ACT BIOSECURITY 2016-2026 STRATEGY...The ACT Biosecurity Strategy 2016-2026 identifies the goals,...
Transcript of ACT BIOSECURITY 2016-2026 STRATEGY...The ACT Biosecurity Strategy 2016-2026 identifies the goals,...
ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY
2016-2026
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 1
FOREWORD 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
VISION: BIOSECURITY – A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 4
WHAT IS BIOSECURITY? 5
BROAD GOALS FOR BIOSECURITY 5
POLICY PRINCIPLES 6
OUTCOMES 7
SCOPE OF THE STRATEGY 7
WHAT ARE WE PROTECTING 8
OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY 9
POLICY CONTEXT 10
Commonwealth Legislation 10
ACT Legislation 11
ACT Strategies and Plans 12
Intergovernmental Deeds and Agreements 12
WHY BIOSECURITY IS IMPORTANT 14
Economy 14
Environment 14
Community 15
Human Health 15
Public Amenity 15
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE BIOSECURITY SYSTEM 17
Shared responsibility 17
The ACT is not an island 22
Appropriate Level of Protection 22
Biosecurity continuum 22
Risk-management 22
Prioritising biosecurity investments 23
Science-based decision-making 24
Appropriate support mechanisms 24
Continual improvement 24
CONTENTS
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GOVERNANCE 25
MANAGING RISK – RESPONDING TO INCREASING CHALLENGES 26
Climate change 26
Globalisation 27
Population growth 27
New diseases and pests 27
Financial constraints 29
Lack of knowledge 29
Emerging risks 29
BUILDING BIOSECURITY CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY 31
IMPLEMENTATION, REPORTING, REVIEW AND EVALUATION 31
OUTCOMES AND ACTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY 33
APPENDIX A: BIOSECURITY THREAT DECISION TREE 38
GLOSSARY 40
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 3
FOREWORD
I am delighted to present the ACT Biosecurity Strategy 2016 – 2026.
The ACT Government is committed to protecting the economy, environment
and community from the negative impacts of pests and diseases establishing
or spreading in the ACT.
The ACT Biosecurity Strategy 2016-2026 identifies the goals, objectives and
supporting actions for addressing identified risks.
This strategy acknowledges that biosecurity is a shared responsibility and
sets out recommended strategic directions for all stakeholders in the ACT’s
biosecurity to work towards over the next ten years. It provides the
foundations for government, industry, non-government organisations and
the community to work together and to share resources, knowledge and
expertise to develop a strong and integrated biosecurity system across all
land tenures.
I look forward to working with government agencies, industry, natural
resource managers, land custodians or users, and community groups to
strengthen the ACT’s biosecurity through the delivery of this strategy.
Mick Gentleman MLA
Minister for Planning and Land Management
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The effective management of biosecurity risks is critical to minimising the
impacts of weeds, pest animals, and plant and animal pests and diseases on
our economy, environment and the community. The ACT Biosecurity Strategy
highlights the importance of biosecurity for the ACT and identifies the goals,
objectives and supporting actions for addressing biosecurity across the
Territory.
This strategy acknowledges that biosecurity is a shared responsibility and
sets out recommended strategic directions for all stakeholders in the ACT’s
biosecurity to work towards over the next ten years. It provides the
foundations for governments, industry, non-government organisations and
the community to work together and to share resources, knowledge and
expertise to develop a strong and integrated biosecurity system for the ACT.
This strategy also recognises and responds to the fact that the ACT is
surrounded by NSW and must work closely together to manage shared
biosecurity threats. Hence its goals and outcomes are closely aligned with
those of NSW.
This strategy identifies the key factors influencing increasing biosecurity risks
and importantly, it recognises that zero biosecurity risk is unobtainable. The
strategy identifies the pre-border, border and post-border elements of the
biosecurity continuum1 at both the national and ACT level and outlines
actions for addressing biosecurity risks across the continuum to minimise the
likelihood of biosecurity incidents and to mitigate their impacts.
1 The system that manages biosecurity risks off-shore, at the border and onshore.
ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
VISION: BIOSECURITY – A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
Our vision is that biosecurity is recognised as a shared responsibility of governments, industry and the
community. We believe working toward this vision will enable the ACT to effectively meet the current and
future challenges posed by biosecurity risks. The effective management of biosecurity risks, in close
cooperation with NSW, will contribute to community wellbeing by supporting a strong local and regional
economy and a healthy environment.
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 5
WHAT IS BIOSECURITY?
“Biosecurity is the management of risks to the economy, the environment, and the community, of
pests and diseases entering, emerging, establishing or spreading.” (Intergovernmental Agreement
on Biosecurity2). Pests and diseases include weeds, pest animals, and pests and diseases of
plants and animals.
BROAD GOALS FOR BIOSECURITYThe ACT’s broad goals for biosecurity are to manage pest and disease
risks by:
• preventing their entry into the ACT;
• quickly finding, containing and eradicating any new entries; and
• effectively minimising the impacts of those pests and diseases that
cannot be eradicated.
2 http://www.coag.gov.au/node/47
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This strategy is underpinned by the principles listed below.
1. Biosecurity is a shared-responsibility between all governments, industry,
natural resource managers, land custodians or users, and the
community.
2. Effective biosecurity in the ACT is strengthened through close
cooperation with NSW Biosecurity.
3. In practical terms, zero biosecurity risk is unattainable.
4. The biosecurity continuum is managed through a nationally integrated
system that recognises and defines the roles and responsibilities of all
sectors and sets out cooperative activities.
5. The pre-border, border and post-border elements of the biosecurity
continuum are managed to minimise the likelihood of biosecurity
incidents and mitigate their impacts.
6. Activity is undertaken and investment is allocated according to a cost-
effective, science-based and risk-management approach, prioritising the
allocation of resources to the areas of greatest return.
7. Relevant parties contribute to the cost of biosecurity activities.
a. Risk creators and beneficiaries contribute to the cost of risk
management measures in proportion to the risks created and/or
benefits gained (subject to the efficiency of doing so).
b. Governments contribute to the cost of risk management measures
in proportion to the public good accruing from them.
8. Governments, industry and other relevant parties are involved in
decision-making, according to their roles, responsibilities and
contributions.
9. ACT’s biosecurity arrangements comply with its national and
international rights and obligations.
POLICY PRINCIPLES
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This strategy seeks to achieve the following outcomes:
• biosecurity is recognised as a shared responsibility by governments,
industry and the community
• biosecurity protects the environment and community and contributes
to sustainable economic growth
• biosecurity is underpinned by a responsive and consistent legislative
framework, risk management framework, business systems and
training.
SCOPE OF THE STRATEGYThis strategy covers threats to primary industries, the environment, social
amenity and human health in both terrestrial and aquatic environments
caused by:
• weeds and pest animals
• animal pests and diseases, including zoonotic diseases (diseases of
animals that may be transmitted to man under natural conditions –
eg. brucellosis, rabies) plant pests and diseases.
This strategy does not address:
• chemical issues (including contamination or residue issues)
• food safety (except issues associated with zoonoses)
• genetically modified organisms
• animal welfare (except issues associated with animal health).
OUTCOMES
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The total area of the ACT is 235,829 hectares of which 53% is conservation area, 21% is rural and
the remainder is urban.
The ACT’s natural assets include Namadgi National Park, which comprises 46% of the ACT and lies at the northern end
of the Australian Alps National Parks, and Canberra Nature Park, which is interspersed with urban centres and gives
the ACT its bush capital image.
Canberra’s urban forest with over 620,000 exotic and native trees is a significant amenity asset to the city.
All rural land in the ACT under private control is held under some form of lease, licence or agistment agreement.
Tenure for rural leases ranges from quarterly to 99 years. The majority of new leases require the lessee to prepare a
Land Management Agreement. This agreement requires the lessee to identify the type and number of stock to be
held on the lease. It also requires the lessee to identify pest animal and weed problems and to identify a control
program and timeframe in which to undertake this program.
Grazing of sheep and cattle is the primary activity conducted on rural land in the ACT. There are 190 leases ranging in
size from 1 hectare to 2,500 hectares. There are normally about 78,000 sheep, 12,000 cattle, 1,500 horses and
200,000 chickens held on these lands, however these numbers fluctuate in response to seasonal variations such as
drought.
There are currently no feedlots, abattoirs or piggeries in the ACT and it is highly unlikely any will be established due to
restrictions in the Territory Plan.
