DOH vs CamposanoAdministrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.Facts: Respondents are former employees of the DOH-NCR. Some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman against respondents arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.

Issue: WON there has been a failure to comply with administrative due process

Held: The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction.[16] Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.

The Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents. The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the them for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019.Then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the PCAGC. The PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution disposing respondents (guilty as charged) and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the government service be imposed thereon. President Ramos issued AO 390 that DISMISSED them from the service. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision on the ground that the PCAGC's jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC's findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due process.

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the 'power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretary's disciplinary authority over respondents when he remanded the PCAGC's findings against them for the secretary's 'appropriate action.

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based.[19] In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.

Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretary's Order dismissing the respondents thus guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

SAMALIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio was formerly an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. On February 2, 1993, Ms. Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese national, arrived at the NAIA from Saipan. She was holding a Uruguayan passport so an inspector suspected that her passport was fake. Ms. Weng was brought to Samalio who was the duty intelligence officer. In exchange for her passport, Ms. Weng paid $500 to Samalio. However, when Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she discovered that it did not bear an immigration arrival stamp. Hence, she complained against Samalio. The City Prosecutors Office of Pasay then recommended the prosecution of Samalio for the crimes of Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan.

In a later indorsement to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), former NAIA General Manager Guillermo Cunanan enclosed a copy of the aforesaid City Prosecutors recommendation. Reacting, then BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio commenced an administrative case against Samalio for Violation of CSMC No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and required petitioner to submit his answer to the charges together with supporting statements and documents, and whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. Samalio was also preventively suspended for a period of ninety (90) days.

Petitioner submitted an answer denying the charges and expressly electing a formal investigation if such answer be not found to be satisfactory. Attached thereto are the affidavits of his witnesses. The answer was found to be unsatisfactory so the case was set for formal hearing before the Board of Discipline of BID.

The case suffered several postponed hearings due to the requests and non-availability of the parties but mostly due to the absence of complainants witnesses until Samalio was allowed to file a motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, the case was not dismissed. The Board of Discipline was then reorganized and this case was assigned to a new Board presided by Atty. Kalaw. Subpoenas were again sent and hearings were scheduled several times before the new Board until Special Prosecutor Edmund Macaraig moved that Samalios Motion to Dismiss be denied and that the case be considered submitted for resolution based on the records. The hearing officer also denied Samalios Motion to Dismiss but granted the case to be set anew.

Finally, BID Acting Commissioner Ramon Liwag, issued the decision finding Samalio guilty of the charges and dismissing him from service. Former Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. confirmed the penalty of dismissal. On appeal to the Civil Service Commission, the decisions of Liwag and Guingona were affirmed. In a petition for review, the CA dismissed the petition of Samalio and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan also convicted Samalio for robbery.

Samalio now contends that he was not accorded due process because no witness or evidence was presented against him, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was misinterpreted by the CA and there was no hearing conducted on his case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Samalio was accorded due process

HELD: SC ruled against petitioner. Samalio was accorded due process.

The CSC decision and resolution are supported by substantial evidence. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of the BID, decided the case on the basis of the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties, and relied on the records of the proceedings taken. In particular, the decision was based on the criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai Qin against petitioner as well as the recommendation of the City Prosecutors Office that Samalio be prosecuted. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the Sandiganbayan and the fact of petitioners conviction in that case. Thus, there was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative proceedings substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion to support the decision of the CSC.

The CSC and the Secretary of Justice also did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony," in deciding petitioners administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency concerned.

For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.

In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID because she left the country or even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in the criminal case filed against him with the Sandiganbayan, which was the basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in the Sandiganbayan was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied.

Further, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.

The Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations in the CSC which were applicable to petitioners case provided that administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. The Uniform Rules further provided that evidence having materiality and relevance to the administrative case shall be accepted. Not only was petitioners objection to the application of Section 47, Rule 130 a technicality that could be disregarded; the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was also material and relevant to the administrative case. Hence, the CSC was correct in applying Section 47, Rule 130 when it took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the aforementioned criminal case.

