Acting Beyond Borders - C3S India
Transcript of Acting Beyond Borders - C3S India
R a h u l K a r a n
C h e n n a i C e n t e r f o r
C h i n a S t u d i e s ( C 3 S )
1 6 O c t o b e r 2 0 1 8
Acting Beyond Borders
- An Action Plan
for
Reorienting BIMSTEC -
Introduction
The recently concluded BIMSTEC Summit of
2018, held in Kathmandu led to the inclusion of
Blue Economy and Mountain Economy to the list
of sectors of cooperation among the members.
Given that BIMSTEC is a sector-driven
organization aiming to harness and accelerate
shared economic growth in areas of mutual
interest, the addition of two new sectors was
received with some skepticism, given the limited
progress made so far in existing sectors. These
sectors, namely Trade, Technology, Energy,
Transport, Tourism, Climate Change and People-
to-People contacts are a few of the focus areas
for the BIMSTEC member states of India,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Myanmar
and Thailand. Though the grouping has been
operational since 1997 and targets a wide
variety of issues for cooperation, it has
organized a Summit only four times. However,
since the Leaders Retreat at Goa in 2016 where
Indian PM Narendra Modi expressed New
Delhi’s intention to prioritize BIMSTEC, a flurry of
activity has fueled speculation about India’s
attempted revival of the grouping.
Despite skepticism from certain sections, the
strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal cannot
be overstated, given its location, its role as a
funnel for trade into the Malacca Straits and
being a primary area of operations for the Indian
Navy. Notably, one-fourth of global trade every
year is carried by global maritime shipping
routes sprawled across the Bayi. The Bay’s
energy resources are some of the world’s most
abundant, but are yet to be fully exploited by
BIMSTEC member states. On the other hand, the
silt-rich Bay’s waters contain large fishing stocks
that are driving vigorous efforts of regional
players. Leveraging these geographic and
resource advantages the Bay has to offer is the
basis for the BIMSTEC grouping to cooperate on
infrastructure, transportation, trade facilitation
and connectivity.
This cooperation is crucial, as the region has
scope to overcome physical and psychological
barriers to integration. The need for connectivity
networks such as BIMSTEC is apparent, as seen
in the dependence of Nepal and Bhutan on India
for access to sea trade, given the smaller
countries’ landlocked nature. Bangladesh’s geo-
strategic advantage of being situated at the
junction between South and South-East Asia can
be cultivated through BIMSTEC projects, thus
bridging the two regions. This would give
benefits of trade diversification to Bangladesh
as well. For India, Thailand and Myanmar, such
connectivity between regions is a means to
integrate neighborhoods, and hence enable
unprecedented economic growth for BIMSTEC
members.
Mainstreaming the Alternative:
BIMSTEC over SAARC
BIMSTEC’s newfound prominence partly stems
from SAARC’s moribund and defunct status
since 2016. Shortly after cancelling the 2016
SAARC Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi signaled the advent of a new phase of
cooperation through BIMSTEC. Significantly, the
2016 BRICS-BIMSTEC outreach summit in Goa
brought international attention to the revival of
BIMSTEC as India’s priority forum for regional
cooperationii. New Delhi’s rejuvenated
commitment was underlined eight months later
in 2016 by an increase in the MEA’s budget for
BIMSTEC from 12 lakh to 4.5 croreiii. The Indian
PM appeared to be making good on his
statement made at the 2014 SAARC Summit in
Kathmandu, to seize opportunities for
integrating the region ‘through SAARC or outside
it’ and ‘among us all or some of us’.
Image Courtesy: The Hindu/PTI
However, BIMSTEC does not share the same
priority status as was enjoyed by SAARC
previously, from the perspective of New Delhi or
India’s neighbors. BIMSTEC has been criticized
for being a lethargic and ineffective ‘talk shop’.
New Delhi may be looking to mainstream
BIMSTEC and accord a more central role to the
grouping in India’s foreign policy. Nonetheless,
the grouping requires streamlining and reform to
take the stage as New Delhi’s main regional bloc.
In this context, this report analyses the current
status of BIMSTEC and its potential to emerge
not only an alternative to SAARC, but also
become the prime connectivity and trade hub of
the region.
BIMSTEC offers a more amenable environment
for New Delhi’s diplomatic interactions with its
neighbors, compared to SAARC. Primarily, the
balance of power in BIMSTEC is different from
that of SAARC, the latter being unstable and
riddled with political differences. This is based
on the advantages offered by BIMSTEC
members. The grouping includes Thailand, a
regional player whose relations with India can
have the effect of calming nerves of BIMSTEC
members wary of New Delhi’s influence. And
unlike the India-Pakistan dynamic in SAARC,
which is based on animosity and disagreement,
the India-Thailand relationship is based on
convergence in significant policy areas
concerning trade and connectivity.