There are three poultry farms, the largest of which has approximately 200,000 laying hens. There is no other poultry
farm for at least 50 kilometres.
The ACT government is responsible for the monitoring of the Canberra saleyards. Approximately 400 – 600 cattle pass
through these saleyards each fortnight.
There are three significant zoological establishments in the ACT, one is the National Zoo and Aquarium (exotic and
native animals) the other two are Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve and the Mulligans Flat Woodlands Sanctuary
(native animals).
Forestry is the dominant plant industry in the ACT with 7,000 hectares of pine plantation under management. A small
amount of grain and fodder cropping also occurs on rural leases.
The largest horticultural industry in the ACT is grape growing however there are small apple orchards, plantings of
olives, truffle farms, a turf farm and a few market gardens. With its predominantly urban population and garden city
ethos, gardening is popular and there is a thriving nursery industry.
Urban and suburban areas provide residential living for most of the ACT’s population of 385,6003 and communal
facilities such as sportsgrounds, public open spaces, shopping centres, roads, utilities and other infrastructure.
3 http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/mf/3101.0
WHAT ARE WE PROTECTING
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The objectives of the strategy are to:
• communicate a clear vision and build support for a strong and
integrated biosecurity system for the ACT
• help meet the ACT’s obligations under national biosecurity agreements
• provide the foundation for all stakeholders – government agencies,
industry, natural resource managers, land custodians or users and
community groups – to work together and help to make best use of the
synergies across all groups
• identify a clear set of outcomes and actions that are relevant to the
ACT and aligned with those of NSW4
• provide a framework for more detailed planning, monitoring and
reporting of biosecurity programs.
4 http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/biosecurity/biosecurity-strategy
OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY
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This strategy is consistent with current ACT and Commonwealth biosecurity legislation and
strategies, as well as national and cross-border agreements, in particular the Intergovernmental
Agreement on Biosecurity, which was developed in response to the Beale review5 of Australia’s
quarantine and biosecurity arrangements.
Biosecurity in the ACT is currently governed by the following legislation and respective subordinate legislation and
supporting strategies and plans:
• Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth)
• Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)
• Animal Diseases Act 2005 (ACT)
• Plant Diseases Act 2002 (ACT)
• Pest Plants and Animals Act 2005 (ACT)
• Nature Conservation Act 2014 (ACT)
• Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT)
• Fisheries Act 2000 (ACT)
• ACT Pest Animal Management Strategy 2012 – 2022
• ACT Weeds Strategy 2009 – 2019
• ACT Biosecurity Emergency Plan
Commonwealth LegislationThe Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) (the Act) will commence on 16 June 2016. The Act was developed to underpin a more
modern and responsive biosecurity system consistent with the findings of the Beale review.
The Beale review recommended a shift in focus from ‘quarantine’, which has a largely defensive connotation
associated with isolation, to the broader concept of ‘biosecurity’ with an emphasis on managing risk rather than
eliminating it, and a shift from a border focus to encompass fully pre-border and post-border measures.
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) provides for the protection of the
environment – especially matters of national environmental significance, and controls the international movement of
plants and animals (wildlife), wildlife specimens and products made or derived from wildlife. Trading in wildlife can
pose a serious threat to Australia’s unique biodiversity and to plants and animals around the world.
Wildlife from other parts of the world can present a biosecurity risk if imported into Australia. That’s why Australia
strictly regulates the international movement of animals and plants, and animal and plant products.
5 http://www.agriculture.gov.au/about/annualreport/annual-report-2008-09/annual-report-2008-09/special-report-review-australian-quarantine-biosecurity- bealereview
POLICY CONTEXT
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 11
ACT LegislationThe objectives of the Animal Diseases Act 2005 (ACT) and the Plant Diseases Act 2002 (ACT) are to protect the health
and welfare of people and animals and to protect markets relating to animals and plants and associated products.
These Acts provide mechanisms for the detection, prevention and control of outbreaks of endemic and exotic animal
and plant diseases in the ACT, and allow the Territory to assist in the prevention and control of outbreaks of endemic
and exotic animal and plant diseases in other jurisdictions within Australia. The Acts outline procedures for imposing
quarantines, prohibiting entry of material that could spread disease and for dealing with outbreak of diseases or
pests. They provide for the declaration of a notifiable disease or pest.
The objectives of the Pest Plants and Animals Act 2005 (ACT) are to protect the ACT’s land and aquatic resources from
threats from pest plants and pest animals (including fish and invertebrates) and to promote a strategic approach to
pest management. This Act provides for the declaration of various classes of pest plants and animals of concern, the
preparation of pest plant and animal management plans in response to a declaration and establishes authority for the
control of declared pest species. Land managers also have certain responsibilities under this Act.
The Nature Conservation Act 2014 (ACT) provides for the protection and management of native plants and animals,
the identification of threatened species and ecological communities, management of national parks and reserves, and
the conservation of the ACT’s natural resources. It provides for the preparation of a Nature Conservation Strategy and
action plans for threatened and migratory species, threatened ecological communities and key threatening processes.
The Act’s provisions include restrictions on importing and exporting plants or animals that may threaten biodiversity,
penalties for the release of animals from captivity and for taking an invasive plant into a reserve, and for licensing the
import and keeping of exotic wild animals. There is also provision for developing a Controlled Native Species
Management Plan that can provide protection when native plants or animals are having an unacceptable impact on
an environmental, social or economic asset.
The Emergencies ACT 2004 (ACT) provides for the protection and preservation of life, property and the environment
as well as effective emergency management. Emergency events include ‘epidemic or animal disease’ (eg, Foot and
Mouth Disease, Equine Influenza). In a serious biosecurity emergency an emergency controller would be appointed
who can control the movement of people, animals and vehicles in and around the emergency area and take control or
possession of property, animals, substances or things in or near an emergency area.
The Fisheries Act 2000 (ACT) provides for the conservation of native fish species6 and their habitats, sustainable
management of the ACT’s fisheries, and provision of high quality and viable recreational fishing. This Act also
regulates the taking, releasing, selling, exporting and importing of fish. The Act provides for the declaration of noxious
fish species, however, these are routinely declared as pest animals under the ACT Pest Plants and Animals Act 2005.
The Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT) provides for a Land Management Agreement (LMA) to be entered into
between the Conservator and the lessee upon the granting of a rural lease. Its principal objective is to establish
appropriate sustainable agricultural management practices and good farm biosecurity for the subject land while
maintaining any ecological and cultural values present on the land, and protecting the environment from harm.
As at 2016 the ACT does not have stand-alone biosecurity legislation. This strategy identifies the need for a single
contemporary, consolidated biosecurity act that supports the policy principles identified and is consistent with ACT’s
national and international obligations and responsibilities. Any legislative reforms will also need to be consistent with
the ACT’s human rights obligations under the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
6 Note that threatened native fish species are also protected under the ACT Nature Conservation Act 2014 (ACT).
PAGE 12 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
ACT Strategies and PlansThe ACT Pest Animal Management Strategy 2012 – 2022 sets the framework
and approach for managing the negative impacts of pest animals in the ACT
and provides support to all stakeholders with responsibility for, or interest in,
managing pest animals in the Territory.
The ACT Weeds Strategy 2009 – 2019 aims to reduce the impact of weeds on
the environment, the economy, human health and amenity. It recognises
that weed management is an integral component of sustainable
management of natural resources and the environment, and that weed
management requires an integrated, whole of community and government
approach.
The ACT Emergency Plan and the ACT Biosecurity Emergency Sub-plan
provide the Territory’s emergency response arrangements for responding to
biosecurity emergencies.
Intergovernmental Deeds and AgreementsThe ACT supports a national approach to biosecurity and in January 2012
signed the national agreement on biosecurity between the Commonwealth,
States and Territories – the Intergovernmental Agreement on
Biosecurity (IGAB).
The IGAB strengthens the collaborative approach by the Commonwealth,
States and Territories in managing biosecurity issues. It is underpinned by
three national agreements: the Emergency Animal Disease Response
Agreement (EADRA), the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) and
the National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA). Each
of these agreements includes a number of Commonwealth, State/ Territory
and industry commitments, including that State and Territory level legislation
must be reviewed to ensure consistency with the national approach.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between ACT and Commonwealth
legislation, intergovernmental deeds and agreements and the strategy. In
addition, the strategy is informed by and contributes to ACT strategic plans,
such as the ACT Pest Animal Management Strategy and the ACT Weeds
Strategy. Figure 1 shows key elements in the implementation of the strategy,
which will underpin the biosecurity system in the ACT (see next section).
