UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBERAD391694

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROM:

No Foreign

AUTHORITY1978 per Group4 document markings; ODCSNOD/A ltr., 14 May 1974

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

5ýth SPct1iTbC .itGRliP (AIR-BORNE)1st SPECIAL FORCES

'PAUG 12 1968

02VITIONAL REPORT DE,: C Us*,

OJ L1YS L[.RNID/(RCS CSSC?3-28 (Ri)

FOR PERIOD FlN3N 30 APRIL 1966

-cock OT

.:;0 IA IS OW RCFOd

for~1 jeriy 196666

TIMU: K2 o #)

VAý

Section~ T $L:i:v:tor iiztio-u or Uliit Aetiviio.L1c

on 'omuto th.e ) ý ) publ~icized~ but elcua'I/y Cie'fifioi iO1f.0 ticts in, li,III and 1V Ooz. Yhe attack on A Shau JýI~lusta~ated titthe e'nma-v forcer,irould accept heavy oaeun.ties to %-in. 4- ý'syoChOl()iCil14M.'Z~tlas Or to desixro-f o :c es tCh.~t I-Lve been detrimental to )Ws fr"edom of movement. It alsopointed out the vulnexabil't- o eoeintlV~in o on ~~ilowr Cloud. lfwel lmrnie_ s resu-1i ;u~l wbtix support operations. The attackon Carap JKhe Saih 4 Jm~uary 1966, w.ýs the first reported use of 120mmMftars )y thle 'eneM in YIMVT. Also: dtrxing. t1his rep~orting period, 0 hele was

K m ~iaozease :in CrDCT operationh iz, msniort of' P.'YAV operý%tions.

0AA3

INC, • 8 S TO QUARTýWY OCOA1D 190RT 1ST QUAR1M 1966

saoTx I - SIGINFICANT ORGMAIUTONAL OR MUT W ,TIVI•S1

3. Operations and Tra±inin Activities (5-3)4.' civil Affairs (CA)5. 0 s chological Operations (PO)6. Personnel and Administrative Activities (0.1)7,. Logistical Activities (S-4)s. M~edical (Burg)9, signal (Big Off)

10 CIDG Finance11. Future Plans (8-3)

TIO U- COcOANDUS REXCOM ATIONS8

1. Command Guidance Published. (S-.)2. U.S. Oasualty Chart 1st Qtz vs previous yer (8-1)3. Comparative CI•G/VC Casmualty Cht 1st qtr vs year 65,64, 63 (54)4-. CIDG TOW (S-3)

M. Mike Woroes TO&M (8-3)6. Combat Recon Platoon TOM (8-3)7. Eimployment Concept of Engineer Advisory Team (&W LWO)8. Policy Letter on UL1R0 (S-3)9. Troop Disposition List (8-3)

10. Map of Camps (Present & Proposed) (S-3)11, Briefing List (S-3)12. Sumiary of Delta Operations (Delta)13. CA Success Story (CA)14. PO Sucoese Story (P0)15. Ashau (ASO I CTZ)166 Dong T.re Attack (ASO II CTZ)17. Buon Ea Yang After Action Report (ASO II CTZ)18. Dien Khanh Success Story (ASO II CTZ)19. Dwu Co Success Story (ASO II CTZ)20. Vinh Thanh Success Story (ASO II cTZ)21. Xom Oat After Action Report (ASO III CTZ)22. Operation "Goodyear" After Aotion Report (A-O III CTZ)23. Ben Soi CA Success Story (ASO III CTZ)24, Ben Soi PO Success Story (ASO iII CTZ)25. Tuyen Nhon After Action Report• ASO IV CT'Z)26. Ti~uen, Nhon After Lotion Report (ASO IV CTZ)27, VC Returnees28. Cai Cai Intelligence Buildup29. Dong Ba Thin POVtS30, Lessons Learned. ti-,F,

t on ainformatO

.T his do oum en , containS ...t.. tw . . .

of ... . .it le, 1 1,. S. C.- J .l ,•-

,,,. . . ,. '" , . , . - "

tO~2fl~ t' 32

AVSP - 10 May 1966SUBMI"T CweOxl Operatiol Report on Lesedna Learned (ROS 08G00.46

(Rl)) for Period Ending 30 April 1966

a. The attack on Camp A Shau was well planned. The NVA forcescapitalized on the bad weather conditions that hindered tactical air supportand reinforcement and resupply attempts to relieve the defense. Camp'A Shauis located near the three major infiltration routes leading from Laos, eastinto the A Shau-Aloui Valley. The canp and its operations conducted priorto the attack were continuously harassed by Viet Cong elements. Interrogationof two NVA defectors and continuous overflights detecting numerous freshlydug weapons positions confirmed information received that a large enemybuildup existed and an attack was imminent. The Commanding Offioer, 5th 8FGAtdeployed a reaction (Nihke) force from 1ia Trang, as the initial element toreinforce Camp A Shau prior to the attack. The attack began in the earlyhours of 9 March. The camp received a heavy concentration of 81me mortarfire and a probe on the southern portion of the camp by an estimated forceof two LIVA companies* The initial mortar barrage wvas very accurate, causingheavy demage and a temporary loss of communications. Due to extremely poorweather conditions which prevailed during the two-day'attack, additionalreinforcements from Hue/`Phu Bai could not be deployed. Heavy bombings,aerial resupply and evacuation aircraft flow constantly under heavy groundfire in suppr)-ot of the camp, Upon the request of the detachlent commander,airstrikes wcar. made on the camp perimeter which dispersed the enemy massingfor an assault. Under constant and intense fire, the defensive positionsreduced to rubble and ammunition nearly exhausted, the defensive capabilitydeteriorated rapidly. The personnel were ordered to evacuate the camp. IIItE42 cornmitted sixteen helicopters to conduct the evacuation. Poor visibil-ity and continuous enemy ground fire prevented complete evacuation. Remainingpersonnel began escape and evasion action. On 12 March, the last evadingUS and CIDG personnel of the scattered groups wore picked up by rescue air-craft and returned to the Hue/Thu Bai area (Inol 15).

b. A significant OIDG combat operation which demonstrates thesuccess to be achieved from rapid exploitation of battlefield intelligencewas exemplified when Camp Buon Ea Yang (A-233), lc.rlao Province, II CTZ,conducted an operation on 18 March 1966, in which a VC Company Commanderwas KIA and several documents were CIA. Subsequent analysis of the documentsindicated the location of four VC Companies approximately 22 kilometers BEof the Camp at BQ200052. Operation "Le 11ai 21" was planned on the basis ofthe captured information and departed Buon Ea Yang at 191300 March. At201000 March "Operation Le Hai 21" made contact vwth a VC Battalion locatedat the coordinates taken from the document. The operation fought a delayingaction, calling in air strikos until reinforcements arrived at 201630.On 21 March artillery fire was adjusted on the VC positions and by 211945March friendly forces had overrun the VC Battalion. Results of the action

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AVSP 10 May 1966SUBJECT: Comazi Operational Report on Lessons learned (ROB CSGPO-28

(RI)) for Period Ending 30 April 1966

were 180 V! KIA (122 KBA). Friendly losses were I USASF KIA, 2 USASF WIA,9 CIDG MIA, 1 Interpreter KIA and 8 CIDO WIA (Inal 17).

c. ki:ýfings were conducted for numerous visitors to includeSecretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, General Harold JK. Johnson, andSenator Stuart Symington. These briefings contributed materially to theoverall understanding of the Special Porces role in the counterinsurgencyenvironment (Incl 11).

2. Intelligence.

a. Consistent with the Source Control Program which was promul-gated by HQ USIUCV in December 1965, major effort is being applied toincreased control o. intelligence nets and to the rejistcrizng of all agentsand informants. The goal of the program is to reduce duplication, especiallyregarding the agent handlers, to eliminate "paper mills", and to exercisemore control over each net by recording source background data and officiallyregistering each agent or informant. However, throe particular problemshave been experienced which are impending the progress of this program.Pirst, the IXDV3 supervise the agent handlers arl have expresoed firm reluc-tance to provide the necessary information. Second, tie program places ,nadministrative burden on the "A' Detachment Co=riArer for which he has nofacility. Third, the classification of tiio implementing directive (SBECRET/!iroroin) precludes storage of the docun'ont at the "A" Detachment camp sites.In an attempt to eliminate these problems, SMIAT ropresentatives have beenattached to each "C" Detachment. Their mission is primarily to advise inthe implementation of the Source Control Program and further, to advisesubordinate cor.manders on the establishment of intelligence nets and thehandling of agents. The efforts of the SMIAT personnel have arA vrill be ofparamount importonce in establishing an effective Source Control Progrom.

b. In Fobruary, O3 Officers were assigned to each "0" Detachmentand in March to the Grovp Headquarters. Their efforts have aided materiallyin improvinCg the quality mid quantity of intelligence reporting. The GroupHeadquarters has initiated a Daily Intelligence Surmary -to the "0" Detach-ments as a means of increasing feodback and of keeping commanders informedon other CTZ intelligence. "C" Detacluents now forward weekly intelligencesummaries.

o. Comprehensive studies are being made on all cemp sites forforwarding to HQ USMACV as a vehicle to assist in planning for contingencyoperations; special emphasis is being placed on the more isolated camps in

3

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0 oCCOA/"t1 D ,V'F/i,

AVMA? 10 May 1966SUBJBCT: Comand Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(Rl)) f.;r Period Ending 30 April 1966

I and 11 CTZ duo to the forthcomin-• monsoon season. Sinilarly, studiesare being prepared on War Zonu 'IC" and "D" cad other VO "inviolate" areasin preparation of future' offensive oper-ations.

d. Considerable emphasis w•s placec.. pon administration aid doc-ument security during the past quarter. The purposes were two fold: First,to revamp the sytstem an' ali,ýn thi. Thadv!uartcrs ;with l_,plaentinr direct-ives fron HQ USARV; second, to prepare the Grou'P for the AGI which wasconducted cn 19 - 21 tkxch. The filin.g system was ovorhauled completely tofacilita.te ready reference aid a now, more secure, document loggilWg systemhas been offaccted. The systai employs one document per loS sheet. The logsheet also serves as a destruction certificate by stmapi'n it with properinstructions. Thus, the possibility of administrative error caused whentrtiasferrizg the log entr' from the DA Form 455 to 'A ?oa0ri 546 is eliminz'ted.Consistent with T'hAiRV Regulation 380-5, a new briefing/debriefing systemhas been e:-.1ýyed, which more thoroughly insures that each individual under-stands Uis obligation regarding the dissemination of classified information.

3. pýerr•tions and Trainin(g.

a. C01', Program; The CIDG pro.ýxnm is oontinuing to prove its valueas a stabilizing force ki the complex war effort in Vietnam. It I-as provento be a dollar-savin& economy of force measure designed to establish GV?control in rural areas in addition to the Ezsigned offelnsive missions.USASF Detachments are advising over 75,000 CI01G mnd idY/Pr- troops with anoverall 5th Special Forces G-rour strength of 2,292. Txoeughout the quarterthe kill ratio of known VC IIA to U.S. I1iA has been 71.6:1. Despite theincreased actions of MrA forces the VC/C.-0C kill ratio has remained 4.3:1fo3: tl'i quar:ter.

b. Siomificant CIDG Aoticns.

(1) The most sirnifioant operation has been -ientioned )rev-iously; The battle of A Shau. Others worthy of mention anme the 120nmmortar attack on Camp Khe Sanh, I Corps and Operation :'Uoodyeax" conductedin Tay Tinh Province in II Corps (Inal 22).

(2) Other opel:ations of significance are the successfuloperations conducted by Camp D1ac 1ek, and Camp Buon 1a- Yn- in 1i Corps. Acompany oize patrol loved south of Dak Pek to the abandoned CiDG camp ofDak Sut, this being the first tiine that friendly forces had entered thearea since the cerp was overrun and lost in August 1965. A W4C-IO and sub-ititintlalquanttles t.f atmm•fm• were discovered at the old camp site,

4

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0 0

AYSF CoMII- I D Io Vr10 May 1966SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(Ri)) for period Ending 30 April 1966

indicatir , that after taking the caap the VC moved out and did not return.In ano',hrjr successful operation a combat patrol attacked a ITYA/VMCbivouac area which resulted in 4 VC KIA, an undetermined number wounded;2 81mm mortars, 2 small arms, and several docume~ts worecaptured. Oper-ations conducted f•om camp Buon Ea Yang resulted in 5 contaots with the VC.Ambush and stay behind tactics resulted in 16 VC KIA. After translationof a document found on the body of a VC Company Commander indicatinzi- thelocation of a VC unit, an operation was conducted. Upon reaching theobjective an estimated VC battalion was encountered. The CIDG companiesmaneuvered into peat."-hand brouihit fire on the entrenched VC unit. Airstrikes were conducted against the VC positions and upon arrival of rein-forcemeats the CIDG continued the attack. Under this added pressure theVC broke contact and withdrew. Results of this operation were 130 VCKIA (conf-1rmed). As a result of information obtained, subsequent oper-ations resulted in 38 VC KIA, 5 VCC and large quantities of equipment anddociment.3 capturcd. Significant operations in IV Corps were the 2 VCbattalion size attacks on Camp Tuyen Zhon's FOB on 29 Jan, and 10 April(Incl• & 26) rpsultin,3 in 269 VC KIA (confirmed), and the surrender ofrn Qairtf;VC--latoon at Tinh Bien on 1 !-arch (Incl 27).

c. Increases and Gains.

(1) Since 1 Js.nua••, 8 new camps have been established,-- d t'rce cl~ed. A "B" Detachment, B-24 was established at Kontum, andas.•-wnd c.at-rl. of all operational "A" detachments in Kontum Province.B-45 ,l* 0-3 eziablbished at Plei±n tand assumed control of all operational "A"detaclcyts Li Plciku Province. A "B" detachment was also establishedat Qr,-On ltai in I Corps and assumed operational control of all "A"* mts i.-i Q~ui8g rgai Provinse. The advance party of a "B" detrachment

a•.l./ed at Kie? fla in III Corps, and are presently making an assessmentof •c lu e Iiq "r.ct•c, and planuing for the movement of the remainder of thedotar-tvar. ',,Yew omips were opened at Thuong Duo, Quang NTam Province;Ba •n, La-y Ninh 1 covince; Go Da la, Tay Ninh Province; Ba Chuc, ChauDc•. Pro%-inco4 and Dcon Phuc, i.en Phong Province. An "A" detachment arrived• • Ccm,:; is slated to open the proposed camp at :1inh Long in June.Three "AI ' dee (cW ts aare presently deployed with other detachments in iIICor's J4 crier to 4ain Additional experience and information prior todep? oyc1.t t- prorosed new camps. Camps that have been closed are A Shauoin 10 .Uarch 66 n r" i.'ia T'hien Province, I Corps. Kwnnack, Binh DinhProvinc, was closod on 8 January 66. Bao Loc, Lam Dong Province, wasclosed on 5 Jinuary 1966, and was relocated at Tan Rai. On 15 FebruaryPACV Subs ec• or Team 25 assumed the subsector advisory mission for 1ioai

5

(oMPC) DEAT/ r1A

0 O\/ 1oGrR* AVSF 10 Miay 1966*SUBJ:CTt Connand Operational R~eport on Lessons Lea:rned (RCS CSGPO-28

(Mi)) for Period Wding 30 April 1966

:Thon district, releasinzt the "A" detachment at Dong 'on from the mission.Mith exception of one "All detachment at Tie-n 11huoc in I Corps all TI<detachments -have been replaced vith POS detachmen-ts, T'.e CII)G prog-rea hasdecreaised in strength during the last quarter. The toteJ. number of companiieshas increaseed from 2Z5 at the end of last quarter to 218 at present. Thisrepresents a decrease in, troop stren,-th. from, 30,400 on 1 Jlanuarny to 28,694at the end of the reporting period. This troop stren.gth is spread over theentire count3ýr at 87 separate locations.

d. CIDck Losses.

The most significant loss of GIDG forces occurred durinC- theattack on Oam;o A Shau. Casualties renorted from Caomp A Shatt resulted in 191CIDG/iAIMk FOiIýL' WA Of 111ic' 115 ora'11 believ!ed -10A. Theze have been. no othersi,--iificvit losees durinC- the roti period.

joint MiPi,/CTP YVI av~

Jo in t to JA/IY oe). orLX c~t~~25½xove v~ieir valuo.Sevezal suc:oeasfal .joint o:-e%:atio.n.s h:ave been conducted in- If III Pand IIICorps since last cotr period.

(i) : Corps I 2Ch~jointlu operýýtUions, -Lluded. providingF'0B'1 £roin 01Y.' cam-zps for "LJ(>1i'rojects rd 2or-e JRecon unitz-.

*JFChelico-pters, fro~m III h prov--deci mu-'.ort :Li c-7acua2tin-lJ friendly forcesat the battlo of A1 =4'h an~ reul-n noCmule ccutil , n air-striD i-asz eotablioheod. -i~pe~~e-.-e:o used ruý g~~.ides during Op!--ration.-

(2) L-a IT Corps ý'Lzp :~ei 3Djerengp Pleikua Trovince, opor.-tinC;nc-:?it.± o-- the ctII) vri.th elements of the 1st Cavalr- .~sor. o 14 Jr~uary,encountered. four ?-VA troops captaring 7Ce. Thn Calh, operatinac join"tlytrith * n Y.O.' division, opcned the road bet':--) Qutin Nhon and Vfanh Ce!nhi on 1.9Februavy. Oth-.erc joint or.eerations have beon conducted writh the 3rd BriG--.de,25th infa-ntxy Division. -aong natidnal --oute 19 J1n the 'Lrang pa-s area,~idt -the ist 7r` ,-,d, 101-t `-irhome Division in the Pon- Tre-Le iHoi area.

(3)1 121.? CoriA area, -rvro comrapaies fromt the l.;ike Poroe inaconjiraction withi elemenots of th~e 17;3-.d Airborn-e Ur~d,1.S. Ist 1nf.a=tzry

Divison, nd 1th AV2T ivison prticipa-ted in, Uperation Silve~r City in'War Zone "fl" from 9-21 l'?arch. The two companies of the& ..iie V'orce, operat-ing oa an indepoident, tasic force, made -- first rn~jor contact of tile

6

AVSF 10 May 1966SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(n)) for Feriod JIding 30 April 1966

operation on 13 Iaroh. During the area search oper tion they discovered amaJor political headquarters and fifteen houses. Jhile a thirty man forcewas destroying this installation, it made contact with an estimated companyof VC. One printing press, 10 tcns of printing paper, 750 poiuds of rice,and 15 buildings were destroyed.

f. Co-equal Seotor/Subsector 11ole.

(1) There are no significant changes in the overall mission,which was reported on in the last 1•uarterly Cormand Report.

(2) Presently there are 37 "A;' detachments in the Subsectorrole, and 7 "B" detachments in the Sector Role, this represents on increaseof 2 "A" detachments in the Subsector role rnd 1 "3" detac.hment in the Sectorrole.

g. hiike Force.

(1) There is no chsaLge in the mission of the Mike Force sincethe last reportinE period.

(2) The Detachment C-I Moike Force located in Da Yiang partic-ipated in the reinforcement of Camp A Shau. Th1;ey were also deployed toreinforce threatened CIDG camps at TTa BonE, Ba To, and Khe Sanh and toprovide initial camp security for the newly established sites at ThoungDo and Tien Phuoc.

(3) Drring Tlarch, elemen.ts of the Detachment C-2 .ltke Forceat T'leiku were deployed to Bonz Son, Folei Kleng and 3uon Ea Yang. On 6January, two M•ike Force companies from Pleiku in II Corps arrived to rein-force an operation in an effort to clear the area between camp Dong Tre midDistrict headquarters. The .7ike Force company deployed at Bong Son wasused primarily for internal security of the camp due to an inadequatestrike force. An additional company roinforced VJ:hG v.- the new camp siteof Polei KMeng. One company was deployed at 3.uon Ea Yang with initialmission of a reserve force for a CID01 operation. The company was committedwith elements of camps An Lac and Lac Thien CIDG1 force to assault a VC basearea to the east of Buon Ea Vang. This mission was accomplished with excell-ent results.

(4) In February, A-503 orgsnized r. 2•k Force battalion at',lha Trc'g with En authorized strength of 594. The IThn Trang 131ie Forcecompany (149 personnel), 7 USASFI and 6 interpreters were deployed at A 3hau

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Q0AVSF 10 May 1966SUBJECT: Command Operational Repact on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(311)) for Period Eding 30 April 1966

on 7 March to reinforce I l 1DG against an impending INA attack. The UVAattack occurred on 9 I-larch and continued for two days. The brunt of theassault was borne by the lHike Force and UjASF within the camp.

(5) The Hike Force status in III Corps rerkiins uncha•nged sincelast reporting period.

(6) The Detachment C-4 11ike Force was formed dul this re-porting period and was located at Don Phuc, Kien Phong Province. The USSFadvisors were taken from IV Corps assets instead of t'e original plan ofutilizing a new PCS team. On 1 February the iike Force advisors movedinto Don Phuc and in the latter part of the month received their firstrecruits. The present strength of the llike Force is slightly more than200 with additional recruits expected. All training is being conducted bythe advisors at Don Phuc. The hike Force has been deployed for shortperiods of time at Kinh Quan II and Phu Quoc Island.

h. Training.

(1) LLDB Class V6 started duri~ng the first quarter with 19officers and 89 ENi attending. The 3.i Basic Course graduated during thequarter, with all 89 W, graduating. The FIT are presently undergoing spec-ialist training and will complete the course on 23 IMay 1966. The LLDBOfficer course is also scheduled to end on the same date. Instructionpresented ranged from good to excellent. The Demo Specialist Course nowbeing presented will increase the demolition capability of the "A" Detach-ments. The instructors in this com~ittee are motivated, plan lessonscarefully, and use training aids to the maximum extent.

(2) Two CIDG Leadership Classes raduftted during the period.Class •A13 started with 153 students of which 107 graduated and 45 receivedcertificates of attendance. Class V14 started with 140 students attendingand 140 graduated. Of class -- 14, 95 students were graduated as platoonleaders, and 45 as squad leaders. Class 'l4 was the first to receive the5 week course. Class 1715 commenced on 18 April 66 with 121 studentsattending and are now in the second week of training. USSF instructorstaught all classes in tactics to class -,,I3, with LLDB instructors observing.This block of instruction ji prior classes was poorly planned and executed.It is to be noted that the tactics subjects taught durl--g Class ý',14 by theLLDB instructors has greatly improved. The technique of instruction pres-ented by the USS3dM'-ýrg this phase of instruction has been copied by thetactics committee, whereas, training aids are being used to fullest extentand the practical exercise portion of these classes has become more realistic.

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0VS C(0AIPW~aNflfl:L-AVSF .10 May 1966SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(Rl)) for Period Ending 30 April 1966

(3) Two Combat Recon Platoon Classes graduated during theperiod. Class #11 started with 68 students and 67 graduated. One studentwas dropped due to sickness. Class ,,4-12 started with 139 students and 139graduated. This was the first class that was increased to four platoonsae.•d increased from four to five weeks. Class :''13 which begen on 25 April66cori. :.d of one platoon from each Corp area.

(4) A Basic Training Course for LLDB DM started on 29 Aprilwith 79 trainees. The course is six weeks long and upon successful comp-letion, trainees will be enrolled in the LLDB Basic Course and SpecialistCourse.

i. Project Delta.

(I) Due to increased operational missions, the US personnelof Project Delta hxve been increased from 72 officers and men to 100officers and men. The US element now paral.l.el.o the Vietnamese OrganizationalStructure.

(2) In the past two operations, two different concepts ofemployment were introduced into Project Delta operations. The first conceptwas -' infiltration of CIDG (Roadrunner) Teams in enemy areas of control.These teams, consisting of three to five lightly armed VIT persomiel incivilian clothing, walk ro-Ads mncd trails observing enemy activities. Thesecond concept was the employment of the 91st Airborne Rnzger Battalionin search and destroy operations within the Tactical Areas of Responsibilityof Project Delta.

(3) Du~rin,- the month of January Project Delta presented ashort training program to members of the US lst Infantry Division. Asimilar type proxr'm is 1 chedp" ed for mzmberg-nf.. thQI3r•_ .bl•-Bri_,'ade n . The USM;F Ai- ii.aison Officer and Forzvard Air Controllerkand ulEircraft) originally, attached to the Project or. a test basis werepermanently assigned in February follo~rint o-erations -i II and III Corps.Tne UM AtMyr LislsL- Avation Airlift Platoon (10 1771B Helicopters) originaliyplaced under O-C01Qi of Project Delta has been returned to O'COI,' of the 5th3FG (Abn). Helicopters of the unit are attached to Delta as required. (Incl

j. F LLO.

There were no K.110 activities during this reporting period.The 5th Special Forces Group Com)mnder published a MLP.O Policy Letter whichis enclosed as Inclosure 8.

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AVSF 10 ••ay 1966SUBJECTs Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

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4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

a. During this quarter, the 5th Special Forces Group has initiatedand completed actions in the fields of civil affairs and psychological oper-ations (CA/PSYOP) that will have a far reaching impact on the effectivenessof future Special Forces operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RPIT). Thetraining of USASF, VWSF, CIDG and civilian personnel, the implementation ofnew programs and teciniques, providing practical CA/PSYOP guidance, and thediatr2iuton of PSYOP equipment, gives Special Forces personnel and theircounterparts a foundation wid*direction in their CA/PSYOP prog,,ms that willenable them to significantly improve the overall effectiveness of theircounterinsurgenoy operations.

b. The major contribution in the field of civil affairs/civicaction during this period was the completion of The 5th Special ForcesGroup Civic Action Guide for Vietnam. The vast amount of information avail-able on civic action, Revolutionary Development and the organizz.tion of theGVTT was screened and compiled in a simple reference that provides SpecialForces personnel with 110 psaes of detailed, practical and logical infor-mation. This guide explains the Special Forces approach to CA and givesdetachment personnel the necessary information to assist their counterpartsin planning and implementing highly effective CA programs at district,village and hamlet levels. This guide meets a need which has long existedin the field of CA.

c. During the last quarter, -an evaluation was made of the employ-ment of CIDG CA/PJSYC)P Teams in an effort to develop within the CIDG anadditional and effective means of conducting civic action and psychologicaloperations. As a result of the successful employment of these units, the5th Special Forces Group end its counterpart Headquarters developed a TOMEwhich authorizes one team for each CIDG camp (App. 2 to Incl 13). A jointmemorandum was published which requires each CIDC camp to orfanize, trainand employ a minimum of one CA/PSYOP Team (App. 1 to Incl 13). } onta.3nardCIDG personnel for these teams attend a 10 week course of instruction at theMlontagnard Training Center in Pleilu. To date, 140 CIDG Tiontagnards havegraduated from the course. In July, the Vietnamese Political !f7rfaxe Schoolwill present a six week training course for tho Vietnamese CIDG members ofthese teams. This program will give ipecial Forces over 70 teams that haveCA/PSYOPS as their primary m:.ssion. As these teams develop) better skills,technicues and methods of operation, they will have a tremendous impact onthe CA/P8YOP programs in detachment operational areas.

d. A school was conducted by the 5th Special Forces Group, 24 thru

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AVSF 10 May 1966SUB3ECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(Pn)) for Period Eiding 3o April 1966

28 January for 42 USASF I1on-Commissioned Officer's who were assigned to CA/PSYOP positions throughout the Group. The course was designed to give theITCO's a practical understanding of civic action and PSYOP activities atthe "Ai' Detachment level (App. 3 to Incl 13). Action has been initiatedthrough personnel requisitioning channels to insure that hOe's assignedto CA/PSYOP ii the future are selected and trained at Fort Bragg beforearriving in the RVI•. US personnel trained in CA vnd PZYOP can make definitecontributions to these programs in the RqVI, however, oonsiatant and effect-ive CA/PSYOP, particulary PSYOP, must be develo-.ed and implemented incon:.,.-,': wth trained Vietnamese. Recoiizing this fact, coordination hasbeen made with the Vietnamese Political Warfare School to conduct a sixweek CA/PSY01' course for VLTSP personnel.

e. During the four month reporting period "T 30 April 1966,4,261 civic action projects wore completed in Special Forces operationalareas. Included in this figure is the construction and/or repair of 47schools, 50 dispensaries, 118 wolls, 97 bridges, ond 46 roads. Otherprojects include provision of relief supplies for over 18,385 refugeeswhich moed in!-o dotachLont opexational areas, numerous medical patrolsand othe:c p 'ojects designed to gain the support of local civilians. USASFand V-Z7SF 1.iocs, x.d Special Forcut trained Village Health Workers treated230,497 patients in camp 1ispo saries and on medical patrols.

f. Special Forces has taken steps to improve the ag:"'JZ":o -ductcon of Mrnta•.iards who live in detachmant operational areas. R•ealizingthe impact "hat improved n-athods and tccnmiques of a[Txioulture can have inthe highalands, Spec:l F1rces -ietachrnaets encourage and. assist the CIDG:and l•:.l .pcople to attend agricultur, I.-.atning courses. In the past fourmonth". ý6 C!TDG Th-ntag.axds graduated from the iHontaLznard Training Centerand 90 i.viliwis :^rom "A" Dotachnint operational axroas ,raduated from theAg-ricults.re Traini.nq Center at Pleilcm. 2-:any Special Forces Camps haveexpe.rimeptal garden plots mwhich they use to introduce the people to avariety of vogetables, improved form techniques and new. fvrm tools. Asan exomple, Crm:o lfluon Fa YamZ developed three garden plots and assistedover 1,000 relocatees in clearing and planting 947 hectares of lened. Toprovide thL people of the higlands wit> a much needed soturce of food, the

5th Special Forcon Group organized, and is presently conducting a two weekcourse of instrdotion at ŽIha Trtang in the techniques of building fish pondsand valsirWfi• • , orty CIDV person-nel and hamlet chiefs from the highlandshave ýxaduatod from the course during this quarter.

g. Thro 5th Special Forces Croup PSYOP activities continued to hi-orease in effectivenesn and intensity. During the quarter, 23 million

11

AV8F 10 May 1966SUBJCT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(RI)) for Period iding 30 April 1966

leaflets and over 185,0OO publications such as bulletins, ma~uzinesp post-ers m-d newspapers were distribuated in Special Forces operational areas.The Camp Tien Bien CA/PSYOP VICO and his counterpart produced a bi-monthlynewspaper designed specifically for the VC. It is called "The Truth".In January five VC returned to C-V1T control carrying a copy of the news-paper. Portable loudspeakers, tape recorders =d mimeograph machines -rebeing distributed to all detachments to improve the capability of SpecialForces personnel and their counterparts to carry out more timely and effect-ive propaganda in the local villages vnd hamlets.

h. The CIDG Motivation Team was expaunded in April from 4.0 cadreto 55 cadre, thereby increasing its training capability. Or&'anized into12 five manunits, it is now capable of training 680 men per month. DTurin.this quarter ?. total Uf 1,047.MG, 101 17 soldiers and five local officialsreceived motivational traiing.

i. The *:otivation rnd Ir.doctrination Pro;Te.m, employing highlyskilled c.o&d, is only one approaoh used byeoirl Forces to motivate CIDGtroops. Forces has initiated mn information. program in each CIDGcamp. This pzogram roquizres the camp com iandar to present informationperiods tirioe a w7eek to the CIDIG. Lesson plrans for each period are pre-pared by USAS3*' and VITSP 3e,-Aquarters W.d distributed in English and Vietnam-ose. This pxo...-en, in whioh the Camp Comnaander talks directly to the troops,conveys the comne.der's interest in the ¶:elfate of the Cn); troops, improvestheir lo:;'alty and amreness, and increases their dependability ji combat.Appendix 4 to ],,closure 13 is the joint memorndim establishizi: the proTramand A'•pPavix 5 to :nolosore 13 i- an enim-1, e of one of the lesson plane.

J. Appendix 1 thru 4 of YThelosl=e 14 provide ty4pical examplesof ho,,-1 SpeoiJ.l Forces intec!rates civil _..•airs and psycholo:'ical opera:.tionsduri-ng all four phases of its ope-cations.

5. Perso-=.e.el A•ministrative Activities.

a. Aut'orized Persoiu.el Chann;s.

(I) The 'r;oon Unit C0hancre -equest (TUCR) of 6 n-ovember 1965,:eoquestin• :.-: increase in stren.th of 88 :ersonviel to support the expcasionof the oerctionr..l mission-' of tihe Studies and 0oer,%tions Gm'cup (SO,") wasdisar-iroved in Jarnuaryl)66, A ilodified Table of Or':-,ization end Equipment(I.TOE) v!-s submitted to lnrs USA.1V recnaestinu a " increase of 15 officers and72 euli~ted Pni4 to OG. n ýnaedition this -UTOE'requested authoriza_.tion of*Airmoin9e Company consisting of 13 officezs, 15 v.;rsant officers, and

12

Co0A/ F1 / D NTl~hL

oar 10 May 19668UEJ•dTi Commend Operational Report an Lese.,m Lea=ie'd (RCS CSGPO-28

(P-)) fo•. Period 1hdin•, 30 April 1966

87 enlisted men. eeadquartere, USALVV, forwarded this MOE to COMIUSILACVon 2 ,arch 1966 recomending approval.

(2) This headquartexs is in the process of forwarding to HqUSARV an 1-2E regeaeW v. increase in strength of 143 officers, 3 warrantofficers, and 466 enlisted men. This increase is in addition to that citedin subpararap'> 5a(i) above, and is broken down as follows

CUQA,* T AUImr RIZATIAM MOFOSE A- -W0IZA111IQIT

AF' IWO M! 00CV YO 31

M. O 59 4 203 71 7 276CO A 80 0 278 110 0 321CO 87 0 272 110 0 321CO O 85 0 275 110 0 321CO D 85 0 276 110 0 321Cc E 4 3 191 4 3 194

Sp Op Unit 1 23 0 146Sp Op Unit 2 -11 0 61

40 7 1495 549 10 i39ri

(3) This necessary increase has been directed by the Secretaryof Defense -nd approved by C0.,.",.5ACV.

b. Inclosure 2 shows the attAtion rate for the first quarter of1966. These fiares a.-e valid; however, to evaluate the kill ratio of1t-SSF persomnel for the first quarter of 1966 with tae like period for 1965one must consider the increased USASF exposure rate in coMnizance with therecent escalation of combat activity. The following figures provide anaccurate comparison of the two quarters',

A SSiGI_ ,.Q US.F ICIA , O .ASKIGTE ST!_1

31 March 1965 1338 5 .o04,31 -arch 1966 2164 22 .007Q

c. On 1 January 1966 wte had 9 "A" Detachments T2) to the 2-roupfrom the 1st Tpecial Forces GCroup in Okinawa. Bight of these teams havebeen replaced with POS teams from Fort Bragr'. The remrnining TDY team willbe replaced with a PCS team in iz: 1966. During the third quarter IN 66a tot;l of 3 "B" Detachments and 18 "A" Detaclments have been received inPCS packets from iort Brag,-, North Cacolina.