Moreover, India’s Act East policy and Thailand’s
Act West Policy indicate a common interest in
bridging South Asia and South East Asia. India’s
neighbors have also expressed their ambitions
to activate BIMSTEC to their advantage.
Bangladesh too has an Act East Policy and Sri
Lanka has voiced its intention to develop as a
regional hub for maritime trade, like Singapore.
In this respect, Myanmar is realizing its role as a
bridge between South Asia and South-East Asia
and is keen on capitalizing on its location. The
stable balance of power and acknowledgement
of common interests between members are
advantages of BIMSTEC over SAARC that could
translate into smoother cooperation and greater
progress.
Image Courtesy: bimstec.org
How to not repeat history
Despite the advantages offered by a more
balanced and stable grouping, BIMSTEC has
found it difficult to conclude negotiations on
Agreements. This hints at economic self-interest
of each member state acting as a barrier to
progress in BIMSTEC. This report will explore
resolutions for such issues subsequently.
Interestingly, Agreements to improve trade and
connectivity including the Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) and Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) were
originally negotiated under SAARC, which failed
to implement them. The same Agreements are
still being negotiated in BIMSTEC with little
progress. This report offers suggestions on
expediting the negotiation process.
Another problem area for which this paper will
give solutions, is the BIMSTEC FTA. This FTA is
yet to be ratified after prolonged negotiations
spanning 14 years due to the fact that member
countries have not moved past the framework
agreementiv. There is an alarming sense of déjà
vu vis-a-vis the South Asian Free Trade
Agreement (SAFTA). In the case of BIMSTEC FTA
too, countries have disagreements about
implementation and non-tariff barriers. The
framework agreement of the BIMSTEC FTA
outlines specific areas of trade facilitation,
which require consensus for implementation–
Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA’s),
customs cooperation, travel facilitation and non-
tariff barriers. Unless these are achieved, cross-
border trade via the BIMSTEC FTA would not see
reality. Bhutan’s delay in implanting the
BIMSTEC Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA)
resonates of SAARC scenarios. While the SAARC
MVA had been stalled by Pakistan, Bhutan’s
upper house of parliament is debating the
ratification of the BIMSTEC MVA for the third
time since 2015v. This issue will be seen in
detail subsequently in this paper.
Bhutan’s actions are a reflection of how
protectionist attitudes and mistrust need to be
tacked among BIMSTEC members. For instance,
some BIMSTEC members are reluctant to
participate in areas of military and counter-
terrorism cooperation as well. Counter terrorism
and military cooperation are the most recent
sectors in BIMSTEC to receive special attention
since 2016. Military cooperation in BIMSTEC
faced its first roadblock when members Nepal
and Thailand refused to participate in the joint
military exercises conducted at Pune, India in
2018vi. While security cooperation was never a
consideration in SAARC, BIMSTEC would do well
to overcome differences in this realm, given the
conspicuous advantage of no border disputes
among member states.
Hence this report would analyze various
dimensions of BIMSTEC, the problem areas and
offer recommendations. These will be in the
following domains:
• BIMSTEC FTA
• Trade Facilitation
• Connectivity
• Motor Vehicles Agreement
• Coastal Shipping Agreement
The way forward to address the under
mentioned issues is also projected
• Over-bureaucratization and
Understaffing
• The China factor
BIMSTEC FTA
The implementation of the BIMSTEC FTA would
be a positive first step for intra-regional trade.
However, negotiations are yet to be concluded.
The framework agreement was signed fourteen
years ago and specifies the timeline for
negotiations for trade in goods as 2005 and for
trade in services and investment as 2007vii. The
FTA was still being negotiated at the 2018
Kathmandu Summit. The Agreement seems to
BIMSTEC Leaders at the 4th BIMSTEC Summit in
Kathmandu, Nepal. Image Courtesy: Hindustan Times
be facing resistance from members of the
grouping. Sumith Nakandala, Former Secretary
General of BIMSTEC, responding to a question
about the delayed FTA pointed out that “one
country” delayed the submission of
recommendations till 2014 and wanted to revise
the list of Production Specific Rulesviii.
Reportedly, Thailand may have been the country
being referred to. In fact, Bangkok is currently
reluctant to allow Indian computer engineers to
work in Thailand citing fears that a large inflow
of Indian professionals will adversely impact the
prospects of the local workforceix.
