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Advanced Issues in International Politics

2014-2015

Module Code: 6SSPP328

Module organiser: Dr James Scott

Lecturers: Dr. Elisa Cavatorta

Dr. James Scott

Dr. Gabriel Leon

Seminar Tutor: Saheli Datta

Contact Details: James: james.m.scott@kcl.ac.uk

Gabriel:

Elisa: elisa.cavatorta@kcl.ac.uk

Saheli: saheli.datta@kcl.ac.uk

Office Hours:

James: Mondays 10:30-11:30 and Tuesdays 12:00-13:00, Room S2.47

Gabriel: TBC

Elisa: Wednesdays, 09:00-10:00 and Fridays 15:00-16:00, Room S2.45

Saheli: Mondays 14:00-15:00, Room TBC.

Educational Aims

The goals of this module are to:

further develop students’ understanding of the complexities of international

politics in the 21st century utilising a series of case studies of important global

issues and theoretical approaches

enable students to critically engage with different conceptual approaches to the

study of international politics

develop and deepen students’ understanding of how different conceptual

approaches to the study of international politics can be used to analyse the

selected case studies

Learning Outcomes

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By the end of this module, students should:

understand the specific nature of selected global issues and the general issues

that arise from specific cases

understand the complexity of the international system and the great diversity of

academic approaches to its study

have attained, through experience-based learning, a greater appreciation of how

international negotiations take place

be able to deploy simple game theoretical arguments to understand how states

strategise

ASSESSMENT

The module will be assessed through:

Essay (45%) Due 21st November at 5 p.m.

Exam (45%) Date TBC

Attendance and participation (10%).

Students will be expected to submit an essay taken from the list of essay questions

(that will be provided on KEATS shortly) of 2,500 words, which will account for 45% of

your final mark. The essay will cover weeks one to five, and will make reference to the

negotiation simulation. Please note that essays are partly exercises in writing concisely,

which is an important academic skill. As such, essays that are too long will be penalised

as per the departmental rules – a five point deduction to your mark if your essay is up

to 10% over the word limit and a twenty point deduction if it is over 10% too long. It is

therefore crucial that you ensure that you stick within the allocated word limit. (The

bibliography is not included but everything else is – including footnotes, endnotes,

appendices, boxes etc). Please also note the essay deadline: 21st November, 5 pm

The penalties for late submission have changed from last year. In line with Faculty

regulations, essays submitted after this time, without exceptional extenuating

circumstances, will suffer a penalty. Essays submitted within 24 hours of the deadline

will be capped at the pass mark of 40%. Essays submitted more than 24 hours after the

deadline receive a mark of zero, seriously jeopardising your prospects of passing the

module. (For exceptional or extenuating circumstances, please see the UG handbook for

instructions, guidance and forms.) If you face extenuating circumstances that mean that

you will not be able to meet the deadline it is essential that you inform the relevant

person as early as possible.

The exam date will be confirmed later. The exam will also carry a weight of 45% of

your final mark. The exam will require you to answer one question on game theory

from a choice of two, and one question related to the topics of weeks six and seven.

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In addition, your attendance and your participation will account for the final 10% of the

overall module mark. This is split across two activities. Six percent of that will come

from your attendance and participation in the seminars in the final six weeks of the

module. In addition, in the absence of seminars in the first 5 weeks of the module the

remaining four percent of your A&P mark will be formed from your performance in

weekly online quizzes that cover the material in the lecture and readings. These will be

made available immediately after the lecture and you will have one week to complete

the quiz. It cannot be submitted after that cut-off.

All assessed work is marked under the terms outlined in the College Generic Marking

Criteria for Undergraduate Awards, a copy of which is available online, and is subject to

further scrutiny in accordance with the College Marking Framework.

Lectures: Mondays, 09:00-10:00

Venue: Strand/King’s Building, Room K–1.56

Seminar timetable:

Group 1 (James/Gabriel/Elisa): G.01 Norfolk Building Monday 15:00-16:00

Group 2 (Saheli): Strand, S3.30 Monday 15:00-16:00

Group 3 (Saheli): Strand, S-3.19 Monday 11:00-12:00

Group 4 (Saheli): Strand/S-1.29 Monday 13:00-14:00

NOTE: There are no seminars for weeks 1-5!

The first seminar will be held 3rd November.

Weekend Negotiation Simulation

Replacing the seminars in weeks 1-5 there is a weekend event at which you will engage

in a simulation covering the topics of weeks 2-5 (and others). This will be held at the

Strand Palace Hotel, all day Saturday 1st November (09:00-17:00) and half day

Sunday 2nd November (09:00- 13:00). Please note that this is compulsory, and will

form the basis of your essay. The aim of this event is to give you an enjoyable

experience that is pedagogical that helps you to understand international politics from

a different angle.

