Today is Tuesday, December 09, 2014

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983

SIERRA MADRE TRUST, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP, respondents.

Lobruga Rondoz & Cardenas Law Offices for petitioner.

Fortunato de Leon for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 8, 1970, in DANR Cases Numbered 3502 and 3502-A. The decision affirmed a decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969.

The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137, as amended) which provides: "... Findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised."

The factual background is given in the brief of the petitioner-appellant which has not been contradicted by the respondents-appellees and is as follows:

On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, viz.: (1) Finland 2, (2) Finland 3, (3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6, (5) Finland 8 and (6) Finland 9, all registered on December 11, 1964 with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya.

The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral claims of the herein petitioner

Sierra Madre Trust, viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12, (3) JC-11, (4) W-11, (5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10, (8) A-9, (9) N-9, (10) W-8, and (11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio of Abaca, Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on May 14, 1965.

The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned six (6) lode mineral claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company, null, void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-7872 over said claims. Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the premises.

This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502.

Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the same Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J & S Partnership over six (6) lode mineral claims viz.: (1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4) A-25, (5) A-29, and (6) A-30, all registered on March 30, 1965 and amended August 5, 1965, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya.

The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode mineral claim covered by LLA No. V-9028, encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz.: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3) A-13, (4) H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9) F-11, (10) Wm-11, (11) F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all situated in Sitio Taduan, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya and duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, on May 14,1965.

The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned six (6) claims of respondent J & S Partnership, null void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-9028 over the said claims. Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the premises.

This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502A.

These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 and V-404 were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by the Director of Mines reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and so holds that the respondents have the preferential right over their "Finland-2", "Finland- 3", "Finland-5", "Finland-6", "Finland-8", "Finland-9", "A-19", "A-20", "A-24", "A-25", "A-29" and "A-30" mining claims. Accordingly, the protests (adverse claims) filed by protestant Sierra Madre Trust should be, as hereby they are, DISMISSED.

And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by the appellant, Sierra Madre Trust is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969, affirmed. "

The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against Jusan Trust Mining Company and J and S Partnership were based on the

allegation that the lode lease applications (LLA) of the latter "encroached and overlapped" the former's mineral claims, However, acting on the adverse claims, the Director of Mines found that, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is constrained to believe that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the protestant's and respondents' mining claims. " And this finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus: "Anent the first allegation, this Office finds that the Director of Mines did not err when he found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents Jusan Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership did not encroach and overlap the eighteen (18) lode mineral claims of the appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact has been incotrovertibly proven by the records appertaining to the case."

It should be noted that according to the Director of Mines in his decision, "during the intervening period from the 31st day after the discovery [by the respondents] to the date of location nobody else located the area covered thereby. ... the protestant [petitioner herein] did not establish any intervening right as it is our findings that their mining claims do not overlap respondents' mining claims."

After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had affirmed the factual findings of the Director of Mines to the effect that there was no overlapping of claims and which findings were final and conclusive, Sierra Madre Trust should have kept its peace for obviously it suffered no material injury and had no pecuniary interest to protect. But it was obstinate and raised this legal question before Us: "May there be a valid location of mining claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from date of discovery, in contravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the New Mining Law (Com. Act No. 137, as amended)?" It also raised ancillary questions.

We see no reason why We have to answer the questions in this petition considering that there is no justiciable issue between the parties. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered."

Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association and/or partnership registered with the Mining Recorder of a province, but not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, be vested with juridical personality to enable it to locate and then lease mining claims from the government?" Suffice it to state that this question was not raised before the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. There is also nothing in the record to indicate whether or not the appellees are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. For these reasons, even assuming that there is a justiciable issue between the parties, this question cannot be passed upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

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Today is Tuesday, December 09, 2014

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9553             May 13, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.WILLIAM ERNEST JOLLIFFE, defendant-appellant.

