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1. Rural Bank of Anda vs Roman Catholic Bishop of Lingayen-Dagupan G.R. NO. 155051 The Case This is a petition for review [1] of the Decision [2] dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 66478. The Facts The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1. Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley. In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary. [3] The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day. [4] On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution Nos. 104 [5] and 105. [6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters. [7] In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being constructed enclosing a portion of
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Transcript of adadas
1. Rural Bank of Anda vs Roman Catholic Bishop of Lingayen-DagupanG.R. NO. 155051
The Case This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478. The Facts The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1. Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley. In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.[3] The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day.[4] On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution Nos. 104[5] and 105.[6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters.[7]
In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped. On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736. On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]: 1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent; 2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron railings, to cause to be removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and severally, and 3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as litigation expenses, attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of litigation expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda. The Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 . The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of public dominion and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of Appeals held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private ownership. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void. The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court. The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid. The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.[9]
Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and playground.[10]
On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey[11] of Lot 736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved.[12] The cadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation[13] of Lot 736 which was likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989. The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.[14] Lot 736 was also used for parking and playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:[16]
There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled “that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government.” It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: “The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain.” This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain.[17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.”
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the government.[18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
2. Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural ResourcesG.R. NO. 135385
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. [1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
“(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
“(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
“(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
“(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
“(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.”[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
“(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
“(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
“(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
“(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.”[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that “the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination.” They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
“(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
“(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
“(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
“(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
“(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.”[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
3. Republic vs NaguiatG.R. NO. 134209
Facts:This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by Celestina Nuguiat located at Botolan, Zambales.
Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga, and Fausto Monje and their predecessor –in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.
The Republic filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the monuments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the lands applied for, and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
Issue: Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain and the applicants registration of title will prosper.
Held:Applicant’s registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because the said land is a public forest lands. Forest
lands unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable and agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.
Forests, in the context of both Public Land act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of woodland or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. For unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
Facts:Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of land contending she is the owner of the said land which she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn acquired the same from persons who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic filed in opposition that said lands belong to the public domain and not subject to private appropriation.
Issue:Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land belonging to public domain may be appropriated as private property.
Ruling:For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an express and positive act of the government that it will become a part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of public domain.Occupation in the concept of an owner cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered to as a title.
4. Carino vs Insular Government212 US 449
Land Titles and Deeds – Regalian Doctrine – Statute of LimitationsOn June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petitionaverring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
FACTS: Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because
the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application
For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)
1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail
1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only established possessory title
Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation
ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.
HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.
(Land Titles and Deeds – Native Title)Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
How it reached the court:
- Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the court, but the Government of the Philippines and the government of the United states appealed to the Court of first instance of Benguet (they were taking the property for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for registration) and this was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. This was brought to the US Supreme court by writ of error.
Facts:
- Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30 years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. Although no title was issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.
- Premilinary issues. o Whether the mode of reaching the US supreme court was right (this was a writ of error, some were
saying that it should have been an appeal) – Holmes said that the mode was correct. Writ of error was the general rule, appeal is the exception. He saw no reason not to apply the general rule to this case.
o Another issue was that even if Carino was able to have a title over the land, he could not have it registered because Benguet was one of the excluded provinces in the Philippine Commission’s act no. 926 (AN ACT PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE HOMESTEADING, SELLING, AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS…). But that law dealt with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Carino argued that he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered the entire Philippine archipelago. Holmes held that he could register the land if ownership can be maintained
- Main issue: whether Carino owns the land. o Government’s argument: Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except those it saw fit to permit
private titles to be acquired. That there was a decree issued by Spain that required registration within a limited time. Carino’s land wasn’t registered and so in effect it became public land.
USSC: Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US would view plaintiff to have lost all his rights to the land – this would amount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have granted to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.
Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the US would be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the constitution, it provides that “'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws”. It would be hard to believe that that “any person” didn’t include the inhabitants of Benguet. Nor it meant “property” to refer only to those lands which had become such under a ceremony(of registration) many of the people of the land may have not even heard of.
Although in sec. 14 of the organic act, it is said that the Philippine commission may prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to those cases where the land was admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still remains: what property and rights did the US acquire?
in cases like this one, the presumption would and should be against the government. As far back as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it was never public land. It would not be proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it really meant to use the rights acquired by them “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof”.
The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. They didn’t intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was admitted: that if they weren’t able to produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.
although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title or else lose his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who wrongfully occupied royal lands. IT doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would be attributed to those who may prove possession for the necessary time. There were indications that registration was expected but it didn’t mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to confer title to them but to establish it.
o “Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. “
Judgment reversed
5. Ching vs CAG.R. NO. 59731
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City) granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA, Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633 was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be duly substantiated by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes due the Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo).
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered and set aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated September 2, 1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but the same was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February 10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with the resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, 1982 (p. 159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution of June 28, 1982 (p. 191, Ibid.)
Petitioner raised the following:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PARTIES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES IN INSTITUTING THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19 YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of service of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem, for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng who on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the doctrine enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch III commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly
published in the same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The action being a quasi in rem summons by publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name—after one year from the date of the decree—is not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
6. Castillo vs EscutinG.R. NO. 171056
D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo seeking
the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,[2] dated 18 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533, as well as the Resolution,
[3] dated 11 January 2006 of the same court denying reconsideration of its afore-mentioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
affirmed the Joint Resolution[4] dated 28 April 2004 and Joint Order[5] dated 20 June 2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in
OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, dismissing petitioner Dinah C. Castillo’s complaint for grave misconduct and violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, against respondent public officers Antonio M. Escutin
(Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas) and Marietta L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together with private individuals Lauro S. Leviste II (Leviste) and
Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for
properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla
(Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an Order[6] dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary
Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for
conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by “Perla K. Mortilla, et al.” and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449,
to residential, commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification [7] stating
that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax
Declaration No. 00554-A itself.[8] Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certification [9] attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-
owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May
2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and
Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She immediately went to
the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President,Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any document
to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful
and influential for petitioner to tangle with.