Review and evaluation of implementation success will provide for continuous
improvement of the strategy.
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 13
IMPLEM
ENTATIO
N
Emergency Response PlansAction Plans
DEVELO
PMEN
T OF TH
E BIO
SECURITY STRATEG
Y
Figure 1: Context of the ACT Biosecurity Strategy
• GOAL
• PRINCIPLES
• OUTCOMES
• ACTIONS
Related Legislation (ACT and Commonwealth)
Intergovernmental Deeds and Agreements on biosecurity
ACT Strategic Plans
Review and Evaluation – Continuous Improvement
ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY
ACT BIOSECURITY COORDINATION COMMITTEE
PAGE 14 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
Effective biosecurity contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity
of the ACT. We need to manage biosecurity risks effectively to
protect the economy, environment and community.
WHY BIOSECURITY IS IMPORTANT
EconomyAustralian products have preferred access to international markets because they are free of many of the pests and
diseases found elsewhere. For example, an outbreak of a serious animal disease such as foot and mouth disease
would result in the immediate closure of Australia’s largest international markets for livestock and meat products.
Terrestrial and aquatic weeds and introduced pest animal species (pigs, foxes, cats, rabbits, wild dogs) have significant
impacts on the ACT in terms of the cost of management programs and loss of agricultural productivity.
EnvironmentPests and diseases are among the biggest threats to the ACT’s biodiversity and environment. Introduced pest animal
species (eg, pigs, foxes, cats, rabbits, wild dogs, exotic fish) are primary causes of extinctions, contribute to the decline
of many other native plants and animals, cause soil erosion and damage aquatic environments.
Environmental weeds are one of the most significant threats to biodiversity in the ACT. They displace native species,
reduce habitat quality, modify vegetation structure and alter ecological functions. For example serrated tussock, a
perennial, drought-resistant highly invasive tussock-forming grass, can develop into a monoculture within a few of
years when left uncontrolled, completely excluding other vegetation. It can colonise both native and
introduced pastures.
Exotic pests and diseases such as parasites of fish, dieback fungus (Phytophthora cinnamomi) and myrtle rust are an
additional threat to biodiversity, with the potential to affect a wide range of native species.
Photo S Miller
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 15
CommunityBiosecurity risks if not adequately managed can directly affect both human health and the community’s ability
to enjoy their surroundings.
Human HealthSome animal diseases can be transmitted from animals to people and cause disease and death. Examples include
avian influenza, swine flu, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), rabies, Hendra virus, anthrax, Menangle virus,
Australian Bat Lyssavirus and bacterial organisms (Salmonella, Escherichia coli, Listeria, Campylobacter).
Public AmenityPeoples’ enjoyment of the outdoors can be adversely affected by some pests and diseases. For example European
wasps, which have spread throughout the ACT since their first observed occurrence in the 1980s, prefer to nest
around human habitation where they can scavenge food and sweet liquids. They can sting repeatedly and the stings
are very painful. Large numbers of wasps can be attracted to picnics and barbecues and interfere with
outdoor activities.
If red imported fire ants, which are currently limited to small areas of Queensland, were to become established in the
ACT, they would seriously impact on our outdoor lifestyle. In the United States, people in fire ant- infested areas have
changed their habits to avoid exposure to the ant. For example, people do not have picnics on the lawn, go barefoot
or sit or lie on the ground or even stand for too long in one spot because they will be stung. The ACT Government
contributes annually to two national programs to eradicate this pest under the NEBRA and a NEBRA-like agreement.
Destruction of a large European wasp nest – Youth Haven Farm Tuggeranong.
PAGE 16 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
The Red Imported Fire Ant (RIFA) originates from South America.
First detected in the Brisbane area in February 2001 the RIFA
has so far been confined to a small area in south east
Queensland.
The RIFA poses a serious social, economic and environmental threat.
Fire ants are very aggressive and are voracious feeders on small ground
fauna, including insects, spiders, lizards, frogs, birds and mammals.
Consequently, fire ants may displace or eliminate some of Australia’s unique
native species. The ants’ habit of eating or damaging seeds can cause major
changes in an ecosystem over time. Fire ants are also predatory, attacking
insects and animals that pollinate native plants.
Newborn or hatching animals are particularly prone to attacks that can lead
to death. Fire ants attack young animals and sting in and around the eyes,
which can lead to blindness; and around the mouth and nose, which can
lead to swelling and suffocation.
Fire ants sometimes feed on seeds, and can fatally damage some plants by
tunnelling through roots and stems. They protect some species of pest
insects that produce ‘honeydew’. This downgrades the quality of produce
and assists in the spread of some diseases.
Fire ants will also feed on important biological control agents and interfere
with integrated pest management practices.
Fire ant mounds can destroy equipment such as irrigation systems and can
also damage machinery during harvesting operations.
Fire ants also invade the food and water supplies of animals. The animals are
unable to reach the food or water without being seriously stung, and this
can lead to starvation and dehydration.
Stings from fire ants can cause a painful, burning itching sensation, which
can last for up to an hour. Multiple stings give the sensation that the body
is on fire.
There have been no detection’s of
RIFA in the ACT or surrounding
NSW. ‘High risk’ enterprises in the
ACT include garden centres,
interstate removalists and their
storage facilities, and fruit and
vegetable wholesalers.
CASE STUDY RED IMPORTED FIRE ANTPhotos Q
ueensland Government Departm
ent of Agriculture and Fisheries
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 17
Shared responsibility
This strategy recognises that biosecurity is a shared responsibility. Maintaining and improving the
ACT’s biosecurity status is the responsibility of stakeholders such as governments, industry, natural
resource managers, land custodians or users, educational and research institutions and the
community (Table 1). This strategy aims to strengthen the cooperation between all stakeholders in
managing the ACT’s biosecurity.
Table 1: Major Stakeholders Roles and Responsibilities
Stakeholders Biosecurity Management objectives
Responsibilities
ACT Government
Government veterinarians, Chief Plant Protection Officer, pest plant and animal managers – Parks and Conservation Service (PCS) and City Services, Environment and Planning Directorate, Emergency Services Agency, ACT Policing and ACT Health
Protect agricultural industries, biodiversity and social amenity values from incursions of pests and diseases in rural and urban areas of the ACT.
Undertake biosecurity surveillance, eradication, containment and management programs in accordance with statutory requirements and intergovernmental agreements that address potential and actual pest and disease threats to rural industry, the natural environment and public amenities.
Detect and report notifiable and prohibited pest plants and animal occurrences.
Maintain a competent biosecurity emergency response capability.
Provide leadership and coordination of biosecurity programs across different land uses and tenure.
Deliver nationally consistent biosecurity outcomes through cooperation with regional and national forums and networks.
Contribute to biosecurity research and education programs.
Promote wider public understanding and awareness through community engagement and provision of information on pest and disease impacts and management issues.
Undertake, monitor and evaluate government-funded pest and disease management programs.
Regulators – Licensing and Compliance, Transport Canberra and City Services Directorate (TCCSD)
License plant and animal imports and exports; inspect premises and facilities for licence compliance and prohibited pest plants and animal species.
Implement regulatory requirements and support programs that encourage responsible importing, exporting and of keeping of plants and animals with the potential to be a threat to biosecurity.
Maintain a register of importers and keepers of pest plants and animals.
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE BIOSECURITY SYSTEM
PAGE 18 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
Stakeholders Biosecurity Management objectives
Responsibilities
Legislation and policy makers – Environment and Planning Directorate (EPD)
Develop and amend biosecurity related legislation and policies that guide emergency preparedness, response, management and regulation.
Provide legislative and policy frameworks that protect the biosecurity of the ACT and surrounding region.
Consider stakeholder and community interests in policy development.
ACT Biosecurity Coordination Committee
Minimise the risk of entry, establishment or spread of exotic and endemic pests and diseases that have the potential to cause significant harm to people, animals, plants and the ACT’s environment.
Identify potential, emerging and established biosecurity threats and risk processes for the ACT.
Advise on ranking of priorities for biosecurity action on a risk management basis.
Advise on risks and best practice management for priority species and assets.
Provide advice and leadership for coordinated surveillance, management and monitoring programs across the biosecurity continuum.
Develop and implement an annual action plan.
