Administrative Reform in Bangladesh: An Overview of Political Dynamics

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Nepalese Journal of Public Policy and Governance, Vol. xxviii, No.1, June, 2011

Administrative Reform in Bangladesh: An Overviewof Political Dynamics

Muhammad Azizuddin

AbstractThis paper explores the interplay between politics and administrative reform in

Bangladesh by drawing some perspectives from other developing countries. It covers the period both before and after democratization of the country, hinging around the events of1991, and thus provides the opportunity for comparisons. It has sought to draw out therelative importance of political will (including the intentions and authority) ofgovernments, and to critically assess their capacity, the degree of co-operation theygained from civil service actors, and to assess the relevance and appropriateness ofinternational donor interventions.

I. Introduction: Administrative

Reform PerspectiveAdministrative reform is the inducedsystematic improvement of public sectoroperational performance (El Ghaziri,2005:5). It is to cope with changes ingovernment of countries objectiveswith changes in both the local andglobal social, economic and politicalenvironment (Fuller, 2010). It is apolitical function as important as thegeneral political activities. It must adjustthe relation between a bureaucracy and

other elements in a society, or within thebureaucracy itself in order to change thebehavior of the public service(Montgomery, 1969; Huque, 2002). Theissue of administrative reform dependsmostly on the nature and orientation ofpolitics and political leadership. Whenthere is a change in the nature of politicsin the society the nature ofadministrative reform too getssubstantially transformed (Ahmad andAhmed, 1992). Bangladeshs experience

over four decades clearly illustrates thisfact. In developing countries like

Bangladesh, it may need the support andcooperation of bureaucratic forces for itssurvival in power. However, a tacitcompletion is always there to prevailbetween bureaucracy and politicalleadership to ensure ones influenceover the other. This is war of a differentkind and it is political. It becomesintensified at the administrative reforminitiatives (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1992).The administrative system inBangladesh is a powerful institutionsystematically developed over the

British colonial period (Atrya andArmstrong, 2002) and now sustainingthe traits and cu1ture of colonialbureaucracy. Reform attempts may beinitiated by the government to pleaseadministrative forces (by givingopportunities to deal with reform andchange to the senior administrativefigures and influential lobbies) and toremain safely in power with theirsupport (Ahmad and Ahmed, 1992:82).The nature of the government andpolitical support practically determinesthe actual internal motives ofadministrative reform that may not be


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Administrative Reform in Bangladesh: An Overview of Political Dynamics

visible in the reform reports. Theinternational communities can be ofimportance in the process of reform andchange in designing and implementingstrategies for institutional developmentin Bangladesh; with the appropriate mixof assistance at timely junctures,international organizations asdevelopment partners and bilateraldonors can support, facilitate andencourage the process. However, theygenerally do a poor job ofdiscriminating between different phasesof the reform process and adoptingpackages of assistance to support reform(World Bank, 1998). Moreover, theirassistance reinforces existingadministrative lopsidedness. Theincentive for administrative rent-seekingbehavior, in which the country haspursued project initiatives, it seems toattract external support because they aremost needed from a developmentperspective.Bangladesh had started to reform theadministrative system quite in line withthe then political beliefs of socialistideology and democratic tradition. Dueto personal influence on politics andadministration, the then politicalleadership had failed to prove theircompetence in running the state.Consequently, the irregular regimechanges have been there with the directand indirect military interventions. As aresult of the so-called block change tocapitalist ideology in mid-1990s,international organizations and bilateraldonors have emerged as influentialelements for administrative reforms inBangladesh. They advocate combatingbureaucratic dysfunctions to improvethe quality of services to the citizens.

They are, in fact, keen to paradigm shiftfrom traditional Weberian publicadministration to managerialism: NewPublic Management (Haque, 2001).However, their involvements may serveto aggravate, rather than reduce,administrative difficulties. This canoccur when poor donor coordinationresults in different donors supportingrival bureaucracies or competingprograms (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006).The successive governments inBangladesh have been dealing with theissue of administrative reforms,however, they have failed so far.Consequently, the bureaucracy, whichwas pushed out of their position ofinfluence and power in the early years,brought to the forefront, with changes ofregimes, and ultimately emerged as theinfluential partners with the militarystaff (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1992). Thus,the appearance of such a state of affairswas a response to demands forefficiency rather than those fordemocratic values, popular disciplinerather than popular participation, and thegovernmental virtues of centralizationand not so much as that ofdecentralization. These tendencies havehad a profound impact on the nature ofadministrative reform in the country.Apart from these internal politicalcompulsions, external urges, emanatingfrom the donor countries andemphasizing both development ofadministration and administration ofdevelopmental activities have alsoinfluenced the nature of administrativereform in the country. This paper tries toexplore the interplay between politicsand administrative reform in developingBangladesh. It covers the period both


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before and after the democratization ofthe country, hinging around the eventsof 1991, and, thus, provides theopportunity for comparisons. Thesecond section depicts the nature andrelation between politics andadministration. The third sectionsketches out the reform efforts in thecountry, which follows the fourthsection: the dynamics of administrativereform assessing critically theircapacity, the degree of co-operation theygained from administrative actors, andto assess the relevance andappropriateness of international donorinvolvements. The final sectionconcludes the paper drawing out therelative importance of political will(including the intentions and authority)of governments.