The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition of Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in
the Primary Entry Book and Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 3344 [10]: (a) Notice of Levy;[11] (b)
Certificate of Sale;[12] (c) Affidavit of Publication;[13] and (d) Writ of Execution.[14]
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, [15] indicating that she owned 5,000
square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot 13713, she was shocked to find out that, without
giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648
square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129642 [16] and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A,
[17] both in the name of Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-
B to Summit Realty, to wit: ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of LEONARDO YAGIN: For purposes more particularly stipulated in the contract ratified before Atty. Ernesto M. Vergara of Lipa City as per Doc. No. 639; Page No. 29; Book No. LXXVI; Series of 1976.Date of instrument – 2-6-1976Date of inscription – 6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m. ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF SUMMIT POINT REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP: –ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: – Of the parcel of land described in this cert. of title is hereby sold and cancelled TCT No. 134609(SN-6672938) Vol. 671-A, having been issued by virtue of the aforesaid instrument ratified before Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Notary Public for Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page 31, Book No. LXVII, Series of 2002.Date of instrument: July 22, 2002Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30 P.M.[18]
On 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit
Realty was issued in its place.
The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint Affidavit [19] before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon charging several public officers and private individuals as follows: 32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and July 2002 and onwards in Lipa City, Atty.
Antonio M. [Escutin], the Register of Deeds of Lipa City[;]Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of the City Assessor’s Office of Lipa City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City, who are public officers and acting in concert and conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L. Orense, Executive Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively[,] of Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation x x x while in the discharge
of their administrative functions did then and there unlawfully, through evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and with manifest partiality towards Summit caused me injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City and instead issuing in the name of Francisco Catigbac TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities well knew that TCT No. 129642 was already cancelled and therefore not legally entitled to a new tax declaration thereby manifestly favoring Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation who now appears to be the successor-in-interest of Francisco Catigbac, all to my damage and prejudice.[20](Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit gave rise to simultaneous administrative and preliminary (criminal) investigations, docketed as OMB-L-
A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, respectively.
Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the circumstances surrounding the alleged sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty and in the
documents evidencing the same.
The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbac’s
attorney-in-fact, appeared to be a “one-way street.” It did not express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its
consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. No representative of Summit Realty signed the left margin of each and every page of said Deed. It
also did not appear from the Deed that a representative of Summit Realty presented himself before the Notary Public who notarized the said
document. The Tax Identification Numbers of Yagin, as vendor, and Summit Realty, as vendee, were not stated in the Deed.
Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation, Summit Realty could only act through its Board of Directors. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B was presented for recording before the Register of Deeds, it was not accompanied by a Secretary’s Certificate attesting to
the existence of a Board Resolution which authorized said purchase by Summit Realty. There was no entry regarding such a Secretary’s Certificate
and/or Board Resolution, whether on TCT No. 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A Secretary’s Certificate eventually surfaced, but it was executed
only on 30 July 2002, five days after TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was already issued.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and recorded by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., at
exactly the same date and time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit Realty. Petitioner theorizes that for this to happen, TCT No. T-134609 was
already prepared and ready even before the presentation for recording of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried. The agency Catigbac supposedly executed in favor of Yagin was extinguished by
Catigbac’s death. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had authority to execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of
Summit Realty, making the said Deed null and void ab initio.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death, having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the
Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lipa City. During the ex partepresentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000, Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbac’s
property used to form part of a bigger parcel of land,Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square meters, covered by TCT No. 181 in the
name of Catigbac; after Catigbac’s death, Lot 1 was informally subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of
whom again transferred their shares to other persons; Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners,
with a consolidated area of 105,648 square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey; despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot
1, TCT No. 181 covering the same was never cancelled; and the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated at
the back of the original copy of TCT No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order[21] dated 3 January 2001, the RTC granted the
Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the same
terms and condition as in its original form.
Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with Catigbac’s property, purportedly without legal
personality and capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was
Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but Orense,
who, through a letter[22] dated 27 June 2001, requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new certificate of title
for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orense’s request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, later cancelled and replaced
by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT
No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s Tax Declaration No.
00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in her Complaint Affidavit the alleged scheme perpetrated against her and the
involvement therein of each of the conspirators: 28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation went into action right after I paid Orense a visit sometime
May 2002. Summit resurrected from the grave. (sic) Francisco Catigbac whom they knew to be long dead to face possible litigation. This is the height of malice and bad faith on the part of Summit through its Lauro Leviste II, the Executive Vice President and Benedicto Orense, the Vice President. I had only in my favor a tax declaration to show my interest and ownership over the 5, 000 sq.m. of the subject parcel of land. Evidently, Leviste and Orense came to the desperate conclusion that they needed a TCT which is a far better title than any tax declaration.
Both then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by causing on June 26, 2002 at 11:20 a.m. the
inscription with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City of a purported Special Power of Attorney in favor of Leonardo Yagin (Annex “I”). Next, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “J”) was made the following month in order to make it appear that Yaginunilaterally sold to Summit the subject parcel of land purportedly belonging to Francisco Catigbac. Since the latter was already dead and realizing that the agency was already extinguished, Annex “J” was not signed or executed by Leviste or Orense. This fact however did not deter the two from securing a BIR clearance on July 25, 2002. Also, on this same day, July 25, 2002, Annex “J” was presented to Atty. [Escutin] at 2:30 p.m. simultaneously, at exactly the same time of 2:30 p.m. TCT No. T-134609 in Summit’s name was issued by Atty. [Escutin] WITHOUT benefit of the submission of the necessary documentation such as the Board Resolution, DAR Clearance, Revenue Tax Receipts for documentary stamps, real property tax clearance, proof of payment of transfer tax, tax declaration, articles of incorporation, SEC certification, license to sell and/or certificate of registration by HLURB, etc. Without the total and lightning speed cooperation of Atty. [Escutin] to close his eyes to the total absence of said vital documents, the desperately needed TCT to erase my interest and ownership would not have come into existence. Atty. [Escutin] had indeed acted in concert and in conspiracy with Leviste and Orense in producing Annex “H” and Annex “K”.
