, which frequently seem… empty of political
contact.”43 This seems to be a plausible explanation for the celebrity candidate, who as
ambitious amateurs, possess no experience in the electoral arena and yet receive votes in
congressional elections. For the purposes of this model, I will assume that voters will
vote for the contender they are most familiar with and gain the greatest expected utility
from.
In my analysis of general vote shares, I find that celebrities have a significant
impact on general votes received in House contests. How often candidates are shown in
the media also has a positive correlation with general votes received. Finally, those with
previous electoral experience also produce a positive relationship with general votes
received. All the coefficients are larger than twice their standard errors and achieve below
a .05 level of significance. These findings are important, yet somewhat unsurprising. By
holding our prior assumptions, voter familiarity with the candidate through previous
electoral experience, presence in the media, and celebrity status all contribute to a voter’s
knowledge of the candidate and influences the number of votes received.
In the Senate, we find that celebrity is an insignificant independent variable and
electoral experience, interestingly enough, hurts the candidate in general vote shares.
Again, we can explain this in terms of higher quality candidates, and while many have
electoral connections, there are also, as David Cannon states, those strong candidates
42 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p110.
31
without electoral experience who do not. The only positive association is the candidates’
presence in the media.
Table 4.1 House General Votes Regression Model (genvote) Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.
Interval Celeb 17028.91 6736.967 2.53 0.012 3808.875 to
30248.95 Lexishits2000 251.3401 16.70056 15.05 0.000 218.5684 to
284.1119 Electexp 46981.02 3669.86 12.80 0.000 39779.61 to
54182.43 Constant 18280.95 1295.992 14.11 0.000 15737.81 to
20824.09 Table 4.2 Senate General Votes Regression Model (general_results) Coefficient Std. Error t P>t 95% Conf.
Interval Celeb 192747.6 2642089 0.07 0.942 -5021711 to
5407207 Lexishits 5189.233 1405.055 3.69 0.000 2416.199 to
7962.267 Electexp -2262264 1173980 -1.93 0.056 -4579247 to
54717.88 Constant 71840 559408.4 0.13 0.898 -1032215 to
1175895
43 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p127.
32
V. Suggestions for further study.
Further research of celebrities in congressional elections could produce far
reaching and valuable results. In the context of political campaigns and elected office,
celebrities possess unique qualities in a time where personal appeal earns votes from the
electorate. A data set with a greater sample size of celebrities in the regression analyses,
particularly longitudinal studies of celebrity races, may help to shed light on general
determinates of celebrity candidate success in congressional elections. Moreover, this
would help to discount the copious variant effect of former first lady Hillary Clinton’s
campaign in the Senate. The longitudinal study may also include voter turnout for races
with celebrities now and in the past in the same district to determine if particular districts
are receptive to the celebrity candidate. We may also establish voters’ perceptions of a
celebrity and the celebrity’s perceptions of himself in the state or district that may reflect
the reasons for voting for the respective personality and his reasons for running for office.
Also, a continuing study following the elected celebrity into public office could produce
valuable information. Do voters make good decision by voting for a celebrity? To
ascertain the quality of a celebrity’s representation, what is the quality of legislation after
elected; how many amendments are presented and bills drafted and sponsored? Once in
office, what are their motivations? Are they constituency-driven or ambition-driven to
higher positions within the hierarchical ranks of the House and Senate? It is also
significant to observe whether celebrities maintain the career track of an average
politician once elected, or leave public office and regress to their role as a personality.
Subsequent data gathering should reveal this information.
33
Finally, controlling for population sizes in states to control for variance in
fundraising and spending is necessary. A candidate may not raise and spend, or may not
need to raise and spend, the same amount of campaign money in Nebraska as in New
York. Therefore, controlling for these factors may produce a clearer observance of
causal relationships of campaign funds across state lines.