13

(/VPtlI /),-A'729A1

C co F I DioArA""D jA 10 Yzy 1966SUBJECTs Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (oCS• CSGPO-28

(Rn)) for Period aidinC 30 April 1966

d. Critical '-.70 shortages have been made up with the exceptionof :,iOS 05C2P (Padio Teletype Operator) which continues in short supply.AlthouTh this technical skill shortage has not affected the operationalability of the group to date, it could very well impede the expansionplans of the future.

6. Logistical Activities,

a. General.

(1) Logistical activities aicreased significantly duringthe period 1 Jan thru 30 A-pt 66. The Logisticdl Support Center continuedto provide overall logistical support to the Special ..?orces operationaldetachments and the CiDG spread out in an ever increasing number of looa-tions throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The Logistical Support Centercontinued to operate with approximately 75 US personnel, 40 Phillipinomaintenance technicians and slightly more than 300 indigenous helpers.

(2) During the reporting period the flexibility of theSipecial Forces supply system was tested by a signifioaut buildup in thenumber of Special Y-orces detaclhments including an. additional C detachment.The tonnage of supplies and equipment distri1ited by air to the opexr.tionaldetachments in the field increased 30';.

(t) Plans continued foT decentralizing the supply systemdown to the C detachment level for support ofthe operational detachmentsin each Corps area. A 15 day level of selected fast moving items will beprovided 'to each C detachment with first priority going to Detachment 0-4in Can. Tho as soon as aditional warehouse facilities are completed.Stooka•ge levels at the Lop'istical Support Center are being r;ised 50P/jin anticipation of this decentralization.

(4) Decause of tlhe difficulties encountered in obtainingreplenishment of Class V due to a shortage of SIjT support, plans were eff-eoted for moving the CIDfJ ammunitioz stocks to Cam Rahn Bay from Okinawawith a target date of 1 July.

b. Air Ilovement.

(1) The total tonnage hauled by Air movements during the firstquarter 1966 was sli&.gtly more than 23 mill-ion pounds or an increase of73". A new record in the amount of cargo moved in one month by LSC was setin larch - 9.3 million pounds.

14

CAN6I l 7/T/ AL-

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("O A/p i: D eA1 14F LAVSi 10 Majy 1966SUBJECT: Command Operational -Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSC-PO-28

(Rl)) for Period 1hdin(a 30 April 1966

(2) During the reporting period a total of 6 emergency re-supply missions were effected by aerial delivery of emergency supplies todetachment in the field within 5 hours after receipt of the request.

(3) CV-2B Caribou aircraft were provided to the C detachmentsin order to provide them with the inc•:eased capability of shuttling suppliesfrom their locations. A commensurate increase in the use of C-130's withtheir larger hauling capacity was utilized :n hauling cargo to the ' detach-ments. Apiproxiruately 205' of the total cargo hauled was airdro,.med orlolexed end the balance airlanded, with first priority going to newlyestablished camps.

(4) Testing of the CV-7 Buffalo which assisted the Air I'love-ments Section in hauling supplies was completed durin.- the reporting period.T-he CV-7 wrao considered a valuable asset for Special Forces logisticalcju-7port operations.

a. Su-ply. '2he surilp brenclh of the Logistical Support Centerxintim,'d to improve its operating capability ini order to meet the in-

c~eýeoed dema-dE; placed upon its staff in conjunction with the buildup.The --hysical plenrt of the stock r•ecords section was expanded. ifew offices• ,were b"Lilt for the Supply Officer the Food Service Officer and the Iand:•oei;vt section. A customer service nrea Yms added in order to provide, wcrk•n• azea to personnel with supply problems. "ecurity of the supply

stor!:te area was improved by the comi;letion of a, fence around the entirearea, the initiation of. a pass system for bidividuals desiring to entertho area, ,nud the addition of sentry dogs during the hours of darirness.

d. hnateuance.

(I) Durin: the reporting period'4v numbar. of Philippino.ijntenaaac; teclr~icians was increased from 70 to J.32 in order to satisfythe domands of the pro;:ramed exansion. These additional personnel willpi-ovi<et uv- to a 3rd echelon capability to the B detachment to which theyare assi;eC :aad will provide the B detachment and the attached A detachmentsthe mai:.thelwrunce surport rei.uired for continuous operations.

(2) Dh conjunction with the additional ri.intentaice technioians,::e" air -parts axe being provided to the C and B datacZ-ziento ini order to keept•e ye aious" maes �-d models of equipment utilized in the CIIG proGpamoperat@•ona.', These parts ,re now on order rad a separate warehouse is r'inL-,to be constructed at the Logistical lulŽport Center for stockaoe.

15

C0A41 D NT- hL-

AVSF 10 May 1966SUBJMICT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Leamed (RCS CSGPO..28

(RI)) for Period %ding 30 April 1966

(3) The weapons repair facility was expanded providing adepot maintenance capability for the weao-xms used in the CMG program.

(4) During the peziod a total of 658 minor mad 107 majorrepairs were accomplished by the maintenance section at the LogisticalSupport Center. Due to the increasing number of items to be maintained,work has berun to enlarge the shop facilities.

e. Construction: Construction activities r lso expanded in con-junction with the buildup. 13 construction projects were completed andanother 8 initiated at the Group Read..uarters in Fha Tranc; alone while allC Detachments have also been increasing their physical fa-cilities. Anadditional 12 A detachments and 4 B detachments were provided with thenecesse. ry coretmdWion mteriaIs for their new istallatio"opening of XomCat in War hone D, approxiate-35aOUO a poonds of supplies

consisting of mostly construction materials were delivered by air in thefirst week.

f. Food Service,

(1) A menu printed in Vietnnmese was provided to the oper-ational detachments :-,s P. uide for requesting indigerious "A" type rations.The menu was based on a daily diet of 2,800 to 3,000 calories a day forindi'-:axous personnel.

(2) Electric freezers are being issued to operational det-achmaents in remote locations for storage of frozen foods beoause freezercompartments of rofr~erators are too small for bulk storage of frozenprovisions for US Personnel. A 500 cubic foot freezer has been placed atCamp 'Xodmia in Saigon for storage of frozen commissary items that arepurchased by detachment personnel and are awaiting shipment to the field.A 2'- ton refrig<erator truck has been placed on request for Camp Goodman.This truck will be utilized to transport frozen items to the aircraft andwill reduce spoilage in the event a flight is cancelled. Additional 150cu ft refrigerators have been placed on request and will be distributedto "If" and ;iC:' team level for the storage of frozen foods in support ofthe "A" detachments.

(3) A total of 125 kerosene tlree buxner stoves at :"14.50oach have been ordered to replace buteae nas stove;3 now used by all "A"detaohments because of the short supply of butane gas. All butane gasstoves will be redistributed to 't" -i4nd "C" detachments in order to reducethAe slut ling of butene bottles back and forth by aircraft.

16

C cD D e / / '" L

o -

SOAvIP I 0Dý_Ar L-AVSr. 10 May 1966SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Leaned (?OB CSGPO-28

(.l)) for Period !Qnding 30 April 1966

(4) A ranch type corral has been completed near Dien iQsanh(Det A-502) in order to sraze cattle for feeding the CIDG. Cattle arebeing procured from the Province Chief, ilug- Hoa, Phu Yen.

(5) Food Service has fourd that under the present TOEthere is a shortage of mess personnel. A new TD has been requested toadd eight •additional mess personnel to the eight (3roup presently has intheir TOW. Also a request has been added for two (553 XO3) Ration Break-down !7C0's for the Class I warehouse.

(6) At present Food Service has a ctuned type meat undertest at A-502. This meat will, if ap;--roved, be kept on .band at each "A"team. It will be issued and consumed only during emergencies and can beconsumed hot or cold.

7. Aircraft 'upport.

a. Mieneral. The aircraft supportin,- the 5th Special Forces-roup are three classes: Conmisnd and Control, Cargo -ad Special P:fission.

The increase in newr crmps rnd personnel has led to a rpreater requirementfor all olasses of aircraft. During the reporting period there have beenmarked improvements in the aircraft support receiveCd by the ýToup, butthere is still a -,reater need for r-ll three classes of support as outlinedbelow.

(I) Coianand and Control Aircraft. Tu.ing this period the:,Toup has co.itinued to r.eceive 5 lIA (Otter) 'ircraft for Command and Control

pux~oses. Two of these are provided at 11Ia TranT uad one is provided tothe U110 i.n Saigon. These aircraft also provide a small logistical capabil-ity for the trccnsportation of sensitive or security items such as communic-at'.on equipment iihich is usually transported to the camps in conjunctionvtith conmirzd visits. In r.ddition to the Otters, soeie of the Coimand require-inents, expecially at the 11"C1 Detaclmhent level, has been satisfied by theaaidition of the 171st Aviation Compmay. This compy, which resulted froma• corn iacion of the 145th Avia-tion Plt ew.d the 171st Aviation Plt, waspl.aced under the operational onmtrol of the cýroup in .'arch 1966. It provides20 AiVlV helicopters for command ",xposes .s we.l as for special missions.At the -resent time 4 £11IBs, one por Corps area, .i:e provided to the "C'DctachLhmeit conanadersa; 3 klfDs ure Pllocated to the 0-5 Detachment, anud the

-•mauder are utilized for the spýcial mission of supporting the Delta Projectoperations. While the nilocation of 4 helicopters to the "C" Detachmentsprovides some relief for that level of cotumand, there still exists a definiteneed for more helicopter -,u-,)ort to the Corps areas. Subsecquent helicopter

17

CO/Vfl 1) -_ 1774L-

AVS T 10 Ma;1066SkBJ:C.MCo,,_rd OpeA-ational l~eport on Lessons I.earned (atos S' ICS-,0-2B

fr) or Period 3~~in 0 A"! ril 196!-

adf'Titioxns -to the 171st Av.-i~tion 'oaCom'r; should hellp to remedy, the situatioii,ek,'ce it" io projectod that 2 iU1~l~ '!ii. be i1locat-e,. to each Cr~rps re

dethe o~)er,-tionala control o.' the -C etacluiiiz'. cairmode:.

(2) !=.,:.o Aircraft.

( i) .T-21- fu- 0:C -123 .Liyor!_zft, *,efs~ite co-:.tiuov~z ueutsfor additioiic '-,-2D- vnJ 0-12, J--rcc:'rft -u-.-- ort b.-.Sed a Ofle 1±± tojeoted. build-up,the 5th-, 3`0` ,n a-vera_.-:e of' 3 CV-2?s 'Lqc 4 0-1.230 o2--1 dnil~r basis.

orn~'.1eac J:crct :vera-e M 3 trisp tai thie CVf-?B ya-: --slocndof' 9,00.-' lbsia~ t'.Ae -'-123 co.>'%is _ - ': of 10,000 lbs, %vKich ives thle

.rov!,;:vmt- 1'e'-tion- r% %,~il- capability of moving 165.,000 lbs utilizing these61i:ect s*- sort zz:Lxcraf D, Ysad OLa cuv_--.e.it 0012_L` -. 1l~ fojeot-ions thedraily Lmct~i:. -1'z :-.ch a 3,00,000 lb& fi:_airo. 'Iiscw-it could berercohed. wit'h th-Ie :'i~iti... olc 3 -12' .)A 1 J2T-2%- .ti;. cift- On. ý. d.lil-%; b,.is,o~:r b-i t o ozai w~ of 1 C-VI, !-A., ft :iL di~rect cju:.*o2rv of the '~m

:.>is 1,.te capability would allcw the LSC to establish a more decerxtrali"eou:- s-;tSten b,.i, ri ituW ~~w;. to hi'ir~ b-Lk-1 to u-1i ril,

~-3 1 3iaifi "~-'On -r' C-4. 't Can 1ho 1c of : 24 ciosftoe~ot~o~es. is*r, en1. e.ri.t- ool. locll --ircra~ft suFj~ at ;.-oirloctiom. hi7L.,? :h ajoi-of thý PiiG-;~sio-;i3 'o b, the Y,2T,

a~ 01s :~ :~r i(smi~ons, irtLCto capabil.ity*Xi. ivtr -... su~ff icienr. opportunities to accatiplish airdrops monthly. During

belo7::

Ai:;lrknd C (71,01 -0 C7135,4Ai 1 et 02 S,5332t ,3-77

(b) C-.130 A a' As iL-entioned vabolrýŽ, utilizoation of'the '~-130 aizrcrft i- h& ke-v to 's sore, fluid log-isticvl syote;j %Iithink th-

~ ~ to 0v Y--in0 ON2 oui2o'tof ', lbs of' Cc-;.o d \il~t f=OLIt~he .L;*,-' t:) 'he ozjtouut' t-..At -recfreoen- tirno t1--or-e are ~rx

thnt are, -;,:, Thje _:3.:CCesS of bei,-ij; ýxo, for this c:.Ti~t.~t i~s the-C,1vn of' the ' 1.e " eams r.~. to thiir,-1~ to. -;-!& s iirY.-.-' C-123e~rips to 1 C-B c e..hi-.ty U I, o:.-Vit ri.s i V 'l. 0". tCon-

~tuto.of Ca,.: vý_ is.. stri-Is !-y thecc 'AL c-:er tr,.z is~:jot: for n 0-BO5

00maW W CmsdOpsratijijk kapw ~a Uimm Xw ow bfti (~ CSGPO-28

. O? .20 _. 366

Indicate the exceptional overall oapability of this aircraft vith itse42eqable oargo load of 25,000-10,000 lbs, These foutres are based c 0-130eircaft utilition, for specific mission requirements whioh averaged losetha• one per day during the reporting period. It to onceivable that witha C-1•O aircraft in direct support of the gpoup, 4 .amal avanthly V61tlaat1tfigure of over 6,000,000 lbs could be easily aeleved, This aetaoef 4ls1has an outstanding airdrop capability, ad tan bU utilized to trop vsig thestandard modular platfesm heavy drop system, the ooamtfinr delivery atom(12 A-22 containers; 18,000-25,000 lbs payloa. us•ng either 0-13 or O-UVarachbues) or special sa steras such as the Parachute Low Altitude DeliverySystem (PLAD6) and the Low Altitude Parachute ,Extraction System (LAP3S).

This airdrop capability would be greatly. advantageous during the build-up-hase of new camps, since we could airdrop large vehicles and large quan-

tities of supplies to the new camp during the most critical phase (as ecper-neritd at - -i Cat).

C--*LO Utilizvtion i'igures:JAI. Airland: 5,693,438

Airdrop: 31,488

2ý1 ýedical.

i. Outline of Medical Activities:

(1) Medical Training Tea!-is: Four (4), three (3) Tian training;-roam the 1st SFG., Okinawa, were deployed one to each "C" Detachment.

;.s hove conducted 5 day refresher courses fco UWASF medics at the:' " D•:achient level. At present they are conducting a 2 week basic

MedicA& cocurEge for CIDG medics at the "All and 1G41 Detachmient level. UponpoptlAti•e of this phase of their -tission they will ccnduct a 6 week courseef imtrmctiAn for Hamlet health .orkers (Vietnamese Civilian Sub-professionalH"A4• ers=maL) f ro-a a standardized PCI prepared by the Group Surgeon'sOffick. ".1 this final phase of training is successful, si-ilar courses willbe; prodWcedd c:•o for three t.Liles a year by USASF medics in areas needingHamlet- ht lth .!orkers ihere C;V7i is unable to provide training. Plans arebelngmgtae to request four more training teams fron the 1st 6FG for 6 months

VS-tA the 5th 3F"O to carry out i.. mission similar to that described above.

(2) I.edtal kne-.t tons Section has prepared necessary PCI'sa2d6esaoua pjans tc cover all aspects of the 5th SFC medical program. Copies•i t1hhse4lm been made available to all "C" Detach-ment Surgeons and a central

ffbray im being riairntained in the Group Surgeon's operations section. These

19

"O, N 1.

KoAVSF 10 Hay 1966

SUB, 1T: C -n•,rand (perational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPC-2C(hI)) for Period 14iding 30 April 1966

will be 8eriodically revised and current indexes made available to all Detach-ments so that ,.iedics can reauisition this material as needed.

(b) Training aids -ikpplicable to medical subject-- availablethrough all iilitar arid civilian cha.rnels in country have been procured andsa"mples distributed to all "C" Detach-me.its with irforrqlation on requisitionizigadditional -miterials. in this way it is hoped all Detachr.ients can be keptcurrent on aids available to thei au' procure-Lent procedures.

b. Preventive Xedicine Activities:

(1) The Preventive 1Medicine Cfficer has coordinated w-,ith andassisted civilian authc.ities in the investipation and -ianageient of severalplague epidemics. Of greatest i ,portance in this regard is the rapid diss-

e-uination of tilely spot reports frcm U-AA& medics in the field to appropriatebojiw ari G.': Health Cfficials.

(2) In the local area, the Preventive JNedicine $ection respondedto a Cholera outbreak in Iha Trang with an i. imunizati on progran f or indigenouspersonnel in the Croup Headquarters and nearby Special Forces Detachents.

(3) The Veterin.,r (fficer, '0Y fro-a the 1st SFG, respondedto three reports of animal epidemics in the vicinity of C1DG camps in I, 1i,and IV Corps, providing information to GV, Animal Iiusbandryj Authorities andassisting in treatment.

c. Current Activities:

(1) TIedical Cross Training Program: To :maintain a high levelof First Aid "'raining and proficiency for all 5th SCG personnel, A P( Ifor refresher First Aid Training of non-medical personnel was distributedfro.^ the (ffice of the Surgeon. The course is 14 hours in length and isto be repeated at 6 "mionth intervals by "A" and "B" Detachment medics forall assigned personnel. E;.'phasis on this prof'ram was directed by the(roup Co•iaander at the "C" Detachment COa'anders' Conference.

.2) CIDC Dispensary and Convalescent Ward: The large nuiberof CIDG personnel in Na Trang and tha incro ,se in medical evacuw.tirnof UIDG personnel iro.i camps in bouthern 11 Corps to iMha Tranp raised therequireaent for a CIDG convalescent ward such as exists at the "C" Detach-•ients. Approval has been given for a pre-fabricated building, to house this30 bed facility. Final plans are presently being made with the 1LDB Surgeon

20

................:.::,.-..-...,... •:.•..:••..•" :GI

†††††††††††††††††††-.-

~A 7asp O Si.~,7AL 10 m~ay 1966SUBJECT: C mand Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPC-28(RI)) for Period Ending 30 April 1966

to locate this facility in the ULDB compound in Nha Trang and to staff itjointly with LLDB and 5th SFG medics and physicians. Advanced training forCIDG medics will also be conducted here.

(3) LLDB Nedical Re-organization:

(a) The Group Surgeon has rendered assistance to the LLDBSurgeon in the areas of:

i. Plans for i'qproving the training of LLDB medics.

2. .I'ore efficient utilization of LLDB medical resources.

3. Def.i.nition of goals the LLDB medical program seeksto a chieve.

•. Request for additional personnel. and eeuiprnentto achieve the above.

(b) Lfforts have been smade to conform closely to USASFpolicies while taking cognizance of the LLDB limitations and to find aworkable conpromise between the two.

d. Medical Suppl".: A list of critical items has been formulated,the anounts of which will be reported monthly from the "C" Detachments toinsure that adequate levels do exi•t in country. This will serve as a basisfor initiating emergency requests out-of-country for medical supplies.

9. Sinl

a. Total traffic c-unt continued to increase during the reportingperiod, howevor the increase per month 1 °s been gradual in canparisonto the sharp rise experienced during November and December of the precedingquarter. A total of 3,423 messages were handled by the SFCD Cam-Center,where as the Can-Centers at subordinate headquarters handled a total of2,155 aiessages. A continuing increase is expected with the increase ofA and 3 Detach-ients, increased number of Forward Operation 'Bases, andthe izaproved communications capability provided by radio sets A11/PRC-64and AN/PRC-74.

b. The AN/PRC-64 radio set has provided highly reliable ccamunic-ations in support of the saturation patrolling concept. This lightweight,dry cell battery operated set is providing CV coniaunications over distances

21

CCAO L L)15.A/F/T-1f -

0 0C 0 IVVI DEN 7-/, L-

AVSF lo 1 iay 1966SUBRiCT: Canmand Cperational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPC-28

(Ri)) for Period Lnding 30 April 1966

fron 20 to 200 kilaneters. The voice capability of the set has beenvery unreliable over distances from 0-50 kilometers. The only disadvant-age noted to date, is the antenna system. Llements of the coinand areexperimenting with a whip type antenna, which if acceptable will greatlyreduce the time required to install the long wire ty-pe antenna presentlyutilized. It was assumed that the set would satisfy, the Delta- Projectrequirement for reliable short distance voice, and long distance CWcommunications, however this has proven otherwise, due to the inherentskip tendencies of the set and the time required to place in operation(15-20 minutes).

c. Sufficient AN/PRC-25 radio sets are now on hand to issue theseto each operational detachment. This set has greatly improved the overall FM communications capability in support of air to ground and groundto ground operations. It has enabled the operational detachments to extendpatrol actions over distances which could not be realized due to the limitedrange of radio sets AN/PRC-10 and HT-lA. Plans have been formulated whichwill eventually eliminate all AN/PhC-10 radios frao the group inventoryand replaced by the PRC-25.

d. The requirement for radio set AN/PhiC-74 beccrmes more criticalwith the increase of Project Delta operations, increased number of ForwardCperation Bases and the shortage and naintenance problems experienced withthe present single side band equipment (AN/F•RC-93). Project Delta does nethave the cCpability to establish reliable canmunications between the ForwardOperations Base and Deployed Itecon Teams. At present F•'; is utilized throughan airborne relay station. The AN/PRC-74 will provide direct voice and C*'communications between the two locations over short (0-20 IZ 's) distances.The requirement to establish FCB's to control and extend operational areashas materially increased the need for a side band set which does not requirea generator power source. The AN/PRC-74 will satisfy the require'ment. Fur-ther, the constant maintenance problems inherent with the cammericallymanufactured AI/FRC-53, and its requirement for generator power, has reducedthe set's capability of providing reliable communications. This is partic-ularly true when a camp is under attack. The radio requires a doublet orlong wire antenna which are vulnerable to ground and inortar fire and willif destroyed, render the set inoperative. If each operational detach:ientis issued one AN/PRC-74, it can be utilized for long range caomunicationswith the base camp and a float side band set for the AN[/rC-93.

e. A Crypto Mlaterial Distribution Agency (PlS'hA) was establishedby this headcuarters effective 15 April 1966. This Distribution Agency willprovide the advantages listed:

22

C"OVI'- IDUNF 2.-

AVS-F C A/~/D M ;/L10 Kay 1966,SUBfLCT: Caumand Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(RI)) for Period Lnding 30 April 1966

(1) A more efficient method of distribution will be effected.Prior to 15 April all Crypto Custodians were compelled to travel toSaigon each month to receipt for crypto material to support operationsfor the following month. This was time consumig.-. C (-ie:ýrs assignjedto the DI3TRA will deliver all raterial to the C and R Detacnments whichwill eliminate tim•e and afford greater security and control.

(2) In that this headquarters has one account and a number o•sub accounts, the number of crypto devices authorized will be increased.This will provide a realistic maintenance float which enhances the overall maintenance capability. In the past the FOCB and each C Detachmentmaintained separate accounts, which reduces the number of floats authorizedto each Crypto Facility.

(3) The DISTRA at this headc.uarters eliminates the numerousreports which each C Detachment crypto custodian was recuired to sub.ait.All reports, except feeder reports, will be accomplished by the DISTRA.

(4) The procedure of establishing one account with subaccounts (B and C Detachments) places the responsib2lity for the Liaterialdirectly on the user, thus improving security and control measures.

10. CIDO Finance.

a. At the start of the third quarter 1966, the 5th Special ForcesGroup had received confiruation fro-i Departient of the Armyr that its expan-6ion progrwn (and the funds tc support the expansion) was approved. Theexpansion was begun in the latter weeks of the second quarter and its effectswere beginning to be felt in the financial field. The approval of theadditional d2l ,nillion eased the situation in the in-country portion of thebudget especially. Along with the expansion of Special Forces was also thecontinuing buildup of United States and Free World forces in generzzl. Itbeceae more apparent each day of the thi-rd quarter that costs generally werespiraling upward as the demand for food, supplies, equi-Oent, constructionmaterials, and services increased with the addition of each US and Free ',orldunit. The cost of living index in one month alone rose 48; during the thirdquarter. Lxamples of the inflationary trends were felt mostly in food andconstruction materials with primary interest on meat and lumber, bcth of whichhave nearly tripled in cost since May 1965.

b. Too, the civilian work forces were deziing, so to speak, withUnited States units. United States civilian business concerns were obtaining

23

C. o1VV: I ONTIAL

•~~~~~ ~~~~~~ .i .... ......... -. •u -.........• i`•::

0 0

AVSF 10 May 19666IBJECT: Command Cperational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(Ri)) for Period Xnding 30 April 1966

the more qualified and skilled workers to their employ with better wagerates they were able to offer. As a result a study was conducted duringMarch and a small pay increase of $6 per month was reccamended for allemployees in an attempt to retain long standing employees and to attemptto caapete in the libor market.

c. .ith regard to the rising cost of supplies and materials,money-saving methods were employed in an attempt to achieve as much dollarvalue as possible for eý?.ch dollar spent. Supply personnel began searchingin various areas of the country for sairces of lumber at more reasonableprices. Cattle in herds are being purchased at a tremendous savings inmeat costs rather than buying heads as needed. Although the initial outlayof funds is substantial by such a purchase, the cost per head of cattle is1/3 of the cost prevy -i".ly experienced. Buyers traveled to the Deltaregion to purchase rice @ $3 less a bag than local purchase prices. Theseare but a fcw of nuinerous instances in which cost-consciousneas was appliedin an effort to stem inflation. ln each cace h aver, cozts wore f£nd tobe still rising over theý May 1965 level.

d. The recruiting of CIDG Strike FoQ-"o p•:3oineL coninucd atan increasing pace but was falling short of the 150 man pT3r company goal.It wis decided to reduce the goal to 132 men conipan'.3s ar.d in •o do~in,would serve a two-fold purpose, nmnely, (1) cone in linre with rrcruitingpotentialities, and (2) calign the CIDG corqpany structure with that of theliegional For'ce/Popular Force structure. This lattc : pur-posc would alsoprovide fci, a snooLher convers'iorn of troops from CIDG to 1•/'/F wlhn thesituation presented itself. As a result of the reduction of 18 men percompany it necessarily followed that a corresponding decreaso in fundswere nc.dx..d for pay and allowances and subsistence in hChn in-coun--ty porti :nand Ises weapons, etc., wcre beinj issued fron "-af.-countr•r furs. Astudy was conducted on this matter during Miarch which resulted in '. Mesi3agp:to D,.partmnent of Army to withhold r4 million fron the fourth quart-.r auth-orization of funds.

e. . Depart:rent of the Ar!,V teach visited the Group durin Januar:1566 with the express purpose of determining ha. owitchback fund2s were beingexpended, were any savings being Made, and what procedures were beinp utilizedto correctly monitor the budget. Upon inspection of the procedures, theteam learned that.: (1) adequate contro1 s -. ere established and utilized, (2)limitations vzere being placed on expenditure authorizations and were beingmcniter# to insure adherance to lm-itations, and (;) excess of nearly $1.5million was expected from the in-country portion of the budget as a result

24

C ONFF1i.A /k//,l-A

C o ,,V l-"l............

AVSF 10 Zky 1966SUB W-11 Comnand Cperaticnal Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPC-28

(RI)) for Period Ending 30 April 1966

of savings made. Permission was granted by the tean to defer any c arnittmenat.on Mcess funds until 1 April 66.

f. it is anticipated that costs will not reduce during the forthquarter and may continue to rise during the remainder of the calendar year.Continued use of .nanagement tools and an air of cost-consciousness will beapplied to produce eUective dollar expenditures in the CIDG program.

11. Future Plans.

a. Conversion to hegional Force: It is proposed to convertthre cozps on .1 July. 2wo 4 these croips are in 1I CTZ, Plei Do Lim anda c•,p to be announced at a later date. The third camp being An Phu inUiv ,-Z

t-. The 5th 3pecial FIorces Group is currently sub.mitting an"-hhi.i whon approved will be corisidez-ed adequate. There are no plans forfurth-r : ion of the CUDG propra.

c. It is -lanned to request an increase fro a 245 (JID cowoaics*tuthc..ized by the end of this fiscal yoar to 300 OIDO companies. This isto pl-ovide four co.ipanies per CIDC c&-ap.

d. As large conventior-l units riovo into an area, ha C'LDGcv¶5 wdJ.l be phased out or relocated Lo areas where the populati.on hasnot been pm•-ified or have not been in contact with GVN.

Q, It i- planned to reqvtst the Airmobile cacnpany and tUn P4u.-k enotat~ionn units be organic to the 5th Special Forces Croup on c,: aboutI June.

4 . Q.ject Delta will be eriployed 30-45 days ahead of a plJ.-.nneA4rfOt"'* u:,-,'. an int,.lligence gcthering ele-..ent. They vrill also bh ariplc,.*

6q a l..ag ra-'- .. patrol for lrge conventional units. They will nct opera4e"i.n cloze prcxi:--ty to large conventional units as a screening forco.

"1 "X K. AN,S/s C ol.onel, iniantz,-

C o cmanding

25

.- " {.•..i

APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C 3 March 1966

SUBJECT: Stidar'd of Person=! Appearmice

TO: See Dist-.Iibution

I1 It has bean brought to the lattb•:tion of this comm•and that thestandard~s of personal appearance .are not being upheld by many persernelstationed in Vietnim. Ta a letter dated 28 Jan 66, General Westmorelandhas indicated thkat he is disturbed, lest the overall mission wndexminethe basic soldierly qualities of physical fitness and military appearanoe9

2. I know that the Special Forces trooper adheres to the hig•heststandards of physical fitness, personal appearance, and military conduct.Only in exceptional and isolated instezces, have I seen anything to theoontraxye.

3. It is a oomm•nd responsibility to initiate immediate correctivemeasures concerning any personnel found deficient in his soldierly beax-ing or physical fitness. I am confident our standards will remain highas we continue to fulfill our mission.

s/William A. 1cKeantl',iL & :cI•ICAN

Colonel, InfantryCommanding

DISTRIBUTION:"All

INOLOSURE 1 TO SEC2I0U II to Operational Report on Lessons Leazed (ResCSGPO-.28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

TOTAL CASUALTY pIGURES pOR ls QTR 1966

KIA 22

WIA 77

,AEDEVAC TO COITUS 4

jJIA 3

KIA RATIO.

V0/,AS 7401 51:1 76a1 71.6a1

WI& RATIO

I U6 M6 1964 5 1966USAS? RIA/WIA. 13/132 23/132 34/201 22/77

VO KIA/IVA 963/316 1153/530 2566/730 848/173

INCLOSURE 2 TO SEOTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (ROSCSGPo-28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

OUI TARATIVE C1DG/VC CASUARM' MGMM-S

16,1964 -1-51966

KILI. 9 396 657 230

nTA U T'I1

V`C/CIDG 10.3s1 2.9:1 3.9:1 411

I!IOLOSURE 3 TO SEC~TION II to Operational Report on Lessonsa lamed (ROB

5THi ST CMuL FORC. o s (AnBoPms), 1ST SPECIAL FOCBSAPO US Fbrces 96240

AVSP-C 20 April 1966

SUBJECT; TOLE CIDG Guem'illa Company (Licht)

TO: See Distribution

1. 'TO&E 1-66, CIDG Guerrilla Company (Light) this headquarters, dated

1 Jan 66, is hereby saprseded.

2. This new TO&M is effeotive upon reoeipt.

3. Commanders concerned will begin immediate oonversion to this new"orgsnization.

4. Requests for ohanges or exoeptions to this new TOME will be sub-mitted to this headquarters, ATTN: S-3, with supporting information and willnot be Implemented without prior approval.

FOR TMh COOUNDERt

s/William I. Parksp Jr.2 InolJ i/WILLIAei'I. PARKS, JR.

1. Summary of Changes Captain, Infantry2. TO&E 1-66 (Revised) Assistant Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:"A"

fINCL0BURE 4 TO SECTION II to operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS

CSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

Sof CDhAz

a, The organizational change will be initiated upon receipt ofthis TOM~

b. The equipment changes viri occur' only upon notification thata, camp, has been seleoted for conversion to RP; but not prior to 90 dayspreceeding the conversion date. At that time, equipment excess to TOcE2--66 will be turned in, and additional equipmnent authorized by that TOWEmy then be requisitionod.*

*The following items may be requisitioned at any tines

(1) 132 Canteens w/oover (to provide two per man).

(2) 132 Harness, Load Bearing.

(3) 88 Entrenohing tools (to pmovide one per man)#

2. L _:s The logistical ohangeover, by camp, is desipmed -toaooomplish the followings

a. Authorize camps to keep their presentfirepower until neo-essa-•y to convert,

b. To minimize and "even-out" the logistical inpact on the L.S.C.

3. AFO12 TMN OF Co NGES,

(1) Tuke wps sqda from the 3 rifle platoons, combine themto form a Weapons Platoon,

1 (2) Take two personnel from the 27 now in the new WeaponsPlatoon, tmensfer them to Co Eqs.