Benedicto C.Balderama and Mabanta and Ysip for appellant.Assistant Solicitor General Ramon L. Avanceña and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal taken by defendant William Ernest Jolliffe from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, convicting him of a violation of Republic Act No. 256, and sentencing him to imprisonment for one (1) year, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs, as well as decreeing the forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of four (4) pieces of gold bullion valued P35,305.46, and a travellers' check in the sum of $100.00.

There is no dispute about the main facts, which are set forth in the decision appealed in the following language:

The accused, Mr. William Ernest Jolliffe is a Canadian subject, born in china and residing permanently in Hongkong. He is the son of a former Chancellor of the West China Union University and had been Trade Commissioner for Canada in Shanghai and Hongkong, until 1948. The accused to a good reputable family is quite well-known. The accused had made several trips to Manila, sometimes on business and three times to meet his wife and children passing thru Manila. He also came to collect the debt owed to him by one T. W. Woo, a prominent businessman in Hongkong. He came back to Manila on December 4, 1953 to try to collect the debt owed him by T. Y. Woo. although he had no idea how said debt was to be paid, whether in peso or in gold. He was paid in good which be brought with him by messenger to his room in the Bay View Hotel. At about plane time he went to his hotel room and carried his gold around his body underneath his shirt. When he was going towards the door leading to the runway he was accosted by a woman, Amanda Arimbay, a secret service agent, and was told to go the search room (Quoted from the statement of facts in the memorandum for the accused.)

When the accused was searched four pieces of gold bullion were found tied to his body a few inches above the waist. There was also found in his possession a $100.00 travelers check issued by R. McGinty. While he was under arrest made an offer to settle the case by offering to pay the agents who were then arresting him. He stated also that Mr. Manikan, Deputy Collector of Customs, told him during the search that the case could have been fixed had he told him before hand of his desire to export gold from the Philippines. Mr. Manikan, on the other hand, said that when the accused was about to be searched he offered him P30,000.00 provided the case be settled and forgotten. The Court accepts the testimony of Mr, Manikan as the true version of the incident because the accused himself said in the course of is testimony the Mr. Manikan told him that he could say anything in private to him after he (accused) had signed the written statement, Exhibit I, certifying to the things found in the possession of the accused, among which, were the four pieces of gold bullion. These facts shows that when Mr. Manikan consented to allow the accused to talk with him about the case after signing Exhibit I, there was no other desire on the part of Mr. Manikan but to give the accused every opportunity to explain his side of the case but not for any illegitimate purpose. Mr. Manikan's acts in this case are above board and the only logical steps that an honest official could take in the present case. But these minor incident relating to the case are of no importance, taking into consideration the fact that the accused himself had admitted that on December 7, 1953 when he was about to board in one of the planes of the Pan American World Airway he had with him four pieces of gold bullion of the approximate value P35,305.46. This being a fact, the only question before the Court is purely a question of law.

Appellant alleges that:

1. That the trial court erred in not ruling that Circular 21 of the Central Bank is the only law in point, and that, being special law, it does not penalize attempted or frustrated violation thereof, but merely consummated violations and, therefore, under the facts of this case, the accused cannot be held liable;

2. That the trial court erred in not ruling that even attempted violation of Circular 21 punishable, still the accused is not criminally liable because there was no wilful violation of said circular;

3. That the trial erred in ruling that mere possession of gold is made illegal by Circular 21 of the Central Bank, the truth being that the said circular in fact specially authorizes sales gold within the Philippines even without the benefit of license;

4. That the trial court erred in not ruling Circular 21 of the Central Bank is not a valid law, because it did not comply with the provisions of section 74 of Republic Act 265, in that:

(a) It was approved by the President of the Philippines;

(b) In its promulgation, the Momentary Board exceeded the authority granted it by the Central Bank Act, because the context of the circular does not indicate that it was a temporary emergency measure;

(c) It can only be issued as an emergency measure or during crisis, and as issued, has no force and effect, because the emergency it seeks to remedy never existed or no longer exists;

(d) That the publication of the circular (original and amended) in the November 1951 and October 1952 issues of the Official Gazette are not the adequate publications required by law, because said publications on their faces showed them to be incomplete and defective;

(e) That granting, without admitting, that the power to promulgate it was granted to the Monetary Board by Republic Act 265, and granting without admitting, that the power to so promulgate was validly exercised, still it is invalid because it constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional and void.

