1

ADMISSIBILITY Garcillano v. House of Representatives (Nachura, 2008)1 Facts:

- This case involves the infamous Garci Tapes which allegedly contained the conversation of PGMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano where the former instructed the latter to manipulate the election results in favor of PGMA. The speech of Cong. Escudero in the House of Reps jumpstarted the congressional investigation over these tapes. During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. The House Committee also decided to prepare committee reports based on the recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons in the hearings.

- In the Senate, Senator Lacson also delivered a speech regarding the Garci Tapes. On motion of Sen. Pangilinan, these tapes should be the subject of a legislative investigation by the Senate. However, Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. Sen. Defensor-Santiago also delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.

- Because of these developments, Garcillano, and retired CA Justices Ranada and Agcaoili filed separate petitions before the Supreme Court to for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Garcillano prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations

1 Angel P.

in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. On the other hand, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili prayed that the Senate be barred from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution2.

Issue: WON the House Committee hearings and the Senate legislative should be prohibited for violation of RA No. 4200 (Anti-wiretapping Law) and sec. 3, Art. III of the Constitution (privacy of communications) Held and Ratio:

- The petition of Garcillano praying that the House Committee hearings on the Garci tapes be stopped must be dismissed for being moot and academic. The Court noted that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.

- However, the petition for prohibition of petitioners Ranada

and Agcaoili must be granted. (However, the ponente did not touch upon the issue of the admissibility of the Garci Tapes. The granting of the second petition was based on the non-compliance of the legislative investigation with sec. 21, art. VI of the Constitution which requires that inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance must be conducted in accordance with the Senate’s duly published rules of procedure. Since the Senate did not publish its rules of procedure, then no inquiry must be allowed lest violate the given constitutional

2 Section 3.

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

2

requirement. The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation to be conducted by the Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

People v. Lauga3 FACTS: Antonio Lauga was charged with the crime of Qualified Rape for allegedly raping his 13-yr. old daughter. AAA was left alone at home when her father arrived from a drinking spree at around 10:00pm. He woke AAA from her sleep, removed his pants, slid in the blanket with AAA, removed her pants and underwear, warned her not to shout and threatened her with his fist, and told her he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly and inserted his penis inside her vagina. When AAA’s brother arrived, he found her crying. He took her with him and on the way to their grandmother’s house she recounted her harrowing experience. They sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting (bantay bayan of the barangay) When Moises went to the house of Lauga, he found him wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station where he admitted to Moises that he raped his daughter because he could not control himself. LAUGA’S VERSION: At lunchtime, Lauga went home and found that there was no food prepared for him. When he confronted AAA, she answered back, so he kicked her hard at her buttocks. He went to back to work and went home again around 3:00pm. Since no one was at home, he prepared his dinner and went to sleep. Later, he was awakened by the group of bantay bayans led by Moises and found out that he is being detained for allegedly raping his daughter. 3 Micha Arias

RTC and CA convicted the accused as charged. ISSUE: Whether or not his extra-judicial confession to Moises, without the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver thereof, is admissible in evidence? NO. RATIO: Since the extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant was taken without counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence. Nevertheless, his conviction is affirmed as it was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Malngan, the Court held that:

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x. [But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one

3

of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant]. (Emphasis supplied)

Whether or not a bantay bayan is to be considered a law enforcement officer like the barangay tanods the court held in People of the Philippines v. Buendia that a bantay bayan is, “a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.”

Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized “to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level.” The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Any confession to the bantay bayan in response to an inquiry made in the nature of a “custodial investigation” without the benefit of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. JUDICIAL NOTICE

CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA CUASO4 FACTS: TheTanjangcos own two lots located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision which is managed by Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian) while the Cuasos own a lot which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos' lots. Before the Cuasos constructed their house, a relocation survey was necessary. Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian . Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos' lot by 87 square meters. The Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the former to file with the RTC a suit for Recovery of Possession with Damages. On the other hand, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Tanjangcos but ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching portion of the land. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos' lot when it constructed the house and ordered it to pay damages to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios was dismissed for lack of cause of action. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of the subject lot. CA allowed the Tanjangcos to demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the encroached area. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals, damages and attorney's fees to the Tanjangcos. On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in performing their respective duties and were ordered to contribute 5% each to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay under the decision. 4 Gian Hernal

