Administrating Security

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    Administering SecurityAdministering Security Security PlanningSecurity Planning

    comparison of security planning /comparison of security planning / strategiestrategie

    focus on procedurefocus on procedure

    ex; how much we spend for theex; how much we spend for the projproj

    targeting achievementtargeting achievement

    who involvedwho involved

    onlyonly ITdeptITdept who implement strategy planningwho implement strategy planning Risk AnalysisRisk Analysis

    Security PoliciesSecurity Policies -- how to allocate resources(time(testing , configuration),how to allocate resources(time(testing , configuration),

    money/budget, human resources)money/budget, human resources)

    --must make sure training on policies to make sure everyone knowsmust make sure training on policies to make sure everyone knows

    Physical SecurityPhysical Security

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    Security PlanningSecurity Planning PolicyPolicy

    Current stateCurrent state risk analysisrisk analysis

    What are the assetsWhat are the assets

    What are the risks which link wit theWhat are the risks which link wit theassetasset

    Who are going toWho are going to

    RequirementsRequirements Recommended controlsRecommended controls

    AccountabilityAccountability

    TimetableTimetable

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    Security PlanningSecurity Planning -- PolicyPolicy

    WhoWho should be allowed access?should be allowed access?

    To what system and organizationalTo what system and organizational

    resourcesresources should access be allowed?should access be allowed? WhatWhat typestypes of access should eachof access should each

    user be allowed for each resource?user be allowed for each resource?

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    Security PlanningSecurity Planning -- PolicyPolicy

    What are the organizations goals onWhat are the organizations goals onsecurity?security?

    Where does the responsibility forWhere does the responsibility forsecurity lie?security lie?

    What is the organizationsWhat is the organizationscommitment to security?commitment to security?

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    OCTAVE MethodologyOCTAVE Methodology

    ((operationally control, threats, asset, vulnerabilities)operationally control, threats, asset, vulnerabilities)

    http://www.cert.org/octave/http://www.cert.org/octave/

    Identify enterprise knowledge.Identify enterprise knowledge. Identify operational area knowledge.Identify operational area knowledge. Identify staff knowledge.Identify staff knowledge.

    Establish security requirements.Establish security requirements. Map highMap high--priority informationpriority information assestsassests toto

    information infrastructure.information infrastructure. Perform an infrastructure vulnerabilityPerform an infrastructure vulnerability

    evaluation.evaluation. Conduct a multidimensional risk analysis.Conduct a multidimensional risk analysis. Develop a protection strategy.Develop a protection strategy.

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    Security PlanningSecurity Planning Requirements of theRequirements of the TCSECTestingTCSECTesting((

    computer,systemcomputer,system, evaluation ,criteria), evaluation ,criteria) notnot commingcomming for finalfor final

    Security PolicySecurity Policy must be an explicit and wellmust be an explicit and well--defined security policy enforced by the system.defined security policy enforced by the system.

    Every subject must be uniquely and convincinglyEvery subject must be uniquely and convincinglyidentified.identified.

    Every object must be associated with a label thatEvery object must be associated with a label thatindicates its security level.indicates its security level.

    The system must maintain complete, secureThe system must maintain complete, securerecords of actions that affect security.records of actions that affect security.

    The computing system must contain mechanismsThe computing system must contain mechanismsthat enforce security.that enforce security.

    The mechanisms that implement security mustThe mechanisms that implement security mustbe protected against unauthorized change.be protected against unauthorized change.

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    BS7799BS7799

    BS7799BS7799-- It is the information security standardIt is the information security standard

    Have 137 controlHave 137 control ex:installation, uninstallation,ex:installation, uninstallation,

    Initially created for British standard forInitially created for British standard for

    government and university standardgovernment and university standard Can be simply implemented for any type ofCan be simply implemented for any type of

    organizationorganization

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    Security Planning Team MembersSecurity Planning Team Members

    Computer hardware groupComputer hardware group

    System administratorsSystem administrators

    Systems programmersSystems programmers Application programmersApplication programmers

    Data entry personnelData entry personnel

    Physical security personnelPhysical security personnel Representative usersRepresentative users

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    Security PlanningSecurity Planning

    Assuring Commitment to a Security PlanAssuring Commitment to a Security Plan

    Business Continuity PlansBusiness Continuity Plans

    Assess Business ImpactAssess Business Impact

    Develop StrategyDevelop Strategy

    Develop PlanDevelop Plan

    Incident Response PlansIncident Response Plans

    Advance PlanningAdvance Planning Response TeamResponse Team

    After the Incident is ResolvedAfter the Incident is Resolved

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    Risk AnalysisRisk Analysis

    Risk impactRisk impact -- loss associated withloss associated withan eventan event

    risk probabilityrisk probability likelihood thatlikelihood thatthe event will occurthe event will occur

    Risk controlRisk control degree to which wedegree to which wecan change the outcomecan change the outcome

    Risk exposureRisk exposure risk impact * riskrisk impact * riskprobabilityprobability

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    Risk AnalysisRisk Analysis risk reductionrisk reduction

    Avoid the riskAvoid the risk

    Transfer the riskTransfer the risk

    Assume the riskAssume the risk

    Risk leverage = [(risk exposure beforeRisk leverage = [(risk exposure beforereduction)reduction) (risk exposure after(risk exposure afterreduction)] / cost of risk reductionreduction)] / cost of risk reduction

    Cannot guarantee systems are risk freeCannot guarantee systems are risk free Security plans must address actionSecurity plans must address action

    needed should an unexpected riskneeded should an unexpected riskbecomes a problembecomes a problem

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    Steps of a Risk AnalysisSteps of a Risk Analysis

    Identify assetsIdentify assets

    Determine vulnerabilitiesDetermine vulnerabilities

    Estimate likelihood of exploitationEstimate likelihood of exploitation Compute expected annual lossCompute expected annual loss

    Survey applicable controls and theirSurvey applicable controls and their

    costscosts Project annual savings of controlProject annual savings of control

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    Identify AssetsIdentify Assets

    HardwareHardware

    SoftwareSoftware

    DataData

    PeoplePeople

    Procedures (policies, training)Procedures (policies, training)

    DocumentationDocumentation

    SuppliesSupplies

    Infrastructure (building, power, water,)Infrastructure (building, power, water,)

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    Determine VulnerabilitiesDetermine Vulnerabilities

    AssetAsset ConfidentialityConfidentiality IntegrityIntegrity AvailabilityAvailability

    HardwareHardware

    SoftwareSoftware

    DataData

    PeoplePeople

    proceduresprocedures

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    Determine VulnerabilitiesDetermine Vulnerabilities

    What are the effects of unintentionalWhat are the effects of unintentionalerrors?errors?

    What are the effects of willfullyWhat are the effects of willfullymalicious insiders?malicious insiders?

    What are the effects of outsiders?What are the effects of outsiders?

    What are the effects of natural andWhat are the effects of natural andphysical disasters?physical disasters?

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    Risk AnalysisRisk Analysis

    Estimate Likelihood of ExploitationEstimate Likelihood of Exploitation Classical probabilityClassical probability

    Frequency probability (simulation)Frequency probability (simulation)

    Subjective probability (Delphi approach)Subjective probability (Delphi approach)

    Computer Expected LostComputer Expected Lost (look for hidden(look for hiddencosts)costs)

    Legal obligationsLegal obligations Side effectsSide effects

    Psychological effectsPsychological effects

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    Risk AnalysisRisk Analysis

    Survey and Select New ControlsSurvey and Select New Controls

    What Criteria Are Used for Selecting Controls?What Criteria Are Used for Selecting Controls?

    Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation (VAM)Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation (VAM)

    MethodologyMethodology How Do Controls Affect What They Control?How Do Controls Affect What They Control?

    Which Controls Are Best?Which Controls Are Best?

    Project SavingsProject Savings

    Do costs outweigh benefits of preventing /Do costs outweigh benefits of preventing /mitigating risksmitigating risks

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    Arguments for Risk AnalysisArguments for Risk Analysis

    Improve awarenessImprove awareness

    Relate security mission toRelate security mission to

    management objectivesmanagement objectives Identify assets, vulnerabilities, andIdentify assets, vulnerabilities, and

    controlscontrols

    Improve basis for decisionsImprove basis for decisions Justify expenditures for securityJustify expenditures for security

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    Arguments against Risk AnalysisArguments against Risk Analysis

    False sense of precision and confidenceFalse sense of precision and confidence

    Hard to performHard to perform

    Immutability (filed and forgotten)Immutability (filed and forgotten)

    Lack of accuracyLack of accuracy Todays complex Internet networks cannot be madeTodays complex Internet networks cannot be made

    watertight. A system administrator has to get everythingwatertight. A system administrator has to get everythingright all the time; a hacker only has to find one small hole.right all the time; a hacker only has to find one small hole.

    A sysadmin has to be lucky all of the time; a hacker onlyA sysadmin has to be lucky all of the time; a hacker onlyhas to get lucky once. It is easier to destroy than tohas to get lucky once. It is easier to destroy than tocreate.create. Robert Graham, lead architect of Internet Security SystemsRobert Graham, lead architect of Internet Security Systems

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    Organizational Security PoliciesOrganizational Security Policies

    WhoWho can accesscan access which resourceswhich resources ininwhatmannerwhatmanner??

    Security policySecurity policy -- highhigh--levellevelmanagement document that informsmanagement document that informsall users of the goals and constraintsall users of the goals and constraintson using a system.on using a system.

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    Security Policies PurposeSecurity Policies Purpose

    Recognize sensitive informationRecognize sensitive informationassetsassets

    Clarify security responsibilitiesClarify security responsibilities Promote awareness for existingPromote awareness for existing

    employeesemployees

    Guide new employeesGuide new employees

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    Security Policies AudienceSecurity Policies Audience

    UsersUsers

    OwnersOwners

    BeneficiariesBeneficiaries Balance Among All PartiesBalance Among All Parties

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    ContentsContents

    PurposePurpose

    Protected Resources (whatProtected Resources (what -- assetassetlist)list)

    Nature of the Protection (who andNature of the Protection (who andhow)how)

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    Characteristics of a Good SecurityCharacteristics of a Good Security

    PolicyPolicy

    Coverage (comprehensive)Coverage (comprehensive)

    DurabilityDurability

    RealismRealism UsefulnessUsefulness

    ExamplesExamples

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    Physical SecurityPhysical Security

    Natural DisastersNatural Disasters

    FloodFlood

    FireFire

    OtherOther

    Power LossPower Loss

    UPS; surge suppressors (line conditioners)UPS; surge suppressors (line conditioners)

    Human VandalsHuman Vandals Unauthorized Access and UseUnauthorized Access and Use

    TheftTheft

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    Physical SecurityPhysical Security

    Interception of Sensitive InformationInterception of Sensitive Information

    Dumpster DivingDumpster Diving -- ShreddingShredding

    Remanence (slack bits)Remanence (slack bits)Overwriting Magnetic DataOverwriting Magnetic Data

    DiskWipeDiskWipe

    DegaussingDegaussing

    EmanationEmanation -- TempestTempest

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    Contingency PlanningContingency Planning

    BACKUP!!!!!BACKUP!!!!!

    Complete backupComplete backup

    Revolving backupRevolving backup Selective backupSelective backup

    OFFSITE BACKUP!!!!!OFFSITE BACKUP!!!!!

    Networked Storage (SAN)Networked Storage (SAN) Cold site (shell)Cold site (shell)

    Hot siteHot site