Addressing Côte d'Ivoire's Deeper Crisis

7/31/2019 Addressing Cte d'Ivoire's Deeper Crisis

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AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Addressing Cte dIvoires Deeper CrisisBY THIERNO MOUCTAR BAH

A P U B L I C A T I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Cte dIvoire will need to overcome its deep social divisions to attain stability.

To reverse the politicization o the military, security sector reorm must extend beyond conventional stan-dards and build a orce based on the concept o the Army-Nation (i.e. the military serving the nation).

Cte dIvoires peace, security, and development are closely linked to its neighbors, necessitating a sub-regional strategy or overcoming its ongoing crisis.

H I G H L I G H T S

N O . 1 9 / M A R C H 2 0 1 2

No one holding the highest oce would ever agree toleave power and submit to the will o the electorate.

The resolution o Cte dIvoires traumatic post-

election stando did not mean the end to the coun-

trys troubles, however. I Cte dIvoire is to achieve

stability, it must still address a deeper crisisone that

has estered or more than a decade. The roots, con-

sequences, and implications o this crisis are many-

sided. They stem rom an explosive mix o ethnic,

religious, and land rivalries that have led to a de acto

division o the country since 2002.At its core, this crisis is about national identi-

tywhat does it mean to be Ivorian in this nation o

22 million inhabitants? Cte dIvoire has long wel-

comed and benetted rom West Arican immigrants,

who have worked the coee and cocoa plantations in

the South, generating billions o dollars in exports or

what was once the economic engine o West Arica.

Many o these estimated eight million immigrants

ONGOING FRAGIL ITY

The May 2011 inauguration o Alassane Ouat-

tara as President o Cte dIvoire culminated a tumul-

tuous 5-month transition o power. The unwillingness

o the incumbent candidate, Laurent Gbagbo, to cede

power ollowing his electoral deeat eventually led to

armed confict between military orces who supported

Ouattara and those loyal to Gbagbo. This resulted in

an estimated 3,000 deaths and the involvement o

orces rom the United Nations Operation in Cte

dIvoire(UNOCI). Thousands o rapes, kidnappings,and ear o retribution compelled over a million peo-

ple to fee the countrys commercial capital, Abidjan.

The Ivorian crisis, moreover, has urther signi-

cance or Arica. I Laurent Gbagbo had been allowed

to steal the election, a dangerous pattern would have

been reinorced (building on similar cases in Kenya

and Zimbabwe) just as presidential elections in Arica

have become increasingly common and competitive.


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and their descendants have lived in the country or

decades. Still, they are not recognized as citizens. Nor

is a path to citizenship available to them.

This is the key issue that Cte dIvoire must

come to terms with i it is to move rom its currentpolarized environment to reunication and stability.

I national identity is not ully addressed, other eorts

taken to stabilize the country will prove utile.

One evident repercussion o the social ragmen-

tation is a ractured security sector. Divisions between

the national army and the ormer rebel orces (andOuattara supporters) rom the North have become

entrenched over the years. There is also the need to

recover rom the disintegration o military proession-

alism. During the electoral crisis, the Ivorian military

became a partisan actor, throwing its support behind

losing candidate Laurent Gbagbo.

Now that a new president, whose legitimacy has

been validated both at home and abroad, has taken

Dr. Thierno Mouctar Bah, a Military Historian, was a Pro-

essor at the University o Yaound (Cameroon) rom 1976

to 2009. He has authored numerous books and articles on

armies, conict, and issues o security and peace in Arica.


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oce, Cte dIvoire requires support in all sectors

so that it can address the tremendous challenges it

aces. But what can be done to rebuild, reunite, and

stabilize this country, including the 47 percent o the

population that supported Gbagbo?

The stakes are high. Cte dIvoires stability is

vital to all o West Arica, which is struggling to re-

cover rom the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone

as well as a legacy o coups across the subregion. The

inrastructural damage caused by the post-election

violence combined with the economic stagnation

o the past decade have had ar-reaching economic

impacts or all o West Arica.