(3) Strength should now be:

Co Sqs 11

3 Rifle PLt Nqs 15

9 Rifle Squads 81

Weapons Pit

132 TotalThol# I

a0•a

S(4) Individual Position/Title Changee

Sdelete aidnam

j add one cook

Sadd one oomppny clerk

Aadd one driver

(b) 3 Rifle Platoon lEqdfuarters

1 convert 3 riflemen/meseengers to ,.1-79 Gunners

(o) 9 ifle §Suaas

j delete 9 AR men, make then Asst Sqd Ldrs

- delete 9 Asaet AR men, make thea '"R:fle Team Chiefs"

(d) Wyawsm Platoon 9Aizatio

A Sample

Title SLeoonmdsd Wourc

SPlat ldr I of 3 rlw sqd 1dre

k Plat Sgt 3rd of 3 mortar gmnare

R Eadio Oper let of 6 mortar amo beares

2 Mortar SectionA Sample

WIeoouiended ou2=e

SSeotion ldr 2nd of 3 inse sqd ldrs

kSquad leader (2) 2nd and 3rd of.th 3 onort 6Suierg

SMortar eunmer (2) 2 of 3 aset mort gewme

SAst mort 6umer. (2) I old a&et nort umner

2nd of 6 mort mmo boarers

Amo Bearer (4) Last 4 of 6 mortar ammo bearezw

Inol #l2

Saohine Gun Sootim

Title

a Seotion ldr 3rd of 3 vgaia sqd ldre

_b Squad ldr (2) 2 old m .ohine gunners

c •achine g•amer (2) 3rd of 3 assigned

1 of 3 aset aaohine gomners

Aset machine gmmer(2) 2 of 3 assigned

A Ao bearer (4) 4 of 6 assigned

ITote: The last two n.eg. amo bearers are to be zranufe•'ed to Co Hai.

4. EaUjrs-m . (upon notifioation of acnversion but not Priorto 90 days p2eoeedinu).

so Delete

Vest, oaryngg, magazine, 8S1 23

LM 1

BAR 9

hlortart 60E1 1

Caebine, M-1 51

5MG 23ibao SI 161

Pouch, • ne, an 46

Rag, amo, 60M -orta 2

Binooulam. 6

Cookpot. 11

agasinoe, B&R 72

Wapainev oarbinet, 15 d 98

Pouch, magnsune oaabLne 42

, nol#3

b. Add

Lamzn 1cbp G~c3adp U-.793

Carbine, U.2 37

aifl., 14-1 38

Lolmolao2? Grenade 11-712

lBqonst, OnrbIniet H-4 6

Canteen w/oOver* 132

ikobete v/sheath 2

MahUIsim% Ptol, Cal .45 33Pouch* Mapslzinet pistol 1

shovelp anbrmnohinge V/oozuif* 8

Hm~mess, load bearng* 132

Sbe ir~uisitiomied at any time*

OIDO GUERRILLA COMIPANY (LIGHT)

Designations CIDG Guerrill1a Cor.ieny _ .(Light)

Seotio8 I. Geisrela

Organiz ation - - - - - 6 - - - - - 1Elquipm~ent-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2

II. Ormnusation (Personnel):

Dis tributioni . . . . . .- .3 .Recapitulation - - - - - - --- - -m - 4Recasiks- w mom ---- m w w

III* EquipmenUts3

Di stributi on . . . . m. .5 ....fleoapitulation -m--m m

Remar~ks.-- .n . . . . . . . . . . . .9

8INTIM I

ORGANIZATLW

1. mISSIOU

as Conduct hxa. went and interception along border cooridorsagainst Viet Cong infiltrators fton Laosi. Cambodia and North of the 1-7thPaM1lle into the Republio 0or v)emam.

be lb~rass and oandxot raids ayainst Viet Cong secret' son. mand bases,

a. harrass and intercept the Viet Cong on their inanUd oaio-~li~Ai="outesOo onecting one 80on6 to another,

do Collect intelligmnoe infomiitica on the amea mentioned in &mand b above.

e. Participate in special operations prescribed by the joint Omw.3.

2. ASSI(IflW: Based on pcpaphioal areas '" dizeoted- by seo IrerVietnamuese Special Forces RLgh Coamand In conjauition -with at 5th 8? OP (Abmi)vlot S?.

p -: ... U• - ::: { ¢i~i•:

3 APA=flITI2s a. At full trengtio, this auit k hae 06 1~S+ : oay~ilities, ..

(1) Conduct raids, ambushes, ana combat and intelligace pattols.

(2) Search and seizure operations on a limited scale.

(•) Smll scale conventional comba•t operations.

(4) Conduct of basic psychological operations; i.e., distri-bution of leaflets, face-to-face moetin~s, assistance in all types of civicaction programst etc.

(5) Produotion of intelligence for its oim use and in responseto the ooianders EEl.

be As noted in the rermke section, additional oquil•net providesth8s unit with the oapabilit of establishinC" reoonaiewaae and surzi2Janesoreens (O0DG Borle. SBwalllanoe 1.issmion).

o. The nit is capable of defendinG itself and iL+ installations.

4. MOBILITY. Uobbilit of this unit is dpepmdent upon outside soureowas no vehicles are organic.

5. APPLICABILITY. This TOE will be utilised by all detaohb ito underthe opeational control of Beadqrterte, 5th Speoir-l Forces Group (Alirbooe),lst 81, In organisinm g =its under the OID) Pogrm. Units will be comsndedbo Vietnamese Special Forces,

1 This table is the authority to Ivquisition and issue In aoooatanoewith procedures direoted by Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (AMxrbrne),

2

['-.: •.wj. :w .. .:

PIL: k MDIGZCLATIC 8Th LT T3G2C 111 0 gm Pi -o

-01 Iffedquarters 11

01 compw-CO 1 1 0,/01

0.02. onz, XO 1 1 03

03 1:•.t-•, 1 1 02

04 fptpY C10* 1 1. 02

05 Axwore? 1 04ook 1 1 02

07 OW Rio Opie.tor 2 1 02

08 SW operator I 1 02

09 Oo Ole* 1 1 02

10 D•ziver 1 1 04

02 Rifle Platoa (3) 15

01 Platoon Leader 3 5 03

02 Platoon Sgt 3 3 03

03 Platoon Aidtma 3 3 02

04 Rdio Oprator 5 1 2 02

05 U-79 Gunner 3 3 08

03. 0.. aa"de (9) 81

01 o• u• Leader 9 9 0o

02 Asst SquadLeader 9 9 02

03 BAR .Ome 9 9 0504 Amat n= Gun••r 9 9 04

*0 Rifia Si C 9 03

0 R iflemian 36 6 ()

* 04X W ~pl~Patooni 3

01 Platoon Leader'1 03

02 nJatoonS Bg 1 1 03

03 Radio Operat6?. 1 1 02

05 Vortex Seotluza 11

01 Section LOeWda 1 1 02

o0 Sqad •mAer 2 2 02

03 Mo1rtar 0wm.r 2 2 01

04 Amst Gw•a 2 2 07

05 Amo Baze 4 4 0P.

06 M)aohzie Gun Seotlon 11

01 Seo.oU h e.asms I 02

0 Squad. Leuadz 2 2 02

03 3k o oum.Ownu 2 2 01

04 Asst tmne 2 2 06

* 05 Amo * ea 4 4 02

Recap11astcip 132 1 1 5 21 32 72

10•1. ,S01 Plet.l.Oa6. #45 06 zaIb• 1-ib O

02. Carb1t. ]W1 *I Gap Mrtaw03 Gar'b±io, U-2 08 1&.79 Ginae~i L&1D1oher

04 XIif-1e, M41 09 D-.7 Greade LImmober

05 Be

:Bag amnmo, 60i M~ortar 44Sluoouloue# 6X30 2 2.Parbirne, Cal, 30 111-1 7 15 15 ýCarbine, Cal# 30, UJ.2 2 32 3Compaset Lmeiatio 2 3 3 aCocispot, W/oover 8"1 2 12 4 18

Kit, medical, Sompcany size 1

Kit, pedioall Platooni size 3Knit., fayonet, Oarbine 9 60 25 94Knife, DBonetf Rifle. 2 .36 30

Launohe?, GiwiadMo U-.7 2 9 .11

Lamohez', Oreado, U-79 3Ihbohote, W/vhmath. 3 24 20 47lbobine (Kftq Cal# 30, light 2 1Ifmosinep Barg Cal .30 144 144

Mm~auine, Carbluep 15rd 63 136- 119' 518

Magisesii Pistol, Cal .45 3 12 15

mwox 6m aPanels, Air/Gzound Ilecoojition get 2 2Pistol, Cal .45, W/holster 1 4 3Pouch, mgazin., pistol, de1 .45 1 4 5Pouch, magsre, Oqjrblzi 27 144 51 222E~iop HT-I 1 6 3 10

EaMIop 1-20 1 IRitlet Autmwtict., Dromi~ng 9 9Riti, )&It Cal 030 2 36 36

T1 -ý

M~anketp wool 13*

Boots, beatap p= 264

Bowl, metal, individual 1 32

Canteen with oup & cover 264

Capp camouflage 132

Hammook 132

H~a J.oýv beroring13

Jag~cet; fatiguaeZacket Field 3,*

.' Pket, first aid, individual13

132

' thzksaok, local purobase I3

jSuitt black (coat & trousers) 132

Sweater# wool OD) 132***

Trousers, camouflage 132

Troumers# fatigue 132

* ubstituhe 4 belts, aMmo, AR, for Personnel aimed withiMf~

** Double allowance authorized in Regions where alimatioc oo444.%40

***AllOWowne ~autbovi -2., only in region where o3Li*# amgiitions,

Warrant issue.

D1(.'J, O=a MOrt=~ 4

Belt, Pisol ý

DiMAnkets wool13

Bbots# betar palir 264

Dcid p metalp individual 132

caien w/Oup and oaover 264

cap* oa5ouflage 132

Carbinel cal .30 M1-1 37

Caxblnep cal 930 S.Z2 37

Oookpot, local purobase 1

Hmmook 132

Bazmese# Load bearing 1 32

Jacket, fatigue 132Kits mdlomi, oompeziy suse

* Uts medical, platoon uize 3

-Kife# beaynet, carbine 94

Kaife, bayonet, 11-1 rifle 38

Launcher, Gi'.nadep Mm.-7 11

Laucher, Grme.adet 16.79 3

Wt19 Obel 30 2

tacbet., v/mheath 47

lboximep AR144

Mcapale, carbine Cal. .30 15 rd 518

by,:*-

Imxrtart.60mm 2

Packet, first aid individual 132

Paels$, air/gmomd recognition set 2

Pistol, Cal .45 v/holster 5

Poncho 132

Pouch, magazine, carbine 222

pouch, magazineq pistol5

Radio, MT-1 10

ftdio, T...20I

Rifle, auto, oal .30 9

Rwuokwkq .local purobase 132

Shqvel entren~hing w/oazrier 132

Suit black (coatb and trousers) 132

Sweater, wool OD 132

UTrO~ume?5 camouf lage 132

Timoesm t fatigue 132

TK

0%

C+

4P4

TABLE. 0], MGMATION) 2 Jan: 66X-1D DQUII'MIT TOE 2-661M. 2-66

CI'DG _ "T; :-M •'1.0.1 3OE1E°

Section I. cieneral: Page

• Org~iiz,-.tion - -

Equipment - "------------------------- 2II. o z on (Pe.3.noael).

Distribution .............-.......-- -------------- 2. e-. . t -.t--- .--. .4flemtrks - n -...- nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn . 5

III. Equipment:Distribution- -- -------------------- 5Recapitulation .-.-.- -.-. --

SEOTBI2, I' "'* .. . .G . . . "A.

OflGAI,IZATIOi.

1. MISSION: The NUNG CIDG ,,MIKE FORCE" is a multi-purpose reaction.force which vrill be located in each of the four Corps areas, azd anadditional unit will be located at Mha Traijg. The misoions of theseforces are:

a. Constitute a "C" Tea reserve.

b, Conduct raids, ambushes axd combat patrols.

•c. Be prepared to reinforce CIDUG camps under attack.

do Search and seizure operationa.

e, Conduct small scale convention•l. oonbe.t opern.ti6aoe.

2. ASSIGi1U.EINT: .ased upon geographioal areas as directed byHeadquarters 5th Special Poroes Group (Airborne), lst Special Porces.It is anticipated that each force will operate in its ownm respectivecorps area, however, COP 5th SGA is aut-.'orized to employ each unitanywhere in the Republic of South Vietnem according to the tacticalsituation, provided necessary coordination with LLDB High CowAnd andWACV Headquxrters can be made. Normally, each "0" detachment commanderwill employ this reaction force as a reserve in it's Corps Area. CO,5th SFG has capability to reinforce any Corps Area when the situationthreatens.

INCLOSURE 5 TO SECf.IOn:" II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28(W) 30 April 1966

~~ECT1On I, (1 -C(Crtd 2 Jan 60'

EQUIP2-a

1., This table iis the -,tiz,.-ozityv requisition and Lz~sue jin aýcord~iuwewritli procedureo ý.iec1t&e 5r7o~ t-- 3~,eoial Z1 orces G-roup(Airbor-ne).

2,. Tnt1:vidtial. -0 ovP*-nces Th-r* all'..ýadas -xe list'nd Lir pam~rap1 09of Section III.'

3. Allo~ances of 6q~iiie-nf autiorize~d 'herein may' be decreased oromitted at th6I dieoret16n *o1 the UM'S&; fetaciv'ent Comme.-ders Equi~pmen~tin excese to the aut':oriz~d --Ilovriwe will ntot- be ro-quisitioned vdit1b~ut

approval of th.is Headouarters.o

..................SECTIO,- Il; *ORGAN1ZA.TIo::,

TAR.-IL Or, OR dZATIOi-: AND fL) QIBM-

26RAR DMSIGIATION S~rL TT DMG SCTT CPL PF PV IIMK

0.1 Co Headquarters

01 Company Cmd~r 1 1 01

C2 Exec O2zfioer 1 1

03 Radio Opr 2 2

04 Rifle Grenad:A.er 11

05 Olompexny Medic 11

02 3 Rifle Plat Hqs

01 Plat Leader 3 3022 Plat Sgt 3 3

03 nadio Opr 31

04 Plat Mvedic 3 5

"MONT Ii. TE2.6CdPAR LIU LTýILIO MfSG GTCPL W V

• . . : . • . . . '• .,

03 9 Rifle Squads01 Squad Leader 9 902 Ae sqd Ldr 9. 9 0303 AR Gunner 18 18 02.,04 Rifleman 63 18 18 27

04 3 17pns Sqd (Rifle IPla.t)01 Squad Leader 5 302 Gunner LIVG 6 6 0403 Asst GOmer 6 604 Amo Bearer' 12 1205 Grenadier 3 3 05

05 Eq. Wfpns Plat01 Plat LeadSe 1 1

02 Radio Opr1 103 Plat Iwao 1 104 Gunner 3.5 1 1 0605 Asst Gunner 1 1

.06 3 Wearone Squads.

SO S Ld (GOumer) 3 302 ,,at Guaner (60m) 3 3

*03 Amc Preparc 3 304 Amo Be&rre 18 18

07 1 Reoon Platoon

01 Plat Load"-m 1 102 Squad Ldz 3 303 Chief Scout 3 304 Scout. 9 9

.I3 Riflemen 3 3

* -..

d0

08 RECAPITURAICK

Qopay ,eh e. 1 1

Executive OfftoeV 1

Medic 5 :

aRao Opr 6 6Rifle G•enadier 1Rifle Plat Ldr 3 3Rifle Plat set 3Rifle 8qd Ldr "9 9

.Amst Rifle Sqd Ld 9 9AR Gmner 18 18itfi on 63. 1 18 27Wpm SqO Ld tifle Pit 3 3

6Aset LW 6 6_mo Beaver 12 12Grmnadier 3 3Wpm PlatL Ld 1 1

an-tar So Ldr (Owing?) 3 3a-at Mortar Guner 3 3Ao Preparer 3 5Ao Beae 18 18Gnner•3.5 1 1Asmt Ounner .5 1Recon Plat Ldr 1 1

SqA LTz 3 3Obef Scout 3 3Scouts 9 9Rifl• mn 3 3.TMAOLS 1.96 7 3 34 74 53. 27 34 4ive

t Nb.tmsg

4

* . . . . .... ......

An el &=med with oarbihe i 091 30 unless otheMM;

C0 A~vmd with carbine 04. 30 pind .45 cal pistol ...

01 Armed with .45 cal Piatol

02 Armed with. BM

.03 Armed -with Launcher, Grenade, Carinb~re..

04 Axed witha? M. D.

05 Armed with 11-79

06 Amed with 3.5 Iý

01. Compaw Headquarters

mziocuJanu 6 X 30.1

CSAGMea 35MM9 half ,fraMe

Cawbines caliber .30*. . 6

Compass, Lenastic

* Coolcpot with covert " per sa '6 men

Flashlight

.i+t, Medical, OMO size

ftife, bqonett oAb'ine 4

Luamoher, guaaest carbine ' .

Hachette with obsh.~b1 '

bqasifmlb, pistol, caUber .45 3

P00el,68 air/Ovan reoopiit$0& Not1

Pistols cal .45 sami4"tatoi~c w/ho1.it.:

A IT IO III -E&UMMMi CCTINZIMI'.. 2 ' 5..

Pouoh, universal f2

Radio, PRC-10 I

Radio, 11T-I02 3 Rifle Platoon Headquarters

Binoculars, 6 X 30 3

Carbine . caliber .30 12

Compass, Lensatic 3Cookpot wI/cover 8" 1 per ea 6 man

Flashlight 3Kit, medical, platoon,. 43

Krf.o g b1rozet pobirne 12

Maohette w/sheath 3

Magazine, carbine 15 rd 84.Pouoh, universal 24

Radio, .HT-I 603 9 Rifle-Squads, RPfle Platoon

Carbine, Cal .30 81

Cookpot jv/*over 811 1 per ea 6 menFlashlight 9

tife, bayonet, ocrwe. 81

Launcher, p &%4de, carbine 9

/phette v/sheath. 18

IMgaine AR 21.6Magazine, carbine-, 15rd -567.Pouoh, universal. 102

Rifle,. automatiop, oaliber .30 18

Belt, rifle, automatic

.- 5 5 -, r ... ;i . : i : .

.: • .' . . ,\ 6

K S~~82OVfIII-TOR 2-66 (Conit'd) ..

__ ~~ALLOVIANOWESRt

04 Weapon'S Squad per Rifle Platoon(s).

Bifl0aOrs~8 6 X 30 'Ca~rbine , cal .30 2CompaeoB, Lensatic3

Coolcpot w/cover all . per ea 6men

M~G, c~l. .30Launch,6rp grenade W-79 '3'

M/ta8z±1he oax&b±zI, i5rd t47'Pouch, universal 42

05 Weapons Platoon Iieadqt=iari

Binoculars, 6 X30Carbine, cal.1 .30 ..

Compassp lensatio

Kit, Medical, platoon size .1

Launcher rocket, 3.5 1MAagazine, t arbinep l5rd :21

Pouch, universal "6Radio,' -1-.1

06 Wapca 841"d I.wea~p6nv P1aon'

Carbine, Cl .0 27-*Oookpoti /err 1~. per e.a 6 men

COMPOO~ 'Lehtatlo 3Flashlight *;

carbine 27

'pit

~a'aa a.

a'Z

'9 Ai-- A~

SUOT1~ LU 1% 2-66 (Conil) .

.06- Kacheite w/shiath, ...- ..Mga~zine, obarbine, 15T& .8

Motr 60

Ppuob, universal

07 ... , ponaraisance Platoon 3eadquartera

B$.fomaarq~ 6 X 301

-C~rb~ine P caliber? .301

Magazine, Cax'b-ne , 15rd .

Poiuohp uni±vemae1 . 2.

Radiop HT-i , .2

08 3 Reconnaiusance Squa~dp. .

3BjVoulejru,6 X30 .3Conase, Lensatic 3.Cookpot w/oover 81" 1 per .aa 6 men

CeWbinep Caliber 30MXbohotte w/sheath.. 6

" zLaine, p cobin~e, 15rd .

yI~io HT-1NMI~ I' L1 Cookpot w/oovezr 8"1 authorized. per eaoh' .6men.

2. 60wz HLortar Vz~o b.eaperg, gult4orisqdmortar. carrying aakets.

3*1 ontnrenahing tool suthorized per:*pnh 3 vszAf

- .. 4. bon Platoon authorized St.W., hst4mts

5:, Zaoh laIM Force authorized 6 42f ton. tmwckp

09 JO IW C MAYAAU1

-44:

Belt, Block w/buokle 198

4 4.

4.. - .. . ~ .,N

8~INIII TOE 2-66 .(Cont' d)

Bolts Pistel. 8

Belt, automatic riflIe 16.

Binoculars, 6 X 30 .12.

Blankets Indigenous 198

Boot, Data 396

Bowl$ metal, individual 198.

Cameras 35,mm haLf frame .

Cantleen v/cup and .cover 1E

Hat, camouflage -198 .

Carbine, cal. .30 170Compaase lensatic 14Cookpot W/cover 8"1 32 per oompazW

Flashlight . 20

iremmock, Iudigenovs 198

Haniess,. field 198

Jacket, camouflage 396

Kit, medical, company size 1

Kit, medioall plato'on size 4

Knife, ba~yonetp carbine 170Launoherg grenade, carbine 10

Laimoher# grenade, 11-79 9LMO. -Cal. .30 6

Machette v/sheath 34

Ibgazineq ARt 216

Magazine, carbine, l5rd 1183

Magazine, Pistol, cal. .45 3

mortar, 6omm 3

Packet, first aid, individual 198

FWT

~'P1

OCTIO TOE.2-66 (Oont d).

Paniels Air Gr'ound reco&hi~tion set1Pistol. cal .455Pouch, universal 298

Radiot HT-1 13Radio PRC..1O I

Rifle BARL .30 cal 18-Ruoksaokl Indigenous ' 198

Trotusere, oamou;rg~e 396

Trousezra, Fatigue 190

10'

j"4-- I *...~j; T

K., I

.~ -.. ..

-Fj

Ll

*12

..* .* . .... . ....

I'd41-1

I'd!

13

o 0.

IO

HI-'

II .

10

TABLE OF O11ANIZATICT 2 Jan 66ANDJ BýUIPLMMTT TOE 3ý-66NR. 3-66

cIMG CO7IA'A'1 ROI, T-AISSAaCt PLATOON (APACI-M,)PageS~ction I Gene.;al - -. - -• - - . l.-- - -- 1

Section II. Organization (Personnel) - - 2

Section ljl. Equipment . ---.----------. - 3

SECTION ICfITERAL

a. Perform reconnaissance xad psychological operations in thevillages and hamlets within the operational area of each CIDG camp.

b. Perform recomnaissance missions within Viet Cong dominated

area$,

c. Provide direction for artillery and air strikes on theViet 'Oaag positions.

d. Act as guides for other friendly forces.

e. Hark and secure L~zdn Zone and Drop Zone and stagingareas, . .. ................ .....

f, Conduct limited TARGET/bomb assessments.

g. Employ stay - behind patrol.2. ASSIGNifT: One Combat fleconnaissance Platoon to each CIDG

camp.

a. This table is the authority to requisition and issue inaocor•anoe with procedures directed by Headquarters, .5.th Special ForcesGroups ist Special Forces, Vietnam.

b. Individual allowances for all grades are listed in section

a.. Allo*ances of equipment authorized herein may be decreasedor omitted at the discretion of the United States Ar=y Special Forc.esDetachmf-t Co vier quiint e, -uimes txceii ito th@ orized allowane .Will note ±euiditli~iiad -Vitiiout -a~ppwval of' HeadquArteis, '5th 'specialForces Group, 1st SpeciAl F6es.6"Vetnam. ."

T2hOLOSURE 6 TO SECTION II ýo .Ops.,,tional Report on. Lessons Learned i(.bOS. -S -

GPO-28 (Ri)) 30.April 1.6 , .' . -" .

90AR&L-E ,V CHAITIZATIO.A- AVID EUIP1MT

SECTVICIT 11 - 0?OAfl1ZATIUiT

PARL LUTE DEjýýkT1iTI~jT SIR LT MSlG-1 Mi!G C~b- 0?XL MTlW

01 Headquarters 2

01' Plt Lai -11r

02 Asst Plt Ldr 1. 11

02 Recon Sqds (4) 32

0 qd diA 4 '.6

02' -Ast'Sqd..r - 4

03 Senior, Rifleman 8 80

04 Riflemal 16 6 02.

REAPITULATIONCK

Pit Lede *.gl I' 131OL Y

Plt PltL&? 1 1-

SquadLir 4 4

.8. .1-6

TioTALS Alo 1.Ut .4 4

02 Two men in each squad armed with Browinizg toatcRle

SECTIOIT 11

040

IA 7i

C-4

.4 ~00

SDESIGUITION AUMANTOE

01 Platoon Headquarters

Binooulars, 6X30 2

Carbine, c~al 30, P V*2 2

Compass, Lensatio 2

COOIpOt, with covert 8"1 1

Knf, 4on carbine 2

Laxnoher Igren aides, o~rbine 2

Ma-z-ie orbineq , r 14

Panels~ ",4 g/round rodo'gition, got 1

02 Pour (4O'ombat Recopi SqiAdsCarbinev- be 16

Compasa enstl 0

Rash3igbt72!ý,Kaife, bayonet, car~bine 16 J",

Launcher, grenade# oearbine8

Magazine, BMR. 96 iMaainet oarbine, 15 rd l~

Radio, ET-I

Uifle, Browxir~nautomatio 8

Bayonet- iflef 1.I

03 34 ludiviciM4 a ub

Belt, p~sipl ' 34*Blaketi. 0134 *

Boots# b~taf w 468

4.

SECTION III EQUIPMEN (Cont~d)

PAIRA DMIGNATPION ALLOWANCE

03 Bowl, metal, individual •34

Canteen, W/cup and cover 34

Cap, camouflage 34

ammmock 34

Jacket, camoflage 34

Jacket, fatigue 34

Jacket, Pield 34 *

Packet, first aid, individual 34

Poncho 34

Rucksack, local purchase 34

Suit, black (Jacket & trousers) 34

Sweater, wool od 34 *'*

Trousers, camouflage 34

Trousers, fatigue 34

* Substitute eight (8) belts, ammo, AR for personnel armed withrifle, auto, caliber 30.

•* Double allowance authorized in regions where climatic condi-tions warrent issue.

•* Allowance authorized only in regions where climatia eorAitionsvarrent issue.

AVS F-C

1a1,±-.i.; Ofe D o cea-beýý J'Y6 tl .c 5t), Special i-oorce C-roup (bn)

roqvir(h~ets ouJ.T. ,l-:ve to bo T.it~~± Lo c,- aJ-):po,-t a rapidly~ c~il oce. r1~ . G o vt> jJflplvcuo it ias

conaidered e..-; Ki L tat cv;nruuport be. obtainea1. Duri:n. %~ 5thi Soeciallorces Group freL~ior t.Ci: of Staff of the Am~y -in la~to Deceraberthis problem of engineer oupport %as disueted., PzeviLou queries to USARV

adUVra-ALPAC indicated thiat engineer teecis a-4 eupetc pabeto3avySTAT tez~xr5 were not availalble within .xt-;zeooui'cec in South Vietnam,The Chaisi of Staffo immediately reco,ý-Iiized th-o :aoed for engineer support andindicated it wotad be ma~de avatiluble to the 0-roup, Engineer assets sithinUBAidPAO were again re-exc2avned and va-r..uated tzid the 539tLh Enaineer Detachment,'1st Special FPo.-oces Gro'.,,, (Abn), 12t Sppcia1 PPrc-es, locadt',ae on Odinavra wasselected . to provide. t~he necessa.ry -p)ezu-'Me*nn f'or thb ený7ineer support required.OMIU&A20V direbted -US Am~y Viotiw, -t-o provido the necezisary construction equip-ment for.ther~e teoznsý

In J~anuary 196G the Oor-aund 6"ing Officcers- 6:C th11e 1st Special FworcesGroup* and the 539th Ent-ineer Detachmen't visited flTha. Trencýod steps weretaken to --equea.t one -&gineer KA Te,, (Conrol) eah,! £Cotr Engineer 13B Temem(Advisory). 6ongistiirC' of t, 'tot-J o ý -tient y*-five people.' ~izol a~rr gementsviere *ma.de at t-'io time xad the rewl.iest via63 or#,rarded to TJSAIRBAC' - The CA. Toamarrived.iini country on-15 Pebrut~r., a6nd the FtJ tebir.s 4~rrived approiim.n tely twoqweeks 3Ater on-the 27 February 1ýik*; Zior a 1&ý) "'y periotC:1. If thlis enigineerteam concept- proves sucaes.u _UA2AC' lef t the vi~ %y a o amdfeengineer' detachmluent With ezn ort-;aaic 6nnequip-uent capability týo beassignied to the ,5th Special'Foroes Grourp (Abn-) on a' perm~anent 'basibo.

2., 001-TOPT OP, -OPUT1:

-he enzin~er "control and --tdvisor-;- -P2~zr attacohed to tho '5th* Special

Forces for -ener6.1 support are or~mnized in th--e foillovrin']; ariier.

I-NCLOSUflE 7 TO SE(1TXONJ 11 to 0pcrzatio±i.cU. 2epŽort on Lesoon~s Learnied- -C~S'OSPO-28(Rl)) 30 April 1965

8 ta.: i.1 ne.r- 7010 .04

Pu`$i.ý Vo::--r1'r T-jjjo CC 03

.Pour 17', T*2r:,n,

s.C:rti.tin:~'ev 31Y5 H7.

* Cn.stinerc;1A4 -t 7*-'--e-.,.n a.

* :inetco nltp ~

The operatiorn-oa concept io to 11ovc the KA ter~m opczatinrý cut of theSF0OB locaie'd in ¾ý rTn-; It's~ mincion will be -to provido engineer stc'.ff Support*to thle.-Group whan it is, needod, to provide the control element neoesseary tosupport thne aotivitiwý of t17e 10Z tlax an~d to a3upplment tiiw with personnelwnd equipmenlt az required. Zhe U teA wil ~vm)irl:: unider the Group 8-3 sectionon a miss~ion type asseigment to the vow ious Corpsa reas e .Missions will bebased on ~'oi swhi~ch origin~ted rithl t^.he comd officer of thevarious 0, Detachmeazts. Once received byi Group theoe priorities are staffedwiAth the oouintry; Wiido pro ,rarw. to eeter.-Ine ý, pro.grT Priority.: It. io thispz'ogron prio#±.ty thh~t the X towal's ±mna ro b~e.Control- oX t-heID e.i ic minteainoi. a~t the1 S!1OB for zeverI.l rectcons, The most ilýPortaxltof which is to p,.roperly sv .ppox-tw cu.=.-truct.'n pro,7.i3wtlimited persooinol anm c." iin :t esur es cufred contra control.-The protr.erm got un(Lerway in~ early ~Zleh vvit. one KB twma be~ing. deployed toI Corps, 'two tw.-4is operi~tixk; .I~ I! Ocrp.- =..- ailotfl.' to-4. operating. in IVCorps Area, flquipmer.-ot procur'emept riozL- ths lbi.: poblan C.Xea. HIloeverfaction haa beeo- initiated all oonrtun.2 locvele to oWcjpe6'tb delivery ofrequisitioned equipmaent * In addition2 a pro-an~ to recover &;-d relocateequipment al~ready- under Spc-olpal "Yo-ves control Lax bbeen. ata~ted mid shouldprovide a Yorcir.n3 nucleus until tie pro. ._rJ c; aqit-.±uint a~.,rivese

I1C7,LOSUUh- 7 T0 S`C`XO101 II to Operational Repoz-t on Levc-ons Lea~rned (RCS O~P-28(iRi)) 30 April.l966

O' 0

-.11i~ POLICY IJTT~I

RIRAUKS Mi-1E BY COL•u~TjjIK1G 0');ICER, 5TH SPACIAL FORCES GROUP, TO ALL INCOEING

We of the 5th Special Forces Group have been assigied the task of ýdvisingand supporting the troops of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (OmG) Program.These troops, who are commanded by our •i•tnamese bpeoial Forces counterparts, area very important part of the total military forces which are struggling to ridSouth Vietnam of the Viet Cona and North Vietnamese Army ag.e/ossors from the North,and to create security and stability so tint South Vietnam can achieve its freedom.

The CIDG troops are a pc-romilitary organization and are usually recruitedfrom their local nraea, where they have personal reasons for wanting to live inpeace.

In the highlands many of the CIDG soldiers are V~ontagnard tribesmen. Pormany years these primitive people did not have the advantages which ethnic Viet-nanese enjoyed. The dissatisfaction and frustrations, both real and imaginary,borne b. the Montagnard people approximate those. of minority groups in manycountries.

The Government of Vietnam ful*.y realizes its responsibilities toward thesecitizens, and is endeavoring to meet the legitimate demands presented by Montagnardspokesmen at Kontum and Pleiku in late 1964, after an abortive rebellion by certaindissident Montagnard elements. The Republic of Vietnam rejects the demands of theillegal, separatist organization FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of theOppressed Race), which advocates the political separation of the highlands fromthe rest of Vietnam.

The position of the United States Goverimnent is to support fully the wareffort of our Vietnamese allies. Providing equality for its Montagnard citizensis a stated policy of the RVN, and the United States will do everything possibleto lend assistance to this effort

Rvery single .member of the 5th Special Porces Group must be aware of theposition of our government and impress this position upon those Montagnard unitswhich be advises. In the words of General Westmorel=d, "The U.-. flatly opposesthe PU0IO independence movement and will be in no way associated with its members*.The U.S. has not, does not and will not provide support, .material or psychological,to UILRO or its representatives. The Goverment of the United States fully supportsthe Government of Vietnam and not any individual or group within it. Our interestin the Montagnard is the same as our interest in every other citizen of Vietnam-to assist in winning the war so that all citizens of Vietnam can have peace andfreedom.

INCLOSURE 8 TO SBCTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learnod (ROS QSGPO-28(El)) 30 April 1966

"Furthermore the llonta,-nards should be urged to recognize that *maov proaTeS5has already been made toward meetin; their goals.

"In conclusion the Montagnards should be told that any attempt at revolt couldnot succeed in face of thQ strrngth and capability of RVIN Armed Porces and that eayMontagnard :Loader -who recomne-nds -up' a revolt im not only foolhardy, but a traitorto his owm people. The only element which would gain from such a revolt would bethe V.0I"

In amplification of G,-noral 7tstmorelandts Euida.e6o, your actions will bestrictly -overned by the followin.. instructions:

I. U.S. personmel will not deal directly or indirectly with representativesof FULIO or any other Nointzcýard organization which claims to speak for the politicalinterests of the Yontagnard people.

2. U.S. personnel who ozxe approached by representatives of FULRO or otherorganization-s •ill immediatcly contact tileir Vietrnmese counterparts or the nearestGVN official.