V. Conclusion | Winning Celebrities
What was peculiar about the 4 celebrities in the House and the 1 celebrity in the
Senate who won in 2000? Can we find a formula for success in congressional elections
by climbing the celebrity ladder? First, all successful celebrities were well financed,
from over $30,000,000 in the Senate for former first lady Hillary Clinton’s (D) NY
campaign to over $1 million in the House for former conservative talk show host Mike
Pence’s (R) IN campaign. The average in the winning celebrity’s campaign chest in the
House was $1,089,222 while the mean for the celebrity was $135,315. In the Senate, the
details are a bit more dramatic since former first lady Hillary Clinton was the only
celebrity who won, raising $30,153,926 versus $138,936 for the losing celebrity.
Table 5
Means in Celebrity Contests
House Senate
Campaign_expenditures µ= 1057446 µ= 126337 µ= 30153926 µ= 138936
Funds_raised µ= 1089222 µ= 197959 µ= 29871577 µ= 148057
Celebwon =1 Celebwon = 0 Celebwon = 1 Celebwon= 0
34
By no means is the ability to raise and spend money the only variates to winning.
In a tight race with incumbent Lane Evans (D) in Illinois’ 17th district, former television
anchorman Mark Baker (R) was able to raise and spend considerable sums of money near
the means of the winning celebrities’ campaign funds raised and spent, but he was
narrowly defeated. The partisan leaning of a district, Republican coattails in a
presidential election year and other variables not undertaken by this study also account
for the narrow margin of victory. Also, the celebrity candidate makeup in the Senate was
far weaker than in the House. The losing celebrities were unable to compete with their
other high quality contenders in campaign fundraising and expenditures.
We find that in nearly all cases, celebrities possess an advantage in House
elections. There exist positive significant relationships between celebrity status and
presence in the media and the votes received in the general election. Their status did not,
however, have a significant effect on campaign fundraising nor campaign expenditures.
These findings suggest that celebrities may not need to raise or spend as much money, for
media attention comes free to the celebrity candidate. In the Senate, celebrities possessed
no advantage over their high quality counterparts. This can be explained by the nature of
Senate races which are highly competitive and attract stronger, high-quality candidates.
The interrelational effect of celebrity status and the number of hits they received in Lexis-
Nexis did produce a positive relationship with campaign fundraising and vice versa,
suggesting a two-way causal association that celebrities’ presence in the media
strengthens their ability to fundraise and spend money toward media attention. Also
35
consistent with this analysis is the positive relationship between celebrity campaign
spending and their presence in the media.
Although Tom Osborne had no previous experience for public office, his
credentials as a celebrity and a leader brought him great support which was reflected in
his percentage of the vote share. Although he never held elected office, he brought
several national championships to Nebraska, and coached many “homegrown” players.
Challengers regarded him as “my hero” and “everyone’s hero.”44 Although his
opponents were surely defter in the political arena, he proved to be a great politician,
bringing home particularized benefits for the farmers of Western Nebraska and earning
respect from his colleagues on Capitol Hill. However, hindsight is always 20/20. It was
unclear whether Tom Osborne will possess the non-homologous talent in the political
arena as he did in the football arena. As is the case with other elected celebrities in 2000,
time will tell.
44 See footnote 1.
36
Table 6
Legend for Regression Analysis Variables
Celeb Dichotomous variable in House and Senate analysis coded as 1 if candidate is celebrity and 0 if he is not
Electexp Dichotomous variable in House and Senate analysis coded as 1 if candidate has previous elected experience and 0 if he does not
Lexishits2000 Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each candidate in the House
Lexishits Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each candidate in the Senate
Celebhits Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each celebrity candidate in the House and Senate
Noncelebhits Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each non-celebrity candidate in the House and Senate
Campaign_exp Total amount of campaign expenditures for each House and Senate candidate
Funds_raised Total amount of campaign funds raised for each House and Senate candidate
Celebspend Total amount of celebrity campaign expenditures in the House and Senate
Noncelebspend Total amount of non-celebrity expenditures in the House and Senate
Genvote Total amount of votes received in the general election for House contests
General_results Total amount of votes received in the general election for Senate contest
Won Dichotomous variable in the House and Senate analysis coded as 1 if the candidate won and 0 if he did not
37
Works Cited
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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Principles of International Politics. Washington D.C.: CQ
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1990. Davidson, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek. Congress and its Members. Washington
D.C.: CQ Press, 2002. Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. New York: Longman,
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