ROOTS OF TOLERANCE

Cte dIvoires crisis is grounded in its geogra-

phy and history. The country shares borders with ve

statesGhana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Li-

beria. Its name, which translates as Ivory Coast, dates

back to the period o initial contact with Europeans.

Domination by France extended rom 1883 to 1960,

during which time it developed in the orest-rich

coastal South an economy based on coee and cocoa,

resulting in the concept o a useul Cte dIvoire

that marginalized the North.

While maintaining a one-party political system,

President Flix Houphout-Boigny led Cte dIvoire

or 33 years with wisdom and prudence, managingto avoid the ethnic conficts and coups that beell

neighboring countries. He eectively integrated the

nations disparate regions into a cohesive economy

such that Cte dIvoire became a symbol o prosperity

and stability. The Ivorian economy doubled in size

between 1960 and 1980.

The progressive accumulation o wealth os-

tered improved communication and urbanization,

helping to make Cte dIvoire a multi-ethnic melt-

ing pot, symbolized by the city o Abidjan and itsve million inhabitants. The country welcomed im-

migrants rom all over the subregion, mainly rom

Burkina Faso, who now account or almost 20 per-

cent o the population. Most immigrants became an

integral part o the agricultural sector. Local popula-

tions, including landowners, however, considered

immigrants non-natives and marginalized them,

diminishing their social status.

Houphout-Boignys message o peace and social

harmony is his most important legacy. Oering land

to immigrants in exchange or labor on plantations

and ensuring that members o all ethnic groups were

represented in positions o power ostered a culture o

tolerance that persisted throughout his time in power.

He likewise established a Foundation or Peace, and

UNESCO named its annual peace prize ater him.

Houphout-Boigny, however, did not endow

his country with the institutions needed to ensure

stability ater he died in 1993. His political party,

as in all single-party governments, became ossied.

Cte dIvoire thus aced dire straits derived rom

an undened process o succession at the end o

a reign that lasted too long. This was refected in

growing levels o corruption and an economy that

saw a 35 percent contraction in per capita incomes

between 1979 and 1999.

This institutional ragility set the stage or a mili-

tary coup in December 1999 led by General Robert

Gu. Elections in 2000 intended to legitimize Gus

rule were discredited when two leading candidates,

including Alassane Ouattara, were disqualied overquestions o their parents citizenship. Even so, Gu

came in second in the elections, leading him to de-

clare them invalid and himsel the victor. Subsequent

riots and attacks on the presidential palace orced

him to fee.

As the only other major candidate whose name

appeared on the ballot, Laurent Gbagbo won the

most votes and was eventually declared president.

Another coup attempt in 2002 precipitated an ag-

gressive security operation against regions with largeimmigrant populations, causing widespread displace-

ment. The resulting polarization quickly evolved into

a rebellion and a North-South split o the country.

A United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation was

deployed to monitor the ceasere line.

Although Gbagbo began his political career as

a democratic reormist, his 10-year reign was raught

with intolerance o political dissent, omenting o

Houphout-Boignys message opeace and social harmony is his

most important legacy


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ethnic division, manipulation o religious and citizen-

ship tensions, and violence. Despite numerous peace

agreements to uniy the country, Gbagbos vitriolic

rhetoric against immigrants persisted. Citing logisti-

cal challenges and voter eligibility disputes, partisan

ocials continually postponed elections slated or

2005, the end o Gbagbos legal mandate. The delays

enabled Gbagbo to cling to power or 5 more years,

setting the backdrop to the 2010 elections.