Text Books

Since it is aiming for an advanced understanding of a limited number of contemporary

issues, this module has no textbook.

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Lecture 1: Introduction and course outline. (22nd September 2014 – James Scott).

We begin with an introductory week outlining how the rest of the course unfolds. It will

also draw out some recurrent themes and fundamental questions that will be

addressed throughout the rest of the module.

Reading

It is recommended that you revise your understanding of IR theory, particularly

relating to realism and liberalism. You can use textbooks, though it is recommended

that you try ones that you have not read before. Also, you could explore some original

texts of the most important contributors.

Some resources you might use (all available as ebooks through the library):

Burchill, (2005). Theories of International Relations.

Blyth, (2009). Routledge handbook of international political economy.

Keohane, Robert. (2002). Power and governance in a partially globalized world,

especially chapters 1-3.

Cox, Robert, (1981). ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International

Relations Theory’, Millennium, Vol. 10, no. 2.

Gilpin, R. (2000). The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st

Century. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press).

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Lecture 2: Alliances and coalitions (29th September 2014 – James Scott)

This week examines the use of alliances and coalitions in international politics.

Alliances are a prominent component of the Realist tradition in international relations

theory, and we examine the competing claims made about how and why states choose

to enter into alliances. In addition, we explore the use of coalitions as tactics for smaller

states to help overcome their weakness.

Compulsory reading

Stephen M Walt, (1987), The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press),

particularly pages 1-49 (on KEATS).

Narlikar, Amrita. (2003). International Trade and Developing Countries: bargaining

coalitions in the GATT & WTO. (Abingdon and New York: Routledge), chapter 1.

Evan S. Medeiros (2005) ‘Strategic hedging and the future of Asia‐pacific stability’, The

Washington Quarterly, 29(1), pp. 145-167.

Further reading

Cheng-Chwee, Kuik. (2008), ‘The essence of hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's

response to a rising China.’ Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of

International and Strategic Affairs 30, no. 2, pp. 159-185.

Choong-Nam Kang, (2012), ‘Alliances: Path to Peace or Path to War?’, in John A Vasquez

(ed.) What do we know about War? 2nd Edition. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.

(On KEATS).

Deere-Birkbeck, Carolyn and Meg Harbourd, (2011). ‘Developing Country Coalitions in

the WTO: Strategies for Improving the Influence of the WTO’s Weakest and

Poorest Members’, (GEG Working Paper, 2011/63). (On KEATS).

Drahos, Peter, (2003), ‘When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiation in the

World Trade Organization’, in International Negotiation 8(1), pp. 79–109.

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Lecture 3: Free trade, protectionism and trade negotiations (6th October 2014 –

James Scott).

The choice between pursuing free trade or protectionism has been one of the foremost

issues within international politics for centuries. It lies at the heart of the liberal

paradigm but also draws in other theoretical traditions. This week we briefly explore

the arguments in favour of free trade and protectionism. We also examine how this

debate plays out within the world of trade negotiations.

Compulsory reading

Jawara, F., and Kwa, A. (2003). Behind the scenes at the WTO: The real world of

international trade negotiations. (London: Zed Books). Chapter 6. (On KEATS).

Chang, Ha-Joon. (2008). Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History

of Capitalism. (New York: Bloomsbury), chapter 2. (On KEATS).

Bhagwati, Jagdish. (2007). In Defense of Globalization, chapter 5. (On KEATS).

Further reading

George, Clive. (2010). The Truth About Trade, particularly chapter 4 (but the rest is also

good). (Available as an e-book).

Michie, (2011). The Handbook of Globalisation, chapter 26.

Wolf, Martin. (2005). Why Globalization Works, (London: Yale University Press),

chapter 10.

Wade, Robert H. (2003). ‘What Strategies are Viable for Developing Countries Today?

The WTO and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space’, Review of International

Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 621-644.

Reinert, Erik S. (2008). How rich countries got rich and why poor countries stay poor.

(New York: Public Affairs).

Schafaeddin, Mehdi. (2000). ‘What Did Frederick List Actually Say? Some Clarifications

On The Infant Industry Argument’, UNCTAD Discussion Paper 149, available from:

unctad.org/en/docs/dp_149.en.pdf.