5. That the trial court erred in ordering forfeiture of the four (4) packages of gold, Exhibit G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4, in favor of the Government.

6. That the trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the travellers' check for $100, Exhibit K, in favor of the Government, in spite of the fact that the accused was acquitted on the charge of illegal possession of dollars under Circular 20 and 42.

Appellant does not deny that he had no license to export the gold bullions above referred to. Under his first assignment of error, he maintains, however, that Central Bank Circular No. 21 requiring said license and section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, prescribing the penalty for violations of said Circular, refer to consummated exportation, not to "attempted or frustrated exportation." Section 4 of said Circular provides:

Any person desiring to export gold in any form, including jewelry, whether for refining abroad or otherwise, must obtain a license from the Central Bank. Applicant for export license must present satisfactory evidence that the import of the gold into the country of the importer will not be in violation of the rules and regulations of such country.

This section explicity applies to "any person desiring to export gold" and, hence, it contemplates the situation existing prior to the consummation of the exportation. Indeed, its purpose would be deferred if the penal sanction were deferred until after the article in question had left the Philippines, for jurisdiction over it, and over the guilty party, would be lost thereby.

Appellant's avowed ignorance of the necessity of license and of the illegality of the act performed by him, alleged in support of the second assignment of error, is belied by the fact that he had the gold bullions under his shirt; that by objecting, at first, to being searched, he tried to prevent that the presence of said articles upon his person be discovered; and he tried to bribe the public officers who searched him.

As regards the third assignment of error, it is not necessary for us to determine whether mere possession of gold bullion is illegal under Circular No. 21, for his conviction was due, not to such possession alone, but to the fact that appellant tried to export said gold bullions without the requisite license.

Let us now consider the fourth assignment of error which is based upon several grounds. The first is that the aforementioned circular has not merited the approval of the President of the Philippines, which is required in section 74 of Republic Act No. 265. This pretense is untenable. It would appear from Exhibit S and S-1 that the practice of the Monetary Board was to obtain said approval before the formal enactment and promulgation of circulars necessitating presidential sanction. Indeed, since it has no

authority to subject transactions in gold to license, unless the President agrees thereto, it is, in effect, the duty of the Board to obtain the assent of the Executive to the policy of requiring said license at a particular time, either upon adoption of the resolution of this effect, or prior thereto. As a consequence, it must be presumed — in the absence of proof to the contrary, which is wanting — that such duty has been fulfilled in the case at bar.

It is frequently said that a presumption of regularity the performance of administrative duties. That is, when an act has been completed, it is to be supposed that the act was done in the manner prescribed and by an officer authorized by law to do it. The presumption is of course a rebuttable one, but the bare allegation that there has been a failure to observe statutory requirements has been regarded as a mere conclusion of the pleader; where the administrative order is accompanied by a statement that there has been compliance and there is no showing of fact to the contrary, the presumption of regularity is ordinarily sufficient to support the official act of a public officer. (Administrative Law — Cases and Comments by Gellhorn, pp. 315-316.)

Contrary to appellant's pretense, it is not essential that the administrative acts of the President be made in writing, unless the law says so. Thus, for instance, in Ykalina vs. Oricio, (93 Phil., 1076; 49 Off. Gaz., [12], 5431), this Court quoted approvingly the following passage from Corpus Juris Secundum:

While the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by a commission, as a general rule it is not essential to the validity of an appointment that a commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral announcement of his determination by the appointing power.

In U.S. vs. Fletcher (148 U.S. 84, 89-90, 37 Law Ed. 387, 379-380), the Federal Supreme Court said:

The presumption is that the Secretary and the President performed the duties developed upon them respectively, and it would be unreasonable to construe the Secretary's indorsement as meaning that he had reviewed the proceedings for the action of the President in conformity with Article 65, and had approved them himself and ordered execution of the sentence in contravention of the article. . . . While in the case on hand it is said that the proceedings were submitted to the President, it is stated that they had been forwarded to the Secretary of War for the action of the President, and as that is followed by an approval and the direction of the execution of the sentence, which approval and sentence could only emanate from the President, the conclusion follows that the action taken was the action of the President.