ETHNIC AND RELIG IOUS DIV IS IONS

As in many sub-Saharan Arican countries,

ethnic, regional, and religious divisions have been

exploited by certain Ivorian politicians over the

past decade to mobilize a stronger base o sup-

port. Five main groups dominate. The Snouo,

Malink, and Mand in the North, the majority

o whom are Muslim, account or roughly 40 per-

cent o the total population. Meanwhile, the Krous

and Akans in the South, who or the most part are

Christians, comprise approximately 50 percent o

all inhabitants. Some 50 other ethnic groups make

up the remaining 10 percent o the population.

Immigration on a massive scale has signicantly

highlighted the division between native groups

in the south and nonnative groups in the North,

the principal target being the 4 million-strong

Burkinab community.

These divisions are not, per se, the catalysts

o violence, since no atavistic hatred among the

various ethnic and religious components o the

population is elt. Rather, certain underlying ac-

tors, such as land disputes in the cocoa-producing

areas, are parlayed onto an intercommunal level,poisoning relations.

Unortunately, the social consensus orged by

Houphout-Boigny broke down soon ater he died and

ambitious political entrepreneurs began to an identi-

ty-related tensions. By the late 1990s, this acrimony

became widespread and public resources were increas-

ingly allocated or political avors rather than to address

mounting social issues, such as massive unemployment.

It is in this context that the notion o Ivoirit,

distinguishing between true Ivorians and nonindig-

enous immigrants, was theorized. Ivoirit was used to

exclude Alassane Ouattara, a ormer prime minister

under Houphout-Boigny, rom the race to succeed

the long-time president ollowing his death. More

generally, Ivoirit barred legitimate aspirations to

citizenship among northern communities and exac-

erbated intercommunal tensions.

MILITARY FACTOR AND IMPLICATIONS

The army is an institutional pillar o any na-

tion. Houphout-Boigny, however, distrusted that

institution, especially ollowing the coup that over-

threw President Kwame Nkrumah in neighboring

Ghana in 1966. While Houphout-Boigny sought to

ensure that internal balances were maintained with-

in the Ivorian Army, he was unwilling to provide it

with signicant assets. He avored the Gendarmerie,

established an independently organized Presidential

Guard, and placed the country under the security

shield o France. This resulted in the ormation o

a military with no obligation to deend the consti-

tution and state institutions. Indeed, it paved the

way or the dominant and negative role the mili-

tary would play in Ivorian politics ater Houphout-

Boignys death, underscored by the military coup in

December 1999 against Houphout-Boignys suc-cessor, President Henri Bedi. A rebel movement

dubbed the New Forces subsequently took control

o the entire northern part o the country, with ve

Zone commanders setting themselves up as veritable

proconsuls. Meanwhile, the national army did noth-

ing to show itsel as truly republican in nature. It

had become ethnicized during the 1990s, especially

within the Presidential Guard, to the detriment o

the rule o law and national cohesiveness.

The 5-month stando ollowing the 2010 elec-tions was ultimately resolved when the New Forces

deeated the Gbagbo loyalists with support o the

UN peacekeeping orce that neutralized heavy

weapons being used against civilians. In this morass,

a number o dierent armies, including both regular

and parallel orces, were involved, including an es-

timated 5,000 Liberian mercenaries. Motivated by

the desire or easy prots, oten under the infuence

a military with no obligation todeend the constitution


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the United Nations certifcationo the results o the presidentialelections in Cte dIvoire is an

important precedent

o drugs, and eared or possessing magical powers,

these mercenaries committed atrocious crimes.

Dozons, traditional hunters rom the North, were

also implicated in several post-election massacres.

THE BREAKDOWN OF STATE STRUCTURES

A central lesson rom Cte dIvoire is that a

ailed electoral process almost always has disastrous

consequences or a society. It simultaneously el-

evates the risk o confict and a new cycle o coups

dtat. Such was the case ollowing the lawed

2000 elections in Cte dIvoireand then again

in 2010.

As elections are the means through which power

in a democratic society is authorized and legitimated,

it is during these junctures that the independence o

state bodies, such as electoral commissions and con-

stitutional courts, is most critical. A lack o inde-

pendence o such institutions is a root cause o much

political violence and instability.

