Act and Person in Argument

8/3/2019 Act and Person in Argument

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Act and Person in ArgumentAuthor(s): C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-TytecaSource: Ethics, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Jul., 1951), pp. 251-269Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2378744

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ETHICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OFSOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHYVolume LXI JULY1951 Number4

ACT AND PERSON IN ARGUMENTC. PERELMAN AND L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECAIN ORDER to specify he importof thefollowingobservations, t will be well

to indicate briefly the framework nwhichthey arelocated. Manliving in so-ciety has discussionswith his fellowsandtries to bring them to share some of hisviews and to perform certain actions.Relatively rarely does he have recoursesolely to coercion n orderto do this. Ingeneral,he seeks to persuade or to con-vince; and to this end he reasons,in thebroadestsense of the term, and presentsproofs. In those casesin whichthe meansof proof consist in rigorousdemonstra-tion, they are studied by a well-definedscience: logic. But to the extent that ithas developed into a purely formal sci-ence which determinesthe conditionsofcorrectdeduction, t appears hat a greatmany of the proofsutilized in law, ethics,philosophy, political debate, and dailylife cannotbe considered elevant to logicin the strict sense.All these arguments evidently mightbe relegated to the sphereof mental sug-gestion and deniedany kind of rationali-ty. This has been, moreor less explicitlyand to a greateror less extent, the view-point of a great many logicians andphilosophers. But the consequences ofthis point of view can be quite serious,for it tends to put all kinds of informal

proceduresof argumenton the samefoot-ing, whether those of the confidencemanor the philosopher; and, on the otherhand, thispoint ofviewplaces the systemof logic, as well as of science, beyond allthe restofmentallife andalmostwithoutcontact with it. It seems to us, on thecontrary, that it is worthwhile to studymore closely those argumentative pro-cedures which are of such social andphilosophicimportance. We have giventhe name "rhetoric" to the 'disciplinewhich we thus propose to revive, in rec-ognitionof the fact that, at least in Greekantiquity and particularlyfor Aristotle,the object of rhetoric was precisely thestudy of these techniquesof nondemon-strative argument,its end being to sup-port judgmentsand thereby win or rein-force the assent of other minds.'It soon appearedto us that all argu-ment presupposes hat those to whom itis addressedagree on a certainnumberofdata. This agreement may serve as apoint of departure for further agree-ments, but it may also be questioned,in which case the discussionturns on thejustificationof this agreement,on the ba-sis of other elements presumed to be ac-cepted.

This viewpoint involves another: wewill constantly need a notion correlative25I


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,252 ETHICSto agreement,that of the audience. Forwhat is acceptedby certainpersons s notnecessarily accepted by others; and sothe audiencemay extend from the indi-vidual himself-in the case of delibera-tion with one's self, which in several re-spects can be consideredas a specialcaseof discussion with others-through thewhole seriesof particularaudiences o theuniversal audience.-Of course, the uni-versal audienceneveractuallyexists;it isan ideal audience,a mental constructionof him who refers to it. We could easilyshow that this so-called"universalaudi-ence" varieswith the epochand with theperson: each creates its own idea of theuniversalaudience.This fact explainstheinterest of the sociology of knowledge.2Any audienceaccepts a certainnum-ber of data which it will call "facts,""truths," "presumptions,"or "values."A fact is importantin argumentbecauseit is consideredas formingthe object ofuniversalagreement: t must be acceptedby everyone.If someone says, "I openedthis book," we would doubtless see inthis the statement of a fact. But at anytime this status may be taken awayfromit by objections such as: "No, the bookwas opened by someone else," "Thebookopened tself," or even "There s nobook there at all, but only loose pages,"etc. What is understoodby "fact" thusfurnishesus the firstexampleof an agree-ment always subject to revision. It like-wise showsus that as long as this agree-ment is not questioned, t does not occurto anyoneto demanda justificationof it;as long as the agreementlasts, the factcan serveas a point of departure or fur-ther argument, such as "I opened thebook; thereforeI intend to read it." Itcan be seen at once how this conceptionof fact differsfrom that of the scientistor philosopherwho would seek to extri-cate the facts whichunderlya theory and

the immediate premises, logically orgeneticallyprior,whichserve as founda-tion for his conceptualsystem. It is truethat rhetoric, as a discipline, likewisepresupposes the existence of facts ap-propriateto it. These are audiences,ar-guments, and adherences.The concep-tion of these may, moreover,always bemodified.That on which we ask agree-ment is that thereexistsargumentwhich,starting from certain given opinions,seeks to win new opinionsor to reinforceother opinionsalreadyobtained.All audiences accept values as well,whetherabstractvalues, such as justice,or concretevalues, suchas one'scountry.Thesevalues are generallyacceptedonlyby a particularaudience. Some of themare considereduniversal values, but itcould doubtlessbe shownthat they aresoregarded only on condition that theircontent is not specified.Besides, it is notso much the values to whichthey adhereas the manner n whichthey arrange hevaluesin a hierarchy,whichmakesit pos-sible to describe a particular audience.Indeed, audiencesaccept not only factsand values but also hierarchies, con-structs of reality, and connections be-tween facts and values-in short, a to-tality of commonbeliefs, whichwe shallcall "places," in recognitionof the an-cient usage of the term"commonplaces."These make it possible to argue withmore or less effectiveness.An argumentalways introduceselements of this sort.For example, to support the fact, chal-lenged by an interlocutor,that I openedthis book, others might suggest pre-sumptions (e.g., that an open book hasbeen openedby someone)or values (e.g.,truth, to which it is claimed I pay re-spect and conformmy conduct). In theend, the mattermight be resolvedby ad-mitting that it is indeeda fact; but it is soregarded only on condition that it is


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ACT AND PERSONIN ARGUMENT 253again separated from the arguments bywhich the agreement was obtained.Wehave said that amongthe elementsof agreementare found certainstructuresof reality which are consideredas accept-ed. We may divide them into two broadcategories: connections of succession,such as the relation of cause to effect,and connections of coexistence, suchas the structural properties of a singlebody. Philosophical argumentmay seekto reduce some of these connections toothers, which areconsideredmore funda-mental. But, fromourviewpoint, any ef-fort at systematization being at leastpremature, it is proper to recognize thebroadtypes of connectionwhich are ex-plicitly used in discussion and are im-plicit at other times.One of the connectionsof coexistencewhichmay be consideredasvery general-ly accepted by all sorts of audiences andwhich seemsto us to have a great impor-tance is that of the relation of the personto the act which is attributed to him, arelation which is the prototype of a largenumber of connections of coexistence.The makeupof the humanperson andits separation from his acts is tied to adistinction between what is consideredimportant, natural,and characteristicofthe being under discussionand what isregarded as a transitory and externalmanifestation thereof. The makeup ofthe person always gives us a rule, in vir-tue of which the essencemay be distin-guishedfromits manifestations.Sincethis connectionbetweenthe per-son and his acts does not constitute anecessary ink orpossessthe same sort ofstability as the relation between an ob-ject and its qualities, a simplerepetitionof an act may involve either a recon-structionof the personor a reinforcedad-herence to the previous makeup. Theprecariousness f the relationdetermines