II. Political Regimes and PublicAdministrationThe public administration in Bangladeshis the legacy of the past that traveled

down from ancient Bengal via Mughul(1556-1757), British India (1757-1947),and Pakistan (1947-1971) to Bangladesh(1971 - ). In fact, it started serving thecitizen of a sovereign state with apseudo-democratic tradition. It hasperformed with different regimes ofautocratic and democratic governmentsthat have been led by two major parties,and a third one: Bangladesh AwamiLeague (AL), Bangladesh NationalistParty (BNP), and Jatio Party (JP). The

nature of political regimes is shown inTable-1 below:

Table 1: The usual character of politics in Bangladesh

Timeline Duration Political Party Ideological Nature

Before19911971 1975 Bangladesh Awami League Socialist1976- 1990 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)

and Jatio Party (JP)Capitalist

After 1991 1991 - Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)and Bangladesh Awami League

Capitalist

The Bangladesh Awami League formedthe first government in the country witha democratic socialist ideology.However, fortunately or unfortunately,the regime turned autocratic with theformation of BAKSAL (BangladeshKrishak SramikAwami League) in 1975,that paved the way to martial rule,which, in fact, turned into a process ofmilitarization of public administrationwith two successive regimes of BNP

(19761982: General Zia) and JP(19821990: General Ershad), wherein

the bureaucracy served as their supportbase. The BNP, formed by General Zia,included diverse personalitiesfromdifferent political groups, formerarmy and senior administrative figures.But, it wasforced to quit power in 1982by General Ershad, who declaredMartial Law and ruled the country insuch a way that it paved the path for theestablishment of a new politicalplatform for Jatiya Part. The party-

building process was with the faction-prone political parties and with the


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support of some groups of breakawaysections of bureaucracy while all theopposition parties were disorganizedand weak organizationally (Ahmad andAhmed, 1992). Following a massupsurge in 1990, and the re-establishment of a democratic system ofgovernment in the country, thedemocratization process started.However, the BNP and the AwamiLeague rotate the governments andpublic administration has been servingwith these two parties in governments(Azizuddin, 2006; 2008).The first Awami League regime wasinitially democratic in character butgradually developed authoritariantendencies that eventually led it totransform the countrys political systemfrom parliamentary to presidential, withmulti-party democracy replaced by oneparty rule (Zafarullah, Khan, andRahman, 2001:63). The BAKSAL, theonly officially permitted party in thecountry,inducted senior administrativefigures into the central committee. Thisunpredictable change gave thebureaucracy the opportunity to becomepart of the political process and formalpoliticization of public administrationstarted. Both the BNP (19761982) andJP (19821990) regimes began with theMartial Law rule, which later turnedcivilian through the parliamentaryelections in 1979 and 1986 respectively.This civilianization of military rule ontwo occasions was accompanied by thefloating of state-sponsored politicalparties enable them easily to win largemajorities in general elections in amulti-party political milieu (Zafarullah,Khan, and Rahman, 2001:64). But, theseparties remained the political citadel

(Ahamed and Nazneen, 1988) of martialrulers. The nature of civil-militaryrelations changed; senior administrativefigures were made advisers andministers in the cabinets (Islam,1988:123). The civil service has theobligation to be responsive to themajority party in power and in returnacquired the advantage of nominatingregime loyalists to key positions in theadministration. This situation thuscreates the political support base for theregime, and the opportunity to look aftertheir own interests and the interests ofthose they served (Zafarullah, Khan andRahman, 2001). This implicit politicizedsupport of the bureaucracy for theregime was then withdrawn (Ahmad andAhmad, 1992) in response to massupheaval in 1990, and this acceleratedthe fall of the regime in late 1990. Theirony is that during the democraticperiod the state power tended to rotatebetween the BNP and the AwamiLeague. While the form of governmentwas ostensibly democratic, the style ofgovernance remained largelyunchanged. The bureaucracy, to a greatextent, remained unchanged though thepattern of governance did switchover toa parliamentary form in 1991(Azizuddin, 2008).Due to the lack of political agreementbetween the regimes of the BNP and theAwami League, the bureaucracybecame clearly factionalized along partylines; some senior civil servants openlydefying the Government with otherslending their support. The former werepunished by demoting them to trivialpositions, while the latter were rewardedfor their services with jobs in importantministries (Zafarullah, Khan, and