Promote communication between relevant stakeholders and provide advice and leadership to achieve strategic, coordinated biosecurity management across conservation, rural and urban lands in the ACT.
Advise on training requirements and priorities to ensure that ACT Government officers have core competencies for managing a biosecurity emergency and delivering effective operational outcomes.
Liaise and cooperate with NSW and Commonwealth stakeholders (and other jurisdictions as required) to deliver whole-of-ACT and cross-border biosecurity management outcomes.
Ensure biosecurity management initiatives are consistent with ACT policies and legislation, and with national policies and legislation to which the ACT is subordinate, or is a member or signatory.
Deliver the strategic actions agreed in the ACT Biosecurity Strategy.
Commissioner for Sustainability and the Environment
Monitor the impact and management of pest plants and animals on biodiversity in the ACT.
Provide recommendations to the ACT Government regarding pest plant and animal management through State of Environment reports, referred investigations and complaint resolution processes.
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 19
Stakeholders Biosecurity Management objectives
Responsibilities
Australian Government – Managers of National Lands
Manage pest plant and animals to maintain public amenities and safety; manage in accordance with specific land uses.
Manage in accordance with Commonwealth legislation.
Detect and report notifiable and prohibited pest plant and animal occurrences.
Collaborate with other ACT land managers on coordinated pest plant and animal management programs to enhance outcomes on adjacent land management areas and maximise efficiency and benefits.
Provide input to Australian and ACT Government legislation, policy, regulation and management frameworks.
NSW Government agencies
Effectively manage biosecurity pests and diseases in NSW including regions adjacent to the ACT border.
Collaborate with ACT biosecurity stakeholders to address management issues and to develop and implement coordinated cross-border biosecurity emergency response and management programs to maximise efficiency and mutual benefits.
ACT rural landholders Implement sound farm biosecurity and biodiversity management practices to protect the property from the entry and spread of pests and diseases6.
Recognise the nature and causes of pest and disease impacts on agriculture and biodiversity.
Detect and report notifiable and prohibited pest and disease occurrences.
Manage pest and disease problems using appropriate techniques and practices.
Cooperate with adjacent land managers to deliver positive pest and disease management outcomes.
Provide input to government legislation, policy, regulation and management frameworks.
Protect threatened species and communities through implementation of Land Management Agreements.
Utilities Assist in preventing the spread of pests and diseases
Comply with sound farm biosecurity practices.
Notify farm or land manager before entering a rural property or nature reserve.
Wash down vehicles prior to entering a property and remain on formed roads.
ACT Aboriginal community
Prevent damage to native plants, animals and ecosystems, and cultural assets of significance to the Aboriginal community.
Recognise the nature and causes of pest plant and animal impacts on significant native plants, animals and ecosystems, and cultural assets.
Advise the ACT Government and other land managers of impacts on significant assets and work collaboratively to reduce, remove or restore damage.
Provide input into government legislation, policy, regulation and management frameworks.
7 http://www.farmbiosecurity.com.au
PAGE 20 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
Stakeholders Biosecurity Management objectives
Responsibilities
Plant and animal biosecurity researchers
Improve understanding of the biology and ecology of biosecurity pests and diseases and research on management practices.
Support research to address gaps in knowledge on biosecurity pests and diseases and management techniques and practices, in collaboration with stakeholders.
Ensure research outcomes are delivered to relevant stakeholders.
Horticulturists and plant nurseries. Animal traders, breeders and keepers
Avoid importing, exporting, keeping, breeding and sale of potential pest plants and animals for commercial purposes and/or personal interest.
Refrain from the import or propagation/breeding and cultivation/keeping of pest plants and animals declared as prohibited species in the ACT
Obtain a licence and registration, when required, to import, export, keep, sell and take plant and animal species, or release them from captivity.
Maintain records in accordance with licence requirements.
Minimise the risk of escape of species with pest plant or animal potential.
Report escapes in accordance with legislative requirements.
Promote awareness and understanding of pest plant and animal management issues by industry, trade, keeper and breeder groups.
Provide input to government legislation, policy, regulation and management frameworks.
Community members and groups
Voluntary leadership and participation in the management of private and public lands including conservation (eg, National Parks Association; Conservation Council), Park Care and catchment groups.
Ensuring that threats to conservation are appropriately managed.
Provide leadership and coordination for local group development and action on pest animal problems.
Cooperate with other land managers and rural landholders to achieve local and regional pest plant and animal management outcomes.
Promote awareness and understanding of pest plant and animal issues amongst community groups.
Represent members’ interests at pest plant and animal management networks and forums.
Provide input to government legislation, policy, regulation and management frameworks.
Travellers to the ACT Prevent the introduction of biosecurity pests and diseases into the ACT.
Comply with any quarantine requirements when entering the ACT.
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 21
The ACT Government works with the Australian Government and other state and territory governments to develop
and implement intergovernmental deeds and agreements and other national biosecurity initiatives (Figure 2).
Coordination is achieved through the National Biosecurity Committee and its sectoral committees under the guidance
of the Agriculture Ministers’ Forum and Agriculture Senior Officials Committee. Under emergency response deeds and
agreements for nationally significant pests and diseases (generally those that affect or have the potential to affect
more than one jurisdiction), a National Management Group convenes to address each new pest or disease incursion,
with technical advice provided by a supporting Consultative Committee.
Figure 2: Arrangements supporting Australia’s biosecurity system in 2015.
1 The Invasive Plants and Animal Commi�ee has replaced the Australian Weeds Commi�ee and the Vertebrate Pests Commi�ee
The Invasive Plants and Animal Commi�ee1
PAGE 22 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
The ACT is not an islandThe ACT is unique in its location. Unlike the other Australian states and the Northern Territory, the ACT is surrounded
by another jurisdiction (NSW) and has no coastline. These differences must be taken into account when considering
biosecurity risk management. There are no natural barriers to incursions and given the potential for cross-border
incursions to occur, the ACT must work cooperatively and collaboratively with NSW to identify and address
biosecurity risks.
Current cross-border arrangements with NSW that help to reduce the ACT’s biosecurity risk include close operational
cooperation with regional Local Land Services and a Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural and
Animal Related Emergencies.
The ACT would benefit from greater collaboration with NSW on joint staff training programs, participation in NSW
emergency responses and access to NSW biosecurity information systems and beekeeper registration.
Appropriate Level of ProtectionThis strategy recognises that zero biosecurity risk is unattainable and supports the concept of an Appropriate Level of
Protection as determined by the Australian Government in accordance with the World Trade Organisation’s Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Agreement under the provisions of the IGAB.
The Appropriate Level of Protection for Australia is a high level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection aimed at
reducing biosecurity risks to a very low level, but not zero.
Biosecurity continuumThe biosecurity continuum refers to the range of locations where biosecurity risks may arise – pre-border, at the
border and post-border – and the activities undertaken across these locations. An integrated biosecurity system
involves risk assessment and monitoring, surveillance and response across all three elements of the continuum
(ie, pre-border, at the border and post-border). Each member of the community has a role to play across the
biosecurity continuum to prevent, prepare for, detect and mitigate biosecurity risks, and respond to, manage and
recover from biosecurity incidents should they occur. However, responsibility for primary oversight of pre-border and
border biosecurity arrangements lies with the Australian Government, and primary oversight of post-border
biosecurity arrangements lies with state and territory governments.
Risk-managementDecision-making and investment decisions must be based on a sound risk-management framework that considers the
economic, environmental and community benefits and costs of each option. This is particularly relevant to a small
jurisdiction with limited resources such as the ACT.
The ACT therefore needs to develop a biosecurity risk management system that will identify and prioritise known
threats and help prepare for the unknown.
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 23
Prioritising biosecurity investmentsThe ACT Government has many calls on its budget. It is important that investment in biosecurity is directed to where
return on investment is highest. Figure 3 illustrates the return on investment for different phases of a generalised
invasion curve and appropriate actions for management. It highlights that a high return on investment is achieved
through preventing entry of exotic and new threats, followed by early intervention and eradication if they do appear
as opposed to investing in the management of widely established invasive species. This principle can generally be
applied across the board to all pests and diseases. However, there are exceptions, for example, the use of biological
control agents to manage widely established pest species such as rabbits can provide a high return on investment.
Also, focusing resources on surveillance activities is not always cost effective if efforts are poorly targeted and no
detections are made.
Figure 3: Appropriate management actions and economic returns at different phases of a generalised invasion curve
(sourced from Biosecurity Victoria, Department of Primary Industries, Victoria).