Petitioners assertion that there was no hearing (that he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard) is likewise without merit. Apparently, petitioners concept of the opportunity to be heard is the opportunity to ventilate ones side in a formal hearing where he can have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant. However, it is well-settled that, in administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings.

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, afidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.

In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed his answer and two motions to dismiss, as well as other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the CSC by way of appeal.

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner himself admits that he filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the BID which was confirmed by the Secretary of Justice. He also admits that he filed a motion for reconsideration with the CSC. Hence, by his own admission, petitioners protestations that he had been deprived of due process must necessarily fail.

Notes:

3 main points on administrative due process sa case na ito: una yun sa evidence/witness, 2nd yung paggamit ng provision ng rules of court sa administrative proceedings (provision on former testimony particularly), tapos 3rd hearing/opportunity to be heard) yung naka-bold yun yung main points ng SC sa decision nila, hindi ko kasi alam yung particular issue na gusto ni maam i-discuss kaya lahat na lang ng may kinalaman sa due process nilagay ko hehe (G.R. Nos. 176935-36 March 13, 2009ZAMBALES II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ZAMECO II) BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NAMELY: JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ (PRESIDENT), ISAIAS Q. VIDUA (VICE-PRESIDENT), VICENTE M. BARRETO (SECRETARY), JOSE M. SANTIAGO (TREASURER), JOSE NASERIV C. DOLOJAN, JUAN FERNANDEZ AND HONORIO DILAG, JR. (MEMBERS),Petitioners,vs.CASTILLEJOS CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA), REPRESENTED BY DOMINADOR GALLARDO, DAVID ESPOSO, CRISTITA DORADO, EDWIN CORPUZ, E. ROGER DOROPAN, JOSEFINA RAMIREZ, FERNANDO BOGNOT, JR., CARMELITA DE GUZMAN, MAXIMO DE LOS SANTOS, AURELIO FASTIDIO, BUENAVENTURA CELIS, ROBERTO LADRILLO, CORAZON ACAYAN, CARLITO CARREON, EDUARDO GARCIA, MARCIAL VILORIA, FILETO DE LEON AND MANUEL LEANDER,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

ZAMBALES II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ZAMECO II) BOARD OF DIRECTORS, JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ (PRESIDENT), ISAIAS Q. VIDUA (VICE-PRESIDENT), VICENTE M. BARRETO (SECRETARY), JOSE M. SANTIAGO (TREASURER), JOSE NASERIV C. DOLOJAN, JUAN FERNANDEZ AND HONORIO DILAG, JR. (MEMBERS),Petitioners,vs.NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA), NEA-OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE, ENGR. PAULINO T. LOPEZ AND CASTILLEJOS CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA),Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioners assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the the authority of public respondent NEA to supervise electric cooperatives such as ZAMECO II and the power of NEA to take preventive and/or disciplinary measures against an electric cooperatives board of directors, officers or employees.

The petitioners, Jose S. Dominguez, Isaias Q. Vidua, Vicente M. Barretto, Jose M. Santiago, Jose Naseriv C. Dolojan, Juan Fernandez and Honorio Dilag, Jr., are members of the Board of Directors of the Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II). ZAMECO II is an electric cooperative organized and registered under Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended.

NEA is a government owned and controlled corporation organized under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 269, as amended by PD No. 1645.

Castillejos Consumers Associations, Inc. (CASCONA) is an organization of electric consumers from the municipality of Castillejos, Zambales under the coverage area of ZAMECO II.

On November 21, 2002, CASCONA, through its Board of Trustees, filed a letter-complaint with NEA seeking the removal of the petitioners for the following alleged offenses:

a. illegal payment of 13th Month Pay and Excessive Mid-Year and Christmas Bonus to petitioners;

b. excessive expenses of the Board President, petitioner Mr. Jose S. Dominguez, charged to ZAMECO Power Corporation (ZPC) and Central Luzon Power Transmission Development Corporation (CLPTDC) but advanced by ZAMECO II and treated as receivables by the ZAMECO II from aforesaid corporations;

c. anomalous contract with Philreca Management Corporation (PMC) for ZAMECO IIs Systems Loss Reduction Program; and

d. overstaying as members of the Board of Directors of ZAMECO II.