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Rahman, 2001:46). There wasparticipation of many generalist civilservants under the leadership of apowerful ex-CSP (Civil Service ofPakistan) officer in the protestmovement launched by the AwamiLeague against the BNP government(Sarker, 2001:164) in mid-1996. As aresult, when it did form the governmentin 1996 and 2009, many officers wererewarded by the then government ofAwami League, for example, one evenbeing made a State Minister of Planning(Khan, Zafarullah, and Rahman, 2001),and the followers and so were alsorewarded with mass promotions.Therefore, because of politicalinstability and experimentation withdifferent kind of political regimes, civilservice responsiveness has been presentin varying degrees. Some might havebecome obscure, but may return with achange in regime attributes (Heady,1996, cf. Zafarullah, Khan, andRahman, 2001:64).Bangladesh has experienced eitherpseudo-democratic or civilianizedmilitary regimes for nearly two decadesof 1970s and 1980s, with the formerpredominating in the period followingthe democratization process whichbegan in the early 1990s. Due to theauthoritarian nature of democraticallyelected politicians or martialinvolvement in politics, parliamentshave tended to be used as a convenientinstrument of the strongman (Khanand Zafarullah, 1988) in power. Otherthan the bureaucracy, the politicalinstitutions like political parties and theparliament as well remain largely

underdeveloped. Trade unions andworkers associations, however, haveplayed a major part in the politics ofBangladesh. They have gained informalauthority to influence managementdecisions, and the political parties havereceived their political loyalty andsupport at the organizational, industrial,and grass-roots level (ADB, 2001). Ascenario of politics and administrationrelations in Bangladesh can be gaugedin Table-2.Following the coup of 1975, the militarytook over the power and the successiveregime of 19761982 shifted thefundamental state policy from socialistto capitalist ideology and there was atacit partnership between the senioradministrative and military figures(Ahamed and Nazneen, 1988). Thesenior civil-military figures held most ofthe crucial positions in the decision-making structure of the government.The regime in the country could bedefined as a coalition between civilmilitary bureaucrats and technocrats(Hossain, 1991). In the fieldadministration, senior administrativefigures, including those from theerstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan(CSP), held such coveted positions asDivisional Commissioner or DeputyCommissioner (DC) with immensepower and prestige in the divisions anddistricts sub-national level ofadministration in the country. Thebureaucrats, both civil and military, thusemerged as the ruling elite inBangladesh (Ahamed and Nazneen,1988:75).


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Table 2: Political Regime and Bureaucracy relations in BangladeshTimeline Duration The Regime The Fate The Nature Politics- Administration

Relations

Before1991

1972 1975

BangladeshAwamiLeague with Mujb

Remove by themilitary coup

Pseudo-democratic/ personalist

Ruler + Single-partyResponsivenessand self-defense/ self- interest.

1976 1982

BangladeshNationalist Party with Zia

LeaderAssassinated

Civilianized Military

Military + Civilianizedmilitary partnership/subservience to military.

1982 1990

Jatio Party withErshad

Overthrown bymass upsurge

Civilianized Military

Military + Civilianizedmilitary partnership/subservience to military.

After1991

1991 1996

BangladeshNationalist Party withKhaleda Zia

Resigned onoppositiondemand

Democratic Major - Party responsivenessplus bureaucratic self-interestwith semi-neutral character

1996 2001

BangladeshAwami Leaguewith SkHasina

Transferredpower to electedgovernment

DemocraticMajor - Party responsivenessplus bureaucratic self-interestwith semi-neutral character

2002-2006

BangladeshNationalist Partywith Khaleda Zia

Transferredpower to electedgovernment


2009-

BangladeshAwami Leaguewith SkHasina

Transferredpower to electedgovernment withsome interruption


Sources: M. Azizuddin (2006; 2008), S. A. Malek (2002), F. Heady (1996), H. M.Zafarullah (1996; 2001).

By 2011, despite four-decades ofsovereignty, democracy remained in asomewhat nascent or embryonic stage,with underdeveloped political values,unhealthy democratic institutions, atraditional social structure and defectivebureaucratic machinery. However, thepublic administration has also beenundergoing a reform process, andpeoples expectations from the state arehigh. Their intended commitment tocontribute to the reform process wasalso clearly shown at a number ofcritical events, e.g., during the fall ofErshads nine year civilianized military

regime in 1990, with the development ofwider movements for a just society.Following the events in 1991, thenegative elements widespread in thepublic administration such as serviceconflict, conservatism and inertia wereto be gradually reduced to make thebureaucracy more effective, responsiveand responsible. Administrative Reformwould be to fine-tune the contemporarysituation: reorder the numerous inheritedentities and to launch a new system ofhuman resource management that would

meet the demands of the civil service asa protected professional public service.The civil service, well established in


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Bangladeshi society, is an organizedpolitical institution. It is still insulated,to a large extent, from the people, with adistinctive outlook and substantial sub-system autonomy (Zafarullah, Khan,and Rahman, 2001). Politics stillformally controls the policy makingrole, however, civil service due to itscompetence and expertise tends toestablish their influence throughformulating and implementing thepolicies drawn up by the policy makers.The politicians, in general, have thevision of reform in the administrativesystem. The problem that administrativereform faces in the country is that manypoliticians and political parties talkabout reform, but there is little evidencethat their commitment is genuine(Malek, 2002). None of the politicalparties in Bangladesh have had aspecific agenda for administrativereform, nor did administrative reformfigure in their election manifestos. Thepolitical leaders are, in fact, populist andthey do not have enough understandingof development politics and, therefore,lack technocratic skills, and, as a result,democratic rule has not been able toprovide the desired home-grown policydecisions for the country.