AREA
OCC
UPI
ED
TIME
ASSET BASED PROTECTION
PREVENTION
CONTAINMENT
ERADICATION
ECONOMIC RETURNS (indicative only)
Entry of invasive species
1:1–5ASSET BASED PROTECTION
1:100PREVENTION
1:25ERADICATION
1:5–10CONTAINMENT
Invasive species widespread and abundant throughout its potential range
Species absent
Rapid incresase indistribution and abundance,many populations
Small numberof localisedpopulations
PAGE 24 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
To assist in prioritising where to invest scarce resources and what approach to take, the Territory will use the NSW
Department of Primary Industries’ Biosecurity Threat Decision Tree as shown in Appendix A. This model, which is
based on economic principles, ensures that biosecurity investment decisions are made as objectively as possible.
It determines whether a role for government exists in relation to a specific problem by using ‘market’ failure tests.
It guides the user to identify one of several government activities or programs that have the potential to address the
problem in question and where appropriate the most appropriate cost recovery mechanism.
Science-based decision-makingRisk assessments, decisions and investments must be underpinned by robust scientific evidence. Access to leading-
edge, rapid diagnostics and scientific knowledge to guide treatment and control strategies is important, particularly
during an emergency. Being a small jurisdiction, the ACT does not have the capacity to maintain its own diagnostic
and research facilities and must rely on interstate public sector and private cooperation. Better linkages will need to
be formed with NSW and Victorian facilities, the CSIRO, cooperative research centres, universities and the health
sector to support rapid decision making in relation to ACT emergency incursions.
Appropriate support mechanismsAn effective biosecurity system must be supported by modern legislation, technology, funding and business systems
which support quick response and seamless cross-border cooperation in the event of a biosecurity emergency.
Continual improvementTo ensure continual improvement in biosecurity, this strategy and its supporting documents will be reviewed and
evaluated periodically in consultation with key stakeholders, and consequential changes made as required.
Photo L Padgham
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 25
Strategic leadership and coordination is provided by the ACT Biosecurity
Coordination Committee (BCC) which oversees the development and
implementation of effective and integrated biosecurity legislation, policy and
management programs. An ACT Weeds Advisory Group and a Pest Animal
Management Group are subordinate groups that support the BCC.
GOVERNANCEPhoto M
t Majura Vineyard
PAGE 26 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
Pests and diseases can inflict damage to our crops, livestock
and farm profits, to our unique environment, urban amenity
and occasionally on our human health.
To date Australia’s geographic isolation, a history of strong quarantine measures and world class science and research
capabilities have spared us from some of the serious impacts of exotic pests and diseases that circulate around the
world. However, we are becoming increasingly vulnerable to their entry with increasing global trade and
interconnectedness, and Australia is facing a greater challenge in protecting itself against biosecurity threats.
A changing climate, increases in the movement of plants, animals and people, together with declining levels of
expertise and resources in the biosecurity system, is placing pressure on Australia’s future ability to protect itself from
exotic pest and disease threats, from emerging threats closer to home and to some established pests and diseases
that represent an ongoing challenge.
According to the CSIRO the threat of invasive species to biodiversity is second only to habitat destruction. The CSIRO8
(2014) estimates that alien invertebrate and vertebrate pest animals and weeds cost Australia at least $7 billion a
year. In 2014/15 the ACT spent $2.6 million on environmental weeds and vertebrate pests. It is estimated that 25% of
costs to Australian consumers associated with food products are due to invasive pests and diseases. Weeds alone cost
Australia approximately $4 billion in control measures and loss of production each year.
Over the past three decades 70% of emerging diseases in people have originated in animals. Hendra virus,
Coronaviruses like SARS and avian influenza are just a few diseases that fall within this category (CSIRO, 2013)9.
There are a number of key factors influencing Australia’s and the Territory’s increasing biosecurity risk exposure.
These are described below.
Climate changeModelling undertaken on behalf of the ACT and NSW Governments10
suggests that the effects of climate change in the ACT are likely to include:
• warmer average temperatures leading to more severe drought and
extreme bushfire weather
• less overall rainfall with a change in the seasonal distribution and more
frequent intense storm events.
Changes in climate will mean that for some species to survive they will need
to either relocate or adapt. For other species the new climatic conditions
will provide an opportunity for them to establish or to extend their range.
A good example of this in the ACT is Madagascan Fireweed.
8 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Biosecurity http://www.csiro.au/en/Research/BF
9 http://www.csiro.au/en/Research/BF
10 See ACT Planning Strategy http://www.planning.act.gov.au/tools_resources/legislation_plans_registers/plans/planning_strategy
MANAGING RISK – RESPONDING TO INCREASING CHALLENGES
MANAGING RISK – RESPONDING TO INCREASING CHALLENGES
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 27
Pests will generally extend southwards and to higher altitudes as a result of warming trends. Likely impacts of climate
change are listed below:
• an increase in the risk of invasion by alien organisms new to Australia
• habitats will adapt and change in response to the changes in climatic conditions
• habitats affected by extreme climatic events may leave empty niches which pest animals and weeds colonise
• existing native or exotic species that were not previously pest species (‘sleeper’ species) could thrive under the
changing conditions and become pest species
• the demise of native or exotic species may provide the opportunity for other ‘sleeper’ pest species to establish
or increase their range due the lack of competition or natural control measures such as predation or grazing
• extreme storm events could lead to the escape of exotic animals which could then establish wild populations
that have the potential to become pests
• increases in flood events and flood mitigation measures could also increase the rate of spread of aquatic pest
plants and animals
• increases in fire and drought will favour the establishment of some weeds.
In responding to climate change challenges, the ACT has developed a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. This
adaptation strategy will help identify key impacts and risks for the agriculture sector, allowing it to better plan for
the future and enabling regional food security.
GlobalisationGlobalisation is integrating the world economy and increasing the volume and range of products traded
internationally.
Increases in tourism and a greater demand for international goods have contributed to a growth in passenger and
cargo movements, all of which increase the risk of exotic pest and disease incursions despite the best efforts of
border security. Australia’s biosecurity is particularly vulnerable to the influx of goods from the Asian sub-continent as
these countries host many new and emerging diseases but may lack the resources to manage biosecurity challenges.
The risk is increased where poor socio-economic conditions exist in the country of origin.
Modern communications, in particular the internet, are increasing the trade in exotic plant and animal species for
pets and commercial use and this increases the risk to our biosecurity. There has also been an increase in global
movements of genetic material as farmers endeavour to increase productivity, which places particular demands on
pre and post-border biosecurity services.
Population growthPopulation spread into new habitats, the urbanisation of rural regions, and increasingly intensive agriculture all
complicate the ability to contain a pest or disease incursion and the risk of zoonoses.
New diseases and pestsNew pests and diseases are emerging from a range of sources such as trade including an increase in internet trading,
changing environmental conditions driven by climate trends, ornamental plants escaping from home gardens and
increased visitation to natural areas.
PAGE 28 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
The plant forms a persistent seed bank if not controlled before it flowers.
It can also rapidly take over heavily grazed and neglected pastures and
roadsides, competing strongly with existing plants. It seeds prolifically and
grows to maturity quickly.
Madagascan Fireweed reproduces almost exclusively by seed. It can alter its
germination response, adapting its growing and flowering behaviours to suit
changing environmental conditions. The weed is commonly found in coastal
areas of NSW and is an occasional occurrence in the surrounding regions.
The first incursion of Madagascan Fireweed occurred in the ACT in 2011.
Since that time small infestations have been detected and have quickly been
brought under control. However, in July 2014 significant infestations of
Madagascan Fireweed were discovered in a number of ACT suburbs after
it was introduced in couch turf and landscape materials sourced from
interstate. The ACT Government responded quickly, activating its Biosecurity
Emergency Plan.
CASE STUDY: MADAGASCAN FIREWEED (SENECIO MADAGASCARIENSIS)
A public awareness campaign was
initiated to alert the public of the
risks associated with the weed, to
assist them in the identification of
the weed and to inform them of
what they should do if they see this
weed. ACT Government staff
responded to reported sightings,
working to control the incursion as
quickly as possible and to remove
the plant before it flowered and its
seeds spread. A monitoring
program was then put in place to
ensure any further outbreaks are
controlled quickly.
