Admin Law Chap 4

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G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983

SIERRA MADRE TRUST, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURALRESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MININGCOMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP, respondents.

Lobruga Rondoz & Cardenas Law Offices for petitioner.

Fortunato de Leon for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS,J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary ofAgriculture and Natural Resources dated July 8, 1970, in DANRCases Numbered 3502 and 3502-A. The decision affirmed a

decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969.

The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the Mining Law (C.A.No. 137, as amended) which provides: "... Findings of facts in thedecision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed by theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final andconclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring to appealfrom such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court apetition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised."

The factual background is given in the brief of the petitioner-appellant which has not been contradicted by the respondents-appellees and is as follows:

On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed withthe Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLANo. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust MiningCompany over six (6) lode mineral claims, viz.: (1)Finland 2, (2) Finland 3, (3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6,(5) Finland 8 and (6) Finland 9, all registered onDecember 11, 1964 with the office of the MiningRecorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all situated in SitioMaghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax,Province of Nueva Vizcaya.

The adverse claim alleged that the aforementionedsix (6) lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven(11) lode mineral claims of the herein petitionerSierra Madre Trust, viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12, (3) JC-11, (4) W-11, (5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10, (8) A-9,

(9) N-9, (10) W-8, and (11) JN-8, all situated in SitioTaduan Barrio of Abaca, Municipality of Dupax,Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and duly registeredwith the office of the Mining Recorder atBayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on May 14, 1965.

The adverse claim prayed for an order or decisiondeclaring the abovementioned six (6) lodemineral claims of respondent Jusan Trust MiningCompany, null, void, and illegal; and denying lodelease application LLA No. V-7872 over said claims.Further, the adverse claimant prayed for suchother reliefs and remedies available in the

premises.

This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau ofMines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, andon appeal to the Department of Agriculture andNatural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502.

Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the sameSierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Minesan Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J &S Partnership over six (6) lode mineral claims viz.:(1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4) A-25, (5) A-29, and

(6) A-30, all registered on March 30, 1965 andamended August 5, 1965, with the office of theMining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and situated inSitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax,Province of Nueva Vizcaya.

The adverse claim alleged that the aforementionedsix (6) lode mineral claim covered by LLA No. V-9028, encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13)lode mineral claims of herein petitioner SierraMadre Trust, viz.: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3) A-13, (4)H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9)

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F-11, (10) Wm-11, (11) F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9,all situated in Sitio Taduan, Barrio of AbacaMunicipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcayaand duly registered with the office of the MiningRecorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, on May14,1965.

The adverse claim prayed for an order or decisiondeclaring the abovementioned six (6) claims ofrespondent J & S Partnership, null void, and illegal;and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-9028over the said claims. Further, the adverse claimantprayed for such other reliefs and remediesavailable in the premises.

This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau ofMines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, andon appeal to the Department of Agriculture and

Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502A.

These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 andV-404 were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines,and also jointly considered in the appeal in theDepartment of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by the Director ofMines reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believesand so holds that the respondents have thepreferential right over their "Finland-2", "Finland-

3", "Finland-5", "Finland-6", "Finland-8", "Finland-9", "A-19", "A-20", "A-24", "A-25", "A-29" and "A-30" mining claims. Accordingly, the protests(adverse claims) filed by protestant Sierra MadreTrust should be, as hereby they are, DISMISSED.

And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourcesreads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealinterposed by the appellant, Sierra Madre Trust is

hereby dismissed and the decision of the Directorof Mines dated November 6, 1969, affirmed. "

The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against Jusan TrustMining Company and J and S Partnership were based on theallegation that the lode lease applications (LLA) of the latter"encroached and overlapped" the former's mineral claims,However, acting on the adverse claims, the Director of Mines foundthat, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is constrained tobelieve that there exists no conflict or overlapping between theprotestant's and respondents' mining claims. " And this finding wasaffirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourcesthus: "Anent the first allegation, this Office finds that the Directorof Mines did not err when he found that the twelve (12) claims ofrespondents Jusan Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership didnot encroach and overlap the eighteen (18) lode mineral claims ofthe appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact has beenincotrovertibly proven by the records appertaining to the case."

It should be noted that according to the Director of Mines in hisdecision, "during the intervening period from the 31st day after thediscovery [by the respondents] to the date of location nobody elselocated the area covered thereby. ... the protestant [petitionerherein] did not establish any intervening right as it is our findingsthat their mining claims do not overlap respondents' miningclaims."

After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources hadaffirmed the factual findings of the Director of Mines to the effectthat there was no overlapping of claims and which findings werefinal and conclusive, Sierra Madre Trust should have kept its peace

for obviously it suffered no material injury and had no pecuniaryinterest to protect. But it was obstinate and raised this legalquestion before Us: "May there be a valid location of mining claimsafter the lapse of thirty (30) days from date of discovery, incontravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the NewMining Law (Com. Act No. 137, as amended)?" It also raisedancillary questions.

We see no reason why We have to answer the questions in thispetition considering that there is no justiciable issue between theparties. The officers of the Executive Department tasked withadministering the Mining Law have found that there is neither

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encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved.Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions willnot materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In closing it isuseful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretationby officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration isentitled to great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is inconformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that themining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed andregistered."

Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association and/orpartnership registered with the Mining Recorder of a province, butnot registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, bevested with juridical personality to enable it to locate and thenlease mining claims from the government?" Suffice it to state thatthis question was not raised before the Director of Mines and theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. There is alsonothing in the record to indicate whether or not the appellees are

registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. For thesereasons, even assuming that there is a justiciable issue betweenthe parties, this question cannot be passed upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack ofmerit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro andEscolin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, inhis capacity as General Manager of the National HousingAuthority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity asPresidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A.

YUSON, respondents.

FELICIANO,J.:

By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose

Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot.No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo,Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation.

On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over LotNo. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer wasembodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor(Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, inwhich Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee'sobligations under the original contract, including payment of hispredecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure ofAntipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordancewith its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr.

Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, andincluding, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthlyinstallment payments falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads:

Clause 17. SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. Toinsure the beauty of the subdivision in line with themodern trend of urban development, the SELLERhereby obligates itself to provide the subdivisionwith:

a) Concrete curbs and gutters

b) Underground drainage system

c) Asphalt paved roads

d) Independent water system

e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.

f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall

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g) Developed park or amphi-theatre

h) 24-hour security guard service.

These improvements shall be complete within a

period of two (2) years from date of thiscontract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit theBUYER to suspend his monthly installments withoutany penalties or interest charges until such timethat such improvements shall have beencompleted. 1

On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a noticeto private respondent Yuson advising that the requiredimprovements in the subdivision had already been completed, andrequesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments onLot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conformwith the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the

representation in the notice.

In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realtyreiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of hismonthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the NationalHousing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252(entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes,respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantiallycomplied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to theContract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and therespondent." In addition, a formal demand was made for full andimmediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representinginstallments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the

period while the improvements were being completed i.e.,between September 1972 and October 1976.

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contractto Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment paymentspreviously made by Mr. Yuson.

Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yusonbrought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent

NHA through a letter-complaint dated 10 May 1977 whichcomplaint was docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.

Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2September 1977. Antipolo Realty, without presenting anyevidence, moved for the consolidation of Case No. 2123 withseveral other cases filed against it by other subdivision lot buyers,then pending before the NHA. In an Order issued on 7 February1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled CaseNo. 2123 for hearing.

After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under thefollowing conditions:

l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] toVirgilio Yuzon a statement of account for themonthly amortizations from November 1976 to the

present;

m) No penalty interest shall be charged for theperiod from November 1976 to the date of thestatement of account; and

n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days topay the arrears shown in the statement ofaccount. 2

Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a)that it had been denied due process of law since it had not been

served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that thejurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged inthe regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involvedthe interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.

The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 byrespondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained thejurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Healso found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with noticeof the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had failed to attendthe hearing. 3 The case was submitted for decision, and eventuallydecided, solely on the evidence presented by the complainant.

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On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with aPetition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of PreliminaryInjunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more,the jurisdiction of the NHA was assailed. Petitioner further assertedthat, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could validlyterminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence

thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by thelatter. 4

This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11December 1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing theadministrative remedy." 5 A motion for reconsideration was deniedon 29 January 1979.

Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decisionwith the Office of the President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissedthe same through public respondent Presidential ExecutiveAssistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6

In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, inhearing the complaint of private respondent Yuson and in orderingthe reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties, theNHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its competence, buthad also, in effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform.

We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrativeagencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions,though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or

quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., theSecurities and Exchange Commission and the National LaborRelations Commission) is well recognized in ourjurisdiction, 7basically because the need for special competenceand experience has been recognized as essential in the resolutionof questions of complex or specialized character and because of acompanion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts haveremained crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and AuroraAbejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court,through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee, said:

In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of themove to vest jurisdiction in administrativecommissions and boards the power to resolvespecialized disputes in the field of labor (as incorporations, public transportation and publicutilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the

Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution oflabor management controversies likely to causestrikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to beexclusive, although it did not so expressly state inthe law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primaryjurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will notdetermine a controversy involving a questionwhich is within the jurisdiction of an administrativetribunal where the question demands the exerciseof sound administrative discretion requiring thespecial knowledge, experience, and services of theadministrative tribunal to determine technical and

intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of rulingis essential to comply with the purposes of theregulatory statute administered" (Pambujan SurUnited Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need forspecialized administrative boards or commissionswith the special knowledge, experience andcapability to hear and determine promptly disputeson technical matters or essentially factual matters,subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse ofdiscretion has become well nigh

indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that'between the power lodged in an administrativebody and a court, the unmistakeable trend hasbeen to refer it to the former, "Increasingly, thisCourt has been committed to the view that unlessthe law speaks clearly and unequivocably, thechoice should fall on fan administrative agency]" '(NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citingprecedents). The Court in the earlier case of Ebonvs. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), notedthat the lawmaking authority, in restoring to thelabor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to

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award all kinds of damages in labor cases, asagainst the previous P.D. amendment splitting theirjurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently, . . .had second thoughts about depriving the LaborArbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to awarddamages in labor cases because that setup would

mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of actionand possible conflicting findings and conclusions bytwo tribunals on one and the same claim."

In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NationalHousing Authority, et al., 9Mr. Justice Gutierrez, speaking for theCourt, observed that:

There is no question that a statute may vestexclusive original jurisdiction in an administrativeagency over certain disputes and controversiesfalling within the agency's special expertise. Thevery definition of an administrative agencyincludes its being vested with quasi-judicialpowers. The ever increasing variety of powers andfunctions given to administrative agenciesrecognizes the need for the active intervention ofadministrative agencies in matters calling fortechnical knowledge and speed in countlesscontroversies which cannot possibly be handled byregular courts.

In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which anadministrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling actof such agency. In other words, the extent to which an

administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, ifnot wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empoweringsuch agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agencyconcerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts anddetermine the rights of private parties under such contracts. Onethrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that theinterpretation of contracts and the determination of private rightsthereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisableonly by our regular courts.

Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of

Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision andCondominium Buyers' Decree." 11Section 3 of this statute providesas follows:

National Housing Authority. The NationalHousing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdictionto regulate the real estate trade and business inaccordance with the provisions of this decree(emphasis supplied)

The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authoritythus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and thirdpreambular paragraphs of the statute which provide:

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many realestate subdivision owners, developers, operators,and/or sellers have reneged on theirrepresentations and obligations to provide and

maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,sewerage, water systems lighting systems andother similar basic requirements, thus endangeringthe health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude alsoshow cases of swindling and fraudulentmanipulations perpetrated by unscrupuloussubdivision and condominium sellers andoperators, such as failure to deliver titles to thebuyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances,and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent salesof the same subdivision lots to different innocent

purchasers for value . (emphasis supplied)

Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out thequasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to theNHA in the following quite specific terms:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions toregulate the real estate trade and business and inaddition to its powers provided for in PresidentialDecree No. 957, the National Housing Authority

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shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decidecases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claimsfiled by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyeragainst the project owner, developer, dealer,broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance ofcontractual and statutory obligations filed bybuyers of subdivision lots or condominium unitsagainst the owner, developer, dealer, broker orsalesman.(emphasis supplied.)

The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHAin the instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree

No. 957 which reads:

Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. Noinstallment payment made by a buyer in asubdivision or condominium project for the lot orunit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favorof the owner or developer when the buyer, afterdue notice to the owner or developer, desists fromfurther payment due to the failure of the owner ordeveloper to develop the subdivision orcondominium project according to the approvedplans and within the time limit for complying withthe same. Such buyer may, at his option, be

reimbursed the total amount paid includingamortization and interests but excludingdelinquency interests, with interest thereon at thelegal rate. (emphasis supplied.)

Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to completecertain specified improvements in the subdivision within thespecified period of two years from the date of the execution of theContract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its optionsunder Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neitherrescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments

made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed,under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach of itscontract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested withthe option either to rescind the contract and receivereimbursement of an installment payments (with legal interest)made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to

suspend payment of further purchase installments until such timeas the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHAwas therefore correct in holding that private respondent's priorinstallment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.

Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse ofdiscretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered thereinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Suchreinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA'scorrect ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled torescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question thatunder Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legallyempowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting

parties under the law administered by it and under the respectiveagreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunderare faithfully performed.

We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the rightto due process. This assertion lacks substance. The record showsthat a copy of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss andscheduling the hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as evidenced bythe annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating thatsuch service had been effected. 14 But even if it be assumed,arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner,nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what

the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous noticebut rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In theinstant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present itsside and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, andnot just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due processmust hence sound even more hollow. 16

We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 whichpetitioner insists had accrued during the period from September1972 to October 1976, when private respondent had suspendedpayment of his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision lot.

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The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that the regularmonthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not accrueduring the September 1972 October 1976 period:

[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspendpayment of his monthly installments until theimprovements in the subdivision shall have beencompleted. Respondent informed complainant onNovember 1976 that the improvements have beencompleted. Monthly installments during the periodof suspension of payment did not become due anddemandable Neither did they accrue Such must bethe case, otherwise, there is no sense insuspending payments. If the suspension is liftedthe debtor shall resume payments but never did heincur any arrears.

Such being the case, the demand of respondent forcomplainant to pay the arrears due during theperiod of suspension of payment is null andvoid. Consequently, the notice of cancellationbased on the refusal to pay the s that were not dueand demandable is also null and void. 17

The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need ofcertification and amplification. The NHA correctly held that noinstallment payments should be considered as having accruedduring the period of suspension of payments. Clearly, the criticalissue is what happens to the installment payments which wouldhave accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension hadno default on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our mind,

the NHA resolution is most appropriately read as directing thatthe original period of payment in the Contract to Sell must bedeemed extended by a period of time equal to the period ofsuspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two (2) months) duringwhich extended time (tacked on to the original contract period)private respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthlyinstallment payments until the entire original contract price shallhave been paid. We think that such is the intent of the NHAresolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, thedebtor shall resume payments" and that such is the most equitableand just reading that may be given to the NHA resolution. Topermit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount in a lump

sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, wouldtend to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 ofPresidential Decree No. 957,supra) to lot buyers to suspendinstallment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, [s]uchmust be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspendingpayments." Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount

that would have become due would be an expressively harshpenalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjustenrichment of the private respondent at the expense of thepetitioner. It should be recalled that the latter had already fulfilled,albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their Contractsto Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer should not be regarded asdelinquent and as such charged penalty interest. The suspensionof installment payments was attributable to the petitioner, not theprivate respondent. The tacking on of the period of suspension tothe end of the original period precisely prevents default on the partof the lot buyer. In the words of the NHA resolution, "never would[the buyer] incur any arrears."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHAdecision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified asproviding for the lengthening of the original contract period forpayment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4)years and two (2) months, during which extended time privaterespondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installmentpayments until the entire original contract price shall have beenpaid. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento andCortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 161811 April 12, 2006

THE CITY OF BAGUIO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, and ORLANDOGENOVE, Petitioners,vs.FRANCISCO NIO, JOSEFINA NIO, EMMANUEL NIO, andEURLIE OCAMPO, Respondents.

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A.

Placino (Narcisa) a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10 (the lot)located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay,Baguio City.

Francisco Nio (Nio), one of the herein respondents, who hasbeen occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a PetitionProtest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands.

The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order ofNovember 11, 1976.

Nio appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court buthe did not succeed.

The decision of the Director of Lands dated November 11, 1976having become final and executory,1 the then-Executive Director ofthe Department of Environment and Natural Resources-CordilleraAutonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued anOrder of Execution dated February 1, 1993 directing theCommunity Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Nio andthose acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupyingthe area and remove whatever improvements they may haveintroduced thereto."2

Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, promptingNarcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio CityMunicipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). The MTCC dismissedNarcisas complaint, however, by Order3of August 7, 1996.

Narcisas counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall (Atty. Claravall), laterpetitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Orderauthorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, andthe Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish orremove the improvements on the lot introduced by Nio. TheDENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the

City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the DemolitionTeam of the City Government. The DENR-CAR also invoked Section14 (now Section 10 (d)) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.4

Atty. Claravall thereupon moved to have the Order of Executionpreviously issued by the DENR-CAR amended, which was granted.As amended, the Order of Execution addressed to the CENROOfficer read:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1844 of theRevised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3077, you arehereby enjoined to enforce the aforementioned order, with theassistance upon request of the City Sheriff of Baguio City, theDemolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City Police Station,by Ordering Petitioner Nio and those acting in his behalf to refrainfrom continuously occupying the area and remove whateverimprovements they may have introduced thereto.

x x x x

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The DENR-CENRO, together with the Demolition Team of BaguioCity and the Baguio City police, desisted, however, in their earlierattempt to enforce the Amended Order of Execution.6

On July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed byEngineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police, on orders ofthen Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian,started demolishing the houses of Nio and his herein co-respondents.7

The demolition was, however, temporarily stopped upon theinstructions of DENR-CENR Officer Guillermo Fianza, who lateradvised Nio that the DENR-CENRO would implement the AmendedOrder of Execution on August 4, 1997.8

Nio and his wife Josefina Nio thereupon filed a Petition9forCertiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary RestrainingOrder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City againstGuillermo Fianza, Teofilo Olimpo of the DENR-CENRO, Mayor

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Mauricio Domogan (hereafter petitioner), Atty. Claravall, Engr.Orlando Genove (hereafter petitioner), Rolando Angara, and PoliceOfficer Donato Bacquian challenging the Amended Order ofExecution issued by the DENR-CENRO.1avvphil.net

The Nio spouses later filed an Amended Petition10 by impleadingEmmanuel Nio and Eurlie Ocampo as therein co-petitioners andthe City of Baguio (hereafter petitioner) and Narcisa as thereinadditional respondents, and further praying for damages.

Branch 6 of the Baguio RTC dismissed the petition of Nio et al.(hereafter respondents) for lack of merit.11Respondents Motion forReconsideration12 having been denied, they filed a Petition forReview13 under Rule 42 of the Rules before the Court of Appeals.

By Decision14of December 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals grantedthe Petition for Review, holding that Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of theRules reading:

SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.

x x x x

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of the execution contains improvementsconstructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, theofficer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvementsexcept upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of thejudgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failedto remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.(Underscoring supplied)

applies.

Thus disposed the appellate court:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and theOrders dated September 24, 1997 and November 23, 1998 arehereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent City Mayor MauricioDomogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineers Office arehereby ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended

order of executionissued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional ExecutiveDirector of the Department of Environmental and NaturalResources, concerning the demolition or removal of the structuresmade by petitioners until private respondent applied for a specialorder abovementioned with the proper court.1avvphil.net

SO ORDERED.15 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondents filed before the appellate court an Ex-Parte Motion forReconsideration16 on January 9, 2003, alleging that some of thereliefs they prayed for in their petition were left unactedupon.17 Petitioners too filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 onJanuary 28, 2003, raising the following grounds:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THATTHE CITY MAYOR HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEDEMOLITION OF ILLEGALLY-BUILT STRUCTURES;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVINGDUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW;

3. THE HONORABLE COURT MISAPPLIED SEC. 10 (d), RULE39 of the RULES OF COURT.19(Underscoring supplied)

In support of the first ground, petitioners raised before theappellate court, in their Motion for Reconsideration, for the firsttime, the power of the City Mayor to validly order the demolition ofa structure constructed without a building permit pursuant to Sec.455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation tothe National Building Code of the Philippines.

Alleging that respondents built their house without the requiredentry and building permits, petitioners argued that the City Mayormay order the demolition of a house without a special courtorder.20

The Court of Appeals denied both parties motions forreconsideration by Resolution21 of December 17, 2003.

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Hence, the present petition of the City of Baguio, Mayor Domogan(now a Congressman), and Orlando Genove, faulting the appellatecourt:

1. . . . IN RULING THAT A SPECIAL COURT ORDER ISNEEDED FOR THE DEMOLITION OF RESPONDENTS

STRUCTURES;

2. . . . IN APPLYING SEC. 10(d) RULE 39 OF THE RULES OFCOURT IN THIS CASE;

3. . . . IN ENTERTAINING RESPONDENTS PETITION FORREVIEW.22

The petition fails.

While it is noted that respondents appeal to the Court of Appealswas erroneously brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,instead of under Rule 41, the RTC having rendered the questioneddecision in the exercise of its original, not appellate, jurisdiction,this Court overlooks the error in view of the merits of respondentscase.23

Petitioners contention that the enforcement of the Amended Orderof Execution does not need a hearing and court order which Sec.10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires does not lie. That anadministrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functionsissued the Amended Order of Execution is of no moment, since therequirement in Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoesthe constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall anyperson be denied the equal protection of the laws."24

Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authorityteaches:

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers whichan administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enablingact of such agency. In other words, the extent to which anadministrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, ifnot wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empoweringsuch agency.25(Underscoring supplied)

There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau ofLands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (whichexercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authorityto issue an order of demolition26 which the Amended Order ofExecution, in substance, is.

Indeed,

[w]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to thedetermination of the respective rights of rival claimants to publiclands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, thepower to determine who has the actual, physicalpossession or occupation or the better right of possessionover public lands remains with the courts.

The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have thewherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the meansto prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants.

Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while itmay decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of makingthe proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts ofpossession is recognized to be within the legal competenceof the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection tothe actual possessors and occupants with a view to quellsocial unrest.27 (Emphasis added)

Consequently, this Court held:28

x x x the power to order the sheriff to removeimprovements and turn over the possession of the land tothe party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to

the courts of justice and not to the Bureau ofLands.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to removeimprovements introduced by respondents on, and turn overpossession of, the lot to Narcisa.

Petitioners invocation of the City Mayors authority under Sec.455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code to order the demolitionor removal of an illegally constructed house, building, or structurewithin the period prescribed by law or ordinance and their

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allegation that respondents structures were constructed withoutbuilding permits30were not raised before the trial court. Petitionershaving, for the first time, invoked said section of the LocalGovernment Code and respondents lack of building entry permitsin their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appealsdecision, it was correctly denied of merit,31it being settled that

matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedingsbelow will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as theycannot be raised for the first time on appeal.32

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The questionedDecision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS SUTTON 153 SCRA399

PUNO,J.:

This is a petition for review filed by the Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Courtof Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No.9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of theConstitution.

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited

by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow andcalf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existingagrarian reform program of the government, respondents made avoluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner DARto avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.)No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms usedfor raising livestock, poultry and swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the caseofLuz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2] this Court ruled that landsdevoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the

definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared asunconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as theyincluded livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.

In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed withpetitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as theirlandholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thusexempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3]

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian ReformOfficer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and foundthat it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. Herecommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the

coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DARthe withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of thesupporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.[4]Petitioner ignored their request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of

1993,[5] which provided that only portions of private agriculturallands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. Indetermining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed thefollowing retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectareof land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner),and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations ofthe CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretaryand advised him to consider as final and irrevocable thewithdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, theirentire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6]

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D.Garilao issued an Order[7]partially granting the application of

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respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applyingthe retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitionerexempted1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazingpurposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to besegregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contendthat their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devotedexclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] Theyfiled a notice of appeal[9] with the Office of the President assailing:(1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993,which provided for a ratio between land and livestock indetermining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL,and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view ofthe Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excludedfrom the coverage of agrarian reform.

On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed

the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.[10]

It ruled that DAR A.O.No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as theA.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcelof land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue onthe constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for thedetermination of the courts as the sole arbiters of suchissue.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of therespondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for beingcontrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission toexclude livestock farms from the land reform program of thegovernment. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, DARAdministrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 ishereby DECLARED null and void. The assailedorder of the Office of the President dated 09October 2001 in so far as it affirmed theDepartment of Agrarian Reforms ruling thatpetitioners landholding is covered by the agrarianreform program of the governmentis REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence, this petition.

The main issue in the case at bar is theconstitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,which prescribes a maximum retention limit for ownersof lands devoted to livestock raising.

Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O.No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may beretained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate toplace all public and private agricultural lands under thecoverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contendsthat the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that someunscrupulous landowners have converted theiragricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evadetheir coverage in the agrarian reform program.

Petitioners arguments fail to impress.

Administrative agencies are endowed with powerslegislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules andregulations. They have been granted by Congresswith the authority to issue rules to regulate theimplementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegatedrule-making has become a practical necessity in

modern governance due to the increasing complexityand variety of public functions. However, whileadministrative rules and regulations have the forceand effect of law, they are not immune from judicialreview.[12] They may be properly challenged beforethe courts to ensure that they do not violate theConstitution and no grave abuse of administrativediscretion is committed by the administrative bodyconcerned.

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The fundamental rule in administrative law isthat, to be valid, administrative rules andregulations must be issued by authority of a lawand must not contravene the provisions of theConstitution.[13] The rule-making power of an

administrative agency may not be used to abridge theauthority given to it by Congress or by theConstitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the powerof the administrative agency beyond the scopeintended. Constitutional and statutory provisionscontrol with respect to what rules and regulations maybe promulgated by administrative agencies and thescope of their regulations.[14]

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. isinvalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.

sought to regulate livestock farms by including them inthe coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing amaximum retention limit for their ownership.However, the deliberations of the 1987Constitutional Commission show a clear intent toexclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devotedto livestock, swine and poultry- raising. TheCourt clarified in the Luz Farms casethat livestock,swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities anddo not fall within the definition of agriculture oragricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine

and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It isan industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A greatportion of the investment in this enterprise is in theform of industrial fixed assets, such as: animalhousing structures and facilities, drainage, waterersand blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors,exhausts and generators, extensive warehousingfacilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollutionequipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented

by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevatedwater tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and othertechnological appurtenances.[15]

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate

livestock farms which have been exempted by theConstitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. Ithas exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v.DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case.In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial,commercial and residential lands are not covered bythe CARL.[17] We stressed anew that while Section 4 ofR.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover allpublic and private agricultural lands, the term

agricultural land does not include lands classified asmineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial.

Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the AntipoloHills Subdivision, which are arable yet stillundeveloped, could not be considered as agriculturallands subject to agrarian reform as these lots werealready classified as residential lands.

A similar logical deduction should be followed inthe case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock,poultry and swine have been classified as industrial,

not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarianreform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing theimpugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports ithas received that some unscrupulous landowners havebeen converting their agricultural lands to livestockfarms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform.Again, we find neither merit nor logic in thiscontention. The undesirable scenario whichpetitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance ofthe A.O. clearly does not apply in this

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case. Respondents family acquired theirlandholdings as early as 1948. They have long been inthe business of breeding cattle in Masbate which ispopularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of thePhilippines.[18] Petitioner DAR does not dispute this

fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record thatrespondents have just recently engaged in orconverted to the business of breeding cattle after theenactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspectthat respondents intended to evade its coverage. Itmust be stressed that what the CARL prohibits isthe conversion of agricultural landsfor non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of theCARL. There has been no change of businessinterest in the case of respondents.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutoryconstruction that the reenactment of a statute byCongress without substantial change is an impliedlegislative approval and adoption of the previous law.On the other hand, by making a new law, Congressseeks to supersede an earlier one.[19] In the case atbar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congressenacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certainprovisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new lawchanged the definition of the terms agriculturalactivity and commercial farming by dropping

from its coverage lands that are devoted tocommercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21] With this significant modification, Congressclearly sought to align the provisions of ouragrarian laws with the intent of the 1987Constitutional Commission to exclude livestockfarms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrativebodies must be in harmony with the provisions of theConstitution. They cannot amend or extend theConstitution. To be valid, they must conform to and beconsistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict

between an administrative order and the provisions ofthe Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailedA.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down asunconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage ofagrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the1987 Constitution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. Theassailed Decision and Resolution of the Court ofAppeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4,2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice

JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant, vs. JOSE ANTONIOBERNAS, respondents.

D E C I S I O NTORRES, JR.,J.:

On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed andadministrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose AntonioBernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised PenalCode and Code of professional Resposibility. In his complaint-affidavit [1] dated August 12, 1996, complainant alleged as follows:

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A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr.,subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a notarypublic in Makati City, wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas, averification and certification of non-forum shopping which wasappended to a complaint for reconveyance of property anddamages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the

Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region, RTC, which casewas raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of saidcomplaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1,A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;

B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of publicdocument, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic) of Annex A-6, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping whichstates:

Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:

He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause thepreparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of which aretrue to his personal knowledge and that he has not commencedany other action or proceeding involving the same issues in anycourt, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or anyother tribunal or agency. If he should learn that a similar action of(sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the SupremeCourt or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic)that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to this notice (sic)to this Honorable Court. Underscoring supplied.

C.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in CivilCase No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned from

paragraph 15, 16, and 22;

D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of theallegation under 1-B of the instant complaint, respondent and hiscounsel Jose Antonio Bernas caused the preparation and filing of acriminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case)at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic)Ave., a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto attached andmarked as Annex B.

D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the affidavitcomplaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in CivilCase No. 65646;

D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, JoseAntonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same

cause of action which was reiterated in another letter submitting tothe NBI standard specimen signitures dated October 1995, copiesof said letter complaint are hereto attached and marked asAnnexes (sic) C.

E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis ofAnnexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings knowingly subvertedand perverted the truth when he falsify certified (sic) and verifiedunder oath in the verification and certification of non-forumshopping, that:

He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving

the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, theCourt of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency. Whereverification-certification was placed under oath and wasconveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of respondent inboth cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, anagency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) ofthe Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping.

F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of therespondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same lawyer whoinstigated a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery andrespondents themselves conspired and confabulated with eachother in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and deliberate

violation of Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsifieddocuments.- The penalty of prison correctional in its medium andmaximum periods and a fine of not more than p 5,000 pesos shallbe imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsificationsenumerated in the next preceding article in any public or officialdocument or letter of exchange (sic) or any other kind ofcommercial documents; and

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2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party, or with theintent to cause such damage, shall in any private documentcommit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the nextpreceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any

judicial proceeding or the damage of another or who, with theintent to cause such damage , shall use any of the false documentsembraced in the next preceding article, or any of the foregoingsubdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty nextlower in degree.

G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for havinginstigated abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion oftruth in the said verification and certification of non-forumshopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01,Canon 10 of the code of Professional responsibility for Lawyers, thepertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a copyof said code is hereto attached and marked as Annex E;

CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEYTHE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW ANDLEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest, immoralor deceitful (sic) conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic)at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legalsystem.

CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICESSHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVEINFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory orunfair statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legalservices.

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITHTO THE COURT.

In his Comment,[2] respondents Jose Antonio Bernas aversthat he has not committed forum shopping because the criminalaction is not an action that involves the same issue as those in the

civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forumshopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet been prosecuted inthe criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only existwhen identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiplefora.

In his Supplemental Comment,[3] respondent further contendsthat neither he or his client Pascual has commenced any criminalaction. Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in theinvestigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determinewhether the filing of an endorsement to the prosecutor, who woulddetermine probable caused, would be appropriate. It was onlyupon request of the NBI the he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting

an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents againstcomplainant. Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that theletter transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action orproceeding because the NBIs functions are merely investigatoryand informational in nature. NBI has no prosecutorial functions orquasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief orremedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by thecircular.

The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondentAtty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No.28-91, and administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the

administrative complaint bereft of merit and should be dismissed.

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverseopinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other thanby appeal or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a caseresort to forum shopping because by filling another petitioninvolving the same essential facts and circumstances, xxx,respondents approached two different for a in order to increasetheir chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, [4] In thiscase, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, ascounsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of theNBI to investigate the the alleged fraud and forgery committed by

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Mr. Jesus Cabarrus.[5] The filing of the civil case for conveyance anddamages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does notpreclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule allowsthe filing of a civil case independently with the criminal casewithout violating the circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcelynecessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted

and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the SupremeCourt when it promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was designed toserve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderlyadministration of justice and should not be interpreted with suchabsolute literalness as to subvert and legitimate objective or thegoal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve substantial justiceas expeditiously as possible.[6]

Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 [7], specifically section 1 hereofprovides, viz:

Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation underthe Department of Justice which shall have the following functions:

(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offensesagainst the laws of the Philippines, upon its initiative andas public interest may require;

(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested in theinvestigation or detection of crimes and other offenses;

(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and otherinfromations for the benefit and use of the prosecuting andlaw-enforcement entities of the Philippines, identificationrecords of all person without criminal convictions, recordsof identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership orpossession of all firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom;

(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-enforcement officers and entities of the Government aswell as the courts that may request its services;

(e) To extend its services, whenever properly requested in theinvestigation of cases of administrative or civil nature inwhich the Government is interested;

(f) To undertake the instruction and training of representativenumber of city and municipal peace officers at the requestof their respective superiors along effective methods ofcrime investigation and detection in order to insure greaterefficiency in the discharge of their duties;

(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crimelaboratory and to conduct researches inn furtherance ofscientific knowledge in criminal investigation;

(h) To perform such other related function as the secretary ofJustice may assign from time to time.

Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of Investigationsare merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has nojudicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting anyrelief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is aninvestigative agency whose findings are merely

recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon itsown initiative and as public welfare may require. It rendersassistance when requested in the investigation or detection ofcrimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order toprosecute those person responsible for defrauding his client.

The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under CircularNo. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative CircularNo. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicialpowers and those who not only hear and determine controversiesbetween adverse parties, but to make binding orders orjudgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is notperforming judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannottherefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular

that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant anyrelief, declaratory or otherwise.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint ishereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.Mendoza, J., on leave.

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G.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,vs.MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATIONBOARD, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA,J.:

Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt is the June 18, 2001 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)affirming the January 7, 2000 order2 of respondent Movie andTelevision Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) which read:

In view thereof, the BOARD, by the undersigned, hereby imposesthe administrative penalty of SUSPENSION FROM

AIRING/BROADCASTING any program on EMC Channel 27 for aperiod of seven (7) days which period shall commence immediatelyupon receipt of this Order. Your failure to comply with this ORDERshall be construed by the BOARD as defiance on your part of alawful order of the BOARD.

The facts follow.

Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHFtelevision station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000,respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension againstpetitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing

a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3

The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties forexhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and,at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had compliedwith the suspension order by going off the air since midnight ofJanuary 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely

"noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motionfor reconsideration and letter-protest.

Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which wasdismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.

Hence, this recourse.

The pivotal issues for our resolution are:

(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority toreview the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to itsbroadcast by television and

(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 wasenforceable and binding on petitioner.

First, Section 3 of PD 19865empowers the MTRCB to screen, reviewand examine all motion pictures, television programs includingpublicity materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in itsRules and Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which reads:

SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture,television program or related publicity material shall be imported,exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited orbroadcasted by television without prior permit issued by theBOARD after review of the motion picture, television program orpublicity material.

The onlyexemptions from the MTRCBs power of review are thoseexpressly mentioned in Section 7,6 such as (1) television programsimprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/ordepartments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.

According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for themovie, "Muro Ami." In adopting this finding, we hold that "MuroAmi: The Making," did not fall under any of the exemptions andwas therefore within the power of review of MTRCB.

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On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making"was apublic affairs program.7 Even if that were so, our resolutionof this issue would not change. This Court has already ruled that apublic affairs program -- described as a variety of news treatment;a cross between pure television news and news-relatedcommentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within the

MTRCBs power of review.8

Clearly, "Muro Ami: The Making" (whichpetitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was well within thepurview of MTRCBs power of prior review.1awphi1.net

However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program,Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of thesuspension order, was not binding on petitioner. TheAdministrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof,expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of theNational Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of thePhilippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adoptedby it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed withthe ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.9

Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penaltiesfor the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programswithout valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with theONAR as of January 27, 2000.10Hence, the same is yet to beeffective.11 It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in theONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circularand should not have been meted the sanction providedthereunder.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Thedecision of the Court of Appeals dated June 18, 2001, insofar as itaffirmed the public respondent Movie and Television Review andClassification Boards jurisdiction over "Muro Ami: The Making," ishereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the suspensionorder issued against petitioner GMA Network, Inc. pursuant toMemorandum Circular No. 98-17 is hereby declared null and void.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, andMOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITYAND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as ExecutiveAssistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in hiscapacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in hiscapacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN,J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of publicconcern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to bevalid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette orotherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ ofmandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/orcause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidentialdecrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,executive orders, letter of implementation and administrativeorders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuancesis sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64,103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298,303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360,361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473,486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800,802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,

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1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107,108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209,

211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283,285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63,64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151,1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,1829, 1831

Admin Law Chap 4

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