In light of the above facts, it is imperative for
India to scrutinize the issue for a solution that
clears the way for the BIMSTEC FTA. The
movement of Thai professionals and skilled
personnel is also an issue in India, where
lobbying efforts by professional associations
stall the removal of barriers. This reluctance to
make markets accessible hints at economic self-
interest and protectionist attitudes that typically
drives negotiations between states. It is possible
for New Delhi to surmount this challenge by
engaging in reciprocal action that demonstrates
the mutual economic benefits that will accrue
from greater market access. New Delhi could
overcome this challenge by eliminating one of
the most important barriers to the movement of
Thai workers in India, which is the minimum
salary condition of $25,000 per annum imposed
on foreign workersx. This restriction is
particularly harmful for Thai spa, massage and
medical services in India, leading to the closure
of 50 spa projectsxi. It would allow India and
Thailand to leverage the sectors in which they
enjoy comparative advantages and harness the
benefits of complementaritiesxii. Reciprocal
action by India and Thailand to overcome self-
interest should reduce the trust deficit and
positively affect the finalization of the BIMSTEC
FTA.
The FTA is crucial for the facilitation of intra-
regional trade within BIMSTEC countries, which
currently stands at 7%xiii. Successful groupings
like ASEAN and the EU have higher level of
dependence among members at 22.8% and
63% respectively. Though some studies have
argued that implementing the BIMSTEC FTA
would not impact intra-regional trade
significantly, it is a necessary pre-condition, if
not sufficient for the creation of Regional or
Global Value Chains.
Trade Facilitation
Trade facilitation measures play a significant
role in overcoming barriers and enabling
economic integration of BIMSTEC members.
Overcoming trade barriers will be a significant
challenge for BIMSTEC, but is also an
opportunity to inspire confidence in the
grouping. These barriers are relatively high in
South Asia compared to the rest of the world,
making the resolution of these issues imperative
for future economic growth. Table 1 outlines
costs and delays incurred at the border that
impede intra-regional trade among BIMSTEC
members. Costs and delays are a result of
gateway barriers and behind the border issues.
They refer to non-transport and ‘soft’
infrastructure issues concerning the
administrative and operational aspects of cross-
border trade. They present themselves in the
form of complex certification requirements,
inefficiently run border crossings, restrictions on
rail and road movement of goods, customs
clearance procedures, long dwell times at
ports/borders and the lack of regulatory
harmonizationxiv. Table 1 below illustrates that
the trading environment in BIMSTEC is a
consequence of bottlenecks at the border,
behind the border and across the borderxv.
To illustrate how these costs and delays
translate into low level of intra-regional trade,
take the case of Nepal. Nepal has been provided
with the facility to import bulk cargo via
Kolkata\Haldia port from where it takes 11.5
days for cargo to reach Birgunj in Nepal by railxvi.
According to the Nepal Freight Forwarders’
Association, around 600 Nepal-bound
containers arrive in Kolkata port daily, but only
half of them are transferred to Birgunj dry port
due to delays in clearancexvii. In the case of
Nepal’s imports, cargo spends almost 5 days at
Table 1: Trading Environment in BIMSTEC
Image Courtesy: WDI and WEF
the Birgunj-Raxaul land border in clearing goods,
loading and unloading and idle time inside the
portxviii. The delays in moving cargo across the
border arise from congestion at the Raxaul-
Birgunj land port where the problems of
insufficient warehousing, inadequate
infrastructure, lack of equipment to load and
unload goods and attitudes of customs officials
add delays to the imports/exports of Nepal.
There are also reports of Nepali traders being
forced to suffer shipment delays and pay money
as demurrage charges due to complex
paperworkxix. Though the Indian government has
made the Vishakhapatnam port available to
Nepali traders, very few traders use the new
route citing the lack of adequate infrastructure
and higher costsxx. Granting access to the port
does not by itself constitute an improvement in
the trading environment, and has to be
complemented with trade facilitation measures
that reduce costs and delays.
Several studies have made recommendations
for such measures, and most identify customs
procedures as the primary obstacle to
facilitating economic activity. In a survey carried
out by FICCI in 2017 (See Graph 1), respondents
pointed out that simplified customs processes
was the first step to make BIMSTEC a pro-
business regionxxi. All BIMSTEC members other
than Thailand have complex customs clearance
procedures requiring large amounts of
documentation that cause delays and
discourage businessxxii. The World Bank reports
that the time taken to comply with Thai border
regulations takes 50 hours, while the same
takes 265 hours in Indiaxxiii. Another indicator
that illustrates the document-heavy customs
procedures at Indian borders is the time spent
on document compliance, which is 4 hours in
Thailand and 61 hours in Indiaxxiv.
BIMSTEC members have much to gain, when
they would make uniform implementation of the
principles set by the Revised Kyoto Convention
on Customs procedures and compliance This
Convention calls for the maximum use of IT,
simplification of documentation and
transparency in actionsxxv. Clearly, the goal of
optimum trade cannot be achieved without
internationalization of standards.