3. U.S. personnel should avoid whenever pousible interposing themselvesin issues between Montagqards and Vietnamese which constitute internal affairs ofthe GVx.

a/Willi=m A. McKean

0olonel, InfantryCommanding

2

INCLOSD-fI 8 TO SEOTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (ROB CSGPO-28(Ui)) 30 April 1966

-4 -b 0 .4 'S - .. 0' '... .0. 'i r0 0

co to. w.. mi Li 0. 0 m0 w~

3 3IV-3

8 88

It>I

~~%C. ~ .4.4.4 .4 -4 4* -- .4;r

Ji

ID IM^INai~j .% % -. -.- *-.*~*% -- .. -. W* % -. cm~ ~- W % *

I'

r4 imB to

C%~

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a,

~~~4~t ;4j_ _

4oC ~

URI CI tu"0

cbQC.

E1E-4

WNN

co ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A , ul r iEn ' oV)0 o

EQ.

4; -4 - 4 A -4 -. 4 - 4 1 4 4A 1 0

'IQ

(4zz <1 1 la 0

H 0%

H Cb

41 ~1 ~ Iii

<4 0qW% ~ *

~' -". . - -~ ., I' 6L '%

CDc

S.4.44 .4 4 .4 4 4 .4

A0 0

~~E61

C.4

P4 M

1.441 ui.-5 R

SPECIAL FORCES STRIK FORCE CAMPS

DE Q12-fl-UMEM,, -ACTION -%W-10 (a4Rm (S)

1 5h.l --apt 1azek, ~ Dnn NUOgA1-101 Capt Ivbffitt Khe Saah VN, BrLu.A-102 Capt MLaim, Tien Phuoo V14A-103: Capt- Sppxnqezý Gia-Vuc H~A-104 CatCpoiVN, CuaA-105, ,..C46pt. KiWtz, miat Diuo 1A-106 Capt -.Gaffney Ba, Td:A,-107. p~pt ftqgoxy.ý fta o VIC#rAý;i8 "Capt QOI onnev Tien,!,uoA-109 Capt Herver' :Thudng Duo VNT oA-110 Capt Perry *Minh Long I9 HroF±B-1l Lt Col Lind &..g g '-, u

0-2 Lt Col Patch :PJkj) Nuz P.hadevN J-831kA-219 Capt Dodds Pleiku Nung# "Rhade, Jazai,B-22 Maj George. Ari-' Tuc Jarsit-~~r Bknitlre, V1A-221 Capt-4.1mpeo. otuw Sonl VI

A 0ap2 16v.1ek. Vah.;Canh. VN

A.1,424 CaptQb6A- P hu. Tiuc Jaral,- Bel=ar

94112 Ot 40eau Boti Son VNA,-228 Capt inet Vinh Tbanb VI . .

B-23ý: Maa: &19sey Bia' m~e Thiot Rhad~ YNA-402 apt Hewy Tan Rai Koh4

A,..233 d&tM~ A='* Esa Yene Rhadep. 10g, J"rs.-Am-23.4 Capt Leo nLoIrobotLa Co,Obict

A-~'Capt Ni~±.Ion Co lin 1 VAo-236 Capt Jaobon:-- Lao Tb± baQ Mhm10, ,Jaraif..VNA-237 Capt Affourtit LWong Son Chain, YB-24 Lt Col Dallas Kontum Sedang, Babart Rongaol

Jeli, VN

=NLOS=~ 10 TO SET~ lto Operatiamal Report on Lessons Learned (ROBCSGPO.-28 (Fa.)) 30 April. 1,966

DE2T cm M~NER LCTON iM'mii wM (aA,-241 Capt Monruoe Polei Ideaj Sedang.Ai.-242. 04pt 5anfoxd Dak, Pek Sedoe. WIaangp Jehq YN

A-4Pil.ateau 01 8edn~g#, Bahzaa"r Knong, . YRAP-244 Capt Weinfu~rter Dek To Sodangp lab~narj, Rao.~o

asehA-245 L t Lynn. Xon!Pua (N'one -Staging fow flak

8eaiig)3.625 Mai u~n Plaiku" Muzng,. I-hadof YRA-251 Capt K4S Plei Djezeng Jaimi.a_?Be.1tar, Mhoing, YRA-252 Capt Butte*=ore P~lei Ifrong J~ra4, Beftoa,, YRA-253 Capt Cumnnin Due.. Co-Jxi IA-254 Capt Womd P.40i Do Idm JVNDo~?A,-255 Capt Willo-ughby Plei Me. Jax~ai, 'daiftft, Rhade, YRB-51. MaJ Griuene D~ig, 13% Thin YR.B-52 Lt Co;. Warreni Nba Trang YR.A,501 Capt Ejkl'Ywine Nba Trang VNA-502 Capt Jobnson Trung Duxng YR

A30 Crt0aMA Tbau N ung,

0-3 t~o .rua Bi Boa NoneA-301 'Capt IZ.liot T=W~ ,..UP WjR-:C=aodlganA.-302 Capt, Dýel~o Ast.nGoa Cbi-ne..* COebodian,A-303 Capt Kenny .xoma.t. Catbo 'an, j:-ýhade, WB-31 IaN David .XIMux Loa ~ ~ iaA-311 Capt Triokýett. Taxih I4±zh VN, i.Tholig Ohpbm, ýcahliodianB-32 llaj Ochs To~ Ri~nh. YR,, Cmkdisng Chifti~.s.

A-321 Capt Potter tin Soi Cao Dal,? CapbodiaW.A,322 Capt cores Suoi Da VN, haaCboiaziA-323 Capt Shialtda Tming Sukv VN, -Cambodian,A-3a4Mb"Lt 14toh uiý h ~ Cambodian,A-395 to Poey Mlnih Tlbig CambodiaV RuA.-333A Capt Smith Ohom Thanh None

3-54 Lt~1Ro~ Son 3.None

0 QDET ________ LOCT3D IC G;ROUF (S)

A-341 Capt Stanage Bu Dop Cambodian,.VN, Montagazd

A-342 Capt Stienmetz Dong XoaL Montaguard, Cambodian

A-343 Capt Andrew Duo Stie"g, Camb, VN

B-35 Maj Radosevich giep Hea None*A-351 Capt Eiland Trang Sup None

*A-352 Capt Phillips Duo Phong None

**A-353 l/Lt Waldman Biean oa None

**A-354 l/Lt Atanasoff Bien Hoa None

0-4 Lt Col Tuttle Can Tho VN

B-41 Maj Yantis Moo Ho. None

A-411 dept Anderson Hal yen Chinese

A-412 Capt 01hootti Cad Cal Hoa.H aoA-413 Capt Jones Binh Tbanh Thon Hoet Hao, Cambodian

A-414 Capt Bridgewater Moo Iba Boa RaoA-415 Capt Vay Tuyin nohn HB Hao

A-416 Capt Smith Kinh (a= II Hoa HoB-42 Lt Col Nellev Chau Doo None

A-421 Capt Poe Ha Tien VN, CambodianA-P-422 Capt Neilson Vinh Gia VN, Cambodian

A-423 Capt Blesse Tinh B.ie Hoa Hao, VN, Cambodian

A-424 Capt Marvin An Pha Hoa Hao.

A-425 Capt McCoy An Long Hoa Hao, VN

A-426 Capt Thacker Tr. Ton None

AP-427 Capt Fenlon Phu. Qioo VA-428 Capt Collett Tan Obau Hoa Rao

A-429 Capt Collins Ba Chuo CambodionA-430 Capt Topp Don Pbao Chinese, Cambodian

NOTE: *To -be deployed in Duo Hue Distriot in Bau Nghia Province in CIDG mis-sion when area assessnent is complete.

**To be deployed in Long An Provinoe in CIDG mission as soon as ameaassessment is complete#,

4.4

MEN Un +3XYE (3 DE

ammo

TNIL TRAZIG

AMA

DAK U4 Z LCO

AliNFIDENTIALT

Inc Go

DATE P..XTY L "" VISIT

-1 ~.66 -.en Sntion . 5rlf r iefiýý, andi4n~ ..S,. -n. "u: t45 .. min VI1I

'vi'-1.i: -". E. Yalv•...

3 Jan 66 .. S'.c A..Al- eset .4 5'{ 1 jn Opn Briefiihg]3/G Ware

S- .Co.l .-3aohcadCal Goup'h

.Lt. Col.-•ut c.ieson

5 Jan 66 Sen Mondale 45 ?-.a Opn -riefing

10 Jan 66 Gen Becson 45 Min Opn BriefingGon Dickens

12 Jan 66 B/P. -4s ey 60 min Opn Briefing

15 Jan 66 DA Team 60 min Opn Briefing16 Jan 66 Visit Camps in:I CTZ

17 Jan 66 Gen Abrams 60 min Opn BriefingV.D/O-of S.:,

18 Jan 66 B/G Jones USMC 45 mrin Opn Briefing

18 Jan 66 H/G: Chawang, Tha.land 45 min Opn & CA. BriefingYoung Haroen, Thailand13 Doctors

21 Jan 66 Sen Miller 60 min Opn Briefing

26 Jan 66 B/G Pearson 45 mi~n dPrx' BriefingADO 101st Abn

28 Jan 66 Col Terry 60 mim Opn & Sig Briefing

30 Jan 66 D/G Seith 60 min Opn BriefinQmdt of Cadets USAWA . .

31 Jan 66 Lt Gen Engler' 45 min Opn Briefing

5 Feb 66 B/G Deane 60 min, Opn Briefing

9 Feb 66 Editor, Time Magazine 60 mtai n'.BrLefii. "

15 Feb 66 Ma.j Gen York 60 rain ,O4p.'ie-ing

INCLOSURE 11 TO SECTION II to OperAtional Report on Lesson Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(Rl)) 30 April 1966

0 C)DATE PARTY TYPE ViSIT

21 Feb 66 kr John Spors 60 iin Om & CA Briefing

Editor, Army Iag."

26 Feb 66 B/G Donald H I-TcGovem 45 Ilin Opn Briefing

26 Feb 66 B/G Simpson 30 Min Opn Briefing

2 M-r 66 Itr layr1en Williams 30 Iin Oi Briefing& Asst 4 Pres AsiaFomundtion.Col Gerald H PIagedaleUSARVWSGS,

4 Mar 66 T&? Graham 45 Min Op Briefing andbr KWtz , 60 Min Discussion

Rand Oorporation

6 Mar 66 B/G Zais 60 Min Opn BriefingDep CG FFV

8 Mar 66 Col Towson-' 60 Min Opn BriefingG3, CONARC &Party

11 Mar 66 L/G Cusado USAF 45 Min Oim BriefingM/G Meyers USAFCol Jones USAUFCol McLaughlin USAF

12 Mar 66 M/G F.A. Hansenr 45 Min Opn BriefingUS Army. MWiitionCMD and ofhicialParty

13 Mar 66 Gen John K waters 30 Mmn Opn BriefingC INCU.SA4PACand Official Party

16 Mar 66 M/Gen Steper .,. . .. 60 lHin Opn & Hed BriefingUSARPAC Surgeon

19 Mar 66 B/Ge'in.atterson' 30 Hin Opn BriefingChief, ,il...History, D&

28 Mar 66 /G .Ha=7ry.Qitz 45 Mimn 01mp BriefingDep CG., A9ty School

o 0

31 •ar 66 D/C2 PrMck D Iiiller 45 itun Or Briefingn/c of S, Plans &Opns, US1ARV

5 Apr 66 B/C on . 30 in Opn Briefing

and Staff, 4thInf Div

6 Apr 66 Dr T.P. Chevthmm 120 Min Opn and R&D BriefingDep. Dir TAC ";at

Program Officer of Secof Defense

7 Apr 66 B/Gen Davidson 60 tUn Opm BriefingAC of S J-2USARPAC

19 Apr 66 B/Gen James L. Collins, Jr 30 Min Intel BriefingSpec Asst ClUSUACVOh Rural Construction DivJ-3

19 Apr 66 B/Gen Friedman 60 kin Opn BriefingCG, USASO, Nha Trang

21 Apr 66 Gen Harold K. Johnson 45 Min Oiz BriefingC of S

21 Apr 66 B/Gen Alvin E. Cowan 120 Min Opn BriefingNef-7 Dir of JRATA

27 Apr 66 Col 1I.W. Lunallius 30 !Min Olms & PO7th PSYOP Group

28 Apr 66 Col J.R. 1aedler 30 Min Op BriefingOSD LNO to O0IES!.&CV

28 Ayx 66 Eric Severeid 45 Min On BriefingCBS News

* SMIIIUAY. 0J2 DELTA OPMVRTIONS

1. Significant Unit Activities:

a.. General.

(1) DOu•in! the reportinC period Project Delta worked as follows:

.(a) Operational days - 59t

(b) Trc•iniin• days - 35,

(c) T1roop movement da,-o - 17.

b. Per'sonnel,

(1) Dur.i4g the quarter.•there was a 100% turnover in the DeltaReconnaissance Section. Principle causes being combat oasualties, sickness,land rotation of personnel.

me .. (2) By dixreotio-n of .00.,,, 5th..SFG,, a-TUCR hasbeen submitted .to"meet, epandi, requirements ;of Project -Delta,..... Irmplementation of this TUGR-will

..Allow the US .portion.of !Proje.t ,.Dlta to pparallel the current Vietnameseorganization,

ori (3). The .2ndPlat, .171st Aviation Company, originally placed underoperational control of ...roJeot Delta was recalled by the 5th SFG and placed undertheir OPCON with Delta drawing support as required.

(4) The USAI:.. .ALO/FAC. team originally attached to the project hascontinued to operate ,suace, sully. " USAF OIE aircraft is now tentativelyavailable to Project fDelta on mission request basis onlyW.

c, .':.i.nn.. 'The fol.,-wir, p'rograms were conducted;

(1),. Refr.egsher training7for Vietnamese Recon Teams and the four.,Airborne Ranger COnpaneos. This training ended with local operations in the.Nha Trang area.

(2) Newly assigned American personnel attended a 10 day trainingprogram designed to prepare them for assigrmient with the Recon Section, Thecourse further served to eliminate those not •aaving the mental or physicalstamina needed to; perform the Delta mission,

INCLOSURE 12 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-2S(Rl)) 30 April 1966

(3) Traininc-g 4-ws conducted for OIDG-personnel selected tooperate as Rocon Teama members* Subjects str'essed wotre combat~moyement,reaction firinV: and. field craf't.

(4) Trainin,; for n atJ- ss2J::-ed Vietnamoes Dolta flecbn. Personnelt

(5) Trainin;! fo2Y CIDC p&ýýroonjel alr,!ady assziýned 'to the projectto operate under t-he concept ol' pin~trols :Lade up entirely of OIDG pertsonnel.St~bjects streosed vie37 riaviý7tiong~i,.a ',~i,,t-io.,, coJlloctin,%, and principles ofevasion xnd e~cape*

d, 1'*vcoiionxts - All irocvaliýrnto diming the reporting period wereconducted by t"actical aircrafto

o. Comb_-t Operations.

(1) Ttlo' new conolcts have been developed 'tb .0rnhndri the Delta.

Reconnaissance ~eflort. .. .

(a) . Epl.oymnent of CIDG (4oad~rux~qr) Teams into areas ofpopulationjand heavy trail nets, These, teams .are 'o-i~titted' as local Viet G~ongvinfiltrated first light and ~xi'rtdlast light. '.,Debriebixýg axýe conductedimmediately aftezv exfiltrati6n And spot reports' submitted to appropriate head!-quarters.

(b) Employment of 'the att~ached 'rea tiona force (91st Air.-borne' Banger Bn)* in search and deistroy and , ec nýissan i orce yeoraonvrithin Deltalo assii- ed TAO.R

(2) F~ive' reconnaissance operat6Icins wtere condu~oted.. Recorn-miss~anaeteaims were com~mitted t6. Pind. t .axvetst verify intell~gqhene ad cond4uct air -s~t~pkeson, or guide reaction forces toy targets disodvered.' Recon operations' we re:

OPERATION DATE' .ou -~8AREA' TEAII CONTROL

1-66' 74an-'17 Jan III... U's eax2-66 2 J a*n- 'IFeb 1I US Tedm'3-66 6 IViar -11 M/ax II 'IN Team4-G6 .13Mar,.r31T Max I VY Team,.5-66.' J.3 Apr 30Apr .VN Team

'(3) -T'he. usA ALO/Ac To=m ýlew 294 'houro, conducted'24 airs~trikres, com-priLsn,' 1742srtie~s in'-dirc upr fMet prtos

f. Research and Development. There is a definite need for thedevelopment o:1 the followring items:

2

(i) Zn con. .'An electroiLc zyet•ta to nark: a texrget or a team'slocation. Compact, vrci,;ht !ous tha 2 pounds, ragZe 7reater than 5 Idlometers,to Give a loccation .cc rto to 25 vteterý. The becon syster. should not requirespecial aircraft or hIig2i1y qualified tOcIi.cians to operate it. The UWAI RedChief 73eacon System tested in i*.:tn;a i• thew stuer of 1965 does not meet thiscriteria.

(2) nifohrri. A !i1'ht ',oi ~ht, cotufle n pattern uniform foruse in SteJAoijo. o iaterial sh.ould be porous, allowing body heatto eioape . •.L. to circul"vto.

(t ...... (O'o hal to two pounds)balloon ma,=id:-; kit a<or" m in n,..: ta.rz's a~n,' locations in the junle.Idea*.ly9 tho kit viouli contain t%:',•c to 2ovir balloons s.1 a unit to inflate theballoons.

(4) Rlifle r/silencer. A sutnl) liZht w ei ht rifle with silenceroRange need be no greater than 50-100 meters and can safely be employed behindenemy lines by small Recon units. Present weapons of this type have provenfar from adequate, making too much noise and being inaccurate.

2. Corzaandero Recoozsiendations.

a. Conceptional employmient of Project Delta.

(1) In the past Delta has often been given the Liesion of sup-porting Division operations. This has often developed into Delta's being em-ployed as a flank secatrity clement or being assigned a screening mission. Theresult has been that Delta's efforts were largely dissipated and did little toreflect the overall value that cau be garnered from the employment of Delta.

(2) Tteconmend that Delta bo assigned mission no low~r then Corps

level, assigned TAORts by Corps =d have Corps assets available.

3. Problon Are&,, ý;"d llooxo~iiýdticnz.L;

a. Delta Recon Section has had a i00,Z turnover of persor.xiel in thepast three months. Principle causoe be.n,: combat casualties, sialcieso androtation o2 persoranel.

b. Recommend that the Delta Recon Section be authorized a 20% over"head. This will enable the Racon Section to have enough personnel availableto meet mission requireoients and. train new personnell

*,I-. S ~ lil .S X ý

P0 ilorcouv .96240

AVSF 30 April 1966

SUBJECT: CA Success Stories

Attrohad ii-opcrndix t1i -ou,,.h 5 exe Civil Action Success Storieswhi~ch cov(.,a Ul 1 roportinýý -,crio(1.

5.Appendiciesa~s

.IN0L0SUIUE 13 TO SECTIONT II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned(RCS CSGPO-128 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

ItA.DQUARTERS5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROtUP (AIRBOIi.2E), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

A20 US Forcoew 96240 .

AVSF 24 March 1966

.SUBJECT& CIDG CA/PSYOP Tea.a

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTIOIN

1. PURPOSE.

This memorandum prescribes policy concerning the organization,training and employment of a CIDG Civic Action/Psychological OperationsTeam in each CIDG camp. This unit is designed to give the: CIDG anadditional capability to conduct civic action, propaganda and intelli-gence activities.

2. GENERAL.

An examination of the existing CIDG organization at the "A"De'achment level has revealed a need for a CIDG otganization to inple-ment civic action, psychological operatiQns, and collect. information.designed to extend GVN influence aid control. Previously, except inisolated cases, there has not been a CIDG organization with thesecapabilities.

3. NMISS1. t

a. Conduct propaganda activities wTithin the operational areato gain civilian support and reduce. the effectiveness of the VC.

b. Impleme'nt actions within the operational area to improvethe conditions of the populace and win their support. .

c. Collect information concerning VC. activities, conditionsexisting in hamlets, and the attitude of the population.

4, APPLICATION$

Each CIDG camp will. organize, -train, and. employ a minimum of ,,<.onp (.) CID)G CA/PSYOP Team.*

APPEIDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report o.n Tessonrl,Learned (as. 00"GPO-20 (111)) 30 April 196. -6

77. .

AVSF' 24 March 1966SUBIJET CIDG CA//ýSOP Team

5. OR(TZATION.

She situatio, amid require12ents La each "A" Detachment operationalarea are different; therefore, modifications to the sugestecorgauizat1onmay be necessary. As a guide the uiiii should co6nsisit of the :followingCIDG personnel.-

a. Tew Leader 1 per . -

b. Asst Team Leader 1 per

c. liedical Specialists 2 per

d. Civic Action Specialists 2 per

e. 'Propaganda SpeCialists 2 per

f. Survey Specialists 2 pe~r" .. ,

g. Intelligence Specialists 2 per

Because of the importance of their duties and their 4aily con-,taot with civiliaais, 'CIG personnel selected for this unit should be. '.o'the higheit"possible caliber, a.id' meet the followiing requirements:

a. Have a desire to.participate in the jrogram- . .

b. Be indiginous to the area.

c. Be literate, if possible. •

dL Have leadership qualities.

e. A persoxiaity that enables him 'to get alq¢ig"with People,outgoing and friendly" .

f,. A good sp e•.kerb.'

g, CA persorwel should have skills that can be.. usýed . the area.

APPFIIiX 1I TO Ii1CLOsdiE 13 TO •MOTION II"t"o' 0ratlonsaRetport .0,. .sons.Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (Ri)) 30 April 1966'

7-/ . .1 .7

AVSF 24 !oarch 1966

SUBJECT CIDG CA/PSYOP Team

7.

a. CI0 Team ier-bers will be traiaod by WTSF aiid USASF in eachcamp.

b. Additional i"stractio- wll be iade available to CIDGpersonnel at the Idoatagiard Training Center, Pleik-a and the Rural Con-structiozi Cadre Traiiiing' Center, Vwui Tau.

c. In each province there are Vietnaaese agencies and personnelthat aic capable of providiiiL various instruction to CIDG;

(1) Vietnamese Infornation Service (VIS) - propaganda in-struction.

(2) Province Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Schools -latest agriculture methods and alimal husbandry.

d. The 5th SFGA and LLDB Headquarters will provide additionalinformation to subordinate detaciments concerning training and employ-mento

s/William A. McKeant/WILIAN A. McKEAJ

Colonel, InfantWyCommanding

DISTRIBUTION:00, Det 0-1, ATTN2 CA/PSYIOP 0ffice:,ýCO, Det 0-2, ATTN: CA/PSXOP Officer0O, Det C-3, ATTI: CA/PSYOP Officer00, Det 0-4, ATTN: CA/PSYOP Officer

APPEIJDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons

Le,,wned (RCS CSGPO-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966

•.•a,.,•,,• ".' .- .•.L• -•', • V • -"'"'•• • T.. ... '.. . •,........ -. ---- • .• --'"'-- -•" ''' '... .... .. ... . ... ."'•.... ....... " -"•"'-"-• V

T&2BLE OF ORGMIIZATION 27 Mar 66AN'D EQ.UPIMUT TOE 3-66

R.3-66

CIDGQ Cluo( .A.OIC'n/pbYop TEM

Section 1. General .... * ..

Section II. organization (Persoinnel) 6 * 6 .62

Section III. Equipriont. * 3

SECTIOZr I G&ElIRAL

a. Conduct propaganda activities within. the operational' Aaredesigned to gain civilian support and reduce the effectiveness of the VC.

b. Implemlent actions Within the operational. area t .o improveconditions of the people and win their support.

*c. Collect .jnfo~ation conceraing VC activitt1.e , populationattitddfes.,. 6daireb;*T &,Id '66nitilons iii -an -effort to-Meentif the VO infra,-struicture, assist in establishing friondly infrastructiýxe ard extend GVN.influence and control.

2. ASSIG1OE±T, One Civic Action/PS~tOP Teeam for each CIDG co=ip*

a. This table is the authority to requis .ition a~d issue inaccordance writh procedures directed by Headquartcrs, 5th- Special ForcesGroup (Airbowtie), lot Special Forces, Viýtjlau.

b. Individ~uazl allowwaces for all grades are listed in SectionIII*

c. Equipment excess to- the ,:qthorized allowanosIc .- ill not be

requisitioned writhouit approval of Headquar .ters., 5th Special Forces Group(Airborne), 1st Special. Forces, Yietrnap..

APPENDIX 2 TO I t.;CLOSIMfl 13 TO SECTIONI II to Operational Roport on Lessons.Learned,(lieS CSGP'O-28 .(R.1)) 3Q -April 1966

SECTIOIN I'

TABLE OF ORGAIIIZATION A20D EQUIPI/NT

ýI&AT*QlfSE LT L'G- CPL.-7 1 CPIJ PVTE~l BRqX

01 01 Team Ld. 1.

02 Loot Soma Ldr • i 1

03 ':aedirc . ' 2' 2

04 Civic Action 2' 2

05 PSYoP 2 2

.06 *Intel. 2 2,

07 Survey 2 2

RECAPITULATION

X-SIGN,&TINo_ SER LT MSG -Cs'-' CCPL. PvCP k - :

Team .Ld. 1

As• 'Team Ldr 1 .1

Medic 2 2

Civic Action 2 2

PSYOP 2 *.2

Intel 2 2.

Survey 2 2

"TOTALS 1. O 0 1 . 0 0

NOTE: All personnel anmed vii-th oarbines, oliber .30, ;ad "'ioI,ber unless otherviise indicated.

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSUfL 13 TO SECTION II to -por':tion.- Report on LessonsLearned (RCS OSGPO-28 (Ri)) 30 April 1966

00SECTION III - QUIPTMI'TT

PAR MjCSIMTION ALLOW-ANC

01 Toam

Binocular, 6X30 1

Carbine, Cal 30, 142 12

Pistol, Cal 45 12

Compass, leasatic 2aa1±liicht 2

Knife: bayonet, carbine 12

Laun9her, grenade, carbine 4

Ioudsaeaker, porlable, non-standard 1

Liaazgne, carbine, 15 rd 84

02 12 In-i.diual I members

Belt, pistol 12

Blanket, wool 12

Boots, Bata, pr 24

Bowl, raetal, individual 12

Canteen, W/cup and cover 12

Cap, camouflage 12

Ham=o ok 12

Jacket, camouflage 12

Jacket, fatigue. 12

Jacket, field 12

Packet, first aid, individual 12

APP.,DIX 2 TO INOLOSUME 13 TO SECTION II to Oporationa1 Report on LessonsLearned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

0 0

0 CD 01co CD C+ CD'f

a to ar,-.t ucl c+ ~ tJ

o 2O1o S I t *o 0 oh...

Leae (RI-. .l 0. 1966

p .

APPENiDIX 2 TO INICLOSURlE 13 TO 8ECTION II to OperoationaX Report ohi LessonsL~eazned (ROS CSGPO-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966

0 0

SIECTIO~I III B ~QUI-PLFTT

PARA DESIGNATION A NLOWAHtC

Poncho 12

Rucksack, local purchase 12

Suit, black (jacket atui trousers) 12

Trousers, cauLouflago 12

Trousers, fatigue 12

APPENDIX 2 TO IITOLOSURE. 13 TO SECTIO1 II to Operational Report on LessonsLearned (ROB CSGPO-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966

0 05M SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORJN), IST SPECIAL 20kES

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SCHOOL

DA.TE TI1I 1 ) JT F C T INqSTRtCTOR

25 Ja1n 0800-0815 Openiiig Ro•ma•rks Col McKean0815-0830 Outline oif Course 141x;1 Pattw'x0830-0925 Inteoduction to CA0930-0950 Introduction into GVN Organizations Lt Snetzer1000-1050 GVN Progra~is z.c iY'unds oMaj King1100-1150 Pacification Concepts LtCol Henderson1400-1450 Sources of CA Support Lt Snetzer1500-1700 Heedlth and So:itation Dr. Phiegengill (USAID)

26 Jan 0800-0850 Education Dr. Hall (USAID)0900-0950 Agriculture Dr. Bell (USAID)1000"1050 Resources Control Mr. Brauten (USAID)1100-1150 Public Works USAID1400-1450 Refugees 1r. Hughes (USAID)1500-1550 Planning the CA Program Capt Patton1600-1650 Implementing the CA Program Capt Patton

27 Jan 0800-0850 Introduction to Psy Ops Maj David0900-0950 US Pay Ops Policies and Prograuis LtCol Hendrioks1010-1100 GVN Pay Ops Organization Maj Leach1110-1200 Propagandd Support Capt Staples1400-1450 VIS Mr. Fourt1500-1550 Montagiards Mr. Smith1600-1650 Chieu Hoi Mr. Burns

28 Jai 0800-0850 Pay Ops Planning wad Reporting Lt Dimmitt0900-0950 Pay Ops in Combat Operations Maj David1010-1100 Field Expedients Lt Dimmitt1110-1200 Discussion of Techniques Maj David1400-1450 CA/Psy Ops in tile Sub-Sector Role Lt Kalunki1500-1700 CA/Psy Ops Discussion

APPENDIX 3 TO INOLOS'LTE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on leessonslearned (RCS CSGPO-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966

* .0 0

5THI S.LC4 RdoICs "c*BOTp (AIIU3OMfJ) I1IST sPEI,-AL I\rmn~sUQ. 'US. Vorces 96240

AVSF 25 April 1966

STUhJ3 CT: CI)DG lnfobtwa-Uon. Proc ,rsnia

TO: SE DJ±'SThIBUTI0G

1. Du3ring the past £e-id months it has become evident that there isa need for a '.-.ell planned &OZ.. C:'NICii.,tent inf'ozmati(Al pDtgraM to be di-rootoci, towaird the CI1)G, 1-We~r opporttunityr must be w~ade to improve themorale 'an -fighting potential of' the C'-iDC) troops, diva them a better'uineistanding of .VC/NiVA obj ectives and -teci,±aicuest,and the role of' theCII) inthis 'wax.,

2. A well planned fir'ougri in wvhi ch the Camp Comm~ander talks direct-ly to his tr~oops, wiill convdy the Commander's a nterest in -thweivefare of'the CIDG troops, improve their loyalty, and increase their dependabilityrin combat.

3. General Quangt' Cominauding General. LtDB Hih C'ommado has issuedthe attached mem~orandum to 6.11 'LLDB -detachmien commianderp. 'This mcqo-

raridq rqu~rcs Camp CQmpmar4et's to give .,ýwo .inf'oxmation taljks' to, their' troops each week. Th support of' this progrdm, the LLDB High Conmmaiid will993zard detailed lesson pj~ai~s to cach Camp Commander.

4 Thimotneof'this' program in improving .the''motal e aw .are-

ness, loyalty and combat eff'ectiveness of' the CIDG twoops oa~inotbe 'over-emph~asized. It is my desire that &etachaaient oommaliders at all echelonsgive maximum enicouragement and support to their'0 conrpbxts In imple.-menting. this pro$Fam!.

I~LF ifor CI.colonel, IndfantryCommanding

DISTRIBUTIONi"All

APPEN~DIX 4 TO INOLOSUII 13 TO SBOTION I1 to Opera-tional Rop6rt on Libsoonalearned (RCS CSGPO-28 (Ri)) 30 April 1966

D)epartment of DefenseGeneral Staff

"Republic of Viotnam Military Forces

Viot.nuese Spedial Forces.- oiitical .iarfare Group

Rohabilition Section

±ORA)i,•i Political iiotivation and Indoctrination Plan for CIDG

The Political 1tivation aid Inrdoctrination Plan is aimed atforging a high patriotism,, heigý,tening a. Cobd coonscience in responsibilityand honor, motivating the anti-communist spiri't, consolidating conidenoein the final victory, nourishing a good esprit do cdrps and developing aself-disciplined spirit, in order to accomplish the mission of destroyingt ho`,ommunlst and developing' the country.

"2. "ORG•AIZATION OF .TI DMUCATION.

a. Every wckp, Pach camp Arill organize two moc Lngs wuder thetitlo "The :Commandoer Speaks to the CIDG11. Each session will ;&st from one'to twlo hours.' 'It is preferable' that the camp commander, speak to the CIDG,unless operational dommitments or other iiportantu reasons p'revent it.

b. The lesson plans will be written, published and distributedby the Political Indootrination and Training Office of the LLDB High

.Com mand. .

3."LESSWX PLLI~S.

a, Lesson plans will be composed to twoeoatergorios:

(1) Normal Lesson Plans*

(2) Special Lesson lans.

APPENDIX 4 TO INOLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on LessonsLearned . 1ýqSQSGPO-2e (R1)) 30 April 1966

.'.,

4a-e

LOTO. ' Political .-L.tivation and Indootxination Plan for CIDG (oon't)

(a) The no=. al lesson plns' will be composed of articlesoonconing the nonial J. kouledgo of politics which is •iecessaxy for all mili-

J tazy reon.. Tis type of lesson plap -ill be distributed to carkps monthly.

(b) The special lesson plaxn will be conposed of thesubjects other than nonial kuiooelodgo of politics, such as special events

• ".and.important policies.,anQd thu ii utivosof the A'y and government lead-cr5. Th ypo of lesson plan w.,.1ill be published and distributed to all

' units aa.roquiird by the situationd

b. All the Lesson Plans will be printed and distributed dovm to

the CIDG Company level.

*-4. HOD OF. 'INTR.UT9ION. .

a. The camp coimandero' studies the 'lesson plan in advance., andproparos some humorous or meaningful short stories to stimulato and gainthe attention of the listeners prior to presenting the main subject.

b. After finishing the explaration of the subject, the camp" commander viil. 'roserve 10. to 15 'nrnutes fot the CIlDG to fr6ely, ,express

theirl ideas. and to awsk questions bonceAning the lesson, It is advisablej.. t6' •ndou=ae . th CIDG .to 6tand-up-'ad :give the aiswers0to' the questions

asked by their friends in order to creaao ai a6tmosphere of compotitionand aoqu!ire the attention of all in solving problems,

.c. ,dtr. that the 'oeap omm.ondedr Will rephrase and complete theSans~erl given, :.nd then , g, ive tho. oorrot-d•"s• rs,

d. In case there are no questions, the speaker will. ask ques-tions aimed at:

(i) Obtaining the attention cand stimulating the enthusiasmof the listeners.

(2) Rleminding the listeners of the nain objective of thelesson.

o. Prior to eAding the session, distribute the lesson plans tothe OIDG comparny coimnandors so they can review the loosons• within their

*..,Ootpanis,", a*n-d 'can: rýad, themn to the' C0G 'Sc. they' ban take ,notes "on"the vn&4,topics of the lesson (usually sdtrdrizod' int'.he ioview' questions,).

APPENDIX 4 TO INOLOSURB 13 T0 SEICTION II to Operational Rleport on LessonsLearned (1iOS OSGPO-28 (Rn)) 30 April 1966

-Tt,7

M,10 Political . i6otivatioin and Indoctrination ILlan fo~r. CIWG (cozit)

5. D-&TO AN COIOTROL.

ai. All1 'V!. aild "B" fletaclu~iento hav-.e thoe miosion of controllingadd organizine an oxarination for thie Do.-litical motivation and indoctrina-.tion p1:or;o i at tho CID G

b. Durin g visits` qcos comriaders shoul2d tznexpectedlyr askacortý4 in number £fC.q bu the, lcsoeaon alod-1snoa samaso

testing the -fiiilyo thio political a crenady reon tr~ainn .of thaof

a.To allow the oamp ca-:i.wdr t elect the )lessons most appro..priato to the actual situations in thire± nreas,* they may start w~ith anyone of tho lessons received. (exazie:, the cazp may. use,lJosson 5 before

b. lfonthly,'it is nooceasaxy to roport only the lessons used.

0. 'Commanders wrill roport the lessons anid the mimber of lessons*actually taufdht during the month, oven if the number i~s lovmr then thenum'ber ýrequired,. adnd give the ro~aon wby ;Lt was. not possibloe to iSu1$iUthe instrtttio na). reiu~irotient.

d. Political iindotiria~tion is a vo!*r importanit m.ission, nol Joss t#=n the mission of killiin4 the VC bandits in operations. All comn-mailders have the respqnsibility to' urge their, subordinate w-iits *to .pushon oagerly in the ixidooctxiiniation so as to attain. t~he expec~ted result0

ýMIA PIMI~XX. 4 TO INOLOSUIMl 13 T~O 8POTIOMT 1I. to Opqratio4a1 Report orn LessonsLearned. (.u~s CSGP6.!.28 '(1a)) 30.April 3.966

A7.,

One, -of tha.- techn~iques o±f the VO isa Vhe -`c.ýiaii~uo of' propazing theQ ~p~opulaidon f6r? the: strueglo. 1 n 'ordor to bz'ing the political stru~g~1e

Ac0ceot £c~iaete wzr f oer in a' certaini cou i 'ythe.oomxtrnnists cr.. a~tz -a f avorabl6 oitudti~n- by a1pplyina the follovang, p4inoi-

Put thc govurxnneont in a stato of' total lack of power; unabla to

j Ilace .the p6pulatiun in a -state of' bllJndi~esoi unable to uxld#rstozid the situation by distri .buting all kinds of false runmord 'to tdisiep,.-resent all plans and policies of' that nation#.

at"'e~l ia a, .ao f' %oonfusion *uith all l~dho OX evoi'#8-and. r~x judt. creating a. tvwveing opinion''

-In ordiar to ittairi -the aboVostatod -dbj dotive;-1 't1h ItdriationalCommunisgt Party in general, and the Viet Cong in Vietnam in particular,,s0ysitemaaticall~y 4eraploy' 'all 'kinids 6f d ceptivei trickz ir bi, ' rp~a~~

Iii.. ýCOMITWMS OF; TILE. YO' 1ROPAG91DA: ",I

;:.,Thd VO. propa'gada themes~ 'ridy- be -divided iiitb tilo& categd, 'ob:

(a) The prop.aganda having the chqarater of' estp.blishing a com-ýmunist.' idoolo~t,~ that 'is -to Usbe ýbhe propagiunda - iaeha' to .sow, ̀con-u484 initothe :hQt~t -cf the ýpooplb. 'They -hai~gh'cii the i-1o- of, thei dommulnia tpa'prdiso.- tho! communist leader of th6 N~orth to guidde the Peopie.einto 'biblieVing,that thereazae only. the" Vibot Cohe*.bzd.'1o-C0hi- iihomaro1ybinfood wAn clothing to the Ipeopleo- That fti the' roason wihy., as we o 2 sethat the proes in the North is no more than the official. bulletins of' theParty.t: aining ,to publicize the cojio~pt,- rsy; sad lineo of' the'Pal

(b) The propaganda having tho, ohiiddter atta'ck'ing'bi riegimie.The VC propagandal on the one part heightens their reginle in t~ie North,

*and qnri'the'. tho.t -rtxy to'-discloi~ t~ ou ri ehox-booningd, by' 'dggin~ on allfield'u-of ictivity. 'of' our goveoiaiuont -so t6 'to uhoo'.-er- ''some un'ýjust' poizit-that the administration has not had the time to solve, They will' publi.-cizo, them to the public, by u~sing the method of' tz'ansfoniing the fact ,,p

i~s.to igL4~,1i popuJ. ltion , i~nto 'an ino6~riect' 3u~dc±i of t6he 'irbI- e

APPPMlIX 5 TO IINOLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to O0erational1 Report on.LessoneLearned (RCS CSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

- '-t~~~n-i.-r-7'~~~-'~~-'r'r~~rn-'-'-~~~'-~....... .. ..... . .. , • .-.. ".--.---' *-, . . . *-. -

Ii. VCMIMICxS IN PROPAG.'1INDA:.

(a) Deceiving tho public opinion:. &':Il they werer stepping-uptheir aggre-ssion on tho terýrijtofy theo Southp they did not cease toclaim peace. Y~i~they -ara'stubborftly 3refusilng all, Proposals for nego-tiatiun, they attompt to visual~ize the United States as the most terriblev7ar-mronger. .. hile they 21-1%, -riL2~.g oygdthe innocent people by asoassinatioai, by explosives,, they falsely accusethe Anericman of' employine CBR. warfare.. .Tiethe communist P=xty of the-2oz'0th id~'just a lackey .of'the1' s-Cis I~itornational .CoriwLi~st .Partythqy ozac~mod-thcwoelverj extraivagantly aq the real compatriots a~d atthesdae tim t~o.-atc& all tlhe hationalist p?,ertiep aa the tioaitors during the

roocta agins th Frnch crc 1 as- tho lackoys* of tho Amnericzne after-the calendar year of 1954.

(b) *Transfoiiiin~g the fact., Viot Cong tmay_ unsham-efully misr~p-resent all f acts in order to create confutsion aiia. misufnderstanding writh-in our intcructl orgaalnzationa, to rakec the population raisuzdorstand the

Example: Each time thoy 1aiow? that our troops open an'opor-_4tion in a cortain area or homlot, the.VO. prior to their wiiihdraviall willbuidý*all thie .heudes in the artea ýjvd spro~d. the. rumor'O. wVithin ,the popdloa..tion that tkie government troop's destroyed and: burned the village of' the

peoplethus crp tin$.puppicion amonig the population t. edsteAny

IRecently, w.6 ha e. a campaign of dofbliat.~onf usiing. -airplan.os,t6 .eta7pZtoad a -ceirti hemical .aimod at defoli~ating thea -trees 6.nd bushe~salong the commwricaticon roads so as to clear the VO, hideouts. "But VdietCong propagandize that the Auerican is using'poisonious chemicals to killthe population, attempting to create the hatred among.the ,.naas towardsour allied tnatidn.

()Exploiting maid bloaving-wup: V0 vail thoraaeJves 6f cexrxin'iumjust facot &Aid abe obsure situatione of an undeo veloped nidtio' 'Just

~'caoaig ita. indoen4-auco-, as - UX co6intry# -that the .9040. =6nt can,noAb iompletely, sblve -yet,. They oexploit andi blow.up, those facts so, a~s.'+ocrodte,.disconto'at, 'and ia'trod among the peqople.*

Example. The VC-attqcapt to, create an i~presaiori amoang, the';population; the ý me of our' governnont 'policy thzvugh certain' corruptionsand errrs of somp of our, cadres.

(a.);§Pr.adi4, of false ±nfieomation. usii face' 'to Ia~ce. -props.-ganda. tQ #d4d' oux unity, to, create 'con;,xsioli.piaong thei pop~zlatios4 i

T.0 TOIWCMiOSUtfl l3. TO, PICTION 11 to Operati ualept Xori

Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (?i):) 30 April '1966

S--..-------.-- . - - . ...-.......- . - - ... ..

-. 0 0~~ple;EXp111o:tin.- the twotable 11olitioal situation after

'.terevolution ~oj'the iFirst -Of' i4vemberv, VC spread the nimior~s about theooraiiný,coup d'etEt" so as to crea~te an aitnoup1 hore of' insecurity oanongthe gove=nqent anti h~itie6 a~s well ast am~ong thle population. to deviatethe -anti-corrivnitwt spirit fromr*.the- people.

Recenv.Ly, beeiiii•ti1. Lh oiia iutdn .of' the Souil

is rel.atively. stablep, -the. VC haive turned their aim toxtards our econiomicalfield. They incessantly spread new~s abolLtA =ising of' cost *of livin,about the shortage of' supply of rice, about the acarcity of milk so thatthe pdop.le will alwoys be in fear of' lacking provisions, thus creating

- a suspicioni albout the goodifill -of theo goveni='eiat towiards 'the ~population.

A better tylpic-.l exan~1e: During the Years of' 1956 aw.d 1957,vhehn the 6dý paign*-foir the broeding of tili'Aa fish was on the highestdegree- of' ouccecs, pedple, in all'parts of *Vle coutvitx were.ea~ger to buildthe, f i'sh" poids, 83oeinia th ;*s9 th6 .VTC atarted a propab'anda oompaigfl payingthat' oi'ting. tilipia f ish will cause leprosý&, The, VC propagemda was 'so.

*effective tha.t vexr few p'eopl e -dared -to breed ti~lipio, fi'sh, because thefish -could. znoi-be 'sold .to an~ybody.

*III.' VC PROCEDUIMS U~T-PjRGPAGANDA-.

(a) I*4liziria all means ̀ a-ailable; F1or the Viet Cong hs well01as for all the comrauni *st countries, they axe ready to spend ei-omousamounts bf -mohiey to ýceali2ý6 their probpagaada goaJ.. 'Thdy utilize,. allmeans and Vays to -influence, the p'eopl'e evexy'. \rhero byr their 6vwn axuia~qt.tin p~ropaganda.

(b) VC utilize the propaganda ini all fields of activity, fromlthe higilest political doctrine to theo peciailized problems such as liter-.atu~rd, poetz~o philosophy, -and: even .ný iiatbc-=tics,; from .thie giraidiosemimeirs ao~ii to the' ammlest af'fairb in Odt,%IryTe' 'In all they attempt'to put in some political ideas of coL~mutnsn. They -bring theit'propa.-gand~a into all classes of' the society, especially the adolescents, theyattempt' to. indoctrinuate thc,6~x~ ~~if.~ thern into 'complotely blind,-pbrgonb -raddy to. die' -orthe' Pbxi'tya~id fot the. leader.

(c)Using the- techn~ique' of ' ~ncesesant repetition in propagati,_:Tho' VO -pro paga~nda i's not -only voj~y -vrde: spread', but they also. a'pp thetechniquze of incessant repetition. Thbir principle ixn propaagand&i thaa~lthough the story is oaupletoly false, if' we. repeat it man times,. talkcand, r"-tUltk.a. htuAdred tirie'sp then the popiilation mV.- acbopt it as txuo.On Woi point' they "are 4~ght because'*they did at ike exaotly.at the psy,-',.

*016& -6'te asssa. Vf6 may ut.'plize an olld stoxy as an example,, thatim. the ato~py, of .,Tang Sam a =~iderer"o ..

APPEIMIX5 T QO -dCLOSURB 13 TQO SBC~TIONý II to:Oeatoa Report . on. 'LessonsLoa~ned, (R.CS CSGPO-213 '01)) 30 Ap±'il -1966

In the sprin.g aad Autumn epich,. in China, there w.s a man namedTane Sa.',*a qeleeratei e , . pious son. One d.y, while,Tang Sam's nother.was busy_,ieavihg, there. was one individual who stepped in and t'old her;Tazg Sam "murder!! The uother did not believe.. A momeit later, another oancamne in arid told:,:,der! The r;other still didn't believe butstarted. doubting. Later on - . third ip.,.Lividual came in and told: Tang Sammih.der! This time Tdig Sam "& Lother. immediately. cuit. the -weaving frame,jumped out oft the. Window ard. flod a,.v.ay.

"That is the -.ori;io.su, scholokr of the people.• Tang Samsaiiiothe• hc a ~etfeoqt cohfidenQe in her son. Thus by repetition of the samesavring she was .O•2avinced by the invWc;Inted stoly.

"FollwinC' t~e..st ateients of the VP prisoners of war. recentlyoaptured by. our Ai.-V, wie nmay disclose certain effects of the VC incessantrepetition procedures in i agada. Almost all of the VC prisoners of.wa.r declared that, prior to their departare from the, North. they .reallybelieved. that thieir mission-. n the South. was to liberate their native.terri-to3r from the aeTessi06n' of the US. The propa•s •ida th~epes of. the Hanoipress end broadcasting stations are incessantly repeated days and nightswithout tiring that: The South Vietnam is s.uffaxing from the igression ofthe US. This theme makes the people belidv'"as £afat. ..... Aad-vwat is thereal fact, I believe that .all of, .us are well avrare of t.t.

"The k4erican came to assist us only after the agression oQthe VO started .attempti 't,o conquer SouthlVietam.. The presence of theAmerican on our soil is just to assist us in our efforts again4st theinvasion of the Viet Cong, thie advance soldiers of the Russo-China camp•.gnaimed at conquerine the whole world.

" 14(d) oreov.er, ihe: Vd utilize the tqcl-iiquo "' of tuming xounddSt propagad, ai.ing to iwep the ,pepl .. .from discoverin4 the

Proanda a~gent as a. communist ade

Sbr.. ple" They utilize the revolutio*aries,.. although. notbelonging to the communist party.,,. but out of. their: innocence expl.oited bythe communists. Theý* use the reputation of tho-se revoliu,.-onaries to coverthe *xthentir identity of the conantilsts., They let those revolutionariescay. out .the props da, by• unconaciousness or by persuasion,, so as to

f;6ihiate the eal of the people,_4.

(e)' . in41y Vutil~izing* the. propagaid.tosrk directly -tothe m6st cherished aspiration rind ambition of the population. E xamp.le;All:people love peace. 'Through' thie VC with theii .resiuon` int6 SouthVietnam,. the ,'Chinese -ooiunistb with their c.- eeio± "o i.No al and ,aMidia,the Russians with their savage crushing 6f' the R~ungarian revolutibn hn "1956 are the people most loudly proclained as the best peace lovers!In the btruggle of the South, Vietnam, vho'axe the people. 'trying by allmeans to avoid peace conference? ' Perhaps, no .onea within. us isn' t aware: ofthe illnature of the VC (always proclaim peace vwiile watching every op-portunity to ambush their opponents) did Lunhesitently believe the

APPEINDIX 5 TO IiiCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operation Report on LessonsLearned (ROS CSGP0,28 (RI)) 30 April 1966

-" 0 0treacherous propaganda of the Viet Cong. A certain ;-,umber of the peacemovements, directed by the cornunists, have been organized with the ob-jective of no more that duping the people.

IV. ZR kOL•.•A IL D7. 1,!')

Accordling to the Viut Cong, propaga.da a'd terror must alwaysadvaace in )a-allel. The toarorisn' is ai od at creating an atmosphere ofconfusion auid ý,-averin& ar:og the people, :.-d t1eon utilizing the propagandato appease or donquer. Their %.-ay of ..,ropak:anda is to alw•ys hnave a char-acter of autocracy and strorZ.ly oppressive. "hn they vant- to crush downthe will of tle people, intornall: or exten'ally, they -,ll initiate thewhole cwrmpaigi1 of press, conferences, discussions, and face to face propa-gaada ai-ied at attacking the opTononts. Extercially it seiens like comfortbut in reality, they secretly terrorize theii! opponents.

V. COTCOLUSIOIJ'

•.e have just revievred in summaxy certain VC treacherous tricksand procedures often employed in their propaganda, The objective of theVC propagmada is to prepare the roadg create a favorable circumstance forthe political and military'struggles so aý to facilitate the seizure otpower in South Vietnam. Aware of ti- VC tricks in propaganda, wea My dis-cover the false opinions and info=.ation spread by the VC aimed at dupingthe people. ',.e may discover also the defomaod axA blD=-up infoectionso as not to be booby-trapped by the VC,

If we know perfectly all the VC tricks and always keep ourselfin a state of precaution and on gaard, so tho enemy is absolutely defeated,because all of the eneny heterodox doctrines ,ihich have succeeded to winover a cert..in number of people are due only to their tricks of propaganda.

VI. &rnt]W&UýESTIONqS:

Idiat is the objective of the VC propaganda ?

The VO propagpnda themes rmay be divided into how many categories ?

State some of the VC tricks in propaganda ?

State some propaganda procedures utilized by the VO ?

Is the word and deed of the VC ever the same ?

Is it true that every conmunist cadre is a propagmada oad= ?

APPE MIX 5 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons

Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

BEADQUARTERS5TH SPECIAL F0RCES GROUi (AIZ O1?U), IST SPECIAL PORCES

APO J7 Forces 96240

AVSF 30 April 1966

SUBJECT: PU Success Stories

Attached as Appendix I throuexh 4 are Psyohological Operations Succe~sStories which cover the reportirZ period.

4 Appendiciesa/s

INO1LOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS

CSGPO-28 (Ri)) 30 April 1966

1V-,..,--

0 0

I~J2A0ŽIII!& A- 2335 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBOR lE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

APO US Forces 96297

AVSFB 8 Feb 'uary 1966.

SUBJECT;-. Success Stoxr, .Car! Buoft Ert Y~vnm

TOt Conaarding OfficerfDetachmeo.t C-25+.h SP Gp (Abn), lot SFAPO US Forces 96295

I., The establisbment of Camp Bush Ea Yang was commencedon 13 March 1965 by Det'A-.233 which was then located at Buon Mi Ga. Thearea of the new camp was chosen because of its proximity to Ban Me Thuotand to Highway 21. The physical location was a hill overlooking a smallvalley .at the southern 'edge of the Darlac Plateau. The hill was denselyvegetated and.vws occupied as an FOB for Camp Buon Fa Yalg,

2. §E~JIýCEO2 EVEITS: The proposed camp was to be set up in con-junction i-th the new Phuoc An District Headquarters* The District Head-quarterssmovec on 28 March. The Detachment moved by convoy from Buon XiGa on 25,.28 April and occupied Camp Buon Ea Yang. During the move theconvoy was ambshed several times resulting in 1 USASF WIA, 5 CIDG KIA,: ''16 CIDG 11A. The convoy was ambushed on the last time when they were3 kilometers from the camp. VC losses were 32 KIA during, the mzove.

.The o.earing of 'i•ie vaaetatioa axou;id the :camp was .accomplishedwith the help of refugees who moved with the detachment and was completed'in June. The refugees were settled in three villagesa Buon Ea Yang tII,""Buan Knier I, and Buon Knier II.

The Detachment assumed a mission of sub-sector advisor on I May 65.The months of May, June, July, August and September were concerned pri-marily in Phase I and II operations. The camp was officaaly opened on15 November. The operational area was extended in December.

3. AOCOTPLISQET.S Since April the kill rate is 338VO KIA,. i00' CIA.A total of 52 operations were conducted during the period from April toDecember. Ii the summer months contact could be made by moving .2 kilo-meters from camp. In August the camp was mortared from a hill 1 kilor-.meter from camp. By December the camp had pushed the VC (to the edgeof the operational areal brokenl the VC) wunits from

AYPEFWDIX 1 TO 11:fCLOSUBRE 14 TO 0ECT0IONf II to Operational Report on LessonsLearned (RoS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

0 0

AVSPB 8 Februa7 1966SUBJECT: Success Storiy, Camp. Iuon Ea Yax].

battalion-sized uxiits tro0n. m an .u's. An intelligence net wasin exsietence that infowmed -6ne de,.cmen1 of practically all VC movementin the area awicd soue outside of thte operational area. With the assis-.tance of. USAID, IVS, Province Officials and the District Chief, thepeople. frou Buo-ii-Ei Qa axua ,iere takeox off Of , refugee status, startedrebuilding better villages " "d. have beco..o Lejl-f-sufficient- A total 0 of354 families fvom Vietaramse LDC' l .ho •ro VC shppowrters an.& mk.iy whohad members of their f•wilies i.., VC ui..itc w;ere relobCawed in l•houc Anand started a new villac,1 e wid- t..e euoiision of JSASP and.. Di-strctOfficials. Three :ichoolt have e'.: built. rn1d over 500 children will bein attendance then teachers for the last 1chool become available'. Inan a.cea plaguod by FUrLRO problems, Bt'.on Ba Ya"zxg wqwith 946 Rlhade CIDGhas had no problems. The District Chief has moved PF units into fourlocal villages and the old villages are being reoccupied as VC pressuredi.inishes in the area. The best accomplishment is the frie.•dship andwillingness to help fight tVie VC on the part of the people in the'.operationual area. .

4. CONCLUISION: The success of .Camp Buon Ea Yang resides on fohufacts; aggressiVe patrolling, concurrent operationsi an .outstanding LLDBCamp Commander, &nd the successful enlisting of villager support.

5" RECOMDATIONS: The Detachment in a sub-s'e'tor 'role sbbuldat all times keep in.mi.nd that the R1/'F must be developed at the .sametime as CIDG forces to insur'e that wheni the transfer of the qamp tAkesplace, the'Diatrictwill be prepared.

6. FOLLO•W UP: Future operations ill feature concurrent opera.-tions in different parts of the operational area, joint operations withRF, and saturation patrolling to include snall unit ambushes. Therewill be an increased effort in the siub-aector role to býring District".into preparation for Phase ,IV. .....

3/Ola'L. Mize

Capt 'IfCommamding ,

AePPlIX 1 -TO 1ThOSURE 14 TO $)oATIiN II to Opeirationpf.l ýeport on Ledsons

Le tned --CS- C.. (R ' April 19.6......

0 Q

DETCIDIT B"-245TH SPECILM FORCES GROUP (A•nl ol•,,), 1ST SVECIAL FORCES

APO US Forces, 96499

AVSFB. 9 Iaxoh 1966

SUBJECT: Succeso Story ;at Plateau Gi

TO: Colanding OfficerDetachment 0-25th SF Gp (Abn), v1st SF.AP US. Forces 96295

1. From time to time a group of refugees arrives at the Special'Forces Camp at Plateau Gi., The size .bf the group varies from a fewfamilies to a large village withl several huidred people. Sometimes theyare simply passing through to Kontum, and other times they come to thisarea for security whichrill. allow them to lead noimal peaceful lives.

2. This is the story of a medium sized group of eighty-three peo-ple who' came from the I-Corps border to settle at Plateau Gi. Theyarrived, late -in January and were temporarily housed in 'the districtdispensary.. The refugees stayed in that one building until the CA/

,PSYOP NCO at Plateau Gi, SF0 Maiberger, could persuade the DistrictOA/PSYOP representative to relocate these people.

ed'. Finally, Captain Dickson went . to the District Chief and demand-ed actioni The USASF "A" Detachment Commander remembered vividly thata similar sitoation had aris3ea only C. moa•th earlier with the inactionof the districtiofficials resulting in the previous group moving on toanother area. This time however, the Distriot Chief showed initiativeand save his":&-.5 representative the go aheo-ad. Thb signal to act ias-.,-o

all 2/Lt .a, needed and 'he.immedia~tely began working on plans for a hewvillage with SFO. Maiberger. These two, the refugees themselves and thePlateau Gi CA/PSYOP Team set to a;ork the next day.

4# ,Tho village site was selected so as to be near District Headfquarters, trater and tillable land. The villagers. mid . the CA/PSYOP Teambegan to cleaxthi area and, lay out the basic design of the village.,

APPENDIX 2 TO INOLOSULE. .14 TO SECTIO I to Operational Report-'on LessonsLearned (ROs CSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 April• 1966

0

AVSFB 9 March 1966SUBJECT. SucceGss Stoern at Plateau Gi

5. Within a weok, cc.'rjt-.ction .f the houtues, breastworks and theclearing of iields of iia•u iiaL progxessca to ti.e point Vhere the pro-gross sloued for lsck of enoup.lh ioople. At this time, Captain Dicksonseoit in a platoon of CIDG to assist. In another week the baoic villagewas alrost complete to i:nclud," thirtee lari'e housos and five roiall ones,a dotible. fence of saplir'igo , ith barbed .,ire tyin,-. the trees togetherfoxhioles at each corner of•the hawilet aiid anotther at, the gate, and theWoods cleared out to seventt-tive moteýrE..

6. M Te people hn.d boe..1 ivin:' i-a tie n•-•e0, 1hw.rlet forý tio days ,when

SF0 Maiberger begsm his sanitation aid education pro•ram. First he hadthe people dig t-wo slit tre-achLe for latrines a.n.d showed themi how theywere to be used. He made sure thece -as a thorough understanding of theneed for sanitation and then checked each. day to make sure they were usingit. If they did not use the latrine, he aad Lt Qui. would lecture thewhole village for an hour to reeiphasiZe 'their objectives., The 'educ&tionprogram lad to do with animal husbandry-. Pigs, chickens and goats wereadded..to the refugee's herd of cattle and Nater buffItlo. Grazing areas'*were established so as not to coincide with the hamlet. water supply.. The.pigs were put into pens aýnd the preferred feed was explained to the peo-ple. The chickens were established in coops made by the CA/PSYOP Teamand the people were taught how to collect the eggs from the nonfertilizedhens and how to start a breeding industry wuith the others. The goatsw•re provided to keep the area between the two fences closely cropped andto try and teach the Montagilards to use the milk to improve theit nutritibn.

7. The final aspect of building the hamlet was to imaprove its defensesand to train some of the men as Popular Force. To accomplish .thi*A facet,Captain Dickson had SFC Anderson make a complete sure6y o'o the defensesystem of the village. eThy then got the villagers to ,cleax avenAes ofapproach and establish defecluivo aýd conu=ication trenches.,

8. Of course, the life of this hamlet is not static. SFCTai-berger a~id CaptainDickson .continue to moniitor the project and make surethe people continue to learn'new things and dp not forget what they havQalready taught.

9. The people are very gratoful to 2/Lt Qui. aid Detachment A-243.The entire Village turns out to aelconeo 'one mentioned above andseveral celebrations have been 1eld in their honor. thus, this is a good

APPENDIX 2 TO INJCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II. to Operttional Report on LepsonsLearned (ROSCSGP0O-28 (R1i.)) 30 April"1966: .

8tBhJOTa Suoes6 Stox'y at, Platei

eXaMPle Of' I~ the &o~1 -z2 ~ a~i )h1 themselves anid accept theSv4idicl will idmprove their Lili a.

ion TLS~ C1O4IJMiER:

a/Jolui 11. JaoksoxiVJOI J1. KSON

Adj utr;at

APPEIMIX 2 TO 11-TCLOS1JILE 14 'TO SBUTION II to Operatiom-1 Report on.LIeasor4sLearned (nZOS CSGPO-.28 (Ri)) 30 April 1966

DBUWCIfL. IZ1 A-4245 T-H SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRI3BO E), AST SPECIAL '7JRCES

.APO US Forcus 96215

AV~! ~..15 March 1966

SUBJECT-*- e~sSo.,'apA~ ~.:

TO 'oinxiLgOfficer ...

.Thtaloi~ae.t C-4.5th SP Gp -(Abn), 1st BFA-F 13 Plorco~s 96215

1. The following success story demonstrates the effective co-ordiniation.'which- is. characteristic 'of Phase IV .Detachmenits..'- Thedem6notzated ability of local officials to.; react on .6ho'rt nmotice. tomeet the: immediate needs, of the popul~ation. clearly'iadlcates'the. pro-gross vihich has bbeni attainod in this area;.

2. At approximately 1230 hours oil 4 February7 1966, a fird,,%ias*noticed in one of the shops in Phuoc Hung Mar1ket, Since the majorityof h~usab in. the 'ýarea-ake- thnatch, the- fire -spread rabtdly' anda'W stite.of pentpc gripped-the. people..: I,

3.Detacbmentlmembers q~uickly organized: bucket brigades J %rtished .water pumps into, action and1 begwt~ tearing. thatch' from, haouses .to -fon~fire bieskso," Shortly after the, outbreak of, fire- the Viet nmebe'. Info~a-tion Service (VtIS) Hung Xuari teaxis began broadcasting instruictions tocontrol -the. people, and diu~1Ja jaxnic. , hr1oughout the.. firei, tha! Di6-trict Cdhief ' a in 6omma.nd of the situation, !di:,eoting. fike fightingand evacuation efforts,'~

4. B~'. I 345q houtb the -fire W as- under. control:, and xeli ef.: supplies :

were preparad for distribu~tion at District h-eadquarters. Special For-~ces supplied some supplies Wrhile others were provided from districtstocks.k Additional relief~ supplies viere requested from Proviince throughboth Vietnamese and US clunaiels.

5. At 1600 bours the .District. ,Chi~f proclaimed the organizationof the An Phu District Aid and Hfelp .Committee to assist victims of thefire. The first meeting; T-as held imiediately,

APPL MIX:5 T 11C i4TO SdT1 N,-1 o Operaotional Report. -on Lessonp..Learned (RCS OB'GPO-28 (Ri)) 30 April i.968

AVS1D .15 March 1966*SU13JECT- Success ,Story, O~ An TPhun....--BC- Al F 1U .

6. By 1700 hours the i18 fi`iilie- -!o were victims of the fire hadbeen a edbJCe•, at i• iXstcl'c . -,±e I.uwbriot Chief spoke b0 uiepeople at this tite, asourinie the.i, that he awid hio s taff would do every.,thizg possible to assist theLi aid restore ad Kwuiy of the necessities of.life as poooible. His reaarks were well received -ýs evidenced by thespirit of cooperation wid! deoonstratio-.l. ,of good will, among" the people,The IDistrict Chiefs rcrirk' were followed hi those of theDeputy Pro-vince Chief. Iiiitial relief .uý::,lics ooIsi[tina f blaakets, pochos;,moscquito acta, bulgar kAheat, cow1i..g oil D.xLI- dry railk were distributedto thle faz~ilies. ,

7. The foIlowiagL or•ii.;s additional relici Supplies arrived fromProvince. The "I" Detacluaent S-5 aud USAID Province Representativeaccompanied the supplies. Further distribution was completed thatmorning.

8. Of great significiance vas the Aid sad Help Co=rittees; ability toorganize assistance fwn surrounding villa•gs. Each of the J! villages in

..,the disorict voluntaoly provided theq*ri proportionate salare of ,u:p liesand labor. The labor consisted of the v'illagg youth' orgaigzaitons, popularforce troops and OIDG troops. Temporai-j housing for all victims wascompleted. wahitn one, week. 9 . . ,1 . ..

9, Detachment medicos assisted the Dist Rea t Workers in treat-,ing injuries. There was no major health or sanitpatoq pmoblem due to.preventive measures taken by the health workers. The entire area *assprayed'..vith D3)T, .tash reaeptioals .were provided and the clean-ýup. caq-paign was: condixcte,-in hort.ord.er. Wp.ter barrels,, hose,, and pumps.,wera. provded in ithe ,temporary ho4using .apeý,. by tle diotr±ot goveimient.

10. In: conclusion, 0ti-e . oaca et"...e Govermwent was:c apable o "meeting *his6ralatively large scie disaster with only. mjnox assistance -a-,from US Agencies. The ability of the government to meetthe needs Of,:the population, and the correspondiag suppoxt of the goveraaent by thepeople ,a=. !Lear. siens o,.-,.e±,fective full scope oountQrizsmgen•prog ,,., ,. x,. . . .

,~~~~~~~~.. '.• .".,..'...'. . . ..:'-;••," • ," ", . .

- . .I,

ComimamirisgAPPiRDrKIX 1 10 LiCLOSUfRB 14 TO SEOTION II to Operatiqannl oport on Lessons,eathe'a (cOS O8P0-28 (1a)) 30 !Ap3i19GG , 6....... "

0 0~DETACXVLT A-234

5T.H SPECIAL IORCES GROUP (AIPhORITrE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCE- . .

APO US Forces 96297

AVS B .. • :v :." ... .: . ..:,:. .. " '11l April 196

SUBJECT:._ Su.ccess. Story. .

TI•IU Coaa-ni•i• Officer....,. D -ý . ... e a pe a~e t B-2 . ,. .- •... 5t1S Gp. (Abn), st SP."

"A4 US Forces 96297.

TO. -, COntand.Lag Officer . . ..Detachment C-2 .5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF

... .. US Forces •6295:

1. Upon movement into our present locatioon. we f6our the "local -in,,habitants completely hostile toward the American and Vietnamese soldiers.Th~e ,peep!e were,-open'ly • spfo.ti±• the , Vit eC5on. ."Whenever• an, Anerioen

entered a village, the people would ruwi to their homes and close.' tedoors. The children were even afraid of the Americans.

-2. .,aliz .the problem and ..kowinvg me could, no.t, opbetate, eff.ftive-ly .unt4J. we gained the confidence of .,the. peoplev we,. called a meeting .,tthe !meetinig,-, s.,decided to,.. oo.va. -ith this situation by' dividing. it ix.t.6.four.,, tep°.

a. Step One: We called upon all the village chiefs and invitedthem to our camp for a-supper 'nd"get-acquaiinted"paxty.' At. this -gather-ing.w•e told the village., chiefs .e wo ere here to help in an.y w.ay v *:e could.'We.romiv :them protection Xrom the Viet Cong, anid also explained wewanted to help thao to -have a ..better'life. 1ýdTe plwnned On seading medicalpatrolswto the villages. We also plamed distribution of clothes, toys,soap, salt .and -food. to needy f£azilies. ',.ihen the .paw.ty ended, we had con-vincec. the. village. chiefs :,that we. w'z'er..incere in vantirg. to. help...

'PP4E IDI.S 4 TO IfMjMOSDUm 14 '%O 8 B TIO1' II to 'Oporz.,tional Rieport on LessonsLeaned (RTi .•.q-c2,8. (,i)). 30 April 1966. . -.

, .. . . .. , ,. . . ,. . ', i "

• , .v. . . ;[ . ..; .. . .. " . .." ," . : . . ' .

0 0AVSn .11 April 1966

SUJECT:. Success StOry

b. Step Tio: Jc,--. cotvI•c ted UID and IVS in Dalat and Ban '2oThuot and asked them ior sUipoi-a 01 0ur uuuau. They uere very coopera-tive &id soo-in tr,,e cta~tud leceiin' auplies. The American toan -alsosent for CAIRE packages. Once the supplies uiere collected, we began toact.

c. Step Three; We began .imonci.g medical p)atrols to the villages.The c=Aj col.'nder aent aloaCý a:d talked with the people explaining that

we wanted to help. At first sthe people refused to cone out of the housee;so we decided to leave the clothes, ca~.ýdf, au-d toys iwith the village chief.The next time we visited the villages i fou-ad a fLo people who would comeout to see us but they were ve:r 6u,3:icioU'3. 01e continupd to be friendlywith tliem. Soon the childre, Cereo accepti,4• cmady and clothes from useOnce the ice was broken it wasn' t long before all the villagers were look-ing to our next visit.

d. Step Four: We were now ready to: give the villagers protec-tion and show them the latest techniques in agriculture so they couldgrow more food. We placed a squad of soldiers with an American Advisorin each village. Their mission, was to help the people during the dayand conourrently provide protection at all times. We helped build houses,dig wells, alidplant gardens,

3*, SooU villJ.,rs 'Jers inviting us to their hones for meals and localoelebratioiw.

4. A-s time passed we continued to help the villagers, and -we wereab.e to gain intelligence on the Viet Cone movements. Acting on this in-fomation we hýid sevoral successful combat operations. We began pushingthe Viet Cong back into the mountains and were able to pacify our localarea. This convinced thz .. t!Lat 'o *e,-"-t what we said about help-ing. The people therefore gave us more and more information.

5. Accomplishmentsv Today ,hienevex .;e visit the villages we aregTeeted with smiles aad laughter.0 The people eare alia-vs Nilling to helpus and vie in .turn help them in any w.ay we can. 1Je are also able to gathermore intelligence from the people about the Viet Cong.

6. ConcLusion: We fowadl that in'orxder to become friends with thepeople, it is important to first shovi then you areI sincere in wantingtheir fribndship.' We must be w:i.ling to accept and honor their customsand habits. We must always be considerate and not openly take advantageof their kindness in offering us food and gifts.

7. The best way to make friends is to learn their .liguage and ou.S-toms and always be friendly, considerate, and helpful in any vmy possible.

APPE1'Q)IX 4 TO INCLOSUEE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on LessonsLecrnod,-(T1C0 CSGPO"28 (Hl)) 30 April 1966

AVM 11 April 1966SUBJECT: Succecs StoWr

8. Reoom•.endations." I reconmend that new7 ar•ivals in Vietnam attenda mand.atoi- glass on~ -ic looi cuitoms habits of the people in the areaof their assignment. This W7ill prevent misunderstanding and possibleserious results.

s/Prnk J* Leach

Captain, ArtyComuanding

APPEMDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on LessonsLearned (ROS OSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

AMTM ACTION REPORT--TEfE WTL•LD ?OR. A SZAU

G0E1YRAI SITUATION:

The A Shau CIDG Camp had -the primary mission of border surveillance and inter-diction of infiltration routes into it-: assigci-ed a-ea of operation. The Camr, waslocated south west of HUE and approximately five kilometers east of the Laotion borderat coordinates YC 494834. Because of itsi location near three major infiltrationroutes leading from Laos east into the A Shau-Aloui Valley the camp was continuouslyharassed by small Viet Corn elements with small arms fire prior to the large scaleattack which began on 9 March 1966. The only local population that e7cisted prior to

Wit; tLULu we a n numbe.- of te e Kive anJ l% .• Le tu Tribesmen who wereeither Viet Cong or Viet Cong sympathizers. --he occupants of Camp A Shau never madefriendly contact with the KATU. The weather on 91 10,I , anid 12 1.1arch included aheavy cloud cover and ground fog dfting the early morning houi-s, with ceilimgs lessthan 2,000 feet. The attack uoo'." full advantage of bad weather conditions to hindertactical air support, reinforcement, and resupply attempts. Elephant grass reaching8 to 12 feet high covers most of the valley floor around the camp, therefore, obser-vation from the ground and air is very diff•'icult and detecting movement of even largaunits is practically impossible unl,3ss they are detected while moving on trails inthe valley. On the east side of the airstrip and the south side of camp were oldmine fields that were overgrown with dense, high grass, which could not be outbecause of the danger to friendly forces.

The friendly situation prior to the attack was as follows: Patrols on 18-19Feb and 24-25 Feb captured enemy documents that indicated Camp A Shau was under enemyreco:-maissance pending an enemy attack. On 5 11arch a reconnaissance patrol consist-ing of 30 OIDG and 2 USASP was dispatched 2 kilometers south of Camp A Shau, and nocontact was made. On 6 Ma;'ch a company size patrol was dispatched. The mission ofthis patrol was to move southwest of camp A Shau and be prepared to attack and destroya suspected enemy position in this area. These positions were detected by an over-flight aircraft on 5 March 1966. This patrol was planned for a 2 day operation. Inthe meantime, however, 2 NVA defectors had turned themselves in at Camp A Shau andindicated that four battalions of NVA planned to attack Camp A Sheau on 11 or 12 Marchand that heavy infiltration into the valley was continuing. Based on this infonmation

the patrol was reca'..led to Camp A Shau to improve the defensive posture of -.e camp.The patrol returned with negative enemy contact. On 6 Lla-ch a reconnaissance patrolwas dispatched approximately 2 kilometers northwest of Camp A Shau with the miission to

retei ioiter a suspected enemy mortar position. This patrol was unable to locate theposition and returned to Camp A Shau with negative contact. Since Headquarters ICorps had disapproved repeated requests to reinforce the camp, Detachment 0-1 requestedand received a reinforcement from the 5th SFG Mike Force in Nha Trang. On 7 Marchat 1640 hours one Ilake Force Company consisting of 141 Mike Force, 7 USASY and 7Interpreters arrived to improve the reconnaissance and defense capability of the camp.

Patrols were initiated approximately 1 to 2 kilometers north, south, and northwestof the camp with the mission of confirming the locations of reported NVA troop posit-

ions. These patrols returned with negative contacts and negative information of any

enemy activity. In conjunction writh these patrols night ambush patrols were dispatched

INCLOSUMf 15 to SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (Rl))

30 April 1966 ' . ' I -. ,. ,: -n I !

in all direotinns sround the camp area and resulted in no enemy contact. During theperiod 4 thru 8 March daily overflight aircraft ware requested and received. Theseoverflights detected numerous weapon positions, freshly dug personnel positions, andanti-aircraft emplacements. This confirmed information received from the 2 NVA def-ectors that a definite buildup of a large urit was in prog.'ress. Tactical airstrikeswere requested and receiveO on theSio poritions; howiever, asses.sments of these strikeswere virturally impossible because of dense foliage and heavy ground fog. On 7 Marcha leaalet drop was conducted in conjunction with a loudspeaker broadcast encoura.ingmore enemy personnel to defect vith the theme that all defectors would be well treatedand moved to a securo location. On the evening of 8 TIaa ch the Camp's strength wasas follows: 220 OIDG, 141 PIIC. 'orce, 9 Interpreters, 41 Civiliansý 6 UDBt 17 USASE.

The sequence of events during the attack, evacuation, and escape and evasion wereas follows:

On 8 March, the night before the attack, the camp conmander placed the camp ongeneral alert, since he considered an attack imminent. All personnel remained intheir defensive positions. At approximately 1930 hours a squad of enemy was observedon the north end of the camp, axd was fired on with mortars. At about 2300 hours thece- was ajerted by digging noises heard -ruth of the camp. At about 0130 hours aclaymcre mine was fired in the direction toward which wire cutting sounds were heard,Thent at approximately 0350 hours on 9 March the cnmp began receiving heavy 81mmortar f1a vdaich continued until 0630 hours. A probe of about 2 NVA companies vsinitiated in the south wall at approximately 0430 hous. They were met with heavyfire and fell back at no loss in additional friendly oasualties, The initial barrageof mortar fire was extremly acct-.te and caused hea-y damage to the USASF team house,supply room, water storage, and contributed to the temporary loss of communicationswith all outside installations. Communications were reestablished thjrough LLDBchannels at approximately 0800 hours and through UO' channels at approximately 0920hours. Casualties resulting, frcn the 3 hour mortar barrage were as follows: 2 UWASPKIA, 5 ,SASF WAt, 25 CIDG WIA, 7 Ti'ke Force KIA, 14 =IKI Force WIA, 1 Civilian KIA,3 Civiliar.s WIA. After the .gorta" barrage stopped, sporadic sniper fire continuedresulting in 1 Civilian KIA, 1 Cý.vili-u rWA, and 3 CIDG ;IA. Sniper and mortarfire coAtnued throughý.ut the day,

At 1100 hours on 9 March an airstrike was received north and south of the camp,Because of heavy ground fog the PAC could not observe the target, sq. bombs were in-itially dropped from above the clouds and were adjusted from within the camp by sound.All airs~ri~kes were discontinued at approximately 1500 hours due to low ceilings. Atapprotimately 1015 hours the camp requested emergency resupply of ammunition andmedical evacuation of all wounded, At 1100 hours two L-19 aircraft landed to evacuateseriously wounded personnel. Hiowever, theae aircraft begrn receiving intense groundfire aid were able to evacuate only 1 U&AS1. (1SCIT IROBET I. GIBSON). At approximately1300 hours an A03-47 aircraft arrived over t•,, camp area. This aircraft was flyingnorthwest to southeast and reoeiveL .Intense cauti-aircraft fire while flying down the

2

INCLOSURE 15 TO S:C2ION II to Operational Report on Lerjons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (Rl))

30 Ari 1966*~*~**

valley. The aircraft attempted to circle east of the camp and again received heavyanti-aircraft fire from the high ground to the east. At this time the ground firewas very accurate and the aircraft crashed approximately five kilometers north of thecamp. Three of the crewmen weif:e rescued by helicopter and three were KIA. At 1415hours a load of ammunition and medica.l supplies wore air dropped bt- CV-2 just outsidethe camp ao'ea. It was retrieved by a porrty from t'he c'p. At 1630 hours another loadof ammunition was air dropped by C-123, a part falling outside the camp area. Approx-imately 505 of this resupply was not recovered because of heavy ground fire on therecovery team. At 1700 another resupply drop from a CV-2 aircraft lar:d both in andout of camp. Also about this time an 11-34 helicopter landed inside the compound toevacuate casualties. It as heavily damaged by sniper fire on the approach into thecamp and was unable to lift off. One more medical helicopter, an Air >'orce C11-3 whichhad been called in, evacuated 26 casualties prior to darkness. As darkness fellpersonnel were deployed in defensivo positions in anticipation of ground assault duringthe night, and work continued to repair drmaged defensive positions caused by mortarattacks. Those portions of the airdrops that had fallen outside of :,' p re'e rotriuv&dAt approximately 2000 hours a flare ship vxrivod over "•he canp -md provided continuousbut limited illumination throughout the night,

At 0400 hours 10 March the camp again began receiving intense and extremelyaccurate mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle fire which battered almost all remainingbuildings to rubble. This heavy fire continued throughout the entire day in varyingintensity until the camp was eventually evacuated at 1730 hours. The 57mmr fire rap-.idly destroyed approximately fifty percent of all crev- served weapons. At 0500 hoursa massive ground assault was initiated on the east wall from across the runway, and onthe south wall, the most vulnerable side due to the tall grass. At approximately thesame time defense of the southeast corner of the camp collasped as CIDG company 141ceased all effective resistance. The remainder of the cast wall occupied by MikeForce and two Americans initiated fire against, the oniy '..,itht,. th.•. c -ip -iho..L - d taknpart of the east and south %walls and temporarily halted their advance. Bitter h"id.-t.-hand fighting continued for almost 3 hours until t=.ose friendly forces on the eastwall were isolated from the rest of the camp, drawing heavy maching gun and smallarms fire from front and rear. Then the south ,wall was taken at about 0800 hours theretreating personnel withdrew to the vicinity of the communications bunker and thenorth wall. They were joined about 0830 hours by survivors from the east wall. Theexamples of outstanding courage, self-S.Lcrifice, r"sou•rcefulluoss and leadership ofthe defenders were so widespread as be commonplace.

At 0600 hours the camp had requested airstrikes and targets were hit in theimmediate vicinity north and south of the camp. These strikes were effective but anassessment could not be made due to the heavy ground fire within the camp. At 0850hours only the north wall and the communications bunker were still held. About thistime the enemy inLitiated an assault to secure the comnunications bunker but Vws un-successful because of the heavy volume of fire delivered by the defenders. The oneremaining 81rm mortar and 60=n mortar continued to fire but wore destroyed priorto 1200 hours.

3INCLOSURE 15 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO.28 (RI))30OApril 1966 OQ JI1- JA

•J In r,: /-. " LAt 0900 hours airstrikes continued cand inflicted heavy casualtios on the INVA

entrenched in the south \wall, ':owever, no exact figures of enemy casualties could bemade. The remaining USASi' and iike Force personnel, led by Captain David BLAIR, madeseveral assaults to reoccupy the south wall 'out these attempts were unsuccessful.

At 1000 hours the "A" detachiaent cormmander requested the entire camp, except forthe communications bunker anud north wall, be bombed and strafed. Between 1000 and 1200hours the airstrikes continuod, inflicting heovy casu0ltics, and discouraged anyfurther assaults on the communications biunKr and the north wall by the North Viet-namese forces.

At 1215 hours a CV-2 aircraft dropped another resupply of water and ammunition.However, all of this fell into the enemy controlled portion of the cap. At thesame time an AlE aircraft crash landed on tho airstrip, shot down by heavy anti-aircraftfire from the many AA positions in the valley. The pilot was immediately picked tip byanother AlE which landed on the strip.

Between 1215 and 1400 a heavy exchange of smaiall arms fire continued, and thecommunications bunker sustained several near hits from a heavy caliber weapon. Itshould be noted that enemy 81mm mortar fire had continued uninterrupted throughout theattack.

At 1415 hours the enemy was observed to be massing on the east side of the air-strip, presumably for another assault on the east wall. (This is the wallwhere thefront gate is located). Airstrikes were immediately called on this target, and heavycasualties were sustained by the enemy, causing them to disperse. The assault failedto materialize. 11owever, the VC continued to pour intense fire into the camp.

Mrom 1430 to 1630 hours the situation of the defenders deteriorated gravely.Almost all firendly crew served weapons were destroyed. Very little ammunition remained,Io food and water had been availablp for 36 hours. lRo further offensive capabilityexisted due to the strength of enemy forces entrenched in the Camp.

At 1500 hours a decision was made by III MAP Headquarters to commit Marinehelicopters to support the evacuation of the garrison. The camp was therefore immed-iately instructed to destroy their weapons and SOIls dad prepare to evacuate byhelicopter at 1700 hours.

At 1700 hours all communications equipment and S"OI's had been destroyed and per-sonnel occupying the bunker withdrew under fire to the north wall and took defensivepositions with the remaining force. *riendly forces on the north wall covered this

withdrawal by fire.

At 1720 hours personnel were ordered to evacuate the camp by moving north to ahelicopter landing zone approximatoly 300 meters outside the wire. All able-bodiedAmericans and the remainder ot' the Wilm Forcs stayed belhind to fight a rear guardaction but the enemy laid heavy fire dovn in the helicopter pickup area and inflictedmany casualties. The rescue element consisted of 16 H-34 helicopters in flights of4 supported by 4 HU•JlB gun ships and tactical air, which had remained over the camparea. Some of these helicopters were unable to come in, however, due to low ceiling.

4XNCLOSU1fE 15 TO SECTION II to Optvational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (nl))30 April 1966 t- Ot-J 7

At the helicopter pickup point the Vietnamese personnel p-nicked and mobbed the air-craft. AbandoniAg thoir xoundod and throwing dovan their weapons the Vietnameseperson•_l fled irom the camp, trwplir•4 1, USASF, who was providing firesupport, At the aircraft thoy .Zol4-.t to got aboard ond at one point threw a woundedUSASP aoldier,-C-0W YJ o off the aircraft. One helicopter piloted by Lt Col IIOUSE,the 163rd IllUdd Squadron 'Coanand6'r, was so overloaded that it could not iU4-tially take-off# All efforts to throw the peanic-stricken :nd hysterical Vietnamese persoi el offthe under carriagos were fruitloss. Dy this tixae the tail rotor was damaged ruid thehelicopter had to be abandoned. Due to the tuncontrolled actions of the indigenouspeople and the mounting intensity of heavy ground fireq the rescue helicopters wereonly able to lift out 69 personnel tlhot first day, including four wounded Amoricoms.Two H-34 helicopters wei_'e destroyed dtirin. this operation. By 1745 hours all friendlypersonnel had left the cmap who could do so ulid CO, Detachtment C-1, declared the c.,aapclosed.

At approi tely 1800 hours all persoanel not evacuated began evasion and escapeaction. This included seven Uti.kSF personnel, one of whom was seriously wournled; fortyMike Force personnel, fifty CIDG and the craw of two dowrned Marsine helicopters. Thewounded U died in the vicinity of the helicopter landing" zone. 1?romthis time on the evasion salement moved northwest and took up positions on the highground approximately two kilometers away from the camp. At 0200 hours they movedagain in a northerly direction. During this move),lent several men were lost because OXestreme exhaustion and the difficulty of moving in the dark. On 11 March one USASF,the marine helicopter crew, and an unknown number of Uike Force and CIDG were rescuedby helicopter at different times during the day. The remaining elements continuednorth in the hope of being seen by friendly aircraft. Their objective in the eventrescue aircraft failed to materialize was the city of I-UE. The remaining Americansand some scattered groups were seen by rescue aircraft and returned to IiHUG on 12March. Further air reconnaissance on 13, 14, and 15 March failed to locate any morefriendly personnel and was discontinued on 16 March. The total personnel still MIAare depicted in the personnel recapitulation.

5

INCLOSIiU 15 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (ROS CSGP0-28 (RI.))30 April 1966

"~~~~~I" 0, P,+ IU O.,,• LU]O•ITIJUITI O}• "

JIJ)G :'0O~CE CIV USASP, aDB 10 TT IN TOTALJ

Originially in Camp 210 143 .51 17 6 7 43A

Returned 109 53 6 12_ 1 . .6

Returned 7ounded _5 2 1 1 1 ,,I01

111j,.. 1 01 2Q 45 . 5. 3- .. 6 ._24a8

MiLA Bulieved KIA 4Q 75 4 1 6 172

Wn~ONS LOST (ESITDlI'wri)

100 Carbines

10 TZIGs

4 Mortars - 60mm

2 Mortars - 81m

6

INCLOSURE 15 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGO-28 (Rl))30 April 1966

(~~~OJ, 7l~~~~4

--]•:- , .i A ~ ', .'

o 0"iQ :2 j"~ a , . .. , - .

,, t ..... ...... :.. . . " .. ...., .ion o o • ih. , jor cto chievinsuccess in count-r-guerrilla wo are. The application of this maxim playedan Lporta1nt role ins, .chievi..-uccesu -in "61e coLbat operation describedbelow:

The hla ..lot o, Tha,±, Duo, Don,, ,i 2 Yen ?iovinoe ("Q9'E.7-5)is located :.,rodl-,t -':: i ,-,o--.........-CIDG o-p of Done Tro.

In early sumit.r of 19675, the Ponulv.-- !;:'or-e '..latoon "•.lat was securiik..' the hm'leteas -thdrva.:,2-a, le-.vi..: tie i~h:".-it.'.t, or. : grey for VO domination, As the

hamlet is lcat.qd on•tihe .:'ViiVe .of a io.u:aally pacified =-w.e. "-ad. is frequentlyused as a patrol b:.se by : ional- :oicc' .i:.e Viet Oon7 Cid nQt chposeto occupy it. Inite•,,t..ey croc:teo covert inirtcture, contro1linZ the'

• people 1)10. t .l=au ..coercion and:• io. terroa,; This iz.vzed theiir ch:-4nces ofbein.-I comproie ton•• '",_;oa '0y .s...being coipsoie0t and L3~ydL~ iz1 Corote

In early.iOebru.ry, l966, Intelligence agents from Camp Dong Tre reportedan increase in VO. abivity at" Thaih D'.~c. This activity. included;,.,..-ý ' Organ-(ization of the farmers into a colle6tive; (2) Formation of co.mitt'es for theyouth, women and aged, supervised by Communist Party members; (3) Political.and propaganda lectures being conducted; (4) Defensive fortifications beingbuilt; (5) Intro'duction of an armed VO militia squad into Thimh Duo to providesecurity for tho VC cadre and to guard the farmers as they worked their fields.Interrogation of captives taken during recent combat operations tended toconfirm the.e reports. A request for more detailed information was dispatchedto agents in the field.

On the afternoon of 9 February, an a&ent passed the following infor-mation to the S-2 Section of Camp Dong Tre: ýi) The previous reports wereessentially correct; (2) A seven man VO squad was staying in the hamlet, occupy-ing three huts at night; (3) One guaud was usually posted near the huts. On thebasis of this report and earlier intelligence, a combat operation was plannedfor ir•mediate execution.

The LDB Or-op 0onmander, advised by the USAS1F Detachment A-222 Oommamderfconsidered a night raid 9S company strenjgth to be the most effective tactic.On 10 February, a CIDG'Company, -cco.,paniied. by IIDB and USASF advisors, movedto a point three lilometers from the hamlet. To prevent security leaks, onlythe OCDG compankr uomaader, the LLDB ail the USASF Lacw the true mission ofthe operation. The troops veore under the impression that they were reinforomentefor another CIDG ad5••'ýiy on a roed.security operation in that area.

At 110100 Vebruary, tile OIDG company conma•der issued the operationorder to his platoon leaders, Two platoons departed L,.Vaediately to occupybloc••d•. posi.tions on t.. hi,:oh .ound to the west of Thanh Duo, with the rneinforce crossiag the line of depoxture an hour later. Taki,_ng.' maximuv advantageof all concealmont iafofrded by the terrain, the assault element was able toreach the hamlet undetected. Under the cover- of dar3'iess2 and aided by detailedintell'iencee , a barbodl dte/puh , i .,tOko- .- b••rier.,,fas silently breached add the

IN10LOSURJI 16 TO S';OTION IT to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RS CSGPO-28(ni)) 30 April 19ý6

VO guard dispatchece.. The CL"XG troops swiftly deployed for thleir. asshulteThe reaai~nikgn. et'x mcmbers ofL the VC squad were sur'prised and anihila.tedbefore they ̀ýculk*c zae:ct. Swe.bpijt' ojh h ~ne, the fenly foroe k~illedfive of the V1.~t COon,:', cadre, rio t~:.oy ,:.ttemptoW to escape,'and captur~ed:': leven!ot~hers(-. '.ive weajjons were seized as wdl.i as documents, military equipment c.ntwo -tons of' r~ice, Z--e ao.at~I oii~. ~~~ t ie .,i'ell iak tho- overt

Viet- Cofiii~ ozoe had been -suoo esoftlly -oenaý-od from Thauah Due.'M'CIlG~ withdre.vi to Cenap' Vonf:, Tre - ia~i- aj; ccomiplishedt.

1.Cu~ epr car. px'oduoc t~iualy, ccute inite~ll5.enoe- on a locallevel. that it ofL ±2 nedi(Ate tactioz-11 vr~tý,e.

2.* :;-l'o:r e~ isý,Iro o: -y. :-r,-n 1 led ai-4. aivi~sedý have the 'capability

3.A night rai~d, long a Lavorite Viot Cong taotic., can be used equallyeas wefll by fr1,e~dly f orces to achieve excellent success.

33CLOSURE 16-TO SECTION 11 to Qperatiaaal Reporto on Lessone Leaxned (RCSOSGPO6-28 01i)) 30 April. 1966

EA YANG AFTER ACTION REPORTv

• •e ;mpor ands, of: exploi. ig intelizgen~eo•.•m~te atoL.value.

obtained .fim captured enemy documents is, illustrated by the series of combataotions 4esctibed'.below,. -J4or suco.ess 7:.rs n-chieved' by utilizing information

iptu of 6ne document and folloxing up subsequentinteiligenc LoOathered. durindg- enagemlen, ts with the Viet Congo

.On. 18 March. 1.966, a C•DG ambush pta.cl ,'from Camp Buon EB. Yang, killed-a Viet Cong Company Commander and captured a number of documents he wascarrying, including one that directed four VC compalies to establish atraining ,base at a given location. The follovwing day, a two company sizeforce of. CIIG.Iith.USASF and.-I11DB advisors moved- by: foot toward the suspectedenemy conQeP.trtion ..An' assault-on the:; objective, preceded by an intensiveartillery said -aerial bombardment, was'launiohed at 211000 March and immediatelyencountered heavy opposition. The VC, occupying fortified positions on highground", employed'a hbigh voquiue .6fautoma"lic Weapons said small arms fiiecaus.W the"CODW Pordis t".w{°fhdraWt0o more' favorable pOsitions 'and awaitreinforcements.- 0-ntaot with the 'enevr.;wag lcontinued with the CIDG counter-attacking between the numerous air strikes .that were :called. in. .At. 211400March, .the friendly units ,were reinforced by an a4ditional CfIDG company andthe VC .defTnid beg4a't 'ac-vumbi'e. " 'By nightfall, the enemy had beeri drivenfro.m...ir.o,•tios .andf.ed to flee the area. Total VC casualties were:109 KBA, 21 KIA by ground action,-with an undetermined number 'of yVC wounded.No weapons or captives were taken, indicating..that this V .unit possesseda high degree of military discipline and training, Friendly casialties were9 CIDG and 1 interpreter. ,XIA with.: QT and 2 USASF WIA...

A search of the battlefield uncovered documents that revealed the presenceof a VC battalion command post to the south in a land development center.To exploit this information, one company of CIDG each from Camp An Lao,Camp Lac Thien and the Pleiku Mike Force were alerted for a raid in strength.On 211315 March,. following intensive'airstrikes, this mixed unit was airlandedby helicopter on the objective. Heavy contact with an estimated company ofVC was immediately established. As the VC resisted stubbornly for more thantwo hours before they retreated, it is apparrent that these troops possessedthe same high degree of discipline as those engaged in the previous day'saction. A total of 33 VC were KIA and 9 were captured. Friendly losses were1 USASF and 2 CIDG KIA with 3 CIDG ;IA.

Evaluation of all intelligonce acquired during these two operations andinterrogation of the captives revealed the most likely infiltration routesused by the .VC in their movement through this area. On the night of 30 March,a CIDG company from Camp Buon Ea Yang established an ambush on one of theseroutes. At 2130 hours, an estimated VO battalion entered the killing zonefrom the south and, at the same time, a local VC platoon moved in from thenorth. 'Both VC units were immediately taken under intense fire by automaticweapons, small arms and three claymore mines. Enemy casualties from the initialburst of fire were apparently heavy but, recovering quickly, the VC returnedfire and counterattacked the friendly positions, both frontally and on one.flank. "These attacks .were thrown btok by the CIDG forces.'

INCLO0URB 17 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Lea~ied (RCS CSGPO-28(Ri) 30 April 1966

Contact* ith the VO continued tuntil 310100 vIrch, with both sides using automaticweapons, small arms and mortars. 155MM artillery support and flare ships aidedthe ou n~umbered, endly IQrQ0 i-jn .holding brck ,the VC. Again, tkhe discipline of

the, VO ý ' .demons trated by their e -,Louation: of.,moat of their dead, wouridedand .equipme.t Czom th.e, batt1afiel, UBy .10115 Mai'ch, all -firing ceased asthe. V- broke qontart. and. withdretiT. .First light revealed.but 4 VO bodies and1 woun'ed VC wew-inniVW' oh tho a one. ,••`umeous blood trails and other evidenpoeof high VO losses were found. 's number of rucoksacks, p 1 I.M-. mount, 1 mortarbase plate:and .misoellneous ammunition were captured. Friendly losses were2 OIDG XIA&-a nd 4 WA:.,

Conplusions:,

1, The three combat actions described were the direot'result of.rapid 'eIobtation of. aý capiured documont containing informati6. of immediate,

2. Aggressive combat, ac€tion on the part Of the CIDG units .involved

resulted in a- impressive viory oz nd. the decimation of three major VO units,

.,." e VC lmitsi'engaged possessed a hig4 degree of military traininidiscipline~i and, morale -As evidenoed byt "

"a. Ruusal., td wi..hd&zaw until their positions became uateneb.le

b.,, ,Reiov&l ofall ,wounded, tany of tMr dead, and thejx ,aPon.from, ;the battlefield. •.

o. Immediiate action *takep wh.en ambushed.

d. Utilizing suitable 'terrain for their base axeas,

2

INCLOSUBE 17 MO SE.CTIO1.II to Operational Report On Lessons Lenin" (nCS CSGPO-28(Rl)) 30 April 1966

D Thiitr at'* is7-ldoated 10klot .weas,c,pf 1ha~ Trans, A4.#h• ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . .'"•o '-•'i ., ..• ,0;ae I.-• 6fý .: rI . .. • ..the'6 b -~~~h ~ e~ 0o ahe& f th.~~~ ~~~~~ 'A , At'... .... . .. . . ....... .. .. . ep thl • .....r19= s.o liiýD#3 bo-anid Dai1 Dien 'arsng a' ~A4 xten44ng nrof these villages all the way to the Hba Gid LU mountains. This rich areawas built up during the Diem regime.. M!ost of th.e -homes were constructedIn-i960,! -.19 61 , n -d 19i. Each: house. hap a we.l ana, thehomes axe of .oemtconfs t16tn. 'Since 193 t~ ic'hric-e'.harveStf in thig area had alw sgo ne to' v -th& V '. .. .. e "...

For several years the people in the Dien Xhanh District, had been vic-tims of the Viet Cong who had been terrorizing them and collecting most oftheir rice harvest each year. At the request of the District Chief an op-eration was planned utilizing USASF advised CIDG troops from DetachmentsA-502 and A-501; their mission being to clear the rice lands in the Dai Mienfour area so that the people in the hamlets would be able to harvest theirrice for themselves without VC terrorism.

This operation, "Morning Star",'commenced on 28 January 1966, with twoCIDG companies from Detachment A-502, one Mike Company from Detachment A-501and a blocking security force made up of one company from A-501 and onefrom A-502. A CP was secured by the blocking force after a few encounterswith the V0 and patrols were sent out sweeping the surrounding area andproviding security for the rice fields at the start of the harvest. Thetwo maneuver elements sweep parallel. to each other northeast through themountain range clearing it of V0 as they moved toward the CP. During thethird and fourth days of the operation the local villagers covered the ricefields like ants on sugar, From an initial hundred or so there were-an ex-timated 1000 people working in the rice fields with many more moving backand forth between their homes a-ad the fields carrying the freshly out rice.

--On 2 February "Operation.Morning Stare was completed. One CIDG oin-penY stayed in Dai Dien Trung, providing additional security for the Vill.ages until the end of the harvest. This operation netted a total of 6 VC.IA an estimated 15 VC WIA, 2 VC CIA with their weapons, another sevenChieu Hoi turned themselves and their weapons in to'District Headquarters.A VC Compa- training area, containing several huts, food and a make shiftfiring range, complete withtargets was located and destroyed. A largecache of docunents and medical supplies had also been found.

The most significant thing about the whole operation' is not the numberof VC KIA or WIA but more important that an estimated 700,ooo kilos of rioama harvested in this area during the harvest period. This was the firsttime in several years that it had not gove to the VC. This was not merwya military defeat for the V0, but more important a psychological defeat.

mCLOSUR 18 TO SECTION II to Operationaml Report onLoamao Leamed (mZ"CSGMp.28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

This Was not cmily ba 'their o~' a uho W-`tb 2-17zo of defootcm,but al so to +he peqplo of thp ~ Le foi* axeat io~r ba4 b.ý thammhi* 'hiwe lha"' ýpe±i -$.6~1 be dpad dd~a robiw o

te~bit t~*s Aifiinsl , 'the. ýVdo.., 9A a .or .ad19 ek4- ý0*itd ftý,

wa ~~~ii ~ef ~o~aa .they lined'. Thb Mos. hs year the havesthad gbe' id them ad wliii +b~e hi1p -of thie CIDO thin oan be reip~atftd. ntyears to oome.

I~I.

Iz

jo Zi

.4OS 1 TO~ ECIM l.''' to '4mloa Haota sma4M(O

.4- i 4 Lf

O 0

missionsssied 7puyes of infiltration and one of. , mthe..isston's'' a*. ssie~n to '-SASF AAdvised CIG Cfamrs.T follon coaCt aot s

illustates the effeotiveness f a.gre~sive -atrolingby CIDG Foroes imnac-

oomplishing thtis task:

Ni~ierou .nteligence reports veoeived by Camp Duo Co, Pleiku Pro'(ine'indi6&ted that elements .of the. North Vietaamese ArAy (NVA) were using theIa Drang Valley Ias an' infiltration route from Cambodia into South Viet Nsa.In order to confirm these reportst a combat reconnaissance patrol of companystrength, accompanied by USASF and LLDB advisors, was sent into the area'

On the night of 17 February, this CflG patrol went into tactical biv-oua4 •ithout making contact vith the enemy. At 2330 hours, listening postsreported that they had heaxd v~oices and movement to the' south of the friendlypositlonb.b After maintaining noise dicipline all night, the CIDO troops de-ployed silently at first light and launched a suidea, violent attack cn thesuspected enemy oamýsite. The' assaulting force enoountered ans atimated re-inforded NVA Squad. The enemy, totally surprised, fled in panic, carryingwith them an unknown number of wounded. The bodies of three NVA soldieralay where they had fallen. The extent of the surprise of the assault wasevidenced by the amount of equipment found on the soene: One ChiCom lightmachine gun; three ChiCom AYA assault rifles, five Soviet Tokarev semý.-&uto-matic tifles, sixteen hand grensdes, tvo bangalore torpedoes, thirty poundsof TNT, four oases of 12.7mm amiunition, a Chinese made radio transmitter/receiver complete with operators manual and SOI of Regimental level, and aquantity of clothing and field equipment. There were no friendly casualtiesduring this action.

Further reconnaissance of the area oonfirmed that the NVA did use theIs Drang Valley as an infiltration route for units of squad and platoonsize. The patrol returned to camp on 19 February, without further contact.On the basis of their report, another combat operation in the same area wsplanned.

On 21 February, a company sized CIDG combat recon patrol with USASF/LLDB advisors began a screening mission to the south west of Camp Duo Conear the Cambodian border. The first contact with the enemy oooured at 250700 February when the forward elements of the friendly force sighted agroup of 15 NVA troops moving toward them from the direction of the frontier.Undetected by the snak, the CIDG troops deployed into hasty flank ambushpositions. As the EVA unit entered the killing zone of the ambush, theirranks wete enfiladed with small arm fire. Although they fought back des-peratelyp the entire enem patrol was killed. The attacking force" lost 1CIDG killed and 2 others wounded. Seven ChiCom AXU assault rifles, 10 handgrenades and miscellaneous field equipment was captured.

INCLOSUBE 19 TO SMTTC* II to Operational Report on Lessona Learmed (HOSCS00O..8 (RI)) 30 April 1966 .7- ' . (.

La~ter thant aftumon~u, owiother NVA uai~t of si~miliaa' size was observedbut at too great a e-.stvo.ne to be eoffect-ively engaged. An. airstdike wascal~led. in-and iri believed to have decimated the enem~y's ranks. As the gnenmyfled, they abando-ned 16 rucksacks e'nd mibcellaneous field' equipMent which.-was recovered by the CIDG.

On 27 Februai-y, the same o-oeration intercepted a squad sized flTVAcaxzying party. A aharp fixeo :1-,'--. rr m'lt(t' ir+bvre tnf±'hIe enemy killed,an. unkaiawn. number wounded and 14 hand grenades captured.' One C3W was.killed and one received miaadr wounds.

These comb--t actions show tha-t:

(i Inter7diation missions assigned to OIDO Camps can be successftullyaccompl.ishea-.'by lon~g rang~e p~toln in. reaction to sound intelligence,,

(2) The OIDG Sol 'dier,. properly -advised a-ad trained, is more then 6match for North Vietnamese Rogulaxrs.

INCLOSUIM 19 TO SBOPIONI II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned' (OS,CSGPO-28 (ai)) 30 April 1966

VIN T.IUL.LL !S STORY

1. Back Ground: During the month of October 1965, units of the 1stCavalvy (Ainnobile) conducted a clearing o:.oeration in Vinh Thanh valley.Immediately following the operation Camp Vinh Thanh was constructed andoccupied by a .SSF d .u, . , ±, fou. '0I1J companies.The objective being to Eecuxe the valley t2nd its route of transportationso that government administrators could function and the populace coulddevelop the full potential of the vailey in relative safety. In February1966 a team of government administrators -ind two popular force platoonsreturned to the valley and ir conjunction with the commander of CampVinh Thanh beegn the steps necessary to orýýnize the pop .ace and estab-lish firm government control. Simultaneously, CIDG forces began satura-tion patrolling efforts to uncover and restrict Viet Cong movement andto control and protect the population in the valley.

2. Conduct of Operations: At present, Miarch 1966, conditions haveimproved to such an extent that final planning for bringing in remainingVinh Thanh valley refugees from the Binh Khe area and locating a DistrictHeadquarters in Vinh Thanh is in progress. In the near future inhabitantsof the whole valley will become more and more familiar with the legalgovernment and the benefits it offers. A dispensary is nearing completionin the upper valley near Camp Vinh Thanh and another is soon to be startedacross the river from the camp. The dispensaries are AID projects andwill be staffed with the necessary health workers and medicines. CIDGpatrols are beginning to range deeper in efforts at literally saturatingthe valley with government authority and the security it offers. Much

emphasis is being placed on securing the road to highway 19 so that safetravel by commercial bus and future movements of produce can be insured.Civil affairs activities are-still concentrated on short term, rapidresult projects that will, in the near future, also include long termprojects. The key to true pacification and security of this valleylies in correctly organizing and supervising long term economic develop-ment. These efforts must of necessity be agricultural. The agricultural

capacity of the valley is 11 "114t -:1'7 i , J 'A acrbiration of fertileland and readily available water could make this valley one of the most

productive farm areas in this part of the world. Government officialsin this area are planning to organize farmers into - cooperative so thattransportation can be used most effectively and top market prices obtain-ed by selling in quantity. The newest economic opportunity seems to bein the field of vegetable growing. There is sufficient land and waterin the valley to grow almost any type of vegetable. It is anticipatedthe market for vegetables will increase tremendously in the near future.It is planned that seed be obtained and the projected influx of new

families be urged to concentrate on vegetable production as well as theusual rice crops.

3. Conclusions: If the proposed agricultural programs, civil affairsefforts, and government controls are allowed to proceed to fruition, Vinh

Thanh valley will eventually be the perfect school book example of whatoan be done through cooperation of government and people.

INCLOSURfl 20 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS

CSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

A•?A2D AA.'LIi iAPORT O1ji EXODUS II

The mission- of Operation Exodus II was -to secure an airhead and to providea secure base for the constr.ction of a Special Forces CIDG camp, at Xom Cat,at the junction of the S7',"j . " Xom Cat is located on thesouthern edge of .,ar Zone "D" and would provide Free 1.'orld Forces with theirfirst foothold on the VC. secure area. In adc3ition, a main-Viet Cong infiltrationroute from War Zon.e "ID" to Phuoc Thy Pro ince ra.s. throubgh the Xom Cat ai/ea.When fully operational this cam-p would provide a sec- e base from which toconduct operations into . ar Zone 'D", while at the same time extending govern-ment influence into the Uar Zone, On 1-Day, 12 February, the helilift of4 companies from :oicn 2oba Mid 4 additional CIDC` companies from Phuoo Vinh, tothe 3 seperate ladinu zones (see attached overlay) went exactly as scheduled.The 6 initial objoctives, vere seouacbd by 1245 hours. tly D-0eay night, 3 IlikeForce Companies scnd 2 co-i-anies from A-312 had established a tighlt perimeteraround the ciwnp site, 1 dbwi~ il from A-312 was in an outpost on the west sideof the Song Be, and 1 company each from A-312 and A-301 were in position southof the Dong Nai Rivers. One battalion from the 173d Airborne Brigade conducteda river crossing concurrentlyo*with the helibor;Ae assault, and operated on thewestern flank. On the morning. of 13 Februyla',4ea D-4 dozers and 2 dump tuickswere helilifted by C. -34 helicoptersi 'to begin' construction of the camp and runway.A runway which can accomodate C-125 aircraft has now,.1een.completed and campconstruction is nearing completion. With -We monsoon seasoll rapidly approaching,camp construction has had to take top,...pribortyt This has limited the amp' soperational capabilities. Never-the"ies5 Yumerous VC way stations and a VCpolitical headquarters have been'lated and destroyed in the area. The camp isyet to reach its full poledtial-] but thbi greatest -hurdle has been conquered.A government outpost exists on what was once Viet Cong territory, and it is in aposition to •h.ndez VO-a tivibies in War" Zone "D". Another step forward hasbeen takenwin the -.caupaigh' to eliminate the VC War Zones.

INCLOSURE 21 TO SECTION I! ýo Operational Report on Lessons Lotrned (RCS CSGPO-28(RI)) 30 April 1966 -

'.- '

M 0-.3 ýth 4M; Jit SP

231400 Z 1966

SO• .G BE

G- .I .* .,0 I

DOI•uDO1 W ROVU I

WAA. XCK AT H4 VN

Sheets -6344 1 044"116344. 111 6344. IV

INCLOSURE 21 TI0N II to Operational Report on lessons Learned (RCS OSGPO-28(Pa)) 30 Apr 1966

. , ... .... L

AJP';Eý, A./PION REPORT •" OLiI. GOODYEAIi

GENERAL SITUATION

"Goodyear" was conceived 1.9 December 1965 as a result of .the increasing VietCong operations in the area ou LLiie ; ~u vdioi Euober Plantation in Tay Ninl

Pro vince. The hub of the VC. activity w;as concluded to be within the plantationoantonmejit area (XT341457). A platoon size Ruhral Force outpost adjacent tothe plantation was overin and destroyed by the Viet Cong in July 1965.Subsequently, the French proi-rietors were evicted Mad the VC seized control ofthe plantation and tho eight adjoining hanlets. Viet Cong influence increasedrapidly and at the tiine of "Goodyear" the VC were virtually in control of theentire plan lation. Qontrol of this aro.a provided a way station and marshallingarea along a vits route of com nic at-ion foV transit VC forces moving to and

from Cambodia and Wrar Zone "C". Roa,`ds leading into the area were blocked andthe outlyingr hamlets were organized azd made responsible for early warning andlocal security. Frequently intellieence sources reported that large VC unitspassed through the area. Interdiction by air or indirect fire weapons wasprohibited by regulations governing the use of v,-eapons in the plantation areasactively producing rubber. Ground action by the respo. .sible subsectors wasineffective due to the limited number of troops available and the size of theplantation which comprises 192 square kilometers. During the first 2 weeks ofDecember, it was noted by aerial reconnaissance flights that an. increasingnumber of fighting trenches were bein, constructed t: roughout the area. Alsonoted were large signs errected over the entrances to several of the hamletsand the plantation cantonment area, bearing the National Liberation Frontinsignia and -proclaiming the area "Liberated", Detachment B-34 at Tay Ninhformulated a plan combining Tay Ninh Sector and, CIDG forces in an operationwhich would encircle Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation~destroying or capturing allenemy personnel, materials, and installations. The plan was approved by theSector Commander, Major Trung, with a proposed action date of 27 December.The 25th Division Corcmander, Colonel Chien, approved the operational concept,but placed a hold on the implementation date. On 23 January the G-3, 25thDivision sent a message giving the divisional commanders approval to conductOperation Goodyear. A total of 8 'CIT aoriyoai s, 7 Ruýo0-al Force Companies,and 8 reconnaissance platoons took paxt in the operation which was executedon 27 January. Frequent contacts were made with small VC elements as thefriendly elements closed into their oziciroling positions. It appeared thatthe VC elements were withdrawing toward the plantation cantonment area.As friendly forces closed on the main objective from all sides it appearedthat an estimated VC company was trapped in the middle. By 1000 hours allbut 2 of the elements were in their final blocking positions. These elementshas been slowed down and were unable to close into their assianed positionsuntil 1400 hours. Ben Soi CIDG elements made a sweep through the objectivearea with no resistance. The VC contained within the closing encirclement hadevidently discovered the gap between the 2 elements that were late closing,and escaped to the north. In the 61jective area were found 600 local villagersmost of which were women and children. There was a conspicious absence of malepersonnel. Final statistics 'ubstantiate the success of the operation, whichnetted 27 confirmed VC IaA and 11 \bIAi 98 structures with fortificationsdestroyed, 4 Chi Corn rifles captured, 2 la-Lown VC captured, 18 suspects detained,

INCLOSURE 22 TO SECTION II,.to Opeei onal RoporT Lessns Learned (RCS CSGPO-28

(RI)) 30 April 1966 ( (M/ I 2/0/I f/.'/--

and numerous documents and propa6anda material ftptured. thre re 2 Minorfriendly casualties. Tactical air slpport was outstanding duid4 the oprtion.Seven stril.l:ea -. re flown by armed :&.cicoters and 6 strikes " *VS flown bytactical aircraft, which ,: -.uluded A-1!, Sly raiders, and P5 Jnte. The 600personnel foutad' in the caiiton:ient azoa were ]-rocensed by the ':Iien ThienNlational Polioedi id an estin.ated 250 fadlies were resettled in governmentcontrolled areas' Tho pres. ':oo oY' ' 3,-arin VC slo.unans posted,'thrqughout the area were furtther proof of the VC control of the area.Perhapa even more, s i.'ificant thawi -We statistics was the psyoaological effectupon the local population. It was coz,_ion Irlo.! eC=ol a the local populationthat the Caua- I~hoi .P1iantation was VC territory. Operation "Goodyedar" proved•to the people •that the govorwneclt could and. would destroy the Viet Conhg on hisoVm territoxy. "Goodjearz" serves as an example of how a coordinated governmenteffort can bring a, so called#, VC secure area under government control.

INCL~q8UD.22 M SflTION IZ to OperatioZ~a Iport on Lessons . e•A:a -.C .GPO..28 .(l)) 3o.'Aprl 1966

C .L. 'Al

% .. 4..

BTV 801 C.- Mt %3CTh9

During the past three mornths Detahobmnt A-321 Ban-Soi (Cao Xa) haamade great strides in their civic aotion pgm, a ires*ing self-helpprojects with close coordi"-.. i.=.I %rith C7,17 'ffic.isT

Gi'eat emphasis has been placed on health-sttnitation, education andwelfare :.n the oaeration area. Health-sanitation- Bed .stands were con-structed for th.e maternitr unird at Cao Inp new blankets and mosquito netsdistributed, and lime provided for pidnting of the. wards. These items inconjuctior.with the cooperation of the District, 3-5 Officer created.muchiiproved s'gitr conditions in the hosipital "

A fiurhoe :pit at: the maternityT vfa:td at Binh Phongfor human waste wasconstr6te• AiA.ter stornge contlainer, ne, water: well, equipment and broomsadded g're.tiy i improving the sanitary Cdiidtions.

Two health centers were constructed, furnished, stocked and openedduring this reporting period. The center at Phuoc Tan was officially opened29 January and the center at Thai Hoa was recently dedioated. The nurseswhich are working in these centers were trained by Detachment A-321. Thehealth centers are visited periodically by the Detachment Medics, LLDBmedics and a District S-5 representative to evaluate the medical program,usage of medical supplies and to conduct sick oaUII

Eduoatipn: Detachment A-321hbas the primary support for six schoolsin its area; Cao Xa, where tables and chairs were built, chalk boards con-structed and installed, and two additional cLwroon ereoted; 116 Muoi andTam Hap schools were painted and repaired. A class room was added to theXoii Rung school and was furnished with desks and chairs. The old well atthis location was cleaned and renovated by volunteers of the community underUSSF and LLDB guidance. Class rooms were also constructed and equiped atBinh Long and Thanh Dien. All of these schools received school kits, andother education supplies..

Welfare: During the month of February the vast majority of all CA act-ivity was centered upon the Thanh Dien area where a refugee problem existed.This was a direct result of a combined airstrike and ground operation con-ducted'in the area which destroyed approximately 100 homesp killed 15 civ-ilians, and wounded an additional 19. This operation feft approximately1300 people temporarily homeless. Counterpart agencies were immediatelycontacted and with their help and cooperation this emergenoy situation wskept under control and mass hysteria thereby averted. A VIS loudspeakerunit wAs utilized to assemble the people to a designated temporary refugeecentert USAID supplied money for immediate reliefp an the XProvinoe avd DistriotS-5 supplied cooking utensiles. The Minister of Social Welfare authorizedand provided.fmnds for payment to the next of kin of the WIAls and the DintriotChief and his representatives were present .to start immediate processing ofolaims from these people. After the immediate situation was we.V in hand

INCLOSURE 23 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Leasned (RCSCSGPO.28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

L

e bo d itexr' ___-., i-nu-9! ::-A tt-&m th~ov the area to detcnateall u•apladed at" ad p-eaitostiun te to iawess alaine, hey- 1.-sediate dert-• cli•-., &rd to dietribute foodatiffs pwrchased 1W the DistrictOhief. A ran Ccnstruction Team was also sent to the area and assisted thepeople to re-entb14ish oei ? rue'mo..ý;. r;.J for general pacification.

During the first three months of the year tU-htmdred and eighteen (218)families, a total of one thousa-nd and fift,,r-five (iO5) people moved intoGVM hamlets in Detachment A-321 area.

11-ny of'these refugees have provided valuable enemy i.orc.at-onwhich, in turn greatly adds to the over,-all war effort. Civic action projectssuch as these show that wirning the peoples' "Heasrts and mizids" is not justa useful cliche but a meaningful phma-se. "Working with the people, helpingthem to' help themselves is of the u'uost importhnce. In so doing the peopleat the grass roots level wi-ll realize, that the Govermnent of Viet.a. is in-terested in them and their welfare.

,. .

1=68M 25 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (ROS.OSGPO.48 M)) 30 Ail 1966 ,

"' W S0I PO SUCCSS STORY

Staeting with the JUmar Year (Tt) Celebzation in Janua=7 1966, campBen Sol located in Tay Ninh Provinces Republic of Vietnam had a continuingpsychological operations program that resulted in 1 t052 refugees and 57Chiaa Hoi rallies coming Into the camp area during January, Februat, andMmh 1966.

Tet gave the District Chief an opportunity to get out and mix withlarge groups of people In all the suwroundin villages. Captain Bill Holt,the USSF Detachment A-321 Commander at Ben Soiv assisted the District Chiefwith his talks to the villagers and with his presentation of pro-governmentmessages. The Tot season put the people in the proper frame of mind to receivethese messages. The sum total was effective face-to-faoe ooumiunicationu wellreceived by local villagers.

The Tot se.iscn also presented an opportunity for United States andVietamuese Spe6ial Forces personnel from Ben Sol camp to meet with theDistrict Chief, Village Chiefs, and elders. ?ersonal gifts were exchanged,meals partaken together, and a closer comradeship formed.

Captain folt and his detachment, working olosely with Vietnameseoffioials, us6d face-to-faoe oomunmications by employing rallies, smallstatus groups, social functionu, and person-to-person contact to bind amore working relationship between the CIDG camp, and the local popalation.

During Tet, year books pointing out the progress of the previous yearwere handed out along with large numbers of leaflets covering the advantagesof govoxnment progxams and the drawbacks of the Viet Cong proigam.

With US/GVN people relations at a new high, lied Cap patrols wereincreased. Weekly visits by a US Aid doctor helped the progmam immensely,and at present, twenty-two dispensaries and maternity vards are under thesupervision of Ben Soi camp with an ever increasing workload being shiftedto the Vietnamese staffs. Another reralt of this medical program is anincreasingly effective intelligence collection system. Of late, Bon Soioamp has been able to give accurate results of airstrikes and artillerybombardments in their operational area.

"Loildspeaker missions are flown over known Viet Cong areas. In thisrespect, Captain Holt has made excellent use of ralliers by having themmake tape recordings for broadcast over the Viot Cong areas from whore they'riginated.

INCLOSUM 24 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCSCSGPO-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966

Being located in an area with predominately two religious groups,Catholic and Cao Dai, great efflort has been made to insure that bothgroups receive equal attention. The result has been Cao Dai and Catholicsworking closely together.

Still another major pro-,ram of DetaciA-ent A-321 is the ima-ediate aidgiven all people Who suffer loss due to combat operations. Sympatheticmedical attention and fair reimbursement is made on the spot whereverpossible. This program has cut deep into Viet Corr propaganda, since theVietnamese Government has better means of taking care of the victims thandoes the Viet Cong.

Camp Ben Soi is located in an area long under Viet Cong control.An ever increasing number of people are voluntarily coming under the-security of the camp due in large part to intelligently p.lanna(Landexecuted psyohologca•l operations.

flMOUA 24 TO SBOTION II to opemj.ozal H~por' on Lqssonx Leex22d 00OSGPO.02 (Mi)) 30 Apwi1 1966

IV CTZ SUCCESS SRY

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON TUYET IHON FOB, 30 JANUARY 1966

1. 0eneral Sittio+n-: On 27 January 1966, Tuyen Nhon (A-415) plannedan operation which required more troops than were present for duty at thebase camp. In order to run the operation, a certain number of troops hadto be withdrawn fron the FOB, which left the FOB with the bare minimum forsecurity. The operation was planned for 28 and 29 January, but was cancelledat the last minute because of intelligence reports which indirated a possibleVC attack on the base camp or the FOB. The intelligence sergeunt figuredthey would hit the latter. Late in the afternoon on 29 January, CIDG com-pany 403 with 103 CIDG troops plus 2* USASF and 2 VNSF advisors, moved intoposition at the FOB to replace company 404. The" troops were in excellentshape, well armed, and in a state of high mar The morale was increasedgreatly by an aerial resupply that ims received about 1830 hours. The dropcontained 100 blankets for the troopsy and amunition. The company CO gaveout the blankets, then put the troops in position and sent out four ambushsquads of six men each. The ambush patrols were sent in four differentdirections fr6m the FOB. These squads returned to the FOB about 0130 hourson 30 Janiouary, with negative contact.

2. A At 0400 hours the VC attacked from the northwith an estimcted battalion, using 82mm and 60mm mortarsx, 57mm im .:!os

, .50 cal machine guns, rocket launchers and a .number of machine gunsand small :ms The VC force was later identified as the 269th battalion.The base cmp (Tuyen Ihon) was immediately notified of the situation andwas asked to Ye2uest a flare ship and tactical air. At 0414 hours heavyfire ras alao received from the northeast as the VO increased the tempo ofthe attack. The CIDG ti-ocjs were quick to react and placed accurate andintense cn.uiter-fire ca the attacking VC. Essential to this rapid reactionwas the important fact that the troops all slept in their positions. Thetwo USASF coirnented on the excellent fire discipline of the CIDG in the useof their BARs and LIfG's. About 0430 hours a FAC aircraft was over the FOB.At thds time the FOB was receiving 57mrm recoilless rifle rounds from thehortheast a~nd southeast an. at least one 60rm. from across the rive: to therear. About tirzty minutes later, at 0500, the FC-47 "Spooky" flare/gimship arrived and pla:ed heavy fire on the VC. The FOB marked the suspectedVC mortax pocitions with flares for "Spooky" to take under fire. The in-tensity of the enemy fire was suppressed by the extremely effective airsupport, Appr-)ximately 0615 hours, the firing was only sporadic and the VObegan b-e "•akinZ contact. 9he VC failed to penetrate the FOB's defenses, andwere held off for over two hours by the defenders. Just as daylight camethe outer wire and peopmeter were checked. The CIDG counted 46 VC bodiesaround the pe:?metcr and picked up 12 weapons, a large number of mines,grenades and amm•dition. A request for a medevac chopper and a resupplywas put in about' 0645 hours. A lift of six helicopters, twb gunships andfour troop ships, bringing in re., nforcements, medical and am~aition re-supplies arrived at the FOB approximately 0810 hours. The FAC aircraftspotted the VC withdrawal route and directad the armed choppers into the

INCLOSURE 25 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on lessons Learned (RasCSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

am-. At 0930 hours the first lift of reaotion forces landed to the north.east of the FOB in order t- out off the VC. The combined FOB defense andresotion force action aooounted for 78 VC KIA, two VC oaptured, 18 weaponsseized and five sampas destroyed. The CIDG oquaulties were exoeoinglyLight with one NIA, tvo VIA and two dependents (a woman and child) killed.7his established a 78:1 ki11 rti'o in frvor of the CIfG, vhioh is the high-eat ever recorded in the LV 1 6 trwemendous sumcesa in the defense ofthe FOB can be attributed to the excellent fighting spirit of the CIDG,outstanding leadership, the priority air drop of supplies on 291830 Jan-uaVY and the timely arrival of the FO-47 A list of weapons captured fol-lows:

I - US X.1 rifle2 - US oarbinesI - US Thmpson ME4 - Russian 7.62 semi-automatio. riflesI - Rusasi 7.62 LW5 - CHICO 7.62 assault rifles1 - IAssin Nagant Carbine1 -Russian Greziade launoherI CHIQQL LMW

S5 - tRouids 81= totta ammunition'130 -Hand grenades50M.- Rounds assorted sm aris alnmoition

/

INCLOSURE 25 TO SECTION 1 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RasCSGPO-28 (It))) 30 April 1966

WUYE- T IUOT AZ'TER ACTIOE REPORT

1. .General Situation;, Intelliigenoe reports received during the monthofl arch indicatpd a po--sikle Viet Comg build-up in the Kien Tuong and LongAn provincial areas of IV -nd TTI. CT7, .'-ispectively. Agent reports indicatedthe VC were moving irom uuijg iui,. £ •gI provinoes in- III CTZ, intoKien Tuoný. Th.'ovincc in IV OTZ. The VC force, iihich was later identifiedas elements of the Donr Thap 261 &nd Dong Thap 267 battalions, and a supportunit, were reportedly preparing to attack either Tuyen 11-on district head-quarters, Canp T¢yoer Phon itself, ox- the FO3. The attack was believed tohave been a retaliatory action, to rovenge the VC losses suffered during the30 Ja..wxry 1966 attack on thie'Tuyon ilon FOB. by the 269th.VO Battalion.

2.; Concept of Operotion.: On the night of 9.April 1966, the FOB,oceupied by CIDCG Compaxy 402, 2 USASV a:4 1 VTSF advisor, came under attackby.,a Viet Cong foXrce :estimanted between one and two battalions in. strength.At 092300 April, CIDG troops manming; the north wall of the--FOB heard, voicesoutside the perimeter deiCensive wire and placed small arms fire in the area.Their fire was immediately returtned by a VC element attempting to infiltratethe FOB. Simultaneously, heavy VC fire was placed on the southeast cornerof the FOB, and gradually, s' the volume of VO fire in:r'eased, fire wasbeing received from all sides. During this initial assault, the Viet Congemployed 75mm and 57mm recoiless rifles, 82mm and 6Omm mortars, .50 calanti-aircraft machinegun. and 40rm AT grenade launchers against the FOB(see Appendix #1). ,

".. At 2301 hours, an. inmediate airstrike and flare ship was re-.quested by,: the FOB defenders. Additional medical supplies were also.

.requested at that time. By 2320: hourstVC small axms fire had decreasedbut w4s compensated by a- heavy mortar barrage. At 2331 hours, an AO.-4"'1Puff Ship" and Beaver 74 (PAC). arrived over the FOB. providing, flare. Andfire siupport. An immediate response was received for tactioal: air). and ..aflight of F-loe's were enroute to the FOB within minutes P.fter requested.By 100011 April, the intensity of the VC assault had again increased...UWASF communications wi-th tlie b(Tzec c.Iip arxd the overhead PAC aircraftwas completely lost at that time, but was re-established with the basecamp at 0035 hours through ViWSF channels.

-b. At approximately 0030 hours, a 15 ,man. VO suicide team sucoess-fully penetrated the FOB at the northweet corner (see Appendix #1). The,VC team, equipped with a flamotiarower., was successful in destroying theUSASF communioations bunker and several other buildings, also killing th6VITSF advisor, VIT radio operator and the assistant CIDG company commander.The suicide t.eam wms ejected from the FOB, leaving. 4 of their dead behindbut taking 3 CIDG prisoners with them.

IfLOL.SURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RS8OSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966 . .

a. At 100035 Apr~., a flight of F-100's arrived over the FOBand coriaucted bombirng and, -ffiý 1-unen on the VC positions. A secondflight of F-100's vws on s#4qion at 0130 hours, and a second strike wasconducted. Tho airstrikeeswere v.ery successful and caused a temporttrylull in -the VC attack, but woNJuld have been more devastating had the USASFoommunications equipment been operativei' By 0210 hours, the F0B was onceagain under heavy attack f.rom t-ree si~ei.

a. The defensive wire at the north •vall and southeast corner.were completely breached by baSaloros, but the VC were unsuccessful inpenetrtiin.j the 2OD. Ths tempo of the attaok bogoan to deoreaso at 0300hours, e=..1 by 0:30 hours, this VC ha cot.- enced In orderly withdrawal fromthe battle ,area, to pre-prepcxed positions northwest o-! the FOB.

o*e At 100410 April, m.nmunition, communications eqUipment and twoadditional USASP warw airlarnod at the 'FOB by helicopter. A Cobra heavy,fire team (UHl-B) asounmed the tcacticol air support mission, and the AC-47

.and FAC departed the area. Contact .,dth the vrithdrav7ik- VO was temporarilySlost at 6730 hours rhen the armed helicopters returned to Moc Hoa for

-fuel and ammunition. Contact was regained upon their return to the areanorth of the FOB (see Appendix #1). The reaction force from Camp TuyenNhon arrived at the FOB at 0745 hours, but failed to establish contactwith .the routed VC'

£. At 1125 hours, a 100 man CIZG reaction force from Moo Hoawas airlifted into LZ 31 (objective #11), accompanied by the Viki- a=edhelicopter platoon (in-B' s), and at 2145 hours, an additional 100 manreaction force from Tan Can was airlifted into LZ 21 (objective #21) alsoaccompanied by a platoon of armed helicopters- (see App,-ndlx #2)0 Thereaction force landing at LZ 21 was immediately engaged by the VC, with oneplatoon being pinned down by the superior VC fire. The three armed platoonsof MUI-B helicopters (C0bras, Vikings and Bandits) supporting the reactionforce imediately engaged the VC, placing intense and devastating fire on*the VC positions, alloVing the pinned dowm CIDG troops to withdraw from thearea. ..

g. The armed helicopters remained in contact writh theYVC until1615 hours. In addition to the armed choppers, four airstrikes were con-*ducted on the V0 positions. Extraction of friendly troops commenced atS1605 hours, and was completed at 1645 hours, Sporadic fire was reoeivedfrom the VC positions until 1800 hours, at which time the armed chopperslost cont~act and retur•ned to Moo o.oa. Throughout the days action; 188 VChad been' re*ported killed.

h. On 11 April a second reaction fores was mounted, supported byslick ships, one platoon-of armed choppers and two armed Mohawks& The Foroe

I1CLOSURE 26 TO SECTION IIto Operatiohdl Report on Lessons Learned (ROSCSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 April 1966

p pwas airlifted into the same aea as the previous day (see Appendix #3)at 1200 hourr. A sevrep of the - r. ,, cornducted tuntil 1635 hours, butno contact was made vith VC, Friendly dead and several lost weapons fromthe previous day woere recovered. The opcration was officially terminatedat 1700 hours. 'Ohe sequnonq0 of evonts and final battle statistics areattachod as Appendix -4- and A ,--ndix :'omnectively.

5. Concl-,iozrm:

a. Local cecurity arotvd the M1B and eawly vrrnz-ing systemsappýcýz' to Ii:voe beea iQ on iac nicht o2 thc c.ttack, allowing theVC to prepare foxholes with-in 300 meters of the POB.

b. The attack ,ms trij;:cored pre-.iaturoly by the 0IDG troops onthe north vmll, and the VC force vzas not fully deployed during the initialassault.

c. The attacking VC force oxwcuted an exceptionally well plannedassault. They were heavily supported vrith automatic, direct and indirectfire weapons. Their failure to succeed can be attributed to a preowatureattack; the valiant and professional manner in which the FOB defendersfought; and the exceptidoially outstanding air support,

d. Air support during the battle was outstanding. TAO air missionswere close, accurate and very effective. AC.-47 support at the FOB provedhighly effective and necessary for a sustained suocessful defense, Armedhelicopter support was exceptionally outstanding. The Cobra armed platoonflew a total of 15 hours without rest, from 100340 to 101830 April, ren-dering devastating firepower on the'VC. During the action air supportincluded:

2 M~hwoo3v0 ah-ts of-rlOO's (TAO air)'2 AC-47 "Puff 'hips" (Plare/fire support)'2 Armed MohawksI PAC (Beaver 74)

5 Appendicies:

INOLOSUPLB 26 TO SMOTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (ROBCSGPOý-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966,

,7'7., ;7 , ... "M. 17-7 -7 7- -. ,7 .7 U .' .

, • ...•:........ • ' • >•X;:!• o•!•.•.•.•V•;•!•..• 7....•A• .u.-P. ,,7.7. '-7.7o.-.,17T:7-,-,.,: .1. , • '',,•..''.. •

AU

RFATIO VCAG%21&~/ RvFORCE

\% \.\~.WITIMPJWAL VC. WOKE CONTACT

AUTOMATIC Ws8~m MRTA(.50 Cal AA)

AT THIS LOCATION 9' =0 i IIMS RIFLE

i-;.. -. RUCTION

MAP, VISTNM, PIIONG PHI3, 1:50 000BERM:8 L703.BEMT 624.3 111Z4

APPnDIX I TO IflOLOSME 26 TO SECTIOfl XI to 0per'a1±oriA1 Report'= i Lea 8013*

Lea~rned (RCS CSGPO-28 (Rl)) 30 AprilJ 1966

I CIDG

MAP,. VIE•.MI, PIHONG PHTo, 1:5o,00oS~RX; 1701smEm: 6243. 'riti

APPMMDIX 2 TO INCLS0PB 26 TO S3DOTIU II to Operational Report-on Lessons Learned (ROB CSGPO-28 (Ri)) 30 April 1966

V

*J 0

IL-4

1R71

H

09*

0c

C+- -

100410 Apr 66 Ammunition, communications equipment and 2 USASP airlaaded at 2?0B by Cobra (10.-1B) platoon.

100500 Apr 66 FO' reported 7 CIDG KIA, 5 WI4, 7 MIA, 1 ViTSI KIA.

100503 Apr 66 Ad.:iitiora1 rleqeohi' !recuested by FOB.

'100507 Apr 66 0-4 (can Te o) reportAd choppers not available forre,-'ction force.

100520 Atr 65 FP03 reportod • .......:iion 11 CIDG wo.undod.

100525 Apr 66 3-41 (Moc Hoa) dircoted to request choppers from7th Divicion -for reaction force*

100645 Apr 66 FOB reported Captain Shelton (CO, Dot A-415) steppedon mine vthile cbhckin., perimeter of FOB, CaptainShelton was picked up by aun ship at POB and is enrouteto 3rd Field Hospital.

100735 Apr 66 Gun chip at FOB location reported 2 VO KIA. Fired onVC located 1200 meters west of POB0

100745 Apr 66 Reaction force 15 Bravo (Oamp Tu~en Mh=n) arr at

POB.

100810 Apr 66 Captain Shelton confirmed as KA4

100900 Apr 66 100 man lift authorized by 7th Diyvilsn.

101100 Apr 66 100 man lift arrived at B (Moo Hoa).

101145 Apr 66 Additipnal armed helioopter platoon arrived at 1641(Moo Hoa)*

101205 Apr 66 -let lift airlan4ded at LZ114

101242 Apr 66 2nd lift ail1anded at LZ21.

1013Q7 Apr 66 Reaotion force in contact -with estimated VO Battalion.

101345 Apr 66 Reaction force withdrawing'

101445 Apr 66 Requ'est for additioxa1 troop support &issapprovedi

101605 Apr 66 Reaction force air lifted out of operation area.

AIP31M4DI 4 TO I11CLOSMT1 26 TO SECTZOIG 31 to Operatio•al Report on LessonsLearn~ed (ROB CSGPO..28 (IU.)) 30 April. 1966

U

092300 Apr 66 Tuyeu *on FOB (15 A•lpha) under attaok by estimatedVC Batt44lcn. 7C x.,,-loyinn, mortare and small armsi

092301 Apr "-X4 I dtC•mzuclht* ..... .. .......

092320 Apr 66 Siaall --= £fr do'-ozaed. ?.Mort=- barrage Ooitrt:-so

092331 Aor 66 10-47 "Spook," De•e-.r:vor 74 (FAC) au-rivod over F0I3.

100011 Apr 66 Cot=w-iAction, lost \-ItL FOB.

100023 A;'.2 66 SeorVr.l 'ýCirc, iuside P•? reported by Behaver 74 (FAC).

100035 A'rr 66 Fpi.hters (r-lOO's) on station at POD.

100038 Apr 66 Coomunicatioiw reestablished with FOB through VNSP.

100100 Apr 66 Request for additional fighters and flareshipo ...FOBagain under heavy.- ttack.

100102 Apr 66 Additional :E!tghters (F-100s) and fla•a Itp ezwub.eto FOB..

100105 Apr 66 Status of USASF at POB unknown&

100130 Apr 66 . nd flight of tighrs. (?-100's ,on target.

100155 Apr 66 Amunition and coApunications equipment prepared for.airdi-dp

10020 'p 66 USA8j'pers66ih~1 'at POB ok~y. POB now being, attAokdd& fromthroe (3) sides.

100220 Apr 66 Beaver (4PA(CA)') otabzieaidcontact with reaotio" .toe(15 Bravo) f Cap Nqen Nhon (A0-415)..

.*100225 Apr. 66. C V-2, enrouta~.from,. 0-4 (qan Tho) to B-41 (~Ioo liQ-0 prith'amif~id~tion 'a~ld cc ,uriidationO eiqiipment ~rc

100228 Apr 66 Beaver 'T4'(Yid) 'reported VC tr'ithdrawing notNriFB.

100237 A4r' 66 Beatver 74 (AO ridported VCO niirý increasing' frft, th6.Q5.ot'Of.OB ., *

100340 A:tr 66 CV-2 and Cobras (HUI-B) arrived at B-41 (Moo Hoa).

irPa-Ix 4 ( -OS S-2 ( Id 0 •0C26 SCI01966 II to : e"a'""'lLearned (RCSS CSGPO-28 (El)) 30 April -'1-966 .

111145 Apr 6i• 3.00 tma 3ft e•*v at -:•41- (o•t)oa.Y -

3.11215 Apr 66 -!eaoUton. ox.ce air landed vicinity of obootiveie#n1 •.1•.

111300 Apr .-r, rep•4t#vq oontaot reported by reaction forces

111430 Api, G 66 Rend1Qi force re.porteA Dnazy VC bodies found inobj•.bive z..rea (anpromimately 55).

111540 Apr G -rian2ly. IiA from I0 A4pril recovmred.

111635, Apr 66 Reactioh force air lifted out of objective areal

111700 Apr 66 Operation officially terminated,

iA

APPENDIX 4 "TO ITCL0S1U 26 TO S,.TXOK. 3I to Operational .Report onUeisbona Ieiimd (ROS "OSGPO.28 (0)) 30 April 1966

Fl- :8&1'TIE S ITA S~SQ AAK-AGAINST CAM. Z=X~ 4IO)! FOB

VIET C02Tq LOSSM PRIMF•LY LOS8ES

a. Porso'imel: a* Personnel:

93 A 1JA body t) 1 USA8F XA140 KL. Colra coumtnt 2 USASF VIA28 K Vki alnd Bandit comit) i US WIrA (door ýunrer)100 K3A eotiuw.ted) 3 vr K "lo0 WI!A eat.m..-.ted.) 25-,CIDG KIA

15 OCIJ WIAC3IDG TIA

9 OIDG Dependents KIA

b. Piquipmeznt: b. Equipment:

3 AK-47 Assault Rifles 1 .45 cal pistol3 K-50 Soviet Llachineguns 7 Carbines1 X CICI aF!metbrower 2 BARs1 CITICOM 40= AT GreMde Launcher 2 MII1 Radios

Type 56 1 Medical Kit6 10 Kilo Mines6 15 Kilo Polo Charges

40 Hand Grenades,2 Kilo Documents15 Kilo Medical Supplies (These supplies included ai•.a1 i±ntrwontas,

stothonoope, intravenous kit, penicillin, morphine, and otherpain killing drugs. The equipment was clean and apparentl.y beal edto a physician).

APPENDIX 5 TO -=dLbO 26 TRO1 BBOTII to RepAprol r19 ... "soiiLearned (RC6S CSGPO-228 (mi)) 30 April 1966

1e Generdl Situ- tion: During Janmury and Pebruazy 1966, th•re has beenan increased offort at Tiah *Bien (A-423), GChau Doc Provinoe, to contact VietCong and local ýuerrilla units within the area of influence and area ofinterest of USASP arn! ILIDB inte.lliGance nets.

aT Or, 282200 Febray -one platoon of Viet Co.g moved to vicinity(1) (see overlay). The VC platoon leader' had received instructions hecould meet. '"3ASV ig.,d LLDB intellii.±ence p,:rso:.aol at (2) -o discuss thereturn 0•'15± platoon.to CI-.. controlt Duo to 6thor VO units being in.thesame area, the bontact procedures were altered and the actual contact wasmade by t,,,o agents: from Tirn Bien.

----b;' On 282220 Pebrumry the two a:ents returned to camp Tinh -. en(3) 'with "tha VC platoon2.ea.ý.r, where a meeting "wca held.. The meetingbegan with the status of both id-es being ascertained. The plAtoon leaderidentiaed hbiTself as "1GUYE.T PIOLG CAkh11" aid a member of 0-85 supportcompa'=. IHi..unit was located on: ifu Gai mouniin violnity(4>.- His platoonstrength'viS 17 people. An agreementv vs made to surrendert all weaponS,muition. and doumente with the conditIon that USASP. and I. DB providedeoii4kty•for the ftmilies and members of the. pilaoon upoii-Atriva -in TinhBien. This "point .was agreed upon and a plan was made ...fortie d' platoon 'to come Ade".CYN control at 01=100 ,March. The meeting -rolke Up at 010100March.

'Z :*Concept of the Operation: The plan was thit the p~atoon deadr'would return to his platoon and brief his people on the results of themeeti with ýthe 'UASP ad IZLDB and disouss the 'terms' that w'ere hrramged atthe meeting. .

a.. On 011845 March three platoons of CIDG from Camp Tinh Biende~ated. -by vehicle t`o oP21 (5). One security squad, was.left there, t6(a) a•~sh any •i~it ente• •from Cambodia into Vietnam; (b)act asareserve" if needed". ,Two platoons dismounted at (6) .". thre `squllld wereplaced in position a6 OP 23, (7) with the mission.of ambiashin any VO Unit

enroute from Ca bodia to Vietnam, Under the cover ofdaykness -two platoonsmoved from their 'distount point to a predesignated areal. "(), where flankand rear security were estiablidhed.

b.. By 012030 the VC platoon had. moved .fro ( "o-(10)! 0On•tmen for the VC platoon initiated the prearranged .sigal of. three6flashes'from a match or cigaraette lighter. This signal vas answered in turn withtwo flashes of' ialighter, This exchange of signals was executed six timesbetween 2030 hours and 2100 houre. During this time the remainder of theplatoon mov'd fr'm (10) to (II), where physical contact was made with theLLDB. The 'V0 immediately surrendered all weaponst equipment and doouments

I1TOLOSUE 27 ,TO ECTION II to Operational Report on LessonrT Learned. (ROBdS~-'2r(Il)30 kpta11946. F

to the LLDB intelligence aqgeant. The 17 returnees were placed on a 4.

ton truch a(nd tr&;1=ortod •q t . pretrranged pick-up point where the twoplatoons of CIDG were locawtd. The time then was 012230.

e. Small arms and 4.2 inch mortar fire was arranged to coverthe 'withdrawal of the CIJ.,. VC x- -, i ,as called in on thesouthwest portion of .Tui T4 Doc from (12) to (13). The fire support wasa cover to m"::o it look as4 if t-he VC platoon had been in a firefight andhad not surr'endered. It was felt, by porsox•=el who planaae.d and executedthe .••ssion, the firing would reduce *the probability of reprishls againstthe failies of the returnjee who were still in VO aredas

A. 71y 012400 Morch the CIDG forces and returnees had closedinto 0amp Tinh Bien, Tho returnees wer'e given food, blankets, 'sleepingmats.. mosquito nchs and a place to sleep.

of, hie next morning,. 2 Plach, Sector and District representativesarrived td inspeot the weapons end equipment and' interview" the pldtoonleader and other memb6irs. of the platoon. A review of the documentsprovided the USASP and LLDB with oubstantial in1formation on VO locations.An airstrike was called in on Nui Ta Beca, resulting in 4 VO liA. 8 WIAt14 structures, destroyed and one kniown secondary explosion.

f. On 3 Maroh intelligence agents contacted another member 61this platoon in the vicinity of (14) and he was returned to the camp,

3. Repult of Operation: As a result of this operation, the per-aormel and 'equipment returned to GVN control were:

18 Returnees (15 men, 3 women) 1 M-26 hand. grenade1 US model MA1 SMG 1 home made grenade in dylinderw1 French .AS1916 rifle ical container$, lb chs.ge:5 Russian carbines, 1960 1500 rounds of assorted smal .7 German model 98 , arms azmmunitiori1 US.rile, Cal 030, 1907 V S mC. namgazinoe-3 US Remington Rifles, Cal .30,1917 A~sorted load-bearing equiptent.'2 US Winchester Rifles, Cal .30, 1917 2 Viet Cong flags4 Eddystone rifles, Cal .30, 1917 "1 CoOnurdist Chinese FlagIQ: AP mines, • lb charge Miscellaneous documents including:1 Bopby trap, 100 gram-charge Letters 4ddressed to Sector Viet

C.ng CoommnderTax collection booksfDocuments of intelligence valueto higher headquarters

1 Apendix

INCLOSME 27 TO SEBZ01N 11 to Operational Report on.Lessons Learned :(ROSOSGPO-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966

M . ...... . -...1,ý

.~ ~ ~ * 1Cl.01 _ (

6a1, Temporary location of VO platoodl2,. Location of planned initial meeting3.; .Actual meeting place4. Pe~manent location of VC platoon5. OP #216. Diamount point

MAP, VIBT~ZM, 1150,000 7. OP #23SERIBS: L701 8. Plan~k and r'ear' security positiofl8OPPM-5: 5942 It 5942 11 9. Teinpoz'ary location of VO platoon

6042 111, 6042 IV 10. Temporary location of VC platoon Whileenroute to rendezvous pointR1 Iendezvous point with LLDB

12-13, Area mortared during withdrav~al,14. Second meeting With additional member of

VC platoon

SUBJECT: BUILD..UP VICINITY OF CAKP CAI CU1

1. %evelopments- since'I '1arch to i•he present in the vicinity of Ca±Cai Special Foroes Camr, fi.n T'h•. . PrcK"e *' , have indicated a milti-bat-talion build-up in the 1anediato anc cor.,Wiguous areas. Because of thepzciximity-of -this ocanp to' th4. Oaindodiazn border, enemy activities 'o.' include .Cambodian Army activities, onnnot bk' ovor]on.,' or m.n.i• •.ot. At presentpreports indicate a VC force of at least four battalions are located withinstriking distance of the cozap. Mha.so ba*ttalions are the 502nd and 504thwhich are confirmed in this areaý '• the 197th and 397th which are heldas unconfirmed, horever probable.

2,. It is nov con;2,irmed that tho VC in this area either have or haveat their disposal, 105mm howitzers v:'id/or British 25 pounders. This wasconfirmed whon the examination of fragmernts from' shells fired into the campon 3 April 1966 revealed they were of the 87.6mm, 25 pounder variety. Dud105mm rounds have been found within 100 meters of the camp proper. TheCambodian Army has eight British 25 pounders in their arsenal and the pos-sibility exists that they are firing these weapons in support of VC oper-.ations or allowing the VC access to the weapons. Agent reports have con-tinuously indicated the presence of'1051 a in the area. There have alsobeen sightings of vehicular traffic, including five ton trucksp along theborder in both Cambodia and South Vietnam.

3. Enemy activity during the past several months has increased sharply.Since 1 March, the camp itself has been fired upon by mortar, recoiless wea.pona, artillery, mnd small arms, on 11 ,e-ai6ns|, two of the camp's out-posts have sustained probes; and patrols from the camp have made contactwith the VC forces 19 times within a five kilometer radius of the camp.These developments have begun to follow the classic pattern of events priorto a VO attack on a camp, i.e. enemy troop concentrations reported, probeson outposts, and harassing mortar fire on the camp itself.

4. It is of intexw'b- tiu i t wu wvu wea will out intoIV Corps .uring the latter paxt of April. These .rains will of course bringlow clouýd cover and limited visibility, impairing air operations to' ag ;_textent. By the middle of June, the terrain will, for the most part, be.inundated and will hardly support a ground attack. Therefore, the optimumlime for an attack appears to be either the latter part of April or in Ma*.Other intelligence reports support the probability of a monsoon offensivein IV Corps and have indicated the possible infiltration of NVA personnelin support of this.

5. Based upon the aforementioned informationp the VC have the follow-

ing capabilities:

a. To launch an assault on Cai Cai in multi-battalion strength

INCLOSURE 28 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCSCSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

n~ 0g.;. ~ . ...~'rt - -~~77- ' .

0supported by mo%4x= and artillery fire tit a timno ot +hei~r choosing withintho next 31) djays

b, To continue p~cobes arax ha ismentst aind usine ar~tillery toinflict kus t&n o- asualties, ospo~i~ on thý. caimp vrithout 'omimitirU4g2?owi~d foroozi.

.~To. .46iit$.nue reovpnizati on a~nd training. ±~r f orces, and avoi&.irig4eoiad.ve contiaot,6

INO~1~tli~28 'O ~0TIN I toOpea-Uonal Repoit mi, Leasons ea' ed(

CSGPO..'28` ý3) 0, April 1966 .

L ...... ., 77 7

*0 9

T&C1OM.M.T B-515TH SPECIAL FClE .8 0UP, ,(AIRBOIRnm),; !ST SPECIAL Y-RCES

4PQ tS. Forces 96240

AVSF-4 3... 30 April 1966

SUBJECT: Opera~tional Repopo on Lessons Leanied

TO: Commanding Officer5th SF (Abn),-.1st SFATTN: AVSF-CAPO US Forcels,6240"

In compliance with D2.F. your Headquarters 4•.ted.14 and 16 April 1966,subject as above the attached report is hereby submitted.

s/.Enest K. Gauene, Jr.4 Appendixes it/ERNEST K. GRIENE, JR.

1. POI Basic Training Major, InfantryCourse Commanding

2. POl OIJ Leaders Course3. PO1 ClP COourse4. Student Attendance

nWLOSIJIU q 2 TO .EC~E(t it to Operdtibna. ROport. Cal:.. "WZIA34 1 ("sCSGPO-28 (Pa)) 30 April 1966

o 0PROGBAf OF 1'TSTRUCTIONBAQI- T-A.MTG, COURSE

S... 06. Weeks = "360 .9ousW

TR M ' HOURTRPf'IIT,, h DAY NIGni

1. M•TSICAL TRALI'G (18 H ours)'

- Obstaclo Course04- Movement u=der fire 04- Bayonet 04

Hand to Hand CombatTotal 18

2. GIMMAL SUBJECT (57 Hours)- Political Warfare 08 04

• Lp e and,., .e.emon . 13 . .

- map, CompassIntelligence 02 02

- C•ommnioation 06 02Medical 00 04

- Maintenanoe 06""o."ao 45 12

3. WFAPM (74 Hours) ..

-Mi Rifle 02.Carbine 0.

BR(L PE) 14 606

L.•M.G. 12 .04- Grenade 04- Mi Reaction fire 04- Night firing 04 04

Fire technique 10Total =0 14

4. TACTICS (115 Hours)

- Individual Combat 04- Hand and arm signal, Fomations 13 04- Group Combat 08 04- Helicopter Operation 04 04- Squad in Night Combat 00 08- Imediate action drill 06 06- Ambush 06 06

APPIDIX 1 TO UITCLOSURE 29 TO SflCTIOfl II to Operational Report on LeasaLeaae& (RCS -CSGPO,.`28..(ma))-. 30A•o. l i1966!;

twk.... I.

o 0

* PR0G . OF INSTRUOTI0N

*, 05 Weeks

SU .... •T- T AINI'G HOURDAY "TONI

I GEI'•RAL 8U CT. 50 ..03 53

II TACTICS ' 96 48 144'

II WEAPONS " 46 "'

IV 0 waT•ib 10 00 10

v DEMOLITION ., P 3

VI MEDICA

VII IN~TELLIGENCE 07 09. 07

VIII POLITICAL WA... 18 00 1B

IX GU.I ....WAP',.. 06 03. .9

X MISCELAInOUP

- : mi. a 04 001-. 04.-

- .pening aý Gradu'ion Cerebby, DL go 04TOTAL 255 66* 321

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 29 TO SECTION 3:1 to Operational. Report2 oni LessonsLearned (ROB CBGPQOm28 ())30 April 1966

TRiLNLNG SUBJECT HOUR

- Patrol . 09 30- Village searching . 04 00

-- Sq .a~~tak-.*-**.--* -- . .... 04.-. --- Squad attalck withl. 1ve ammo 10 00- Squad def.Mse (live .ammo). 02 06

Total 70 45

5. AJýMVfJBIOUS OPERATIOIT (14 Hours)

- Introduction to Amphibious Operation 02 00- DZ Selection and Reporting 02 00- DZ Mvrking 02 00- Reception from a drop 02 00- LZ - DZ (day and night PE) 0o

S,. ... Total--i US- 0

6. LLDB TRAINING

- Introduction to UnWonvtn al Warfareand Guerrilla Warfare 02 00

- LLDB duties# Capzbilities and Limitatiows 01 00- VNSF Organi•ation. 02 00- Periods of 'Guerrilla development 02 00

Initial Contact . 02 O9- Infiltratior Phase 02 00- Organizatioz Phase 00 •02.

Training Build-up phase 00 02Operation guiding period 02 00Survival 03 60Escape and Evasioi 0 w00.

To tal..

7. SCELLANEOUS,

- Zzamination 07 00- Commander Time 12 00. Fx 2_43 12

Total 43 12

TOTAL 270 360 90

.. . ..' *

SUBJ . O. ",'" . , .4:•. . .. ,

A - Use of U.S. compass 02 00 02- Movement by Compass 04 03 07- Movement by Map 02 00 - 02- Met'ods of Oentation" 02 00 .02.- CooraLnate Relrding 06 00 06- Roa.4 Maroh Orientation 04 00 04- Loo t on and Orientatipn 12 00 12

B LEAD•ZIP,:

- - •e •'--.- ... 01 00 0i- Coniuot of leadersbip 01 00 01

Teohniques of the Commander 02-- 00 02:T raining Methods 04 00 04*,

a A.W, HAMD CO•MAT

- weess of Defense 01 00, 0,- Pal3,. Positions 01 .00 :01- ••m.. (I- • 00 05- Hand to hand Combat w'itf knofe-.' 02 00 02- POWls Searchi~ng and Handling Q

TOTAL 50 0. 53

11 TACTICS.....

A OMMA D AI Un en .

ýhCm~faue and Conoealmen't 03 02 05-bnd and Arm Sigr1s 01 00 03.- Movgment Obsezvation and, Reporting .0 , 02 05

Sooiaitng Agenta and Mlessengers i ', 03 02 ' 0-G a• . . 02 0..2 .04:""

B C0&•]ItFTIf SQUAD- Squad Organization 01 00 01. ,- Squad Formation 02 00 02- Squ&A.Ambush . :*. .04 .03 .

0 PIATOOI" *:" " " '" .,.."." ""'- lat'oa n•,za:±±.on ... ".: •, 01: "0'""OI,,.

- Plaibon Poma,'ons 02 00 02- Platoon Patrol 08 O0 .11- Pla'6on in Defense 04 0' 07-Platoon in Attaok 04 03 . 07,

Platoon Ambush. ,... 04, . 030Plat~on Raid 04. 5 7

064 04 -

- Im•ddate Aotion Drill 03 00 03"43 22 6,

Total 96 0. 144

(DT~'M unaIING HOU

III WEAP'Q1,1- Grenades 02 00 0z.- MIl. Rinle 05. 03 08- Carbinae .05 03 ý;08- SMGI.Thompson and 113A1'. 04 00 04

BA'06.: 00 .. 06<K 06 00 .06-

-Mortars 15 00 1Tr~apsitior (R~eaction) 1!iring lap . .,jQL

IV COMfVIUJ.CIATIONS .Toa46055

-Introduction to Commo 01 00 01-Com~nioation Security 01 00w 0~1-Radips, MT-i and TH 20'. 02 00 .*2-Radio, AN/PR0-ýLO 02 00 Q02.-C 0mmunications:Systems 04. 00f

Total-,. 1.0.: 0

-Mine s and Booby Traps 0300 0

-VCMine 02 00 02-Claymore Mine 02 03 05

-Arming and Disaxming Mines Qapiq.,rmw.pq.

VI MEDICS

wIntroduction to First Aid 02 00 -0.-he~rgerioy Treatment in the Field 01 00 01

VD1000Total, 04. 00' 94.

VII INTELLIUNCE

- Thtýoauction to Intelligence 02 00 02,-Observation and Reporting Information 02 00 02-Information Collection and Development 02 .00 . 0?HaIndling of POW'5 and Information 01 00 -. 11 ,

Total 07. 00 07.VIII POLITICALI WARFARE18

IxGUBILA WARFAR~E *

- Introduction to Guezrrilla Warfa~re 02 00 02-- Counter Guerrilla Warfare 04 0.1 07

Total 06' 03 -09.

GIITMa4II TeR13AlING SCHEDULE. ... .. . . O 1 T •ECOIT ' UO..SE

5 :.Si=(23ý- lis I Day + 58 hra for Nqingt -341 bra)

TAr-iLJT SUDJECT$ fG! OA

GETERA -UL SUBJECTS

11-M•, Compass 40 4 4412 - Communication 21 2113- Kedical 12 1214 Tntelligenoe 18 1815 Politiocal Wofae 24 2416 -Landing Zone and Drop Zone 8 817 FAC 118 - Survival 4 419 - Briefing and Debriefing 2 .

Total 3=0 434II TACTICS

- Patrol 35 U2 47- wdver arossing 8 8- 3TX -&

- Total U23+

III WEAPMS

- Mortar Ajustment 18 6 24- -Indvvidua Weapon

MISCELANEOUS

- Review 04 bra- Eliamination 04 brs- Commandere time 06 brh

Opeoing and Graduation Ceremonies 02 breTotal %6 h~s

CLASSIFIED

- Confidential 24 bra- Seoret 46 bra- Unclassified 271 bra

APPFENIX 3 TO INCLOSURE 29 TO SECTION II +o Operatiawl Report mt LessonoLea~ed (RCS CSGPO6-8 ())30 .Apz'il .%66

- -:

LLDY: 1kIGHTL T~OTIAL

X MIS OCIMWlE0US -

- 26~fl~f .04 00 04--riOpening -an~d -Grdua'tion Oexemony CA. 00 04:

Total 08 00 08

GEN~IM"- TOTAL 255 -66, 322.

T-AIN04;SXULE ,,.' DETAIL

TR&.Th SUBJECTS `D AY 'N.G. I{td"DAY 'XGUT TOA

I GOEERAL SUBJECt'S

11 - ,h-p and Compassi11 -Ue of US Coopass 04 . I 04112 -Ngovement with Compass .by day

Oi ih o4' -04 08113 - tXatroduotion to Map. 02 02114 6 •oolrdinate Reading 08" 08115. gap Orientation 02 .02116- Arginal Information 04 4.- .117 ]Position Location, Road Lk±oh

0identation 04. 04118 - Looation Orientation 04 " 04119 - looatimo by Resection aznd . .

-Inter!section19120 - -Positim Determinationx by4""

Contour Lines O.Total1 Q

12 - ommwunoation

"- RlCooo adio 12 1,9- 1T- Radi.o '04 .4

ss• .................. :.. '........• ... •, ":, :- A teld amiena for AS/ho-o 03a&HIT-1 03 0

M lessage wr~iting and Comun~ic'.a~tion Seouizzyi0r

121

- Use of Individ~ual Dressing 04 0-tretmnt forShook 02 0- Stop the. Bleeding 02 02- Frao1•uzes 02- Xmergeoy Treabnt en, .

,Peration " ,;T,, •.12;

- ~~oa .00.•.,' : .

APPAMIX T TO nOLOSPE 2 TO SECTION II to Opexational Report on Lessons

LearnedU. ...30 •i1966 .... . . . ,.... ,.•, . :, ,€ . , , :

-Introduction to k2teliiW~ono6 02m-Oboer m ;4.cn Lui4 j~r0b~iug 02 0

thes Bt4 :1. 02 02-~ ~ ~ I Z.OXe89 '.rU.UUMUUAw18 tU . 02'

-T~otal. 18001

15 Polittical 1W.xfrtve -

- ;ý1istcurv of' Viet Nam 02 .0"-'iastory of~ Viet I-Tam To'd'ay 02 .. 0.2

-~~of Fpc ýd in Wa~r time 02 02RI OA 'Policy . ~ .1 , ., 01

-pr~opaganda. with People.' 01 .*.01

- OrAdva~ntage and Disadvantage,,'(Pxpaganda.) 01 1.01

- Advantage and Disadvantage of.:1enWr (Propaganda) 01 ".01

- lu~troduation, to Gue=U.l aWarfare QI,..10

- )Rpoponsibility of the QIDG 01 ,,03

- Action and Tactics of -the Bhemy Q2 r;.:' .

EBiemy~ Propaganda and Cabhii~6tis' ;:,02 02

;- Counterespionage and''Preserva-tion 02 02'

- Wby do we ocounter Comm~isits 02 .0

- 1.eason to Win Communist overA-to the Government

Total 24 00 :24

16 Lianding Zone and Drop Zone ., . .. , . .

.. Z SeJlect16n and Report.=g -. 06 06- 3Z ýe100ý iw.~ 02. -

Total 10 00 1

17 E'Ad 01.

18 Survival

- Looat.ing Water 011. ' 01U:IiOatina% Jood on Ground- 02 02

- ooating'Pood Underwat eirTotal 04,., 0 0

AYPPEDIX 3 TO fINCLOSURE 29TO SECTION II to Opezmtiohal Report'o= e~nLearned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1ý))30 April'1966

T. Z

Total: 0 04 134

II TAdTIQdo"

21 - Ognzto 'c ri 'itof~Recdti S4iad 02' 02'

22 - Ianmediate Aottion Dri2.1 '08 .08

231 Patrol Techniques 074 0424-i- Patrol Order C omba t Patrol,

Patrol Base, Patrol Reporting 2112 3325- Live-, Crossing with E~xpedient..

*'and Ponoho Q80826-- YTIC _ 32

Total .123 44 167

1-4 ww~AomT

- M(ortar Ails~int1 06 24- Oabxine Firing

Total 4810 28

IV IMICELLANE0US

-Review * 4 04- Traitaton04- 04

O ommanderg Time 06 06-Opening and Graduation

CeremonyTotal 15 *00 1

TOTALY 283 * 58 3421

AYP~jDIX 3 TO INICL0SU 2'9' TO.'.-EOTION II +,o Operat .igral1 Report on LeasesLeanied (RCS C8GPO~-28 (Ri)) 30 AprilJ 1966

p4)

.4 0-

A0 f

o14311 P4ON

104 134 .3rid Hd

CV~

I~~~I~ -HL~ P~H COf 1~ ' ,

'0 244)

f% jed4~

IVflSSUITS L 2PJMED

AE: SUPPOR~T OF SPEC4I FORCES CATIPS INI R0,0ARE AP

DISCUSSION? During 'thq "'Bttle* of A SHAU"1 suifficient tactical andlogistical support was prohibtted due to extremely poor weather conditions(extendeid periods of lo~w o106d cover and limited visibili'ty) whi-oh.a..prev1ar'tt~s t "of tie 'time: in' the vicihi-tr 'of -and the surrounding" aress 'ofCamp A SR1AU (70500083Y 10oated within the' A SHM.JALOUI Valley, adjacent to.the Laotian border.

These conifitions placed severiei '1Mi titL~ions -on the use of dirdect air3strikes, bombing, resupply and medical, evacuation efforts and the abilityto place effective fire on enemy mortar positions.

The.-en~em .emplo)1yqd the tao ios. of.. placing their troops and - n*#,4rcraft' weaPo'n-s (50 Cal.' V6) along .likely aqvenues of approach of ftf~hdly-,reinfrorements,...

.The unem7. had .,the advantage of short and .rej.atively securetspllines. resulting -fxom .;establisihed. ira b.nroutes.fo aa ad~bt

to 11ca Fre ciamwp- 190o0ed, zear t1~e 14,ot~ 'border.p

~ Con genoy plan. ,r eIna- estoabJis1~dWib FM FW z,ARVý- unitsa to iup~t. tile. Specal 16oe ..A." to inlue _

1.The use Of "Skly Spot B(ombin~g" (an electria radar a32d lhao.,,

vice, UKP'/ADF AN/PRO 41 'and COM1ITE. IMQ.35) to allow direct bomibi ontargets under extend'.ed. cloud cover*

2. Airlift mobile artillewr units ahould preplan landing aomes a=oudthe periphery of' the.:enemy -a~ii- to.rede- 'suppdot. to friezidly Ioc~

3. Establish pimcimsr and alte~aliae .Voie ComImimia-UtionAa 1yet + t aoi~as relays for the camps. when conmmnioatins. ara reatriot~

4.. Dploy i-.mnoroements to camps' in. eadvanceof lhm±ý~n attacks based!.on timely intellignece and weatherd.cndiizs

5. Border surveillance efforts must be increased (air and land):inorder to detect the eneqr massing for a large scale attacke

6.The! timey reinfoc6en by convit ionl% iunits ehAV n SGroud oue o renorcements must` b~e,`p1ainn'eC jý.i i aea1 wer w1tconditions are li±kely 'to" pr3edlude flying,*

7~ Acampshoud nt be~tab~shd iAi sn axea' which iswilbr0reinfrtrcement, distaaice, and capability offinl n~.Thie 'a. paxI'soularly truze in areas, such as A SHAU, where poor weather aonditions existmost of 'thd t~ii~e&

IIICLOSTJR 30 TO SECTION II to Operational Repo~rt oa Lesso= LeA~ed (RasCSGPO-28 (iu.)) 30 April 1966

ITEM: Reduction of Pijý:rage. of. SBesitiVe Items

DISCUSSION: It bhas be discovered that some pilferage of sensitive•item, has been occU7rqing dvýng shipment to the operational detachments.,

DBSVATIOiT:• To reueg ofu•io- I .; " e.during shipment all itemsare being boxed. handed ar4 -lletized with the sensitive items enclosed in'the qe46er. lRequisition vouche' nurbers axe used to mark .the boxes insteadof item 'descriptions. Lightweight sensitive items are being sent through,the mail. It is e-cýected that the 1oss of such items as pistols, binoculars,and medical supplies will be appreciately reduced.

ITE: Due Out Review System

RXDISCUION: A•. larg'e .umber .f due.-outs....to •the: operational detachmentsacoumula.ted..and -there. was. no syst.ematio me-thoc4 established to .review andreduce the due-outs to meet an acceptable demand accomodation Tate@

OBSRVATIONT:. .,A 120. ay -due out review system was. initiated. All re-quisitions 'tha••.re, over 120 days re :eturned. to. the. requesting unit, . Ifthe unit determines that -the' item .1is" still a. valid requirement the ru~es*tis resubmitted and alternate methods of obtaining the item are examined*The reviews have :resulted in a. 50% -reduction in the. zumber of due outs be.cause the detachment-ha~s:obtained .the item. by another means or the- irdivid-izals an site at the time of review have decided that they no longer wantthe itemq.

IT: Issue of Generators

'DISCUBSIC,, 3•0 Rgen#••eaato .Were being isud to the operationaldetaohmerfs d were 'being d6aged as a result of the personnel on sitenot mowing how, to inotall or operate them.

OBSNVATION: 4&it technical "ehunt isiid to 'the field is now

coppoaXied by a lii!ipino tec44tohn vho conducts on the.Spat, in•trtionson operating and mntaing the equ••.•.•e-

ITEM: Camp Opehig '""-. . . .

DISCUSSION: Unless carefully planned and programmed, detachments open-ing'ýew co•Amps oan be hampered by. teobiving more a.pplies and equipment thanoam be."ffidiently ol-eared frOm:the'dzop zone"and put, to ube*.,

OB9 ,ATION: Detachments given .the mission of opening new camps mustaouae~ ydtrie their ; equirements for baxrier anid construction mat..

INSLOSURE 30 -TO SECTIOIT I to Opertional Report on Lessons Learned (RCSCSGPO-28 (s) 30 April 1966

'A I L

era. . Following ulc.:v~y oe e m I.t;&. 'etermined' to program

the supplied Uito the or-.mp#s te at a usable Tate so that supplies anid equip-ment are rwovered quicklk ond not left on the drop zone for long periodsof time.

ITM Supply requests bymessage

DISCUSSION': Detachmenits submitting priority requests by message often.do not furnish enough details to enable S-4 personnel to determine what isneeded._ f

ODSATIO'N: For repair parta, fuxnish detailed description of the1part an~d model of end item to be repaired. For other t.tems send enough!details to enable supply personnel to-determine exactly what is needed,

IIiDuring the battle of Camp A Sbau in I Corps, it was dete~inedthat the Coaxial Cable lead in from the Antenna to the radio set bad beenout by an -unidentified individual within the camp, The cutting of the,cable severed communications with higher headquarters for a period in ex-ioess of eight hours. P'ositi~ve steps which can be taken to eliminate si-M..*i).iax J.nstances are;

1, Erect a lead pipe to a height six to seven feet ,kbove ground level.a-ad run the Coaxial Cable through it. This will prevent dutting and. affoxd.some protection against ground and mortar fire.

2, An underground or indoor type antenna should be installed for emexgenoy use, and pexiodioally chock~ed for reliability.

3# The installation: of dummy~ antennas will confuse saboteurs anid ez-ewr gun cxens*

OBSRVATIC~t: All eamps have been notified to take necessavy precametions to pr~clude the sabotage of all commnitmcation equipmen~t and associated

aooessoriese 1

INCL0SURE.13O TO SECTION 11 to Opeaational Report on Lessons Learned (RCSCSGOP' -28 (RI) 30 April 1966

T~jv~P