In Cte dIvoire, the politicization o the Com-

mission lectorale Indpendante (CEI), or example,

was starkly evident in its unwillingness to address chal-

lenges to voter lists, securely distribute electoral mate-

rial and collect ballots, and announce results o the

2010 elections in a timely manner. The Constitutional

Councils immediate rejection o Ouattaras victory,

which even the CEI had validated and the UN Securi-ty Council endorsed, ostered urther uncertainty that

led to the violence that soon enguled the country.

The tarnished independence o these electoral bodies,

which grew less reliable over Gbagbos decade in power

as he lled them with loyalists, created an environ-

ment in which heavy weapons became the inevitable

method to settle election-related disputes.

NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Cte dIvoires electoral crisis was preceded bya long decline perpetuated by strong-willed political

leaders who operated with limited checks and bal-

ances and thereore could reely exploit ethnic and

regional divides. Overcoming this vulnerability in

the uture will require establishing institutions that

can constrain powerul politicians who may wish to

pursue radical or extraconstitutional actions. Spe-

cically, a vigorous legislature is needed to serve as

a counterweight to the long dominant executive

branch. The prevailing status quo in Arica, o a

centralized state under the orders o a monarch-like

president, must be overcome.

The new parliament must have the authority

to create a new constitution, oversee security sec-

tor reorm, and pursue decentralization policies that

promote balanced development and participatory de-

mocracy. In act, a strong, independent parliament

could rejuvenate Cte dIvoires political leadership

by providing the third postindependence generation

with opportunities to ocus their talents and ideas or

the benet o the society. This generational renewal

will also help deescalate engrained bitterness and

political polarization. The decision by the opposi-

tion party (largely composed o Gbagbo loyalists) to

boycott the parliament is a lost opportunity to reduce

this divisiveness.

Closely linked to creating an eective parlia-

ment is establishing a credible, capable, and inde-

pendent CEI. This is imperative in order to assure

all parties that they have a viable, legal meansthrough which they can compete or power. The

high stakes o elections require independent struc-

tures that operate both upstream and downstream in

the electoral process.

This matter is so central that i domestic struc-

tures are too ragile or politicized to play this role

eectively, then the engagement o outside bod-

ies, such as the Economic Community o West

Arican States (ECOWAS) and the UN, should

be considered. The United Nations certicationo the results o the 2010 presidential elections in

Cte dIvoire is an important precedent in that re-

gard. While this approach has obvious drawbacks,

these are less costly than the armed intervention

that ensueda point underscored by the violence

that surrounded disputed electoral processes in the

Democratic Republic o the Congo and Senegal

subsequent to the Ivorian crisis.


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BUILDING A UNIF IED AND REPUBLICAN

SECURITY FORCE

Security sector reorm is key to normalizing

Cte dIvoire. Even though he achieved victory

through the enorcement capacity o the New

Forces, Ouattara must nd a way to extricate him-

sel rom the military spiral. Given that he also

received support rom the UNOCI and French

peacekeeping orces, he must provide reassurance

that he is not the candidate parachuted in by the

ormer colonial power. From this perspective, the

creation o a unied and republican army must be

a priority or his administration.

Ouattara must ocus on restoring proessionalism

in the army and other security sector bodies while

at the same time depoliticizing them. Every presi-

dent since Houphout-Boigny has altered the ethnic

composition o the military to avor his own ethnic

group.1 By putting an end to this destructive cycle,

Ouattara would demonstrate by his actions that he is

committed to reunication.

Removing paramilitary threats, particularly

in the west o the country, is also among the most

pressing challenges. This requires a solution that ismore multiaceted than a traditional demobilization,

disarmament, and reintegration approach. Vigor-

ous yet fexible training must provide government

security personnel with the skills necessary to orce-

ully stamp out illegal armed groups, most o whom

are generally young traditional hunters patrolling

their areas o origin but also include militia and or-

eign mercenaries. Incentivized social rehabilitation

projects or ex-combatants and close consultation

with relevant local chies and leaders are necessarycomponents.