In this respect, New Delhi could set an example
by harmonizing these standards and simplifying
customs, which could be followed by similar
efforts from India’s neighbors, The Asian
Development Bank (ADB) Study on BIMSTEC
Transport, Infrastructure and Logistics
recommends reforming customs procedures
Graph 1: How to make BIMSTEC a pro-business region
Image Courtesy: FICCI Perception Survey 2017
especially in the Indian North-East Region (NER)
by further automating customs procedures,
developing national single windows and
harmonizing import-export procedures between
member states. The NER is positioned to act as
a logistics cluster for trade in and around the
region, aligning the recommendations of the
ADB study with India’s developmental agenda
for the NERxxvi. Furthermore, it would facilitate
the development of Regional and Global Value
chains that rely on timely delivery of
parts/components. Unfortunately, in the climate
of big infrastructure projects that currently
dominates policy on connectivity, customs
simplification and regulatory harmonization
does not get the attention it should. BIMSTEC
members cannot afford to concentrate mostly
on trade with big powers while not prioritizing the
Bay neighbors. It must also be pointed out that
cumbersome customs and regulatory
procedures stand in the way of promoting
people-to-people contacts that generate
goodwill among members and can have the
effect of reducing mutual suspicion.
The spillover effect of trade facilitation into
people to people contacts:
People-to-people exchanges are also affected by
barriers to cross-border interaction. Cultural
exchanges are important for peoples of different
countries to understand each other and develop
a common identity. Tourism and education are
means to promote an understanding between
cultures and countries that India has been
historically well connected to. In the modern era,
complicated visa and documentation
procedures, requirement of special permits and
poor coordination among tour operators has
impaired the ability of people to connect with
cultures of different regions. For example,
Jayantha Colombage, the Director for Indo-
Lanka Initiatives of the Pathfinder Foundation
pointed out that he received only a four day visa
when he went to Bangladesh for a conference,
while the US was prepared to offer him a five
year visa with multiple entries and the UK
offered him a two year visaxxvii. Therefore, trade
facilitation would benefit not only commerce, but
enable cultural exchange as well.
Border Trading post at the India Nepal border. Image Courtesy: Kathmandu Post
Connectivity
Connectivity is one of the main pillars of
cooperation under BIMSTEC and the means of
integrating economies in the Bay of the Bengal
region. BIMSTEC’s success in this key area will
shape opinion on the grouping and its efficacy.
So far, several agreements have been
negotiated on connectivity. One such agreement
that improves both trade and people-to-people
contacts is the Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA).
The MVA facilitates trade and improves
connectivity by eliminating the need to transship
goods – unloading goods from one truck and
loading them onto the truck of the other country
at the border, which is a cumbersome process
that increases delaysxxviii. The MVA also contains
a Passenger Protocol that details the procedures
for cross-border movement of busses and
private vehicles. The first trail run of the
Bangladesh-Nepal Bus service that runs through
India as a part of BBIN was a positive
development for the MVA which demonstrated
cost savings of about 20% alongside a
substantial reduction in timexxix. But the MVA has
not been implemented by Bhutan, who has
expressed concerns about the livelihoods of
Bhutanese truckers and wants a cap fixed on the
number of vehicles entering its territory. The
increase in vehicle traffic and tourists may
damage the environment of Bhutan, the only
Carbon-Negative country in the worldxxx.
However, India has a chance to get Bhutan on
board the MVA through reciprocal action.
Thimphu has raised the issue of Bhutan’s
decreasing exports to Bangladesh as a result of
quotas imposed on the number of Bhutanese
trucks entering Bangladesh. The decline was
attributed to a ratio system unilaterally
developed by Truck Owners and Exporters
Association of Changrabandha, West Bengal
that allows only 25 trucks carrying Bhutanese
goods to enter Bangladesh for every 30 trucks
with Indian goodsxxxi. This bottleneck has
resulted in only 50 Bhutanese trucks entering
Bangladesh while there are 100-150 trucks
carrying Bhutanese goods waiting to enter
Bangladesh every day. New Delhi has the
opportunity to break this bottleneck and
demonstrate the benefits to trade that would
accrue if the MVA was ratified. While pushing
other members to join the initiative, New Delhi
must look to find practical ways, like the trial run
of the bus service and reciprocal action, to
demonstrate the efficacy of these initiatives.
Unfortunately, the Agreement may face more
roadblocks in the future with Thailand also
expressing concerns about the effect of the
Agreement on its domestic transport industryxxxii.
Conveying the importance of the MVA for future
big ticket infrastructure projects can have the
effect of softening Thailand’s position. New
Delhi could argue that since the MVA is slated to
boost trade once the India-Thailand trilateral
highway is completed, ratifying the MVA is
imperative for the highway to bring intended
benefits of increasing the volume of trade across
borders.
Coastal Shipping Agreement (CSA):
The participation of landlocked countries like
Nepal and Bhutan in intra-regional trade can be
improved through greater maritime connectivity
that the Coastal Shipping Agreement looks to
address. Currently, over-land routes are the
dominant means of transporting cargo in the
BIMSTEC region and account for about 70% of
the freight movement in the regionxxxiii. However,
better maritime connectivity will ensure that a
greater volume of trade is transported through
the Bay of Bengal.
The Coastal Shipping Agreement (CSA)
distinguishes between coastal shipping and
The India-Thailand Highway which passes through
Myanmar and NER will bring South and South-East Asia
closer. Image Courtesy: Times of India
deep sea shipping since coastal shipping is
cheaper because it is carried out by smaller
vessels and requires lower draft, thereby
reducing costs and making it more efficientxxxiv.
It is an environmentally friendly means of
transport and is of particular interest for Nepal
and Bhutan.
The benefits of the CSA are evident from the
India-Bangladesh Coastal Shipping Agreement
which has reduced travel time for India
Bangladesh trade. Prior to the CSA between
India and Bangladesh, maritime trade would
have to be routed through Colombo or
Singapore, for which freight charges were
between $1700 USD - $2400 USD and transit
time was 30 - 40 days. However, with the CSA,
transit times have been reduced to 8 – 10 days
and costs have shrunk to $400 USD.xxxv This has
the added advantage of reducing costs to
transport goods from Bangladesh and mainland
India to the NER. As the leader of the Working
Group on Trade, India must fast track
negotiations on the CSA, by highlighting the
success of Bangladesh in improving maritime
connectivity.
For greater connectivity between regions and for
improved trade across borders, the CSA and
MVA agreements must be prioritized and their
implementation should be expedited. To do so,
New Delhi must demonstrate that the MVA and
CSA, will yield the maximum intended benefits of
infrastructure spending on highways and ports
The ADB BTILS study has identified and
prioritized 66 projects (See Table 2) that can
bring about an improvement in trade
facilitationxxxvi. However, these hard
infrastructure projects need regulatory
harmonization and Agreements like the MVA and
CSA that simplify the procedures and processes
associated with the transport of goods and
people across borders, without which the
projects will have limited impact.
Tackling other challenges in
BIMSTEC Beyond Over-bureaucratizion and Understaffing
India’s attempts to cultivate momentum for
contemporary South Asian regionalism have met
Shipping Routes as per the protocols of the CSA
Image Courtesy: ADB BTILS Study
Table 2: List of projects prioritized by the ADB BTILS Study to improve trade and connectivity.
with limited success. While discussions and
cooperation through SAARC have reached an
impasse, the lack of leadership and streamlining
in BIMSTEC has created its own share of
problems. Marked by infrequent Summits,
stalled agreements and a marginalized status of
the grouping symptomatic of the lack of
leadership, BIMSTEC remains underutilized.
Cooperation under BIMSTEC has expanded to
14 sectors, already an unwieldly list. However,
BIMSTEC does not have the resources or
manpower to generate progress in all the fields
considering that the grouping operated without
a secretariat till 2014 and has a staff of only ten
membersxxxvii. India’s earlier commitment to
BIMSTEC is also questionable since its budget
for the grouping until 2016 was only Rs. 12
lakhsxxxviii. It has been recommended that
rationalizing the organization by reducing the
sectors of cooperation and focusing on priority
areas is a way to make the grouping relevant and
active.
An active Secretariat with specific directives to
implement Agreements and follow through with
negotiations is essential for BIMSTEC. A stronger
Secretariat will perform the task of eliminating
mutual suspicion among members who fear that
India seeks to promote its own interests through
BIMSTEC. It will also maintain continuity and
consistency in implementing policies and
projects that would otherwise be tethered to the
uncertainties of domestic politics and elections.
To safeguard against these uncertainties, the
BIMSTEC Secretariat should be empowered with
more personnel and finances. The functioning of
the Secretariat could be complimented with the
inclusion of think tanks and advisory groups that
assess the effects of various Agreements and
engage in dialogue with partners in other
BIMSTEC countries. These linkages would have
the effect of gauging and creating public opinion
on BIMSTEC and its agreements, while bridging
the resource gap that constrains BIMSTEC.
The China Factor
China’s infrastructure projects and financial
assistance in South Asia have the potential to
influence India’s neighbors. Beijing’s influence
has been shrewdly calibrated in the form of
infrastructure and connectivity projects for
India’s neighbors who are either geographically
inaccessible or lack the resources to develop
connectivity with other markets. Nepal has
indicated its willingness to engage Beijing and
relieve its dependency on India to diversify its
economic growth.
Beijing recently signed an Agreement with
Kathmandu to build the Kathmandu-Kerung
railway line, which is an extension of the Qinghai-
Lhasa railway line. The Kathmandu-Kerung
railway line is part of the Trans-Himalayan
Multidimensional Connectivity Network, which
was one of eight cooperation deals worth $2.4
billion USD signed by Nepal and China in
September 2018 that focused on infrastructure,
connectivity and energyxxxix. The railway line
opens up a previously difficult-to-access market
of 400 million people by land and will diversify
Nepal’s trade, reducing dependency on India
and also raising Kathmandu’s confidence during
trade negotiations with India.