We regard the certification of the Secretary of War . . . as perceive no ground upon which the order of that date can be a sufficient certification of the judgment of the President, and treated as null and void for want of the required approval.

What is more, in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451, 463), the majority of the members of this Court expressed the view that:

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the department organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 21, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistant and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U.S. 543; 30 Law ed. 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1141; see also U.S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet. 291; 10 Law ed. 968; Pones vs. U.S. [1890], 137 U.S. 202; 34 Law ed. 691; 11 Supp. Ct. Rep. 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880] 101 U.S. 755; 25 Law

ed. 916; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet. 498; 10 Law ed. 264.)

Needless to say, the case cited by appellant herein refer to the presidential approval of legislative enactments, which the Constitution explicity requires to be evidenced by the signatures of the Executive (Art. VI, section 20 [1]) There is no similar provision in Republic Act No. 265.

It is urged, however, that the authority of the Monetary Board to suspend or restrict the sales of exchange by the Central Bank and to subject all transactions involving foreign exchange to license, is temporary in nature and may be exercised only during an exchange crisis, as an emergency measure to combat such crisis, and that the context of the circular in question, as amended, does not indicate that it was a temporary emergency measure. It is not necessary, however, for the legality of said circular that its temporary character be stated on its face, so long as the circular has been issued during an exchange crisis, for the purpose of combating the same. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, which has not been introduced or offered in the present case, it is presumed that the provision of section 74 of Republic Act No. 265, under the authority of which the aforementioned circular was issued, has authority of which the aforementioned circular was issued, has been complied with. Besides, the fact that there has been an exchange crisis in the Philippines and that such crisis, not only existed at the time of the issuance of said circular in 1949 and 1950, but, also, remained in existence up to the present, may be taken judicial cognizance of.

Although, from a purely theoretical and legal viewpoint, the Monetary Board and the President could have specified in Circular 21 the period of its effectivity, their failure to do so did not necessarily impair its validity. As a measure taken under the police power of the state, said period had to be commensurate with the crisis that led to its adoption, and the duration of said crisis could not be anticipated with reasonable certainly. Upon the termination of the aforementioned crisis, as determined by competent authority, the circular would become inoperative. Thus, in Rutter vs. Esteban, (49 Off. Gaz., 1807), Commercial Investment vs. Garcia (49 Off. Gaz., 1801), Salvador vs. Locsin, (93 Phil., 225), and Nicolas vs. Matias, L-5250 (May 29, 1953), we held that, although the moratorium laws enacted in the Philippines, upon its liberation from the Japanese forces, could not be permanent in character and did not specify the duration thereof, it was valid and effective until the emergency for which it was intended had already disappeared.

It is further argued that, as published in the Official Gazette, Circular No. 21, in its original, as well as in its amended form, did not bear the approval of the President and that, accordingly, said publication was not sufficient to give the effect contemplated by law therefore. This pretense is based upon false promise. The original circular subjecting to licensing by the Central Bank "all transaction in gold and foreign exchange", Circular No. 20, which, as approved and published, states, that, "pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 265", it had been adopted by "the Monetary Board, by unanimous vote and with the approval of the President of the Philippines." What is more, the last paragraph of Circular No. 20, provides that "further regulations in respect to transactions covered by this circular will be issued separately." Thus, the President had approved not only the licensing by the Central Bank" of "all transactions in gold and foreign exchange," but, also, the issuance, subsequently to the promulgation of Circular No. 20, of "further regulations in respect" of such transactions. Said further regulations were incorporated into Circular No. 21, which thus bears the stamp of presidential sanction, although this is not specifically required by law. It is only the decision of the Monetary Board to subject to license by the Central Bank all transactions in gold and foreign exchange that needs the approval of the President. Once the same has been given, the details in the implementation of said decision may be determined by said Board, through such regulations as may be promulgated from time to time. The assent of the President is not a prerequisite to the validity and effectivity of these regulations, as distinguished from the aforementioned decision thereby sought to be enforced or executed. The authority of the Monetary Board to make regulations is governed, not by section 74 of Republic Act No. 265, but by section 14 thereof, in the language of which:

In order to exercise the authority granted to it under this Act the Monetary Board shall:

(a) Prepare and issue such rules and regulations as it considers necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the power assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank under this Act.

Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to

local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United Sates, 88 L. ed. 848.) Referring the case at bar, section 74 of Republic Act No. 265 conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis." The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures" to protect the international stability of the peso, "whether the international reserve is falling, as a result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the national welfare" (section 70, Rep. Act No. 265). It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.) These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers (Cardon vs. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil., 547; Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Utility, 34, Phil., 136; Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; People vs. Rosentral, 63 Phil., 328; Antamok Gold vs. C.I.R., 68 Phil., 340; Calang vs. Williams, 70 Phil., 276; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil., 359; Phil., Association of Colleges & Universities vs. Sec. of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz., (12) 6230; Mutual Films Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 276 U.S. 230; Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S. 48; National Broadcasting Co. vs. U.S. 319 U.S. 225; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S. 414; Ammann vs. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245).

Under the fifth assignment of error, appellant maintains that Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the forfeiture of the proceeds of a crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, does not apply to the case at bar, the crime involved herein being covered by a special law. However, pursuant to section 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions of said Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, "unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary", and there is no such provision to the contrary in Republic Act No. 265 (U.S. vs. Parrone, 24 Phil., 29; People vs. Moreno, 60 Phil., 712; People vs. Ramayo, 61 Phil., 225; Copiaco vs. Luzon Brokerage, 66 Phil., 184).

The last assignment of error refers to the propriety of the order of confiscation of the traveller's check for $100, the lower court having found that the accused had no knowledge of the fact that it was in his physical possession, and that therefore, he had no criminal intent in connection therewith. We feel that this point is well taken, and that, accordingly, said travellers' check should not be forfeited to the Government.

With this modification, the decision, appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against the defendant-appellant. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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Today is Tuesday, December 09, 2014

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 95832 August 10, 1992

MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Tranquilino F. Meris Law Office for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September 1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His appointment was classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent". Before said appointment, he was working at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Department of Agriculture.

On 8 December 1989, petitioner received his initial salary, covering the period from 25 September to 31 October 1989. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his absences during the covered period, namely, 29 September 1989 and 20 October 1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays. More specifically, the dates of

said absences for which salary deductions were made, are as follows:

1. 29 September 1989 — Friday

2. 30 September 1989 — Saturday

3. 01 October 1989 — Sunday

4. 20 October 1989 — Friday

5. 21 October 1989 — Saturday

6. 22 October 1989 — Sunday

Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief, General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989 inquiring as to the law on salary deductions, if the employee has no leave credits.

Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a memorandum dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that "when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay (CSC, 2nd Ind., February 12, 1965)."

Petitioner then sent a latter dated 20 February 1990 addressed to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas raising the following question:

Is an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday? 1

Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman argued that a reading of the General Leave Law as contained in the Revised Administrative Code, as well as the old Civil Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260), the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree No. 807), and the Civil Service Rules and Regulation fails to disclose a specific provision which supports the CSC rule at issue. That being the case, the petitioner contented that he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual situation posed), and that the withholding (or deduction) of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

On 25 May 1990, respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 90-497, ruling that the action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof corresponding to six (6) days (September 29, 30, October 1, 20, 21, 22, 1989) is in order. 2 The CSC stated that:

In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 12, 1965 of this Commission, which embodies the policy on leave of absence without pay incurred on a Friday and Monday, reads:

Mrs. Rosalinda Gonzales is not entitled to payment of salary corresponding to January 23 and 24, 1965, Saturday and Sunday, respectively, it appearing that she was present on Friday, January 22, 1965 but was on leave without pay beginning January 25, the succeeding Monday. It is the view of this Office that an employee who has no more leave credit in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually

rendered. (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale for the above ruling which applies only to those employees who are being paid on monthly basis, rests on the assumption that having been absent on either Monday or Friday, one who has no leave credits, could not be favorably credited with intervening days had the same been working days. Hence, the above policy that for an employee on leave without pay to be entitled to salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, the same must occur between the dates where the said employee actually renders service. To rule otherwise would allow an employee who is on leave of absent (sic) without pay for a long period of time to be entitled to payment of his salary corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. It also discourages the employees who have exhausted their leave credits from absenting themselves on a Friday or Monday in order to have a prolonged weekend, resulting in the prejudice of the government and the public in general. 3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and in Resolution No. 90-797, the respondent Commission denied said motion for lack of merit. The respondent Commission in explaining its action held:

The Primer on the Civil Service dated February 21, 1978, embodies the Civil Service Commission rulings to be observed whenever an employee of the government who has no more leave credits, is absent on a Friday and/or a Monday is enough basis for the deduction of his salaries corresponding to the intervening Saturdays and Sundays. What the Commission perceived to be without basis is the demand of Peralta for the payment of his salaries corresponding to Saturdays and Sundays when he was in fact on leave of absence without pay on a Friday prior to the said days. A reading of Republic Act No. 2260 (sic) does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding Saturdays, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. Further, a reading of Senate Journal No. 67 dated May 4, 1960 of House Bill No. 41 (Republic Act No. 2625) reveals that while the law excludes Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in the computation of leave credits, it does not, however, include a case where the leave of absence is without pay. Hence, applying the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the claim of Peralta has no merit. Moreover, to take a different posture would be in effect giving more premium to employees who are frequently on leave of absence without pay, instead of discouraging them from incurring further absence without pay. 4

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.

What is primarily questioned by the petitioner is the validity of the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary deductions corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays where an employee without leave credits was absent on the immediately preceding working day.

During the pendency of this petition, the respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 91-540 dated 23 April 1991 amending the questioned policy, considering that employees paid on a monthly basis are not required to work on Saturdays, Sunday or Holidays. In said amendatory Resolution, the respondent Commission resolved "to adopt the policy that when an employee, regardless of whether he has leave credits or not, is absent without pay on day immediately preceding or succeeding Saturday, Sunday or holiday, he shall not be considered absent on those days." Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 dated 26 April 1991, was also issued by CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas adopting and promulgating the new policy and directing the Heads of Departments, Bureaus and Agencies in the national and local governments, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to oversee the strict implementation of the circular.

Because of these developments, it would seem at first blush that this petition has become moot and academic since the very CSC policy being questioned has already been amended and, in effect, Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797, subject of this petition for certiorari, have already been set aside and superseded. But the issue of whether or not the policy that had been adopted and in force since 1965 is valid or not, remains unresolved. Thus, for reasons of public interest and public policy, it is the

duty of the Court to make a formal ruling on the validity or invalidity of such questioned policy.

The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service the following powers and duties:

Sec. 16 (e) with the approval by the President to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, and the rules prescribed pursuant to the provisions of this law shall become effective thirty days after publication in the Official Gazette;

xxx xxx xxx

(k) To perform other functions that properly belong to a central personnel agency. 5

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the Commission promulgated the herein challenged policy. Said policy was embodied in a 2nd Indorsement dated 12 February 1965 of the respondent Commission involving the case of a Mrs. Rosalinda Gonzales. The respondent Commission ruled that an employee who has no leave credits in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. The same policy is reiterated in the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service. 6 Chapter Five on leave of absence provides that:

5.51. When intervening Saturday, Sunday or holiday considered as leave without pay — when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, such Saturday, Sunday or holiday shall also be without pay. (CSC, 2nd Ind., Feb. 12, 1965).

It is likewise illustrated in the Primer on the Civil Service 7 in the section referring to Questions and Answers on Leave of Absences, which states the following:

27. How is leave of an employee who has no more leave credits computed if:

(1) he is absent on a Friday and the following Monday?

(2) if he is absent on Friday but reports to work the following Monday?

(3) if he is absent on a Monday but present the preceding Friday?

- (1) He is considered on leave without pay for 4 days covering Friday to Monday;

- (2) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from Friday to Sunday;

- (3) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from Saturday to Monday.

When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. 8 It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not be published. 9

In promulgating as early as 12 February 1965 the questioned policy, the Civil Service Commission interpreted the provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 (which took effect on 17 June 1960) amending the Revised Administrative Code, and which stated as follows:

Sec. 1. Sections two hundred eighty-four and two hundred eighty-five-A of the Administrative Code, as amended, are further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 284. After at least six months' continues (sic) faithful, and satisfactory service, the President or proper head of department, or the chief of office in the case of municipal employees may, in his discretion, grant to an employee or laborer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a municipality, of a municipal district or of government-owned or controlled corporations other than those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof, fifteen days vacation leave of absence with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, for each calendar year of service.

Sec. 285-A. In addition to the vacation leave provided in the two preceding sections each employee or laborer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a municipality or municipal district in any regularly and specially organized province, other than those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof, shall be entitled to fifteen days of sick leave for each year of service with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays: Provided, That such sick leave will be granted by the President, Head of Department or independent office concerned, or the chief of office in case of municipal employees, only on account of sickness on the part of the employee or laborer concerned or of any member of his immediate family.

The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees who have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days.

Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. 10

We find this petition to be impressed with merit.

As held in Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo: 11

. . . . where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

The intention of the legislature in the enactment of R.A. 2625 may be gleaned from, among others, the sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo M. Tolentino during the second reading of House Bill No. 41 (which became R.A. 2625). He said:

The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave of 15 days each year of service to be with full pay. But under the present law, in computing these periods of leaves, Saturday, Sunday and holidays are included in the computation so that if an employee should become sick and absent himself on a Friday and then he reports for work on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he will be considered as having had a leave of Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday, or four days.

The purpose of the present bill is to exclude from the computation of the leave those days, Saturdays and Sundays, as well as holidays, because actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days. And it is unfair and unjust to him that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves. 12

With this in mind, the construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.

Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A. 2625, Sections 284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative Code applied to all government employee without any distinction. It follows that the effect of the amendment similarly applies to all employees enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits.

As the questioned CSC policy is here declared invalid, we are next confronted with the question of what effect such invalidity will have. Will all government employees on a monthly salary basis, deprived of their salaries corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays (as herein petitioner was so deprived) since 12 February 1965, be entitled to recover the amounts corresponding to such non-working days?

The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. 13

But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank: 14

. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.

To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and

equity to all affected government employees.

It must be pointed out, however, that after CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 — amending the herein invalidated policy — was promulgated on 26 April 1991, deductions from salaries made after said date in contravention of the new CSC policy must be restored to the government employees concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, CSC Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797 are declared NULL and VOID. The respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts previously but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary as above indicated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 32.

2 Rollo, p. 37.

3 Rollo, pp. 36-37.

4 Rollo, pp. 46-47.

5 P.D. No. 807, issued on 6 October 1975, in Article V, Section 9, specifically provides for the following powers and functions of the Civil Service Commission:

Sec. 9 (b) Prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Decree. These rules and regulations shall become effective thirty days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation;

(c) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government; and prescribe all forms for publications, examinations, appointments, reports, records and such other forms as may be required under this Decree.

6 Published by the Personnel Officers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (POAP) and the Law Center of the University of the Philippines System, Revised Edition, 1978.

7 February 21, 1978.

8 Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 (1962).

9 Tañada vs. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446.

10 Sagun vs. PHHC, G.R. No. L-44738, June 22, 1988, 162 SCRA 411.

11 G.R. No. L-25326, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105.

12 Senate Journal No. 67, Vol. III, May 4, 1960, H. No. 41.

13 Municipality of Malabang, etc., et al. vs. Benito, et al., G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533 citing Norton vs. Shelby Count, 118 U.S. 425 (1886).

14 308 U.S. 371 (1940) cited in Mun. of Malabang vs. Benito, supra.

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