The letter-complaint was essentially based on the "Management and Financial Audit Report of Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. for the period from 01 January 1989 to 30 September 1997" dated June 1998 submitted by the Manager of the Coop Systems Audit Division to the NEA.

After failure of the petitioners to file their position papers as agreed in the Preliminary Mandatory Conference, the NEA issued the assailed resolution.

The appellate court further declared that the petitioners have not been deprived of due process in the administrative proceedings.

CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES:

1. The petioners contended that they were denied due process as they were never notified of the charges against them based on the July 24, 2003 Audit Report (2003 Audit Report). Allegedly, petitioners had been asked to respond only to the charges under the June 25, 1998 Audit Report (1998 Audit Report).

2. NEA refutes petitioners allegation that they were denied due process in the administrative proceedings, insisting that they were sent notices of the audit proceedings conducted by NEA.

ISSUE:WON the petitioners were denied due process.

HELD: NEAs compliance with due process requirements should be evaluated based on the standard set forth inAng Tibayv. CIR,pertaining to the cardinal rights which must be observed in proceedings before administrative tribunals, synthesized in a subsequent case as follows:

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

In Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, the Court emphasized the need for a hearing before any punitive measure may be undertaken by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The Court said:

Sec. 21 requires notice and hearing because fine is a sanction, regulatory and even punitive in character. Indeed, the requirement is the essence of due process. Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The right is guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to enhance the fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings.

In the case at bar the petitioners were given fair and ample opportunity to present their side with respect to CASCONAs charges covered by the 1998 Audit Report. Specifically, the charges of illegal payment of 13th month pay and excessive bonuses/allowances claimed by petitioners in violation of a NEA Memorandum and overstaying as members of the Board of Directors were duly established by the evidence on record. It should be mentioned, in this regard, that the issue that petitioners had overstayed in office is not so much election-related as it is connected to the allegation that they had committed serious misconduct and deliberate negligence in office.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in order to determine whether the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, and its Implementing Rules for the conversion of an electric cooperative into a stock cooperative under the Cooperative Development Authority had been complied with. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle this case immediately upon receipt of this Decision and to proceed accordingly with all deliberate dispatch. Thereafter, it is directed to forthwith transmit its findings to this Court for final adjudication. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 78569 February 11, 1991-194 SCRA 1

EARTH MINERALS EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner, vs.DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MALACAANG, MANILA, BUREAU OF MINES DIRECTOR BENJAMIN A. GONZALES, AND PHILZEA MINING AND DEV. CORP., respondents.

This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated June 27, 1986 and resolution 2 dated May 5, 1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary in O.P. Case No. 3023. The decision and resolution set aside the orders of the Minister of Natural Resources and Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated November 7, 1985 rendered in MNR Case No. 6353 and July 23, 1985 rendered in Mines Sp. Case No. V-183, respectively, that upheld petitioner's action to cancel/rescind the mining contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. and private respondent Philzea Mining and Development Corporation.

FACTS: On September 11, 1980, Zambales Chromite, owner of 10 patentable chromite mining claims, and Philzea, as operator and the herein respondent, entered into a Contract of Development, Exploitation and Productive Operation on the ten (10) patentable mining claims. During the lifetime of such contract, Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc., the herein petitioner, submitted a Letter of Intent on to Zambales Chromite whereby the former proposed and the latter agreed to operate the same mining area subject of the earlier agreement between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining. Consequently, the same mining property of Zambales Chromite became the subject of different agreements with two separate and distinct operators.

Earth Minerals filed a petition for cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining to the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS). Earth Minerals alleged that Philzea Mining committed grave and serious violations of the latters contract because of failure to produce the agreed volume of chromite ores; failure to pay ad valorem taxes; failure to put up assay buildings and offices, all resulting in the non-productivity and non-development of the mining area.