Nepal also stands to benefit from the Transit and
Transportation Agreement that grants Nepal
access to four Chinese seaports, three land
ports for imports and six transit points for
exports, for third-country tradexl. These
Agreements and projects have the potential to
fulfill promises of economic growth that K.P. Oli
made to the people of Nepal during the elections
in 2017, thereby justifying Kathmandu’s
relationship with Beijing. The railway and Transit
and Transportation Agreement improve Nepal’s
bargaining position vis-a-vis India and ensure
that in the event of another blockade,
Kathmandu is not stranded.
The Kerung-Kathmandu railway line. Image Courtesy:
Spotlight Nepal
Alarmed by the inroads made by China since
2017, New Delhi reacted to these developments
by fast-tracking the construction of a 130 km
railway line from Raxaul in Bihar to
Kathmanduxli. The Agreement was signed at the
BIMSTEC Summit in Kathmandu where PM
Narendra Modi and PM K.P. Oli agreed to
develop connectivity and bilateral ties between
the nations. An amendment was also made to
the provisions of the Transit Treaty that allows
Nepal to import bulk cargo directly to three other
transit points other than Birgunj, which faces
delays and hassles. The expansion of Nepal’s
import capacity is welcome and underlines
India’s relevance to Nepal’s economic
development. Overall, the agreements are an
attempt to improve regional connectivity but are
perceived to take place when a compulsion to
match China’s offer bothers New Delhi. Now that
an alternative to India’s support has been made
available to Kathmandu by Beijing, Nepal is
unlikely to be swayed by ad-hoc, piecemeal
overtures.
Nepal’s position and China’s influence do not
bode well for BIMSTEC whose inaugural military
drills and disaster relief exercises Kathmandu
did not attendxlii. Instead, Nepal participated in
counter-terrorism exercises with Beijing held
only 10 days laterxliii. Moreover, K.P. Oli has
maintained that SAARC cannot be replaced by
BIMSTEC, which has yet to gain any momentum.
With Nepal staking the future of BIMSTEC on the
revival of SAARC, New Delhi will have to contend
with the idea of revisiting cooperation through
SAARC where China is an observer state.
Moreover, it could undermine New Delhi’s
attempt to isolate Pakistan in SAARC.
In short, New Delhi stands to lose the
cooperation of its neighbors if BIMSTEC fails to
deliver on its commitment to regional
connectivity. This makes it more incumbent for
India to apply the recommendations made in
this report, which would lead to BIMSTEC
becoming a buzzword concerning the region’s
connectivity and trade.
Conclusion
BIMSTEC and SAARC do not serve the same
strategic purpose, but share common objectives
for the South Asian region. Realizing these
objectives – greater connectivity, increased
trade and alignment in security responses – is
more likely through BIMSTEC as a result of
convergence in foreign policies of BIMSTEC
members. This is a positive for the grouping that
is free from contentious issues. This
environment in BIMSTEC can facilitate greater
progress on trade facilitation and people-to-
people contacts, where New Delhi and other
members can concentrate their efforts to
generate momentum.
BIMSTEC can benefit from prioritizing customs
cooperation, regulatory harmonization and other
trade facilitation measures that are often
sidelined for high profile infrastructure projects.
Delivering on these areas of cooperation will
inspire confidence in the operational capacity of
BIMSTEC and increase the ability of large
infrastructure projects to improve trade and
connectivity. Doing so achieves foreign policy
objectives for New Delhi while also attaining
some of its national development goals in the
NER. However, this process will require
increasing the autonomy and authority of the
BIMSTEC Secretariat which New Delhi has only
recently begun to do. An independent and
dedicated Secretariat will bring consistency to
the workings of the grouping, keeping it relatively
free from the influence of New Delhi or any other
member.
Like with other regional groupings, BIMSTEC is a
platform for negotiating the self-interest of
states. To overcome differences and deadlocks
in negotiations, New Delhi must engage in
reciprocal action to demonstrate the mutual
benefits that accrue from better connectivity and
regulatory harmonization across borders. The
MVA and CSA must be placed front and center of
discussions on connectivity while efforts like the
BBIN bus services from Bhutan to Bangladesh
must be encouraged as ways of bringing
members on board. For its part, New Delhi must
empower the grouping to demonstrate the
positive effects of integration, while keeping the
grouping alive and active.
References i Xavier, Constantino, and Darshana Baruah. Connecting the Bay of Bengal: The Problem. Seminar Brief. Carnegie India. March 01, 2018. https://carnegieindia.org/2018/03/01/connecting-bay-of-bengal-problem-pub-75710. ii Haider, SUhasini. "BIMSTEC a Sunny Prospect in BRICS Summit at Goa." The Hindu, December 01, 2016. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/BIMSTEC-a-sunny-prospect-in-BRICS-summit-at-Goa/article16072254.ece. iii Xavier, Constantino. "Opinion | India Needs to Walk the Talk on Bimstec." Https://www.livemint.com/. August 28, 2018. Accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/wqT03pNM5tC5bP3MgcxMhI/Opinion--India-needs-to-walk-the-talk-on-Bimstec.html. iv Bose, Saheli. "What Has Kept BIMSTEC from Taking Off?" South Asia @ LSE (blog), July 18, 2018. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/07/18/challenges-to-south-asian-integration-have-kept-bimstec-from-taking-off/. v Haider, Suhasini. "Bhutan Backs out of Motor Vehicle Pact." The Hindu, April 27, 2017. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bhutan-backs-out-of-motor-vehicle-pact/article18260565.ece. vi Roy, Shubhajit. "Three Days before PM Announced BIMSTEC Exercise, Thailand Said We Are out." The Indian Express, September 18, 2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/bimstec-three-days-pm-modi-announced-military-exercise-thailand-5363593/. vii Hossain, Sharif M. "Impacts of BIMSTEC Free Trade Area: A CGE Analysis." Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 2013th ser., 4, no. 13 (2013). 2013. https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JEDS/article/viewFile/7214/7273 viii Chakraborty, Shubhayan. "Issues in FTA Are Being Addressed, Says BIMSTEC's Secretary General." Business Standard, October 31, 2016. https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/issues-in-fta-are-being-addressed-says-bimstec-s-secretary-general-116103100976_1.html. ix Online Report. "India-Thailand Difference Delaying FTA under BIMSTEC." The Financial Express. October 25, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/economy/india-thailand-difference-delaying-fta-under-bimstec-1502090860. x Mukherjee, Arpita, and Tanu M. Goyal. Integrating South and Southeast Asia through Services Value Chain: The Case of India and Thailand. Working paper no. 301. Indian Council for Research On International Economic Relations. June 2015. http://icrier.org/pdf/Working_Paper_301.pdf. xi Mukherjee, Arpita, and Tanu M. Goyal. Integrating South and Southeast Asia through Services Value Chain: The Case
of India and Thailand. Working paper no. 301. Indian Council for Research On International Economic Relations. June 2015. http://icrier.org/pdf/Working_Paper_301.pdf. xii Mukherjee, Arpita, and Tanu M. Goyal. Integrating South and Southeast Asia through Services Value Chain: The Case of India and Thailand. Working paper no. 301. Indian Council for Research On International Economic Relations. June 2015. http://icrier.org/pdf/Working_Paper_301.pdf. xiii Bose, Saheli. "What Has Kept BIMSTEC from Taking Off?" South Asia @ LSE (blog), 2017. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/07/18/challenges-to-south-asian-integration-have-kept-bimstec-from-taking-off/. xiv Kardar, Shahid. South Asia—Intraregional Cooperation: The Way Forward. Publication. Asian Development Bank. August 2011. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/rcs-south-asia-2011-2015-oth-02.pdf. xv Rahman, Mustafizur, and Estiaque Bari. Value Chains in BIMSTEC Region Current Status, Possibilities and Challenges. Report no. 4. Centre for Policy Dialogue, Bangladesh and South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment. April 2018. https://cpd.org.bd/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Research-Report-4-Rahman-and-Bari-2018_Value-Chains-in-BIMSTEC-Region.pdf. xvi Bose, Pratim Ranjan. "India at Risk of Losing Nepal Transit Trade to China." Businessline. January 11, 2018. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/india-at-risk-of-losing-nepal-transit-trade-to-china/article9770990.ece. xvii Khanal, Rajesh. "Tackling Cargo Movement from India." The Kathmandu Post, August 24, 2018. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-08-24/tackling-cargo-movement-from-india.html. xviii De, Prabir. Disentangling Transit Costs and Time in South Asia. Publication no. Ii. December 2015. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10260.pdf. xix Himalayan News Service. "Nepal-bound Containers Stuck at Kolkata Port." The Himalayan Times, November 06, 2016. https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/nepal-bound-containers-stuck-kolkata-port xx Acharya, Pushpa Raj. "Trade through Vizag Port Could Be More Feasible." The Himalayan Times, August 06, 2016. https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/trade-vizag-port-feasible/. xxi Reinvigorating BIMSTEC. Publication. FICCI Core Group, FICCI. January 2018. http://ficci.in/spdocument/23016/BIMSTEC-Report-final.pdf. xxii Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS). Technical paper. Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report, Asian Development Bank. January 2008. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/65311/38396-01-reg-tacr.pdf.
xxiii "Time to Import, Border Compliance." World Bank, 2017. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.IMP.TMBC?end=2017&locations=TH&start=2017&view=bar xxiv "Documents to Import." World Bank, 2017. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.IMP.DOCS?end=2014&locations=TH&start=2005&view=chart. xxv "The Revised Kyoto Convention." World Customs Organization. Accessed October 12, 2018. http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/conventions/pf_revised_kyoto_conv.aspx. xxvi Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS). Technical paper. Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report, Asian Development Bank. January 2008. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/65311/38396-01-reg-tacr.pdf. xxvii Correspondent, Senior. "BIMSTEC Conference Brings up Stark Truth of Regional Connectivity." Bdnews24.com. April 11, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/04/11/bimstec-conference-brings-up-stark-truth-of-regional-connectivity. xxviii Saran, Samir. For BIMSTEC to Work, Fix BBIN First. Proceedings of Raisina Debates, New Delhi. August 30, 2018. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/43735-for-bimstec-to-work-fix-bbin-first/. xxix Saran, Samir. For BIMSTEC to Work, Fix BBIN First. Proceedings of Raisina Debates, New Delhi. August 30, 2018. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/43735-for-bimstec-to-work-fix-bbin-first/. xxx Bose, Pratim Ranjan. "Bhutan Says Exit from BBIN Motor Vehicles Pact Is Temporary." Businessline, May 7, 2018. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/bhutan-says-exit-from-bbin-motor-vehicles-pact-is-temporary/article9685062.ece. xxxi India. Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Commerce Secretary. India-Bhutan Bilateral Meeting on Trade and Transit. January 18, 2017. https://commerce.gov.in/writereaddata/UploadedFile/MOC_636213794037466533_Agreed_Minutes_India-Bhutan_CS_LLevel_meeting_18-19 _Jan_2017.pdf. xxxii Press Trust of India. "Thailand Expresses Concern over BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Pact." Business Standard, April 11, 2018. https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/thailand-expresses-concern-over-bimstec-motor-vehicle-pact-118041100722_1.html. xxxiii Gupta, Moushumi Das, and Jayanth Jacob. "Bimstec to Launch Ambitious Land, Air, Sea Transport Plan." Hindustan Times, September 17, 2018. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bimstec-to-launch-ambitious-land-air-sea-transport-plan/story-DzO94rxSA9rarGIhEmBPkJ.html. xxxivPress Information Bureau. Ministry of Shipping. "BIMSTEC Member States Discuss Draft Text of Coastal Shipping Agreement." News release, December 01, 2017. Pib.nic.in. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=174036. xxxv Nath, Prithviraj. Bay-to-River: Integrating Inland Waterways and Maritime Connectivity for Regional Growth. Publication. Coastal Association for Social Transformation,
Coastal Association for Social Transformation. November 2016. http://coastbd.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Blue-Economy_Final.pdf. xxxvi Updating and Enhancement of the BIMSTEC BTIL Study. Report. Asian Development Bank. July 2018. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/439106/updating-bimstec-transport-logistics-study.pdf. xxxvii Xavier, Constantino. "India Needs to Walk the Talk on Bimstec." Https://www.livemint.com/. August 28, 2018. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/wqT03pNM5tC5bP3MgcxMhI/Opinion--India-needs-to-walk-the-talk-on-Bimstec.html. xxxviii Xavier, Constantino. "India Needs to Walk the Talk on Bimstec." Https://www.livemint.com/. August 28, 2018. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/wqT03pNM5tC5bP3MgcxMhI/Opinion--India-needs-to-walk-the-talk-on-Bimstec.html. xxxix Press Trust of India. "Now, China and Nepal to Build Railway Line Linking Tibet To Kathmandu." The Financial Express. June 22, 2018. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.financialexpress.com/infrastructure/railways/now-china-and-nepal-to-build-railway-line-linking-tibet-to-kathmandu/1216637/. xl Nayak, Nihar. Nepal-China Transit Agreement: An Evaluation. Issue brief. Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies. September 27, 2018. https://idsa.in/issuebrief/nepal-china-transit-agreement-nnayak-270918. xli Press Trust of India. "Nepal, India to Expedite Raxaul-Kathmandu Rail Project." The New Indian Express, July 11, 2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/delhi/nepal-india-raxaul-kathmandu-bihar-rail-project-kp-oli-modi-5255184/. xlii Press Trust of India. "Nepal to Skip BIMSTEC Military Drill in India." The Hindu, September 8, 2018. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/nepal-to-skip-bimstec-military-drill-in-india/article24904586.ece. xliii Press Trust of India. "Nepal, China Hold First-ever Joint Military Exercises." The Economic Times, July 12, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/nepal-china-hold-first-ever-joint-military-exercises/articleshow/58208949.cms.