29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the already cancelled TCT No. 129642 in the name of Francisco
Catigbac to be the basis in seeking the cancellation of TD #00942A in my name (Annex “F”). The Tax Mapping Division of the Office of City Assessor of Lipa City opined that my 5,000 sq.m. was (sic) part and parcel of the 105,648 sq.m. covered by TCT No. 129642. A photocopy of the Certification from said division is hereto marked and attached as Annex “P”, hereof. Aquilina Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City then conveniently caused the disappearance of my Notice of Levy and other supporting documents which she had personally received from me on March 13, 2002. For her part of the conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, forthwith cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu thereof she issued TD #00949-A in the name of Francisco Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas and Linatoc were presented a cancelled TCT as basis for obliterating my 5,000 sq.m. The fact of cancellation is clearly stated on the posterior side of TCT No. 129642. Both can read. But the two nevertheless proceeded with dispatch in canceling my TD, though they had ample time and opportunity to reject the request of Summit who is not even the registered owner appearing on TCT No. 129642. Francisco Catigbac could not have been in front of Mistas and Linatoc because he was already six feet below the ground. Mistas and Linatoc could have demanded presentation of the document authorizing Summit in requesting for the cancellation of my TD. Also, they could have demanded from Summit any document transferring my interest and ownership in favor of a third party. Or, at least, they could have annotated in Tax Declaration No. 00949-A the fact that I bought my 5,000 sq.m. from a public auction sale duly conducted by the court sheriff. Alternatively, Linatoc and Mistas should have advised Summit to the effect that since they already appear to be the owners of the subject parcel of land, the new tax declaration should bear their name instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed conspired with Summit in the illegal and unwarranted cancellation of my TD and in covering
up the behind-the-scenes activities of Summit by making it appear that it was Francisco Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even Leonardo Yagin, the alleged attorney-in-fact did not appear before Mistas and Linatoc. Yagin could not have appeared because he is rumored to be long dead. The aforementioned acts of the two benefitted (sic) Summit through their manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable negligence. Perhaps, there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin is dead because he does not even have a TIN in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. If indeed Yagin is already dead or inexistent[,] the allged payment of the purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on July 25, 2002 is a mere product of the fertile imagination of Orense and Leviste. To dispute this assertion[,] the live body of Leonardo Yagin must be presented by Orense and Leviste.[23]
After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro-
indiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. She also sought the annotation of her Affidavit of Adverse Claim on
the said 5,000 square meters on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty.
Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriff’s
Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance registered, since: The Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic) ownership in favor of the Plaintiff, [Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it happen (sic) that the presented Tax Declaration [No.] 00942-A is already transfer (sic) in the name of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo, therefore[,] the registration of Sheriff (sic) Final Sale is no longer necessary. [24]
Escutin likewise denied petitioner’s request to have her Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated on TCT No. T-134609 on the following
grounds:
1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the registered owner. The registered owner is Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134609 of the Registry of Deeds for Lipa City.
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or interest of the adverse claimant is by virtue of
a Levy on Execution by the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them (Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her adverse claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds no title over the property.[25]
Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the denial of her request
for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and annotation of her adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609. This petitioner did on 3
July 2003.
While her Consulta was pending before the LRA, petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint Affidavit [26] and a Second Supplemental
Complaint Affidavit[27]with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, bringing to its attention the aforementioned developments. In her
Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit, petitioner prayed that Sta. Ana be included as a co-respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-
03-0728-F, averring that the latter’s actuation deprived petitioner of a factual basis for securing a new title in her favor over her 5,000 square
meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, because the public auction sale of the said property to her could never become final without the registration of
the Sheriff’s Deed.
The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F filed their respective Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. T-134609 reflected the same date and time of entry of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Yagin (as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact) and Summit Realty, i.e., 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., in accordance with Section 56[28] of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. He emphasized that his duty as Register of Deeds to register the
Deed of Absolute Sale presented before him was purely ministerial. If the document was legal and in due form, and there was nothing mutilated or
irregular on its face, the Register of Deeds had no authority to inquire into its intrinsic validity based upon proofs aliunde. It was not true that he
allowed the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale notwithstanding the absence of the required documents supporting the application for
registration thereof. On the contrary, all the required documents such as the DAR Clearance, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Certificate
Authorizing Registration (CAR), Real Property Tax, Transfer Tax, Secretary’s Certificate and Articles of Incorporation of Summit Realty were
submitted. While it was true that the Secretary’s Certificate did not accompany the Deed of Absolute Sale upon the presentation of the latter for
registration, Section 117 of the Property Registration Decree gives the party seeking registration five days to comply with the rest of the
requirements; and only if the party should still fail to submit the same would it result in the denial of the registration. The License to Sell and the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Registration of Summit Realty are only required when a subdivision project is presented for
registration. The use of TINs in certain documents is a BIR requirement. The BIR itself did not require from Yagin as vendor his TIN in the Deed of
Absolute Sale, and issued the CAR even in the absence thereof. The Register of Deeds, therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As to the
Certification earlier issued by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was
not covered by any certificate of title, Escutin explained that the Register of Deeds was not technically equipped to determine whether a cadastral lot
number was within a titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or participating in the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No.
00942-A for, as Register of Deeds, he was not concerned with the issuance (or cancellation) of tax declarations.
Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, disputed petitioner’s
allegations that she personally received from petitioner copies of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents, and that she caused the
disappearance thereof. Although she admitted that said documents were shown to her by petitioner, she referred petitioner to the Receiving Clerk,
Lynie Reyes, who accordingly received the same. Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian of records of the Office and she should not be
held responsible for the missing documents. She opined that petitioner’s documents could have been among those misplaced or destroyed when the
Office of the City Assessor was flooded with water leaking from the toilet of the Office of the City Mayor. As Assistant City Assessor for
Administration, Mistas identified her main function to be the control and management of all phases of administrative matters and support. She had
no hand in the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and the issuance of Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A for such
function pertained to another division over which she did not exercise authority. Thus, it was also not within her function or authority to demand the
presentation of certain documents to support the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A or to cause the annotation of petitioner’s
interest on Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A.
Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, she was in charge
of safekeeping and updating the North District Records. With respect to the transfer of a tax declaration from one name to another, her duty was
limited only to the act of preparing the new tax declaration and assigning it a number, in lieu of the cancelled tax declaration. It was a purely
ministerial duty. She had no authority to demand the presentation of any document or question the validity of the transfer. Neither was it within her
jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner’s interest should have been annotated on Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A. Examining the
documents presented in support of the transfer of the tax declaration to another’s name was a function belonging to other divisions of the Office of
the City Assessors. The flow of work, the same as in any other ordinary transaction, mandated her to cancel petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-
A, and to prepare and release Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A after the transfer had been reviewed and approved by other divisions of the
Office. It was also not true that TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was already cancelled when it was presented before the Office of the City
Assessors; the photocopy of said certificate of title with the Office bore no mark of cancellation.
Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged with the respondent public officers, admitted that they were corporate officers of
Summit Realty. They related that Summit Realty bought a parcel of land measuring 105,648 square meters, later identified as Lot 1-B, previously
included in TCT No. 181, then specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of Catigbac. As a result of such purchase, ownership
of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good faith that said property was indeed
owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latter’s certificate of title over the same. Catigbac’s right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No.