III. Reform and Reorganization:Leap Services as CommonlyUtteredThe emergence of independentBangladesh in 1971 necessitated makingthe public administration moreaccountable and responsive in line withthe resulting shift in state policy(ies) andobjective(s). The prevailing euphoriaafter independence, and the need for an

effective and efficient administrativesystem to handle the increasingresponsibilities of a nation state wereresponsible for making administrativereform efforts a top priority for politicalleaders. Table-3 below shows theremarkable administrative reform effortsin the country.

Reform Efforts Before 1991Just after independence, the thengovernment of Bangladesh AwamiLeague initiated the administrativereform quite in line with their politicalbeliefs of socialist ideology anddemocratic traditions. The publicadministration can therefore be neitherinnovators nor catalytic agents for asocial change . It is only a politicalcadre with firm roots in the people andmotivated by new ideology and willingto live and work among the people asone of them that can mobilize the massand transform their pattern of behaviour(GoB, 1973a:4). Therefore, at the outset,the government paid due attention toadministrative reform from its legalstatus to its structure.

The appointment of the AdministrativeService Reorganization Committee (ASRC) in 1972, known as MACCommission, and the National PayCommission (1973) were the first oftheir kind in the direction ofadministrative reform in line with thegovernment objectives that wererecommended for a single classlessgrading structure covering all services inten grades (GoB, 1973:10) of payscales (GoB, 1973a:45). These were inthe expectation that the publicadministration should be attuned to the


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hopes and aspirations of the people, andthey were expected to create a kind ofliving fellowship with the commonmen on a firm dedication todemocracy and socialism (GoB, 1973:10); and having regard to the declaredobjectives of government to establish asocialist society in Bangladesh andreduce the disparity between the highestand lowest incomes in the society anine tier administrative system withcorresponding pay scales could meet therequirements of a rational system for thenext five year (GoB, 1973a:45).However, the regime was unable to

implement all these proposals, though ithad early success. The reform effortswere undertaken in a context of serioussocio-economic and political crises.Political unrest of the highest magnitudedeveloped in the country and the regimedirected all its efforts towards its ownsurvival. Ironically enough, thebureaucracy, which was denounced bythe political leadership for itsimpermeable character, was ultimatelyto be relied upon and utilized by theregime itself during its last phase thushelping to restore its political influence(Ahamed, 1980:157162).

Table 3: Remarkable Administrative Reform Efforts in Bangladesh

Timeline Reform Committee/ Commission Main FocusReformEfforts before1991

Administrative Service ReorganizingCommittee (ASRC), 1972 with Muzaffar AChowdhury

Service Structure

Pay and Service Commission (PSC), 1976(1977) with M A Rashid

Services Structure and Pay Issues

Martial Law Committee for examiningorganizational set-up of Ministries/ Divisions/Directorates and other Organizations (MLC),1982 with Brigadier EnamulHaque

Organization and Rationalization ofManpower in the Public SectorOrganizations

The Committee for AdministrativeReorganization/ Reform (CARR), 1983 withRear Admiral MA Khan

Reorganization of sub-national leveladministration

ReformEfforts after1991

Cabinet Committee of AdministrativeReform, 1993 (1995) with Colonel (rtd) WaliAhmed MP

Recognition and review the reports ofPublic Administration Sector Study(UNDP) and Towards BetterGovernment in Bangladesh.

Administrative Reorganization Committee(ARC), 1993 (1996) withNurunNabiChowdhury

Structure and Rationalization ofManpower AcrossMinistries/Departments/ Directorates

Public Administration Reform Committee(PARC), 1997 (2000) with A T MShamsulHaque

Administrative change anddevelopment in the light of NewPublic Management

Source: A M MShawkat Ali, Civil Service Management in Bangladesh An Agenda for

Policy Reform, UPL, Dhaka, 2010.


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The appointment of the Pay and ServiceCommission (PSC) by the BNP in 1976,known as Rashid Commission, for asuitable pay and service structure (GoB,1977:45-46) like that of the earlierregime, disparaged the claims of thegeneralists and advocated on behalf ofthe new class of technocrats, equal payfor equal status and an appropriate levelof participation in the decision-makingstructure, and suggested a newer paypolicy with a new pay structure of civilservice within 21 grades (GoB,1977:53). It called for the creation of asuper cadre at the top of the pyramidstaffed by men of superior intellect andvision from each of the cadres (Ahamedand Nazneen, 1988:77).The regime also undertook certain stepsto rationalize the staffing process,framing new rules and regulations toreplace systems of patronage.Competitive examinations began to beheld more or less on a regular basis from1977, and the standard of civil servantsrecruited on the basis of examinationswas quite high (Ahamed and Nazneen,1988:78). The introduction of thisrational basis in the staffing processfrom the later part of the 1970s was asignificant stride forward. However, theefforts at reforms during the regimecould be considered as piecemealchanges and changing the form ratherthan the substance (Khan andZafarullah, 1982). In fact, apart from thechanges detailed above, no substantialprogress towards administrative reformhad been achieved during the regime inspite of the fact that the PSC hadsubmitted a comprehensive reportproposing new organizational structurefor services (Ahmad and Ahmed, 1992).