The plan o quotas, using elements rom op-

posing armies to recast the army, is doomed to ail.

Rather, objective recruitment, including o youth

who have not taken part in past conlicts, and a

selection process that is based on intellectual and

proessional competences, is the ideal ormula the

government should use to rebuild the Ivorian armed

orces. The ght against the culture o impunity is

also an imperative.

However, security sector reorm must exceed

conventional standards. It is important to eliminate

the seeds o division in society that contaminated the

armed orces. Ultimately a new ethic and a new vi-

sion o the security architecture must be promoted,

inspired by the concept o the Army-Nation as the

guarantor o harmonious civil-military relations. Sen-

egal is a valuable model in this regard. In addition to

its mission o deense, the armed orces in Senegal

play a key role in natural disaster response and na-

tional inrastructure eorts. Replicating these prin-

ciples in Cte dIvoire could help repair civil-military

relations and regain sociopolitical stability.

RECONCIL IATION AND PEACE

To advance a uniying theme o peace, President

Ouattara has established an 11-member Commission

o Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation inspired by

the South Arican model. While the South Arica

experience will doubtless prove helpul, Ivorians will

have more to gain by refecting on their own realities,

cultures, and historical background.

The Commission should draw rom mecha-

nisms o conlict resolution and restoration o

peace used in the traditional kingdoms and com-

munities o Cte dIvoire. Adopting many o thesetime-honored practices, including palavers and

parent plaisanterie,or kinship joking, whose ca-

thartic unction is to deuse intercommunity ten-

sions, can give political decisionmakers and media-

tors modalities to neutralize confict rhetoric and

promote a culture o peace. This was the creed o

Houphout-Boigny.

A central eature o any reconciliation strategy

will be to renegotiate the notion o citizenship in a

more inclusive way and banish the concept o Ivo-irit. Cte dIvoire is a multiethnic society largely

shaped by immigration. This must be recognized in

the laws governing citizenship. Any other approach

is exclusionary and would hinder national reconcilia-

tion while sowing the seeds or uture instability.

In this process o reconciliation and pacica-

tion, women will have a undamental role. First,

by virtue o their sheer numberswomen make

the plan o quotas . . . to recastthe army is doomed to ail


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up more than hal the population o the country.

Beyond this is their natural anity towards peace.

Throughout this crisis, there was not a single report

o a woman who took up arms. On the contrary,

women were raped, harassed, and killed in great

numbers by both sides.

The role o women in transethnic amily net-

works also constitutes a real advantage in mending

the torn social abric. Examples o interethnic mar-

riages among the political elite are numerous and sig-

nicant. Guillaume Soro, a prime minister under both

Gbagbo and Ouattara, is a Snouo rom the North

married to a Bt woman rom the Southeast. Gbagbo

himsel, to expand his political sphere o infuence,

took a Dioula woman rom the North as his second

wie. More iconic is the case o Henriette Diabat, an

Agni rom the Southwest, whose husband rom the

North was minister o state under Houphout-Boigny.

A renowned historian, Diabat was awarded the title

Grand Chancellor o the National Order, which sends

a strong signal to Ivorian women. Such matrimonial

alliances that cross ethnic lines are plentiul in Cte

dIvoire, and not only among the elite. The childrenrom such marriages cannot be placed in strict ethnic

and regional categories.

In order or peace and democracy to take root,

a proactive strategy that targets the nations young

people is also needed. Cte dIvoire has an advan-

tage in this regard in that it can build on a long

legacy o tolerance rom the Houphout-Boigny

years. The goal must be to educate young people in

a way that encourages a harmonious integration o

all o the countrys communities into national lie.This is especially important since people under 15

years o age account or 43 percent o the popula-

tion. They were also an important playing card or

the Gbagbo regime, which relied on detribalized,

urban youngsters whom it had indoctrinated and

who were prone to violence.

Such tendencies, though, are not irreversible.

An educated, responsible class o young people can

nd its place in the political arena and make sound

contributions to the countrys reconstruction, par-

ticularly i they are aorded education and employ-

ment opportunities. However, they need to be given

tangible hope or a better tomorrow and supported

and encouraged to create social networks that culti-

vate a civic spirit and tolerance.

SUBREGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Cte dIvoire borders ve countries and can-

not, thereore, conceive o any national security

strategy without taking into account the subre-

gional context.

Consider the Mano River Union, established

in 1973 between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea,

with Cte dIvoire joining in 2008. This union has

experienced severe crises and is seen as the under-

belly o West Arica, with two civil wars in Sierra

Leone (19912002), a tragic civil war in Liberia

(19902003), a political-military crisis in Cte

dIvoire rom 1999 to 2011, and violent social up-

heavals, military repression, and ongoing criminal

activity in Guinea.

The Mano River Union, then, is a problematic

zone where yesterdays child soldiers, now adults,

join together in mercenary groups to continue

their transboundary criminal activities, threat-

ening the stability o the subregion. A concertedstrategy, bolstered by renewed political will that

entails joint action to demilitarize the inernal

triangle, the Liberia-Guinea-Cte dIvoire border

zone, and coordinated cross-border development,

is needed among the countries o the Mano River

Union to neutralize mercenaries, implement secu-

rity sector reorm, and impose peace in this subre-

gion o enormous resources.

The Ouagadougou-Abidjan axis is another stra-

tegic linchpin to stability given the deep geographicand historical bonds and size o the Burkinab dias-

pora in Cte dIvoire. The authorities o both capi-

tals are thereore duty-bound to cultivate harmonious

relations between their two countries. Ouagadougou

should work with Abidjan to help control migratory

fows into Cte dIvoire, improve border security, and

initiate economic and social development programs

in remote border areas.

Cte dIvoire is amulti-ethnic society largely

shaped by immigration


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Peace in Cte dIvoire will also not take

root without close and loyal cooperation with its

neighbor to the east, Ghana. Indeed, both coun-

tries share a border that arbitrarily divided the siz-

able Akan community, who are members o what

was once one o the most prestigious kingdoms in

Arica, the Ashanti. Ghana has welcomed a large

number o Ivorian reugees. It is imperative, there-

ore, that the new authorities in Abidjan work

proactively with Accra to reassure these reugees

that they are welcome to repatriate and essential

to rebuilding the country. In October 2011, Presi-

dent Ouattara made such an appeal when signing

a tripartite agreement with Ghana and the United

Nations High Commission or Reugees to jointly

acilitate reugee return to Cte dIvoire. In ad-

dition, Ghana, a peaceul neighbor that has em-

barked on a path o sustained economic develop-

ment and democratization, could provide Abidjan

with guidance and expertise on its recovery.

In other words, peace, security, and develop-

ment in Cte dIvoire are inseparable rom that o

its neighbors.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it is important to calm souls, to

restore trust in Cte dIvoires institutions, and

to bring divided communities together around acollective project aimed at achieving shared and

united development. As or its tremendous natu-

ral riches, and the proven skills o its human re-

sources, Cte dIvoire can, with responsible and

reassuring leadership, take up the challenge and

regain its role as a catalyst or West Arican de-

velopment. The task, however, is large and will

require patience and sel-denial. It is imperative

that government leaders avoid conveying any sense

o triumph and be proactive in overcoming the in-

evitable obstacles.

NOTE

1 Ragnhild Nords, Identity Polarization and Confict: State

Building in Cte dIvoire and Ghana, paper prepared or the 49th

International Studies Association Convention, San Francisco,

CA, March 2629, 2008.

ISSN 2164-4039

Addressing Côte d'Ivoire's Deeper Crisis

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