Madagascan Fireweed is a Weed of National Significance and a Prohibited Pest Plant in the ACT. It
is poisonous to horses and cattle and has the potential to invade native grasslands and quickly
degrade agricultural pasture. Control costs can be high.
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 29
Financial constraintsGovernments need to allocate scarce revenue among many competing demands so it is essential that costs of
ensuring biosecurity are shared fairly across all risk creators and beneficiaries, and government funding is directed to
the areas of greatest risk and greatest public benefit. Limited resources mean a limited capacity to undertake pest
management programs or regulatory activities such as regular inspection of plant nurseries, pet shops, imported soil,
fodder and turf, and markets and fetes.
Lack of knowledgeThere is likely to be an emerging shortage of highly qualified plant and animal pest and disease professionals – partly
associated with ‘baby boomer’ retirements and partly the result of competing career alternatives.
There are often gaps in knowledge and understanding relating to pest species due to lack of existing information,
related research or effective extension of research outcomes. This is particularly relevant to new and emerging pests.
Emerging risksChanging agricultural and socio-economic conditions and the growth of Canberra will present new biosecurity risks in
the future. The Canberra Airport will commence catering for international flights in 2016 and the Master Plan for the
airport includes an intention to use its 24-hour status to become Sydney’s freight airport. This will provide a direct
pathway for exotic overseas pests and diseases to enter into the ACT and require establishment of stronger
quarantine border controls. The return of defence aircraft from overseas direct to the Fairbairn Air Force facility is
another potential entry point for new pests and diseases that threaten the Territory’s biosecurity. The ACT
Government will need to work closely with the Australian Government to tighten border biosecurity through these
entry points.
Likely future peri-urban development, including growth in smaller scale farming and lifestyle enterprises in rural
communities, the growing popularity of urban agriculture ventures in an around the ACT and a culture of non-
traditional crops and livestock, will increase the range of biosecurity pest and disease threats which may have to be
responded to.
Meeting community expectations for greater variety and availability of food, garden and amenity plants and for new
and exotic animals also creates new pathways for the introduction of pests and diseases to the primary industries and
environmental sectors.
The growth in pesticide resistance amongst existing weed and pest species is also of concern. Poor practices in the
use of chemicals and antibiotics used to treat pests and diseases can lead to resistance to treatments and make weed
species more difficult to control.
The ACT Biosecurity Strategy will apply the precautionary principle to emerging risks and assume a steadily increasing
biosecurity threat from external sources such as trade and the movement of goods and services entering the ACT.
PAGE 30 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
The Red-eared Slider Turtle is an American species which cannot
be kept legally in Australia as it has become an invasive pest
animal in several states. It is important to prevent this species
spreading through the Murray-Darling Basin. Keeping of other
related species is also illegal. To date two Red-eared Slider
Turtles have been found in the ACT, one was an escaped pet
and the other was found living in a dam near the
Murrumbidgee River.
Some aquarium plants and animals, exotic reptiles and ferrets are all animals
that have a proven record of establishing in the wild near the ACT.
CASE STUDY: CASE STUDY – RED-EARED SLIDER TURTLE
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 31
The ACT is a small jurisdiction which demands innovative solutions for
meeting our biosecurity responsibilities. These will include:
• prioritising biosecurity resources and investment to areas of greatest
biosecurity risk and impact
• developing a contemporary legislative framework and reducing the
regulatory burden and compliance costs facing ACT residents when they
manage pests and diseases, while improving regulatory capacity
• taking a more strategic approach to the science that underpins
biosecurity and the adoption of technology through stronger
partnerships, particularly with our universities and the CSIRO, better
linkages with the national industry groups based in Canberra and better
extension with local industries
• increasing the awareness of biosecurity in government, industry and the
community to get more people involved in managing biosecurity risks
and help them understand the role they play
• building the capability of Canberrans to undertake biosecurity activities
and deliver biosecurity services in partnership with Government
• forming stronger linkages and increasing cooperation and coordination
with NSW and other jurisdictions to reduce the risk of incursions and
improve our capacity to address them
• identifying suitable funding sources, including cost sharing where
appropriate, to support biosecurity activity
IMPLEMENTATION, REPORTING, REVIEW AND EVALUATIONThe Biosecurity Coordination Committee (BCC) oversees the Territory’s
biosecurity governance arrangements and is responsible for implementation,
reporting and review of this strategy. The BCC will report on the
implementation of the strategy as part of the ACT Government’s Annual
Report with additional independent reporting by the Commissioner for
Sustainability and the Environment every four years.
Interim reviews of the strategy will be conducted annually with a formal
review and evaluation after five years. A review will include as a minimum an
evaluation of the implementation of the actions based on performance
indicators. The strategy will also be reviewed as required to ensure that it is
up-to-date and reflects current legislation, scientific knowledge, technical
expertise and management practices.
BUILDING BIOSECURITY CAPABILITY AND CAPACITYPhoto M
ichael Machonachie
Photo L Padgham
PAGE 32 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
CASE STUDY: EQUINE INFLUENZA NATIONAL STANDSTILL
Early on Saturday 25 August 2007 the ACT was notified that horses suspected of having a highly
virulent exotic disease called Equine Influenza (EI) had been detected in an equestrian centre in
Sydney. By that afternoon a national standstill was declared that prevented the ACT’s 2,500 horses
from being moved until further notice. A Local Disease Crisis Centre was established to manage
the ACT response and all horses in horse studs, riding schools, farms and government horse
holding paddocks were quarantined. Border controls and road blocks were put in place on that
evening to prevent the entry into or exit of horses from the ACT.
On 21 September 2007 NSW introduced a zoning system to govern horse
movements as part of the Equine Influenza Protection Plan, which also
included the ACT. The aim of the zoning system was to keep the area of
infection within containment lines, whilst enabling movement under strict
movement guidelines applicable to each zone.
These restrictions remained in place until the 27 September 2007 when the
ACT was classified as a green zone which allowed a relaxation of the
movement of equine species within this zone. This allowed riders and
industry reliant on public riding to again undertake these activities on their
property without a permit, and outside of their property with a permit.
On 28 February 2008, the NSW
Government declared that EI had
been eradicated, lifting most of the
remaining movement restrictions
on horses.
The outbreak had a significant
financial and social impact on the
ACT horse industry and severely
strained the resources of
responding ACT Government
agencies.
The success of the national EI
response is reflected in the fact that
Australia is one of only a few
countries that have eradicated EI.
Photo SMH
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 33
OUTCOME 1. Biosecurity is recognised as a shared responsibility by Government, industry and the community
Actions Performance Indicator/s Responsibility TimeframeShort-term (up to 2 yrs)Medium-term (2-5 yrs)Long-term (> 5 yrs)
1.1 The ACT Biosecurity Coordination Committee (BCC) oversees the ACT’s biosecurity arrangements to minimise the risk of entry, establishment or spread of pests and diseases that have the potential to cause significant harm to people, animals, plants and the ACT’s unique environment
BCC Terms of Reference reviewed annually to ensure that activities remain targeted at the highest biosecurity risks and greatest public benefit
BCC membership is reviewed annually and consists of representatives from across the ACT Government with the relevant skills and knowledge to make a positive contribution to the ACT’s biosecurity
ACT Government (BCC)
Annual
1.2 The BCC will form collaborative working relationships with its counterparts in other jurisdictions (states, territory and Commonwealth) and relevant industries to facilitate the timely exchange of information. This will ensure that the ACT is informed and involved at all levels of biosecurity management and related decision-making processes
Working relationships have been formed and, where necessary, arrangements such as memoranda of understanding (MOU) have been agreed to
(eg ACT and NSW Memorandum of Understanding for Regional Collaboration)
ACT Government (EPD & TCSCD)
Other jurisdictions including NSW and Commonwealth Government
Industry representatives.
Ongoing
1.3 ACT representation at relevant regional and national conferences, meetings, workshops, activities and on committees
ACT represented on regional and national sectoral committees and at conference, meetings and workshops (eg the National Biosecurity Committee and its subordinate groups)
ACT representatives report on regional and national engagement to BCC
ACT Government (EPD)
Annual
1.4 Provide support for and work collaboratively with community groups (eg. rural landholders, Friends of organisations, Landcare, Conservation Volunteers, Equestrians) to deliver improved biosecurity outcomes for the ACT.