In course of time, however, unpleasantfeatures arose in the administrativesystem, such as the tension between theBCS administration cadre and theremainder of the twenty-nine cadres(Miah, 1997; Murshed, 1997).The regime, however, was able to bringabout some changes in Bangladeshpublic administration (Ahamed andNazneen, 1988; Ahmad and Ahmed,1992); the appointment of PSC in 1976was intended to resolve issues whichhad been left unresolved during theearlier regime. The government decidedto implement its proposals in a modifiedform (Miah, 1997). As the apex pool inthe administration the Senior ServicePool (SSP) was established for thecentral secretariat services at nationallevel administration, that would providean opportunity for representation fromvarious cadre services of the civilservice in the Secretariat (Ahmad andAhmad and Ahmed, 1992). This wasquite in line with the expectation of thesenior administrative figures whodreamed of assuming authority andprestige like that of the Indian CivilService (ICS) and the CSP officers. TheSSP was, in fact, was not an institutionalarrangement for mobilizing the supportof members of all cadre services,support that was essential for such aregime starting to run the stateadministration without political andadministrative experiences. It was notfrom the standpoint of administrativeefficiency; rather, it was used andmisused politically (Ahmad and Ahmed,1992).This was, in fact, the period whenBangladesh began to be assured oflarger share of external assistance after


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the dilution of the so-called socialistideology. As a result, the economicsituation that had started deterioratingfrom 1973 and reached its lowest ebb in1974 began to show signs ofimprovement from the beginning of1976 (Ahamed, 1980; Ahamed andNazneen, 1988; Ahmad and Ahmad,1992). During this period oftransformation, some of the trends inreform that had become visible duringthe early years of the Awami Leagueregime were watered down. From thistime, more emphasis began to be placedon efficiency rather than ondemocratization, on productivity ratheron participation and more oncentralization than on decentralization.In many areas, the orientation of thecivil service changed towards, in otherwords, militarization of administration(Ahmad and Ahmed, 1992, Ahamed andNazneen, 1988), through directinduction of a large number of militarypersonnel into the public administration.The regime during 19821990continued the military rule in thecountry. It introduced some measures aspart of a program of top prioritiesincluding administrative reform with anemphasis on decentralization and theprocess of transition to civilian rule. Itwas heavily dependent on the senioradministrative figures and had a numberof civil bureaucrats, technocrats andpoliticians in its Council of Advisers atthe outset, and in successive Cabinets, inaddition to retired military officers. Inthe absence of political leadership in thegovernment machinery, policy makingand implementation had been done bythe army officials in close cooperationwith the civil service. Two major

administrative reform measures weretaken in 1982 and 1983 respectively: theMartial Law Committee for examiningorganizational set-up of Ministries/Divisions/ Directorates and otherOrganizations(MLC), known as EnamCommittee, and the Committee forAdministrative Reorganization/Reform(CARR), Known as Khan Committee, tomaterialize the intention ofstrengthening and legitimizing themilitarys power over the statemechanism (Miah, 1997). The MLCrecommended improvements for theefficiency and effectiveness of civilservice officials working at the nationallevel, resulting initially in the reductionof the number of Ministries/ Divisionsand manpower and rationalization ofthe charter of duties of the civil servants(Khan, 1991). On the other hand, theCARR has been for administrativereorganization and institutionalization ofa local government system in thecountry. The regime, by making the tworeform bodies reflect diversememberships, intended to project therecommendations as the views ofdifferent professional and pressuregroups. The fact remains that the leadingarmy officers in the two committees,with the assistance of senioradministrative figures, ably representedthe interests of the regime-government.

Reform Efforts after 1991Following the mass upheaval of 1990,the BNP became the single majorityparty in the parliamentary election of1991, and formed the government for a

five-year term. The government inpower felt the necessity of


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administrative reform for a newlyestablished democratic environment.Some international organisation andbilateral donor-sponsored voluminousreports were produced during the tenureof the regime. The government-sponsored reports were produced bycommittees staffed mostly by the senioradministrative figures both directly asmembers and in supporting roles.The first such report was during the firstdemocratic regime of 1991-1996 for theUNDP by a team of publicadministration experts: Reports onPublic Administration Sector Study inBangladesh, known as UNDP Report,and completed its work in June 1993,providing valuable proposals foradministrative reform in the country.Simultaneously, the British OverseasDevelopment Agency (British ODA)sponsored study Towards BetterGovernment in Bangladesh, known asFour Secretaries Report, was startedwith four senior members of the civilservice playing an important role in itssubsequent development. The reportidentified anomalies and suggestingchanges in the civil service. Thegovernment subsequently appointed theCabinet Committee of AdministrativeReform in 1993 (GoB, 1993), whichreported in 1995 mostly in line with theso-called Four Secretaries.Subsequently, the AdministrativeReorganization Committee (ARC) wasappointed by the government in 1993, toreview the size and scope of publicadministration, so that the machinery ofadministration would be dynamic in itsoperation. Again, senior administrativefigures dominated the composition ofthe committee. However, the efforts at

reform in this regime effectivelyachieved little other than the productionof four voluminous reports (Subhan,2001).The following Awami League regime of19962001 appointed in 1997 a newPublic Administration ReformsCommission (PARC,) once morechaired by A T M ShamsulHaque, aretired senior administrative figure,which took until June 2000 to completeits report. Since the Awami Leagueregime left office in mid -2001, and theyrotate to the power successively in 2001and 2009, the administrative reforms itproposed have not been carried out andthe chances of the report obtainingcabinet approval, going through aprocess of public debate seekinglegislative support, all within years, didnot look promising (Subahan, 2001).The disappointing results of the reformefforts during the democratic regimesmay be seen partly as a consequence ofpolitical factionalism, and the deeperstructural relationships between politicaland administrative actors in Bangladesh.The fact is that Collective action by the

bureaucracy is seen as an accepted normof behavior. Each political party fearsthe cost of resisting such collectivepressures. The party in power fearsadministrative disruptions, they fear lossof votes, but above all they fear the lossof control over the administrativemachinery so as to be able to use it forpartisan gains. This compulsion bysuccessive regimes for using themachinery of state for partisan andpersonal gain has given theadministration a sense of immunity toreform and forged a collusive bondbetween state, politics and business


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(Subhan, 2001:95). As a result, thecitizens interest has largely beensidestepped. It is generally the fact thatall these reports are paved with goodintentions, and propose scores of waysin which administration maybereformed. But they do not expose thepolitical economy of politico-bureaucratic entente in Bangladeshwhich serves as the most powerfuldriving force in retaining the oldadministrative order (Alam et al, 1998:36).

IV. The Dynamics of Reform:Civil, Military Bureaucrats andDonors InterventionBangladesh inherited an administrativesystem, institutionalized in the colonialregime of British India, which grewstronger with military interventionsthroughout the quarter century ofPakistani period (1947-1971). However,the administrative system was verymuch for provincial governance insteadfor an independent nation-state(Ahamed and Nazneen, 1988).

Administrative reform efforts during theearly years (19721975) aimed atstreamlining the public administrationby integrating the different categories ofcivil services, abolishing elitism fromthe services and making theadministration accountable to thepolitical leadership. The need was for adifferent system responsible to thepolitical government and capable ofimplementing those political andconstitutional objectives. Moreover, thegovernment had a strong hatred for thethen Pakistani public administrationsystem which helped sustain military

rule in Pakistan at the cost of politicaldevelopment and caused much sufferingfor the new ruling politicians and theirpolitical allies (Ahmad and Ahmed,1992). However, the bureaucracy wascomposed of diverse elements withdifferent group interests. The overallpolitical situation of the country was notcongenial for the stability inadministrative system (Ahmad andAhmed, 1992). The formation of a newpolitical party, during 19761982, withBNP broke down the backbone of allmajor political parties. Most of themembers of the party were from theexisting parties including the earlierregimes ruling party, the AwamiLeague, which caused the disintegrationof political parties as a whole(Maniruzzaman, 1981; Ahmed, 1996).As a result, the opposition ingovernment was found to adopt a newstrategy to create pressure on thegovernment by using the differentservice unions and professional servicegroups (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1992:73).The induction of military officers in thecivil administration through literalentry became visible. In this process, alarge number of military officers gainedaccess to the classical citadel ofbureaucracy (Ahamed and Nazneen,1988). There were 25 military officers inthe 625-member contingent of SSPmeant for policy-making in theSecretariat at national leveladministration (Ahmad and Ahmad,1992). Of the 101 Chairmen/ ManagingDirectors of the public corporations, 42were military officers and 22 of 40district superintendents and additionalsuperintendents of Police were fromarmy personnel. It has been contended