a constant interaction between the actand the person.Of course, the conceptionof what con-stitutes the person may vary consider-ably accordingto the epoch and accord-ing to the metaphysicsto whichone con-nects the construction. It is very likelythat the argument of primitive peoplesmade use of a much broaderconceptionof the personthan ourshasbecome.Theydoubtless would include therein all theincidentals, such as the shadow, the to-tem, and detached fragments of thebody. Whereas we must make use ofspecialconnections n orderto join theseelements to the person, primitive manwouldhave to use disassociation n orderto isolate the personality in the lim-ited sense from this more extended per-sonality.The person,as we will consider t, willbe that which occurs in differentepochsand according to different authors, sothat we will not have to ask ourselves, nthis moregeneralinvestigation, how theperson s definedor whatarethe elementswhich, for practicalpurposes,enter intoits makeup or which, according to thepsychologists, should theoreticallyenterinto it.It may be useful to show by an ex-ample that phenomena of this sort mayor may not be regardedas a part of thepersonrather thanmerelyas a purelyex-ternalmanifestation, .e., an act. A wom-an's beauty can be considered as aquality constitutive of the person ratherthan as a transitory and contingentmanifestation of it. In this regard itshould be noticed that the fact that sucha phenomenon s attached to the makeupof the person rather than treated as anaccidentalmanifestation, i.e., as an act,may be considered one way of placingthis phenomenonin a hierarchyin rela-tion to others. As a general rule, the


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254 ETHICSmore important traits are integrated ntothe makeupof the person. That is to say,the manner of formation of the personmay be the object of the uncertain andlimited agreement of a given group, al-though this will always be susceptibleofrevision.We must emphasizea primarycharac-teristic of the person, namely, that theperson ntroducesan element of stability.An argumentconcerning he persontakesadvantage of this stability, since we pre-sume it in interpreting the act as de-pendent upon the person, or we deplorethe fact that this stability has not beenrespected, when someone is reproachedforinconstancyor an unjustifiedchange.A large numberof argumentsattempt toprove that the person has not changed,that the change is merely apparent, orthat it is the circumstanceswhich havechanged, etc.3But the stability of the person s nevercompletely assured, though certain lin-guistic techniques help to emphasizetheimpressionof stability. The use of prop-er namesallows the continuityof the per-son to be presumed;otherways of speak-ing manifestapermanent raitof the per-son. Thus the insertion of a typical cate-gory ("yourstingy father"),the useof anepithet ("Charlemagneof the flowerybeard")or the hypostasis ("his generosi-ty has contributed . . .")-each of thesereinforces he impressionof the stabilityof the whole person by emphasizing acharacteristicof the personwhich is re-gardedas permanent.In this regard wemay note the role in argumentof whatare called "figures of speech"-a rolewhich confers on them an importantplace in all rhetoricaimed at achievingthe adherenceof minds.The person,consideredas the supportunderlyinga seriesof qualities,as the au-thor of seriesof acts andjudgments,and

as the object of a seriesof evaluations, isthus this enduringbeing around whichclusters a completeseries of phenomenato which it gives coherence and signifi-cance. But, on the other hand, this per-son is himself knownin virtue of his ac-tions and his manifestations, for there isa deep community between the ideawhich we have of the person and ourknowledgeof the totality of his acts. In-deed,we are faced with a constant inter-relationship between the act and theperson.Both moral life and legal life needthese twonotions, bothas they arejoinedtogether and in their relative independ-ence. Ethics and law judge the act andthe agent at the same time; and neitherwould be satisfied o considerone of theseelementsalone. By the very fact that itis the individual,and not his act, whichwejudge,it is grantedthat he is linkedtothe acts which he committed.But, on theother hand, if we are interested in theperson, t is on account of acts, which canbe characterized ndependently of him.If the notions of responsibility, merit,and guilt emphasizethe person,those ofnorm andrule are primarilypreoccupiedwith the act. But this separationof theact and the person is never more thanpartial and unstable. The merit of a per-son may be seen independently of hisacts, but this would be possible only in ametaphysics in which the reference toacts is given by the context.On the otherhand, if the rules prescribeor forbid cer-tain acts, theirmoralorlegal importcon-sists in the fact that they are addressedto persons.The terms of the relation ofact and person aresufficiently ndepend-ent to permiteach of them to be used inisolation at certain times, but they aresufficientlyconnectedthat theirjoint in-teractioncharacterizes ntire areasof so-cial life.


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ACT AND PERSONIN ARGUMENT 255The distinction between the act andthe person and the interaction of thesetwo notions are not utilized by moralistsalone.They permitthe introduction nto

all thought of distinctionswhich are im-portant for argumentand play an out-standing role, even if they are not ex-plicitly invoked, as will be shownby thetwo exampleswhich follow.The firstof these examples s furnishedfor us by a little dialogue imagined byStevenson 4A (speakingto C, a child): "To neglect yourpiano practice is naughty."B (in C's hearing): "No, no, C is very goodabout practicing." (Out of C's hearing):"It'shopeless to drive him, you know: but if youpraise him, he will do a great deal." [AndStevenson adds] Here B is not opposed to thegeneral directon of A's influenceon C,but wishesto change the manner in which it is exerted.A judgesthe act of C and decidesthatC does not conformto the rule, since heneglects his piano. B forms a judgment

on the person and says that he workswell, hoping to see him conformto theflattering picture which is presented tohim. Both seek the same result, and atfirst glance they seem opposed only be-cause the firstblamesthat whichthe sec-ondpraises.But let us note that the twoarguments are not the counterpartsofeach other.Actually, the blameputs theemphasis on the violated norm, and theperson is involved only because of thisviolation;in the secondcasethe accentisput on the personin the attempt to en-courage him in spite of his action.The secondexample s furnishedus bya text of Chevalierde M&r6,5n whichhedistinguishes two modes of expression:"Among all the servants, those whoserved him well were rewarded" and"Among these numerous gentlemen,those who were judged worthy werepleased by his recognition."Mere here

opposesa delicate mode of expressiontoanother which expressesthe same fact.According to the second formula, theperson seemsto be rewarded,not his act.A merit is recognized, not a service-which seems more honorable,at least inMere's surroundings.Moreover, the per-sons are placed in the esteemed class ofgentlemen; and, finally, a reward is al-luded to only in an indirect manner, bythe appreciation of those who benefitfrom it. In the same way it is impliedthat they have the added merit of beingableto appreciate he recognitionof theirmaster, i.e., a reciprocal ecognition s in-dicated. In general, to proceed in thisway ends in an evaluationof the person;the acts fall into the background.