Project applications assessed and, where appropriate, support is provided for biosecurity- related projects with a public benefit component and other relevant strategies such as the climate change adaptation strategy
Community groups engaged in the management of biosecurity in the ACT including integration of community activities into annual operations plans and reporting
ACT Government (EPD)
Ongoing
OUTCOMES AND ACTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY
PAGE 34 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
OUTCOME 1. Biosecurity is recognised as a shared responsibility by Government, industry and the community
Actions Performance Indicator/s Responsibility TimeframeShort-term (up to 2 yrs)Medium-term (2-5 yrs)Long-term (> 5 yrs)
1.5 Explore new partnership options with key ACT stakeholders
New partnerships are formed and engaged in the management of biosecurity in the ACT
Relevant ACT stakeholders invited to participate in BCC (or subordinate group meetings) where appropriate to specific biosecurity issues
ACT Government (EPD)
See key ACT stakeholders in Table 1 of the strategy.
Ongoing
1.6 Promote public awareness of priority biosecurity issues in the ACT through appropriate communication channels
Web-based information, signage, media releases, brochures and leaflets are available at strategic locations as well as targeted mail-outs, information sessions, mobile displays, television and radio
Communication activities reported through the annual review process for subordinate strategies (weeds and pest animals) and other relevant strategies such as the climate change adaptation strategy, or to the BCC
Public awareness has increased. To be measured through survey and through an increase in community participation
Increases in compliance and reporting
ACT Government (BCC)
Short-term
1.7 Industry-wide biosecurity plans relevant to the ACT are identified and their implementation by industry in the ACT is supported
Biosecurity arrangements discussed with ACT peak bodies and industry participants.
Assistance provided by ACT Government in implementation of industry-wide biosecurity plans where appropriate
ACT Government (EPD) & industry representatives
Medium-term
1.8 Ensure Land Management Agreements (LMA) for rural leases include the identification and management of pests and diseases and outline the landholder responsibilities in terms of biosecurity
LMAs address pest and disease management and outline biosecurity responsibilities.
Review of the LMA (occurs every 5 years) to determine compliance
EPD and rural landholders
Short-term (ongoing)
1.9 Form collaborative partnerships with education and research institutions to ensure the management of biosecurity issues is based on sound scientific evidence and research
Management of biosecurity issues responds to and reflects scientific evidence and research
BCC
Other state, Australian government and tertiary research agencies
Medium-term (ongoing)
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 35
OUTCOME 2: Biosecurity protects the environment and community and contributes to sustainable economic growth
Actions Performance Indicator/s Responsibility TimeframeShort-term (up to 2 yrs)Medium-term (2-5 yrs)Long-term (> 5 yrs)
2.1 Provide skilled licensing and compliance officers to monitor and enforce biosecurity matters.
Increase in the number of trained officers and resources for undertaking monitoring and compliance activities
Monitoring and compliance undertaken and penalties applied as necessary
Key areas of non-compliance addressed through education and awareness campaigns (ref: Action 1.6)
ACT Government (EPD & TCSCD)
Short-medium term
2.2 Develop and implement effective biosecurity systems for surveillance and monitoring of existing and potential pests and diseases and product tracing
(eg NLIS, mapping, LMAs, hotlines)
Systems in place that assist in the surveillance, monitoring and tracing of pests and diseases
Pest animals and weeds can be effectively monitored and traced through the delivery of relevant strategic actions under the pest animal, weed and climate change adaptation strategies
Reduced detection and response times for new pest and disease incursions
New incursions reported annually to relevant sectoral committees
ACT Government (EPD)
Medium-term
2.3 Prepare and maintain an ACT Biosecurity Emergency Plan to address incursions
Biosecurity Emergency Plan has been developed
Biosecurity Emergency Plan is reviewed every five years to ensure consistency with national strategies and policies
ACT Government (EPD)
Short-term
2.4 Develop and regularly review response plans for high risk pests and diseases
Response Plans developed and reviewed ACT Government (EPD)
Medium-term (ongoing)
2.5 Develop and maintain operational plans for pests and diseases
Up-to-date operational plans for pests and diseases in the ACT
ACT Government (EPD)
Annual
2.6 Reduce the adverse impacts of established pests and diseases for priority high-value sites and assets
Reduction in adverse impacts or in abundance and/or distribution of pests and diseases demonstrated through effective monitoring, assessment and reporting of control programs
ACT Government (EPD, TCCSD), other stakeholders engaged in coordinated control programs
Annual
PAGE 36 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
OUTCOME 3: Biosecurity is underpinned by a responsive and consistent legislative framework, risk management framework, business systems and training
Actions Performance Indicator/s Responsibility TimeframeShort-term (up to 2 yrs)Medium-term (2-5 yrs)Long-term (> 5 yrs)
3.1 Review current biosecurity legislation and amend as necessary to respond to emerging biosecurity threats and reforms in Commonwealth and NSW legislation as well as scientific evidence and new technologies
Updated and harmonised legislation in place ACT Government (EPD)
Short to Medium-term
3.2 Review compliance mechanisms (ie reporting, monitoring and penalties) as part of the review of current biosecurity legislation in the ACT
Review completed and legislative amendments made
ACT Government (EPD)
Short to Medium-term
3.3 Identify existing pests and diseases in the ACT and ensure lists of declared weeds, pest animals and diseases (Disallowable Instruments under biosecurity legislation) are kept up-to-date
List is updated as necessary on a risk management basis
Lists incorporate nationally- agreed pests and diseases and categorisation is consistent with that of other jurisdictions, eg, the national noxious fish list, Weeds of National Significance
ACT Government (EPD)
Ongoing
3.4 Develop stand-alone biosecurity legislation for the ACT that incorporates existing pest plants and animals, and plant and animal disease legislation
ACT Biosecurity Act ACT Government (EPD)
Medium to Long-term
3.5 Develop a risk management framework that will help determine the risks associated with identified threats to biosecurity and to inform decisions about allocation of resources
Risk management framework developed and adopted
Incorporate risk management systems already in place such as the NSW Weeds Risk Management System
ACT Government (EPD)
Short-term
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 37
OUTCOME 3: Biosecurity is underpinned by a responsive and consistent legislative framework, risk management framework, business systems and training
Actions Performance Indicator/s Responsibility TimeframeShort-term (up to 2 yrs)Medium-term (2-5 yrs)Long-term (> 5 yrs)
3.6 Review subordinate strategies (ie ACT Pest Animal Management Strategy, ACT Weeds Strategy) to ensure consistency with this ACT Biosecurity Strategy and overarching national strategies and frameworks (eg, Australian Weeds Strategy, Australian Pest Animal Strategy, Established Pests and Diseases of National Significance Framework)
Updated strategies that are complementary ACT Government (EPD)
Medium-long term
3.7 Develop and implement an Emergency Response and Preparedness Training Strategy
A strategy has been developed to outline ongoing training requirements for relevant ACT Government staff
ACT Government (EPD)
Short-term
3.8 Provide ongoing opportunities for delivery of appropriate national, state and territory training to relevant ACT Government employees including licensing and compliance officers and rangers. Extend training opportunities to other ACT biosecurity stakeholders where appropriate
Increase in the number of ACT Government staff participating in relevant training and in the application of the training in licensing and compliance activities
Staff training is sufficient to respond effectively to a pest or disease incursion of national significance in accordance with ACT obligations under the IGAB
Training opportunities are extended to other key ACT biosecurity stakeholders participating in government- coordinated biosecurity activities
ACT Government (EPD, TCCSD)
Short-term (ongoing)
3.9 Conduct regular biosecurity response simulation exercises as part of staff training and accreditation requirements
Training exercises undertaken and staff accredited. Other biosecurity stakeholders (eg, industry, rural landholders, NSW agencies) participate where appropriate
ACT Government (EPD)
Short-term (ongoing)
PAGE 38 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
APPENDIX ABIOSECURITY THREAT DECISION TREE
No
aPPeNdix a: Biosecurity tHreat decisioN tree1. actioN: clearly identify the Nature of the Problem – then conduct a Market Failure test as below
externalities: Would the biosecurity threat be likely to significantly affect
those not directly involved in the risk spreading transaction? For example, the spread of a pest or disease.
1a industry goods: Would the private sector/industry (if left unassisted) fail to
provide an adequate level of investment to remove (or reduce to an acceptable level) the biosecurity threat?
For example, an industry may fail to pay for a monitoring program (that provides industry benefits), due to lack of an appropriate collection/delivery mechanism.
1b asymmetric information: does one party to a transaction have more or
better information than the other party in relation to the biosecurity threat, thus creating an imbalance of power in the transaction? (this includes ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’) e.g. sale of stock with oJd.