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that taking advantage of secure militarypower, the armed forces increased theremuneration of the civil servants invarious forms and thus a coalition ofcivil and military bureaucrats developedfurther (Maniruzzaman, 1981). Moresignificantly, the trends of peopleparticipation and decentralization of theadministrative system tended to bediluted; in its place a new trend of over-centralization began to surface in realityalthough peoples participation anddecentralization were commonlyuttered terms in the public speeches ofimportant government functionaries,including the president (Ahamed andNazneen, 1988:79).The regime during 19821990 followedthe footsteps of its earlier regime asregards the bureaucracy andadministration in the country, in that thecabinet was filled with representativesfrom the army and the civil bureaucracyand greater trust was placed on theadministrative elite in the decisionmaking areas, especially the allocationof resources, than on the political elites.This trend continued throughout and themilitary officers began to man importantpositions in the secretariat and publiccorporations and they gradually madeinroads into foreign affairs, too. Thishampered the planned change in thepublic administration system.The feelings of deprivation amongdifferent cadres were observed in theformation of SSP. There was a politicalurge on the part of the government toview the administration in such a way sothat it could utilize it as a political base,which every military government needs.The attempts for administrative reformin the regime served the same political

purpose. Intended for the effectiveadministrative system and theimportance of reform from theperspective of the total system, thecreation of the Upazila came intobeing, a mid-tier of local governmentwhere members of Bangladesh CivilService were posted in the name ofadministrative decentralization. It wasan amalgamation of local governmentsystem and government bureaucracy bythe name of Upazila system (Ahmad andAhmad, 1992:76).The abolition of the sub-divisional tierin the sub-national level during theregime, and converting them to a districtraised the number of districts from 21 to64. These were able to satisfy themembers of civil service by givingpromotional scope so that 64 DeputyCommissioners (DC) and moreAdditional Deputy Commissioners(ADC) were posted in the districts, andpaved the way for the appointment of300 Upazila Nirbahi (executive)Officers (UNO), the chief executiveofficer in the Upazilas. It also opened upopportunities for the specialist civilservants such as doctors, engineers etc.However, these new promotionalopportunities gave the regime theopportunity to gain support amongstcivil servants to run the civiladministration. On the other hand, theinfluence of senior administrativefigures in the government andadministration was manipulated toprovide the main support for the Ershadregime (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1992) hence decentralization may be seen aswindow-dressing and reorganizationwas, in fact, the extended hands of thenational administration at the local level.


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The efforts at administrative reform bythe regimes during the democraticperiod of 1990s onwards followed thesame tradition, though reforms wereurgently needed. Although, thebureaucrats as a group came outvictorious during the regimes of Zia andErshad in their struggle for power andprestige in the polity, the innercontradictions, developed in the civilservice over the years, tended tofragment it (Ahmad and Nazneen,1988). The earlier factionalisms in the1970s, based on patronage orparticipation in the liberation war of thecountry, were replaced by those basedon academic background or professionalspecialties or functional expertise in the1980s and the 1990s. This trend ofgrowing, micro-bureaucracies (Ahamedand Nazneen, 1988) in the countrybecame heightened. This is partlybecause of the greater involvement ofthe technocrats in the production processand partly because of the internationaldonors involvements in thedevelopment of administration.Donors are endowed with economicand technical assistance which togetherconstitute foreign development aidthrough which they supposedlysignificantly influence the public policymaking process (Khan, 1994:01; Khan,1998:123) in the country (Sobhan, 1982;Subhan and Bhattacharya, 1990). Theissue of the donors involvements in thedevelopment of administration ismultifaceted. Critics speak of aconsensus on the agenda for reform ingeneral and improving the capacity ofthe administration in particular (Jenkinsand Plowden, 2006; ADB, 2001; Muhit,2000). The UN agencies as a whole, and

the World Bank in particular recognizethe centrality of a competent, affordable,and accountable public administration(WB, 2002:1). However, Initially theytried to operate only in their donorsupported activity environment, only torealize that the pervasive andpreponderant influence of the totalpublic sector will offset whatever gainsthey may achieve in their limited area.Many donors and lenders actively argue,advocate, support and promote publicsector reform (Rahman, 2001:150 -151). The reform challenges facing theadministration are largely structuralissues. The major donors, all agree thatthe strengthening of governmentinstitutions in Bangladesh is essentialfor a significant improvement in thegovernance-related outcomes. Theirefforts, however, at reform are not wellcoordinated and problems have arisenfrom the uncoordinated actions (Jenkinsand Plowden, 2006; WB, 2002). Duringthe early 1990s, two important donor-funded reports (UNDP, 1993; Rahmanet al, 1993) on public administrationreform were produced. One wasprepared by a team of national andinternational public administrationreform experts, funded by the UNDP, inJune, 1993. The other one was preparedby a team of senior members of civilservice, funded by the British ODA, inSeptember 1993. The submission of theformer report coincided with the start ofwork on the latter, and this simultaneousuncoordinated donors effort may wellhave undermined the reform effort(Shelley, 2000).There has been a sharp lack ofcoordination, as observed amonggovernment initiatives, donors


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assistance and bureaucrats support.During the democratic period, forexample, two donor-aided and twogovernment initiated reform reportswere produced. These were reviewed bya high powered commission on publicadministration reforms during theAwami League regime (19962001).The senior administrative figuresdominated most of the governmentcommittees. Indeed, one extremeexample of their approach is providedby an account of a meeting between themembers of the team who had preparedthe UNDP report and the senior officialsresponsible for the Four SecretariesReport:One meeting between the Members andAdvisors of the Public AdministrationSector Team [better known as UNDPreport of 1993] and the AdvisoryCommittee took place. After theMinister of Establishment opened themeeting and asked the Team Leader toexplain briefly the Study (but not thefindings and recommendations), severalof senior civil servants [those whoprepared the Four Secretaries Report of1993 funded by British ODA] presentdominated the meeting, and castigatedthe UNDDSMS/ UNDP for undertakingsuch a study and maintained that theGovernment had never agreed to such astudy, and openly questioned itslegitimacy. In essence, these senior civilservants condemned the study beforethey had seen the findings andrecommendations or examined the dataupon which the findings andrecommendations were based (LaPorte, 2000:196197).A donors meeting in May 2000 (ADB,2001) under the auspices of the World

Bank formed the Bangladesh Initiativefor Good Government (BIGG) aimed atfunding joint initiatives. This was in partbecause the relationship between thedonor agencies particularly the WorldBank had improved with early dialogueand the building of personalrelationships between staff (WB, 2002).However, this doesnt mean that thereis a single organizing principle andconsistent donor strategy foradministrative reform. Rather donororganizations have tended to pursuetheir own specific portion of the agenda determined partly by their perceptionsof governance imperatives inBangladesh but also by their ownagency charters, political relations andthe political ideologies and imperativesback home or (in the case of themultilaterals) on their governingboards, on the other, on the whole jointdonor funded projects are few, mostagencies preferring to pursue their ownstrategies. Only a small number ofmissions have any staff with anyspecialist knowledge of core publicsector reform (ADB, 2001:60 61).International organizations and bilateraldonors are often the critics of publicadministration in general rather than theadministrative system in particular(Khan, 1994). Most critics of publicadministration refer to the decline incapability of the administration (ADB,2001). Training and development of thepublic administration falls short of therequired standard (WB, 1998; ADB,2001). In order to make theadministrative system well-run, donorstend to emphasize the training of thecivil service. Therefore, they, like theWorld Bank and UNDP, looked at


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training institutions in the country inorder to enhance their institutionalcapacity. While this form of assistanceis worthwhile, it is unlikely to impact onthe structural issues.

V. Conclusion: Similar Sides of theCoinAdministrative reform in Bangladesh isnow to be carried out under thedemocratic conditions of competitivepolitics. Popular support for such anational issue should be relatively easyto mobilize. Citizens want change, toavoid suffering in their dealings with thegovernment in the present system, andthat the general public was supportive ofreform.Bangladesh is still striving for realdemocratic practice. There has been alack of national consensuses sinceindependence, which has had an impacton many major policy issues, includingthat of administrative reform. Therehave been disagreements between andamong the political regimes. A positiveculture has yet to be developed amongthe political parties as how to respecteach other. Each successive regime hassought for administrative reform, in themeanwhile abandoning or ignoring theefforts of previous governments.Instead, they form new committees andcommissions with new chairmen andmembers, instead of continuing withprevious plans and seeing them throughto implementation. This is probably dueto the tradition of appointing committeesfor implementation which are staffed bysenior administrative figures. The latestof these, for example is located in theCabinet Division of the Bangladesh

Secretariat. This committee has beenheaded by the Cabinet Secretary withthe support of a section within theCabinet Division named theAdministrative Reform Cell. However,anecdotal evidence suggests that thework of the Secretary Committee andthe Administrative Reform Cell(responsible for setting priorities andissuing executive orders) is notintensive; meetings are rare, other workoften takes priority, and attempts tomove forward may have been stifledthrough lack of enthusiasm on the partof other highly placed officials.The motives and capabilities of politicalleaders is also a matter of question. Thelack of bold political commitment andweak political leadership are alwaysthere towards the reform process; andthe negative attitude of senior levelbureaucrats seeing this almost as a formof undeclared bureaucratic non-cooperation (Azizuddin, 2006; 2008).The shortcomings have been glaring as aresult of the poor design of the reformprocess itself, of unclear goals andobjectives of reform, to some extent,unrealistic reform proposals and anabsence of appropriate reformimplementation strategies. Such factorsobscure the wider structural and politicaldynamics of political-administrativerelations in Bangladesh, which clearlyhave a crucial role in determining thecontext and outcomes of the reformprocess. Political leaders, especiallyduring the democratic period, have notbeen sincere in their attempts to reformadministration. Confrontations betweenthe political regimes have largely

jeopardized agreements among thepolitical leaders about the necessity of


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the administrative modernization(Sarker, 2001). The reform programmes,in fact, taken up by the ruling party areseen with suspicion by the oppositionfollowed by their likeminded senioradministrative figures (World Bank,2000). The party in power appears more

interested in establishing its hegemony(Sarker, 2001:162) rather than followinga long-term strategy of development andnation-building. So, the process ofadministrative reform remains in theend, by and large a populist politico-administrative gadget.

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Administrative Reform in Bangladesh: An Overview of Political Dynamics

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