181/No. 129642, was superior to petitioner’s, which was based on a mere tax declaration. Leviste andOrense rebutted petitioner’s assertion that the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, and Summit Realty was a “one-way street.” The Deed was actually signed on
the left margin by both Yagin and the representative of Summit Realty. The inadvertent failure of the representative of Summit Realty to sign the last
page of the Deed and of both parties to indicate their TINs therein did not invalidate the sale, especially since the Deed was signed by witnesses
attesting to its due execution. Questions as regards the scope of Catigbac’s Special Power of Attorney in favor of Yagin and the effectivity of the
same after Catigbac’s death can only be raised in an action directly attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot 1-B, and not in an administrative
case and/or preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman, which constituted a collateral attack against said title. Leviste and Orense further
explained that since the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and was judicially ordered replaced only on 3 January 2001, entries/inscriptions
were necessarily made thereon after said date. As to Orense’s failure to show petitioner any document proving ownership of Lot 1-B by Summit
Realty when the latter paid him a visit, it was not due to the lack of such documents, but because of petitioner’s failure to establish her right to peruse
the same. Orense also denied ever threatening petitioner during their meeting. Finally, according to Leviste and Orense, petitioner’s allegations were
based on mere conjectures and unsupported by evidence. That particular acts were done or not done by certain public officials was already beyond
the control of Leviste and Orense, and just because they benefited from these acts did not mean that they had a hand in the commission or omission
of said public officials.
After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F were finally submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Resolution[29] dated 28 April 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon gave more credence to respondent Escutin’s
defenses, as opposed to petitioner’s charges against him: Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he convincingly explained that he allowed the registration of the
allegedly defective Deed of Sale because he, as Register of Deeds, has no power to look into the intrinsic validity [of] the contract presented to him for registration, owing to the ministerial character of his function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said respondent, all the documents required for the registration of the Deed of Sale were submitted by the applicant.
We likewise find said respondent’s explanation satisfactory that Section 56 of P.D. 1529 mandates that the TCT bear
the date of registration of the instrument on which the said TCT’s issuance was based. It is for this reason that TCT 134609 bears the same date and time as the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which deed served as basis for its issuance.
As to his denial to register [herein petitioner’s] Affidavit of Adverse Claim and Sheriff’s Certificate of Final Sale,
through the issuance by the Registry of Deeds Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana, of the 29 June 2003 Order denying registration thereof, such matter had been raised by herein [petitioner] in a letter-consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As the criminal and administrative charges respecting this issue is premised, in part, on a matter still pending with the LRA, we find it premature to make a finding on the same.
It is for the same reason that we deny the motion contained in the Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit praying
for the inclusion, as additional respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana, who is impleaded solely on the basis of having signed, by authority of Escutin, the 29 July 2003 Order of denial of [petitioner’s] application for registration.
Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully demonstrate, through Consulta 2103 dated 25 July 1994, wherein
the denial of registration by the Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City was upheld by the LRA Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice in the different Registries that Examiners are given authority by the Register to sign letters of denial. [30]
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon declared in the same Joint Resolution that there was no basis to hold respondents Mistas
and Linatoc administratively or criminally liable:
In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges that Aquilina Mistas caused the disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents received from [petitioner] on 13 March 2003 when she applied for the issuance of a Tax Declaration in her favor, she did not present her receiving copy thereof showing that it was Mistas who received said documents from her. Neither did she show that Mistas is the employee responsible for record safekeeping.
Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation that respondent Marietta Linatoc cancelled Tax Declaration No.
00942-A and issued Tax Declaration 00949-Q (sic) on the basis of a cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title upon the behest of Summit [Realty], which was not the registered owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioner’s] allegation, admits having physically cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 00942-A and having prepared a new declaration covering the same property in Catigbac’s [name], as mandated by the flow of work in the City Assessor’s Office. However, she denies having the authority or discretion to evaluate the correctness and sufficiency of the documents supporting the application for the issuance of the Tax Declaration, arguing that her official function is limited to the physical preparation of a new tax declaration, the assignment of a new tax declaration number and the cancellation of the old tax declaration, after the application had passed the other divisions of the City Assessor’s Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are the ones officially designated to receive
applications for issuance of Tax Declaration, evaluate the sufficiency of the documents supporting such applications, and on the basis of the foregoing recommend or order the cancellation of an existing Tax Declaration and direct the annotation of any fact affecting the property and direct the issuance of a new tax declaration covering the same property.
In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official designation of said respondents. While [petitioner] impleads
Mistas, in her capacity as Local Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records Clerk, Mistas, in her counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, i.e., Assistant City Assessor for Administration, while Linatoc claims to be the Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the City Assessor’s Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents not having been neatly defined by [petitioner], this Office cannot make a
definitive determination of their liability for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which charges both relate to the performance or discharge of Mistas’ and Linatoc’s official duties.[31]
Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any probable cause to criminally charge private individuals Leviste
and Orense for the following reasons:
Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully cause the transfer of the title of [herein
petitioner’s] property to Summit sufficiently explained by respondent Register of Deeds, such allegation against private respondents loses a legal leg to stand on.
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently outline the official functions of respondents Mistas and Linatoc to
pin down their specific accountabilities, the imputation that private respondent (sic) conspired with said public respondents respecting the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 00942-A is likewise stripped of any factual and legal bases. [32]
As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter property, which issue comprised the very premise
of OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ruled that such matter was not within its
jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil action before the courts of justice.
In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed: WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that : (1) the administrative case against public
respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be DISMISSED, for lack of substantial evidence; and (2) the criminal case against the same respondents including private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for lack of probable cause.[33]
In a Joint Order[34] dated 20 June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took notice of the Resolution dated 17 December 2002 of the LRA in
Consulta No. 3483, which involved circumstances similar to those in petitioner’s case. The LRA distinguished between two systems of land
registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the Property Registration Decree, and the other is the system of registration for
unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree). These systems are separate and distinct from each
other. For documents involving registered lands, the same should be recorded under the Property Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of
an instrument under the wrong system produces no legal effect. Since it appeared that in Consulta No. 3483, the registration of the Kasulatan ng
Sanglaan, the Certificate of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation was made under Act No. 3344, it did not produce any legal effect on the disputed
property, because the said property was already titled when the aforementioned documents were executed and presented for registration, and their
registration should have been made under the Property Registration Decree.