1c
Market failure present – government action may be justified government action is not required
if provided, a fee on individuals/firms should be
considered first, otherwise cost recovery via a levy on an entire industry should be pursued (see 13a or 13b).
7
do not provide unless industry requests
government involvement and agrees to pay for the provision (this may also require a regulatory basis).
4
11. actioN: conduct a Benefit cost analysis only proceed with options in which benefits are greater than costs.
Would it be necessary to regulate for the provision of this activity/program (e.g. to pursue impactors, establish industry levies, enforce compliance certification, etc)?
3
Would the activity/program involve ‘registration / approvals’ or ‘Compliance / enforcement’?
5 Would the major beneficiaries be a
narrow identifiable group (e.g. individuals or industries)?
6a
Would it be appropriate to recover costs from
the individual risk creator i.e. individuals/firms (through a fee or fine, as opposed to recovering costs from an entire industry through a levy)?
8 Would other individuals/firms be able to free ride
on the approval of the first applicant?
9
compliance / enforcement registration / approvals
Would charging an individual/firm for the
activity/program be efficient and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a fee collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10a Would ‘group‑based’ cost recovery be both efficient
and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a levy collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10b
Would any of the identifiable minor beneficiaries
capture enough benefits to warrant paying for the provision (sufficiency principle)?
6b
Would charging an individual/firm for the
activity/ program be efficient and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a fee collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10a Would ‘group‑based’ cost recovery be both efficient
and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a levy collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10b
10a 10b 10a10b
if the impacts of the biosecurity threat lie solely within one sector or industry, the responsible funding party (government/levied industry) may decide for the proposed biosecurity activity/program not to be
provided. otherwise…
12
Cost recovery via Fee on individuals/firms
13a Cost recovery via levy on individuals/firms
provision with No cost recovery
(taxpayer funding)
13b Cost recovery via Fee on individuals/firms
13aCost recovery via levy on individuals/firms
13b
provision with cost recovery @ coMMercial cost
*a+b+C+d+e
*cost recovery components
a – salaries and on‑costs
b – operating expenses
C – overheads
d – return on assets
e – profit margin
provision with cost recovery @ Fully distriButed cost
*a+b+C+d
provision with cost recovery @ avoidaBle cost
*a+b+C
provision with cost recovery @ MargiNal cost
*a+b
Cost recovery fee or levy set to achieve fully distributed cost recovery
15
Would there be actual or potential competition for the provision of this activity/program?
14
Would the provision of this activity/ program involve additional data collection, analysis or research beyond what is already taxpayer funded?
16
provision of this activity/program involves the further dissemination of a basic product.
17
No No
y es
2. actioN: devise a Proposed Biosecurity Program or activity the proposed intervention should be designed to overcome the specific market failure identified above (see notes). (the component parts of each activity/program should be considered separately through the remaining part of this diagram.)
y es
y es
y es N o
y es
y esN o
No
N o
N o y es
yes
yes y es y es y es
No
N o
N oN o
No No
No
No
yes
yes
y es y es y es y es
regulatory
regulatory
non‑regulatory
non‑regulatory
44 nsW bioseCurity strateGy 2013–2021 bioseCurity: a shared responsibility 45
2016-2026 | ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY PAGE 39
No
aPPeNdix a: Biosecurity tHreat decisioN tree1. actioN: clearly identify the Nature of the Problem – then conduct a Market Failure test as below
externalities: Would the biosecurity threat be likely to significantly affect
those not directly involved in the risk spreading transaction? For example, the spread of a pest or disease.
1a industry goods: Would the private sector/industry (if left unassisted) fail to
provide an adequate level of investment to remove (or reduce to an acceptable level) the biosecurity threat?
For example, an industry may fail to pay for a monitoring program (that provides industry benefits), due to lack of an appropriate collection/delivery mechanism.
1b asymmetric information: does one party to a transaction have more or
better information than the other party in relation to the biosecurity threat, thus creating an imbalance of power in the transaction? (this includes ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’) e.g. sale of stock with oJd.
1c
Market failure present – government action may be justified government action is not required
if provided, a fee on individuals/firms should be
considered first, otherwise cost recovery via a levy on an entire industry should be pursued (see 13a or 13b).
7
do not provide unless industry requests
government involvement and agrees to pay for the provision (this may also require a regulatory basis).
4
11. actioN: conduct a Benefit cost analysis only proceed with options in which benefits are greater than costs.
Would it be necessary to regulate for the provision of this activity/program (e.g. to pursue impactors, establish industry levies, enforce compliance certification, etc)?
3
Would the activity/program involve ‘registration / approvals’ or ‘Compliance / enforcement’?
5 Would the major beneficiaries be a
narrow identifiable group (e.g. individuals or industries)?
6a
Would it be appropriate to recover costs from
the individual risk creator i.e. individuals/firms (through a fee or fine, as opposed to recovering costs from an entire industry through a levy)?
8 Would other individuals/firms be able to free ride
on the approval of the first applicant?
9
compliance / enforcement registration / approvals
Would charging an individual/firm for the
activity/program be efficient and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a fee collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10a Would ‘group‑based’ cost recovery be both efficient
and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a levy collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10b
Would any of the identifiable minor beneficiaries
capture enough benefits to warrant paying for the provision (sufficiency principle)?
6b
Would charging an individual/firm for the
activity/ program be efficient and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a fee collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10a Would ‘group‑based’ cost recovery be both efficient
and cost effective i.e. are the affected parties identifiable, is there (or could there be) a levy collection mechanism in place and would the amount of money collected be likely to significantly outweigh the administrative costs of doing so?
10b
10a 10b 10a10b
if the impacts of the biosecurity threat lie solely within one sector or industry, the responsible funding party (government/levied industry) may decide for the proposed biosecurity activity/program not to be
provided. otherwise…
12
Cost recovery via Fee on individuals/firms
13a Cost recovery via levy on individuals/firms
provision with No cost recovery
(taxpayer funding)
13b Cost recovery via Fee on individuals/firms
13aCost recovery via levy on individuals/firms
13b
provision with cost recovery @ coMMercial cost
*a+b+C+d+e
*cost recovery components
a – salaries and on‑costs
b – operating expenses
C – overheads
d – return on assets
e – profit margin
provision with cost recovery @ Fully distriButed cost
*a+b+C+d
provision with cost recovery @ avoidaBle cost
*a+b+C
provision with cost recovery @ MargiNal cost
*a+b
Cost recovery fee or levy set to achieve fully distributed cost recovery
15
Would there be actual or potential competition for the provision of this activity/program?
14
Would the provision of this activity/ program involve additional data collection, analysis or research beyond what is already taxpayer funded?
16
provision of this activity/program involves the further dissemination of a basic product.
17
No No
y es
2. actioN: devise a Proposed Biosecurity Program or activity the proposed intervention should be designed to overcome the specific market failure identified above (see notes). (the component parts of each activity/program should be considered separately through the remaining part of this diagram.)
y es
y es
y es N o
y es
y esN o
No
N o
N o y es
yes
yes y es y es y es
No
N o
N oN o
No No
No
No
yes
yes
y es y es y es y es
regulatory
regulatory
non‑regulatory
non‑regulatory
44 nsW bioseCurity strateGy 2013–2021 bioseCurity: a shared responsibility 45
Photo L Padgham
PAGE 40 ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY | 2016-2026
GLOSSARY
Term Definition
Climate change Increasing greenhouse gas concentrations resulting in changes to the pattern of temperature, rainfall (volume, frequency and distribution), solar radiation, humidity, and evaporation.
Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
National Emergency Biosecurity Response Agreement
Agreements signed by the ACT Government which include Federal, State jurisdictions as well as industry. The agreement allows for the contribution of funding on a shared basis when a defined disease or pest event occurs within a jurisdiction. The idea being to spread the cost associated with handling the disease or pest event provided the defined terms and conditions are followed.
Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB)
An agreement between the Commonwealth and all state and territory governments, with the exception of Tasmania. The IGAB aims to strengthen the working partnership between governments and to improve the national biosecurity system and minimise the impact of pests and disease on Australia’s economy, environment and the community. The IGAB Schedules identify priority areas for collaboration.
Zoonotic disease A disease caused by infectious agents that can be transmitted between (or are shared by) animals and humans.
ACT BIOSECURITY STRATEGY
2016-2026