4

When its MR was denied by the CA, Corinthian filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC. ISSUES: 1. WON there is legal basis for the CA to hold Corinthian liable to pay 5% of thr judgment money to Spouses Tanhangco 2. WON CA has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof the amount prayed for in the complaint (P2,000) as reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached upon, to P10,000. [Can the CA take judicial notice of the general increase in the rentals of real estate?] HELD: 1. YES. Based on the CA's findings and conclusions which were substantiated by the evidence on record, it is clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and Regulations thereby resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos' property. Corinthian cannot be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos' building plans was only limited to a so-called "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, Corinthian, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls. If the supposed inspection is merely a "table inspection" and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order. In sum, Corinthian's failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter wall into Tanjangcos' property - despite the 2inspection conducted - constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. 2. NO but the increase in the award of rentals was reasonable given the particular circumstances of the case. Note: The Tanjangcos contend that a court can take judicial notice of the general increase in the rentals of real estate, as in this case, where the CA considered the value of their lot in the "posh-and-swank" Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and the fact that they were deprived of it for almost two decades. The SC reiterated its ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag in discussing the second issue. In the said case, the SC said that courts may fix

the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property. However, it is not correct to assume that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. A court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties. In Herrera v. Bollos, the SC declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:

x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without supporting evidence.

In the case at bar, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, the uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA that rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of their property was based on the evidence presented. The increase in the award of rentals was reasonable given the particular circumstances of the case. The Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. There's no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. ATIENZA5 Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified several areas from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within 6 mos. from the date of effectivity (December 28, 2001) of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan 5 Lou Rigodon- This is the judicial notice part.

5

Terminals" of the oil companies. On March 7, 2007 the SC ruled that that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city", including Ordinance No. 8027. The SC also concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Chevron, Petron, Shell and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the March 7, 2007 decision of the SC. Prior to this case in the SC, the oil companies have pending cases in the RTC assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Moreover, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The respondent did not inform the SC of this ordinance on the belief that these two ordinances are different and they are not inconsistent with each other. The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119. Issue: One of the issues submitted for resolution for the SC is WON the enactment and existence of Ordinance No. 8119 which were not previously brought by the parties to the attention of the SC constitute as legal impediment to the March 7, 2007 decision. No. Held: The SC did not consider Ordinance No. 8119 in its March 7, 2007 decision for the reason was that SC was never informed about this ordinance. The SC cannot take judicial notice of local ordinances. While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Although, Section 50 of RA 409 74 provides that “SEC. 50. Judicial notice of ordinances. — All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod”, this cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it. Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it

does not have access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances. The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice. Issue: WON the respondent judicially admitted the Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119. No. in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) Held: Petitioners contend that in civil case no. 03-106379, where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027, respondent judicially admitted the repeal of Ordinance No. 8027. As a result of which, the admission worked as estoppel against the respondent in claiming the Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis supplied) While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, 83 the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil cases which are not "the same" as the case before the SC. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119's) validity. Ordinance No. 8027 was not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119. SC denied the MR.

6

"G" HOLDINGS, INC (GHI) v. NATIONAL MINES UNION6 FACTS: National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC). GHI bought 90% of MMC’s shares. Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute (refusal to bargain collectively and ULP) arose between MMC and NAMAWU. Labor Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of NAMAWU. The SC, on two other cases, sustained the validity of the order of the Labor Secretary which became final and executory.A partial writ of execution (SC Associate Justice Brion Writ) was issued by the SC. The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMC resisted its enforcement. Another writ (Labor Sec Sto. Tomas Writ) became successful in attaching properties. GHI assails issuance of writ, contending that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage executed by MMC in favor of GHI and that the mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially foreclosed and sold to GHI as the highest bidder. RTC decided in favor of GHI. RTC issued a Writ of Injunction enjoining the execution. Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA set aside the RTC issuances. The CA ruled that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was a sham. The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMC’s real properties did not contain any annotation of a mortgage lien. The CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment against MMC. Dissatisfied, GHI elevated the case to the SC via the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON the RTC properly issued the writ of injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Sto. Tomas Writ. HELD (TOPIC): NO. SC has already decided on the issue of this case on two other SC decisions. SC says “it is essential to take judicial cognizance of cases intimately linked to the present controversy which had earlier been elevated to and decided by this Court.” Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corp v. Brion, in which the SC upheld the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, the SC decision in Republic v. GHI in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes accompanying 6 JD Atanacio

the said purchase. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations "establishing and constituting in favor of GHI mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties. SC finds both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided the RTC and CA in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. These decisions confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal properties of MMC. The CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, SC found it timely to reiterate that: "courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration." It is imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is a party with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. OTHER RULINGS

1. The mortgage was not a sham. Republic v. GHI acknowledged the existence of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between the MMC and GHI. In this transaction, certain notes established and constituted in favor of GHI the several mortgages. It is difficult to conceive that these mortgages, already existing in 1992, almost 4 years before NAMAWU filed its notice of strike, were a "fictitious" arrangement intended to defraud NAMAWU. GHI’s mortgage right had already been registered by then, and it is basic that mortgaged properties answer primarily for the mortgaged credit, not for the judgment credit of the mortgagor’s unsecured creditor.

2. It is not right to pierce the veil of corporate fiction i.e. that GHI is not accountable to liabilities of MMC.

Republic v. GHI adjudged that GHI was entitled to its rightful claims─ not just to the shares and other instruments of MMC itself. Certainly, no badge of fraud can be imputed. Thus, CA’s conclusion that it was right to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, because the circumstances belie such an inference, is incorrect. Since the factual antecedents of this case do not warrant a finding that the mortgage and loan agreements between MMC and GHI were simulated, then their separate personalities must be recognized.

3. It is settled that RTC can validly issue a TRO and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a writ of

7

execution issued by a labor tribunal on the basis of a third-party’s claim of ownership over the properties levied upon.

GHI is such third-party claimant. The registration of the mortgage document operated as notice to all on the matter of the mortgagee’s prior claims. SC have observed, however, that the lower court and the CA failed to take judicial notice of, or to consider, Decisions in Republic v. GHI and Maricalum Mining Corp v. Brion, in which SC respectively recognized the entitlement of GHI to the shares and the company notes of MMC, and the rights of NAMAWU to its labor claims. At this stage, therefore, neither the lower court nor the CA, nor even this Court, can depart from our findings in those two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis. While, theoretically, this case is not ended by this decision, since the lower court is still to try the case filed with it and decide it on the merits, the matter of whether the mortgage and foreclosure of the assets that are the subject of said foreclosure is ended herein, for the third and final time. So also is the consequential issue of the separate and distinct personalities of GHI and MMC. Having resolved these principal issues with certainty, SC finds no more need to remand the case to the lower court, only for the purpose of resolving again the matter of whether GHI owns the properties that were the subject of the latter’s foreclosure. SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP vs. ROSALIE CHUA7 FACTS: Respondent Rosalie Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building in Parañaque City. Spouses Latip began leasing two cubicles therein sometime in December 1999. On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against the Spouses Latip. Rosalie attached to the complaint the contract of lease (see defects of this lease contract in the RTC decision below.) A year later, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint. In their Answer, Spouses Latip averred that the lease of the two cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment (in cash and in check) to Rosalie of the total amount of P2.57-million. They argued that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the 7 Monica Marcelo

Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer. In effect, they argued thatthe contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. METC ruled in favor of Rosalie. RTC reversed. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete (with blanks). It also noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) years only starting from December __ 1999 or up to December __ 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts. The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two cubicles for six years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2.57-million. As to Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of P2.57-millionwas simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC pointed out that Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. The CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. On the issue of whether the amount of P2.57-millionmerely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie. ISSUE: WON Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles – YES, but only because the lease already expired when the SC decision was promulgated. (MAIN ISSUE: WON the CA can take judicial notice of the alleged common practice of payment of goodwill money to the lessor - NO). HELD: The matter which the CA took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite notoriety.To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even

8

ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known. State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive: The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. In general, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Things of "common knowledge" may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. The SC notes that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2.57-millionsimply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie. The requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What need not be proved.

ON THE ISSUE OF EJECTION: (SC only partially adopts RTC’s findings; ruled that P2.57-million constitutes only advance payment, not full payment.) There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua sinceonly Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg. On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2.57-million, the SC consideredthe Civil Code provisions, particularly Arts. 1371-1373. The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for P2.57-millionmodified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two cubicles for the entire six-year period. There is nothing on the receipts and on record to support this. SC finds that Rosalie’s receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the lease. But as the lease ended in 2005,Spouses Latip can now be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals in accordance with the stipulations in the lease contract. However, the amount of P2.57-million, covering advance rentals, must be deducted. JUDICIAL ADMISSION SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V MAYOR ATIENZA8 FACTS: Social Justice Society in an original petition for mandamus sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies.

8 JI Ibanez- This is the Judicial Admissions part.

9

Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that “the issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119].”They contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent. Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said ordinance’s constitutionality, opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119. The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No. 8027: ... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the reclassification were given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven years. ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on judicial admissions is applicable against Atienza HELD: NO RATIO: THE RULE ON JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE AGAINST RESPONDENT. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 4. Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,

does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not “the same” as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119’s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or ordinance. Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist9 Facts: Petitioner Jesus Cuenco leased from respondents the Talisay

Tourist Sports Complex to be operated as a cockpit. Under the Contract of Lease:

o Petitioner was was liable to repair and compensate any damage caused to the furniture, chattels, equipment and parts of the leased premises.

o Petitioner was to give a deposit equivalent to six (6) months rental (P500,000) to answer for whatever damages may be caused to the premises during the period of the lease.

When the contract expired, the lease was awarded to another bidder.

Thereafter, petitioner wrote respondent company’s President, respondent Matias Aznar III, a demand letter, wherein he:

9 Bambi Gumban

10

o Recognized his liability for the damages sustained by the property as well as his obligation to undertake the necessary repairs thereto.

o Asked respondent to send an inspector to check on the repairs he made

o Requested the return of his P500,000 deposit once the repairs are to respondent’s satisfaction.

This first demand letter went unheeded so petitioner sent three more reiterating his request for the return of his deposit. All three were likewise unanswered.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money, damages and attorney's fees.

During pre-trial, respondents’counsel admitted that “there is no inventory of damages up to this time.” This admission is likewise set forth in the Pre-Trial Order as a stipulated fact of he parties.

However during trial, respondents presented Ateniso Coronado (Coronado), the property custodian of the respondents, who testified that there was in fact an inventory of damages conducted and that according to such inventory, the property sustained damages and needed repairs amounting to around P570,000 which respondents shouldered.

TC ruled in favor of petitioner and commanded respondents to return the full amount of petitioner’s deposit. It gave weight to the admission of respondents' counsel during the pre-trial that no inventory of the property was conducted and ebunked the inventory presented by the respondents during trial as a mere afterthought.

CA reversed and dimissed the Complaint for lack of factual and legal basis. In doing so, it considered the testimony of Coronado as to the the existence of an inventory of damages.

Issue: WON the admission made during pre-trial by respondents’ counsel as to the lack of inventory of damages is binding upon respondents. YES Ratio: Respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.

The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.”

A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings,

(2) during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.

In this case, respondents did not deny the admission made by

their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT v. CIR (2010 | Leonardo-de Castro, J.)10 Toshiba is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting of electric machinery, equipment systems, computer hardware and software, etc. It is registered with the PEZA as an Economic Zone export enterprise in the Laguna Technopark. It is also registered as a VAT-taxpayer in San Pedro, Laguna. It declared input VAT payments on its domestic purchases of taxable goods and services in the aggregate sum of P3.9M during the first two quarters of 1997, with no zero-rated sales. It subsequently submitted to the BIR its amended VAT returns for the same quarters, reporting the same amount of input VAT payments but, this time, with with zero-rated sales totaling P7.5B. Two years later, Toshiba filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance wo separate applications for tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT payments for the first half of 1997 in the total amount of P3.7M. It then filed a petition with the CTA to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 230 of the 1977 Tax Code and to obtain a tax refund. Upon the CTA’s advice, Toshiba and the

10 Lou Macabodbod

11

Commission on Internal Revenue filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, wherein the opposing parties “agreed and admitted” that:

1. Toshiba is a duly registered value-added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended.

2. Toshiba is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended.

3. Toshiba filed its quarterly VAT returns for the first two quarters of 1997 within the legally prescribed period.

4. Toshiba is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales.

5. Toshiba has duly filed the instant Petition for Review within the two-year prescriptive period prescribed by then Section 230 of the Tax Code.

CTA eventually ruled in favor of Toshiba. According to the said court, the CIR itself admitted that the export sales of Toshiba were subject to zero percent (0%) VAT based on Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended. Toshiba could then claim tax credit or refund of input VAT paid on its purchases of goods, properties, or services, directly attributable to such zero-rated sales. However, it reduced the amount to be refunded to Toshiba to P1.4M. CIR filed a petition with the CA, which reversed and set aside the CTA decision. It ruled that Toshiba was not entitled to the refund of its alleged unused input VAT payments because it was a tax-exempt entity under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916. As a PEZA-registered corporation, Toshiba was liable for remitting to the national government the five percent (5%) preferential rate on its gross income earned within the ECOZONE, in lieu of all other national and local taxes, including VAT. Furthermore, it ruled that the Answer filed by the CIR did not contain any admission that the export sales of Toshiba were zero-rated transactions under Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code of 1977. As to the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues filed by the parties in CTA case, which stated that Toshiba was subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales, the CA declared that the CIR signed the said pleading through palpable mistake. This palpable mistake in the stipulation of facts should not be taken against the CIR, for to do otherwise would result in suppressing the truth through falsehood. ISSUE: WON CIR should be bound by its judicial admission HELD/RATIO: YES. The CIR judicially admitted that Toshiba was VAT-registered and its export sales were subject to VAT at zero percent (0%) rate. The arguments of the CIR that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latter’s export sales were VAT-exempt transactions are inconsistent with the explicit admissions of the CIR in Joint

Stipulation that Toshiba was a registered VAT entity and that it was subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales. The Joint Stipulation was executed and submitted by Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised to do so by the CTA at the end of the pre-trial conference. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when the opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not require proof.46cЃacЃaląw In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted by the CIR and Toshiba in their CTA-approved Joint Stipulation are that Toshiba "is a duly registered value-added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended[,]" that "is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended." The CIR was bound by these admissions, which it could not eventually contradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA Decision, by arguing that Toshiba was actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions. Obviously, Toshiba could not have been subject to VAT and exempt from VAT at the same time. Similarly, the export sales of Toshiba could not have been subject to zero percent (0%) VAT and exempt from VAT as well. The Court disagrees with the CA ruling that the CIR could not be bound by his admissions in the Joint Stipulation because (1) the said admissions were "made through palpable mistake"Ѓaląw which, if countenanced, "would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice"; and (2) the State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes of its officials or agents. This ruling of the Court of Appeals is rooted in its conclusion that a "palpable mistake" had been committed by the CIR in the signing of the Joint Stipulation. However, this Court finds no evidence of the commission of a mistake, much more, of a palpable one. The CIR does not deny that its counsel, Atty. Biazon, signed the Joint Stipulation, together with the counsel of Toshiba. Considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,aląw Atty. Biazon is presumed to have read, studied, and understood the contents of the Joint Stipulation before he signed the same. It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the contrary. CIR

12

never alleged that its lawyer made a mistake in signing the Joint Stipulation. PARAFFIN TEST CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, vs. PEOPLE (2006; Panganiban, C.J.)11 FACTS: At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 04 Nov, 1998, Lito Santos, a 43-year-old farmer and resident of Bunawan, Davao City, saw his neighbor and ‘kumpare’ Artemio Pantinople arrive on board a jeepney, carrying a truck battery, some corn bran and rice. They talked for a while after which, Artemio proceeded to connect the battery to the fluorescent lamps in his store. Artemio’s store was located about 5 meters away from Lito’s house. After installing the battery to the fluorescent lamps, Artemio sat for a while on a bench located in front of his store, while Lito went to his kitchen to eat supper. Later, Lito heard a gunshot and he then saw Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to Lito’s kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, ‘Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan,’ meaning ‘Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.’ However, Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Lito's wife Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on Artemio. Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, Artemio's wife, coming from her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, ‘Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa.’ She also repeatedly cried for help. When the shooting incident happened about 7:30 in the evening, Lito’s house was illumined by a lamp. Their kitchen has no walls. It is an open-type kitchen giving him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about 5 meters away from where he was positioned at that time. At the same instance, Ernita was also in their own kitchen. She suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, ‘Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain.’ She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw appellant Marturillas wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the back portion of Lito’s house. From there, appellant crossed the street and disappeared. Appellant was carrying with him an M-14 rifle. Ernita had a clear view of appellant at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by the 2 11 Angela Felicia

fluorescent lamps in their store. Ernita immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio. Artemio tried to speak to her but he could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. Ernita shouted several times, ‘Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay and akong bana.’ (“Captain, why did you kill my husband?”) She also repeatedly called her neighbors for help. After 2 hours, the police arrived. PO2 Mariano Operario, Investigation Officer of the Investigation Section of the Bunawan Police Station, PNP, was already armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible for the shooting of Artemio. PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of appellant and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited appellant to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police station where he was detained. The next morning, P/Chief Insp., Station Commander of the Bunawan PNP made a written request addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory requesting that a paraffin test be conducted on Petitioner and that a ballistics examination be made on the M-14 rifle which PO2 Operario surrendered to Bunawan PNP. Appellant Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City at 10:30 a.m. The next day, November 6 the paraffin test results found Petitioner NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates:

‘FINDINGS: ‘Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave NEGATIVE result to the test for the presence of gunpowder nitrates. x x x ‘CONCLUSION: ‘Both hands of Celestino Marturillas do not contain gunpowder nitrates[.]’

TC: guilty. CA: affirmed. [RELEVANT] ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict appellant of homicide. HELD/RATIO: YES. Petitioner: that the burden of proof was erroneously shifted to him; that there should have been no finding of guilt because of the negative results of the paraffin test. SC: unmeritorious. The facts alone of the negative result of the paraffin test done on him did not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. A negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. In other words, it is possible to fire a

13

gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. Besides, the prosecution was able to establish the events during the shooting, including the presence of petitioner at the scene of the crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative paraffin test result, are of lesser probative value. PHOTOGRAPH AS EVIDENCE JOSE vs CA12 Facts:

MCL is the operator-lessee of the subject bus Said bus, driven by Jose, collided with a car (Ford Escort)

owned by Macarubo As a result of the collision, Macarubo died while the other

passenger of the car, Abraham, was seriously injured and became blind

Abraham then sued MCL and Jose for damages On the other hand, parents of the deceased Macarubo filed a

separate suit for damages against MCL alone MCL also filed a third-party complaint against the registered

owner of the car on the theory that Macarubo was negligent The aforementioned civil cases were consolidated and later

tried jointly During trial, pictures taken of the two vehicles were

submitted as evidence. These pictures, according to the trial court, clearly show that the bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car driven by Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the bus, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the impact. The Court also noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the point of the impact. From these damages as shown by the picture, it was deduced which vehicle did the bumping. The car driven by Macarubo was considered to have hit the bus which was on its right and correct lane.

Thus, the TC dismissed the civil cases and ruled in favor of MCL

CA reversed saying that the TC erred in relying on photographs which had been taken an hour after the collision

12 Jessa Cedeno

as within that span of time, the positions of the vehicles could have been changed; and the photographs do not show that the car was overtaking another vehicle when the accident happened and that Macarubo, its driver, was negligent

Issue: Who between the bus driver and the car driver was at fault for the collision? Held: CAR driver

It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the particular contention. In the CAB, petitioners relied mainly on photographs, identified in evidence showing the position of the two vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private respondents offered the testimony of Abraham to the effect that the collision took place because the bus invaded their lane.

The TC was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Abraham's testimony which was obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.

In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs taken by MCL line inspector about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abraham's self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided because the bus invaded the lane of the car and clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened.

Contrary to Abraham's testimony, the photographs show quite clearly that the bus was in its proper lane and that it was the car which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the car positioned diagonally on the highway, with its two front wheels occupying the bus' lane.

As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of the bus is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that the bus was overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the car.

Indeed, the bus could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It was filled with passengers, and it was considerably heavier and larger than

14

the car. If it was overtaking another vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter car to a considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the car's smashed hood was only about one or two meters from the bus' damaged left front. If there had been a great impact, such as would be the case if bus had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have ended up far from each other.

CA refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could have been moved because there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is not correct. The bus’ conductress testified that, immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, Jose, took the injured driver and passenger of the car to the hospital. This fact is not disputed by private respondents.

Abraham mentioned that a sketch of the scene of the accident allegedly prepared by a patrolman, which shows the bus to be occupying the car's lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the TC or that patrolman was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, §3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally offered by a party.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. v. BF CORPORATION| Velasco, Jr. | 200813 FACTS: A construction contract was entered into between EDSA Shangri-

La Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI) and BF Corp. for the construction of EDSA Shangri-La Hotel. It was agreed that BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month’s progress billing.

From 1991-1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings. However, ESHRI did not prepare the Progress Payment

13 Jabi Valenton

Certificates for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19. Thus, no payment was made with respect to said billings.

And so BF filed a suit for a sum of money and damages. To prove its claim, BF presented photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 explaining that it could not present the original of the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF despite requests

ESHRI opposed the admissibility of said photocopies. It contended that BF ought to have laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence before being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to

The TC and CA admitted in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19

ISSUE: WoN BF failed to conform to the Best Evidence Rule in presenting photocopies of said billings making said evidence inadmissible DECISION: NO. The rule is that a party may present secondary evidence of

the contents of a writing: (1) when the original is lost or destroyed; and (2) when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence

Thus, the mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must be laid first.

The conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence are the following: (1) there is proof of the original document’s execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original document’s unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.

In the case at bar, said conditions have been met. When BF’s counsel asked the opposing counsel whether he brought the originals that they requested from ESHRI during the last hearing, the opposing counsel replied “We have already informed our client about the situation that it has been claimed by plaintiff that some of the originals are in their possession and our client assured

15

that, they will try to check. Unfortunately, we have not heard from our client.”

Said exchanges show (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them

Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in question as secondary evidence.

Chua Gaw v. Chua | Nachura, J. | April 16, 200814 FACTS

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of 3 business enterprises, one of which is Hagonoy Lumber. The couple had 7 children, among them were Concepcion Chua, Suy Ben Chua and Chua Sioc Huan. Chua Chin died and left his wife and children as the only surviving heirs.

The surviving heirs executed a Deed of Partition, wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: ½ to Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares. In said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

Petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw (Spouses Gaw), borrowed P200,000 from Suy Ben Chua to be used for the construction of their house. Suy Ben Chua issued a check for the amount. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable in 6 months without interest.

Chua Sioc Huan executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for P255,000 in favor of respondent Suy Ben Chua.

Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed within the designated period. Suy Ben Chua filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the Spouses Gaw.

In their Answer, the Spouses Gaw contend that the P200,000 was not a loan but Concepcion’s share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber

In his Reply, Suy Ben Chua explained that pursuant to the

14 Candice See

Deed of Partition, their sister Chua Sioc Huan became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. Suy Ben Chua became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.

Spouses Gaw countered that the documents on which Suy Ben Chua anchors his claim of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were not true and valid agreements and do not express the real intention of the parties. They claimed that these documents are mere paper arrangements which were prepared only upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign a final and binding agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by the heirs.

RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua and ordered Concepcion Gaw (her husband Antonio had passed away) to pay P200,000. RTC held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were never impugned. Although Suy Ben Chua failed to produce the originals of the documents, Concepcion judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. The contents of the Deed of Sale have not been put in issue, the non-presentation of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its contents. Also, the parties to the documents themselves do not contest their validity.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Since Concepcion did not dispute the due execution and existence of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale, there was no need to produce the originals of the documents in accordance with the best evidence rule.

ISSUE & HELD

WON the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence Rule. The best evidence rule is not applicable to the case at bar. RATIONALE

The “best evidence rule” in Rule 130, Section 3 applies only when the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

16

Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original.

Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

There was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. Concepcion never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, Concepcion, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules (Rule 8, Section 8).

o Concepcion merely claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel. Apparently, Concepcion does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.

An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

Sasan v. NLRC15 Facts:

- Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Petitioners Sasan, et. al. were among those employed by HI. They were assigned to various E-PCIBank branches in Visayas.

- Petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC Cebu City.

15 Francis Tiopianco

- Petitioners claimed that they were employees of E-PCI. - E-PCI claimed that it entered into a contract for services with

HI, an independent contractor; hence, it was HI and not the bank that was the true employer of petitioners.

- HI asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, thus, petitioners' complaints before the NLRC were without basis.

- LA ruled in favor of petitioners and found that HI did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. Hence, it was a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.

- NLRC modified, taking into consideration the documentary evidence (i.e. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation, Audited Financial Statement, and Tax declarations—although not categorically stated, these appear to be certified true copies) presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only contracting."

- MR denied. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Held:

1. The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

2. There is likewise no merit in petitioners' protestations against the documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were

17

mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. This provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to the petitioners.

3. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.

DECS v. Del Rosario16

16 Fatima Macanan