After these generalconsiderations,wewill examinesuccessivelythe influenceofacts on the conceptionof the personand,that of the personon his acts.The reaction of the act on the agent isof such a natureas to modify constantlyour conceptionof the person,whether itis a question of new acts which are at-tributed to him or of former actionswhich arereferred o. Both play ananalo-gous role in argument,although greaterweight is given to the more recent acts.Except in limited cases, of whichwe willspeak, the makeup of the person is nevercompleted,not even by his death. How-ever, certainmakeupsnecessary for con-sistency are much more constant thanothers.This is the caseparticularlywithhistoricalpersonages. t is this whichwaswell recognized by Mr. Aron, when hewrote: "Another,when he is present, re-minds us constantly of his capacity tochange; when he is absent, he is the pris-oner of the image of him which we haveformed. And if we distinguish what ourfriends are from what they do, this dis-


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256 ETHICStinction fades away to the extent thatthey sink into the past."6 In place ofspeaking of a distinction which fadesaway, we wouldrathersay that the reac-tion of the acts on the person no longerhas occasionto manifestitself. Neverthe-less, this constancy is only relative: notonly might new documentsgive rise to arevision, but, completelyapart from anynewfact, the evolution of the personalityof the historian or a change of publicopinion might modify the conceptionofa personage, owing to the inclusion inhis makeupof acts consideredunimpor-tant until that time or by the minimiza-tion of acts formerly udged significant.This conception,whichstressesthe un-certainty of the makeup of the person,issharplyopposed to a "thinglike"concep-tion thereof,wherebyeach act is consid-eredmerely as a sign which revealsan un-changeablepersonality, which exists pri-or to its manifestation.Thus it happensthat theperson s separated romhis acts,as the fire is distinguished from thesmoke; but the systematic utilization ofsuch a conception would appear ratherstrange to us. Witness this passage fromIsocrates,whichspeaks of men as things:"If some sign distinguishedvicious men,it would indeed be best to punish thembeforethey had done any harm to theirfellow citizens. But since people cannotrecognize hem beforethey have harmedsomeone, t is at least proper oreveryoneto hate them and regard them as anenemy when they are discovered."7Inthis way the punishment would not beproportionateto the seriousness of theoffensebut to the wickednesswhich theoffensereveals.But it oftenhappensthatan act obligesus to reconstruct our con-ception of the person and to place a per-son in a category different from that towhich he had been believed to belong.This revision, with the transfer of value

which accompanies t, is often expressedby the assertion of a qualificationapply-ing to the person.Everyone knows the famous passageby Pascal: "Thereareonly threesortsofpersons:some who have found God andservehim;others whosearch orhim,buthave not foundhim; and still others whoneither search for him, nor have foundhim. The first arereasonableandhappy;the last are mad and unhappy; those inbetween are unhappy but reasonable."'The act servesto characterize he person,to makehima reasonablebeing or amad-man; we should notice, however, thatthis characterizationof the personmustserve to disqualifycertainbehavior. It isthe act which determinesour conceptionof the agent, but the interrelation s suchthat, to that extent, we end up with anevaluation of the act.The valuewhich we attributeto an actleads us to attribute a certain value tothe person, but this is not merelya high-er or lower evaluation. In the case inwhich an act determines a transfer ofvalue, this is correlative with a revisionof ourconceptionof the person, to whomwe explicitly or implicitly attribute cer-tain tendencies, aptitudes, instincts, orsentiments.In the relation of act to person, weunderstand by "act" anything whichmay be consideredas an emanation ofthe person;in addition to actions, thesemight be judgments, modes of expres-sion, emotionalreactions,or involuntarymannerisms.In this way, in placingval-ue on a judgment,an evaluation s there-by accorded o its author. The manner nwhich he judges permitsthe judge to bejudged, and, in the absence of acceptedcriteriaapplying to the object, it is ex-tremely difficult to prevent the interac-tion of the act and the person in thisarea. The judgment which is applied to


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ACT AND PERSONIN ARGUMENT 257both is, at the same time, quite often de-pendent upon the idea which has beenformed of the subject discussed. To calla man "frivolous"becausehe has treatedfrivolously things which are consideredimportant constitutes a well-foundedjudgment only in the eyes of those whoagreeon the importanceof what has beenneglected; thanks to this mechanism, anambiguity is introduced nto the debate,whereby certain cases are prejudiced byjudging the persons.Very rarely is the effect of the act onthe person limited simply to a higher orlower evaluation of the latter. More oftenthe person serves as what might be calleda steppingstone, permitting the passagefrom known to unknown act, from theknowledge of past acts to the anticipa-tion of future ones. Often the argumentconcerns acts of the same nature, as inCalvin: "Is it plausible that we wouldplot to overthrow kingdoms-we, fromwhom a seditious wordwas never heardand whose life was known to be simpleand peaceful, when we lived under you,Sire?"9Often acts of the past must ren-derlikely acts which area little different.In his speech against Callimachus,Isoc-rates arguesthat one who had bornefalsewitness would not hesitate to producefalse witnesses n his ownfavor.'0Howev-erdifferent hey may be, one always triesto make known acts and presumed actsfall into the same category.One may base an argumenton habit-ual actswhicharesufficientlynumerous ocharacterizea way of being; but it is alsopossible to use a unique act or a singlejudgment,the importanceof whichis un-derlined.The uniquenessof the act is noobstacle to proceeding n this way, unlessuse is made of techniques, of which wewill speak later, which seek to separatethe act sharplyfrom the person. It is bymakinguse of a singleact that the estab-

lishment of heresy on a lone issue makesthe entiredoctrine of a condemned heo-logian suspected.Likewise,Simone Weilargues from the fact that we find a de-fense of slavery in the writings of Aris-totle, to the condemnationnot only of allAristotelianismbut alsoof the Thomisticmovementwhich is inspired by it.",Past actsand effectsproducedby themmay acquirea certain firmnessand forma sort of asset which their author wouldnot wish to lose. Enjoyment of a goodreputationmust be taken into considera-tion, and Isocrates does not hesitate toinvoke it in the defense of his client:"[I] would be the most unhappy of menif, having paidout agoodbit of moneytothe state, I were saidto covet that of oth-ers or to take no accountof your opinion-when peopleseethat I have been muchless concernednot merely with my for-tune, but even with my life, than withthe good reputation which you giveme."1I2Past care for the reputation be-comes a guaranty that nothing would bedone that would bringaboutits loss. Pre-vious actions and the reputation whichresults fromthem become a sort of capi-tal which is incorporated n the person.It becomesa sort of acquiredasset whichone may invoke in his own defense. Weshould notice in this respect that, al-thoughthe rhetoricalargumentmaynev-er be restraining, the very fact thatpeople affirmthat it must not be over-looked and must be attended to is itselfthe sign of its rationality and its valuefor a universalaudience.'3

In the preceding pages, although wehave discussed the effect of the act onthe agent, we have been induced to al-lude also to the effectof the agent on theact. But the idea which we form of theagent is itself founded on previous actsand it often happens that the idea we


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258 ETHICSformof the personis the point of depar-ture for the argument,serving to antici-pate certain unknown actions, to inter-pret themin a certainway, or to transferto them the judgment applied to theperson.An exampleis furnishedus by a jokeattributed to the Belgian statesman,P. H. Spaak.After a press conference,areporterpressedhim: "Is it really true,what you have just told us?" and Spaakretorted, "With a good head like mine,could I tell you somethingwhichwasn'ttrue?" We shouldmentionin this regardthat there is a humorin argumentationwhich results from the application ofargumentative schemas beyond theirconditions of normal application. Thestudy of this sort of joke, which neednot be confusedwith generaluse of hu-mor n persuasion, houldshow us certainschemas of argument. It doubtless per-mits us, as well, to specify their condi-tions of application. Mr. Spaak's jokecaricatures he passage from the personto the act as it is currentlypracticed.In reasoningconcerninga person, asconcerning things, we constantly inferhis future behaviorfrom what is knownofhim andhispast andmoveto unknowncasesfromthosewhichare known. But itis more nterestingto declare hat the be-havior of personsmay be predictednotmerelyon the basisof ourpast experiencebut onthe basisof the ideaof a moral m-possibility, furnishedby a system of be-liefs, which is completelyparallelto thephysical impossibility furnished by ascientific system. It is thus that Pascaltells us, concerningmiracles,"Thereis agreat deal of differencebetween not be-ing for Christand saying so, and not be-ing for Christ,though pretendingto be.The firstmaydomiracles, he secondnot,for the firstare clearlyseen to be againstthe truth;but not so the others,andthus

miracles are more clear"'4 and "himwho is a covert enemy, God would notpermit to do miracles adversely."IsDia-bolical miracles are possible, becausethey fool nobody; but it is not possible,conversely,that God should permit hid-den enemiesof Christto fool the faithfulwith miracles.The interpretationof acts in terms ofthe image we form of the person consti-tutes a more specific aspect of argumentin this area. The context which the per-son supplies and which permits bettercomprehension f his acts most often ap-pears in terms of the notion of "in-tention."When we pass from the knowledgeofa person'sprevious acts to considerationsconcerning future ones, the role of theperson stands out, but it constitutesmerelya sort of privileged ink in the to-tality offacts whichare nvoked,whereasthe notion of intention puts the emphasismuch more on the permanentcharacterof the person. The intention is, indeed,intimately tied to the agent, being theemanationof his personalityor the resultof his will-that is, of that which charac-terizes him most fully. Since the inten-tion of others s neverknowndirectly,wesimply presume t throughwhatis knownof this personand his permanentcharac-teristics. Generallythe intention is pre-sumedin virtue of repeated and consist-ent acts, but there are cases in whichmerely the idea which we form of theagent permits his intentions to be de-termined. The same act, committed bysomeoneelse,wouldbe consideredas dif-ferent and esteemed otherwise, becauseit would be believed to have been donewith a different ntention. So recourse ointentionsconstitutes the heartof the ar-gument and subordinates he act to theagent, whose intention permits the un-derstandingand evaluationof the act. It


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ACT AND PERSONIN ARGUMENT 259is thus that Calvin, recallingthat the af-flictions of Job could be attributedsimul-taneously to threeauthors-God, Satan,and men-finds that Godhas acted prop-erly, whereasSatan and the men weretobe condemned because their intentionswere different.'6But the idea we have ofthe intentions depends entirely on whatwe know about the agents.All moralargumentbasedonintentionconstitutes a morality of the agent, inoppositionto amorality of the act, whichis much more formalistic.The above ex-ample shows clearly the mechanism ofthese arguments because it brings inagents, as well, characterized s God andSatan, but thereis no moralcontroversywhich does not makeuseof sucha mecha-nism. The intention of the agent and themotives which determinedhis action areoften consideredas the reality, which ishiddenbehindpurelyexternalmanifesta-tions. It is assumed that knowledge ofthem must be sought through appear-ances, for they alone have importance nthe final analysis.Here is another little dialogue byStevenson, the effect of which, accordingto the author, is to disqualify the inter-locutor and to removeall value fromhisadvice :7

A: You ought to vote for him, by all means.B: Your motives for urgingme are clear. Youthink that he will give you the city contracts.It is not without interest to opposetothis dialogueby Stevenson,and the con-clusionwhich he drawsfromit, a passageby Pareto:A certain proposition A can not be good un-less it is formed by an honest man; I show thathe who made this proposition is not honest, or

that he waspaid for doing it; thus I have shownthat the propositionA is harmful to the country.This is absurd;andanyone whouses this reason-ing has departed completely from the domain ofreasonableness.8

To hold that the dishonestyof the au-thor or the fact that he had a peculiar n-terest constitutesan argument nvalidat-ing his propositionor to reject this argu-ment completelyas irrelevantaretwo ex-treme positions which are equally over-simplified. In the first case, account istaken only of the person and the in-tentions attributed to him, to the neg-lect of the examinationof the proposi-tion advanced;in the second, only theproposition is looked at, apart fromwhat is known concerning its author.Actually, in daily practice, we takeaccount of both these factors, for whatwe know concerningthe authorpermitsus to understandthe propositionbetterand to estimate its proper value. Thisshowsthat in this areapractice s a greatdeal more varied than the analysis oftheoreticalthinkers,andthe effectof theagent on the act is of an infinitely var-iableintensity. It is only at the extremesthat it may be accordedan exclusivein-fluence or entirely eliminated. We willsee that one of these extremesis locatedin the regionof theologyand the otherinthat of science, inasmuch as science isconsideredas a system in itself.Wemay cite on this subjecta very in-terestingstudy by Mr. Asch,I9who criti-cizes the proceduresgenerallyusedin so-cial psychology to determine the influ-ence of prestige.These consist in askingsubjects to what extent they agreewitha judgment. Ultimately, the same judg-ment is presented to the same subject,but with a modificationof the subject'sknowledgeof the authorof thejudgment.Mr. Asch shows quite well that the re-sults attained do not at all demonstrate,as is generallysupposed, hat evaluationsaremodifiedexclusively n relationto theprestigeaccordedto the author.Indeed,the judgment estimated is not at all aninvariableelementwhichis evaluatedby


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260 ETHICStaking accountof the prestige of the dif-ferent authors to whom it is attributed.The judgment is not the same because,when it is attributed to one authorratherthan to another, it changes its signifi-cance; thereis no simple change of valuebut a new interpretation, for the judg-ment is put in the new context of ourknowledgeof the person who is supposedto have enunciated it. There are, then,judgments, as there are acts, which weinterpret by what we know concerningtheirauthor.The influenceattributedinrecent years to prestige and its powerofsuggestion is manifest less irrationallyand simply than is generally supposed.It is this interpretationof acts as de-pendent on what is known concerningtheir author which makesus understandthe mechanismofprestige,andthe trans-fer of value which it effects from the per-sonhaving prestigeto the most diverseofhis acts. "What genius does not vindi-cate the works of his youth!" Malrauxexclaimed.20And, indeed, anyone whoconsiders he earlyworksof a greatartistcannot help seeingin them the foreshad-owing of his future greatness.Thus rec-ognitionof outstandingvalue in a personeven validates acts which precede thetime whenit becomes ndisputablymani-fest. The author of works of genius cre-ated at different times is a genius; andthis characterization ttaches the acts toa stable quality of the person whichshines as well into the years previous tothe periodof productionof masterpiecesas into the years which follow. It is notsufficient o say that the past guaranteesthe future-for the futuremay very wellvalidatethepast-but the stablemakeupof the persondoespermitus to prejudgehis acts and particularlyhis judgments."There are persons," says Mere, "whorecognizetrue merit and to please themis a good indication;but there are many

more who do not have good judgment,and satisfying them should not cause toomuch rejoicing.21We thus see how prestige may serve tovalidate acts, to give rise to inclinationsto imitation, and to work out the idea ofa model from which conduct may becopied. The use of this argumentativemechanism in knowledge has given riseto both the use and the abuse of argu-ments from authority.When Ciceroasked us to scornworksof art and wrote: "In your opinionwhatwould be said by L. Mummius,who hadsuch complete scorn of Corinth, if hesaw one of these dandies lovingly fon-dling some chamber-potmade of Corin-thian bronze?'2 This argumenthas nointerest unless L. Mummius has someprestige. In addition, we should noticethat this scorn for Corinth, which canserve as a model, is at the same time anelement of this prestige, for very oftenthe authority to whomwe referis at thesame time being justified. If there is noprestige, argument from the model be-comes worthless.In the Rhetorica d He-rennium we find a humorous examplewhichrequiresus to distinguishbetweenan argumentativeschemeand the condi-tions of its application.Thiswork triestogive an exampleof an argumentwhichisfeeble because it argues from what isdone to what ought to be done. It con-cerns a passagefrom the TrinumnusbyPlautus: "It is very disagreeableto re-buke a friend for a fault, but it is oftenuseful and profitable:for today I shallrebukemyfriend or whathehas done. 23The argumenthas scarcelyany value be-cause it is stated by a comic character,the old Megaronides.But this is not al-ways the case. To be convincedof this,it is sufficient o remember he confessorsof the faith.Argument based on the idea that a


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ACT AND PERSON IN ARGUMENT 26imodelmust be followed s stronger o theextent that the authority is not contest-ed. When it is a question of divine au-thority, this authorityevenmakes it pos-sible to determinestandardsof goodnessand of truth.Very often the authority is based oncompetenceas the only reasonforthe ar-gumentativevalue of certainexpressions.When the teacher says to his pupil, "Idon't understandwhat you are saying,"this usuallymeans,"Youhave expressedyourself badly" or "Your ideas are notvery clear on this point." Again, incom-petencemay bemadeuseof as a criterionfor the disqualificationof everyone whois considered ess competent than thosewho disclaimtheirowncompetence.Thisis the import of the argumentused byChevreul,presidentof the ParisianAcad-emy of Sciences,when the attempt wasmade to disqualify the testimony ofhandwritingexperts from the discussionof the authenticity of the manuscriptpresentedby MichelChasles.24 his formof argument can have an outstandingphilosophic mportance,since it may de-stroy the competencenot only of an indi-vidual or a group,with respect to a cer-tain matter,but of humanityas a whole.When one denouncesin himself the de-ficienciesof reason, this may be done inorderto affirm he deficienciesof humanreason in general. He does not presenthimself as an exception: quite the con-trary,he createsthe impression hat oth-ers arein the samesituationas he. In theextreme case, if all men are in thesame situation, the problem is deemedinsoluble.Schopenhauer shows quite well theabuse of this argumentwhich might oc-cur, using the artificeof feigningincom-petence in a ticklish situation.25Here wepass fromrhetoricalargumentsto eristicand even sophisticalargument.But it is

because rhetorical argument has somevalue that it may be utilizedin badfaith,just as counterfeitingwould beinconceiv-able unless there were authentic billshavingsomevalue. And if sophisticalar-gument differsfrom honest argumentbythe bad faith which is employedin it, inorderto establishthis bad faith in anoth-er we makeuse of the ensembleof rhetori-cal methodsof argumentwhich permitusto concludefrom the acts to the inten-tion. Sophisticalargumentthus providesdoubleconfirmationof the value and im-portanceof rhetoric,for its value is con-firmedboth by those who imitate it inbad faith and by those who make use ofit to discredit the pretenses of an ad-versary.

In analyzingsuccessively the effect ofthe act on the agentand that of the agentonthe act, wehave beenled to emphasizefirst one and then the other. But this ismerelythe artificeof analysis.The inter-action is constant and is quite often ex-plicitly seen.We may gain the benevolence of thejudges, we read in the Rhetoricaad He-rennium,"by praising the courage,wis-dom, kindness, and brilliance of theirjudgments, and by considerationof theesteem whichthey will merit,and the ex-pectations which they must fulfill."6Thus we pass from the considerationofpast judgments to an evaluation of thejuryandfromthe goodjuryto the antici-pated favorableverdict, whichwill itselfelevate the prestige of the judges. Suc-cessive evocationof the act and the per-son, then of the personand the act, doesnot leave the mind at the point at whichit started.The cumulativeeffectof theseinterrelationships s clear, as long as nouse is made of a separating technique.We shall call this the "snowball" nter-action. This may take place even in the


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262 ETHICScase of a single act, since a work whichdoes honor to its author will be itself allthe more prized as the author is highlyesteemed. But the snowball nteraction sbetter revealedwhen there is a differenceeitherin the time or in the nature of theacts to be performed. ts effectis then toallow the personor the agent to be a basisfor expectations quite superiorto thosewhichhis previous acts wouldhave justi-fied,had this interactionnot taken place.We find an exampleof this in the reason-ingwhich Whately cites, whereby,on thebasis of the marksof divine benevolencein this world, we concludeconcerning hesplendorof the afterlifeby way of the in-termediate conclusion that God is be-nevolent.No less than the interventionofa person s required o permitthe passagefrom an observablerealm to one entirelydifferent, rom the real worldto the worldof the future life. But there is more: thebenefitswhich we expect in the afterlifeinfinitely surpassthose we enjoyhere be-low, which serve as the beginning pointfor a snowballargument.Of course, the snowball interrelationimplies that the act and the personmu-tually affect each other in the same di-rection. However, the interaction mayoperate in opposed directions.It is gen-erallyinsuch casesthat useis madeof cer-tain techniqueswhich prevent the inter-play. It is these which we are going toanalyze in the remainderof our study.

The techniques which break or curbthe interactionof the act and the personmust be utilizedwhen there is an incom-patibility between the act and what isknown concerning he person, that is tosay, when the act requires a profoundmodificationof ourconceptionof the per-sonwhichwe refuse to makeor when thepersonshouldconferon the act a value in-compatiblewith the consequenceswhich

it involves, that is to say, with other con-nections which also influence ts value.The most effective technique for pre-venting the reaction of the act on theagent is to consider the latter as com-pletely good or evil, that is, as a god or ademon. The most effectivetechnique forpreventing the reaction of the agent onthe act is to consider he latter as a truthor the expressionof a fact on which thereis complete agreement, at least in thepresent circumstances.We will begin byexamining these two techniques, whichwe will call "separation" echniques.

The introduction nto ourthought of aperfect and divine being gives the possi-bility of completely detaching the personfrom the act. Nevertheless, the notion ofGod is not always used in this manner,far fromit. We are familiar with a seriesof arguments n which God is presentedas operatingin order to acquireprestigeandis deemed o have done certainthingsto show his power,or as a signof hispow-er, which, being manifestin a naturalor-der, permits belief in his actions in an-other order.28Leibniz likewise refuses to neglect theworks and consider only the creator."And so," he writes, "I amvery farfromthe sentiment of thosewhomaintainthatthere are no rules ofgoodnessandperfec-tion in the nature of things, or in theideas which God has of them, and thatthe worksof Godaregoodmerelyfor theformal reasonthat God has made them.. . . The creator s discoveredyconsidera-tion of creation. "29 Leibniz thus wishes toapply the same reasoningto God as toman. In the double transition from thepersonto the act and from the act to theperson, the first transitionis prior,sinceGod is involved. But Leibniz does notwish to leave it at this; he wishesas wellto understandwhy the worldis goodandto pass from the creation to the creator.


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ACT AND PERSONIN ARGUMENT 263But let us not forget that it is in virtueof the highly privileged first movementthat he knows that the present world isthe best of all possibleworlds.However,if he makes use of the value of the crea-tion to glorify the creator,he alsoknowshow, in somecases, to prevent the actionof the act on the agent, by makinguse ofdivine perfection.This he explainsto usin the Essay on Theodicy,by imaginingaman of extraordinaryreputation in thefollowingsituation. He writes:

A manmight give suchgreat and strong proofof his virtue and holiness that all of the most ap-parent reasons which could be held against himto charge him with a proposed crime, for ex-ample, larceny, or an assassination, would haveto be rejectedas the calumniesof false witnesses,an extraordinary accident which occasionallylays suspicion on the most innocent. Thus in acase in which all others would be in danger ofcondemnation, or questioning ... this manwouldbe unanimously acquitted by his judges.3oIn this case, Leibniz continues, therewouldbe no new law but the applicationof a "good logic of probability," since"this person has such admirablequali-ties, that in virtue of a good logic ofprobabilitywe must have more faith inhis wordsthan in that of numerousoth-ers."Leibnizhas used a humanexampleas a basis for this justification,which heconsidersas rational,of a techniquecon-sisting in refusingall unfavorableeffectsof the act on the agent;but by that veryfact, whenthe same technique s appliedto God,it operatesperfectly:"I have al-ready remarked that anything whichmight be opposed to the goodness andjustice of God, is merelyan appearance,whichwouldbe damagingto a man, butwhich becomesas nothing when appliedto Godand when weighedwith the dem-onstrationswhichassureus of the infiniteperfectionof his attributes."We just as often encounterthe inde-pendenceof the personin relationto the

act whenit is amatterof negativevalues.Bossuet makes use of it in this curiouspassage:We Christians must recognize that neither

the sciences, nora great mind, northe other giftsof nature are very considerable advantages,since God permits them to be completely pos-sessed by devils, his chief enemies, and therebyrenders them not merely unfortunate, but evenworthy of infinite scorn;that in spite of all theseoutstanding qualities, and miserable and impo-tent as we are, we are enviable to them, becauseour great God chooses to regard us with pity.3'It is qualities which are involved here,but the mechanismis the same as withacts. These qualities cannot modify theidea which we hold of the demon, butrather they are tainted thereby-theyare devaluated and do not constitute"veryconsiderableadvantages."The actor the qualityis interpretedorminimizedso that it cannotaffect the agent, and itis completelysubordinated o the natureattributed to the latter.

From the moment an act expressesafact, the valuewhichis attributedto it iscompletely independent of that of theperson, so that we find ourselves in asituation the opposite of that in whichthe personis shieldedfrom his acts. "Afactual errorsubjectsa wise man to ridi-cule," La Bruyere tells us. But this isevidentlyon conditionthat the fact is in-contestable.No man has enoughprestigeto makeus believethat 2 + 2 = 5 orac-cept any testimony which seems to uscontraryto experience.It is a matter ofweighingthe evidential value of the ex-perience.In this regard,Locke remindsus thatto a man whose experience has been alwaysquite contrary, and has never heard of anythinglike it, the most untainted credit of a witnesswill scarce be able to find belief: as it happenedto a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining theking of Siam with the peculiarites of Holland... amongst other things told him "that the


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264 ETHICSwater in his country would sometimes in coldweather be so hard that men walked upon it,and that it would bear an elephant if it werethere." To which the king replied "hitherto Ihave believed the strange things you have toldme, becauseI look uponyou as a sober,fairman:but now I am sureyou lie!"32

In this account, experience and thegeneralizationswhichseemto be author-ized by it are consideredas a fact whichsurpassesany influenceof the person.Hisact, sinceit is deemed ncompatiblewithconvictions drawn from experience, istreated as a falsehood,which is, in turn,considered a fact. The person can donothing about it. And, conversely, theact is not without effect on the person,since the validty of all his previousasser-tions is damaged.Anythingwhichis consideredas a factis independentof the action of the per-son; this is why the status of the fact isshakenby usingone meansor anothertoattach its assertion to the characterofthe witness. Everyoneknowsthe famoustale of the magicianwho was trusted bythe king and had him put on clotheswhich, he said, were seen only by menabove reproach.The king and his cour-tiers saw nothingbut did not dareto sayso until one daywhena child,in his inno-cence, cried, "Why is the king naked?"The spell was broken.The magicianhadenoughprestigeto makeperceptionserveas a criterionof everyone'smoralityuntilthe indisputable nnocenceof a child de-stroyed this favorable prejudice. Fromthe momentthe perceptionwas no longertied to a judgment of value, everyonegave it its usual importance.

Whendoes a judgmentexpressa fact?As long, we have seen, as it is believedtobe valid for a universalaudienceand (toavoid all discussionin this regard) hasbeen included in a special disciplinewhose foundations are presumed to be

accepted and whose criteria have beenmade the object of an explicitor implicitconvention.There is a numberof scientificor prac-tical techniqueswhich attempt to obtainobjectivity by separating the act fromthe agent eitherto describe t or to judgeit. Behaviorism is one example; anotheris suppliedby all competitionsin whichthe contestantsare judgedon measurableperformancesor in which the work isjudged without the name of its authorbeing madeknown.In law a great manyarrangements seek to characterizeactsindependently of the person committingthem and even without concern for hisintentions. In ethics such recourse o thefact without considerationof the inten-tion is much less frequent.Still it is ap-parent that an ethics such as the Japa-nese, which is much more formalisticthan Western ethics, may be consideredas a morality of the act. Ruth Benedictcites a long list of Japaneseschool direc-tors who committed suicide because theflames of a conflagration, with whichthey had nothing to do, threatened theportrait of the emperorwhichornamentseach educational nstitution.33Detachment of the act and refusal tointroduce into its evaluation any consid-eration concerning he personseem muchmore rationalistic than does the inversetechnique.Wehave seen that Pareto ridi-cules the introductionof considerationsconcerning he authorinto estimationofthe foundationof a proposition.In thishe merely follows Bentham's view. Wemay note in this regard a remark byWhately,of whichwe cannothelpadmir-ing the insight on this point. "If themeasureis a good one," says Bentham,"will it become bad because it is sup-ported by a bad man?" And Whately re-plies, "It is only in matters of strict sci-ence,andthat too, in arguing o scientific


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ACT AND PERSON IN ARGUMENT 265man, that the charactersof the advisers(aswell as all otherprobablearguments)should be wholly put out of the ques-tion."34Nevertheless,whateverthe valueof Whately'sconsiderations, t cannot bedenied that preoccupation with objec-tivity leads to the detachmentof the actfrom the personbecauseit is more diffi-cult to obtain agreementconcerningper-sonsthan concerningacts, orat least thisseems to be the situation in virtue of thenotion of a "fact." Someone is usuallycalled "fair" because he judges the actwithout taking accountof the person.Itis truethat thisprocedureoftenpossessesindisputable advantages, the principalone being the facilitation of the agree-ment on criteria. But it must never beforgotten that it is no more than a pro-cedure and may have serious disadvan-tages. The best proof of this is the recentattempts to individualizepunishment.The cases in which the interactionofthe act and the person is entirelybrokenin onesense oranotherarerelativelyrarein sociallife, for they aremerelylimitingcases. Most techniques which are usedforthis are not separation echniquesbutcurbing echniques,which have the effectof restraining this interaction withoutcompletelyannulling t.One of these techniques s prejudiceor,perhapsbetter,bias.Anact committedbysomeonedoes not reacton the conceptionwhichwe have of this person,in so far asfavorable or unfavorableprejudiceper-mits maintenanceof an adequation be-tween the act and the person.The act isinterpreted and judged in such a waythat it need not modify our idea of theperson, which, as we have already seen,supplies the context whereby the act isbetter understood whenever the act isnot perfectly univocal. But if prejudicedoespermitthe removalof a threatening

inconsistency, t cannot be usedwhentheinconsistencyis too obvious.The effect of bias or prejudice s quiteoften a blindnesstowardthe value of anact and the transfer to it of other valuesstemmingfrom the person.Avoidance ofprejudice s thus a healthyseparationbe-tween act andperson. But if we put our-selves in the point of view of the normalinterrelation of act and person, whichseemsto usprimordial,prejudiceappearsas a curbing technique, a techniquewhichis opposed to the continualrenew-al of the image of the person and con-tributesprimarilyto the stability of theperson.When we look at the role of bias andprestige, we see that it is prestigewhichmay be consideredas the forcewhichas-sures the action of the agent on the act.It has an active andpositive roleand oc-cursat anearlier tage thanthat at whichbias enters. Bias itself correctsan incon-sistency between the act and the personand occurs when the latter must beshielded against the act. But thoughprestige may preparefor bias, they arenot alwayslinked, for bias may be basedon otherkinds of previousarguments.In order o avoidgiving the impressionthat we Judgecertainacts as a functionof the person or that we suffer fromprejudice,certainprecautionsmustoftenbe taken.Oneof them is to prefaceanun-favorableestimation of an act with cer-tain eulogiesof the person,andconverse-ly. Theseeulogiesaresometimesdirectedtowardotheracts, but with the intentionof praising the personand making clearour own impartiality.If the technique of prejudice s insuffi-ciently establishedand the act standsoutin spite of everything, it is possible tomake a separation between distinctrealms of activity in such a way thatan act done in one of them will be con-


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266 ETHICSsideredirrelevantto the idea we formofthe person,whoseimageis determinedbythe action of another realm. In differ-ent societiesand differentenvironments,these realmswouldnot be determined nthe same way. For example,to be hard-workingor faithful in marriagemay incertain cases be determinant for theimage we form of the person, while inothersthey wouldbe relegatedto the re-serve realmof acts of scant importance.The extent of these inactiverealms s theobject of an agreement,generally tacit,which comes under the same headingasthe values and connectionsadmitted bythe group and even contributes to itscharacterization.It need hardly be saidthat the reserverealmof acts which areconsideredirrelevant may vary accord-ing to the person.Such acts as would beconsideredunimportantwhenattributedto a ruler would be essential to the ideawe form of a person of lesser rank, andvice versa. It is the samewith respecttothe acts of a certainperiodof life-child-hood, for example.But we neednot believe that the sepa-ration between the act and the personcannot be extended to the most impor-tant acts. Quite the contrary; n reality,the most important acts are also thosewhich arewatched, preciselybecauseweknow that they reflect on the imagewhich we form of the person. But if wethink that an act has been set up to cre-ate a certain impression, its indicativevalue is greatly reduced. This was em-phasizedby Schopenhauer,orwhomtheperson colorsand impregnatesthe leastof his acts.35Indeed, it is in the littlethings whichare least regarded hat menindicate their true naturebest.

In othercases,fromthe multiplicityofacts we retainonly a singleaspect,whichaloneis judgedimportant.Sometimes-wesplit the person nto fragmentshavingno

mutual interrelationor frustratethe in-fluence of the act on the personby crys-tallyzing the latter at a particularstageof his existence. Jouhandeautraces theportrait of the woman who reducesherego to what it once was and refusesto in-tegrateherpresentactions into it, sayingto her customers,"I am in the past; it isonly my mummythat mendsyour shoes,Monsieur."36This technique is usedmuch more often than would seem.Eachtime we make a rigid exception of pastaction, we crystallize the individual insome way. Thus shielded,he is endowedwith some value but has lost his spon-taneity.Paulhan notices quite correctly thedisagreeable mpressionwe feel whenwehear friendsspeakingof US.37Accordingto him, this disagreeableimpression istied to the illusionof forecasts from thepast. But it is not necessarilythis whichcauses the impression,being rather thefact that our acts and our person arelinked by others in a mechanicaland un-changeablefashion, as if our personhadbeen arrestedat a certainstage of its de-velopment. It is disagreeable to hearsomeonesay of us, "He will certainly actnobly and sacrificehimself,"because thisact is presented simply as the conse-quence of the past and doesnot have thepowerto react on our futurepersonalityand re-create t for ourselvesor others.Along with these techniques of moregeneral mportance,whose ichnesswe arevery farfromhavingexhausted,there aretechniques of less importance, whichmerelyseekto removeanincompatibilitybetweenthe act andthe person n a givencircumstance.Oneof themis recourse o the notion ofan exception.The meritoriousor blame-worthy act which seems incompatiblewith what we otherwiseknow of the per-son is consideredas exceptional, to pre-


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ACT AND PERSONIN ARGUMENT 267vent the futhertransferof its value to theperson. Still it is often necessary to ex-plain howthis exceptionalbehaviorcouldoccur. If a friendwrongsus, we explainthis behaviorby ignoranceor awkward-ness, in order to avoid seeing in it causeswhich would shatter our friendly rela-tions. It is on a conceptionof the samesort that we base the respectfulrecourse"from the pope poorly informedto thepope well informed."We therebyunder-stand that the judgment which is op-posed is not attributed to an imperfectfaculty of judgingbut to badly informedcounselors.It is thus possible to disap-prove of the judgment,without modify-ing one's estimationof the person.An extremeprocedureconsists in sup-posing that the act only apparentlybe-longs to the personand that it was sug-gested or dictated by someone else or,still better, that someone else speaksthroughhis voice. The personis reducedto the role of a witness. Bossuet asks,"May corruptpreachersbear the mes-sage of eternallife?"And he replies,car-ryingonAugustine'sanalogy to the vine-yard and the bush, "The bush bears afruit which does not belong to it, and isnonethelessthe fruit of the vineyard forbeing supported by the bush" and "Donot scornthe grapeson thepretextthat itis found amongthe thorns:do not rejectthis doctrinebecauseit is surroundedbyevil: it still comesfrom God."38Sometimesseparationestablished be-tweenthepersonandhisactsis anattemptnot to protect the personbut to see thatthe acts aregiven theirpropervalue andarenot loweredby the envy or ill reputewith respectto theirauthor. ChevalierdeMeretells us that "Caesarattributedhismost admirabledeedsto the favor of theGods.However,Cato accuseshim of be-lieving in neither Gods nor Goddesses;Caesarmerelyunderstood he sentiments

of the people."39Demosthenes does nothesitate to use the same technique:"Well,if I showedgreater foresight thanothers in all circumstances, I do notmean to attribute it in any way to a spe-cial wisdom or some faculty on which Ipride myself. No, these insights I owe totwo causes which I shall explain: first,Athenians, to good luck ... and second,to the fact that my judgments and mypredictionsarenot paidfor.14oIn this ex-ample the tie is only partially broken.Demosthenesattributes his good adviceto luck but also to his own honesty. In-deed, the first reason might turn againsthim: If luck rules, why should t continueto favor him in the future? Now what isimportant, namely, confidence in hispresent forecast,he attributes equally tothe honesty which his adversaries ack.Recourse to luck or the goddessof for-tune is a profession of modesty which,though it neednot be taken too seriously,doespermitthe reductionof the effectofthe act on the person. We may treat inthe same mannerotherprocedures,suchas recountinga story as if it camefromathird person or such as making judg-ments preceded by "they say that . . ."in place of "I suppose that ... -inbrief,all thosecases n which we attempt,as far as possible, to separate the actfrom the person in order to reduce therole of the latter to that of a witness ora mouthpiece.

It is in the realm of judicial debatethat all these techniques are really ap-plied to a happy hunting ground. It isthere that we find all the procedures y-ing act and person or permitting theunion of the two to be broken.The onlyconclusionwhichmaybe drawn romthisis that the connection between act andperson s merelya presumptionandmustnever be considered a necessary tie.


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268 ETHICSAmong the techniques examined in theRhetoricaad Herennium, he one knownunder the name of "deprecation"s veryinterestingfrom ourpoint of view. "Theaccused admits the crime and its pre-meditation, but none the less imploresmercy." And the author adds: "Thiscouldscarcely be done beforea tribunal,unless we plead for a man who has beenrecommended by fine acts which aremany andwell-known."14 t the extremecase, it is demanded hat accountbe tak-en only of formeracts which are put inopposition to the recent acts of the per-son. The argumentat the same time im-plies the unity of the act and the person-without which previous acts wouldhave no significance o the trial-and at-tempts to destroy this unity with respectto present actions.Soconceived, his dep-recation presumes that laudable actsexpress the true personality better thanthose which are harmful.It thus employsa doubleconvention-that whichties theact to the personand that whichpermitsthem to be separatedunder certain cir-cumstances. The duality of this conven-tion alonepermits this formof argument.The question is to note whether the de-struction of the tie of act and person

seemssufficiently ustified underthe giv-en circumstances;but it must be empha-sized that this destruction is invokedonly in cases of difficulty.The connectionbetween act and per-son seems to us the prototype of a seriesof ties whichgive rise to the same inter-actions and lend themselvesto the samearguments: he connectionbetweenindi-vidual and group, the connection be-tweenan event andthe epochin whichitoccurs, and many other connections ofcoexistence of which the most general is

that of act and essence. We have beenableonly to outline ourobservationscon-cerningthe relationsbetweenthe act andthe person. The study of other connec-tions, the aspectsin whichthey resemblethe first,and those in whichthey are dif-ferent, would carryus beyond the limitsof this article. We will be satisfied if theprecedingpagesstrengthenourreaders nthe idea that rhetoric, conceived as thestudy of methods of argument, mayclarify the most diverse areas of humanthought, fromliteratureto epistemologyand metaphysics,by way of law, morals,and religion.UNIVERSITEDE BRUXELLES

NOTESi. Cf. C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca,"Logique et rhetorique," Revue philosophique, Nos.

I-3 (Paris, I950).2. Cf. C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca,"Sociologie de la connaissance et philosophic de laconnaissance," Revue international de philosophic,No. I3 (Brussels, I950).3. Cf. the study by N. Leites, "The Third Inter-national on Its Changes of Policy," in the collectivework edited by H. Lasswell, Language of Politics:Studies in Quantitative Semantics (New York:George N. Stewart, I949).4. C. L. Stephenson, Ethics and Language (New

Haven: Yale University Press, I945), p. I28.5. Chevalier de Mere, cEuvrescompletes (Paris:Collection esUniversit6s eFrance, 930), III, I34.6. G. Aron, Introduction a la philosophic delPhistoire Paris: Gallimard, I948), p. 8o.

7. Isocrates, "ContreLobbites,"in Discours (Paris:Collection des Universites de France, I928), Vol. I,No. I4.8. Pascal, ?Euvres,ed. La Pleiade, Pensdes, 364(ed.Brunschvicg, 57).9. John Calvin, Institution de la religion Chre-tienne (Geneva, i888), p. I4.io. Isocrates, "Contre Callimakhos," par. 57, op.cit., Vol. I.ii. S. Well L'Enracinement (Paris: Gallimard,

I949), p. 260.I2. Isocrates, "Contre Callimakhos," par. 63.I3. Cf. C. Perelman, "La Quete du rationnel," in

Atudes de philosophic des sciences en hommage dF. Gonseth,p. I4I.I4. Pensees, 75I (ed. Brunschvicg, 836).I5. Ibid., 753 (ed. Brunschvicg, 843).i6. Calvin, op. cit., Book I, chap. xviii, par. i.


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ACT AND PERSONIN ARGUMENT 269I7. Stevenson, op. cit., p. I28.i8. Pareto, Traite de sociologie generale, trans.Boven (Geneva: Payot, I9I7), Vol. II, par. I756.I9. Asch, "The Doctrine of Suggestion, Prestige,and Imitation in Social Psychology," PsychologicalReview,IV (I948), 250-76.20. Malraux, Saturne: Essai sur Goya, la Galeriede la Pleiade (Paris: Gallimard, I950), p. i8.2I. Merr, op. cit., I, 77.22. Cicero De paradoxe 2.23. CiceroRhetoricaad Herennium ii (QEuvresorn-pletes de Cicero, trans. Nisard [Paris: Didot, I859],chap. xxiii); cf. Plautus Trinumnus, Act I, scene i,vs. 5.24. Vayson de Pradenne, Les Fraudes en archeo-logie prehistorique(Paris: Nourry, I932), p. 297.25. Schopenhauer,"Eristische Dialektik," Kunst-griff 3I (Samtliche Werke [Munich, Piper ed.], VI,

423).26. Rhetorica ad Herennium i (?Euvres,chap. iv,P. 5).27. Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Ox-

ford, I828), p. 62.28. Pascal, Pens6es, 560 (ed. Brunschvicg, 643).29. Leibniz, Discours de mgtaphysique (Paris:Vrin, I929), pp. 26-27.

30. Leibniz, "Essais de th6odicee," in ?Euvres,d.Gerhardt (Leipzig, I932), VI, 70-74.3I. Bossuet, "Sermon sur les demons," in Sermons(Paris: Garnier), II, ii.32. Locke, An Essay concerningHuman Under-standing (London: Routledge, I894), Book IV, chap.

xv, par. 5.33. R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and theSword (Boston, I946), p. I5I.34. Whately, op. cit., pp. I62-64.35. Schopenhauer, "Zur Ethik," in Parega undParalipomena (Samtliche Werke, ed. Brockhaus[Leipzig, I939], VI, 245).36. Jouhandeau, Un Monde (Paris: Gallimard,I950), p. 34.37. J. Paulhan, Entretien sur des fats divers(Paris: Gallimard, I945), p. 67.38. Bossuet, "Sermon des pecheurs," op. cit., II,489.39. Mere, op. cit., II, I09.

40. Demosthenes, "Sur la paix," par. ii, in Ha-tangues (Paris: Collection des Universites deFrance).4I. Cicero Rhetorica ad Herennium i (op. cit.,chap. xiv).

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