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in the same Joint Order, took into account petitioner’s withdrawal of her
appeal en consultabefore the LRA of the denial by the Register of Deeds of her request for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which prompted the LRA Administrator to declare the consulta moot and academic. For want of a
categorical declaration on the registerability of petitioner’s documents from the LRA, the competent authority to rule on the said matter, there could
be no basis for a finding that respondent public officers could be held administratively or criminally liable for the acts imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court challenging the 28
April 2004 Joint Resolution and 20 June 2005 Joint Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. [35] The appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 90533.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision [36] on 18 October 2005, also finding no reason to administratively or criminally charge
respondents. Essentially, the appellate court adjudged that petitioner can not impute corrupt motives to respondents’ acts: Without evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money or other pay-off or that they were induced by offers of such, the Court cannot impute any taint of direct corruption in the questioned acts of respondents. Thus, any indication of intent to violate the laws or of flagrant disregard of established rule may be negated by respondents’ honest belief that their acts were sanctioned under the provisions of existing law and regulations. Such is the situation in the case at bar. Respondent Register of Deeds acted in the honest belief that the agency recognized by the court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered owner Francisco Catigbac and Leonardo Yagin subsisted with respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to Summit as the vendee, and that the Special Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale presented as evidence during said proceedings are valid and binding. Hence, respondent Escutin was justified in believing that there is no legal infirmity or defect in registering the documents and proceeding with the transfer of title of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner Summit. On the other hand, respondent Linatoc could not be held administratively liable for effecting the cancellation in the course of ordinary flow of work in the City Assessor’s Office after the documents have undergone the necessary evaluation and verification by her superiors. [37]
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his
investigatory power. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless
clothed with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court pronounced that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in dismissing petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit against respondents.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The challenged Joint Resolution dated April 28, 2004 and Joint Order dated June 20, 2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.[38]
In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for failing to present new
matter which the appellate court had not already considered in its earlier Decision.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, with the following assignment of errors: I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT (sic);
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS COULD NOT BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR UNDULY FAVORING SUMMIT TO THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER.[39]
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, Registration Decree which provides: SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. – In case of loss or theft of an owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any new instrument, a
sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct
the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of
the lost one. However, respondents did not only issue a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled petitioner’s Tax Declaration No.
00942-A and issued in its place Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. Respondents did not even annotate petitioner’s existing right
over 5,000 square meters of Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner maintains that a new
owner’s duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one. Under Section 109 of the Property Registration
Decree, the new duplicate of title was issued only to replace the old; it cannot cancel existing titles.
Petitioner’s position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous arguments and befuddled reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause
or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. [40] Title, therefore, may be
defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. [41] Certificate of
title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. [42] Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be
an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the
original registration.
Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its purchase of
the same from Yagin, the attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said property. Summit Realty merely sought the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it could accordingly register thereon the sale in its favor of a substantial portion of
Lot 1 covered by said certificate, later identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s title to Lot 1-B passed on by sale to Summit Realty, giving the latter the right
to seek the separation of the said portion from the rest of Lot 1 and the issuance of a certificate of title specifically covering the same. This resulted
in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which was subsequently cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-
134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Petitioner’s reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the
issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181,
but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No. 181 (and
subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. [43] All persons must take notice, and
no one can plead ignorance of the registration. [44] Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize
the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not
supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax
from different persons on one and the same property.
As between Catigbac’s title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner’s title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is
evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac’s
ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers and even petitioner
herself. Time and again, the Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a
real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. [45] Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square meter property from
Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals
aptly observed that, “[c]uriously, as to how and when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners
acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent.” [46]
Petitioner’s allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty by Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, are
beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already
acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership
of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally attacked in the administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. For this same reason, the Court
has no jurisdiction to grant petitioner’s prayer in the instant Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised by petitioner on the administrative liability of respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it establishes that petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Luzon gave rise to two charges: (1) OMB-L-A-03-0573-F involved the administrative charge for Gross Misconduct against respondent public
officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728-F concerned the criminal charge for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act[47] against respondent public officers and private individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, dismissed both charges. In the Petition at bar, petitioner only assails the dismissal of the administrative charge for grave
misconduct against respondent public officers. Since petitioner did not raise as an issue herein the dismissal by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, of the criminal charge against respondent public officers for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, the same became final and executory.[48]
In Domingo v. Quimson,[49] the Court adopted the well-written report and recommendation of its Clerk of Court on the administrative matter
then pending and involving the charge of gross or serious misconduct:
"Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for disciplinary action. And under MC No. 8, S. 1970, issued by the Civil Service Commission on July 28, 1970, which sets the 'Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in Administrative Cases and other Matters Relative Thereto,' the administrative offense of 'grave misconduct' carries with it the maximum penalty of dismissal from the service (Sec. IV-C[3], MC No. 8, S. 1970). But the term 'misconduct' as an administrative offense has a well defined meaning. It was defined in Amosco vs. Judge Magno, Adm. Mat. No. 439-MJ, Res. September 30, 1976, as referring 'to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' It is a misconduct 'such as affects the performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as effects his character as a private individual.' In the recent case of Oao vs. Pabato, etc., Adm. Mat. No. 782-MJ, Res. July 29, 1977, the Court defined 'serious misconduct' as follows:
‘Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this would be merely an error of
judgment and not serious misconduct. The term `serious misconduct’ is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action more particularly, unlawful behavior of gross negligence by the magistrate. It implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. We have previously ruled that negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. This is not so in the case at bar.’” (Italics supplied.)
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by
an intention to violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and
the Court of Appeals found that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s charge of grave misconduct against respondents. For this
Court to reverse the rulings of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals, it must necessarily review the evidence
presented by the parties and decide on a question of fact. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed
is one of fact.[50]
Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In order to resolve this issue,
the Court would necessarily have to look into the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings below. It is not the function of the
Court to reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again. This Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction in these cases being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts or administrative bodies performing quasi-judicial functions. It
should be emphasized that findings made by an administrative body, which has acquired expertise, are accorded not only respect but even finality by
the Court. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only substantial.[51]
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not disturb findings of fact. The Court cannot weigh once more the
evidence submitted, not only before the Ombudsman, but also before the Court of Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, findings of
fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. [52] Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[53]
The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that
respondents did not commit gross misconduct. Evident from the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution of the former and the 18 October 2005 Decision of
the latter is that they arrived at such findings only after a meticulous consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties.
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to convincingly explain that they had only acted in accordance
therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her documents. Respondents also enjoy in their favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duty. The burden of proving otherwise by substantial evidence falls on petitioner, who failed to discharge the same.
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of
the City Assessor. How then could she even assert that a particular action was within or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true
that petitioner should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such
would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her
insistence that respondents should have done or not done a particular act. A perfect example was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc
should have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which
authorizes or recognizes the annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any reliable evidence, petitioner’s charge that
respondents conspired with one another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just
because the acts of respondents were consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner
prejudice. Respondents’ actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty,
registered under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 18 October 2005 and
Resolution dated 11 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner
Dinah C. Castillo.
SO ORDERED.
7. Rudolf Lietz Holdings vs RD ParanaqueG.R. NO. 133240
NATURE:
A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of Parañaque City, Metro Manila involving questions of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Parañaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.
HELD:
Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court held that it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law. [16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would
have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
8. Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro vs CAG.R. NO. 103727
> This is a claim of a huge parcel of land covering lands in the provinces Nueva ecija, Bulacan, and in cities including Quezon city.
> This case involves 2 cases, which prior to being decided by the SC were consolidated. The first case was a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In the complaint, it was alleged that the defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz) were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to a portions of the claimed estate. In the end, the lower courts ruled in favor of Ocampo - Dela Cruz, declaringthat the Torrens titles of the defendants cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad no. 4316.
> The 2nd case is a petition for letters of adiministration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban. This involves a prayer to be declared as administrator. This case eventually ended in the same manner as the first case - the Titulo de Prorpriedad was declared void and of no legal force, therefore the lands covered by the Titulo are not within the estate of the deceased.
> Issue: W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and therefore the lands covered or claimed under such title are not included in the estate of the deceased...
> The Titulo is null and void. It has been defeated by the title of the defendants under the Torrens system.
> It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which tool effect on Feb 16 1976 the syte of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6mos from date of effectivity of the said decree.
> Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title) with the said decree should have been presented during trial.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or “214,047quiniones,”[1] on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled “Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136” dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south.[2]
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court,[3] in connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985];
andDirector of Lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994][4] terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
“It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court’s, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court’s dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.”[5] [Cited cases omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate’s claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint[6] for recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision[7] dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion[8] of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of suit.”
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the “Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban” against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614[9] and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B.[10]
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.[11]
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.[12]
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban” specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens system by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.[13]
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied,[14] and so, the petitioner estate interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed[15] for being unmeritorious and the lower court’s decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens System hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private individuals;
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and void. [16]
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the present petition[17] docketed as G. R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition[18] for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order[19] dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.
The dispositive portion[20] of the said Order reads:
“WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect and that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect.
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which had come into their possession or knowledge under oath.
7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.
The consideration and approval of the administrator’s final accounting and inventory of the presentation of movants-intervenors’ evidence as well as the consideration of all other incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a. m.”
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners was received by the lower court without any opposition.[21]
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate.[22]
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).[23]
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding GeneralPhilippine ConstabularyCamp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor GeneralManila
(c) The Government Corporate CounselA. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City andCaloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacanand Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the variousmunicipalities in which properties of the estate arelocated; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, QuezonCity and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.[24]
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
“4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in the proceedings at bar;
“5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;
“6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription;
“7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and
“8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in State ownership.”[25]
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings.[26]
On February 16, 1977, the Republic’s Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
“WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the ‘Opposition’ dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof.” [27]
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic.[28]
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private land
covered and described by said above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons, or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said sales, quitclaims, and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is hereby revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.”[29]
On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision:[30]
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12,1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said petition.[31]
After hearings were conducted on the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated Order[32] dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasao’s decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republic’s motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro.[33]
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs.[34] In affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republic’s claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision by invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[35]
Hence, the herein petition,[36] docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15, 1994.[37]
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
“I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower court’s null and void judgment.”[38]
In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:
“First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a question of title or ownership over which the lower court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners. [39]
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges of equal rank.[40]
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already final.[41]
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal. [42]
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Guido title.”[43]
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners’ Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court’s resolution of the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners’ Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an “intestate court”,[44] to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.[45]
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that petitioners’ contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the State’s patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased.[46]
A probate court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Mañingat v. Castillo,[47] that “the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration.” Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,[48] we stated, thus:
“x x x questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons x x x”
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia[49]that:
“x x x The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belongprima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.”[50] [Underscoring Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao’s decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez’ act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge
Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a “reviewing judge.” By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a “reviewing judge,” proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction.[51]
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied. The “reviewing judge” argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that “the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal.” [52] In the case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting aside Judge Bagasao’s Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez’ disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R. No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act[53] within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976.[54] Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. [55] Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.[56]
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
“SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.”
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:
“WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system”;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al.,[57] we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. [58] Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. [59] Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the so-called estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims.”[60]
In the same light, it does not escape this Court’s onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R. No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao’s Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulo’s validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez’ Order of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts’ holding in G.R. No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. “Q-RP”) to produce it as requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as “hypoteca” (the Spanish term is `hipoteca’) allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. “C-9” to “C-19”).
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
“SEC. 2. - Original writing must be produced; exceptions. - There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;"
x x x x x x x x x
Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:
“SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. --- When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.”
SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party’s custody. --- If the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party.”
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.[61]
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of Appeals,[62] we pointed out that:
“Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.[63]
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as “Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163”; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao’s April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado
appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel for the government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo propriedad 4136.
COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is already answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the due existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is actually in existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the question candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared to state that there is really in existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this Court that there was such a document examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic.”[64]
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
“x x x the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit `O-RP’) concluded that the document contained material alterations as follows:
a) On line 15 of ‘p. 1, Title’ and on line 5 of ‘p. 2, Title,’ the word ‘Pinagcamaligan’ was written after ‘Pulo;’
b) On line 16, ‘p. 1, Title,’ ‘un’ was converted to ‘mil;’
c) On Line 18, ‘p. 1, Title,’ ‘mil’ was written at the end of ‘tres’ in ‘tres mil;’
d) On line 19 of ‘p. 1, Title,’ a semblance of ‘mil’ was written after ‘setentay tres;’
e) On line 6, ‘p. 2, Title,’ ‘un’ was formed to a semblance of ‘uni;’ and
f) On line 8, ‘p. 2, Title,’ ‘un’ was formed to ‘mil.’
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the Titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still “pieces of black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of burnings.” The burnings were made on the very portions where there were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act.”[65]
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. [66] Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial court’s judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
“x x x The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the location of the land described in the original title x x x.”
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower court’s analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
“To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit “Q-RP’”) was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the Titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence.
It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park’s whereabouts are unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if produced.” [67]
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value.[68]
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muñoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al.[69] is enlightening. In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity,[70] Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
“But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City.’Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco’s ‘Rejoinder to Opposition’ dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its ‘Opposition’ of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco’s land. Piadeco’s ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment -- showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for -- were to be filed with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco’s Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v.Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadeco’s title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco’s explanation -- not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco’s treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the
land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco’s title.”
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[71] we categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muñoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo’s validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulo’s nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[72] the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:
“x x x conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required by merely identity of issues.”
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no “net estate” to speak of after the Titulo’s exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. “2”, Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. “2”- De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. “2” - Dela Cruz). [73] Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree.[74] More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity.[75] As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs’ claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client. [76] The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al.,[77] we held:
“It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.”
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993,[78] denied Catalino’s motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned
bonds were not included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows :
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
9. Legarda vs SaleebyG.R. NO. 8936
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.
FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued
the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?HELD: The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose itGranting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration?For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of titles under the Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
10. Talusan vs TayagG.R. NO. 133698
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed the taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the resultant proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property through an unregistered
deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because they are not the registered owners. Moral lessons: real property buyers must register their purchases as soon as possible and, equally important, they must pay their taxes on time.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 20, 1997 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41586. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision is hereunder reproduced as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated February 4, 1993) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) in Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs/appellants.”
Also assailed is the April 27, 1998 CA Resolution[2]which denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The questioned CA ruling affirmed the Decision[3] of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R. The RTC, in turn, dismissed an action for the annulment of the auction sale of a condominium unit, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 and located in Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of this case in this wise:[4]
“On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter alia, that:
--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, ‘[herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at public auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--‘Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974.’ Elias Imperial never authorized ‘a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for and on his behalf;’
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag for P4,400.00 ‘without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;’
--A final bill of sale was later issued ‘in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag.’ The assessed value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair market value of the same is more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these;
--The bid price of P4,400 ‘is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience,’ thus, the sale ‘for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties’ is ‘null and void ab initio;’
--‘[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has never been in possession of the said property;’
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered ‘to pay to the [respondents] the sum of P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.’
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to ‘preserve the status quo.’
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of not less than P20,000.00; attorney’s fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 for every appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00 to prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with [C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the allegations in the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative defenses, among others:
--‘(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;’
--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a ‘buyer in good faith in a regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.’
--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners’] claim ‘because the [petitioners] pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;’
--The public auction sale complied with ‘the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 464’ – hence, the same is ‘lawful and valid:’
--‘[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the [petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.’
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at least P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorney’s fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and, expenses of litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that ‘no irregularity or illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant herein were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the provisions of the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed against him.’ He also claimed, by way of affirmative defenses, that:
--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:
--‘[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus, the case cannot prosper;’
--‘Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because of] the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including defendant herein.’”
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the condominium from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was purportedly evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth never been registered with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioners also averred that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan Hernandez sold the property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate taxes thereon. The property was sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400 which represented the unpaid taxes.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.
Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16, 1987 judgment of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier Branch 6 Decision had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of Respondent Tayag. The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of Branch 5 of the same court which had granted a Petition for the Cancellation of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the Register of Deeds to issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of Respondent Tayag. According to the trial court, the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court, contrary to the principle of “conclusiveness of judgment.”
Ruling of the CA
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling and ratiocination. The CA explained that LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already ruled on the validity of the auction sale of the subject condominium unit. It further sustained the validity of that sale, because the city treasurer complied with the requirements of notice, publication and posting. It added that “[i]f [petitioners] never received the notices sent to Elias Imperial, then they have only themselves to blame for failing to register the deed of sale between them and the former owner x x x.”
Rejecting petitioners’ contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the CA ruled that such inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale. It likewise held that petitioners had not established bad faith on the part of respondents in conducting the auction sale. Finally, it agreed with the latter’s contention that the former were “remiss in causing the registration of the sale in their favor of the subject property and they likewise did not fulfill their obligation to pay taxes. It [is] thus clear x x x they should only have themselves to blame. Laws exist to be followed, failing in which the price must be paid.”
Hence, this recourse.[5]
The Issues
Petitioners assigned the following alleged errors for the consideration of this Court:[6]
“I. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider that the petitioners were deprived of their right to due process in this case due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of their former counsel who failed to inform them of the decision in this case and protect their interest.
“II. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the auction sale of the subject property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency when there was no compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 46 of P.D. 464 that such notice of delinquency of the payment of the property tax should be published.
“III. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider the lack of personal notice of the sale for public auction of the subject property to its owner which nullifies the said proceeding.
“IV. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the decision of the trial court in the petition for the consolidation of the title case filed by the private respondent in LRC Admin. Case 207 is a bar to this proceeding.
“V. FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the auction sale of subject property on equitable considerations.”
We deem it appropriate to simplify the issues in this wise: (1) whether the RTC Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R is a bar to this proceeding; and (2) whether the auction sale of the subject condominium unit should be annulled on the grounds of (a) non-publication of the notice of delinquency for the payment of property tax, (b) lack of personal notice of the sale or public auction of the subject property and (c) equitable considerations. As a preliminary matter, we shall also consider petitioners’ submission that they were deprived of due process because of their counsel’s failure to inform them immediately of the receipt of the CA Decision.
Preliminary Matter:
Negligence of Petitioners’ Former Counsel
Petitioners aver that their former counsel informed them of the CA Decision only on February 5, 1998, more than two months after he had received a copy on December 3, 1997. According to petitioners, their former counsel’s negligence effectively deprived them of their right to due process.
We disagree. Notwithstanding its late filing, their Motion for Reconsideration was accepted and considered by the CA. Hence, this issue has become moot, a fact which petitioners themselves admitted in their Memorandum: “As a matter of fact, in the very resolution of the Court of Appeals of April 27, 1998 (Annex ‘C’ to Petition) denying the motion for reconsideration, wherein the matter of inexcusable negligence of counsel in not informing petitioners immediately of the decision of the court a quo, were among the grounds thereof, it was held that the issues raised therein had already been considered in the Decision of November 20, 1997. The Court of Appeals obviously considered that the Motion for Reconsideration was validly filed by petitioners so that the Court of Appeals favorably considered the plea of petitioners to be afforded due process by acting on the Motion for Reconsideration. Otherwise, it could have just denied said Motion for late filing or simply noted the same without action.”[7]
Moreover, petitioners themselves declared in their Reply Memorandum [8] that this matter is no longer in issue: “At any rate this issue was raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the appellate court and obviously it was favorably considered as the said Court denied the merit of said Motion by stating that the issues raised have already been treated in the Decision, instead of outrightly denying the same for late filing. Hence, this is no longer in issue in this proceeding.”[9]
First Issue:
Bar by Earlier Judgment
Petitioners contend that the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (Branch 6), did not preclude the filing of a separate action to annul the auction sale. Citing Tiongco v. Philippine Veterans Bank,[10] they aver that this RTC Branch had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of that sale. Hence, its Decision in the LRC case cannot bar the present proceedings.
Petitioners’ reliance on Tiongco is misplaced, considering that its factual incidents are different from those of the present controversy. In that case, the trial court was acting on a Petition for the Surrender of Certificates of Title. In LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, the trial court was faced with a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership. It had jurisdiction to rule on all matters necessary for the determination of the issue of ownership, including the validity of the auction sale.
Indeed, this Court in several cases[11]has previously declared that a petition for the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate involves contentious questions which should be threshed out in an ordinary case, because the land registration court has no jurisdiction to try them.
Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases,[12] therefore, the Court declared that this Decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.[13]
Thus, petitioners err in contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred from ruling on the validity of the auction sale. That court now has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. [14] Especially where the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land registration court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction. [15]
It is equally important to consider that a land registration court’s decision ordering the confirmation and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world.[16] Thus, the trial court’s ruling consolidating the ownership and the title of the property in the name of herein respondent is valid and binding not only on petitioners, but also on everyone else who may have any claim thereon.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Auction sale
Petitioners contend that the auction sale was invalid, because several requisites regarding notice and publication were not satisfied. We are not convinced.
It has been held that matters of notice and publication in tax sales are factual questions that cannot be determined by this Court .[17] Moreover, a recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as in this case, generally precludes the determination of factual issues. This Court will not, as a rule, inquire into the evidence relied upon by the lower courts to support their findings. [18] In this case, the CA had already ruled on the question of compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in this wise:
“In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements of notice, publication and posting have been complied with by the public defendant prior to the auction sale wherein the subject condominium unit was sold. x x x Ergo, there was nothing irregular in the questioned public auction -- thus, the validity of the same must be upheld in accordance with the aforementioned cases.”[19]
The CA ruling notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss these factual issues in order to assure petitioners of a complete adjudication of their case, and not a mere disposition of procedural technicalities.
The Non-Publication of Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency
Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with the requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464.
In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam.[20] As such, mere publication of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the permanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by registered mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it.
Lack of Personal Notice of the Sale or of the Public Auction of the Subject Property
Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the public auction. They cite Section 73 of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced hereunder:
“x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by messenger, or through messenger, or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls or property tax records of the municipality or city where the property is located, or at his residence, if known to said treasurer or barrio captain. x x x.” (Underscoring supplied by petitioners in their Memorandum)
According to petitioners, the notice of public auction should have been sent to the address appearing in the tax roll or property records of the City of Baguio. That address is Unit No. 5, Baden #4105, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the known address or residence of the registered owner at 145 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City. They contend that notice may be sent to the residence of the taxpayer, only when the tax roll does not show any address of the property.
The above-cited provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayer’s address to which the notice may be sent is the treasurer’s discretionary prerogative. In this case, the city treasurer deemed it best to send the notice of public auction to the residence of the taxpayer. The former validly exercised this option, inasmuch as the address of the latter was known to him. Moreover, it was more practical and favorable to the registered owner that the notice of delinquency be sent to his permanent residence in Manila, because he was using the subject condominium unit merely as a vacation house and not as a residence.
This Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals[21] made a clear and categorical ruling on the matter, when it declared as follows:
“Under the said provisions of law, notices of the sale of the public auction may be sent to the delinquent taxpayer, either (I) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located or (ii) at his residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio captain.” (emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of the property is considered the taxpayer. Although petitioners have been in possession of the subject premises by virtue of an unregistered deed of sale, such transaction has no binding effect with respect to third persons who have no knowledge of it.
The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the Property Registration Decree or PD 1529, which reads:
“Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms, deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or effect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.”
Thus, insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale that can validly transfer or convey a person’s interest in a property.[22] In the absence of registration, the registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title is deemed the taxpayer to whom the notice of auction sale should be sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of the auction sale may not be invoked successfully.
The Annulment of the Auction Sale on Equitable Considerations
As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not find application, if the statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and standards by which the matters at bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent purchasers of the subject property, it is a well-settled principle that between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in one’s favor has a preferred right over the other whose title has not been registered, even if the latter is in actual possession of the subject property.[23]
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune upon themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse, they failed to pay the real property
taxes due. Although they had been in possession of the property since 1981, they did not take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners’ suit is now barred by laches.[24] The law helps the vigilant, but not those who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against the slothful and the contemners of their own rights.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
11. Malabanan vs RepublicG.R. NO. 179987
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Malabanan presented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan o o had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
CA noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. (Interpretation of CA of Section 14(1) was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Herbieto) Malabanan died while the case was pending with the CA; it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court Petitioners rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit (handed down just 4 months prior to Herbieto) - with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree . With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). o According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been “converted” into private property through prescription.
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to “patrimonial property,” while Section 14(2) speaks of “private lands.” The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable. DISCUSSION: Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of “by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles” through “judicial legalization.”
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term “agricultural lands” was changed to “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.” o o The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, “agricultural lands” are a mere subset of “lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition.” Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only “agricultural lands.”
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for “thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application” to possession “since June 12, 1945 or earlier.” It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed , may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
It is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act (amended by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002) limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48.Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter : Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
The substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020. The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. Discussed in Naguit. – “adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declaredalienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. “ “[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed .”
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2)Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of “private lands” under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: “[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.” The identification what c onsists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.” Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. SYNTHESIS OF DOCTRINES APPLIED: (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51] (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES: Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED.
12. Republic rep. the Mindanao Medical Center vs CAG.R. NO. L-40912
Facts: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site purposes. On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Jose Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant. In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare. On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes. On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. In the following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health. The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals it which it held that the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said appellants, but said
appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to the SC thru the present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in rendering its decision.
Ruling: The SC find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious on the following grounds. 1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. 2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejandro's father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares 64, acres 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas20.6400 hectares, it becomes imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him. 3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Government, and most strongly against the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 4. The SC cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that Eugenio de Jesus' alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of the land, which right was controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase 5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would be returned to him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the existence of such donation thru the testimony of persons who
supposedly saw it. ADMITTEDLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. With costs against private respondent.
13. Chavez vs. Republic Estates AuthorityG.R. NO. 133250
sadasdadsadasd
14. Republic vs DoldolG.R. NO. 132963
15. Republic vs AlconabaG.R. NO. 155012