Wolf, Martin. (2005). Why Globalization Works, chapter 10

Crane and Amawi, (1997). The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy,

chapter 2 – excerpts from Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

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Lecture 4: Water conflict (13th October 2014 – James Scott)

This week we examine an area of rapidly growing concern as a source of significant

conflict in coming decades, namely securing access to sufficient fresh water. As Ismail

Serageldin (when Vice President of the World Bank) has said, ‘The wars of the next

century will be over water’. Here we examine why this issue becoming so prominent,

what the sources of potential conflict are, and what ameliorating efforts have been

undertaken. Specifically with regard to the latter, we explore the UN Watercourses

Convention which came into force in August 2014.

Compulsory Reading

Leb, Christina. (2013). ‘The UN Watercourses Convention: the éminence grise behind

cooperation on transboundary water resources’. Water International, 38(2), 146-

155.

Loures, Flavia Rocha and Alistair Rieu-Clarke (eds.) (2013). The UN Watercourses

Convention in Force. (Abingdon and New York: Earthscan), chapter 8.

Mariam, Alemayehu G. (2013). ‘Ethiopia: Rumors of Water War on the Nile?’, Ethiopian

Review, available at http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/46543. (Also on

KEATS).

Elhance, A. P. (2000). ‘Hydropolitics: Grounds for despair, reasons for hope’,

International Negotiation, 5(2), pp. 201-222.

Further Reading

Dinar, Shilom. (2009). ‘ Scarcity and Cooperation Along International Rivers’, Global

Environmental Politics, 9(1), pp. 109-135. [Don’t be put off by the 2 lines of

‘maths’. It’s pointless and doesn’t add anything to the paper. Just read the

explanation if maths isn’t your thing].

Barlow, Maude, and Tony Clarke. (2010). Blue gold: the battle against corporate theft of

the world's water. (McClelland & Stewart).

Loures, Flavia Rocha and Alistair Rieu-Clarke (eds.) (2013). The UN Watercourses

Convention in Force. (Abingdon and New York: Earthscan).

Dinar, Ariel et al. (2007). Bridges over Water. (London: World Scientific), chapters 1-4

and 7.

Hsiang, Solomon M., Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel. (2013). ‘Quantifying the

influence of climate on human conflict’. Science 341, no. 6151, pp. 1212-1227.

Note that this is a quantitative article.

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Special Issue: International Negotiation, volume 5, number 2, (2000). (A collection of

papers all on the subject of water conflict).

Postel, Sandra L. and Aaron T. Wolf, (2001). ‘Dehydrating Conflict’ Foreign Policy, No.

126, pp. 60-67.

Other resources

Film: Blue Gold. (2008). Based on the book by Barlow and Clarke. The whole film is

available on Youtube.

Website: http://www.circleofblue.org/ Gives details of the coming water shortages in

key areas.

Website: http://worldwater.org/water-conflict/ Analysis and list of water conflicts

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Lecture 5: UN Security Council Reform (20th October 2014 – James Scott)

This week – the final week of preparatory lectures for the negotiation simulation – we

explore an area of international politics that has come to the fore strongly over the last

10-20 years, namely reform of the UN Security Council. Pressure has been mounting for

the Security Council to be made more equitable and to reflect better the realities of

today’s power structure. In the light of the repeated failures to achieve any reform

despite this pressure, we examine the bigger question of whether fundamental change

to global institutions only occurs after significant war.

Compulsory Readings

Gilpin, Robert. (1981). War and Change in World Politics, chapter 5, ‘Hegemonic War

and International Change’ [on KEATS].

Weiss, Thomas G., and Karen E. Young. (2005). ‘Compromise and Credibility: Security

Council Reform?’ Security Dialogue 36(2), pp. 131-154.

Hurd, Ian. (2008). Myths of membership: the politics of legitimation in UN Security

Council Reform. Global Governance, 14(2), pp. 199-217.

Further reading

David Malone (ed.). (2004). The UN Security Council : from the Cold War to the 21st

century. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner).

Weiss, Thomas G. (2003). ‘The illusion of UN Security Council reform’, The Washington

Quarterly, 26(4), pp. 147-161.

Tharoor, Shashi. (2011). ‘Security Council Reform: Past, Present and Future’. Ethics and

International Affairs, 25(4), pp. 397-406.

Thakur, Ramesh. (2004). ‘United Nations Security Council Reform’, African Security

Review, 13(3), pp. 66-74.

Luck, Edward C. (2005). ‘How not to Reform the United Nations’, Global Governance,

11(4), pp. 407-414.

International Peace Institute. (2011). ‘Issue Brief What Impact? The E10 and the 2011

Security Council’, available at

www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/what_impact.pdf

Chan, Steve. "Power, Satisfaction and Popularity A Poisson Analysis of UN Security

Council Vetoes." Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 4 (2003): 339-359.

Websites

Global Policy Forum –background information on SC reform, UN documents, analysis

etc. https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform.html.

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27th October – Reading Week. No lecture, no seminars.

Lecture 6: Civil wars (3rd November 2014 – Gabriel Leon)

Civil wars are currently taking place in many countries around the world, causing

thousands of deaths and costing billions of US dollars. These wars can last for years,

and even once they are over they leave behind a legacy of poverty and disease. Given

that they are so destructive, why are civil wars so common? This lecture examines the

causes of civil wars.

Compulsory Reading

Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel, (2010). “Civil War” Journal of Economic

Literature 48:1, pp. 3-57.

Collier, Paul, (2008). The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, Chapter 2: The

Conflict Trap. [Available as an e-book].

Further Reading

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford

Economic Papers 56(4), pp. 563-595.

Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan F. Vargas. (2013). “Commodity price shocks and civil conflict:

Evidence from Colombia”. The Review of Economic Studies 80(4): pp. 1384-1421.

Fearon, James and David Laitin, (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”

American Political Science Review 97(1), pp. 75-90.

Reynal-Querol, Marta and Jose Garcia Montalvo, (2005). “Ethnic polarization, potential

conflict and civil war,” American Economic Review 95(3), pp. 796-816.

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Lecture 7: Coups d’État (10th November 2014 – Gabriel Leon).

Coups d’etat are still common in many countries around the world. They often result in

a change in leaders and institutions, and so their impact on a country's political and

economic conditions can be substantial. However, there is no consensus as to what

triggers coups, or whether their consequences are always negative. This lecture

examines the causes and consequences of coups d’etat.

Compulsory reading

Belkin, Aaron and Evan Schofer, (2003). “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup

Risk,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (5), 594-620.

Londregan, John and Keith Poole, 1990. “Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of

executive power,” World Politics 42: 151-183.

Further reading

Connor, Ken and David Hebditch. (2008). How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning

to Execution. Frontline Books, 2nd edition. Particularly the Introduction and

Chapters 1, 2 and 10.

Dube, Arindrajit, Ethan Kaplan and Suresh Naidu, (2011). “Coups, Corporations, and

Classified Information,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 1375-1409.

Leon, Gabriel, (2014). “Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d’Etat,” Public

Choice 159, 363-383.

Londregan, John and Keith Poole, (1990). “Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of

executive power,” World Politics 42: 151-183.

Powell, Jonathan, (2012). “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups

d’Etat,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6): 1017-1040.

Wintrobe, Ronald, (2012). “Autocracy and Coups d’Etat,” Public Choice 152, 115-130.

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Lectures 8-10. Strategic interactions. (17th, 24th and 31st November 2014 – Elisa

Cavatorta).

These three lectures introduce several concepts and methods to analyse situations of

strategic interactions. The branch of social science that studies strategic decision-

making is Game Theory. These three lectures are designed to introduce key concepts in

game theory and their use to analyse real world situations, principally but not

exclusively, in the fields of politics. Defence and deterrence policies of nations, conflict

and business strategies will be among the topics discussed.

Reflecting the content of these weeks, the format will be slightly different to previous

weeks. Seminars will involve applications of the concepts presented in the lectures. The

exam will be based on the lecture slides and the core reading below.

Core reading

Dixit, Avinash and Barry J. Nalebuff, (1991). Thinking Strategically, (W.W. Norton &

Company, London). Chapter 1-6, 8 [Available at the library and as an e-book].

Additional references

Dixit, Avinash Skeath, Reiley, Games of Strategy, Norton.

Schelling, (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press.

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Lecture 11. Decision-making and policy in contexts of poverty (7th December

2014 – Elisa Cavatorta).

The lecture will discuss stylised facts of the economic lives of the poor and will explore

some insights generated by recent behavioural and experimental research. Policy

applications in developed and developing countries will be examined.

Core reading

Bertrand, Marianne, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir. 2004, A Behavioral-Economics View of Poverty. American Economic Review, 94(2): 419-423. Bertrand, Marianne, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir. 2004, Behavioral economics and marketing in aid of decision-making among the poor, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1): 8-23. Further readings and video lectures: Video and interview: Sendhil Mullainathan, The psychology of scarcity http://edge.org/conversation/the-psychology-of-scarcity-class-3 Duflo et al. 2011, Nudging farmers to use fertilizers: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/publication/well-timed-nudge Video: Dean Karlan on commitment savings: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhZ_rLp4pYQ&list=UUBDUMuZfiAR8bAP1sG5LqXg