Philzea Mining filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Earth Minerals is not the proper party in interest. BMGS denied the petition, so Philzea elevated the case to Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) to dismiss the appeal. MNR on the other hand ordered BMGS to investigate and found out that Philzea grossly violated the terms and conditions of the contract. BMGS rendered a decision canceling the said mining contract.

ISSUE: Is Earth Minerals the proper party to seek cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite?/

RULING: Yes. Petitioner Earth Minerals seeks the cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining, not as a party to the contract but because his rights are prejudiced by the said contract. The prejudice and detriment to the rights and interest of petitioner stems from the continued existence of the contract between Zambales Chromite and private respondent Philzea Mining. Unless and until the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining is cancelled, petitioner's contract with the former involving the same mining area cannot be in effect and it cannot perform its own obligations and derive benefits under its contract. The Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences in his order denying Philzea Mining's motion to dismiss the petition for cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite stated:

From the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner, the Letter of Intent and Operating Agreement between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals, it may be gleaned that, at least, there appears some color of right on the part of petitioner to request for cancellation/rescission of the contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining.

Fifth Requisite ( page 101) It is sufficient, however, hat administrative findings of facts are supported by evidence. Such findings will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.

Barredo- Fuentes vs. Albarracin456 SCRA 120Facts:

Barredo are the defendants in the trial on the forcible entry cases. Judgments were rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Thus, complainants filed with the RTC of Davao City a petition for annulment of judgments under Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court. The cases were raffled to RTC Branch 13 and is pending resolution.

On March 4, 2004, Judge Albarracin issued a writ of demolition despite the pendency of the case for annulment of judgments. Barredo requested respondent judge to await the result of the annulment of judgments case. However, he still issued the questioned writ of demolition. This prompted complainants to file a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent judge from further acting on the subject cases during the pendency of the case for annulment of judgments. During the pendency of the petition, respondent judge, after notice and hearing, issued three (3) separate writs of execution and special writs of demolition on April 30, 2004 relative to the subject cases.

Contention of Barredo-Fuentes:

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. Complainants aver that they were not served with a copy of the motion. Neither was the motion set for hearing in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Contention of Albarracin: Asserts that a hearing is not necessary because the special writ of demolition had already been granted after several hearings and the ex-parte motion was merely for the enforcement or implementation of said writ.

Ruling:

After a perusal of the evidence on record, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) ruled that complainants had no basis for their charges. It noted that the wheels of justice would run smoothly if the members of the judiciary who perform their functions conscientiously are not hampered by groundless and vexatious charges. The evidence reveals that the respondent judge notified complainants and conducted a hearing before the issuance of the writ of execution and special writ of demolition.

MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR vs. Ombudsman

Facts:Dec. 15, 1998 -Ursal filed a complaint against petitioner Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. (Barangay Chairman)and was subsequently charged with sexual harassment before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thereafter Ursal filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a similar complaint-affidavit charging petitioner with grave misconduct. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the charge, dismissing the complaint for lack of substantial evidence. However, on 2 July 2001, upon review, and with the approval of the Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of material benefits, per its Memorandum Order.He was dismissed from service.Issue:1.Whether the Office of the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction over the administrative complaint;

2.Ursals filing of the same administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman and the City Council through the DILG warranted the dismissal of both cases; and

3. petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before the Ombudsman.

Ruling:

1. Petitioner is also estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. A perusal of the records shows that he participated in the proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit with supporting evidence. Neither did he inform the Ombudsman of the existence of the other administrative complaint of which he is presumably aware at the time the proceedings in the Ombudsman were on-going. It was only when the Ombudsman rendered an adverse decision that he disclosed the proceedings before the Quezon City Council and raised the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it has been held that participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them

2.The Ombudsman was not aware of the pending case before the Quezon City Council when the administrative complaint was filed before it. There was no mention of such complaint either in the complaint-affidavit or in the counter-affidavit of petitioner. Thus, the Ombudsman, in compliance with its duty to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government, took cognizance of the case, made its investigation, and rendered its decision accordingly.

3. Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the formal charge and given a chance to present evidence in his behalf. He was not denied due process. More importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is well supported by substantial evidence.

Petition is DENIED: