ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace

National Police Training

ACPO Manual of Guidance

on Keepingthe

Peace

Contents

3 MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACEACPO

CONTENTSPage No

FOREWORD.............................................................. 5

1. ABOUT THE GUIDE .................................................................7What is its status? .....................................................................7Who is it for? ..............................................................................7What does it do? ........................................................................7What does it not do? ..................................................................8

2. KEEPING THE PEACE – AN OVERVIEW ...............................9Keeping the peace .....................................................................9The principles of human rights ................................................15Community information management .....................................19Nature and scope of disorder ..................................................21A disorder model ......................................................................23Strategic principles ..................................................................29

3. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ............................................31Strategic considerations : the key points .................................31Command ................................................................................35Planning ..................................................................................43Intelligence and information .....................................................49The role of the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and CrimeManagement ............................................................................55Public Relations strategy .........................................................61Mutual aid .................................................................................65Traffic management .................................................................67

4. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ..............................................69Tactical considerations: the key points ...................................69Tactical advice .........................................................................73Tactical options .......................................................................75Warning messages ..................................................................97

5. SUPPORT ELEMENTS ............................................................99Training principles ....................................................................99The National Operations Faculty ...........................................101Briefing and debriefing ...........................................................103Welfare issues ..........................................................................107

INDEX ................................................................. 109

4 ACPOCONTENTS AND FOREWORD


FOREWORDFOREWORD

For many police officers the term disorder no longer reflects the serious urban violence seen inthe 1980s. Instead, at the start of this new millennium, we may be facilitating the right to engagein or protest against lawful activity, or helping to ensure safety at large scale public celebrations.Our commitment to the law however requires us to be capable of dealing with significant disordershould it arise.

Across this wide scope of expectation, Government now demands that we engage with ourpartner agencies and the community in preventing and reducing crime and disorder, therebykeeping the peace. Whilst pursuing and achieving this vital objective, we must retain thecapacity to respond to disorder and restore the peace should the need arise.

This Manual has been produced as a result of wide consultation both in and outside the service.A needs analysis was carried out on a national basis, and included inputs from advisory bodiessuch as Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary. The findings of that survey were used by ateam of public order practitioners, with assistance from National Police Training, to write theguide as it appears today.

In producing this guide, the style, purpose and focus had to incorporate modern ideas andpractice, and this is reflected in the title. It is not intended to be an all-encompassing “everythingyou need to know about public order policing” manual. It is meant to help planners, advisors andcommanders prepare for and manage events and incidents where there is a risk to public safetyor a potential for disorder – both spontaneous and pre-planned. Details of specific tactics can befound in the ACPO Public Order Tactical Trainers’ Manual and information and intelligence oncurrent operational practice can be obtained from the National Operations Faculty at Bramshill.

Above all else it is intended to help the officers of the police service discharge their duties andresponsibilities, thereby helping to ensure that the police forces of the country are ready to meetfuture crime and disorder problems.

Sir Ronnie Flanagan, OBEChief ConstableRoyal Ulster ConstabularyChairman, ACPO Public Order Sub-Committee

6 ACPOCONTENTS AND FOREWORD



on Keepingthe

Peace

Chapter 1


WHAT IS ITS STATUS?This is an ACPO sponsored document, which replaces the ACPO Guideto Public Order Policing. It should be read in conjunction with:

♦ The ACPO Public Order Tactical Trainers’ Manual

♦ HMIC thematic inspections and guidance on good practice

♦ Home Office Circulars in relation to crime and disorder, public safetyand public order management

♦ ACPO and force policy documents.

It is a central reference providing a framework of guidance and advice toaid strategic thinking and tactical deployment. It is aimed at thoseinvolved in the planning and management of public safety and publicorder.

WHO IS IT FOR?Persons who require an understanding of the framework for themanagement of public order, particularly:

♦ gold, silver and bronze commanders

♦ tactical advisors

♦ event planners

♦ managers

♦ trainers and training designers

♦ those who work in partnership with the police

to aid them in the planning and delivery of policing where there is a risk topublic safety or a potential for disorder.

WHAT DOES IT DO?It places crime and disorder in the context of mainstream policing activity.

It links and reinforces the need for a partnership-based approachcompatible with community safety and crime reduction initiatives.

It emphasises the need for locally based initiatives to all aspects of publicsafety and public disorder policing, whilst recognising the need for acorporate approach to policing and training within an agreed framework.

It provides a structure for the planning and management of local, regionaland national events and incidents where there is a risk to public safety ora potential for disorder.

8 ABOUT THE GUIDE CHAPTER 1

It provides a reference as to where and how relevant specialist skills andknowledge can be sourced through:

♦ the National Operations Faculty

♦ the National Crime Faculty

♦ the National Public Order Intelligence Unit.

WHAT DOES IT NOT DO?This document is not exhaustive. It is not intended to restrict individualinnovation within the general principles of this document.

It does not replace the need for the correct selection and provision ofspecialist training as identified by individual services.

It is not a prescriptive document, and does not remove the responsibilityof individual services to determine their own needs for the policing ofpublic disorder.

It does not provide a list of tactics and responses to individual eventrequirements.

It does not preclude any partnership being formed to assist in theresolution of any incident or issue, which may affect the overall outcomeof the event, nor does it remove the need to consult.



on Keepingthe

Peace

Chapter 2


KEEPING THE PEACECrime and disorder within society:

♦ adversely affects the public’s quality of life

♦ reduces opportunities for economic and social regeneration

♦ violates people’s freedoms and rights.

Crime and disorder reduction is therefore a major role for the police. Thisguide focuses on its three principal components:

1. identifying and assessing the risk

2. minimising and managing the risk

3. the police’s reasonable, proportional and effective response.

These three points are inextricably linked to all aspects of police workwithin the community. They encompass the protection of human rights,the recognition of diversity within society, the law governing the use offorce and the partnership work set out in crime and disorder reductionstrategies. Intelligence obtained from within the community and othersources, is pivotal to effective crime and disorder reduction.

Crime and disorder: a strategic modelThe model below illustrates how, through a partnership approach,strategic action in four key areas will reduce crime and disorder.

Crime andDisorder

Reduction

‘Hot Spot’ managementIdentify locations

Tackle the aggressors

Partnership approach

Behaviour managementLink crime and disorder

Identify patterns

Focus resources

Analyse methods - learn

TargetingThe profiling of offendersThe career criminal

The criminal network

Preventative measuresCCTV – overt - covertTarget hardening

Community action plans

Design out crime and disorder

10 CHAPTER 2KEEPING THE PEACE – AN OVERVIEW

The strategic approach advocated seeks to limit the threat to peace bycorrect identification of problems and suitable measured action againstthe root causes of these problems. It supports a balance of preventionand preparation.

None of the items within the model should be viewed as being the soledomain or responsibility of the police. The police and partners have arange of measures for dealing with a wide variety of conflict. Theseinclude strategic direction, keeping the peace in the longer term,prevention of disorder and managing the return to normality.

Some crime and disorder is predictable. Through positive action bypolice in conjunction with partner agencies, much can be done to keepthe peace and limit opportunities for crime and disorder.

The nature of tensions and conflictsTensions in relationships are part of daily life and most conflicts arisingfrom them are managed by a complex web of social interactions, thuspreventing conflict from escalating into something more damaging.

Tensions and conflicts in communities are often driven by recognisablecircumstances. Unacceptable or inappropriate behaviour by someindividuals, or an absence of stability in a location, can be an indicator ofa slow deterioration of the quality of life in that area. This situation canoften be exacerbated by criminal behaviour.

Failure by anyone to recognise and address the causes and symptoms ofconflict and resulting tension will often be an aggravating factor in anysubsequent difficulties.

Spontaneous or sudden violence, disorder and damage aremanifestations of unresolved tensions. The cumulative effect is areduction in a community’s quality of life.

Tension is increased within a community when people’s concerns or fearsare not resolved. This has an adverse effect on the quality of life ofindividuals and communities. Conflict may occur when behaviourscausing the tensions are challenged. Behaviours associated with lowlevel disorder do not generally attract the status of recordable crime andtraditionally have not been seen as a priority for police activity. Targettingresources at this significant, albeit lower end of the disorder scale is veryimportant, as it should be the starting point for managing the conflict in anattempt to avoid more serious incidents requiring police attention.


Building, keeping and restoring the peaceThe police, working with others, have two overlapping roles which shouldbe in constant use:

1. the building and keeping of peace in the community

2. the restoring of peace, in the short term through local negotiation andcritical intervention to minimise the effects or risks from violence.

Understanding the nature and context of conflict and what behaviours aremanifested by the different parties involved (including the police), goessome way towards explaining why perceptions give way tomisunderstandings and fears.

Building and keeping the peaceLocal communities and agencies have a view of what is ‘normal’ in theircommunities. Local people and agencies recognise when things aregetting better or worse. The police role, by means of information andintelligence management, is to:

♦ consult with communities

♦ provide services which preserve the peace and work forimprovement

♦ be proactive with the public and other agencies in maintaining apeaceful society

♦ respond appropriately to threats of crime and disorder

♦ ensure that, if required, the use of force is within the law and isproportionate to the harm which is being prevented.

Diversity in communities makes it incumbent on the police and theirpartner agencies to have a good understanding of sensitive issues andthe local significance of events and places. This cannot be done unlesscommunities assist the police in understanding what is important to them.Community information management is a key element in this process.

Restoring the peaceThe police and other agencies need to be proactive in dealing withunforeseen conflict. In the short term the police may have to restorepeace within a community. This may range across giving advice to rowdypeople, dealing effectively with domestic abuse, successfully resolvingincidents involving firearms or major public disorder. The objective mustbe a reduction of tension and a return to normality. In certaincircumstances the action(s) to combat a problem will, by necessity, bepolice led.


Throughout the peace-restoring process the community still requirenormal policing services. During such periods there are two aspects ofpolicing:

♦ Normal policing: the use of local officers in the maintenance of thepeace. The activities associated with reducing tension and causesof conflict should be a priority in areas that have been made safe.

♦ Specialist tactics: police resources (who may be speciallyequipped and trained) whose role it is to restore order in the mostappropriate manner to prevent violence and minimise risk, reducetension and speed the return to normality.

The restoration of peace is closely linked to the efforts made in buildingand maintaining peace. Local commanders should recognise thepriorities of the community and incorporate them in the crime anddisorder reduction strategies. The tactics used in an operation to restorepeace should support this longer-term strategy as much as possible. Therationale for the restoration of peace should be communicated via thepublic relations (PR) strategy. The local police commander should set apolicing style and consider which operational tactics and resources areappropriate within a given community. The crime and disorder reductionstrategy should specifically consider implementation of communityinitiatives aimed at promoting cultural diversity, addressing racism andprotecting human rights.

Policing is not the sole preserve of the police. The promotion of goodorder and citizenship is dependent upon truly inclusive partnership whereall in society work together to achieve a safe environment. Resolving andmanaging conflict requires appropriate and timely intervention.

Tension and conflict may be present in every community and socialgrouping. It can be both positive and negative but always requires to bemanaged. It is essential that the management of conflict be regarded asa continuous process and not as crisis intervention.


A Conflict Management ModelThe community and its agencies, including the police, will still have todeal with crime and disorder situations that have not been successfullyresolved or are unforeseen.

The model illustrated below seeks to counter any conflict by logicalprogression through five key stages.

None of the stages can be seen as the sole responsibility of the police.Indeed, restoration of normality in the community is a truly multi-agencystrategy. Although the five stages have titles which fit comfortably withpolice procedures, they clearly map onto activities which are theresponsibility of other agencies or can be achieved by groups within thecommunity.

Information and intelligence received leads to a threat assessment, thenconsideration of the relevant powers and policy, combined with choice ofthe appropriate tactical options to manage the threat and resolve theconflict. Risk assessment applies to the whole model and in particular atthe threat assessment stage (hazards and level of risk), and the powersand policy, and tactical options stages (suitable control measures). Thecyclic nature of the model allows for constant re-assessment of thesituation and for appropriate action to be taken on the basis of the mostup to date information or intelligence available.

Information/intelligence

received

Threatassessment Action(s)

PowersPowers and policy

Tacticaloptions


The model illustrates the resolution of conflict by the individual patrolofficer through to several officers on a firearms operation or a substantialnumber of officers during large-scale disorder. It can be applied equallyto spontaneous incidents or planned events. From the police point ofview, choice of the appropriate tactical options would be made from therelevant public order, firearms or personal safety manuals.

Equally, the model highlights the importance of the information availablewithin the community, threats to the wider community and our partneragencies and the legal powers, capabilities and actions available to ourpartners. It is this shared recognition and joint action within thecommunity which facilities the return to normality.

Police action(s) must be lawful and supported by a statutory or commonlaw power. Individual officers may be called upon to account for theiractions. They will need to show that any force used was necessary andreasonable on the basis of their honestly held belief of the information orintelligence available to them. In line with human rights legislation, thetest, which will be applied in such cases, will be one of proportionality interms of the action taken and the legitimate aims pursued.

The ACPO manuals of guidance relating to public order, police use offirearms and the Personal Safety Programme are designed to assistplanners, advisors and commanders in managing their response toconflict in a reasonable and proportional way.


THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTSRespect for people’s human rights is one of the principal factors thatshould be borne in mind throughout the entire process of policing. Thisrespect derives as much from a moral obligation as it does from legalrequirement. There is an obvious expectation that all policing will beconducted reasonably and within the bounds of the law.

The legal parameters within which police work can be found are:

1. The domestic law of the United Kingdom. This is based in:

(a) statutes such as the Public Order Act 1986 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

(b) the common law, which is a mixture of legal conventions and the case law of the courts, and

2. International law and especially the provisions of the EuropeanConvention of Human Rights (ECHR). Some of the provisions of theECHR have been given legal effect within the United Kingdom byvirtue of the Human Rights Act 1998.

All officers have an individual responsibility for ensuring that they areproperly educated and informed about the extent of their legal powersand the context within which those powers can properly be exercised. Itis unacceptable for a police officer to claim ignorance of the law.

In addition to having a comprehensive knowledge of United Kingdomlaws, it is now extremely important for all officers to understand theapplicability and scope of the provisions of the ECHR that have beengiven effect under the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act has twobasic purposes:

1. The law of the European Convention on Human Rights andspecifically the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention will beactionable before UK courts, and

2. Courts and tribunals, public authorities and Government Ministershave to act in a way that is ‘compatible’ with the law of the convention.Failure to do so may be unlawful although it is not a criminal offence.


The rights and freedoms of the Convention that may be relevant topolicing include:

Article 2 - the right to life

Article 3 - prohibition from torture, inhumane or degradingtreatment

Article 5 - the right to liberty and security of person

Article 6 - the right to a fair hearing

Article 7 - protection from punishment without legal basis

Article 8 - the right to respect for private and family life

Article 9 - freedom of thought, conscience and religion

Article 10 - freedom of expression

Article 11 - freedom of assembly and association

Article 14 - freedom from discrimination.

A full explanation of the Articles can be found in the Human RightsAct 1998.

It is generally recognised within ECHR law that the responsibilities of thelikes of police extend not only to taking positive action to protect theserights and freedoms but also includes a failure to act or to take steps toprotect them. It is therefore vitally important that the legal parameters ofeach of these rights and freedoms must be carefully considered by allofficers and at every stage of policing.

There is a presumption too that convention rights can only be interferedwith by any kind of state action where the Convention expressly allows it.These conditions are set out within the wording of each of the Articles.The rights provided for in Article 8 – the right to privacy, Article 9 –freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 10 – freedom ofexpression and Article 11 – freedom of assembly and association eachhas qualifications attached to them. The first part of the respective Articleprovides the right and the second specifies permissible qualification.

In general terms, the rights can only be interfered with:

1. Where the action is prescribed by law, and

2. It is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and for one of the followingreasons:

♦ national security

♦ territorial integrity


♦ public safety

♦ preventing disorder or crime

♦ protecting health

♦ protecting morals

♦ protecting the rights of others.

In deciding whether the action was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ itwill be necessary to show that the action:

(i) fulfilled a pressing social need, and

(ii) pursued a legitimate aim, and

(iii) there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality betweenthe means employed and the aim pursued. This means that theaction was designed to:

(a) impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question

(b) meet the objectives of the domestic law in question and

(c) not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations,and

(d) be balanced against the severity of the effect that the measurehas on the individual or group. The more severe the adverseeffects of the measure, the more important the object must be if itis to be classified as legitimate.

The ECHR is a living instrument and seeks to take account of changes insociety and its values. Therefore, action which was consideredunreasonable 10 years ago may be viewed as reasonable today.

Use of forceThe law regarding use of force is contained within:

♦ Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967

♦ Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

♦ common law.

The ECHR and Human Rights Act complements and gives direction tothe lawful application of force under the above legislation.

The subjective tests of necessity and proportionality should be appliedwhen considering whether action taken is reasonable.


COMMUNITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENTCommunities are varied entities and may be permanent or transient innature.

Any policing activity carries the potential to impact positively or negativelyon the community.

Community monitoring allows for the gathering of social, economic,political and environmental information.

The potential for disorder or threat to public safety may be depicted by avariety of behaviours which can be classified in two ways.

The first is a slow deterioration in quality of life. This may manifest itselfas minor crime, graffiti or neglect to the infrastructure of a community.

The second is the existence of open hostility and violence.

There are a number of sources which may provide valuable informationand intelligence to indicate and monitor the mood of a community,including:

♦ patrolling officers

♦ community beat officers

♦ police managers

♦ community liaison officers

♦ the media

♦ consultative groups (statutory or voluntary)

♦ IT systems

♦ ‘Watch’ schemes

♦ pressure groups

♦ partnership agencies

♦ other emergency services

♦ intelligence systems

♦ criminal justice system.

Information obtained may indicate changes in attitude or levels of hostilitytowards police and their partners.

An increase in tension within or between groups manifested by antisocialbehaviour, may be linked to external social, economic and politicalfactors.


A system should be in place to analyse this information and produceintelligence in order to indicate the mood of the community. This mayalso form part of the threat and risk assessment procedure for an event,incident or specific operation and can be categorised as a CommunityImpact Assessment. This process forms an integral part of the nationalintelligence model and intelligence structure example (both illustrated andexplained in Chapter 3 Strategic considerations - intelligence section),which should operate continuously and as part of an intelligence-basedproblem solving policing style.

Staff at all levels will have, through an effective briefing and debriefingprocess, a heightened awareness of the mood of the community.

Community information management should be at the core of crime anddisorder reduction strategies for all police forces. It must be consideredwhen planning and undertaking operations where there is a risk to publicsafety or a potential for disorder and included in the audit trail.

All forces, through an effective performance management system, shouldbe able to gauge if their community information management schemesare contributing towards a reduction in crime and disorder.

The aims of this monitoring strategy are:

♦ to prevent and reduce crime and disorder

♦ to determine the most appropriate police action

♦ to reassure the public that the police are actively seeking to preventdisorder through effective internal management, partnership andconsultation with all sections of the community including the followinggroups:

♦ hard to reach

♦ alienated

♦ vulnerable

♦ youth

♦ minorities.


NATURE AND SCOPE OF DISORDERThe information contained in this guide deals with events and incidentsranging from routine operational policing through to major disorder.

The scope of disorder refers to its category, size, impact and frequency.

Trends, influences, pressures and changes can be identified bycommunity information management.

Policing activity can then focus on preventing and reducing crime anddisorder.

Disorder can be generally categorised into four broad areas:

Disorder associated with spontaneous incidents, for example:

♦ community issues

♦ criminal activity

♦ police activity.

Single issue protests, for example:

♦ direct action groups

♦ industrial disputes

♦ environmental issues.

Lawful public events, for example:

♦ sporting events

♦ concerts

♦ organised marches.

Unlawful public events, for example:

♦ illegal raves

♦ illegal gatherings.

Whatever the nature and scope of disorder it can be addressed by theprinciples contained within this Manual of Guidance.


A DISORDER MODELIntroductionKeeping the peace should be achieved through partnership with thecommunity, this principle continues when tension rises and conflict anddisorder occur.

A model may assist in understanding disorder, and help advisors,planners and commanders to manage events and incidents where thereis a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder.

Disorder model – the stages explained♦ State of normality: The day-to-day state of order and provision of

policing services within a community. This can vary widely from onearea to another and even by time of day. Community informationmanagement will provide accurate information as to the currentstate. Communities are varied entities and may be permanent ortransient in nature.

♦ Tension: A level of increased concern or feelings in a community.A trigger incident can result in movement from a state of heighteningtension to disorder; such incidents can be instigated by the police,the community or a third party.

♦ Disorder: This represents the stage at which mood is supplementedby action, whether isolated or sustained. It manifests itself indisruption, damage or violence. Such disorder may occur following asingle or series of trigger incidents. At this level, unchecked oruncontrolled activity may encourage serious disorder.

♦ Serious disorder/riot: Escalation into violent or disruptivebehaviour. This stage may by typified by extreme conflict. Thiscould take the form of violent protest, the act of rioting, criminaldamage, looting, or the use of weapons of offence.

♦ Unrest: This is the period, sometimes prolonged, when therebuilding of relationships takes place. Sensitivity and trust are keyfactors in this process. Police activity must focus on a structuredreturn to a state of normality, and commanders should be aware thatit is possible to return or cause a return to disorder or riot byexcessive or inappropriate action.

These stages are shown in diagramatic form overleaf.


A disorder modelDisorder is a dynamic process. The model is a flexible framework inwhich serious disorder or rioting may be viewed and may assist inunderstanding and managing disorder.

Note:

As can be seen, progression through all levels is not necessary, in somecircumstances it may be possible to return to the state of normality fromany level. The stages from state of normality through to seriousdisorder/riot can be viewed in terms of an increase in tension and conflict.A return to the state of normality from any other stage can be viewed as adecrease.

Tension

Disorder

SeriousDisorder/Riot

Unrest

State ofNormality


Disorder model - considerations♦ The desired outcome should be the return to a state of normality.

The state of normality before and after disorder may differ.

♦ It is possible that the police and the community will have differentperceptions of the level of conflict or disorder. Communityinformation management and liaison assist in reducing this disparity.

♦ The use of intelligence to identify community tensions or ‘hotspots’may prevent escalation.

♦ Rumours or misinformation relating to the activities of the parties to adispute or disorder may circulate. These may include the actions orresponse of the police. They should be clarified as quickly aspossible. Good liaison and a sound public relations strategy are keyfactors for success.

♦ During periods of disorder there is still a need to provide policingservices to the community.

♦ At all levels within the model, police activity must be based upon thestrategic principles of initial response, effective resourcing andtactical deployment.

♦ Force used by police must be lawful and proportionate to the threat.

♦ Activities by the community, other agencies and the police inpartnership are key elements in the prevention of disorder.


Crowd behaviourThere has been considerable research into trends in crowd behaviour.When planning, commanding or advising on operations where there is arisk to public safety or a potential for disorder the following behaviouralpatterns may be present in any crowd:

♦ Crowds will contain many different attitudes and behaviours. It islikely therefore that there will be different levels of participation incrowd activities. A trigger incident may affect levels of involvement.

♦ A trigger incident may be a result of actions by crowd participants,the police, or as a result of altered perceptions arising from theinteractions between them. Information about external eventsreceived accurately, or inaccurately by the crowd or policingorganisation, may also heighten, diminish, or alter perceptions ofcircumstances.

♦ Members of a crowd do not necessarily get carried away by ‘crowdhysteria’. Each person in a crowd has a different perception ofevents based upon their ability to see, hear and move. This mayaffect their behaviour.

♦ When crowd members become highly emotional or aggressive theirvisible behaviour can spread and become regarded as acceptable bythose around them. It can be an opportunity for an anti-socialminority to influence and mobilise others around them.

♦ Anonymity removes the fear of identification and sanction from crowdmembers and may lead to the breakdown of legal and moralconstraints. This also applies to the police, who should ensure thatall identification markings are clearly visible.

♦ During crowd migration, non-directed crowds will follow routes ofleast effort. Highly motivated crowds will attempt to follow the mostdirect route to achieve their objective.

♦ If it is desired to apply direction to crowds, exits and escapes mustbe considered.

♦ The higher the crowd density, the higher the likelihood of interactionwithin the crowd, and action by the crowd. The higher the density ofthe crowd the more difficult it becomes for crowd members to leave.


♦ The less informal control there is within the crowd in relation to thecrowd members, the more likelihood of the need for police control.

♦ Policing crowds is a dynamic and interactive process. Members ofthe police service – as individuals, or groups may also be subject toinfluences received from the crowd, or by being party to eventsgenerally. It is here that considerations of planning, communicationand leadership are of particular importance.

Crowd management principlesThe following key principles should be considered during the planning,briefing and deployment stages of any policing operation involving themanagement of crowds:

♦ Intelligence: Prior to any event, the police should identify thegroups that might be involved; their intentions, their tactics, theirnotions of acceptable behaviour, together with their views of othergroups. Intelligence may also indicate the proportion of activistswithin a crowd, and how homogenous that crowd might be in itsintention, for example the balance of those prone to violence andthose who are peaceful.

♦ Facilitation: The police should seek to facilitate any lawful andlegitimate aims of groups that are present – especially when conflictbreaks out. The aim should be to permit the pursuit of lawful aimswhilst dealing with groups acting illegally.

♦ Communication: The police should communicate to the crowd howthey are seeking to facilitate the crowd’s legitimate aims and how theillegitimate actions of some in the crowd may serve to impede thoseaims. Communication should be through figures respected by crowdmembers. Liaison should be established at an early stage.

♦ Identification: The police commander should encourage officersnot to treat all crowd members in the same manner. When violencestarts there is a tendency to treat everybody with hostility. However,especially in such situations, it is crucial to treat people with respectand win them to your side, not the side of those already promotingconflict. It may be necessary to facilitate the desires of the many,such as the wish to peacefully protest, so that they may assist thepolice with their overall intention which is to prevent disorder.


STRATEGIC PRINCIPLESPartnerships and links with the community are means by which potentialproblems are identified and effectively managed.

While this is the most desirable state of affairs, there are times whentensions rise suddenly and unexpectedly, day-to-day policing methodsare insufficient, and the restoration of peace is necessary.

It is therefore necessary for police to base their response to incidents thatmay arise upon the following set of principles:

♦ initial response

♦ effective resourcing

♦ tactical deployment.

In managing any incident or event that threatens public safety or has thepotential for disorder, the strategy should:

♦ define the overall intention(s)

♦ determine the tactical parameters

♦ set the policing style.

Tactics should:

♦ reflect the strategy

♦ be appropriate to the level of threat

♦ be applied to achieve the intention(s).

Initial responseWhere there is a threat to public safety or potential for disorder, the initialpolice response should support and complement routine operations. Thestrategic intention should be to restore normality as soon as practicableby measures and appropriate interventions. It may be suitable to pursuean early resolution of the situation, whether by information or action.

Police should involve their partners wherever possible at an early stage.

In order to establish and maintain any advantage, a number of optionsshould be considered, from low key to highly impactive activities. Thoseused will be guided by intelligence and community informationmanagement. The potential for trigger incidents must be considered.


Effective resourcingIn order to maintain or restore the state of normality, effective resourcingis a key principle. The ability to mobilise police, and where appropriate,partner agencies, is based upon agreed protocols, sound planning andregular training.

The level of resources should reflect the ongoing threat to public safetyand the potential for disorder.

The welfare of those involved should be considered. Failure to do somay affect their ability to perform effectively and efficiently.

Tactical deploymentThis is the method of converting strategy into tactics by the use ofappropriate and risk assessed options, within set parameters. Theoverall intention should be to keep or restore the peace.

These strategic principles must be read and used in conjunction withtactical considerations which are detailed in Chapter 4.



on Keepingthe

Peace

Chapter 3


STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS: THE KEY POINTSWhen planning for and managing events and incidents where there is arisk to public safety or a potential for disorder, there are a number of keyareas that require consideration. This list is not exhaustive, but is offeredas a framework to aid the decision-making processes.

What is the situation?This may be determined by consideration of the following impact factors:

♦ location, scale, size, timing

♦ participants, numbers, motivation

♦ spontaneous or pre-planned

♦ community feeling

♦ community representatives

♦ other agencies involved

♦ media interest

♦ political implications (local, national and international)

♦ wider policing implications

♦ preferred outcome for police, agencies and participants

♦ risk assessment.

Developing partnershipsIdentify all stakeholders, both internal and external.

Produce statement of intent and protocols to aid joint working.

Consider forming multi-agency/emergency services group which will beco-ordinated by police.

Keep all relevant partners informed and updated.

When non-Home Office policing services are a stakeholder in the eventthey must participate in the strategic and tactical planning.

Intelligence and how can it be obtained?LocallyLocal intelligence structures

Identified local intelligence officer

32 CHAPTER 3STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Community feeling

Previous event/litigation debriefs in-force or external

Use of informants.

Regional and national levelNorth and South Intelligence Units

National Public Order Intelligence Unit.

Other agenciesIntelligence available to stakeholders

Security services

Outside agencies

Environmental scanning, including Internet and relevant databases.

What are the preferred outcomes?♦ for police?

♦ for the participants?

♦ for our partners?

Are they compatible?

The following rationale may be of benefit when making decisions:

1. What is my preferred outcome?

2. What is an acceptable outcome?

3. What is an unacceptable outcome?

The ethical considerationsIdentify the ethical basis for the strategy. It should be agreed, shared andeasily communicated.

Take the moral high ground when formulating strategy.

Devise processes for checking actions against agreed strategies.

Avoid a quick fix that may compromise the strategy.

Be aware that our actions may unnecessarily align the service with otherstakeholders.


What are the resourcing considerations?ResourcesCurrent operational capability.

Command and operational resilience.

Operational readiness (should be tested on a regular basis).

Command structure and facilities.

Skills profile.

Equipment needs and availability.

Communication requirements.

Mutual aid.

SkillsPlanning team, logistics, support services, risk assessor.

Tactical advisor(s).

Training of command team.

Designated senior officers.

Intelligence co-ordinator and intelligence cell.

Evidence gathering and forward intelligence teams.

Senior Investigating Officer and support.

Press liaison.

Specialist skills, for example roped access.

Security co-ordinator.

FinancialUse a predictive costing model to inform the police authority andcommand of anticipated expenditure.

Investigate all possible sources of finance, and cost recovery.

All stakeholders must be aware of the statement of intent and theircommitment to it, in particular the financial implications.

Be aware that costing may be affected by other agencies actions.


What are the legal considerations?European Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated into the HumanRights Act 1998.

Criminal Justice strategy in conjunction with criminal justice partners,CPS, legal experts and the courts.

Organisational and individual liability.

Access to a barrister and/or solicitor prior to, during and after an event.

Correct use of appropriate legislation and powers to aid strategy.

Planning considerationsAre planners suitably skilled?

Develop a clear audit trail for decisions reached.

Risk assessment and control measures.

Ensure plan meets needs of event and remains effective over time.

Contingencies within the operation order should address the ‘what ifs?’.

Contingency plans should take into account any cross border/boundaryimplications and if so protocols must be developed to deal with anysituation that may arise.

Contingency plans should be tested and reviewed.

Protocols should exist within the same working group, for one member ofthat group to assume the lead for that area of speciality, for example, fire,press.

Ensure planning reflects the specialist need of all participants, forexample arrested person’s diets and clothing requirements, needs ofpolice and other specialists.

Check that all agencies plans dovetail, and resolve disparities.

The requirements of any post incident investigation.

Resources are correctly selected, trained, briefed and available.

Recognise that the location of the event may well become a major crimescene.

Debriefing to identify improvements to systems, equipment andresources. Review of tactical options selected and dissemination oflessons learned to National Operations Faculty.

Consider and incorporate the principles of best value.


COMMANDIntroductionThere is a long established and nationally accepted structure within thepolice service and amongst our partner agencies for the effectivecommand of incidents and events.

The structure has three levels: strategic, tactical and operational. Thecommand functions of these are commonly referred to as Gold, Silver andBronze respectively. These commanders need to be carefully selected,trained and updated.

This structure is widely used for both pre-planned and spontaneousevents and can offer the degree of flexibility required to cope with a variedand developing range of incidents. The decision to implement thecommand structure should be taken with regard to the threat and riskassessment available for an event or incident.

The command structure relies on the paramount principle of flexibility andas such is role specific and not rank-related.

It requires all commanders to recognise the parameters of their own role,whilst accepting their relationship with others in the command team.

Officers of a senior rank to the commander whether that be Gold, Silveror Bronze cannot assume primacy, solely on the basis of rank or territorialresponsibility, without taking up the appropriate role within the commandstructure. This type of change should be consulted upon and must bedocumented for the audit trail.

There is a need on protracted operations for command resilience to beaddressed. Suitably qualified replacements should be identified andbriefed in good time.

Strategy and tacticsStrategy - definitionIs the overall intention(s) to combine resources towards managing andresolving an event or incident.

The Gold Commander♦ is the officer in overall command and has responsibility and

accountability for the incident or event

♦ is required to resource the event

♦ chairs the strategic co-ordinating group in the event of a multi-agencyresponse to an incident

♦ is required to set, review and update the strategy


♦ must be so located as to be able to maintain effective strategiccommand of the operation

♦ is required to consult with partners when determining strategy

♦ must maintain objectivity and as such should not become drawn intotactical level decisions

♦ must remain available to the Silver Commander(s) if required

♦ must ensure that the strategy for the event is documented in order toprovide a clear audit trail, including any changes to that strategy

♦ needs to approve the Silver Commander(s) tactical plan and ensurethat it meets the strategic intention for the event or incident

♦ is responsible for ensuring the resilience of the command structureand the effectiveness of the Silver Commander(s).

Gold supportGold support are organisational structures that support the command ofthe operation and may include:

Personnel Resources♦ event controller♦ channel controllers♦ radio operators♦ plotters/logist(s)♦ call handlers♦ media support♦ staff officer♦ tactical advisor♦ inter-agency representatives♦ intelligence co-ordinator♦ logistics co-ordinator.

♦ mapping system♦ air support link♦ inter-agency communications♦ intelligence cell♦ telephones and IT♦ separate conference room♦ CCTV monitoring/recording♦ deployment boards♦ stationery♦ contingency plans♦ command log.

Tactics - definitionTactics are the way resources are used to achieve the strategicintentions, within the range of approved tactical options.

The Silver Commander♦ is responsible for developing and co-ordinating the tactical plan in

order to achieve the strategic intention of the Gold Commander

♦ must be so located as to be able to maintain effective tacticalcommand of the operation


♦ must ensure that all decisions are documented in the command login order to provide a clear audit trail

♦ provides the pivotal link in the command chain between BronzeCommanders and the Gold Commander. This ensures all othercommanders are kept apprised of continuing developments

♦ is responsible for ensuring that all staff are fully briefed

♦ has the responsibility to review, update and communicate changes inthe tactical plan to Bronze Commanders and the Gold Commander

♦ is responsible for ensuring the tactics employed by BronzeCommanders meet the strategic intention and tactical plan.

Consideration should be given to the appointment of more than one Silverif there are linked events in remote geographic locations. If the durationof the event is likely to be protracted, command resilience must beconsidered.

Silver supportSilver support is the command post and as such plays an essential role inthe command chain and may include:

Personnel Resources♦ call handlers♦ staff officer♦ tactical advisor♦ plotter/logist(s)♦ controllers♦ briefing officer(s)♦ risk assessor♦ press officer♦ representatives of other

agencies when appropriate.

♦ mapping system♦ air support link♦ stationery♦ IT♦ deployment boards♦ media support♦ CCTV monitoring/recording♦ command log♦ contingency plans♦ communications♦ briefing facilities.

The Bronze Commander♦ is responsible for the implementation of the Silver Commander’s plan

by the use of appropriate tactics within their geographical orfunctional area of responsibility

♦ must have knowledge and clear understanding of the SilverCommander’s tactical plan and their role within it

♦ ensures staff within their area of responsibility are fully briefed


♦ keeps the Silver Commander updated on current developmentsincluding any variation in agreed tactics within their geographical orfunctional area of responsibility

♦ must be so located as to be able to maintain effective tacticalcommand of their area of responsibility

♦ must be available to unit commanders. However, they must allowthem the independence to carry out their role in accordance withstrategy and the tactical plan

♦ decisions taken by Bronze Commanders must be documented in acommand log to ensure a clear audit trail exists.

Bronze supportThis may include a staff officer, tactical advisor and runner/logist.

CommunicationsThere is a need, in appropriate circumstances, to establish a specialoperations room, to manage pre-planned and spontaneous events. Thisensures that operational events and major disorder does not impinge onday-to-day policing activity. The room must be staffed by speciallytrained personnel.

The scale of policing operation will dictate the number of radio channelsnecessary. The minimum requirement is an operational channel and acommand channel.

Air support is valuable in providing immediate, visual and radioinformation to assist commanders in making tactical decisions. Careshould be taken to ensure this information is not used in usurping thestrategic and tactical plan.

If it is intended to use a ‘command vehicle’ it must have a communicationlink with the event’s control room.

Where mutual aid is requested, call signs should be allocated inaccordance with ACPO guidelines.


A COMMAND STRUCTURE

THIS ILLUSTRATION PROVIDES A PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR A COMMAND TEAM TO MANAGE AN EVENT. IT MUSTNOT BE REGARDED AS EXHAUSTIVE.

Gold Commander

Gold Support

Silver Support

Bronze Territorial Bronze Functional

PSU(s)as required

Functional Units asrequired

Silver Commander(s)


Command protocolsEvents and incidents which involve a threat to public safety or a potentialfor disorder may escalate to assume the proportions of a major incident.Similarly they may involve criminal use or possession of firearms andtherefore crime investigation, or may include resourcing and command bya partner agency such as at a major fire.

Operations with more than one area of activity requiring the introductionof a command structure, will contain potentially competing demands. Forexample, a firearms commander may wish to pursue a tactic whichrequires more time than the public order commander, responsible for theouter cordon, can sustain. Likewise the leader of a surveillance teamwould need to co-operate closely with the firearms commander on a staticor mobile operation to co-ordinate an armed contact. Similarly, the seniorinvestigating officer may require time to investigate a scene duringdisorder and the public order commander cannot protect that scene withcurrent resources.

It is the Gold Commander’s responsibility to manage the assessment ofthe situation, consider the resources available and ultimately make thedecision about balancing competing demands, to achieve the desiredoutcomes.

Command protocols reduce risk and inform and direct decision making byallowing commanders to know what they are expected to achieve andhow they will do it.

The key principle is that the commanders involved know:

(a) Who is responsible for achieving each OBJECTIVE.

(b) Who is responsible for minimising each RISK identified.

(c) Who controls each of the RESOURCES available.

A command protocol will identify:

(i) The desired outcomes of the operation.

(ii) Who is responsible for achieving each objective which will lead tothe desired outcomes.

(iii) Who is responsible for minimising each risk identified.

(iv) Who controls each of the resources available.

(v) Who commands each separate geographical or functional area (ifrelevant).


(vi) How the individual objectives are dependent on each other, forexample ‘the firearms silver commander is unable to operate untilthe public order silver commander has achieved the objective ofsecuring the scene’.

(vii) What instigates the transfer of command from one commander toanother. This includes how this is defined, communicated andrecorded. Such prompts are likely to be the achievement of anobjective or the decision that an objective can or cannot beachieved, for example the public order silver commander who canstate that a scene has been secured, and can then transfercommand of the inner cordon area to the firearms commander.

Firearms operations within disorder extend the command structure. Theofficer commanding the scene of a firearms operation is at Silver level. Itis vital that command protocols are agreed.

NB Specific guidance on the use of baton rounds and firearms insituations of disorder, is contained in the ACPO Manual ofGuidance on Police Use of Firearms.

Command protocols can be summarised as ‘Who owns what and when’.


PLANNINGIntroductionThe success or failure of any notified event or contingency plan forspontaneous events is dependent on a thorough, competent planningprocess.

‘Failing to plan is planning to fail.’

This section is intended to provide, within nationally accepted guidelines,a framework to assist police services in the planning arrangements forevents. It should not be regarded as exhaustive. Experience has shownthat a community and multi-agency approach to problem-solving oftenenhances the overall policing plan.

If a non-Home Office police service is involved in an incident or event,they must be full participants in the planning process. A protocol shouldexist between the police services as to the respective responsibilities, forexample, security of locations and loads in transit.

When planning events due regard must be paid to the contents of therespective HMSO publications: ‘Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare atPop Concerts and Similar Events’ (purple guide) and the ‘Guide to Safetyat Sports Grounds’ (green guide).

During spontaneous incidents these principles may be subject to the timeavailable and the dynamics of the situation. A workable plan within theavailable timescale is preferable to a perfect plan too late.

Liaison with organisersNotification of an eventUpon receipt of the initial information of an event, it is important that ameeting takes place to ensure as much information as possible isobtained, in order to facilitate the police planning process for the event.

The following gives an indication of the requirements:

♦ the name of the organisation and details of the principal planner

♦ details of the event

♦ numbers and profiles of participants.

There is a need to ensure that details obtained are documented andcirculated to the appropriate heads of departments.

The appointment of an intelligence co-ordinator at this stage is importantto ensure that all relevant information/intelligence is collated andassessed. This will assist the planning process.


The early appointment of a planning team and identification of gold, silverand bronze commanders ensures the cohesion of the pre-event, eventand post-event phases.

Regular meetings with event organisers, should facilitate the productionof a statement of intent, ensuring that each party is aware of theirparticular responsibilities.

All policy and planning decisions should be recorded to facilitate the audittrail and are subject to disclosure.

Strategy meetingA steering group should be formed with the intention of determining thestrategic objectives for the event. The group should consist of thefollowing key decision makers:

♦ Gold Commander

♦ Silver Commander(s)

♦ Senior Investigating Officer

♦ Intelligence Co-ordinator

♦ Press and Public Relations Officer

♦ Planning Co-ordinator.

Other specialist representatives may include:

♦ human resources

♦ training

♦ finance

♦ security co-ordinator

♦ communications

♦ Bronze Commander (traffic)

♦ tactical advisor

♦ legal advisor.


The meeting should have a fixed agenda prepared in line with the‘IIRMAC’ mnemonic:

♦ Information/Intelligence (to include a threat assessment for theevent)

♦ Intention(s)

♦ Risk assessment

♦ Method (in line with risk assessment and health and safety factors)

♦ Administration

♦ Communications.

Tactical planning meetingChaired by the Silver Commander(s) to develop the tactical plan in linewith the Gold Commander’s strategy. The group may include thefollowing personnel:

♦ traffic

♦ uniform operations

♦ crime

♦ tactical advisor

♦ planning co-ordinator

♦ communications

♦ press

♦ logistics

♦ intelligence

♦ support services.

Welfare and staff association representatives should also be invited toattend.

‘At this meeting contingency plans MUST be developed and agreed.’

Operational ordersThe planning team will be responsible for producing the operational order.This document will include the operational Information, Intention(s), RiskAssessment, Method, Administration and Communication details.


The order should address the following:

♦ resource schedules

♦ traffic arrangements

♦ security duties

♦ communication duties

♦ briefing and refreshment arrangements

♦ public information

♦ plans and maps

♦ police powers

♦ contingencies ‘what ifs?’ to be implemented in respect of specificincidents

♦ emergency procedures

♦ miscellaneous information.

The order should demonstrate resilience and cater for both the expectedand unexpected. It must reflect the duration and complexity of the event.

Briefings/debriefings‘The deployment of dedicated briefing and debriefing teams enhances themanagement of an event.’

BriefingThe briefing of all those involved in the event must reflect the multi-agency and community approach. It is of paramount importance andshould include an overview of the whole order as well as a role specificbrief for individuals.

In collaboration with our partners a proactive public information andreassurance policy should be considered.

DebriefingA structured debrief will provide an opportunity to identify anyimprovements to systems, equipment and resources. It should beregarded as the beginning of the process for planning future events.

The purpose is not to apportion blame, but to identify the most and leasteffective aspects of the operation.

The briefing and debriefing process must form part of the recorded audittrail, which is subject to disclosure.


Compliance with ECHR during planningThis must be demonstrated during planning and debriefing in order todisplay a transparent decision making process. The key elements are:

(i) defining the aims and objectives

(ii) determining all relevant information

(iii) assessing feasible options

(iv) documenting decisions and actions together with reasons

(v) reviewing outcomes.

Threat and risk assessmentAn assessment is required and should focus on the following:

♦ any threat to the event

♦ any risks arising from the event

♦ any risk to participants and people policing the event.

Where threat and risk assessments are required:

♦ the threat assessment should be co-ordinated by the Intelligence Co-ordinator, and disseminated

♦ the risk assessment must be co-ordinated by a qualified riskassessor, and disseminated.

Five step plan for risk assessment:1. Look for hazards.

2. Decide who may be harmed and how.

3. Evaluate risks.

4. Implement control measures.

5. Record findings and review assessment from time to time andrevise if necessary.

Contingency and mobilisation planningForces may find it valuable, to highlight persistent causes of threats ofdisorder. Some of these threats will be local and low level and thereforesuitable for a locally developed contingency plan.


Where the threat is likely to require a substantial response there isconsiderable merit in drawing up both generic plans and specificoperational orders. Testing of these plans and training of key staff canensure a more effective response to disorder and a structured return tonormality. This is particularly important when the response involvespartners or even a number of different forces.

Comprehensive plans should cover strategic elements, including policingstyle, partners, desired outcomes, command, resourcing, investigationand possible methods to reduce tension. Equally, matters such astactical options, rendezvous points and vehicle marshalling should beincluded. Post-event issues such as debriefing should also be givenconsideration. Plans should be readily accessible. This may indicate anIT-based system of plan retrieval.

The above plans cannot be activated without sufficient resource.Mobilisation plans support this activation and also assist in meetingmutual aid commitment. The elements of initial response, effectiveresourcing and tactical deployment should be covered. A key element inthe development of a mobilisation plan is to ensure that the staff expectedto activate the plan, at any time of day, are aware of its priorities andprocedures.


INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATIONThe role of information and intelligence in day-to-day policingThe day-to-day collation of information and intelligence, properly analysedand disseminated, enables steps to be taken for maintaining the peace,minimising disorder, and preventing crime.

The correct handling and control of covert human intelligence sourcesplays an integral part in all areas of policing, not just public order events.There is legislation contained within the Regulation of InvestigatoryPowers Act 2000 and codes of practice relating to the obtaining and useof intelligence products. Their use can be a key element in preventing orreducing disorder.

Intelligence systems should be capable of gathering information andintelligence from a wide number of sources, for use both at strategic andtactical level within a linked intelligence model. This should enhanceresource planning and deployment.

National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU)The NPOIU exists to support the police service by providing intelligenceon conflict and major areas of disorder. The national group draws stafffrom UK forces and the access point for any commander is through thelocal force’s Head of Special Branch.

The Unit’s terms of reference are:

‘to gather, evaluate, analyse and disseminate intelligence relatedto criminal activities, or where there is a substantial threat to publicorder, which arise from political extremism or protest activity.’

The NPOIU exists to:

♦ provide operational support to police forces using that intelligence

♦ assist forces in the investigation of any related crime and theprosecution of offenders

♦ act as a co-ordination point for Special Branches

♦ provide post-event information

♦ provide strategic analysis to assess and develop trends

♦ assist in the development of intelligence skills

♦ act as UK contact point for other national police agencies.


National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)and National Intelligence Model (NIM)The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the specialistsections within it are available to support and assist policing agencies inthe development and use of intelligence. This is primarily by the use ofthe principles of the National Intelligence Model (NIM), adopted by thepolice service as a national structure incorporating both systems andpersonnel for dealing with intelligence processes at all levels of policing:local, cross border and national. At its heart is the direction of resourcesby both strategic and tactical tasking co-ordination groups. The principlesof the model are recommended for use with the management of publicorder intelligence activity issues, and are outlined below:

Identify key intelligence productsStrategic assessment – the ‘game plan’

STRATEGIC TASKING AND CO-ORDINATING GROUP (SCG)Responsible for direction and leadership of resources

Setting intelligence prioritiesSets intelligence requirement – ‘what do we want to find out?’

Examples: identification of - trouble spots - criminal groups - targets

THE INTELLIGENCE UNITResponsible for creating intelligence products

Intelligence ProductsCan then be used to target individuals, to assist in crowd

management, for tactical deployments etc


Principles of running in-house intelligence unitsWhen managing any pre-planned or spontaneous events which pose athreat to public order or public safety, it is important that intelligence andinformation is viewed as an integral part of the process. This ensures thatthe police response is commensurate with strategic and tactical priorities.

There is a need to see prevention and reduction of disorder in its widestsense. Community feeling forms an important factor in the collation ofintelligence and information.

Any event or incident known to police which presents a risk to publicsafety or could develop into public disorder should be regarded as atrigger for the formation of an intelligence unit.

There is need for both information and intelligence to aid planning andtactical deployment. Such information should be seen as a part of thecontinuum and is relevant at all stages of the disorder model.

There are three stages where intelligence/information assists:

♦ pre-event

♦ during the event

♦ post-event.

Pre-eventGold commanders must employ a suitably skilled Intelligence Manager toco-ordinate the collection, analysis and dissemination of information andintelligence products.

The following is a non-exhaustive guide as to the responsibilities of theIntelligence Manager:

♦ to brief the Tasking and Co-ordinating Groups for resource decisions,and leadership on prioritisation of work

♦ to establish an intelligence unit utilising in-force intelligence gatheringmechanisms

♦ to ensure intelligence units are staffed by suitably qualified personnelincluding trained analysts

♦ to collate and analyse community feelings to aid the planningprocess


♦ to use all intelligence and information held by other agencies,organisations and partners involved in policing the event

♦ to brief or cause to be briefed personnel at all levels

♦ to ensure protocols exist for the communication of relevantinformation and intelligence products to assist any post-incidentinvestigation

♦ to recognise that some intelligence products may aid planning, butwould not be disclosable under any circumstances

♦ to identify suitably skilled briefing/debriefing officers

♦ to ensure suitably equipped briefing/debriefing facilities are provided

♦ to disseminate intelligence products only to those who require themand who are in a position to use them

♦ to ensure officers are aware of the need for confidentiality whendealing with information and intelligence products.


AN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

THE FOLLOWING DIAGRAM IS OFFERED AS GUIDANCE. IT SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A CONSTRAINT TO LOCALLYPREFERRED STRUCTURES. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL (NIM) ARE INCORPORATEDINTO THIS STRUCTURE.

GlossaryIntelligence ManagerIs responsible for co-ordinating all intelligence gathering activities, and forbriefing the TCG so that resource decisions can be made, and leadershipgiven on prioritisation of work.

Forward IntelligenceTrained personnel who are overtly deployed in teams (FITs) to gatherintelligence information and evidence for an event or incident.

Evidence GatherersPublic order trained officers and audio/visual specialists who can bedeployed at all stages of an event to gather intelligence and evidence.

LocalIntelligence

EvidenceGatherers

ForwardIntelligence

SpecialBranch

BriefingDebriefing

ForceIntelligence

IntelligenceProducts

INTELLIGENCE UNIT

SilverCommander

IntelligenceManager

GoldCommander

MediaManager

Strategic

Tactical

TASKING ANDCO-ORDINATING

GROUP (TCG)SIO

National Public OrderIntelligence Unit


Intelligence UnitThe role of the intelligence unit is to receive, assess and disseminate allintelligence relating to the event. It should include officers who areexperienced in dealing with sensitive intelligence, for example, fromcovert sources.

Real-time intelligence may be subject to caveats, but must be passed toSilver who will decide on its use. When intelligence is passed to theSilver Commander without caveat it may be used freely and the onus ofsource protection lies elsewhere.

It is essential that the intelligence unit be located close to the commandstructure with full access to all communications, in order to provide themost effective support.

During eventGold and Silver Commanders should be apprised of all relevantintelligence and information without delay, even though it may not havebeen researched at length. It is the role of the Intelligence Unit to addvalue to intelligence products, and produce intelligence briefings in theorder of prioritisation as directed by the TCG.

A proactive system must be established to seek information andintelligence by debriefing staff involved in the event and ensuring that thisis fed into the ongoing briefing system.

The scale of operation may mean that there are a number of agenciesrunning intelligence and evidence gathering operations at the samelocation. Clear understanding between the agencies must be developed.

Post-eventIf there is to be an investigation the plans and protocols previously agreedbetween the Intelligence Manager and the Senior Investigating Officer(SIO) should be implemented. This will allow intelligence gathered duringthe event to be used by the post-event investigation team.

The Intelligence Manager or nominee should be a party to the strategicdebrief. A summary of this will be disseminated to interested parties, forexample in-service intelligence units and the National Operations Faculty.


THE ROLE OF THE SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER (SIO) AND CRIMEMANAGEMENT

IntroductionEvents and incidents which present a risk to public safety or a potentialfor disorder present unique challenges for those responsible for theirmanagement and the investigation of crime.

These include:

♦ the potential scale of investigations

♦ the diversity of offences

♦ the difficulties of scene management

♦ the resource implications

♦ the likelihood of high profile court proceedings

♦ the management and handling of witnesses and suspects.

Advances in information technology, scientific practice and investigativetechniques now applied to criminal investigations should be used whendealing with incidents of serious disorder or public safety.

It is recommended that the contents of this section be read in conjunctionwith the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual.

Appointment of the SIOThe police response to an event is dependent on the threat assessment.With good intelligence and information any risk to public safety should beevident at an early stage of the planning process. A Senior InvestigatingOfficer must be identified, appointed and will be a member of the GoldCommander’s strategic group for planning purposes where it is felt thatan event may degenerate into disorder or public safety is threatened.The SIO is responsible for ensuring that all crime investigation policydecisions are recorded throughout the event, to ensure that an audit trailexists. During the event the SIO would normally report to the SilverCommander.

SIO: Pre-event responsibilities♦ determine criminal investigation strategy

♦ determine prosecution policy within case disposal guidelines

♦ establish liaison with key members of the Crown Prosecution Service(CPS)


♦ determine the available budget

♦ in liaison with the Press Officer, determine the crime media policywithin the constraints of the overall media strategy

♦ ensure communications systems meet the requirements of theinvestigation

♦ determine resources required

♦ obtain necessary authority levels

♦ develop working protocols and maintain close liaison with theIntelligence Manager

♦ identify and brief key staff to ensure investigation can be activated ifrequired

♦ decide on contingencies to deal with crime scene management

♦ identify file preparation team(s)

♦ consider the implications of civil litigation.

The individual circumstances or incident may require the appointment andbriefing by the SIO of:

♦ hospital teams

♦ prisoner reception teams

♦ interview teams

♦ disclosure and exhibits officer(s)

♦ file handling teams.

SIO: During event responsibilities♦ to be the crime advisor

♦ to obtain sufficient quality evidence to successfully bring offenders tojustice by making the best use of available resources

♦ together with the Silver Commander to decide if the risk of usingplain clothes officers on patrol during disorder is justified in theparticular circumstances

♦ co-ordinate major enquiry, file preparation teams and crime scenemanagers

♦ maintain liaison with the Intelligence Manager

♦ liaise with representatives of specialist investigation agencies.


Hospital teamsA nominated officer should be placed in charge of making arrangementsfor co-ordinating hospital team(s) with a view to:

♦ ensuring injured officers’ welfare

♦ obtaining evidence from victims, statements, photographs, exhibits(forensic and other), crime reports, medical evidence

♦ identifying injured offenders

♦ liaison with SIO.

Prisoner receptionEnsure clear guidelines exist as to how prisoners are received andhandled.

A dedicated charge centre(s) should be identified and suitably staffed toensure the efficient processing of prisoners. This should assist the swiftreturn of operational officers to the event. If a large number of arrests isexpected, then a forward reception point should be considered.

Standard documentation and arrest pro-formas, together with an earlyphotograph of arresting officer and prisoner, will aid the administration ofprisoner processing. Clear procedures are required for the handling anddisposal of such photographs.

Interview teamsThere is a need for experienced investigators, wherever possible, tointerview prisoners irrespective of the grounds for their arrest.

Disclosure and exhibits officer(s)The implications of disclosure of sensitive material should be consideredat an early stage. It is the responsibility of the SIO to decide whether oneor more disclosure and exhibit officers should be appointed.

File handling teamsProtocols should be established with the CPS and the courts. Filesshould be prepared in line with those agreements, by experienced casepreparation teams. Early convictions at court may act as a deterrent.

Consideration should be given to the opening of dedicated courts to dealwith large numbers of arrests.

The SIO should, having regard to the scale of the event, decide whetherto appoint a manager for the File Handling Team or its local equivalent.


CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT

The preservation of any crime scene must be balanced with the needs ofthe ongoing police operation as dictated by the Silver Commander. TheSIO will advise the Silver Commander on the need to preserve a scene.The Silver Commander will advise on the feasibility of preserving thatscene with current resources. The decision must be recorded for theaudit trail.

It may be prudent to appoint a Scientific Support Manager to liaise withthe forensic science, photographic and fingerprint services.

Where terrorist involvement is suspected early liaison with Special Branchand the Anti-Terrorist Unit is essential.

S I OScientific Support Manager

Scientific Support Control Office

Exhibits Officer(s) Crime Scene Managers

Home Office PathologistCrime Scene Examiners Photographic/VideoForensic Scientists Fingerprint BureauPOLSA Search Teams Other Specialists


SIO: Post-event responsibilities♦ Manage the investigation of crime and lead the teams involved.

♦ Ensure that evidence is preserved which will assist in the processingof any claims lodged through the Criminal injuries CompensationAuthority (CICA) and the Riot (Damages) Act 1886.

♦ Ensure that accurate records of damage are kept to combatfraudulent claims.

♦ Decide when scenes can be released from police control.

♦ Continue liaison with the Intelligence Manager to ensure that allinformation and intelligence is available to the enquiry.

♦ Maintain close liaison with the CPS.

♦ Determine arrest policy within the constraints of the agreed strategy.

♦ Maintain close liaison with press officer.

♦ Ensure close liaison with the appointed Police Complaints Officer.

♦ Contribute to the event or incident debriefing process.

ClosureThe Gold Strategic Group should decide the extent of any post-eventinvestigation, taking into account such factors as:

♦ scale of incident(s)

♦ number and types of offences committed

♦ media interest

♦ public opinion

♦ resource implications.

On conclusion of the event all materials should be catalogued andretained in line with service policy.

Events and incidents where loss of life occursContingency liaisonProcedures to be adopted by each emergency service to a major incidentshould be developed and documented in order to ease their method ofworking in conjunction with each other.

HM Coroner is ultimately responsible for identifying the deceased andestablishing the time and cause of death. It is therefore recommendedthat officers regularly employed as an SIO should have frequent meetingswith coroners in their own area to ensure awareness of the coroner’sneeds, for example, bodies not to be moved unless unavoidable.


Appointment of staffBy appointing another senior detective (known as the identification officer)at an early stage the SIO will be free to concentrate on the investigation.Appointments to be considered are:

♦ body and property recovery teams

♦ a casualty bureau

♦ press and media support

♦ mortuary teams

♦ scientific support.

The Major Disaster Advisory Team (MDAT), (Operation ‘Goliath’), anationally recognised ACPO operation, is a database containing details ofpersonnel, who can be called upon as required to render assistance indealing with major disasters.

Reference to Operation ‘Goliath’ can be found in the ACPO EmergencyProcedures Manual. The database is retained at the National OperationsFaculty, Bramshill and can be activated on an ACPO officer’s authority.

Control of the sceneThe bodies of victims should not be moved unless it is necessary torescue survivors. Once life-saving activity has ceased the whole areashould be preserved as a crime scene, so that vital evidence is not lost ordestroyed.

Body recoveryPolice should co-operate with the coroner in respect of the followingmatters:

♦ the control of the remains of the deceased

♦ the identification of those remains

♦ informing the next of kin

♦ their release to the next of kin with the coroner’s consent.


PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGYIntroductionAny pre-planned or spontaneous event is bound to attract high-profilepublicity within the local - and often wider - community. A public relations(PR) strategy will include a media strategy and a plan for locating andinvolving community mediators. Participants with a cause will seek to usemedia attention to manipulate public opinion and gain support. They will,if it suits their cause, seek to put the police on the defensive. Events canpresent powerful photographic and broadcast images that can add topublic opinion and may cause alarm. Confrontation is news and long-term environmental protests can see media outlets through many a quietnews day. In these circumstances they will be more than willing to giveairtime and column inches to the protestors, however unrealistic theiraims may appear to be.

Without a carefully structured PR strategy, the police will be forced into apurely reactive role by a seemingly hostile media. In this unenviableenvironment, the police will appear less than authoritative - having beenforced into a defensive stance. The media battle needs to be taken everybit as seriously as the policing operation itself. Police reputation is easilydamaged and is a lot harder to repair than physical damage to property.However, with forethought and planning, the media can be used tocomplement the police operation.

The PR strategy needs to address the following issues:

What are our objectives?Every PR strategy is different and tailored to meet the needs of particularcircumstances, but in almost every strategy it is likely that we will want to:

♦ demonstrate police integrity

♦ offer public reassurance

♦ highlight our obligation to enforce the law whilst facilitating the rightto demonstrate

♦ demonstrate even-handedness

♦ proclaim our duty of care

♦ illustrate our professionalism


♦ demonstrate forethought and planning

♦ deter criminal activity and arrest offenders

♦ address local issues which might contribute to a death, seriousinjury, or dangerous rescue scenario

♦ address local issues which may encourage and sustain unlawfulactivity

♦ win the moral high ground

♦ highlight the diversion of local resources.

How are we going to achieve our objectives?When the potential for serious public disorder arises, or a service isconfronted with a long-term event, an off-the-cuff media response issimply not an option. Without careful planning, it is easy to step outsidethe proper remit of police responsibilities and inadvertently alienatepartner agencies.

Involve press officers/PR professionals during the planning stages ofoperations - they must have a good understanding of the issue to provideeffective support.

♦ Remember internal communications are a vital part of your PRcampaign.

♦ Involve other agencies/partners in the planning of PR strategy.

♦ Agree key messages with partners.

♦ Establish a credible frontline spokesperson for each agency.

♦ Agree individual agency responsibilities.

♦ Do not encroach on each other’s areas of expertise.

♦ Avoid justifications of wider issues – for example the need for a newroad.

♦ Ensure that ownership stays with appropriate authorities.

♦ Agree the key messages and areas of responsibility with partneragencies, draft the media strategy for the event or incident.

♦ Identify target audiences.

♦ Adapt the game plan with closely targeted strategies for specificphases of the operation.

♦ Review the strategy as circumstances change.

♦ Prepare for the 'media inquest' after a major policing operation.


♦ Consider pre-briefing of media where specific issues need clarifying.

♦ Use experts to support your argument.

♦ Anticipate statements and actions of participants/protestors.

♦ Anticipate negative perceptions following police action.

♦ Rehearse responses.

♦ Ensure consistency of message.

♦ Consider media training for key spokespersons if their role does notnormally bring them under the media spotlight.

♦ Consider the media's need and desire for pictures and footage andpossible PR benefits that may result.

Target audiencesWhen preparing a media strategy, you may have a single audience inmind, but it is likely that there will be more than one. The media is notsimply an audience in itself, but the vehicle by which you carry messagesto a wider audience, which is likely to include:

♦ public who support the protest

♦ public who are hostile to protestors

♦ public who are frightened by the protest

♦ public who hold no strong views

♦ the protestors themselves

♦ journalists who edit your message.

Targets are likely to include audiences touched by parts of the widerpolicing strategy, such as Members of Parliament or local councillors. Itmay well be that these audiences are being dealt with at ACPO level.However, it would be wise to link the media strategy into the widerpolicing plan to avoid repetition of effort or, worse, complete neglect of animportant audience.

What to avoidMistakes are easily made under pressure, especially when subjected tosustained attacks on competence, integrity and force tactics. With carefulplanning, it is possible to avoid some common pitfalls that can expose thepolice to embarrassment or ridicule. Be vigilant.

♦ Do not confuse your key messages, thereby reducing their impact.


♦ Guard against loose cannons. Ensure your staff know themessages, who is and who is not authorised to deliver them.

♦ Do not have too many frontline spokespersons and do not allowanyone with a credibility problem to front your operation.

♦ Avoid being drawn into criticism of, or blaming partner agencies.

♦ Ensure that people who are, have been or may be, involved inintelligence gathering are kept away from the media spotlight.

♦ Do not compromise the security and integrity of sensitive intelligence.

♦ Challenge inappropriate press behaviour.

♦ Avoid the assumption that you can control the media or yourrelationships with them.

♦ Remember that there is no such thing as ‘off the record’.


MUTUAL AIDIntroductionMutual aid is the provision of assistance in response to an individualservice’s inability to adequately meet the demands for personnel andresources placed upon them, particularly in situations of public disorder.

Police National Information and Co-ordinationCentreThere is a statutory requirement for services to assist each other and thiscan be co-ordinated through the Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre (PNICC) which is located at New Scotland Yard andactivated through the president of the Association of Chief Police Officers(ACPO) or nominee.

Services may well have developed local arrangements for mutual aid.However, once PNICC is activated the national arrangements supersedeany local ones.

When PNICC is operating, the direction and control of police operationswithin a service area, including the control of officers provided undermutual aid, is the responsibility of the receiving Chief Officer.

PNICC is responsible for co-ordinating any request for aid, but is notempowered to take the initiative for moving personnel from one policearea to another.

The primary function of PNICC is the co-ordination of the provision ofpersonnel. However, it has other roles:

♦ to act as a national reference point for the collation anddissemination of information where it would be beneficial, eventhough mutual aid is not required

♦ to be able to support the president of ACPO in keeping theGovernment appraised of the current situation.

Call sign structureThere is a nationally agreed call sign structure to facilitate mutual aid.Details can be obtained from the National Operations Faculty at NationalPolice Training, Bramshill.


TRAFFIC MANAGEMENTIntroductionEssential to the overall success of any event is the implementation of aTraffic Management Plan. The objective is to assist in the managementof events by maintaining the flow of traffic, thereby minimising disruptionto all legitimate transport users, including pedestrians. Traffic should beconsidered in its widest possible context and may include air, sea andrail.

Where the indications are that an event could have a significant impact onthe community, the appointed Bronze Commander (Traffic) may need toconsider the following:

Pre-eventConsultation with♦ other police services

♦ staff associations

♦ local/national roads authorities

♦ emergency services (re access routes)

♦ air, sea and rail operators

♦ motoring and transport organisations

♦ utility companies.

Reference sources♦ local policies and procedures

♦ The Standard National Motorway Manual Workbook

♦ National Operations Faculty.

Traffic monitoring♦ Automatic Number Plate Recognition System

♦ trafficmaster schemes and driver information systems

♦ air support.

Traffic management planThe Traffic Management Plan must take into account availableinformation/intelligence and be risk assessed. It must complement theSilver Commander’s Tactical Plan and the overall event strategy. Thefollowing should be considered:

♦ traffic diversions and traffic calming measures


♦ Temporary Traffic Regulation Orders

♦ holding areas

♦ specific vehicles, and allocation of essential equipment

♦ impact on fleet management and ongoing policing operations

♦ recovery vehicles

♦ production of traffic contingency plans

♦ informing the public of congested areas, delays and alternativeroutes.

NB These lists are not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive.

During the event♦ managing the Traffic Plan as it develops, including the

implementation of any contingency plans

♦ advising the Silver Commander on all traffic matters

♦ ensuring tactical command is maintained

♦ advising the Intelligence Unit and its manager of data obtained fromANPR and other mediums, for example on target vehicles orindividuals.

Post-event♦ managing the co-ordinated and structured return to normal traffic

conditions within the community

♦ debriefing personnel

♦ debriefing the effectiveness of the traffic management plan.



on Keepingthe

Peace

Chapter 4

69MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACEACPO

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE KEY POINTSIntroductionThe following issues should be considered by Silver and BronzeCommanders in the planning and implementation stage of themanagement of any disorder.

Consideration should be given to the impact that any tactic has on thecommunity.

When considering their use, consideration should be given to existingcommunity based partnerships, ECHR guidelines, H&S risk assessments.

Tactics and deployments whilst being flexible enough to meet changingcircumstances should reflect the overall strategy.

The responsibilities of each tier of the public order command structure areoutlined in Chapter 3 of this guide and should be read in conjunction withthe following sections.

Tactical considerations1. Negotiation

Negotiation with identified organisers or representatives may minimise orremove the potential for conflict. This may result in a reduction in thelevel of resources required.

2. Operational parameters

A phased operation allows the commander the flexibility to review andamend tactics as the situation evolves. Consideration should be given to:

♦ timings

♦ safe entry and exit routes

♦ environmental features

♦ objectives - geographical or strategic.

These must be clearly identified during briefings.

3. Briefing/debriefing:

♦ effective briefing is essential to the successful completion of anyoperation

♦ debriefing supports intelligence and evidence gathering, addresseswelfare and community issues and assists planning future events(see Chapter 5)

♦ people have a right to assembly and association. Accurate briefing ofthe police, based on an assessment of the likelihood or not ofdisorder helps to protect that right.

70 CHAPTER 4TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4. Establishing control

In order to maintain or restore normality it may be necessary to protectvulnerable premises or establish control of certain key locations by meansof appropriate tactics. Specialist resources may be appropriate.

5. Containment

♦ can keep disorder as a localised incident, or buy time for extraresources

♦ may be used to provide intelligence/evidence

♦ can be pre-planned to minimise disruption to local community

♦ allows police and other agencies to exert control but crowd dynamicsmay escalate tension, and lead to confrontation

♦ can be potentially resource intensive and difficult to maintain control

♦ may be used to protect property.

6. Maintaining and regaining the initiative

♦ priority should be given to flexible and where possible pro-activeresponses to potential disorder. Every advantage naturally occurringor obtained, should be capitalised upon

♦ where possible territorial control should be established or regained inaccordance with the strategic objectives

♦ it may be appropriate to relinquish ground, whilst maintaining control,in order to create a tactical advantage

♦ unlawful activity may be disrupted by appropriate informationmanagement.

7. Diversionary tactics

These may be utilised in order to create an advantage or disrupt unlawfulactivity. Some alternatives for gaining an advantage or disruptingunlawful activity are:

♦ feint/riposte

♦ vehicle horns and lights

♦ air support.

Other tactics may be used or developed to achieve a similar objective.

8. Withdraw-regroup

♦ the need to withdraw from any public disorder on the grounds ofofficer safety must be balanced against the need to serve and protectthe public


♦ ongoing assessment of the threat level should determine the tacticalresponse

♦ changing circumstances may necessitate a withdrawal and/or theredeployment of resources

♦ it is important that a withdrawal is not viewed as a negative step. Itmay provide the opportunity to reconsider tactics, diffuse thesituation, or disengage prior to a planned escalation in the use offorce by police.

9. Dispersal

♦ less resource intensive and can be high or low profile

♦ is proactive but can be confrontational

♦ reduces potential offenders’ cohesion and resolve

♦ may be difficult to control and lack of defined exit routes may impacton crowd safety

♦ may displace flash point.

10. Arrest

♦ can deplete offender numbers and weaken resolve of protagonists,assisting the police to gain or regain the initiative

♦ assists intelligence/evidence gathering

♦ removes primary offenders, inciters of criminal activity, andestablishes acceptable tolerance levels

♦ given difficult circumstances it is essential that detention can bejustified

♦ can be resource intensive, prisoner processing machinery required

♦ may trigger adverse response

♦ arrest policy must be considered.

11. Reserves

Reserves ensure flexibility and tactical advantage. Where necessaryreserves should support any proposed tactical deployment. The absenceof such a capability should not prevent a positive response whenimmediate action is necessary. Consider:

♦ mutual aid

♦ specialist support

♦ other agencies.


TACTICAL ADVICETrained tactical advisors are accredited to the national standard and holdevidence of their competence.

Their use should be considered at the planning and implementation stageof every operation. The decision not to involve a tactical advisor must bedocumented.

An advisor can provide information and recommend courses ofaction/inaction with their potential advantages and disadvantages.

The advisors do not make any decisions or take action. Theresponsibility for the validity and reliability of the advice lies with theadvisor, but the responsibility for the use of the advice lies with thecommander.

The tactical advisor can assist with:

♦ advice to all levels of the command structure

♦ pre-planned or spontaneous events, for example urban,environmental and single issue protest, sporting and public events

♦ risk assessment process, including appropriate control measures

♦ development of strategy and tactics

♦ use of legislation and policy

♦ post-event review.


TACTICAL OPTIONSIntroductionThe following section sets out the identified tactical options approved byACPO. This list is not exhaustive. Forces may develop these options tosuit local need, or the circumstances of a particular event or incident.Commanders wishing to implement a tactic not listed must undertake riskassessment and obtain the views of a qualified tactical advisor.

The test for their use should be based on ECHR principles of:

♦ legality

♦ necessity

♦ proportionality

♦ transparency.

Whilst listed sequentially, it may be appropriate to utilise a selected optionor combination of options at any stage.

At a national level it is accepted that in-force capabilities vary. This mayimpact upon their ability to implement a particular option.

Support and assistance may be available from a variety of externalsources including mutual aid in the form of personnel and equipment.

PrinciplesThese explain what the tactics are and what they can do.

ConsiderationsThese should be borne in mind when deciding upon the appropriateoption(s). Consideration must also be given to local issues, resourcesand policies.


List of tactical options1. Normal policing

2. Community mediators

3. Directed response

4. Tactical support group/task force

5. Protected officers

6. Police support units

7. Stand off/regroup

8. Cordons and intercepts

9. Barriers

10. Batons

11. Arrest teams

12. Mounted police

13. Police dogs

14. Obstacle removal

15. Vehicle tactics

16. Artificial lighting

17. Air support

18. Screening smoke

19. CS agents.

The tactical options of:

♦ baton rounds

♦ firearms

are contained within the ACPO Manual of guidance on the PoliceUse of Firearms. These sections must be read before considerationcan be given to use of these particular tactical options.


1. NORMAL POLICINGPrinciples1. Promotes close links with the community; it offers support and

maintains confidence.

2. Should be maintained for as long as possible, and returned to assoon as possible.

3. Maintains accepted image and appearance.

Considerations♦ any transition from or to normal policing should take account of the

safety and welfare of all persons present

♦ where it is necessary to depart from normal policing this may havethe effect of weakening links with the community, partners and otheragencies and may impair community information management andinformation/intelligence gathering.


2. COMMUNITY MEDIATORSPrinciples1. People who can facilitate or establish dialogue thereby:

- dispelling rumour

- reducing conflict

- providing information that supports the intelligence function.

2. Someone who formally or otherwise may:

- have influence or authority

- be part of the community or represents it, or

- be a member of an organisation with statutory

responsibilities

- have an awareness of community issues.

3. May assist in achieving disorder reduction strategies.

Considerations♦ using mediators throughout the full range of events

♦ formal and informal links with the community including mediaappeals/public meetings

♦ care should be taken not to inadvertently disclose police tactics

♦ individuals or groups may have hidden agendas

♦ the provision of local arrangements for managing and supportingmediators

♦ compare information and intelligence from all available resources toaid decision making

♦ disclosure or non-disclosure of sensitive information should be acarefully considered step. It may support an early resolution of anevent or incident.


3. DIRECTED RESPONSEPrinciples1. The positive tasking of patrol officers and other existing resources,

based on intelligence, to diminish the threat to public safety andpotential for disorder.

2. To offer community reassurance.

Considerations♦ the use of community links or partner agencies in order to appreciate

the mood of the community. This will assist in ensuring that anyresponse is appropriate

♦ more specific use of intelligence including targeting individuals andassociates. The use of structured briefings ensures thedissemination of intelligence

♦ the redeployment of resources to reassure the community andreduce potential for disorder

♦ engaging our partners to assist with target hardening initiatives andidentifying potential hotspots

♦ the use of CCTV, whether fixed or temporary, to provide:

- a strategic and tactical overview

- intelligence and evidence.


4. TACTICAL SUPPORT GROUP/TASK FORCEPrinciples1. A competent enhanced specialist resource.

2. Highly trained, better equipped and effectively led.

3. Mobile and flexible, offering support for commanders.

4. A proactive or reactive option.

5. Known by a variety of different names in different forces.

Considerations♦ ability of these units to perform a variety of roles including:

- firearms

- baton guns

- public order

- search

- house-to-house

♦ units may be available on a full or part-time basis, in force or viamutual aid agreements

♦ deployment in the initial stages of conflict may assist in earlyresolution

♦ mode of dress should be appropriate to the threat level and tasks tobe undertaken

♦ use of comprehensive briefings in order to:

- determine policing style

- give understanding of local issues

- raise awareness of their impact on normal policing in the future

♦ deployment of these units to one specialist role may impinge upontheir ability to effectively carry out another role.


5. PROTECTED OFFICERSPrinciples1. Officers wearing public order personal protective equipment (PPE)

2. Are able to work effectively in a particular environment, properlytrained and equipped.

Considerations♦ the impact protected officers may have on the situation, the

participants and the public in general

♦ level of protection required in prevailing circumstances to increaseofficer confidence

♦ the welfare of officers deployed in full public order equipment in theprevailing circumstances

♦ the range of protective measures available including:

- public order equipment

- shield tactics*

♦ health and safety – their use must be subject to risk assessment

♦ the use of this option in conjunction with protected vehicle tactics(information can be obtained from the National Operations Faculty).

* Contained in ACPO Public Order Tactical Trainers’ Manual


6. POLICE SUPPORT UNITSPrinciples1. A nationally agreed unit of:

- 1 inspector

- 3 sergeants

- 18 constables

- 3 drivers

with protected personnel carriers.

2. Trained and equipped to Common Minimum Standards (CMS).

Considerations♦ established and tested callout/mobilisation procedures will ensure the

effective deployment of PSUs

♦ subject to local arrangements, PSUs may be able to provide orrequire additional equipment, including:

- method of entry equipment

- hand held lighting

♦ complementing PSUs with specialist resources, including:

- intelligence and evidence gatherers

- local guides

♦ PSUs should be deployed as a whole unit, but may be split intoserials/sections if operationally necessary.


7. STAND OFF/REGROUPPrinciples1. Facilitates withdrawal of personnel when under threat.

2. May facilitate reduction in conflict.

3. May be used to disengage from a conflict, regroup, brief and re-engage. This may be accompanied by a change in tactical optionsor an escalation in lawful use of force.

Considerations♦ the need to afford protection to the public should always be a prime

consideration

♦ re-deployment of resources as soon as is practicable

♦ impact on those present – perceived loss of control

♦ may reduce levels of disorder and can be used as part of thestructured return to a state of normality

♦ may be used as a diversionary tactic

♦ this is difficult to co-ordinate.


8. CORDONS AND INTERCEPTSPrinciples1. A flexible human resource which allows the police to manage

movement and gather intelligence.

2. A tactic that can be used in conjunction with appropriate legislationto meet strategic or tactical objectives.

Considerations♦ intercepts can be used independently of cordons

♦ effective use of this option is dependent upon appropriate officerprotection and sufficient resourcing

♦ appropriate use and security of personal protective and safetyequipment

♦ various resources can be used including:

- foot officers

- dog units

- mounted police

- protected vehicles

- barriers

- automatic number plate recognition systems

- traffic patrol officers

♦ intelligence and evidence gathering

♦ community or crowd safety

♦ when using intercepts in conjunction with legislation officers mustcomply with and record details and decisions.


9. BARRIERSPrinciples1. To control crowd movement.

Considerations♦ safety – barrier use needs to be physically supervised

♦ ‘exit’ points should be established and clearly identified

♦ different types of barrier, for example – metal, cordon, tape

♦ barrier type should reflect intended use

♦ clearly define boundaries, routes and sterile areas

♦ more appropriate for pre-planned events than outbreaks ofspontaneous disorder

♦ lack of mobility of barriers limits rapid deployment

♦ during outbreaks of disorder, use of mounted sections in conjunctionwith barriers must be closely monitored

♦ is a ‘support’ option, not a substitute for personnel

♦ can become a weapon for hostile crowds. Securing barriers togethermay reduce the risk, but may trap the crowd and police.


10. BATONSPrinciples1. Equipment primarily issued for the protection of the public and

police officers.

2. Demonstrate a show of strength, facilitate dispersal or arrest.

Authority levelsFor use as group tactic:

1. Pre-planned: Silver Commander.

2. Spontaneous: PSU Commander, serial/section supervisor ifseparated from PSU.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of these authority levels, it must benoted that they do not affect the right of an individual officer to draw anduse a baton, to protect themselves, a colleague or member of the public.Any use of a baton to strike must be justified.

Considerations♦ officer safety

♦ warning messages should be given of impending use (Chapter 4page 97)

♦ a show of strength can be intended as a warning message in its ownright, dissuading people from violence and encouraging them todisperse

♦ level of force should be proportionate to level of threat

♦ it is a lawful order to require officers to draw batons or advance withbatons. The decision to strike with a baton is for the individual officerand must be justified in the circumstances - the commander decidingto deploy officers with batons drawn must be able to justify thedecision to use that group tactic

♦ side-handled batons are not suitable for use in situations of seriouspublic disorder

♦ in circumstances where officers carry more than one baton at anyone time, clear guidelines are required

♦ aftercare of injured.


11. ARREST TEAMSPrinciples1. Suitably skilled personnel acting together with protection, if

appropriate.

2. Target unlawful action of ring leaders or agitators with the intentionof reducing crime and disorder.

Considerations♦ use of intelligence

♦ the potential effects on the community

♦ necessity to arrest

♦ arrests before, during and after any event

♦ resource availability and potential depletion

♦ appropriate training and equipment

♦ media interpretation

♦ any arrest policy in existence.


12. MOUNTED POLICEPrinciples1. Provide a show of strength and support cordons.

2. Escort marches/groups.

3. Sweep, divide and disperse crowds.

4. May assist with the rapid dispersal of a violent crowd.

5. Monitor crowd dynamics and assist with intelligence/informationgathering.

Considerations♦ it is essential the capabilities and limitations of using police horses be

fully understood by the police commander prior to their deployment

♦ advice should be sought from the most senior mounted officeravailable

♦ undertaking risk assessments and implementing control measures,including entry and exit routes for police and the public

♦ supporting mounted officers by deploying officers on foot, particularlywhen taking ground

♦ issuing a warning message prior to deploying mounted police into acrowd (Chapter 4 Page 97)

♦ the use of horses and barriers in close proximity needs carefulconsideration and close liaison with a senior mounted officer.


13. POLICE DOGSPrinciples1. Support Police Support Units:

(i) deployed on foot for

(a) show of strength behind police lines

(b) crowd dispersal

(ii) mobile in specially adapted vehicles (dog carrier) for rapiddeployment.

2. Protect property:

(i) police stations

(ii) prisoner reception/holding areas

(iii) vulnerable property and areas

(iv) prevent looting.

3. Patrol the periphery to:

(i) prevent access to the area of disorder

(ii) contain area of disorder

(iii) provide high profile policing post disorder.

Considerations♦ it is essential that the capabilities and limitations of using police dogs

are fully understood by the police commander prior to theirdeployment

♦ advice should be sought from the most senior dog officer available

♦ specific risk assessments and control measures including protectiveequipment and ‘public order’ leads

♦ during dispersal tactics, dog handlers should be supported by officerson foot

♦ issuing a warning message prior to using police dogs in a dispersalrole (Chapter 4 page 97)

♦ dogs are unable to discriminate as to who is or who is not is breakingthe law.


14. OBSTACLE REMOVALPrinciples1. The means of removing anything that is designed to delay or obstruct.

Considerations♦ the strategic importance of the obstacle and whether or not its

removal or disablement is an operational necessity

♦ the resources available in order to achieve desired outcome including

- police specialists

- emergency services

- statutory groups

- environmental agencies

- private contractors

♦ contacting the National Operations Faculty for current trends

♦ policing measures must evolve in line with new, innovative andunlawful protest tactics

♦ must be based on risk assessment which will determine the use ofappropriate specialist resources - some protestors are willing to putthemselves and others at considerable risk

♦ the use of legislation against those persons identified as puttingothers at significant risk.


15. VEHICLE TACTICSPrinciples1. The use of a vehicle as a tactic in itself.

2. May be used to:

(i) provide safe transport of personnel, equipment and prisoners

(ii) provide physical protection and support for officers

(iii) act as a physical filter

(iv) provide a protected platform from which to gather intelligenceand communicate with the crowd

(v) discourage unlawful behaviour by a show of strength

(vi) provide lighting.

3. Because the vehicle is used as a tactic in itself drivers must receivethe following driver training:

(i) a standard level course

(ii) a personnel carrier course

(iii) a vehicle tactics course

(iv) appropriate driver refresher training.

4. Should be carried out using suitably equipped and protected vehicles.

Considerations♦ tactical use of protected vehicles may be a sensitive issue which

could have a positive or negative effect on the community

♦ undertaking risk assessments and implementing appropriate controlmeasures, including entry and exit routes for police and the public

♦ use of emergency warning equipment, including sirens, may affectbehaviour patterns

♦ issue a warning message prior to deploying vehicle tactics into acrowd (Chapter 4 Page 97)

♦ effective communication between the ground commander andvehicles is essential to maintain control

♦ information on current vehicle tactics and driver training can beobtained from National Operations Faculty.


16. ARTIFICIAL LIGHTINGPrinciples1. Illuminate an area.

2. Reduce health and safety hazards.

3. Reduce anonymity.

4. Assist intelligence and evidence gathering functions.

Considerations♦ the lighting systems available include:

- night sun

- vehicle mounted

- hand held

- stanchions

♦ the prevailing conditions and desired objective(s).


17. AIR SUPPORTPrinciples1. Assists in providing a strategic and/or tactical overview.

2. May be used for intelligence and evidence gathering.

3. Effective in monitoring of crowd safety and traffic movement.

Considerations♦ the limitations of using air support should be fully understood prior to

deployment

♦ seeking advice from the air support staff

♦ differing types of Air Support Units available include:

- helicopter

- fixed wing

- airship

- balloon

♦ availability and cost

♦ their use for spontaneous incidents, before, during and after plannedevents

♦ assist in effective deployment of other resources

♦ raised noise levels from aircraft can hamper communication.


18. SCREENING SMOKEPrinciples1. Conceals police movement and/or deployment.

Authority levels1. Officer of at least the rank of assistant chief constable/commander.

2. Designated officer (inspector or above, suitably selected and trained)who can make an independent assessment at the scene that thesituation still justifies the use of the particular tactic.

Considerations♦ is used when conventional methods of policing have been tried and

failed or are unlikely to succeed if tried

♦ used in serious public disorder, where there is the potential for loss oflife, serious injury, widespread destruction and whether such action islikely to reduce that risk

♦ must only be used by trained officers

♦ avenues of escape must be identified to avoid panic and minimisethe risk of injury

♦ allegations may be made that smoke has been used to maskunlawful or questionable police activity

♦ may be used as a cover for demonstrators to commit crime

♦ wind direction

♦ is suitable in situations of serious disorder involving firearms wherecasualties/bodies need to be recovered

♦ issuing a warning message prior to use (Chapter 4 page 97).


19. CS AGENTSPrinciples1. To disperse a riotous assembly in life-threatening situations.

Authority levels1. Chief officer or, when absent, the acting chief officer.

2. Designated officer (assistant chief constable/commander, suitablyselected and trained - if unavailable chief superintendent orsuperintendent) who can make an independent assessment at thescene that the situation still justifies the use of the particular tactic.

Authority can only be given in accordance with Home OfficeGuidelines.

Following operational use of CS agents, the chief officer should submit awritten report to the Home Secretary as soon as is practicable.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of these authority levels, it must benoted that they do not affect the right of an individual officer to usepersonal issue CS incapacitant spray, if such use can be justified.

Considerations♦ atmospheric conditions and wind direction and effect on unprotected

persons

♦ avenues of escape must be identified to avoid panic and minimisethe risk of injury

♦ impact on the community and media presentation

♦ medical assistance and aftercare procedures includingdecontamination and subsequent monitoring

♦ use in serious public disorder, as a last resort, where loss of life,serious injury and widespread damage are likely

♦ to be used when conventional methods have been tried and failed, orare unlikely to succeed and where such action is judged to be likelyto reduce that risk

♦ require warning messages to be given to inform all persons presentof impending use (Chapter 4 page 97)

♦ must only be used by trained and suitably equipped officers.


WARNING MESSAGESIntroductionWarning messages to the public give a clear indication of the course ofaction to be taken. The ECHR principles of necessity, lawfulness andproportionality are prime considerations. They may also highlight publicsafety issues.

Delivery

May include:

♦ verbal/public address system/sky shout

♦ written/banners/hand bills

♦ electronic notice boards.

Audience

Consider:

♦ groups of differing sizes

♦ non English speaking

♦ hearing difficulties

♦ physically impaired

♦ visually impaired

♦ the audience may seek to obstruct or frustrate the delivery of themessage. Police should seek to demonstrate that the delivery of themessage was genuinely attempted.

Presentation

When giving a warning message the following information must berecorded:

i. The situation before.

ii. Time, date and place of delivery.

iii. Content of message.

iv. Method of delivery.

v. Officer giving the warning.

vi. The situation after.


Method of recording

♦ video

♦ audio

♦ written.

Statute

♦ some legislation requires the delivery of a message prior toimplementation of a particular legal power.

Specimen warning messagesIn a situation where the police can justify the use of force or an escalationin the use of force, warning messages should be given, if practicable andtime permits. If a tactic is to be used over a period of time, or a largearea, it may be desirable to repeat the warning message(s).

“ATTENTION, ATTENTION,

THIS IS A POLICE WARNING

DISPERSE IMMEDIATELY OR ………………………………….….

WILL BE DEPLOYED.

NO FURTHER WARNING WILL BE GIVEN.”

Tactical options that require a warning message:

♦ firearms

♦ baton rounds

♦ CS agents

♦ screening smoke

♦ vehicle tactics

♦ dogs

♦ horses

♦ batons

♦ force will be used.

Other warning messages may be appropriate. The contents of whichshould reflect local circumstances and be recorded.

(SEE BELOW)



on Keepingthe

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Chapter 5


TRAINING PRINCIPLESTraining and development has been identified by Government, ACPO andHer Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary as being critical to theachievement of operational outcomes. The following points must beconsidered:

♦ Training should be focused to meet both current and futureoperational needs and must be considered as an integral part of therisk assessment process.

♦ Training should be to a common minimum standard, incorporatingnationally recognised terminology.

♦ Commanders should attend command level courses recommendedby the ACPO Public Order Sub-Committee.

♦ The specialist knowledge and skills required by public ordercommanders must be linked to their respective personal developmentplans, to ensure vital skills such as leadership, decision-making andstrategic planning are enhanced.

♦ Workplace assessment and development can be extremely beneficialin enhancing operational effectiveness.

♦ Tactical advisors should be trained on the National Public OrderTactical Advisor Programme.

♦ Specialist skills areas such as driving and the use of baton gunsshould be trained in accordance with the relevant ACPO committeeguidelines.

♦ Training should not be restricted to those commanding or policing anevent. Other notable key personnel, for example, briefing anddebriefing officers, communications staff, should receive trainingrelevant to their role.

♦ Training should not be seen as an activity in its own right and shouldbe designed following a needs analysis. Aims and objectives shouldbe set and closely monitored. Validation and evaluation should formpart of the training process. The result of evaluations and operationaldebriefs should be used to direct and develop future training.

♦ Police services should ensure they have in place an effective systemfor keeping and monitoring training records.

♦ There are additional benefits to be obtained from joint exercises, interagency and inter disciplinary training.

100 CHAPTER 5SUPPORT ELEMENTS


THE NATIONAL OPERATIONS FACULTYThe National Operations Faculty (NOF) can provide information to assistthe police service in its operational police management.

One of the focus areas for the NOF is Public Order. The NOF can assistin the preparation for and response to disorder, by identifying trends indisorder, in protestor activity and police tactics and strategy.

The functions of the NOF are:♦ Training including both structured training events and training

specifically designed to meet identified needs which can be deliveredin the workplace.

♦ Seminars and conferences which address topical issues of currentimportance.

♦ Consultancy that aims to provide training information and support toplanners, commanders and advisors who are responsible for eventsand incidents where there is a risk to public safety or a potential fordisorder. NOF officers are available to attend operational debriefs, toresearch and identify appropriate material for addition to thedatabase. This consultancy can be accessed by making direct contactwith the Public Order Section at the NOF.

♦ Database and help desk to provide information on ACPO policy,current practice, and the availability of training. The faculty also holdsdetails of specialist resources from within the service and outside.This database is accessible at all times via a 24 hour ‘standby’ officer.

♦ Research including the gathering and analysis of information oncurrent trends in public order policing.


BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFINGIntroductionGood communication is crucial to the organisation and management ofevents or incidents. Effective briefing and debriefing will act as qualityassurance for operational effectiveness and should be performed bysuitably trained personnel.

It must be borne in mind that disclosure implications may arise in bothcriminal and civil proceedings in respect of briefings and debriefings.

BriefingAll staff should be thoroughly briefed prior to participation in an event.

Briefings should:

♦ be concise

♦ include relevant information

♦ include evaluated intelligence

♦ include the strategy and the tactical plan

♦ include health and safety information

♦ include specific duties

♦ include advice on legal implications

♦ be recorded.

Experience has shown that the adoption of the IIRMAC briefing model:

♦ Information

♦ Intention

♦ Risk assessment

♦ Method

♦ Administration

♦ Communication

assists in the communication process.

DebriefingDebriefing should be regarded as part of the planning process for futureevents.

Its purpose should not be to apportion blame, but to identify the most andleast effective aspects of the operation.


Debriefs should:

♦ be carried out in chronological order

♦ be structured

♦ make use of open questions to encourage participation

♦ identify and promote good practice

♦ be timely if appropriate (‘hot’ debriefs can be a suitable forum forensuring that all evidence and intelligence has been gathered).

The following chart shows a debrief model:

Some practical examples of debrief structures (using the model above)are shown below.

Structured agenda one

♦ grouping roles and areas of responsibility together for example initialresponse to scene, cordon officers, communications, casualty bureau

♦ debriefing structure

i. areas of good practice (what went well)

Who attendedand where?

What next time? What happened?

Why?What did we

learn?


ii. areas to avoid (what did not go well)

iii. areas for further research (is there a better way of doing it?)

♦ the formulation of actions in the three areas above to consolidate thedebriefing process.

Structured agenda two

♦ aims of debrief

♦ emerging issues

i. communications

ii. equipment

iii. human resources

iv. planning and briefings

v. command and tactics

vi. welfare

vii. other issues

♦ key learning points for individuals

i. most significant thing learnt during event/incident

ii. what would be done differently if facing similar operation?

iii. how could operation be improved?

♦ actions.


WELFARE ISSUESThe welfare of all personnel is of vital importance if an efficient service isto be provided to the community. Personnel suffering from the anxiety ofpersonal problems, whether associated with their private life or their work,cannot function effectively.

Responsibility for welfare in the first instance rests with line managers,who may seek assistance from staff associations and occupational healthrepresentatives.

Critical incident debriefingMany events in which police staff are involved are outside the range ofnormal human experience or may be particularly distressing. Thefollowing mechanism exists to allow for such personnel to be sensitivelydebriefed.

The following chart shows a critical incident debriefing model:

Critical incident

Mini debrief bysupervisor

Supervisor contactsWelfare Officer or other

appropriate body

Yes Is it critical ? No

Welfare deploys debriefers

Debrief 48 to 72 hoursafter incident

Seriously affectedofficers.

Professional welfaresupport

One month later.Follow-up by

professional welfaresupport

Discussalternatives


Critical incident debriefing must be carried out by trained individuals andshould be conducted approximately two days after the incident; notimmediately or on the same day. Trained welfare professionals are bestplaced to offer advice.

Critical incident defusing which may be best described as initial help andsupport, is intended to lessen the impact of the incident and restore theindividual’s equilibrium and may also be considered immediately after anincident.



on Keepingthe

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Index


INDEX

About the guide.............................................7What is its status?...............................7What does it do? .................................7What does it not do? ...........................8Who is it for? .......................................7

Air support...................................................93Arrest teams ...............................................87Artificial lighting ...........................................92Barriers ......................................................85Batons ......................................................86Briefing ........................................46, 69, 103Bronze Commander ...................................37Bronze support ...........................................38Building the peace ......................................11Command ...................................................35Command – communications.....................38Command protocols ...................................40Command structure – illustration................39Communications .........................................38Community information management ........19Community mediators.................................78Conflict management model.......................13Contingency and mobilisation planning......47Cordons and intercepts ..............................84Crime and disorder: a strategic model .........9Crime management ....................................55Crime scene management – illustration.....58Critical incident debriefing.........................107Crowd behaviour.........................................26Crowd management principles...................27CS agents ...................................................95Debrief model – illustration .......................104Debriefing......................................46, 69, 103Directed response ......................................79Disclosure and exhibits officer(s) ...............57Disorder model ...........................................23

Considerations ..................................25Diagram.............................................24Stages explained...............................23

Dogs – police..............................................89File handling teams ....................................57Foreword.......................................................5Gold Commander .......................................35Gold support................................................36Horses (mounted police) ............................88Hospital teams............................................57Human rights.........................................15, 47Index ....................................................109

In-house intelligence units ..........................51Intelligence and information........................49

During event.......................................54Pre-event............................................51Post-event..........................................54

Intelligence structure – illustration ..............53Intercepts ..................................................84Interview teams...........................................57Investigation – closure ................................59Keeping the peace..................................9, 11Liaison with organisers ...............................43List of tactical options..................................75Loss of life ..................................................59

Appointment of staff...........................60Body recovery....................................60Contingency liaison............................59Control of the scene...........................60

Mobilisation plans........................................47Mounted police............................................88Mutual aid ..................................................65

Call sign structure..............................65Co-ordination centre (PNICC) ...........65

National Crime Intelligence Service............50National Intelligence Model.........................50National Operations Faculty (NOF) ..........101National Public Order Intelligence Unit.......49Nature and scope of disorder .....................21Nature of tensions and conflicts .................10Normal policing............................................77Operational orders ......................................45Obstacle removal ........................................90Planning ..................................................43

Briefing/debriefings ............................46Compliance with ECHR.....................47Contingency and mobilisation............47Operational orders .............................45

Police dogs..................................................89Police support unit.......................................82PR strategy .................................................61

How to achieve objectives .................62Objectives ..........................................61Target audiences ...............................63What to avoid .....................................63

Prisoner reception.......................................57Protected officers........................................81Reserves ..................................................71Restoring the peace....................................11Screening smoke ........................................94

110 INDEX

Senior Investigating Officer (SIO)...............55Silver Commander ......................................36Silver support ..............................................37SIO ..............................................................55

Appointment of...................................55During event responsibilities .............56Role of SIO ........................................55Post-event responsibilities.................59Pre-event responsibilities ..................55

Specimen warning messages ....................98Stand off/regroup.........................................83Strategic considerations .............................31

Developing partnerships....................31Ethical considerations .......................32Intelligence.........................................31Legal ..................................................34Planning.............................................34Preferred outcomes...........................32Resourcing ........................................33What is the situation? ........................31The key points ...................................31

Strategic principles......................................29Effective resourcing...........................30Initial response...................................29Tactical deployment...........................30

Strategy definition........................................35Strategy meeting .........................................44Tactical advice ............................................73Tactical considerations ...............................69

Arrest .................................................71Briefing/debriefing..............................69Containment ......................................70Dispersal............................................71Diversionary tactics ...........................70Establishing control ...........................70Maintaining and regaining initiative ...70Negotiation.........................................69Operational parameters.....................69Reserves ...........................................71Withdraw/regroup ..............................70The key points ...................................69

Tactical options ...........................................75Air support..........................................93Arrest teams ......................................87Artificial lighting ..................................92Barriers ..............................................85Batons................................................86Community mediators........................78Cordons and intercepts .....................84CS agents ..........................................95Directed response .............................79Introduction ........................................75Mounted police.................................. 88Normal policing.................................. 77Obstacle removal .............................. 90Police dogs........................................ 89Police support unit............................. 82Protected officers.............................. 81Screening smoke .............................. 94Stand off/regroup............................... 83Tactical support/group task force ..... 80Vehicle tactics ................................... 91

Tactical planning meeting........................... 45Tactical support group................................ 80Tactics – definition...................................... 36Task force................................................... 80The function of the NOF........................... 101The National Operations Faculty ............. 101Threat and risk assessment....................... 47Traffic management ................................... 67

During the event................................ 68Post-event ......................................... 68Pre-event........................................... 67

Traffic management plan ........................... 68Training principles ...................................... 99Use of force................................................ 17Vehicle tactics ............................................ 91Warning messages .................................... 97Welfare issues.......................................... 107

ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace

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Transcript of ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace