ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS

CENTRO DO COMÉRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO

Coordenadora: Vera Thorstensen

OS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO ÓRGÃO DE SOLUÇÃO DE

CONTROVÉRSIAS:

Efeitos na aplicação das regras do comércio internacional

Acordo Anti-Dumping

Coordenadoras

Leanne Cornet Naidin

Marta Lemme

Autores

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

Bruno Herwig Rocha Augustin

Maria Carolina Mendonça Barros

Gisela Sarmet

Isadora Souza

Leanne Cornet Naidin

Luciano Inácio de Souza

Lucas Spadano

Luciana Maria de Oliveira

Mariana Chacoff

Marina Pantoja

Marta Lemme

Rubens Romero

Tatiana Lins e Cruz

INTRODUÇÃO

Análise do texto de lei do Acordo sobre a Implementação do Artigo VI do GATT 1994 (Acordo Anti-

Dumping) e da jurisprudência consolidada pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (DSB) da OMC.

ACORDO SOBRE A IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DO ARTIGO VI DO GATT 1994

(ACORDO ANTI-DUMPING)

Artigo 1

Marina Pantoja

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 1

Principles

An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of

GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated (1) and conducted in accordance with the

provisions of this Agreement. The following provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT

1994 in so far as action is taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulations.

Footnote 1: The term “initiated” as used in this Agreement means the procedural action by which a Member formally

commences an investigation as provided in Article 5.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 1

Princípios

Uma medida antidumping deve ser aplicada somente quando da ocorrência de uma das circunstancias

expressamente previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 e perseguindo as investigações iniciadas e

conduzidas de acordo com as previsões desse Acordo. As disposições seguintes coordenam a

aplicação do artigo VI do GATT 1994 na medida em que sejam tomadas medidas antidumping, de

acordo com a legislação do GATT.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 1

O Artigo 1 do Acordo Anti-Dumping trata da análise preliminar da medida anti-dumping, para a

efetiva aplicação deste acordo. Restringe as possibilidades de aplicação das medidas anti-dumping ao

que está expressamente dDSUrito no Artigo VI do GATT.

Relatorio do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras.

4.4, 7.87, 7.88 e 7.183.

Para. 4.4. “Consequently, Mexico respectfully requests the Panel to conclude that the final anti-

dumping measure adopted by SECOFI on HFCS imports from the United States, and the actions

preceding it, are consistent with the obligations incumbent on Mexico under the AD Agreement, in

particular Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12 and 18, and the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.87. “In turn, the United States respectfully requests the Panel to find that:

(a) SECOFI neither initiated nor conducted the anti-dumping

investigation on imports of HFCS from the United States in

accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement, and therefore

its application of a final anti-dumping measure violates Article 1 of

the AD Agreement.

(b) SECOFI’s initiation of an anti-dumping investigation on imports

of HFCS from the United States was inconsistent with Articles 5.1,

5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8 of the AD Agreement.

(c) SECOFI’s initiation notice was inconsistent with Articles 12.1 and

12.1.1 of the AD Agreement.

(d) SECOFI’s final determination of threat of injury was inconsistent

with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.7 of the AD Agreement.

(e) SECOFI’s imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of HFCS

from the United States was inconsistent with Articles VI:1 and VI:6

of the GATT 1994.

(f) SECOFI’s application of provisional anti-dumping measures on

imports of HFCS from the United States in excess of six months was

inconsistent with Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement.

(g) SECOFI’s imposition of final anti-dumping duties during the

period of application of provisional measures was inconsistent with

Articles 10.2 and 10.4 of the AD Agreement.

(h) SECOFI’s final determination was inconsistent with Articles 12.2

and 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement.

Para. 7.88. “Accordingly, the United States respectfully requests that the Panel recommend that

Mexico, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, bring SECOFI’s final anti-dumping measure into

conformity with the AD Agreement and GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.183. “The AD Agreement contains specific rules for the implementation of Article VI of

GATT 1994 with respect, inter alia, to the period of application of provisional measures. Those rules

are binding on all Members, and arguments based on references to the “spirit” of the GATT 1994 are

unavailing to justify a failure to comply with those rules. We conclude that, in light of the specific

limitation on the period of application of provisional measures contained in Article 7.4, the

application of the provisional measure beyond the six month period is inconsistent with Mexico's

obligations under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement.”

Relatorio do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act (EC)),

WT/DS136/R, paras. 7.89, 7.90, 7.91, 7.92, 7.93, 7.94, 7.96, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.103, 7.104, 7.105,

7.106, 7.108, 7.109, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113 e 7.114

Para. 7.89. “The United States contends that, under these standards, the European Communities'

panel request in the present dispute is insufficient to place claims that the 1916 Act violated Articles 1

and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement before the Panel. The European Communities, in its panel

request, characterised the 1916 Act as an anti-dumping statute and claimed that the 1916 Act was

inconsistent with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which, according to the European Communities,

“specif[ies] that anti-dumping duties are the only possible remedy to dumping whereas the 1916 Act

is having recourse to treble damages and fines and/or imprisonment.” The European Communities at

no point claimed - in its panel request or even in its request for consultations - that the 1916 Act was

similarly inconsistent with any provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or, in particular, with

Article 1 or Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 7.90. “In response to a question of the Panel regarding its position vis-à-vis the US request, the

European Communities states that the United States requests the Panel to exclude claims that the

European Communities has not made. The relevant EC claims are that by providing for a remedy

other than duties against dumping the 1916 Act violates Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing

the WTO and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The European Communities makes no separate claims

that this feature of the 1916 Act violates Article 1 and 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. These

provisions were merely mentioned as arguments in support of the European Communities' claims.

Accordingly, the US request for a preliminary ruling can be dismissed as being without object.”

Para. 7.91. “The European Communities further submits that the Anti-Dumping Agreement is fully

consistent with Article VI and defines in greater detail the conditions and in particular the

requirements for an investigation that need to be fulfilled to allow anti-dumping action to be taken.

Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement confirms that an anti-dumping measure can be applied only

under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations

conducted in accordance with the Agreement, while Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

stipulates that action can be taken against the import of dumped products from another WTO Member

only if the dumping causes or threatens material injury, and that no other measures can be taken than

those provided for by Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 7.92. “As concerns the United States' reliance on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, the European

Communities notes that the reference made by the Appellate Body to an indivisible relationship

between Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement rather supports the view that a

separate citation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the present case is not necessary. The Appellate

Body in Brazil - Desiccated Coconut held that Article VI cannot be read independently of the SCM

Agreement and that they “together define, clarify and in some cases modify the whole package of

rights and obligations […]”. The European Communities agrees that the same applies to the Anti-

Dumping Agreement. Yet the United States in fact asks the Panel to do the opposite of what the

Appellate Body found to be necessary. The United States seems to admit that there is within the

“package” an obligation not to apply remedies other than duties against dumping but asks the Panel to

only look at Article VI:2 and exclude any argument under Article 1 and 18 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.”

Para. 7.93. “According to the European Communities, the same argument applies to the cited Articles

of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 1 provides in relevant part that “[a]n anti-dumping measure

shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant

to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this agreement”.

Articles 2.1 and 2.2 set forth amplified rules on the substantive definition of dumping. Article 3 does

the same for injury. Article 4 defines “domestic industry”, which is relevant for the injury definition.

Article 5.5 provides that, “after receipt of a properly documented application and before proceeding to

initiate an investigation, the authorities shall notify the government of the exporting Member

concerned”. It can easily be seen that all these provisions make no mention of the application of duties

as a remedy, and would have to be applied even if it were to be decided that measures other than

duties, such as civil damages or criminal penalties, could, consistently with Article VI of the GATT

1994, be applied to remedy dumping.”

Para. 7.94. TABLEAU

Provisions of the 1916 Act Provisions violated Comments

“[A] price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such articles […] in the

principal markets of the country of their production, or of other foreign countries to which they are

commonly exported […].” Article VI:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement The 1916 Act does not respect the precedence of criteria for establishing

normal value.

“Provided, That such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the

United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining

or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States”. Article VI:1

of the GATT 1994 and Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In order to condemn dumping,

there must be injury, threat of injury or material retardation, while the 1916 Act merely requires the

intent thereof.”

“Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to violate this section is

guilty of a misdemeanour, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding

$5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.” Article VI:2

of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. WTO Members may only offset

dumping through the imposition of duties not greater than the margin of dumping and only once they

have initiated and conducted an investigation in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

“[A]nd shall recover threefold the damages sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable

attorney's fee.” Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 Anti-dumping duties may not be greater than the

margin of dumping of the product in question.

“The foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive the proper State courts of jurisdiction in

actions for damages thereunder.” Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI of the GATT

1994 The proper means of offsetting dumping consists in anti-dumping measures imposed pursuant

to an investigation conducted in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

Para. 7.96. “However, we limit ourselves at this stage to taking note of the fact that the EC does not

make any separate claim under Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In light of the

clarification by the EC, we also conclude that the EC claim under Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement does not relate to its claim under Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, but addresses a

different aspect of the matter.”

Para. 7.97. “Neither the context of Article VI, nor the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 or the

WTO Agreement contradicts this assessment. On the contrary, Article VI:1(a) and (b) confirm that

there is no requirement that the export price be above or below fixed or variable costs or that price

undercutting, price suppression or price depression be identified for “dumping” to exist, even though

they may be considered for injury purposes. Article VI:2 supports the view that Article VI is about

what Members are entitled to do when they counteract dumping within the meaning of Article VI. So

does Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, by referring to “anti-dumping measure[s]” which

may be applied by Members. The supplementary means of interpretation of Article 32 of the Vienna

Convention, in particular the travaux préparatoires, confirm that Article VI of the GATT was about

what category of dumping could be subject to counteracting measures.”

Para. 7.98. “Having found that Article VI of the GATT 1994 applies to the 1916 Act, we note that

Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that an anti-dumping measure shall be applied

only pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of that

Agreement. Article 1, second sentence, also provides that: “the [provisions of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement] govern the application of Article VI of GATT in so far as action is taken under anti-

dumping legislation or regulations.” Given the link between Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the

Anti-Dumping Agreement, we find that the applicability of Article VI to the 1916 Act also implies the

applicability of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 7.99. “The parties argued at length on the possibility for the Panel to consider Articles 1 and

18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, since those provisions were not listed as claims in the request

for establishment of the Panel.” Article 1 provides as follows: “An anti-dumping measure shall be

applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to

investigations initiated [footnote 1] and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this

Agreement. The following provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as

action is taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulations.”

Relatorio do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States- Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Paras 1.8; 118;

119; 120; DS 136- Appellate Body Report:

Para. 7.103. “According to the United States, the word “may” in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994

confirms that Article VI provides a right that Members would not otherwise have – the right to impose

duties – but does not contain any prohibition on the use of other types of measure. Article 1 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement means that a Member's actions are governed by Article VI and the Anti-

Dumping Agreement if a Member is applying one of the specified measures to counteract dumping,

i.e., anti-dumping duties, provisional measures or price undertakings. Article 18.1 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement and its footnote 24 also make clear that when specific action taken against

dumping is in the form of anti-dumping duties, provisional measures or price undertakings, such

action must comply with Article VI, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but that when

specific action against dumping takes another form, such action is governed by the provisions of the

GATT 1994 other than Article VI.”

Para. 7.104. “As we have stated, Article VI of the GATT 1994 must be read together with the

provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 1 of that Agreement provides: An anti-dumping

measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and

pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this

Agreement. The following provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as

action is taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulations.”

Para. 7.105. “The first sentence of Article 1 states that “an anti-dumping measure” must be consistent

with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, as

the United States concedes, the meaning of an “anti-dumping measure” in this sentence is “not

immediately clear”. The United States argues, on the basis of the history of this provision, that the

phrase “anti-dumping measure” refers only to definitive anti-dumping duties, price undertakings and

provisional measures. However, the ordinary meaning of the phrase “an anti-dumping measure”

seems to encompass all measures taken against dumping. We do not see in the words “an anti-

dumping measure” any explicit limitation to particular types of measure.”

Para. 7.106. “Since “an anti-dumping measure” must, according to Article 1 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement, be consistent with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the provisions of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement, it seems to follow that Article VI would apply to “an anti-dumping measure”, i.e., a

measure against dumping.”

Para. 7.108. “There is nothing in Article 17.4 or in any other part of the AD Agreement to prevent

claims being made against any action taken during an anti-dumping investigation (even the imposition

of a provisional measure), provided that the requirement to identify the definitive measure as the

“specific measure at issue” is met. Article 1 of the AD Agreement itself obliges the authorities to

impose anti-dumping measures only “pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance

with the provisions of this Agreement”. This means that the imposition of the definitive measure must

be the result of an investigation conducted in accordance with the AD Agreement. In other words, all

the steps taken in the investigation preceding the definitive anti-dumping measure affect the

imposition of that measure. In the present case, the provisional anti-dumping measure is a step taken

in the investigation (or action preceding the definitive anti-dumping measure), and therefore, Mexico

can unquestionably make several claims in this regard.”

Para. 7.109. “Furthermore, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Article 17.4 prevents the

provisional measure from being contested as an action, it should be noted that the second sentence of

the Article only refers to paragraph 1 of Article 7 and not to other obligations related to the

provisional measures. Following Guatemala's logic, therefore, even if the Panel did not have the

mandate to examine claims relating to violations of Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement, the same Panel

could examine Mexico's claims regarding violations of Articles 2.2, 2.4.3 and 12.2.1. If this were the

case, the absence of a mandate would be offset by the Panel's authority to examine the provisional

measure under Article 1 of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.111. “Having demonstrated that neither on initiation of the investigation nor when imposing

the provisional and definitive measures did the Guatemalan authority make a valid determination of

dumping nor the alleged threat of injury nor the alleged injury, and also failed to demonstrate a causal

relationship between them, as required by Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement, and in view of the

violations of Article 5, 6, 7 and 12 of the Agreement committed when initiating the investigation and

during its course, the Panel can see that:

(i) Guatemala decided to establish definitive anti-dumping duties on

grey Portland cement from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul without

having duly complied with all the requirements for their

establishment prDSUribed by Article 9.1 of the AD Agreement;

(ii) the application of the definitive anti-dumping measure under such

circumstances is contrary to the provisions of Article VI of the

GATT 1994 and in turn constitutes a violation of Article 1 and 18

of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.112. “Throughout this dispute Mexico has claimed that Guatemala did not make a valid

determination of dumping or injury and also failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between them,

as required by Articles 2 and 3 of the AD Agreement. Mexico has also claimed that Guatemala

violated Articles 5, 6, 7 and 12 when initiating the investigation and during its course. Therefore,

Mexico claims that Guatemala has also violated Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement and Article

VI of GATT 1994, in so far as:

(a) Guatemala decided to establish definitive anti-dumping duties on grey

portland cement from the Mexican firm Cruz Azul without having duly

complied with all the requirements for their establishment prDSUribed by

Article 9.1 of the AD Agreement;

(b) the application of the definitive anti-dumping measure without a valid

determination of dumping injury and causal relationship between the two, is

contrary to the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and in turn

constitutes a violation of Article 1 and 18 of the AD Agreement.

Para. 7.113. “Article 1 and Article 9.1 read:

“1. An anti dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances

provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations

initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

The following provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT 1994

in so far as action is taken under anti dumping legislation or regulations”

(Footnote omitted)

“9.1. The decision whether or not to impose an anti dumping duty in cases

where all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the

decision whether the amount of the anti dumping duty to be imposed shall be

the full margin of dumping or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities

of the importing Member. It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in

the territory of all Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such

lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.”

Para. 7.114. “Mexico asserts that Guatemala's initiation of the anti-dumping investigation at issue in

this dispute was inconsistent with Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement. Mexico considers that

the anti-dumping investigation should never have been initiated, and that its initiation and subsequent

conduct resulted in the nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Mexico under the WTO and

in particular the AD Agreement. Mexico asserts that the Ministry's decision to initiate the

investigation is also inconsistent with Articles 2, 3 and 12 of the AD Agreement.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS162/AB/R, paras. 7.115-7.116

Para. 7.115. “Japan contests the maintenance and application of the 1916 Act by the United States.

Specifically, the maintenance and enforcement of the 1916 Act violates the following US obligations

under the WTO agreements:

(a) Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 18.1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement by

allowing the application of penalties other than anti dumping duties to remedy dumping;

(b) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement by

applying an anti dumping measure without conducting the requisite investigation and

establishing the requisite facts;

(c) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2 of the Anti Dumping Agreement, inter

alia, by specifying a comparison for normal value that is not compatible with the

comparison set forth in those articles;

(d) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 3 of the Anti Dumping Agreement by

providing for application of an anti dumping measure without establishing material

injury or threat thereof;

(e) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Articles 4 and 5 of the Anti Dumping Agreement,

inter alia, by not limiting the parties that may pursue an anti dumping claim;

(f) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 9 of the Anti Dumping Agreement by

providing for the imposition of impermissible penalties outside the scope and directives

of Article 9;

(g) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 11 of the Anti Dumping Agreement by not

limiting the duration of an anti dumping measure and not providing for periodic reviews

of the need for its continued imposition;

(h) Articles 1 and 18.1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement by failing to comply with Article

VI of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 11 of the Anti Dumping Agreement;

(i) Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 by providing less favourable treatment to imports via

the 1916 Act versus domestic goods, which are subject to the far less restrictive, nearly

moribund, Robinson-Patman Act;

(j) Article XI of the GATT 1994 by providing for, via the 1916 Act, the improper

application of an impermissible prohibition or restriction; and

(k) Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and Article 18.4 of the Anti Dumping

Agreement by failing to conform its laws to WTO provisions.”

Para. 7.116. “In response to a question of the Panel regarding the meaning of the word “measure” in

Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement as opposed to that of the word “action” in Article 18.1 of

the Anti Dumping Agreement and footnote 24 attached thereto, Japan notes that the term “measure”

in Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement refers to provisional measures pursuant to Article 7,

price undertakings pursuant to Article 8, and anti­dumping duties pursuant to Article 9 of the Anti

Dumping Agreement. All of these types of actions must comply with the Anti Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 7.117. “Japan argues that the term “action” in Article 18.1, in contrast, is intentionally broader.

Because “action” is not defined in the Anti Dumping Agreement, its meaning should be determined

by “reference to its ordinary meaning, read in light of its context, and the object and purposes” of the

Anti Dumping Agreement. The drafters recognized that countries might be tempted to take other

actions targeted at “dumping,” and therefore drafted a clear statement that any such actions were not

permitted. “Action” thus covers any type of border measures, internal measures, procedural steps, or

any other conduct to discipline dumping. This distinction also is echoed by the use of the narrower

term “applied” in Article 1 versus the broader term “taken” in Article 18.1.”

Para. 7.118. “The United States, in reply to the same question of the Panel, submits that, in

interpreting the term “measure” in Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement, it is first necessary to

consider that this term is modified by the term “anti dumping.” When the term “anti dumping

measure” is read together with the plain meaning of the remainder of Article 1, it becomes clear that it

means any of the measures provided for under the Anti Dumping Agreement, which includes (1)

provisional measures under Article 7, (2) price undertakings under Article 8 and (3) the imposition of

anti dumping duties under Article 9. A review of the history of Article 1 further confirms this

meaning. In this regard, Article 1 of the 1979 Tokyo Round Anti Dumping Code only expressly

addressed a measure in the form of an anti dumping duty. It provided that “[t]he imposition of an anti

dumping duty is a measure to be taken only” in the circumstances provided in Article VI and pursuant

to the rules set forth in the Anti Dumping Code. As a technical correction, Article 1 of the Anti

Dumping Agreement was subsequently clarified to read that any measure provided for by the Anti

Dumping Agreement could be taken only in the circumstances provided in Article VI and pursuant to

the rules set forth in the Anti Dumping Agreement. It is for this reason that it now refers to “[a]n anti

dumping measure” instead of only an anti dumping duty.”

Para. 7.119. “The United States further notes that, with this meaning given to the term “anti dumping

measure,” Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement can properly be interpreted as providing that if a

Member takes a measure provided for by the Anti Dumping Agreement, it may only do so in the

circumstances provided in Article VI which means that findings of “dumping” and “injury” must be

made and if it follows the rules set forth in the Anti Dumping Agreement. Article 1 does not explain

what a Member can do if it takes action against dumping other than by resorting to one of the

measures provided for under Article VI and the Anti Dumping Agreement. However, it plainly

implies that measures other than those provided for in the Anti Dumping Agreement can be taken

against dumping. That is why the second sentence of Article 1 explains that it is only addressing what

can happen “in so far as action is taken under anti dumping legislation or regulations.”

Para. 7.120. “The United States argues that, similarly, in light of the reasoning of the panel in Brazil

Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut which was affirmed by the Appellate Body, the Panel has no

jurisdiction to decide a claim under Article VI of the GATT 1994. The panel in that case found that:

“Article VI of GATT 1994 is not independently applicable to a dispute to which the SCM Agreement

is not applicable,” relying on language parallel to Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 7.121. “Japan considers that the particular finding of the Appellate Body in Guatemala -

Cement cited by the United States has no relevance to the present panel proceeding. The Guatemala -

Cement case dealt with the issue of whether a provisional or definitive anti dumping duty had been

levied before the relevant panel process was initiated. In the present case, however, the subject of the

deliberations is not an anti dumping duty or a price undertaking, but action other than anti dumping

duties or price undertakings. Thus, the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body in Guatemala-

Cement on this particular issue do not apply here.”

Para. 7.122. “With regard to the term “action” in Article 18.1 and footnote 24 of the Anti Dumping

Agreement, the United States notes that, like the term “measure” in Article 1 of the Anti Dumping

Agreement, the term “action” in Article 18.1 and footnote 24 of the Anti Dumping Agreement is

modified. In particular, Article 18.1 refers to a “specific action against dumping.” A “specific” action

against dumping is one that regulates particular import transactions, such as can take place through

the imposition of duties, an injunction, a quantitative restriction or valuation procedures. An action is

one that is “against dumping,” meanwhile, if it is designed to counteract dumping.”

Para. 7.123. “Japan asserts, first, that the 1916 Act provides for the application of remedies against

dumping outside the circumstances specified at Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the

Anti Dumping Agreement. Specifically, the 1916 Act provides for the imposition of measures in the

absence of an investigation (i) initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of and (ii)

which establishes facts required by Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement. Therefore, the Act is

inconsistent with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 7.124. Japan recalls that Article 1 of the Anti Dumping Agreement provides as follows:

Para. 7.125. “An anti dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in

Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with

the provisions of this Agreement. The following provisions govern the application of Article VI of

GATT 1994 in so far as action is taken under anti dumping legislation or regulations.”

Para. 7.126. “The European Communities considers that the Anti Dumping Agreement is fully

consistent with this scheme of Article VI and defines in greater detail the conditions and in particular

the requirements for an investigation that need to be fulfilled to allow anti dumping action to be taken.

Article 1 of the Agreement confirms that an anti dumping measure can be applied only under the

circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations conducted

in accordance with the Agreement, while Article 18 of the same Agreement (which says that “no

specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance

with the provisions of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement”) confirms that action can be

taken against the import of dumped products from another GATT 1994 Member only if the dumping

causes or threatens material injury, and that no other measures can be taken than those provided for by

Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti Dumping Agreement.”

……………………………………………

III. Comentários

A jurisprudência do DSB, em cada um dos casos analisados e que citam o Artigo 1 do Acordo Anti-

Dumping demostra que, cada vez que este Artigo foi citado, o objetivo tanto das partes como do órgão

julgador foi o de delimitar ou restringir a utilização do Acordo Anti-Dumping exclusivamente para as

hipóteses previstas no Artigo VI do GATT.

O Artigo 1 é a norma base que delimita ou direciona a utilização das medidas Anti-Dumping dentro

do sistema de solução de controvérsias, dando um caráter preliminar, que condiciona o

prosseguimento da ação anti-dumping entre os Membros da OMC.

Por ser de caráter basilar, o Artigo 1 pode assumir duas facetas. A primeira, é o da existência de pré-

requisitos básicos para o início da investigação, que poderá resultar em uma medida anti-dumping,

que é o ponto que direciona a aplicação da medida. Em segundo plano, observa-se uma utilização

geral, muitas vezes superficial da letra do Artigo 1 na “jurisprudência”, que o utiliza somente como

introdução do case, sem, portanto, explorar toda a importância do caráter introdutório do Artigo.

Artigo 2

Maria Carolina Mendonça Barros

IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingles

Article 2

Determination of Dumping

2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e.

introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export

price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in

the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the

exporting country.

2.2 When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic

market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low

volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country (2), such sales do not

permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a

comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided

that this price is representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a

reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.

2.2.1 Sales of the like product in the domestic market of the exporting country or sales to a

third country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus

administrative, selling and general costs may be treated as not being in the ordinary

course of trade by reason of price and may be disregarded in determining normal

value only if the authorities (3) determine that such sales are made within an extended

period of time (4) in substantial quantities (5) and are at prices which do not provide

for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. If prices which are

below per unit costs at the time of sale are above weighted average per unit costs for

the period of investigation, such prices shall be considered to provide for recovery of

costs within a reasonable period of time.

2.2.1.1 For the purpose of paragraph 2, costs shall normally be calculated on the basis

of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that

such records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting

principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the costs associated

with the production and sale of the product under consideration. Authorities

shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs,

including that which is made available by the exporter or producer in the

course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been

historically utilized by the exporter or producer, in particular in relation to

establishing appropriate amortization and depreciation periods and allowances

for capital expenditures and other development costs. Unless already reflected

in the cost allocations under this sub-paragraph, costs shall be adjusted

appropriately for those non-recurring items of cost which benefit future

and/or current production, or for circumstances in which costs during the

period of investigation are affected by start-up operations. (6)

2.2.2 For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling and general

costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in

the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer under

investigation. When such amounts cannot be determined on this basis, the amounts

may be determined on the basis of:

(i) the actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter or producer in

question in respect of production and sales in the domestic market of the

country of origin of the same general category of products;

(ii) the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized by other

exporters or producers subject to investigation in respect of production and

sales of the like product in the domestic market of the country of origin;

(iii) any other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit so

established shall not exceed the profit normally realized by other exporters or

producers on sales of products of the same general category in the domestic

market of the country of origin.

2.3 In cases where there is no export price or where it appears to the authorities concerned that the

export price is unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between the

exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of

the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or if the

products are not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as imported, on

such reasonable basis as the authorities may determine.

2.4 A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value. This

comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in

respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance shall be made in

each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price comparability, including

differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical

characteristics, and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price

comparability. (7) In the cases referred to in paragraph 3, allowances for costs, including

duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and for profits accruing, should

also be made. If in these cases price comparability has been affected, the authorities shall

establish the normal value at a level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the constructed

export price, or shall make due allowance as warranted under this paragraph. The authorities

shall indicate to the parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair

comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties.

2.4.1 When the comparison under paragraph 4 requires a conversion of currencies,

such conversion should be made using the rate of exchange on the date of sale (8),

provided that when a sale of foreign currency on forward markets is directly linked to

the export sale involved, the rate of exchange in the forward sale shall be

used. Fluctuations in exchange rates shall be ignored and in an investigation the

authorities shall allow exporters at least 60 days to have adjusted their export prices to

reflect sustained movements in exchange rates during the period of investigation.

2.4.2 Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of

margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on

the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted

average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal

value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value

established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of individual

export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ

significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an

explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account

appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-

transaction comparison.

2.5 In the case where products are not imported directly from the country of origin but are

exported to the importing Member from an intermediate country, the price at which the

products are sold from the country of export to the importing Member shall normally be

compared with the comparable price in the country of export. However, comparison may be

made with the price in the country of origin, if, for example, the products are merely

transshipped through the country of export, or such products are not produced in the country

of export, or there is no comparable price for them in the country of export.

2.6 Throughout this Agreement the term “like product” (“produit similaire”) shall be interpreted

to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under

consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike

in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.

2.7 This Article is without prejudice to the second Supplementary Provision to paragraph 1 of

Article VI in Annex I to GATT 1994.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 2

Determinação de Dumping

2.1 Para as finalidades do presente Acordo considera-se haver prática de dumping, isto é, oferta

de um produto no comércio de outro país a preço inferior a seu valor normal, no caso de o

prego de exportação do produto ser inferior àquele praticado no curso normal das atividades

comerciais para o mesmo produto quando destinado ao consumo no país exportador.

2.2 Caso inexistam vendas do produto similar no curso normal das ações de comércio no mercado

doméstico do país exportador ou quando, em razão de condições específicas de mercado ou

por motivo do baixo nível de vendas no mercado doméstico do país exportador2 tais vendas

não permitam comparação adequada, a margem de dumping será determinada por meio de

comparação com o preço do produto similar ao ser exportado para um terceiro país adequado,

desde que esse preço seja representativo ou com o custo de produção no país de origem

acrescido de razoável montante por conta de custos administrativos, comercialização e outros

além do lucro.

2.3

(a) Vendas do produto similar no mercado Interno do país exportador ou vendas a

terceiro país a preços inferiores aos custos unitários de produção (fixos e variáveis)

mais os gastos de venda gerais e administrativos poderão ser consideradas como não

incorporadas nas relações normais de comércio por motivo de preço e desprezadas na

determinação do valor normal somente no caso de as autoridades3 determinarem que

tais vendas são realizadas dentro de um lapso de tempo dilatado4 em quantidades

substanciais5 e a pregos que não permitem cobrir os custos dentro de lapso razoável

de tempo. Preços abaixo do custo no momento da venda mas acima do custo médio

ponderado obtido no período da investigação deverão ser considerados como

destinados a permitir recuperação de custos durante lapso de tempo razoável;

2 Serão normalmente considerados como em quantidade suficiente para a determinação de valor normal as vendas de produto similar

destinadas ao consumo do mercado interno do país exportador que constitua 5 por cento ou mais das vendas do produto em questão ao país

importador admitindo-se percentual menor quando for demonstrável que vendas internas nesse porcentual inferior ocorrem, ainda assim, em quantidade suficiente que permita cooperação adequada. 3 Quando usado neste Acordo, o termo “autoridades” deverá ser interpretado como autoridades em nível de chefia adequada. 4 O lapso de tempo dilatado deverá ser normalmente de um ano, mas não deverá ser nunca inferior a 6 meses. 5 Venda abaixo do custo unitário ocorre em quantidade substancial quando as autoridades estabelecem que o preço médio ponderado de

venda nas transações investigadas para a determinação do valor normal está abaixo do custo médio ponderado ou que o volume de vendas

abaixo do custo unitário responde por 20 por cesto ou mais de volume vendido nas transações examinadas para a determinação do valor normal.

(b) Para os efeitos do parágrafo 2, os custos deverão ser normalmente calculados com

base em registros mantidos pelo exportador ou pelo produtor objeto de investigação,

desde que tais registros estejam de acordo com os princípios contábeis geralmente

aceitos no país exportador e reflitam razoavelmente os custos relacionados com a

produção e a venda do produto em causa. As autoridades deverão levar em

consideração todas as informações disponíveis sobre a correta distribuição de custos,

inclusive aquelas fornecidas pelo exportador ou produtor durante os procedimentos da

investigação, desde que tal distribuição tenha sido regularmente utilizada pelo

exportador ou produtor, particularmente no que tange à determinação dos prazos

adequados de amortização e depreciação e deduções por conta de despesas de capital

e outros custos de desenvolvimento. A menos que já refletidos na distribuição de

custos contemplada neste subparágrafo, os custos devem ser ajustados adequadamente

e em função daqueles itens não-recorrentes que beneficiem produção futura e/ou

corrente ou ainda em função de circunstâncias nas quais os custos observados durante

o período de investigação sejam afetados por operações de entrada em

funcionamento6.

(c) Para as finalidades do parágrafo 2, valores adotados para os custos administrativos de

comercialização e outros e para o lucro deverão basear-se em dados reais relativos à

produção e à venda no curso normal dos atos de comércio do produto similar

praticados pelo exportador ou pelo produtor sob investigação. Quando tais valores não

puderem ser determinados nessa base eles poderão ser determinados por meio de:

(i) os valores reais despendidos e auferidos pelo exportador ou produtor em

questão relativos à produção e à venda da mesma categoria geral de produtos

no mercado interno do país de origem;

(ii) a média ponderada dos valores reais despendidos e auferidos por outros

exportadores e produtores sob investigação em relação à produção e à

comercialização do produto similar no mercado interno do país de origem;

(iii) qualquer outro método razoável, desde que o montante estipulado para o lucro

não exceda o lucro normalmente realizado por outros exportadores ou

produtores com as vendas de produtos da mesma categoria geral no mercado

interno do pais de origem.

2.4 Naqueles casos em que não exista preço de exportação ou em que ás autoridades competentes

pareça duvidoso o preço de exportação por motivo de combinação ou entendimento

compensatório entre o importador e o exportador ou uma terceira parte, o preço de exportação

poderá ser construído a partir do preço pelo qual os produtos importados forem revendidos ao

primeiro comprador independente, ou, no caso de os produtos não serem revendidos a

comprador independente, ou, ainda, no caso de não serem revendidos na mesma condição em

que foram importados, a partir de uma base razoável que venha a ser determinada pelas

autoridades.

2.5 Comparação justa será efetuada entre o preço de exportação e o valor normal. Essa

comparação deverá efetuar-se no mesmo nível de comércio, normalmente no nível ex fábrica,

e considerando vendas realizadas tão simultaneamente quanto possível. Razoável tolerância

será concedida caso a caso de acordo com sua especificidade, em razão de diferenças que

afetem comparação de preços, entre elas diferenças nas condições e nos termos de venda,

tributação, níveis de comércio, quantidades, características físicas e quaisquer outras

diferenças que igualmente se demonstre afetam a comparação de preços7. Nos casos tratados

6 As correções efetuadas em razão da entrada em funcionamento devem refletir os custos verificados ao final do período de entrada em funcionamento ou, caso tal período se estenda além daquele coberto pelas investigações, os custos mais recentes que as autoridades possam

razoavelmente tomar em conta durante a investigação. 7 Entende-se que alguns dos fatores acima podem incidir cumulativamente e, nesse caso, as autoridades devem zelar para que não se dupliquem acomodações que já tenham sido efetuadas ao abrigo destas disposições.

no parágrafo 4 deverão ser tolerados ajustes em função de custos, entre eles tarifas e taxas que

incidam entre a importação e a revenda e também em função dos lucros auferidos. Se em tais

casos a comparação de preços tiver sido afetada, as autoridades deverão estabelecer o valor

normal em nível de comércio equivalente àquele do preço de exportação apurado ou aplicar a

tolerância prevista neste parágrafo. As autoridades devem informar as partes envolvidas da

necessidade de informação que assegure comparação justa e não deverão impor às partes

excessivo ônus de prova.

2.6

(a) Se a comparação prevista no parágrafo 5 exigir conversão cambial, tal procedimento

deverá servir-se da taxa de câmbio em vigor no dia da venda8, desde que, na

ocorrência de venda de moeda estrangeira em mercados futuros diretamente ligada à

exportação em causa, a taxa de câmbio dessa venda futura seja utilizada. Flutuações

na taxa de câmbio deverão ser ignoradas e, no caso de uma investigação, as

autoridades deverão permitir aos exportadores pelo menos 60 dias para ajustar seus

preços de exportação para que reflitam alterações relevantes ocorridas durante o

período da investigação.

(b) De acordo com o disposto acerca de uma comparação justa no parágrafo 5, a

existência de margens de dumping durante a investigação deverá ser normalmente

determinada com base em comparação entre o valor normal médio ponderado e o

preço médio ponderado de todas as exportações equivalentes ou com base em

comparação entre o valor normal e os preços de exportação apurados em cada

transação. O valor normal estabelecido por meio de média ponderada poderá ser

comparado com o preço de uma exportação específica no caso de as autoridades

estabelecerem padrão de preços de exportação que difira significativamente do

universo de compradores, regiões ou momentos e também caso seja fornecida

explicação de porque tais diferenças não podem ser consideradas adequadamente por

meio de comparação entre médias ponderadas ou entre transações.

2.7 Na hipótese de um produto não ser importado diretamente de seu país de origem, mas, ao

contrário, ser exportado ao país importador a partir de terceiro país intermediário, o preço

pelo qual o produto é vendido a partir do país de exportação ao Membro importador deverá

ser normalmente comparado com o preço equivalente praticado no país de exportação. Poder-

se-á, porém, efetuar a comparação com o preço praticado no país de origem se, por exemplo,

ocorre mero transbordo do produto no país de exportação ou se o produto não é produzido no

país de exportação ou ainda se não houver preço comparável para o produto no país de

exportação.

2.8 Ao longo deste Acordo o termo produto similar (like product - produit similaire) deverá ser

entendido como produto idêntico, i.e., igual sob todos os aspectos ao produto que se está

examinando ou, na ausência de tal produto, outro produto que embora não exatamente igual

sob todos os aspectos apresenta características muito próximas às do produto que se está

considerando.

2.9 O presente Artigo não prejudica o disposto na segunda Disposição Suplementar ao parágrafo

1 do Artigo VI do anexo I ao GATT 1994.

Footnote 2: Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country shall

normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or

more of the sales of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a lower ratio should be

8 Em situações normais, o dia da alienação deverá ser o da data do contrato da ordem de compra, da confirmação de encomenda ou da fatura, utilizando-se dentre esses documentos aquele que estabeleça as condições de venda.

acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude

to provide for a proper comparison.

Footnote 3: When in this Agreement the term “authorities” is used, it shall be interpreted as meaning authorities at an

appropriate senior level.

Footnote 4: The extended period of time should normally be one year but shall in no case be less than six months.

Footnote 5: Sales below per unit costs are made in substantial quantities when the authorities establish that the weighted

average selling price of the transactions under consideration for the determination of the normal value is below the weighted

average per unit costs, or that the volume of sales below per unit costs represents not less than 20 per cent of the volume sold

in transations under consideration for the determination of the normal value.

Footnote 6: The adjustment made for start-up operations shall reflect the costs at the end of the start-up period or, if that

period extends beyond the period of investigation, the most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account by the

authorities during the investigation.

Footnote 7: It is understood that some of the above factors may overlap, and authorities shall ensure that they do not

duplicate adjustments that have been already made under this provision.

Footnote 8: Normally, the date of sale would be the date of contract, purchase order, order confirmation, or invoice,

whichever establishes the material terms of sale.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a comentar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 2

Relatório do caso Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from

Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, paras. 7.58, 7.61-7.67

O Painel considerou que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala não cumpriu com os requisitos dos

Artigos 2.1 e 2.4 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, uma vez que deu início à investigação sem possuir

indícios que permitissem estabelecer a existência de dumping, ainda que de forma preliminar. De

acordo com o Painel, para que seja iniciada uma investigação a autoridade deve ser capaz, com base

nos documentos apresentados, de determinar, de forma imparcial e objetiva, que há indícios da prática

de dumping que justifiquem o início de uma investigação. O dumping a que se refere o Artigo 5.2 é o

mesmo do Artigo 2.1, devendo ser apurado de acordo com os critérios expostos no Artigo 2.1, quais

sejam, venda de um produto no país importador por um preço abaixo do valor normal no curso normal

do comércio. Portanto, para se iniciar uma investigação a autoridade deve possuir elementos

suficientes que a permitam concluir, de forma imparcial e objetiva, que há indícios de que ocorreu a

entrada de um produto no país importador por um preço abaixo do preço que este mesmo produto é

vendido no país exportador. No caso concreto, a Guatemala, ao estabelecer o preço de importação e o

valor normal, também não cumpriu o disposto no Artigo 2.4 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, que estabelece

que a autoridade deve realizar uma comparação justa entre o preço de exportação e o valor normal. É

com base nesta comparação que se estabelece a diferença de preços e, portanto, a margem de

dumping. O Artigo 2.4 dispõe que, caso seja necessário, a autoridade deve realizar ajustes nos preços

de forma a permitir que a comparação seja justa. O Painel considerou que a Guatemala, ao realizar a

comparação, não efetuou os ajustes claramente necessários para uma comparação justa, uma vez que

comparou os preços apurados em diferentes níveis de comércio e com base em transações que

envolviam volumes de mercadorias significativamente diferentes. De acordo com o Painel, o Artigo 2

fornece os elementos técnicos que devem constar no cálculo do dumping, incluindo os requisitos

necessários para sua determinação e para a determinação do valor normal, preço de exportação e

ajustes necessários para que a comparação de preços seja justa. Por outro lado, o Painel entende que o

volume e a qualidade das informações necessárias para que seja dado o início à investigação não é o

mesmo necessário na determinação final do dumping, porém deve ser suficiente para, como dito

acima, que uma pessoa razoável e objetiva perceba indícios suficientes da prática, dentro dos

parâmetros fornecidos pelo Artigo 2. Sendo necessário realizar os ajustes acima mencionados para

possibilitar a comparação justa, não pode a autoridade argumentar que estes não foram realizados por

conta da ausência de informação, até porque isto é comum na fase preliminar de um requerimento de

abertura de investigação. No entanto, este argumento não é suficiente para que uma investigação seja

aberta sem que os requisitos do Artigo 2 sejam apurados, ainda que preliminarmente, de forma

tecnicamente correta. Caso a autoridade não logre obter as informações necessárias para apuração

preliminar de dumping ou para realizar os ajustes eventualmente necessários (como era o caso em

tela), não deve dar início à investigação. Nestes casos, o Painel indicou que a autoridade poderia, por

exemplo, analisar a própria experiência de sua indústria doméstica para obter informações necessárias

para a realização dos ajustes nos preços antes de realizar a comparação. O Painel considerou que

realizar uma comparação justa é uma obrigação da autoridade investigadora, e não uma faculdade. No

caso analisado, o Painel entendeu que o valor normal apurado e o preço de exportação apontado pelo

demandante não eram comparáveis para se apurar a margem de dumping, o que só seria possível com

a adequação dos preços (ajustes). Desta forma, conclui que “in our view, based on an unbiased and

objective evaluation of the evidence and information before it in this case, the Ministry could not

properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of the

investigation.” A Guatemala notificou sua intenção de apelar da decisão do Painel em 4 de agosto de

1998 e em 2 de novembro do mesmo ano o Órgão de Apelação circulou seu relatório no qual conclui

que o México não apresentou o caso perante o Painel da forma apropriada e, como consequência, o

Órgão de Apelação não analisou qualquer outra questão de mérito, inclusive o Artigo 2 do Acordo

Anti-Dumping: “Having found that this dispute was not properly before the Panel, we consider that the merits of

Mexico's claims in this case are not properly before us. Therefore, we cannot consider any of the substantive issues raised in

the alternative by Guatemala in this appeal. Accordingly, we have no choice but to come to no conclusions as to whether the

Panel was right or wrong in finding that Guatemala had acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 5.3 and 5.5 of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement or in making its recommendations and suggestion under Article 19.1 of the DSU. Our finding

that the Panel was not entitled, under its terms of reference, to examine Mexico's claims in this case in no way precludes

Mexico from seeking consultations with Guatemala regarding the latter's imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on

imports of portland cement from Mexico and from pursuing another dispute settlement complaint under the provisions of

Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and of the DSU.”

Para. 7.58. “While the parties seem largely in accord that the application must contain evidence and

information on the essential elements of dumping, injury, and causal link, they disagree on what types

of evidence and information are required. Thus, Mexico argues that the substantive provisions

governing determinations of dumping and injury in Articles 2.1, 2.4, and 3.7, must be taken into

account in evaluating the evidence in an application to determine its sufficiency. Guatemala, on the

other hand, argues that Article 2 does not apply to the decision whether to initiate an investigation, but

only to the preliminary or final determination of dumping (…). Thus, Guatemala argues that

information of the type referred to in Articles 2 and 3.7 need not be included in the application, and is

not relevant to the evaluation of whether there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation.”

Para. 7.61. “With regard to dumping, the application states that the retail price of grey portland

cement in Mexico ranged between (…). The price in Mexico was substantiated by two invoices

showing the prices for two separate Sales. (…) The price of imported Mexican cement in Guatemala

was substantiated by import certificates, invoices and bills of lading for two transactions on the same

date (…). There is no indication that any other information on dumping was available to or considered

by the Ministry.”

Para. 7.62. “The two invoices reflect two separate sales at the retail level of one sack of cement of

unspecified weight each. The import documents reflect two separate import transactions at the

distributor (or wholesale) level of several thousand sacks of cement, (…). The alleged margin of

dumping is calculated in the application by comparing the average retail price for the cement bought

in Mexico (…) with the average c.i.f. value of the cement imported into Guatemala (…). The Ministry

recommended initiation based on this information. In our view, this comparison ignores obvious

problems with the data: (1) the transactions involve significantly different volumes; and (2) the

transactions occurred at different levels of trade.”

Para. 7.63. “While in general we agree with Guatemala that there is not a “minimum” of

documentation which must be submitted to substantiate an assertion of dumping, this does not mean

that any documentation will be sufficient to justify initiation in a particular case. Guatemala also

argues that the considerations outlined above are addressed only in Article 2 of the ADP Agreement,

which is not referenced in Article 5.2, and are therefore irrelevant to the determination to initiate. We

cannot accept Guatemala's interpretation of the ADP Agreement in this regard. In this case, we

consider that based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the information before it, the Ministry

could not properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the

initiation of the investigation.”

Para. 7.64. “In our view, in assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify

initiation, an investigating authority may not ignore the provisions of Article 2 of the ADP

Agreement. Article 5.2 of the Agreement requires an application to include evidence of “dumping”

and Article 5.3 requires a determination that there is “sufficient” evidence to justify initiation. Article

2 of the ADP Agreement sets forth the technical elements of a calculation of dumping, including the

requirements for determining normal value, export price, and adjustments required for a fair

comparison. In our view, the reference in Article 5.2 to “dumping” must be read as a reference to

dumping as it is defined in Article 2. This does not, of course, mean that the evidence provided in the

application must be of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to make a preliminary or final

determination of dumping. However, evidence of the relevant type is, in our view, required in a case

such as this one where it is obvious on the face of the application that the normal value and export

price alleged in the application will require adjustments in order to effectuate a fair comparison. At a

minimum, there should be some recognition that a fair comparison will require such adjustments.”

Para. 7.65. “Guatemala argues that at the time of initiation, it was not possible to make adjustments,

as the precise information needed is within the control of the exporting company, which bears the

burden of showing that adjustments should be made. We do not accept this position.” Article 2.4

provides, in pertinent part:

A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the

normal value. This comparison shall be made at the same level of

trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at

as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance shall be made in

each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price

comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale,

taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any

other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price

comparability. (It is understood that some of the above factors may overlap, and

authorities shall ensure that they do not duplicate adjustments that have been already made under this provision”. In our view, this provision establishes an obligation for

investigating authorities to make a fair comparison. Investigating authorities can

certainly expect that exporters will provide the information necessary to make adjustments, and demonstrate that particular differences for which adjustments are

sought affect price comparability. However, the authorities cannot, in our view, ignore

the question of a fair comparison in determining whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation, particularly when the need for adjustments is apparent on

the face of the application. Moreover, the exporting country or company may not even

be aware that an application has been filed and the initiation of an investigation is being considered, and is in any event generally not a participant in the initiation decision, and

can therefore not provide this information prior to initiation. Thus, Guatemala's

position would make it more likely that investigations will be initiated on the basis of insufficient or incorrect evidence of dumping.)

Para. 7.66. “In this case it is apparent on the face of the application that the alleged normal value and

the alleged export price are not comparable for purposes of considering whether dumping exists

without adjustment. The recommendation to the Director of the Department of Economic Integration

reflects this lack of comparability when it states that the normal value is the average price “to the final

consumer”, and the export price is the average of “the c.i.f. values”. However, there is no recognition

of the need for any adjustments in either the recommendation or the notice of initiation. While we

would not expect the authorities to have, at the initiation stage, precise information on the adjustments

to be made, we find it particularly troubling that there is not even any recognition that the normal

value and export price alleged in the application are not comparable, nor any indication that more

information on this issue was requested from the applicant or otherwise sought by the Ministry.

When, as in this case, it is evident from the information before the investigating authority that some

form of adjustment will be required to make a fair comparison and establish a dumping margin, an

unbiased and objective investigating authority could not, in our view, properly determine that there

was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation in the absence of such adjustment, or at least

without acknowledging the need for such adjustment.”

Para. 7.67. “As noted above, while there is clearly a different standard applicable to making a

preliminary or final determination of dumping, than to determining whether there is sufficient

evidence of dumping to justify initiation of an investigation, we cannot agree with Guatemala's

position that Article 2 is irrelevant to the initiation determination. The subject matter, or type, of

evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that needed to make a preliminary or final

determination of dumping, although the quality and quantity is less. Thus, in our view, based on an

unbiased and objective evaluation of the evidence and information before it in this case, the Ministry

could not properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the

initiation of the investigation.”

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 2

1. Artigo 2.2

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access

Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS),

Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, paras. 6.66, 6.69 e 6.73

O Painel considerou que o Artigo 2.2.1.1 indica que o dispositivo “princípios de contabilidade,

geralmente aceitos no país exportador”, aplica-se apenas aos registros mantidos pelo exportador com

relação à venda em questão. Desta forma, o Painel decidiu que as projeções realizadas com base no

estudo de Flamm (preparado por um consultor externo da empresa exportadora) não constituíam

“registros mantidos pelo exportador” por ter o estudo realizado projeções relativos a custos futuros

com base em dados históricos de custos e não em registros mantidos pelo exportador. Além disso, ao

argumentar o motivo de sua discordância relativa à exclusão (não aceitação) pelos EUA, no

procedimento de revisão do direito anti-dumping imposto na venda de DRAM, do estudo de Flamm, a

Coreia apenas indicou que não estava de acordo com a posição do Departamento do Comércio por

considerar ser o referido estudo “econometricamente válido” sem, no entanto, apresentar qualquer

evidência ou argumento que justificasse essa afirmativa, levando o Painel a concluir que a Coreia não

estabeleceu um caso “prima facie” que indicasse que uma autoridade investigadora objetiva e

imparcial não poderia ter concluído que o estudo de Flamm não refletia de forma razoável os custos

associados à produção e venda de DRAM. Não tendo a Coreia apresentado um caso “prima facie”

relativa a esta questão, não pode o Painel analisar a o mérito do assunto (adequação do uso do estudo

e pertinência de seu resultado no procedimento de revisão de direito anti-dumping perante o

Departamento do Comércio dos EUA).

Para. 6.66. “Korea claims that the United States violated Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement

because it disregarded cost data in the Flamm study which (1) were in accordance with the generally

accepted accounting principles of Korea and (2) accurately reflected costs. Korea's claim is effectively

based on an interpretation of Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement that requires a Member to accept

projections for future costs based on historical cost data provided those projections are ”in accordance

with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the

costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration.” Article 2.2.1.1,

however, clearly indicates that the provisos concerning generally accepted accounting principles and

reflection of costs of production and sale only apply to “records kept by the exporter or producer

under investigation”. As the projections for the Flamm study, which were prepared by an outside

consultant on behalf of Hyundai, do not constitute “records kept by the exporter or producer under

investigation”, we believe that the two provisos contained in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 do

not apply to the US treatment of the projections for that study. Accordingly, we must reject Korea's

claim based on those provisos, i.e., that the United States violated Article 2.2.1.1 because it rejected

projections for future costs based on historical cost data that are “in accordance with the generally

accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the costs associated

with the production and sale of the product under consideration.”

Para. 6.69. “In failing to advance anything beyond conclusory arguments in support of its claim that

the DOC should not have rejected the Flamm study, we consider that Korea has failed to “establish

a prima facie case” that an objective and impartial investigating authority could not properly have

found that the study did not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale” of

DRAMs.”

Para. 6.73. “In its Final Results Third Review, the DOC stated that its review of LGS cost data for the

second half of 1996 “indicates that there are serious questions whether the reported costs were

understated due to significant changes in LGS' depreciation schedule and write-offs of foreign

exchange losses.” These “serious questions” were then dDSUribed in greater detail by the DOC in

the Final Results Third Review. However, Korea has failed to challenge the DOC's finding of “serious

questions”, and has failed to identify anything in the record to indicate that, in light of such “serious

questions”, an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not properly have considered that

the LGS cost data for the second half of 1996 did not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the

production and sale” of DRAMs. Korea merely states that the DOC's “failure to treat properly

Respondents' actual cost and price data (…) violates Article 2.2.1.1”. In failing to advance anything

beyond conclusory arguments in support of its claim that the DOC should not have rejected the LGS

cost data for the second half of 1996, we consider that Korea has failed to establish a prima faciecase

that an objective and impartial investigating authority could not properly have found that the LGS cost

data for the second half of 1996 did not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production

and sale” of DRAMs. Accordingly, we must reject Korea's claim that the United States violated

Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement by rejecting the LGS cost data for the second half of 1996.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H. Beams), Demandante:

Polônia, WT/DS122/R, paras. 7.105, 7.112-7.113, 7.119, 7.121-7.123, 7.125 e 7.128

Neste Painel, a Polônia argumentou que os valores utilizados como lucro no cálculo do valor normal

estavam superestimados, impossibilitando um resultado “razoável”. A Polônia argumenta que foram

apresentados na investigação outros dados relativos ao lucro, os quais eram inferiores aos utilizados e

que foram desconsiderados pela Tailândia. A Polônia afirmou que os textos dos Artigos 2.2 e 2.2.2 do

Acordo Anti-Dumping obrigam a realização de um teste separado para a apuração do valor “razoável”

de lucro: enquanto o Artigo 2.2 fala em quantidade razoável de lucro, o Artigo 2.2.2 fala que as

metodologias descritas nos itens (i) a (iii) podem (“may”) ou não ser utilizadas (não há uma

imposição, a autoridade pode ou não se valer dessas metodologias – caso assim fosse, a palavra

“shall” constaria do Acordo Anti-Dumping no lugar da palavra “may”) e, caso a autoridade se valha

desta metodologia, deve apurar se o resultado é razoável. No entanto, tendo em vista a existência de

dados relativos a lucro, a Polônia afirma que a Tailândia deveria ter se valido destes dados ao invés de

se valer dos procedimentos descitos nos itens (i) a (iii) do Artigo 2.2.2 para apuração do lucro do

exportador. De acordo com a Tailândia, as metodologias do Artigo 2.2.2 (i) a (iii) devem ser

utilizadas sempre que as condições necessárias estiverem presentes, ou seja, sempre que a previsão do

caput do Artigo 2.2.2 (“actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of the

trade”) não puder ser aplicada, sendo que, neste caso, o resultado obtido com a utilização da

metodologia será sempre razoável per se. Isso porque a autoridade investigadora só se utiliza dessas

metodologias quando estão presentes as condições descritas nos referidos itens (i) a (iii), o que torna

impossível apurar o lucro de outra forma que não aplicando as metodologias ali descritas, tornando o

resultado razoável por definição. No caso analisado, a autoridade investigadora considerou que os

dados referentes a lucro apresentados na investigação não se referiam a produto similar e, portanto,

foram excluídos. Em seu lugar, a autoridade se valeu dos números referentes a vendas de uma

categoria mais específica do produto, conforme permite o item (i) do Artigo 2.2.2. Os dados

apresentados pela Polônia relativos a lucros se referiam a vendas de uma categoria mais ampla de

produtos, tendo a autoridade investigadora da Tailândia optado por estreitar a categoria. O Painel

considerou correta a posição da Tailândia, afastando a necessidade de dois testes de razoabilidade, e

esclarecendo que sempre que os dados relativos ao lucro apresentados pela empresa investigada não

puderem ser utilizados, a autoridade investigadora deve se valer dos métodos previstos nos itens (i) a

(iii), sendo que, neste caso, o resultado será presumidamente considerado razoável. De acordo com o

Painel, sempre que a metodologia do item 2.2.2 (i) for aplicada corretamente, necessariamente o

resultado será um valor razoável da margem de lucro, não havendo necessidade de aplicação de outro

teste para confirmar tal razoabilidade. Além disso, o Painel considerou que a Tailândia, ao excluir a

categoria HS 7216 (angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel) por entender não ser ela

pertencente à mesma “categoria geral do produto”, não infringiu o Artigo 2.2.2 (i), uma vez que a

redação do dispositivo não impede que a autoridade restrinja a gama de produtos que considera como

sendo “similar”. Na verdade, de acordo com o Painel, quanto mais restrita a categoria, menor a

possibilidade de serem incluídos na investigação produtos que não sejam similares ao investigado,

que é o que o Artigo analisado pretende. Desta forma, o Painel concluiu que a Tailândia não infringiu

o Artigo 2.2 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, tendo o Órgão de Apelação mantido essa decisão com relação

a este Artigo.

Para. 7.105. “In assessing this claim, we are confronted by two issues which are purely matters of

legal interpretation: first, whether Thailand has incorrectly applied Article 2.2.2 (i) by defining the

“same general category of products” too narrowly, (i.e., as all H-beams), rather than as a broader

“general category”; and second, whether an amount for profit calculated pursuant to Article 2.2.2 (i)

is ipso factoreasonable (assuming that the methodology is applied correctly) or must be subjected to a

separate reasonability test.”

Para. 7.112. “In particular, we note that, in general, Article 2.2 and Article 2.2.2 concern the

establishment of an appropriate proxy for the price “of the like product in the ordinary course of trade

in the domestic market of the exporting country” when that price cannot be used. As such, as the

drafting of the provisions makes clear, the preferred methodology which is set forth in the chapeau is

to useactualdata of the exporter or producer under investigation for the like product. Where this is not

possible, subparagraphs (i) and (ii) respectively provide for the database to be broadened, either as to

the product (i.e., the same general category of products produced by the producer or exporter in

question) or as to the producer (i.e., other producers or exporters subject to investigation in respect of

the like product), but not both. Again this confirms that the intention of these provisions is to obtain

results that approximate as closely as possible the price of the like product in the ordinary course of

trade in the domestic market of the exporting country.”

Para. 7.113. “This context indicates to us that the use under subparagraph (i) of a narrower rather

than a broader”same general category of products” certainly is permitted. Indeed, the narrower the

category, the fewer products other than the like product will be included in the category, and this

would seem to be fully consistent with the goal of obtaining results that approximate as closely as

possible the price of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the

exporting country.”

Para. 7.119. “Having found that Thailand has not incorrectly applied Article 2.2.2(i), we turn to the

second element of Poland's claim under Article 2.2/Article VI:1(b)(ii) of GATT 1994, namely

whether the profit amount thus calculated by Thailand was “unreasonable” in violation of Article 2.2.

To resolve this issue, we must consider the legal question of whether, as Poland argues, Article 2.2

and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of GATT 1994 impose an obligation to apply a separate reasonability test to

the results of a correct calculation under Article 2.2.2 (i).”

Para. 7.121. “We recall that the text of Article 2.2 states (…). This text thus establishes the basic

principle that when constructed value is used, it shall include, inter alia, a “reasonable amount” for

profit. The text of the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 cross-references this provision, stating that “for the

purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for (…) profits” shall be determined as set forth in that provision.

This text thus establishes that the methodologies outlined in Article 2.2.2 are to be used “for the

purpose of “determining the “reasonable amount” for profit (inter alia) to be used in a constructed

normal value, as required under Article 2.2.”

Para. 7.122. “We note Poland's argument that the methodologies set forth in Article 2.2.2 are

reasonable per se, but that the results of applying any of these methodologies are, at best, rebuttably

presumed to be reasonable. We find no trace in the texts of the relevant provisions of such a rebuttable

presumption, however. To the contrary, the ordinary meaning of the text seems rather to indicate that,

if one of the methodologies is applied, the result is by definition reasonable.”

Para. 7.123. “Second, we note that the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 provides that where the methodology

in the chapeau “cannot” be used, one of the methodologies in subparagraphs (i), (ii) or (iii) “may” be

used. Poland argues that the word “may” only provides for the possibility of using such

methodologies and implies that any results derived thereby would be subject to a reasonability test

arising under Article 2.2. We disagree, as in our view the word “may” constitutes authorization to use

the methodologies in the subparagraphs where the methodology in the chapeau, which is the preferred

methodology, “cannot” be used. We note that the text of Article 2.2.2 establishes no hierarchy among

the subparagraphs and that there is no disagreement between the parties concerning this issue.”

Para. 7.125. “We note also the requirement in the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 as well as in

subparagraphs (i) and (ii) that actual data be used. In our view, the notion of a separate reasonability

test is both illogical and superfluous where the Agreement requires the use of specific types of actual

data. (…) Thus, in our view, Article 2.2.2's requirement that actual data be used (and its establishment

of a cap where this is not the case) are intended precisely to avoid the outcome that Poland seeks,

namely subjective judgments by national authorities as to the “reasonability” of given amounts used

in constructed value calculations.”

Para. 7.128. “For the foregoing reasons, we find that AD Article 2.2.2 (i), when applied correctly,

necessarily yields reasonable amounts for profits, and that no separate reasonability test is required in

respect of those amounts. As there is no requirement of a separate reasonability test, we find that

Thailand has not violated AD Article 2.2 by not having applied such a test to the results that it

obtained under AD Article 2.2.2 (i). Moreover, even if such a test were required, Poland has not

demonstrated that the profit amount calculated is “unreasonable” nor how a correctly calculated profit

amount could be characterized as unreasonable.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.59, 6.61,

6.70-6.71, 6.74, 6.84-6.86, 6.96 e 6.99

Para. 6.59. “Looking first at the text of Article 2.2.2, we see nothing that would indicate that there is

a hierarchy among the methodological options listed in subparagraphs (i) to (iii). Of course, they are

listed in a sequence, but this is an inherent characteristic of any list, and does not in and of itself entail

any preference of one option over others. Moreover, we note that where the drafters intended an order

of preference, the text clearly specifies it. (…) Thus, in context, it seems clear to us that the mere

order in which the options appear in Article 2.2.2 has no preferential significance.”

Para. 6.61. “In our view, there is no basis on which to judge which of these three options is “better”.

(…) Given, as explained above, that each of the three options is in some sense “imperfect” in

comparison with the chapeau methodology, there is, in our opinion, no meaningful way to judge

which option is less imperfect – or of greater authority – than another and, thus, no obvious basis for a

hierarchy.”

Para. 6.70. “We first consider the language of Article 2.2.2(ii). India's argument has two principal

elements – the use of the plural in the text of Article 2.2.2(ii), and the phrase “weighted average”.

With respect to the first element, the European Communities argues that a phrase in the plural form is

often used, in general and in the AD Agreement, with the intention of including the case where there

is only one such person or thing. We agree. The phrase “other exporters or producers” as a general

matter, admits of an understanding where the plural form includes the singular case – the case where

there is only one other producer or exporter. In both common speech and legal texts, it is accepted that

the ordinary meaning of the plural form may include the singular case.”

Para. 6.71. “With respect to the second element, India argues that because a weighted average must

be based on more than one data point, there must be more than one “other” producers' or exporters'

data under consideration. However, we do not consider that the phrases “weighted average” and

“other producers and exporters” constitute two separate requirements. Rather, we are of the opinion

that the concept of weighted averaging is relevant only when there is information from more than

one other producer or exporter available to be considered. In our view, the obligation to consider a

weighted average of the information of other producers or exporters eliminates the possibility of a

result-oriented or otherwise biased or discriminatory choice among available data. However, when the

data available is from only one source, such a possibility does not arise.”

Para. 6.74. “However, in this case, the European Communities did not arbitrarily pick one producer's

data to use in its calculation. Rather, it was faced with the factual situation that there was only one

producer whose data was available for the calculation under Article 2.2.2(ii). It is true that there was

at least one other exporter which had domestic sales of the like product during the period of

investigation. However, that producer was not in the sample on which the European Communities

based its calculations in the dumping investigation.”

Para. 6.84. “Looking first at the text of Article 2.2.2(ii), we note that there is no reference to sales in

the ordinary course of trade. Thus, we would agree with the view that exclusion of sales not in the

ordinary course of trade is not mandated by that provision. However, we do not understand the

European Communities to be arguing that it was required to exclude those sales in its determination of

the profit rate, merely that it was permitted to do so, based on the general principle allowing the

exclusion of sales not in the ordinary course of trade from the calculation of normal value.”

Para. 6.85. “We consider that this principle may be properly understood to apply to all provisions

falling within Article 2.2, including Article 2.2.2(ii). We do not consider that a Member is obligated

to exclude sales not in the ordinary course of trade for purposes of determining the profit rate under

the subparagraphs of Article 2.2.2, merely that such exclusion is not prohibited by the text.”

Para. 6.86. “We recall that the “ordinary course of trade” limitation forecloses the possibility of

calculating profits on the basis of sales at prices below cost. The profit amount on sales at prices

below cost would be negative. In our view, to require the calculation of constructed normal value

including such sales would not be in keeping with the overall object and purpose of the provision – to

establish methodologies for the determination of a reasonable amount for profit to be used in the

calculation of a constructed normal value. If sales that are considered not in the ordinary course of

trade because they are below cost were used for the calculation of the profit rate, the constructed value

could be equal to cost and thus would not include a reasonable amount for profit. This would render

the calculation of a constructed value meaningless, and not consistent with Article 2.2. In this context,

we recall that one reason an investigating authority would construct a normal value is because the

actual sales of the investigated exporter or producer are deemed inappropriate to serve as the basis of

normal value because they are made below cost. To conclude that such sales below cost mustthen be

taken into account in the construction of normal value in these circumstances makes no sense.”

Para. 6.96. “The text thus indicates that the methodologies set out in Article 2.2.2 are outlined “for

the purpose” of calculating a reasonableprofit amount pursuant to Article 2.2. There is no specific

language establishing a separate reasonability test, or indicating how such a test should be conducted.

In these circumstances, we consider that there is no textual basis for such a requirement. Thus, the

ordinary meaning of the text indicates that if one of the methods of Article 2.2.2 is properly applied,

the results are by definition “reasonable” as required by Article 2.2.”

Para. 6.99. “We note further that the methodology set out in the chapeau of Article 2.2.2, as well as

those in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), rely on actual data from the books of the producer(s) or exporter(s)

being used as sources. India, however, argues that even where the chapeau methodology is applied,

which requires the use of actual data concerning the product under investigation sold by the producer

being investigated, the results are subject to a separate test of reasonability. (…) Thus, the use of

actual data itself ensures that subjective judgments about the reasonability of the results do not affect

the calculation of constructed normal value. We consider that no purpose would be served by testing

the results obtained under the chapeau and subparagraphs (i) and (ii) against some arbitrary or

subjective standard of reasonability.”

2. Artigo 2.4.2 (zeroing)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.102,

6.112, 6.114-6.117 e 6.119

A Índia argumentou que a CE agiu em desconformidade com o Artigo 2.4.2, ao zerar a margem de

dumping negativa para alguns produtos investigados no momento de calcular a margem ponderada de

dumping para o produto similar ao bed linen. A prática do zeroing é comumente realizada pelos EUA

e pela CE e consiste em zerar a margem de dumping negativa obtida na comparação do valor normal

com o preço de exportação. Neste caso, a margem negativa de dumping passa a ser considerada zero o

que faz com que a média ponderada das margens de dumping seja aumentada. Com relação a este

assunto, os EUA apresentaram documento sustentando que o Artigo 2.4.2 não proíbe a prática de

zeroing, afirmando que da comparação do valor normal com o preço de exportação, pode-se chegar a

resultados positivos e negativos. Se positivos, significa que o país importador pode impor medidas

anti-dumping para aquele produto ou para aquele grupo de transação comercial e, se negativo,

significa o montante no qual o preço de exportação excedeu o valor normal. No entanto, os EUA

entendem que o Acordo Anti-Dumping não impõe ao Membro importador a obrigação de pagar ao

Membro exportador um valor pela inexistência de margem de dumping para o produto em questão.

Nesse sentido, afirmam os EUA que a margem de dumping negativa significa apenas que não existe

dumping para aquele produto (ou seja, a margem de dumping é igual a zero). Com efeito, o valor do

direito anti-dumping o qual o país importador pode cobrar é igual a zero.

O Painel considerou que, não obstante o Artigo 2.4.2 não proíba explicitamente a prática de zeroing,

isso não significa que a prática seja permitida caso ela produza resultados inconsistentes com as

obrigações contidas no referido Artigo. Ademais, ao zerar a margem de dumping negativa, a CE na

realidade alterou os preços de exportação naquelas transações em que a margem final seria negativa,

impedindo uma comparação adequada com o valor normal. Isso ocorre porque o zeroing faz com que

a média ponderada do preço de exportação seja igual à média ponderada do valor normal para aquela

transação na qual a margem de dumping foi negativa quando, na realidade, a média ponderada do

preço de exportação é maior que a média ponderada do valor normal. Assim, entendeu o Painel que

neste tipo de prática ocorre uma manipulação do preço de exportação individual utilizado no cálculo

da sua média ponderada, fazendo com que a margem de dumping final para aquele produto (calculada

com base na média ponderada das margens de dumping individuais em cada transação) não se baseie

em comparações que refletem de forma correta o preço de exportação, o que torna a prática

inconsistente com o Artigo 2.4.2. Em 1 de dezembro de 2000, a CE notificou a sua intenção de apelar

de alguns pontos decididos pelo Painel. Em 1 de março de 2001, o Órgão de Apelação circulou sua

decisão, a qual: (i) manteve a decisão do Painel com relação à pratica de zeroing, considerando que a

CE agiu de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 2.4.2; (ii) reverteu a decisão do Painel com relação ao

Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – dados de outros exportadores - entendendo que uma média ponderada pressupõe

a utilização de dados de mais de um produtor ou exportador, e que o fato do Artigo mencionar

“exportadores e produtores sob investigação”, no plural, significa que deve necessariamente ser mais

de um; e (iii) reverteu a decisão do Painel com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – produção e

comercialização - valores “despendidos e auferidos” – acrescentando que a autoridade

investigadora não pode excluir de seu cálculo valores de SG&A e lucro de vendas efetivamente

despendidos e auferidos pelas empresas investigadas, por inexistir no Artigo indicação de que apenas

dados de vendas ocorridas dentro do curso normal do comércio devam ser consideradas, pois o Artigo

prevê claramente que todos os valores apurados que tenham sido efetivamente incorridos e auferidos

devam ser utilizados, independente de serem oriundos de vendas tidas como fora do curso normal do

comércio.

Para. 6.102. “The practice of “zeroing” arises in situations where an investigating authority makes

multiple comparisons of export price and normal value, and then aggregates the results of these

individual comparisons to calculate a dumping margin for the product as a whole. In this case, the

European Communities compared weighted averages of export prices and normal value for each of

several models or product types of bed linen. (…) The European Communities counted as zero the

dumping amount for those models where the margin was negative. (…) It is this aspect of the

calculation, the assigning of a value of zero to the comparisons yielding a “negative” margin, which

constitutes the challenged practice of zeroing which is the subject of India's claim under Article

2.4.2.”

Para. 6.112. “(…) we note that Article 2.4.2 requires that normally, except in circumstances not

applicable here, the existence of “margins of dumping” is to be established on the basis of “a

comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable

export transactions” or on the basis of comparison of individual transactions.”

Para. 6.114. “(…) Article 2.4.2 sets out the permissible bases for comparison of normal value and

export price in order to establish the existence of margins of dumping. In light of Article 2.1 of the

AD Agreement, we consider that the “margins of dumping” established under Article 2.4.2, based on

the comparison methodologies set forth, must relate to the ultimate question being addressed: whether

the product at issue is being dumped. Thus, in our view, a margin of dumping, that is, a determination

that there is dumping, can only be established for the product at issue, and not for individual

transactions concerning that product, or discrete models of that product.”

Para. 6.115. “(…) By counting as zero the results of comparisons showing a “negative” margin, the

European Communities, in effect, changed the prices of the export transactions in those comparisons.

It is, in our view, impermissible to “zero” such “negative” margins in establishing the existence of

dumping for the product under investigation, since this has the effect of changing the results of an

otherwise proper comparison. This effect arises because the zeroing effectively counts the weighted

average export price to be equal to the weighted average normal value for those models for which

“negative” margins were found in the comparison, despite the fact that it was, in reality, higher than

the weighted average normal value. This is the equivalent of manipulating the individual export prices

counted in calculating the weighted average, in order to arrive at a weighted average equal to the

weighted average normal value. As a result, we consider that an overall dumping margin calculated on

the basis of zeroing “negative” margins determined for some models is not based on comparisons

which fully reflect all comparable export prices, and is therefore calculated inconsistently with the

requirements of Article 2.4.2.”

Para. 6.116. “We recognize that Article 2.4.2 does not, in so many words, prohibit “zeroing”.

However, this does not mean that the practice is permitted, if it produces results inconsistent with the

obligations set forth in that Article, as we believe it does.”

Para. 6.117. “(…) the use of the word comparable in Article 2.4.2 indicates to us that investigating

authorities may insure comparability either by making necessary adjustments under Article 2.4, or by

making comparisons for models which are, themselves, comparable. However, in arriving at a

conclusion whether the product as a whole is being dumped, we consider that Article 2.4.2 obligates

an investigating authority to make its determination in a way which fully accounts for the export

prices on all comparable transactions. The European Communities' methodology, which focuses on

those models which are, in its view, dumped, and takes less than full account of those models where

the comparison results in a negative margin, does not accomplish this goal.”

Para. 6.119. “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the European Communities acted

inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in establishing the existence of margins of

dumping on the basis of a methodology which included zeroing negative price differences calculated

for some models of bed linen.”

III. Comentários

A Índia argumentou que o Artigo 2.2.2 (“determinação do volume de lucro apresenta 3 (três)

possibilidades para a apuração dos valores dos custos administrativos de comercialização do produto

investigado, assim como do lucro (“SG&A” costs, que é a sigla utilizada neste Painel para designar

“administrative, selling and general costs”). Tais valores são utilizados na construção do valor

normal, havendo uma escala nas opções descritas no Artigo.

A primeira opção encontra-se no caput do 2.2.2 e as demais nos itens (i) a (iii). Nesse sentido, o item

(iii) do Artigo seria a quarta opção que a autoridade investigadora teria na construção do valor normal.

Por outras palavras, em existindo uma hierarquia no Artigo 2.2.2, a autoridade investigadora deve

primeiro buscar apurar o valor do lucro do exportador conforme o descrito no caput do Artigo (dados

reais do produtor) e, caso isso não seja possível, deve passar para a metodologia do item (i), e assim

por diante. A opção contida no item (iii) seria a mais desfavorável ao produtor investigado, uma vez

que ela o priva não apenas de verificar a sua margem de dumping (ao menos no sistema utilizado pela

CE), mas também de saber se está realmente praticando dumping.

A CE entende que não existe uma ordem de preferência nos métodos do Artigo 2.2.2 e que não há

nada na linguagem do Artigo que indique a existência de qualquer hierarquia entre as metodologias,

posição sustentada também pelos EUA ao participar do Painel como terceiro interessado. Para os

EUA, o caput do Artigo 2.2.2 expressa clara preferência pelo uso dos dados reais sobre produção e

comercialização do produto investigado, sendo que, na ausência de tais dados, quaisquer das três

metodologias constantes dos itens (i) a (iii) do Artigo podem ser utilizados sem qualquer preferência.

O Painel considerou que não há nada na linguagem do Artigo que indique uma ordem de hierarquia

nos métodos dos itens (i) a (iii) do Artigo 2.2.2, e que tais métodos estão listados em sequência apenas

porque isso é inerente a qualquer lista, mas este fato não sugere qualquer preferência entre as

metodologias ali descritas. Fosse a intenção dos autores do Artigo que tais itens trouxessem uma

ordem de preferência, esta intenção teria sido explicitada. Assim, o Painel considerou que a CE agiu

em conformidade com o Artigo ora analisado.

Com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii), a China argumentou que o método descrito no item (ii) pressupõe a

utilização de dados de mais de um produtor para se chegar à média ponderada citada no dispositivo,

não sendo possível se valer de dados de apenas um produtor para apurar-se o SG&A, uma vez que,

para calcular uma média ponderada é necessária a utilização de dados de pelo menos dois produtores.

Além disso, o produtor considerado pela CE é, de acordo com a Índia, atípico e peculiar, e não reflete

os demais produtores do produto investigado. Desta forma, o resultado obtido pela CE não pode ser

considerado razoável na acepção do caput do Artigo 2.2.

A CE, por sua vez, afirma que é possível a utilização de dados de apenas um produtor na construção

do valor normal quando as circunstâncias assim exigirem. Tanto isso é plausível que o Artigo 2.4.2,

por exemplo, usa a noção de comparação entre média ponderada de valor normal com média

ponderada do preço de exportação e essa comparação pode ser realizada quando há apenas uma venda

em ambos os lados da equação. A pergunta que o Painel procurou responder com relação a esta

demanda é se é necessário existir dados de mais de um produtor ou exportador para que a metodologia

do item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2 seja utilizada. Para tanto, o Painel analisou os dois principais elementos do

argumento da Índia: (a) o uso do plural na linguagem do texto analisado (“outros exportadores e

produtores sob investigação”); e (b) o sentido da frase “média ponderada”.

Com relação ao item (a), o Painel concordou com o argumento da CE de que a forma plural é

frequentemente utilizada no Acordo Anti-Dumping, com a intenção de incluir os casos nos quais

apenas um produto ou uma empresa estão envolvidos. Tanto na linguagem comum quanto nos textos

legais é aceitável, de acordo com o Painel, a utilização da forma plural para incluir um caso

singular. Com relação ao item (b), o Painel considerou que o conceito de média ponderada é relevante

apenas quando há informações de mais de um exportador ou produtor para serem consideradas na

investigação. O cálculo da média ponderada dos dados dos produtores/exportadores investigados é a

forma encontrada para se evitar o uso tendencioso ou uma escolha discriminatória pela autoridade

investigadora de dados de apenas um produtor. No entanto, se no caso prático há apenas dados de um

único produtor ou exportador, o risco aqui descrito não existe e o uso de média ponderada não é

pertinente ou mesmo possível.

No caso em tela, a CE não se utilizou de dados de um produtor de forma aleatória, mas o fez diante da

ausência de dados de outros produtores de produto similar ao investigado. Isso porque, não obstante a

existência de ao menos outro exportador que possuía venda de produto similar no mercado doméstico

durante o período de investigação, este produtor não foi inserido na amostragem dos cálculos da CE

durante a investigação anti-dumping (e a Índia não apresentou nenhum argumento persuasivo relativo

à pertinência da exclusão e sobre se a CE estaria obrigada a considerar, na sua análise, informações de

uma empresa que não fazia parte da amostragem). Assim, a conclusão do Painel foi no sentido de que

o fato de se possuir dados de apenas um exportador não impede a autoridade investigadora de se valer

da metodologia do item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2 tendo a CE, portanto, agido em conformidade com o

Artigo em questão.

Com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii), que versa sobre a produção e comercialização - valores

“despendidos e auferidos”, a Índia argumentou que a CE não poderia ter excluído do cálculo do valor

normal dados de vendas consideradas pela autoridade investigadora como sendo não representativas –

a CE excluiu da investigação dados relativos a vendas abaixo do custo, por não considerá-las como

presentes no curso normal do comércio. O Painel também apurou se o princípio contido no Artigo 2.2

- dados associados a vendas não representativas não são confiáveis – pode ser aplicado em todas os

casos regulados pelo Artigo 2.2.

De acordo com o Painel, o item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2 não faz referência específica a vendas ocorridas

no “curso normal do comércio”. Ou seja, o Artigo não impõe a obrigação da autoridade investigadora

de excluir dados referentes a vendas não consideradas como ocorridas no curso normal do comércio

na apuração da margem de lucro a ser utilizada na construção do valor normal. Por outro lado, o texto

também não proíbe que isso seja feito. O Artigo 2 do Acordo Anti-Dumping estabelece que os

Membros devem basear seus cálculos para apuração do valor normal apenas nos dados das vendas do

produto investigado, ocorridas no curso normal do comércio (este é o princípio geral do Artigo).

Nesse sentido, excluir vendas abaixo do custo (e, portanto, consideradas fora do curso normal do

comércio) está em conformidade com o princípio do Artigo 2 aqui descrito. Desta forma, o Painel

entendeu que a exclusão, pela CE, das vendas consideradas como não realizadas no curso normal do

comércio é permitida com base no Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) do Acordo Anti-Dumping.

De acordo com a Índia, a CE agiu de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 2.2 (“razoabilidade”), ao

valer-se de dados relativos à SG&A e lucros erroneamente apurados pela metodologia do item (ii) do

Artigo 2.2.2. Isso porque os valores utilizados como SG&A para fins do Artigo 2.2 devem ser

razoáveis (o caput do Artigo 2.2 dispõe que o preço deve ser acrescido de “razoável montante por

conta de custos administrativos, comercialização e outros, além de lucro”), não existindo essa

recomendação de razoabilidade na metodologia do item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2. Dessa forma, seria

necessária a realização de um teste de razoabilidade para fins do Artigo 2.2.

Na visão da CE, o resultado obtido com a utilização dos métodos do Artigo 2.2.2, itens (i) a (iii) já

resultam em um montante razoável de SG&A e lucro, não sendo necessária a realização de um teste

em separado para a verificação da razoabilidade do resultado obtido com a aplicação das

metodologias previstas no Artigo 2.2.2 (i) a (iii).

O Painel considerou que a linguagem do caput do Artigo 2.2.2 já indica que os resultados obtidos com

a aplicação dos métodos previstos nos itens (i) a (iii) serão, por definição, razoáveis. O caput deste

Artigo dispõe que as metodologias dos itens (i) a (iii) deverão ser utilizadas “para as finalidades do

parágrafo 2” (ou seja, Artigo 2.2), que, por sua vez, prevê que os valores utilizados como SG&A e

lucro na construção do valor normal devem ser razoáveis. Ou seja, o próprio Artigo 2.2 remete à

utilização das metodologias dos itens (i) a (iii) do Artigo 2.2.2 sempre que não haja dados disponíveis

de SG&A e lucro, o que faz com que tais metodologias, se aplicadas corretamente, resultem sempre

em valores razoáveis na acepção do Artigo 2.2 sendo, portanto, desnecessária a realização de qualquer

outro teste de razoabilidade nos resultados oriundos da aplicação das metodologias contidas no Artigo

2.2.2, como pretendia a Índia. Assim, o Painel considerou que a CE agiu em conformidade com o

Artigo ora analisado.

3. Alegação ao Artigo 2.4.2 - “zeroing”

O Painel considerou que, não obstante o Artigo 2.4.2 não proíba explicitamente a prática de zeroing,

isso não significa que a prática seja permitida caso ela produza resultados inconsistentes com as

obrigações contidas no referido Artigo, como afirma o Painel ser a prática recorrente. O Painel

entendeu que, ao zerar a margem de dumping negativa, a CE na realidade alterou os preços de

exportação naquelas transações nas quais a margem final seria negativa, impedindo uma comparação

adequada com o valor normal. Isso ocorre porque o zeroing faz com que a média ponderada do preço

de exportação seja igual à média ponderada do valor normal para aquela transação na qual a margem

de dumping foi negativa, quando, na realidade, a média ponderada do preço de exportação é maior

que a média ponderada do valor normal.

Assim, entendeu o Painel que em práticas como essa ocorre uma manipulação do preço de exportação

individual, utilizado no cálculo da sua média ponderada, fazendo com que a margem de dumping final

para aquele produto (calculada com base na média ponderada das margens de dumping individuais

calculadas em cada transação) não se baseie em comparações que refletem de forma correta o preço

de exportação, o que torna a prática inconsistente com o Artigo 2.4.2. Em 1 de dezembro de 2000, a

CE notificou da sua intenção de apelar de alguns pontos decididos pelo Painel.

Em 1 de março de 2001, o Órgão de Apelação circulou sua decisão, a qual: “(i) manteve a decisão do

Painel com relação à pratica de zeroing, considerando que a CE agiu de forma inconsistente com o

Artigo 2.4.2; (ii) reverteu a decisão do Painel com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – dados de outros

exportadores - entendendo que para que uma média ponderada pressupõe a utilização de dados de

mais de um produtor ou exportador e que o fato do Artigo mencionar “exportadores e produtores sob

investigação” no plural significa que deve necessariamente ser mais de um; e (iii) reverteu a decisão

do Painel com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – produção e comercialização - valores “despendidos e

auferidos” – entendendo que a autoridade investigadora não pode excluir de seu cálculo valores de

SG&A e lucro de vendas efetivamente despendidos e auferidos pelas empresas investigadas, por

inexistir no Artigo indicação de que apenas dados de vendas ocorridas dentro do curso normal do

comércio devam ser consideradas, pois o Artigo prevê claramente que todos os valores apurados que

tenham sido efetivamente incorridos e auferidos devam ser utilizados, independente de serem

oriundos de vendas tidas como fora do curso normal do comércio.

3. Artigo 2.6

Lucas Spadano

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

A tradução contida na Ata Final contendo os resultados da Rodada Uruguai, apensa ao Decreto nº

1.355/1994, numerou os subitens do Artigo 2 de modo distinto da versão original, de modo que o

Artigo 2.6 da versão original, lamentavelmente, corresponde ao Artigo 2.8 na versão traduzida.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 2.6

a) Ausência de diretrizes para definição do “produto sob consideração”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber

from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber V), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS264/R, paras. 7.152-

7.153 e 7.156-7.157

Neste caso, o Painel examinou o argumento do Canadá de que o Artigo 2.6 requer uma definição

apropriada de “produto similar” e de “produto que se está considerando”. O Painel entendeu que o

produto similar deve ser definido em conformidade com o citado Artigo, mas registrou não ter

encontrado nenhum dispositivo que defina como deve ser determinado o “produto em consideração”.

Ressaltou, ainda, que os mesmos critérios foram utilizados para definir tanto o “produto em

consideração” quanto o “produto similar”, tendo concluído que os EUA não violaram o Artigo 2.6 na

metodologia utilizada para tal definição. Por fim, o Painel rejeitou o argumento canadense de que

necessariamente deve haver similaridade entre os “produtos em consideração” individualmente

analisados, o que impediria a definição destes como um grupo de produtos mais abrangente.

Para. 7.152. “In our view, this means that the “like product”, for purposes of the dumping

determination, is the product which is destined for consumption in the exporting country. The “like

product” is therefore to be compared with the allegedly dumped product, which is generally referred

to in the AD Agreement as the “product under consideration”. In the case of the injury determination

(and the determination of domestic industry support for the application), the word “like product”

refers to the product being produced by the domestic industry allegedly being injured by the dumped

product. In both instances it is clear that the starting point can only be the product allegedly being

dumped and that the product to be compared to it for purposes of the dumping determination, and the

product the producers of which are allegedly being injured by the dumped product, is the “like

product” for purposes of the dumping and injury determinations, respectively.” (nota de rodapé

omitida)

Para. 7.153. “Article 2.6 therefore defines the basis on which the product to be compared to the

“product under consideration” is to be determined, that is, a product which is either identical to the

product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which has

characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration. As the definition of “like

product” implies a comparison with another product, it seems clear to us that the starting point can

only be the “other product”, being the allegedly dumped product. Therefore, once the product under

consideration is defined, the “like product” to the product under consideration has to be determined on

the basis of Article 2.6. However, in our analysis of the AD Agreement, we could not find any

guidance on the way in which the “product under consideration” should be determined.”

Para. 7.156. “As stated in paragraph 0, supra, we could find no explicit guidance in the AD

Agreement as to how the investigating authority should define the product under consideration. In this

case, DOC defined the product under consideration, certain softwood lumber, on the basis of a

technical definition involving narrative description and tariff classification. For the purpose of

establishing normal value, DOC based itself upon goods destined for consumption in the exporting

country which fell within exactly the same definition. Similarly, when considering whether the

application was made by, or on behalf of, the domestic industry, DOC identified the domestic industry

on the basis of the same definition. Canada has not identified any instance in which DOC has defined

the like product differently than it has defined the product under consideration. Specifically, Canada

has not suggested that there was any difference between the product under consideration and the like

product in respect of bed frame components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine and

Western Red Cedar. In other words, having defined the “product under consideration”, it seems to us

that DOC has used an identical definition for the “like product”. In particular, both the product under

consideration and the like product included the products Canada argues should have been excluded

from the investigation. On its face, therefore, it would appear that DOC has defined the “like product”

in this investigation in a manner consistent with the definition found in Article 2.6.” (nota de rodapé

omitida)

Para. 7.157. “Canada has a different interpretation of Article 2.6. In effect, Canada considers that,

rather than comparing the overall scope of the product under consideration with the overall scope of

the like product, Article 2.6 requires that each individual item within the “like product” must be “like”

each individual item within the “product under consideration”. This in effect means that there must be

“likeness” within both the product under consideration and within the like product. As Canada itself

has stated, “[t]he terms 'product under consideration' and 'like product' must be limited to a single

group of products sharing characteristics”. Once again, however, we see no basis to imply such a

condition into the AD Agreement. While there might be room for discussion as to whether such an

approach might be an appropriate one from a policy perspective, whether to require such an approach

is a matter for the Members to address through negotiations. It is not our role as a panel to create

obligations which cannot clearly be found in the AD Agreement itself.” (nota de rodapé omitida).

III. Comentários

Como vista acima, no único caso envolvendo a análise substancial do Artigo 2.6, o Painel, em

considerações não revistas pelo Órgão de Apelação, entendeu não haver diretrizes no Acordo Anti-

Dumping sobre a definição de “produtos sob investigação”. Confere-se, portanto, ampla

discricionariedade aos Membros da OMC para definirem o escopo da investigação, embora se deva

observar a regra da similaridade após a definição deste escopo. A linguagem do Artigo 2.6 sugere, a

princípio, uma definição mais estrita de produto similar em relação aos demais Acordos da OMC,

tendo em conta a referência a “produto idêntico” ou, na ausência deste, outro, com características

“muito próximas”. Tal conceito, de fato, não consta nos demais Acordos, como, por exemplo, o

próprio GATT, razão pela qual ainda se aguarda esclarecimento jurisprudencial sobre as eventuais

diferenças de interpretação do conceito de similaridade para os fins de investigações anti-dumping.

Artigo 3

Roberto Kanitz

Gisela Sarmet

Mariana Chacoff

Isadora Souza

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 3

Determination of Injury (9)

3.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive

evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports

and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and

(b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.

3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall consider

whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or

relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of

the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has

been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a

like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to

depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have

occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give

decisive guidance.

3.3 Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-

dumping investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of

such imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to

the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5

and the volume of imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment

of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between

the imported products and the conditions of competition between the imported products and

the like domestic product.

3.4 The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned

shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the

state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market

share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic

prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash

flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list

is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.

3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set

forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The

demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the

domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the

authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped

imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by

these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be

relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at

dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade

restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers,

developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic

industry.

3.6 The effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic production of

the like product when available data permit the separate identification of that production on

the basis of such criteria as the production process, producers’ sales and profits. If such

separate identification of that production is not possible, the effects of the dumped imports

shall be assessed by the examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of

products, which includes the like product, for which the necessary information can be

provided.

3.7 A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on

allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which would create a

situation in which the dumping would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.

(10) In making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the

authorities should consider, inter alia, such factors as:

(a) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market

indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation;

(b) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity

of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased dumped

exports to the importing Member’s market, taking into account the availability

of other export markets to absorb any additional exports;

(c) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing

or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand

for further imports; and

(d) inventories of the product being investigated.

No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the

factors considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and

that, unless protective action is taken, material injury would occur.

3.8 With respect to cases where injury is threatened by dumped imports, the application of anti-

dumping measures shall be considered and decided with special care.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 3

Determinação de Dano (91)

3.1 A determinação de dano para as finalidades previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 deverá

basear-se em provas materiais e incluir exame objetivo: (a) do volume das importações a

preços de dumping e do seu efeito sobre os preços de produtos similares no mercado interno e

(b) do consequente impacto de tais importações sobre os produtores nacionais desses produtos.

3.2 No tocante ao volume das importações a preços de dumping, as autoridades deverão ponderar

se houve aumento significativo das importações nessas condições, tanto em termos absolutos

quanto em relação à produção ou ao consumo no Membro importador. Com relação ao efeito

9

1 Para os efeitos deste acordo o termo “dano” deve ser entendido como dano material causado a uma indústria nacional, ameaça de dano

material a uma indústria nacional ou atraso real na implantação de tal indústria, e deverá ser interpretado de acordo com o disposto neste Artigo.

das importações a preços de dumping sobre os preços, as autoridades encarregadas da

investigação deverão levar em conta se os preços dos produtos importados a preços de

dumping são significativamente menores do que os preços dos produtos similares no Membro

importador ou ainda se tais importações tiveram por efeito deprimir significativamente os

preços ou impedir aumentos significativos de preços que teriam ocorrido na ausência de tais

importações. Nem Isoladamente, nem em conjunto, porém, deverão tais fatores ser

considerados necessariamente como indicação decisiva.

3.3 Se as importações de um produto provenitentes de mais de um país forem objeto de

investigações anti-dumping simultâneas, as autoridades responsáveis pela investigação

somente poderão determinar cumulativamente os efeitos de tais importações se se verificar

que (a) a margem de dumping determinada em relação às importações de cada um dos países é

maior do que a margem de minimis, como definida no parágrafo 8 do artigo 5, e que o volume

de importações de cada país não é negligenciável, e (b) a avaliação cumulativa dos efeitos

daquelas importações é conveniente em vista da concorrência entre as diferentes importações e

da concorrência entre os produtos importados e o similar nacional.

3.4 O exame do impacto das importações a preços de dumping sobre a indústria nacional

correspondente deverá incluir avaliação de todos os fatores e índices econômicos relevantes

que tenham relação com a situação da referida indústria, inclusive queda real ou potencial das

vendas, dos lucros, da produção, da participação no mercado, da produtividade, do retorno dos

investimentos ou da ocupação, da capacidade instalada, fatores que afetem os preços internos,

a amplitude da margem de dumping, efeitos negativos reais ou potenciais sobre o fluxo de

caixa, estoques, emprego, salários, crescimento, capacidade para aumentar capital ou obter

investimentos. A enumeração acima não é exaustiva, nem poderão tais fatores isoladamente ou

em conjunto ser tomados necessariamente como indicação decisiva.

3.5 É necessário demonstrar que as importações a preços de dumping, por meio dos efeitos

produzidos por essa prática, conforme estabelecido nos parágrafos 2 e 4, estão provocando

dano no sentido em que este último termo é adotado neste Acordo. A demonstração de nexo

causal entre as importações a preços de dumping e o dano à indústria nacional deverá basear-

se no exame de todos os elementos de prova relevantes à disposição das autoridades. Estas

deverão, igualmente, examinar todo e qualquer outro fator conhecido, além das importações a

preços de dumping que possam estar causando dano à indústria nacional na mesma ocasião e

tais danos, provocados por motivos alheios às importações a preços de dumping, não devem

ser imputados àquelas importações. Fatores relevantes nessas condições incluem, inter alia, os

volumes e os preços de outras importações que não se vendam a preços de dumping, contração

na demanda ou mudanças nos padrões de consumo, práticas restritivas ao comércio e

concorrência entre produtores nacionais e estrangeiros, progresso tecnológico, desempenho

exportador e produtividade da indústria nacional.

3.6 O efeito das importações a preços de dumping serão avaliados com relação à produção interna

do produto similar quando os dados disponíveis permitirem a identificação individualizada

daquela produção a partir de critérios tais como o processo produtivo, as vendas do produtor e

os lucros. Se tal identificação individualizada da produção não for possível, os efeitos das

importações a preços de dumping serão determinados pelo exame da produção daquele grupo

ou linha de produtos mais semelhante possível que inclua o produto similar para o qual se

possam obter os dados necessários.

3.7 A determinação de ameaça de dano material deverá basear-se em fatos e não meramente em

alegações, conjecturas ou possibilidades remotas. Mudanças circunstanciais capazes de gerar

situação em que o dumping causaria dano devem ser claramente previsíveis e iminentes10

. Na

10 Um exemplo dessa situação, embora não o único, é a existência de motivo convincente para acreditar que haverá, em futuro próximo, aumento substancial na importação de produtos a preços de dumping.

determinação de existência de ameaça de dano material, as autoridades deverão considerar,

inter alia, os seguintes fatores:

(a) significativa taxa de crescimento da disponibilidade no mercado interno de

produtos importados a preços de dumping, indicativa de provável aumento

substancial nas importações;

(b) suficientes quantidades disponíveis ou iminente aumento substancial na

capacidade do exportador que indiquem a probabilidade de significativo

aumento das exportações a preços de dumping para o mercado do Membro

importador, considerando-se a existência de outros mercados de exportação

que possam absorver o possível aumento das exportações;

(c) se as importações são realizadas a preços que terão significativo efeito em

deprimir ou suprimir preços internos e que provavelmente aumentarão a

demanda por novas importações;

(d) estoques do produto sob investigação.

Nenhum desses fatores tomados isoladamente poderá fornecer orientação decisiva, mas a totalidade

dos fatores considerados deverá necessariamente levar à conclusão de que mais importações a preços

de dumping são iminentes e que, a menos que se tomem medidas de proteção, ocorrerá dano material.

3.8 Nos casos em que existe ameaça de dano por motivo de importações a preços de dumping, a

aplicação de medidas anti-dumping deverá ser avaliada e decidida com especial cuidado.

Footnote 9: Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a

domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an

industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Footnote 10: One example, though not an exclusive one, is that there is convincing reason to believe that there will be, in the

near future, substantiallu increased importation of the product at dumped prices.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

3.1. A primeira sentença do item 3.1 seria mais bem vertida ao português com o seguinte texto: “A

determinação de dano para as finalidades previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 deverá basear-se em

provas positivas e incluir exame objetivo (...)”.

Ao invés do texto oficial:

A determinação de dano para as finalidades previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 deverá basear-se

em provas materiais e incluir exame objetivo (...). (g.n.)

Porque o significado literal de “positive” não sugere entendimento semelhante ao da palavra material.

O termo “provas positivas” faria mais sentido, neste caso, para indicar uma análise realizada com base

nos fatos.

3.2. Nada a observar

3.3. Não foi analisado.

3.4. Há um erro de pontuação na primeira sentença do item 3.4: não deveria existir a vírgula após a

palavra “ocupação”.

Texto oficial:

“O exame do impacto das importações a preços de dumping sobre a

indústria nacional correspondente deverá incluir avaliação de todos

os fatores e índices econômicos relevantes que tenham relação com a

situação da referida indústria, inclusive queda real ou potencial das

vendas, dos lucros, da produção, da participação no mercado, da

produtividade, do retorno dos investimentos ou da ocupação, da

capacidade instalada (...) (g.n.)”.

É necessário excluir a vírgula uma vez que este item trata, entre outros, da ocupação da capacidade

instalada e não da “ocupação dos investimentos” como dá a entender a versão em português do

Acordo Anti-Dumping.

3.5. Nada a observar

3.6. A primeira sentença do item 3.6 seria mais bem vertida ao português com o seguinte texto:

O efeito das importações a preços de dumping serão avaliados com

relação à produção doméstica do produto similar (...)

Texto oficial:

O efeito das importações a preços de dumping serão avaliados com

relação à produção interna do produto similar (...). (g.n.)

A expressão “produção doméstica” é coerente com o texto do Acordo Anti-Dumping em inglês e com

a legislação brasileira.

A versão do texto oferecida na segunda sentença do item 3.6 causa imprecisões sobre o texto original

do Acordo. A palavra “determinados” deveria ser substituída pela palavra “analisados”, conforme

abaixo:

Se tal identificação individualizada da produção não for possível, os

efeitos das importações a preços de dumping serão analisados pelo

exame da produção daquele grupo ou linha de produtos mais

semelhante possível que inclua o produto similar para o qual se

possam obter os dados necessários.

Porque a autoridade investigadora não define a existência do dano, mas avalia os indicadores para

poder se manifestar sobre a existência ou inexistência do dano, causado pelas importações a preços de

dumping.

3.7. A versão em português deste item se desvirtua totalmente do texto original. A expressão

“mudanças circunstanciais” deveria ser substituída pela expressão “mudanças de circunstâncias”, uma

vez que a atual redação altera o sentido do Acordo Anti-Dumping.

Assim, a tradução correta seria:

Mudanças de circunstâncias capazes de gerar situação em que o

dumping causaria dano devem ser claramente previsíveis e iminentes.

(a) A versão em inglês deste item se refere ao “rate of increase of dumped imports”. A expressão “taxa

de crescimento da disponibilidade no mercado interno”, constante na versão em português, pode levar

ao entendimento equivocado de que houve aumento de volume de produto em estoque. Na verdade,

este item se refere à avaliação da taxa de crescimento das importações a preços de dumping, que serve

para demonstrar o provável aumento substancial nas importações.

(b) Este item seria melhor vertido ao português com o seguinte texto:

(...) suficientes quantidades disponíveis ou iminente aumento

substancial dessa capacidade (...).

Texto oficial:

(...) suficientes quantidades disponíveis ou iminente aumento

substancial na capacidade do exportador (...). (g.n.)

A atual redação do Artigo em português pode levar ao entendimento equivocado de que está se

falando da quantidade de produto em estoque.

(c) Para que haja maior coerência entre a versão do Acordo Anti-Dumping em português e o texto

original, em inglês, sugere-se a seguinte redação para este item:

(...) se as importações entram no mercado a preços que terão

significativo efeito em deprimir ou suprimir preços internos (...).

Texto oficial:

(...) se as importações são realizadas a preços que terão significativo

efeito em deprimir ou suprimir preços internos e que provavelmente

aumentarão a demanda por novas importações (...). (g.n.)

(d) Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 3

1. Artigo 3.1

Roberto Kanitz

Gisela Sarmet

Mariana Chacoff

Isadora Souza

a) “Exame objetivo”

O entendimento do DSB da OMC, a partir dos relatórios de Painéis e do Órgão de Apelação a seguir,

revela que um “exame objetivo” indica uma investigação conduzida de maneira imparcial. O termo

está relacionado ao processo investigativo em si. O que importa é como a investigação é conduzida no

sentido de como as provas são obtidas e avaliadas. O termo “objetivo” exige que o exame seja

realizado de acordo com os princípios da justiça e boa fé. Ademais, o termo em questão exige que um

exame da indústria doméstica como um todo seja da mesma maneira realizada pelas autoridades, ou

seja, se uma análise de uma parte da indústria doméstica é feita de forma específica, todas as outras

partes dessa indústria também terão que ser analisadas. Caso contrário, é necessário que haja um

esclarecimento pelo qual outras partes da indústria não foram identicamente analisadas ou não se

poderá afirmar que houve um exame objetivo, como exigido pelo Artigo.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on

Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R,

paras. 132-133

Para. 132. “(…) The examination was not “objective” because its result is predetermined by the

methodology itself. Under the approach used by the European Communities, whenever the

investigating authorities decide to limit the examination to some, but not all, producers — as they are

entitled to do under Article 6.10 — all imports from all non-examined producers will necessarily

always be included in the volume of dumped imports under Article 3, as long as any of the producers

examined individually were found to be dumping (…).”

Para. 133. “For these reasons, we conclude that the European Communities' determination that all

imports attributable to non-examined producers were dumped — even though the evidence from

examined producers showed that producers accounting for 53 percent of imports attributed to

examined producers were not dumping — did not lead to a result that was unbiased, even-handed, and

fair. Therefore, the European Communities did not satisfy the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of

Article 3 to determine the volume of dumped imports on the basis of an examination that is

“objective”.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS219/R, para. 7.226

Para. 7.226. “(...) the term “objective examination” is concerned with the investigative process itself.

We see the term “examination” as relating to the way in which the evidence is gathered, inquired into

and, subsequently, evaluated. Thus, this term relates to the conduct of the investigation generally. The

qualifying term, “objective”, indicates that the “examination” process must conform to the dictates of

the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. We understand that an “objective

examination” requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in

an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested

parties, in the investigation. The duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an “objective

examination” recognises that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any lack

thereof, of the investigative process.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber

from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/R, para. 7.28

Para. 7.28. “In this regard, we have kept in mind statements of the Appellate Body regarding the

meaning of “positive evidence” and “objective examination”. While “positive evidence” involves the

facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination, “objective examination” is concerned with

the investigative process itself (…).”

The Appellate Body has defined an “objective examination”:

The term “objective examination” aims at a different aspect of the

investigating authorities' determination (...). The word “examination” relates,

in our view, to the way in which the evidence is gathered, inquired into and,

subsequently, evaluated; that is, it relates to the conduct of the investigation

generally. The word “objective”, which qualifies the word “examination”,

indicates essentially that the “examination” process must conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness.

The Appellate Body summed up the requirement to conduct an “objective examination” as follows:

In short, an “objective examination” requires that the domestic industry, and

the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without

favoring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in

the investigation. The duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an

“objective examination” recognizes that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any lack thereof, of the investigative process”.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-

Holled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R,

paras. 193, 204 e 206

Para. 193. “(...) In short, an “objective examination” requires that the domestic industry, and the

effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of

any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation. The duty of the investigating

authorities to conduct an “objective examination” recognizes that the determination will be influenced

by the objectivity, or any lack thereof, of the investigative process.”

Para. 204. “(...) Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that such a sectoral examination

be conducted in an “objective” manner. In our view, this requirement means that, where investigating

authorities undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry, they should, in principle,

examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up the industry, as well as examine the

industry as a whole. Or, in the alternative, the investigating authorities should provide a satisfactory

explanation as to why it is not necessary to examine directly or specifically the other parts of the

domestic industry. Different parts of an industry may exhibit quite different economic performance

during any given period. Some parts may be performing well, while others are performing poorly. To

examine only the poorly performing parts of an industry, even if coupled with an examination of the

whole industry, may give a misleading impression of the data relating to the industry as a whole, and

may overlook positive developments in other parts of the industry. Such an examination may result in

highlighting the negative data in the poorly performing part, without drawing attention to the positive

data in other parts of the industry. We note that the reverse may also be true – to examine only the

parts of an industry which are performing well may lead to overlooking the significance of

deteriorating performance in other parts of the industry”.”

Para. 206. “Accordingly, an examination of only certain parts of a domestic industry does not ensure

a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic industry as a whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the

requirements of “objectiv[ity]” in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement”.”

b) “Provas materiais”

O entendimento do DSB, a partir dos relatórios dos Painéis e do Órgão de Apelação a seguir, revela

que o termo “provas materiais” faz referência aos fatos que dão suporte e justificam a determinação do

dano, os quais determinam a qualidade das provas utilizadas pelas autoridades na investigação, e que

devem transparecer imparcialidade e lógica. O termo “positivo” indica que a prova deverá ser

afirmativa, objetiva e verificável, ou seja, confiável. Ademais, a determinação de dano deve ser

baseada na totalidade das provas materiais, incluindo todas as informações prestadas (confidenciais e

não-confidenciais).

Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from

Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.75-7.76

Para. 7.75. “While we need not, and do not, opine on the exact nature of the “positive evidence”

requirement of Article 3.1, (...). Moreover, we note that there are any number of bases on which a

price undercutting analysis could be performed, and we do not find the IA's justification of the basis

that it used to be illogical on its face or not objective, nor do we see in it any evidence of bias”.”

Para. 7.76. “(...) we find that Turkey has not established that an objective and unbiased investigating

authority could not have found price undercutting on the basis of the evidence of record. We therefore

find that Turkey has not established that the IA's price undercutting finding was not based on “positive

evidence” in violation of Article 3.1”.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS219/R, para. 7.226

Para. 7.226. “The term “positive evidence” relates to the quality of the evidence upon which the

authorities may rely in making a determination. The word “positive” may be understood as meaning

that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be

credible. While the term “positive evidence” focuses on the facts underpinning and justifying the

injury determination (...)”.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber

from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/R, para. 7.28

Para. 7.28. “In this regard, we have kept in mind statements of the Appellate Body regarding the

meaning of “positive evidence” and “objective examination”. While “positive evidence” involves the

facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination, “objective examination” is concerned with

the investigative process itself. The Appellate Body has interpreted “positive evidence” as follows:

The term “positive evidence” relates, in our view, to the quality of the

evidence that authorities may rely upon in making a determination. The word

“positive” means, to us, that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective

and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and

Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams),

Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 107

Para. 107. “We recall that the legal issue before us is whether the terms “positive evidence” and

“objective examination” in Article 3.1 require that “the reasoning supporting the determination be

'formally or explicitly stated' in documents in the record of the investigation to which interested parties

(and/or their legal counsel) have access at least from the time of the final determination”, and, further,

that “the factual basis relied upon by the authorities must be discernible from those documents”. We

note that the Panel stated that the dictionary meaning of the term “positive” suggests that “positive

evidence” is “formally or explicitly stated; definite, unquestionable (positive proof)”. Likewise, the

Panel reasoned that the dictionary meaning of “objective” suggests that an “objective examination” is

“concerned with outward things or events; presenting facts uncoloured by feelings, opinions, or

personal bias; disinterested”. Even if we accept that the ordinary meaning of these terms is reflected in

the dictionary definitions cited by the Panel, in our view, the ordinary meaning of these terms does not

suggest that an investigating authority is required to base an injury determination only upon evidence

disclosed to, or discernible by, the parties to the investigation. An anti-dumping investigation involves

the commercial behaviour of firms, and, under the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,

involves the collection and assessment of both confidential and non-confidential information. An

injury determination conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement must be based on the totality of that evidence. We see nothing in Article 3.1 which limits

an investigating authority to base an injury determination only upon non-confidential information.”

c) “Volume das importações a preços de dumping”

O entendimento do DSB com relação ao efeito das importações a preços de dumping é de que deve

ficar claro que o termo “efeito” não é utilizado em relação ao volume das importações e sim ao

consequente impacto que a variação deste causaria. Dessa forma, a variação no volume das

importações a preços de dumping afetaria a relação entre um aumento de tais importações e o

consumo sobre os produtores nacionais desses produtos.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS219/R (11), para. 7.235

Para. 7.235. “(...) The provision therefore focuses upon the assessment of effects of imports.

Article 3.2 refers to “the effect of the dumped imports on prices” (emphasis added). Article 3.2 does

not utilise the term “effects” with regard to volume, nor does Article 3.1, which refers in paragraph (a)

to volume and price effects of imports and, in paragraph (b), to the “consequent impact” of the volume

and price effects of imports (...)”.”

d) “Exame objetivo” com base em “prova material”

O entendimento do DSB, como mencionado anteriormente, sugere que um o parágrafo 3.1 exige que

as autoridades investigadoras realizem uma investigação com base nos princípios de justiça e boa fé,

assegurando um tratamento imparcial das informações e dados utilizados na investigação. Para que

essa exigência seja realizada com base em provas materiais, é necessário que as informações sejam

relevantes e pertinentes à questão a ser resolvida (e não a fatos não-relacionados). O processo de

determinar se importações a preços de dumping causaram dano material à indústria doméstica deve

ser baseado em informações confiáveis e completas, e relacionar-se a um período factível de

comparação com a realidade.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS219/R (12), paras. 7.289, 7.292 e 7.297

Para. 7.289. “The Panel examines Brazil's allegation that the investigation and finding by the

European Communities of significant price undercutting is inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and 3.1 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement as no adjustment was made for differences in production methods between

“white-” vs. “black-” heart varieties of malleable fittings.”

Para. 7.292. “(...) We are conscious that the requirement in Article 3.1 to conduct an “objective

examination” on the basis of “positive evidence” is that the investigating authorities examination

conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. The

investigating authority must therefore ensure an even-handed treatment of the information and data on

the record of the investigation. (...).”

Para. 7.297. “(...) we find that the European Communities did not violate Articles 3.2 and 3.1 in not

granting an adjustment for price comparability in its comparison of prices of sales of black heart and

white heart fittings in the context of its consideration of price undercutting.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice

(Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/R, paras. 7.55, 7.61,

7.64-7.65 e 7.77

Para. 7.55. “(...) In our view, positive evidence is in the first place evidence which is material to the

case at hand, in other words it is to be relevant and pertinent with respect to the issue to be decided. It

is positive which make it “evidence” as opposed to unrelated facts. In addition, it must have the

characteristics of being inherently reliable and creditworthy. (13) An objective examination, in turn,

requires in our view that the investigative process establishing the facts be objective and unbiased. We

agree with what the Appellate Body stated in this respect in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel case:

The term “objective examination” aims at a different aspect of the

investigating authorities' determination. While the term “positive evidence”

focuses on the facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination, the

term “objective examination” is concerned with the investigative process

itself. The word “examination” relates, in our view, to the way in which the

evidence is gathered, inquired into and, subsequently, evaluated; that is, it

relates to the conduct of the investigation generally. The word “objective”,

which qualifies the word “examination”, indicates essentially that the

“examination” process must conform to the dictates of the basic principles of

good faith and fundamental fairness. (14)

Para. 7.61. “(...) It is therefore necessary to base a determination of dumping causing injury on data

that is pertinent or relevant with regard to the current situation, taking into account the inevitable delay

caused by the practical need to conduct an investigation. To impose anti-dumping duties without

objectively examining relevant evidence on the dumping causing injury which is on one side of the

balance would thus clearly run counter to the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.64. “(...) A great deal could have happened – or changed – over a fifteen month period, and

there is simply no evidence on record in respect of it. A hiatus of such a duration is, in our view,

sufficiently long as to impugn the reliability of the period of investigation to deliver, for the purposes

of a determination, evidence that has the requisite pertinence or relevance (see para. 7.55 supra). In

other words, given the passage of time and the uncertainty about the factual situation in that relevant

interim, the information lacks credibility and reliability, thereby failing to meet the criterion of

“positive evidence” pursuant to Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.65. “In light of all these considerations, we find that by choosing to base its determination of

injury on a period of investigation which ended more than fifteen months before the initiation of the

investigation, Mexico failed to comply with the obligation set forth in Article 3.1 of the

AD Agreement to make a determination of injury which is based on positive evidence and which

involves an objective examination of the volume and price effects of the alleged dumped imports or of

the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of the like product at the time measures

were imposed (...).”

Para. 7.77. “(...) We are of the view, however, that the requirement to base a determination of injury

on positive evidence and pursuant to an objective examination nevertheless imposed certain

obligations on the Mexican investigating authorities with regard to the completeness of the data used

as the basis for its determination (...).”

Footnote 11: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 12: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 13: We note that in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel case, the Appellate Body stated that: “The word 'positive' means, to

us, that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.” Appellate

Body Report, US – Hot-rolled Steel, para.192. (emphasis added).

Footnote 14: Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193.

2. Artigo 3.2

Roberto Kanitz

Gisela Sarmet

Mariana Chacoff

Isadora Souza

a) “Da escolha da metodologia de análise”

(i) Análise geral

Não há uma metodologia específica e prescrita às autoridades investigativas a ser aplicada no curso de

qualquer investigação. Ademais, não há qualquer exigência de que a análise de subcotação de preços

deva ser realizada em algum nível específico de comércio.

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R (15), para. 7.159

Para. 7.159. “We consider that it is for the investigating authorities in the first instance to determine

the analytical methodologies that will be applied in the course of an investigation, as Article 3 contains

no requirements concerning the methodology to be used. While it could possibly be shown in a given

case that a particular methodology has introduced a flaw in an authority's analysis, in this case Poland

has not demonstrated any specific flaw that has resulted from the application of Thailand's

methodology. Thus, we do not consider this issue further.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from

Turkey (Turquia - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, para. 7.73

Para. 7.73. “On the basis of the plain text of Article 3.2, we find no requirement that the price

undercutting analysis must be conducted in any particular way, that is, at any particular level of trade.

Therefore, we find that Turkey has not established that there was a legal obligation on the IA to

perform the price undercutting analysis in the way asserted by Turkey. Rather, we find that an

objective and unbiased investigating authority could have performed an undercutting analysis on the

basis used by the IA. We therefore find that the IA's price undercutting finding is not inconsistent with

Article 3.2.”

(ii) Frequência da análise

Segundo o Acordo Anti-Dumping, uma análise anual dos dados de importações de um período

composto de vários anos é suficiente. No entanto, há exceções em que a frequência da análise do

volume das importações pode ser necessária.

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R e WT/DS122/AB/R (16), para. 7.168

Para. 7.168. “In our view, it is clear on the face of Article 3.2 that a quarterly analysis of the trend in

import volume is not required, and indeed that no particular analytical approach is required or even

alluded to in Article 3.2. Given that on an annual basis over a multi-year period, imports from Poland

increased in every period examined, we do not believe that quarter-to-quarter fluctuation in import

volumes during one of the twelve-month periods examined invalidates the Thai authorities’ finding

that the import volume of the subject imports “increased continuously”.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.265

Para. 8.265. “We first examine Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a

significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala confined

itself to considering the maximum and minimum imports during the period of investigation. We note

that the Ministry did a month by month examination of the total volume of imports of grey portland

cement as well as of the volume of Mexican imports. Although in the text of the resolution Guatemala

reported the end to end and highest and lowest point results of their analysis of the volume of dumped

imports, it is evident from Table 10 of the Injury Report that the authorities considered the situation

during each of the intervening months during the period they chose for data collection. The Panel does

not agree with Mexico's assertion that “Guatemala confined itself to maximum and minimum volumes

imported during the investigation period”. Thus, we do not consider that Guatemala acted

inconsistently with Article 3.2 in this respect.”

(iii) Extensão do período sob investigação

Segundo a recomendação do Comitê de Práticas da OMC, o período de coleta de dados para

determinação de dano deverá ser de pelo menos três anos, salvo circunstâncias excepcionais, nas

quais embora um período maior de coleta de dados seja preferível, não há qualquer previsão no

Acordo que impossibilite um exame dos dados de importação para um período menor, como, por

exemplo, de um ano.

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.266

Para. 8.266. “We next consider Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a

significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala used a

data collection period of one year and failed to compare the volume of dumped imports during that

period to earlier periods in order to analyse long-term trends in imports. In this regard, we recall that

Guatemala chose a period of data collection of one year from June 1995 to May 1996. A recent

recommendation of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices calls on Members to use a data

collection period of at least three years. This recommendation reflects the common practice of

Members. (17) That said, there is no provision in the Agreement which specifies the precise duration

of the period of data collection. Thus, it cannot be said a priori that the use of a one-year period of data

collection would not be consistent with the requirement of Article 3.2 to consider whether there has

been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in the circumstances of a particular case.

In this case, Guatemala argues that the reason for the short period of data collection was that exports

by Cruz Azul did not become significant until 1995. The record of the investigation supports this

conclusion. (18) Under these circumstances, while a longer data collection period might have been

preferable, we are unable to find that the use by Guatemala of a one-year data collection period was

inconsistent with Guatemala's obligation under Article 3.2 to consider whether there was a significant

increase in dumped imports.”

b) “Do aumento significativo do volume das importações a preço de dumping”

O Artigo 3.2 não requer que o termo “significativo” seja usado para caracterizar um aumento nas

importações objeto da investigação. Ademais, é dever das autoridades investigativas considerar

estritamente as importações referentes ao produto investigado.

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R e WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 7.161

Para. 7.161. “We examine the nature of the obligation in Article 3.2. We note that the text of

Article 3.2 requires that the investigating authorities “consider whether there has been a significant

increase in dumped imports”. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines “consider” as, inter alia:

“contemplate mentally, especially in order to reach a conclusion”; “give attention to”; and “reckon

with; take into account”. We therefore do not read the textual term “consider” in Article 3.2 to require

an explicit “finding” or “determination” by the investigating authorities as to whether the increase in

dumped imports is “significant”. While it would certainly be preferable for a Member explicitly to

characterize whether any increase in imports as “significant”, and to give a reasoned explanation of

that characterization, we believe that the word “significant” does not necessarily need to appear in the

text of the relevant document in order for the requirements of this provision to be fulfilled.

Nevertheless, we consider that it must be apparent in the relevant documents in the record that the

investigating authorities have given attention to and taken into account whether there has been a

significant increase in dumped imports, in absolute or relative terms.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.266 e

8.268-8.269

Para. 8.266. “We next consider Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a

significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala used a

data collection period of one year and failed to compare the volume of dumped imports during that

period to earlier periods in order to analyse long-term trends in imports. In this regard, we recall that

Guatemala chose a period of data collection of one year from June 1995 to May 1996. A recent

recommendation of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices calls on Members to use a data

collection period of at least three years. This recommendation reflects the common practice of

Members. That said, there is no provision in the Agreement which specifies the precise duration of the

period of data collection. Thus, it cannot be said a priori that the use of a one-year period of data

collection would not be consistent with the requirement of Article 3.2 to consider whether there has

been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in the circumstances of a particular case.

In this case, Guatemala argues that the reason for the short period of data collection was that exports

by Cruz Azul did not become significant until 1995. The record of the investigation supports this

conclusion. Under these circumstances, while a longer data collection period might have been

preferable, we are unable to find that the use by Guatemala of a one-year data collection period was

inconsistent with Guatemala's obligation under Article 3.2 to consider whether there was a significant

increase in dumped imports.”

Para. 8.268. “Finally, we turn to Mexico's claim that Guatemala violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 by

failing to take into account certain undumped imports of the product under investigation imported by

an importer named MATINSA, which is associated with the petitioner, Cementos Progreso. Although

Mexico's arguments on this point are unclear, we understand Mexico to be arguing that Guatemala

considered MATINSA's imports to be of non-pozzolanic cement which differed from the like

domestic product and thus were not taken into consideration during the investigation. Mexico

considers however that the product imported by MATINSA was in fact the same product as that under

investigation. In Mexico's view, the failure by Guatemala to correctly characterise the imports by

MATINSA carried the following consequences (i) the resulting volume of total imports of the product

under investigation was lower; (ii) the share of allegedly dumped imports in total imports of the

product under investigation was artificially inflated; (iii) the consideration of a faulty and incomplete

figure for total imports of the product under investigation yielded a distorted figure for apparent

domestic consumption; (iv) because of this incorrect figure for apparent domestic consumption, the

relationship between the increase in dumped imports and consumption was ultimately incorrect; (v) by

considering that MATINSA's imports did not concern the product under investigation, the

investigating authority failed to assess other factors which were injuring the domestic industry at the

same time, such as imports that were not sold at dumped prices.”

Para. 8.269. “The consequences listed as number (i) through (iv) above constitute a violation of

Article 3.1 and 3.2 in that an exclusion of MATINSA's imports from the figures for domestic

consumption of the like product affects the comparison that is made with the figures for volume of

dumped imports for purposes of determining that there has been a significant increase in dumped

imports relative to domestic consumption in the importing Member.” (19) Item (v) above constitutes a

violation of Article 3.5 in that this provision establishes:

The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped

imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the

injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the

volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices (…).

Imports by MATINSA of grey portland cement would constitute the type of imports which are

recognized in the AD Agreement as a possible source of injury different from the dumped imports.

Thus, a failure to examine such imports as another known factor causing injury would constitute a

violation of Article 3.5. We recognize the merit in Mexico's arguments on this issue and to the extent

that Mexico presents us with evidence to support the argument it has succeeded in establishing a prima

facie case that Guatemala has violated Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5. It would be then for Guatemala to

rebut the existence of a violation under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5. We shall now examine whether it has

succeeded in doing so.

c) “Do efeito das importações a preço de dumping nos preços”

Uma investigação imparcial e objetiva pode concluir sobre os efeitos negativos das importações nos

preços da indústria doméstica a partir da análise de queda de preços e incapacidade de atingir os

níveis de preços estabelecidos, coincidindo com as importações a preços mais baixos. Ademais, o

Painel concluiu que a análise do efeito negativo das importações sobre os preços pode ocorrer apenas

em uma região específica, caso os produtores ali estejam concentrados, caracterizando o dano à

indústria doméstica.

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.276-

8.277

Para. 8.276. “We shall first address Mexico's argument that Guatemala lacked the elements to support

its conclusion that there had been a negative price effect on the prices for the domestic like product by

the dumped imports. We note that Mexico's argument on the lack of support for Guatemala's finding

on price effect depends on Mexico's assertion that Guatemala should have done a comparison with the

prices that the domestic industry charged for a period prior to the period of investigation. We have

already found that Guatemala did not violate the AD Agreement in establishing a period of data

collection of injury of only one year, and consequently it was not obliged to review data outside that

period. Moreover, Guatemala submitted evidence (20) that was part of the record of the investigation,

and that supports the determination that: i) prices for the domestic industry declined after the Mexican

imports entered the market, configuring a situation of price depression; ii) that those prices declined to

a level below the maximum price authorized by the Government, and; iii) that although the maximum

price increased at the end of the period the domestic producer could not increase its prices accordingly,

configuring a situation of price suppression. (21) Based on the evidence of declining prices and

inability to achieve established price levels, coinciding with imports at lower prices we find that an

objective and unbiased investigating authority could have properly concluded that the dumped imports

were having a negative effect on the prices of the domestic industry. Moreover, Mexico did not adduce

any evidence to convince us otherwise. Thus, we reject Mexico's claim of an improper and

unsupported Article 3.2 analysis by Guatemala.”

Para. 8.277. “We shall now address Mexico's argument that Guatemala improperly conducted a

regional evaluation of the effect the dumped imports had on the prices of the domestic like product.

The mere fact that Guatemala mentions that the greatest differential between the government fixed

ceiling price and the actual price was felt in the Departments of San Marcos, Quetzaltenango and

Retalhuleu does not, in our view, mean that the analysis was limited to these regions alone, to the

exclusion of Guatemala as a whole. In fact, the mention that these were the departments with the

greatest differential indicates to us that other departments were analysed. Moreover, there is only one

producer of cement in Guatemala, thus, even if the negative effect of the dumped imports on the prices

of the domestic like product was only evidenced in the region bordering Mexico, this could still be

viewed as causing injury to Cementos Progreso. Based on these considerations we find that Guatemala

acted in accordance with its obligation under Article 3.2 to conduct an examination of the effect the

dumped imports had on the domestic industry. Therefore, we reject Mexico's claim of violation of

Article 3.2 on the basis of an improper regional injury evaluation.”

d) “Subcotação de preços”

O Artigo 3.2 não estabelece qualquer exigência de que a análise da subcotação deva ser conduzida de

forma particular, isto é, em qualquer nível específico de comércio. As autoridades investigadoras

deverão considerar todas as importações como “importações realizadas a preços de dumping” após

uma determinação positiva e não existe qualquer exigência de se considerar unicamente as transações

que envolvam essa prática para a determinação do dano. O Artigo 3.2 exige que as autoridades

investigadoras considerem se a subcotação dos preços é “significativa”, mas não estabeleceu qualquer

exigência específica quanto ao cálculo de uma margem de subcotação, ou metodologia específica a

ser seguida.

Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from

Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, para. 7.73

Para. 7.73. “On the basis of the plain text of Article 3.2, we find no requirement that the price

undercutting analysis must be conducted in any particular way, that is, at any particular level of trade.

Therefore, we find that Turkey has not established that there was a legal obligation on the IA to

perform the price undercutting analysis in the way asserted by Turkey. Rather, we find that an

objective and unbiased investigating authority could have performed an undercutting analysis on the

basis used by the IA. We therefore find that the IA's price undercutting finding is not inconsistent with

Article 3.2.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brazil,

WT/DS219/R (22), paras. 7.281 e 7.276-7.277

Para. 7.281. “We disagree with Brazil's assertion that this unadopted panel report can provide no

useful guidance because it preceded the Panel and Appellate Body reports in EC - Bed Linen. We note

that the provision under consideration by the Panel and the Appellate Body in the EC - Bed Linen

dispute was Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and that the part of the particular anti-

dumping investigation in question was the calculation of the dumping margin. Therefore, those reports

do not relate specifically to the matter before us here. By contrast, we deal here with a price

undercutting analysis under Article 3.2 and 3.1 in the context of the “injury” stage of this anti-

dumping investigation. Unlike Article 2 (in particular Article 2.4.2) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,

which contains specific requirements relating to the calculation of the dumping margin, Article 3.2

requires the investigating authorities to consider whether price undercutting is “significant” but does

not set out any specific requirement relating to the calculation of a margin of undercutting, or provide

a particular methodology to be followed in this consideration. In view of the stark contrast in the text,

context, legal nature and rationale of the provisions, we are firmly of the view that the Panel and

Appellate Body's reasoning in the EC-Bed Linen dispute cannot be directly transposed here.”

Para. 7.276. “The text of Article 3.2 refers to domestic “prices” (in the plural rather than singular).

This textual element supports our view that there is no requirement under Article 3.2 to establish one

single margin of undercutting on the basis of an examination of every transaction involving the

product concerned and the like product. In addition, the text of Article 3.2 refers to the “dumped

imports”, that is, the imports of the product concerned from an exporting producer that has been

determined to be dumping. (23) Thus, investigating authorities may treat any imports from

producers/exporters for which an affirmative determination of dumping is made as “dumped imports”

for purposes of injury analysis under Article 3. There is, however, no requirement to take each and

every transaction involving the “dumped imports” into account, nor that the “dumped imports”

examined under Article 3.2 are limited to those precise transactions subject to the dumping

determination. This view is supported by the absence of a specific provision concerning time periods

in the Agreement; an importing Member may investigate price effects of imports in an injury

investigation period which may be different than the IP for dumping. These considerations do not, of

course, diminish the obligation of an investigating authority to conduct an unbiased and even-handed

price undercutting analysis.”

Para. 7.277. “We take note of the shared view of the parties that “the Panel should accord a

considerable discretion to the investigating authorities to choose a methodology which produces a

meaningful result while avoiding unfairness”. (24) One purpose of a price undercutting analysis is to

assist an investigating authority in determining whether dumped imports have, through the effects of

dumping, caused material injury to a domestic industry. In this part of an anti-dumping investigation,

an investigating authority is trying to discern whether the prices of dumped imports have had an

impact on the domestic industry. The interaction of two variables would essentially determine the

extent of impact of price undercutting on the domestic industry: the quantity of sales at undercutting

prices; and the margin of undercutting of such sales. Sales at undercutting prices could have an impact

on the domestic industry (for example, in terms of lost sales) irrespective of whether other sales might

be made at prices above those charged by the domestic industry. The fact that certain sales may have

occurred at “non-underselling prices” does not eradicate the effects in the importing market of sales

that were made at underselling prices. Thus, a requirement that an investigating authority must base its

price undercutting analysis on a methodology that offset undercutting prices with “overcutting” prices

would have the result of requiring the investigating authority to conclude that no price undercutting

existed when, in fact, there might be a considerable number of sales at undercutting prices which

might have had an adverse effect on the domestic industry.”

Footnote 15: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão do Painel.

Footnote 16: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 17: The recommendation provides that: “(c) the period of data collection for injury investigations normally should

be at least three years, unless a party from whom data is being gathered has existed for a lesser period, and should include the

entirety of the period of data collection for the dumping investigation;” (Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data

Collection for Anti-Dumping Investigations, adopted by the ADP Committee on 5 May 2000, G/ADP/6). We note that this

recommendation is a relevant, but non-binding, indication of the understanding of Members as to appropriate implementation

practice regarding the period of data collection for an anti-dumping investigation.

Footnote 18: See, Table 10 of the Injury Report.

Footnote 19: We note that Guatemala establishes that there was both an increase of the dumped imports in absolute terms

and also an increase relative to domestic consumption and production (see Injury Report Table 10 and Guatemala's first

submission para. 359). Guatemala relied on both of these finding to determine that there was material injury to the domestic

industry. So, to the extent that one of the findings on the increased volume of dumped imports was proved to be inappropriate

Guatemala's determination under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 would be inconsistent with its obligations.

Footnote 20: Annex Guatemala-68.

Footnote 21: Guatemala presented evidence indicating that before the arrival of the imports prices were to the level of the

maximum price. We are of the view that as this price is calculated on the basis of costs and inflation it constitutes a

reasonable benchmark to establish the price at which the domestic producer of cement in Guatemala could have expected to

increase its prices but for the competition from the dumped imports.

Footnote 22: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a suboctação de preços, embora tenha

sido discutida a cumulação do Artigo 3.2 e Artigo 3.3, porém não houve qualquer alteração na conclusão/determinação do

Painel, já que este ponto específico não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 23: See Panel Report, EC - Bed Linen, supra, note 77, para. 6.139.

Footnote 24: EC first written submission, para. 277; Brazil second written submission, para. 143.

3. Artigo 3.3

Lucas Spadano

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 3.3

a) “Condições para a cumulação dos efeitos das importações”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Dutires on

Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante:

Brasil, WT/DS219/AB/R, paras. 109-110 e 116

Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação ratificou a decisão do Painel no sentido de que as condições

previstas no Artigo 3.3 para a determinação cumulativa dos efeitos das importações de origens

diversas são exaustivas. Em particular, foi rejeitado o argumento do Brasil de que uma autoridade

investigadora deve primeiramente considerar o volume e preço das importações de cada país

específico, antes de cumulá-las.

Para. 109. “The text of Article 3.3 expressly identifies three conditions that must be satisfied before

an investigating authority is permitted under the Anti-Dumping Agreement to assess cumulatively the

effects of imports from several countries. These conditions are:

(a) The dumping margin from each individual country must be more than de

minimis;

(b) the volume of imports from each individual country must not be

negligible; and

(c) cumulation must be appropriate in the light of the conditions of

competition

between the imported products; and

(d) between the imported products and the like domestic product.

By the terms of Article 3.3, it is “only if” the above conditions are established that an investigating

authority “may” make a cumulative assessment of the effects of dumped imports from several

countries.” (nota de rodapé omitida)

Para. 110. “We find no basis in the text of Article 3.3 for Brazil's assertion that a country-specific

analysis of the potential negative effects of volumes and prices of dumped imports is a pre-condition

for a cumulative assessment of the effects of all dumped imports. Article 3.3 sets out expressly the

conditions that must be fulfilled before the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the

effects of dumped imports from more than one country. There is no reference to the country-by-

country volume and price analyses that Brazil contends are pre-conditions to cumulation. In fact,

Article 3.3 expressly requires an investigating authority to examine country-specific volumes, not in

the manner suggested by Brazil, but for purposes of determining whether the “volume of imports from

each country is not negligible”.”

Para. 116. “The apparent rationale behind the practice of cumulation confirms our interpretation that

both volume and prices qualify as “effects” that may be cumulatively assessed under Article 3.3. A

cumulative analysis logically is premised on a recognition that the domestic industry faces the impact

of the “dumped imports” as a whole and that it may be injured by the total impact of the dumped

imports, even though those imports originate from various countries. If, for example, the dumped

imports from some countries are low in volume or are declining, an exclusively country-specific

analysis may not identify the causal relationship between the dumped imports from those countries

and the injury suffered by the domestic industry. The outcome may then be that, because imports from

such countries could not individually be identified as causing injury, the dumped imports from these

countries would not be subject to anti-dumping duties, even though they are in fact causing injury. In

our view, therefore, by expressly providing for cumulation in Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement, the negotiators appear to have recognized that a domestic industry confronted with

dumped imports originating from several countries may be injured by the cumulated effects of those

imports, and that those effects may not be adequately taken into account in a country-specific analysis

of the injurious effects of dumped imports. Consistent with the rationale behind cumulation, we

consider that changes in import volumes from individual countries, and the effect of those country-

specific volumes on prices in the importing country's market, are of little significance in determining

whether injury is being caused to the domestic industry by the dumped imports as a whole. (25)”

III. Comentários

Como visto acima, a jurisprudência até o momento sobre a “cumulação” dos efeitos das importações

para fins de determinação de dano em investigações anti-dumping deixa claro que, mesmo que as

importações de determinada origem ou os impactos de seus preços não sejam muito significativos

(excetuadas as margens de minimis e os volumes negligenciáveis), tais importações poderão ser

cumuladas com as demais para fins de determinação de seus efeitos, em conjunto, sobre a indústria

nacional.

Footnote 25: “We do not suggest that trends in country-specific volumes are always irrelevant for an investigating authority's

consideration. For example, such trends may be relevant in the context of an investigating authority's evaluation of the

conditions of competition between imported products, and between imported products and the domestic like product, as

provided for in Article 3.3(b). Brazil raised the relationship between import volumes and conditions of competition as the

basis for a claim under that provision before the Panel. (Panel Report, para. 7.252) The Panel found that the divergences in

volume trends between Brazilian imports and those of other countries did not compel a finding by the European Commission

that the effects of Brazilian imports could not be appropriately assessed on a cumulated basis with the effects of imports from

other countries. (Ibid., paras. 7.253-7.256) Brazil has not appealed the Panel's finding in this respect.] O Órgão de Apelação

deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto não foi recorrido por

nenhuma das partes.”

4. Artigo 3.4

Roberto Kanitz

Gisela Sarmet

Mariana Chacoff

Isadora Souza

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 3.4

a) “Importações a Preços de Dumping”

Uma vez determinada prática de dumping nas importações do produto investigado de um produtor

específico, esta conclusão será aplicável a todas as importações do produto desta origem. O Painel da

OMC rejeitou o argumento de que “as importações objeto de dumping” devem ser entendidas como

referentes apenas às importações que são objeto de operações em que o preço de exportação estava

abaixo do valor normal.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R (26), paras. 6.136

e 6.139-6.140

Para. 6.136. “However, consideration of the ordinary meaning of the phrase “dumped imports” in its

context, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 3 of the AD Agreement, leads us to the

conclusion that the interpretation proposed by India is not required. As discussed above, we consider

that dumping is a determination made with reference to a product from a particular producer/exporter,

and not with reference to individual transactions. That is, the determination of dumping is made on the

basis of consideration of transactions involving a particular product from particular

producers/exporters. If the result of that consideration is a conclusion that the product in question from

particular producers/exporters is dumped, we are of the view that the conclusion applies to all imports

of that product from such source(s), at least over the period for which dumping was considered. Thus,

we consider that the investigating authority is entitled to consider all such imports in its analysis of

“dumped imports” under Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 6.139. “Our conclusion that investigating authorities may treat all imports from

producers/exporters for which an affirmative determination of dumping is made as “dumped imports”

for purposes of injury analysis under Article 3 is bolstered by our view that the interpretation proposed

by India, which entails the conclusion that the phrase “dumped imports” refers only to those imports

attributable to transactions in which export price is below normal value, would lead to an unworkable

result in certain cases. One of the objects and purposes of the AD Agreement is to establish the

conditions under which Members may impose anti-dumping duties in cases of injurious dumping. An

interpretation which would, in many cases, make it impossible to assess one of the necessary elements,

injury, is not consistent with that object and purpose.”

Para. 6.140. “An assessment of the volume, price effects, and consequent impact, only of imports

attributable to transactions for which a positive margin was calculated would be, in many cases,

impossible, or at least impracticable. Attempting to segregate individual transactions as to whether

they were “dumped” or not, even assuming it could be done, would leave investigating authorities in a

quandary in cases in which the dumping investigation is undertaken for a sample of companies or

products. Such sampling is specifically provided for in the AD Agreement, yet it would not be

possible, in such cases, accurately to determine the volume of imports attributable to “dumped”

transactions. Similarly, if dumping is determined on the basis of a comparison of weighted average

normal value to weighted average export price, there would be no comparisons concerning individual

transactions which could serve as the basis for segregating imports in “dumped” and “not-dumped”

categories.”

b) “Indústria Doméstica”

(i) Análise setorial

As autoridades investigadoras podem realizar uma avaliação de partes, setores ou segmentos

específicos dentro de uma indústria doméstica, desde que respeitem a obrigação fundamental do

Artigo 3.1 de realizar uma análise objetiva. Sendo o exame objetivo, a identificação, investigação e

avaliação dos fatores relevantes deve ser imparcial e com base em evidências positivas. No entanto, as

autoridades investigadoras devem, em princípio examinar, de igual modo, todas as partes que compõe

a indústria ou, alternativamente, deverão fornecer uma explicação satisfatória do porquê da não

necessidade de examinar direta ou especificamente as outras partes da indústria nacional. Além disso,

ao examinar apenas uma parte da indústria a autoridade pode falhar ao avaliar a relação econômica

entre a parte da indústria analisada e as outras partes da indústria, ou a indústria como um todo.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-

Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R,

paras. 195-197 e 204-206

Para. 195. “We see nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement which prevents a Member from

requiring that its investigating authorities examine, in every investigation, the potential relevance of a

particular “other factor”, not listed in Article 3.4, as part of its overall “examination” of the state of the

domestic industry. Similarly, it seems to us perfectly compatible with Article 3.4 for investigating

authorities to undertake, or for a Member to require its investigating authorities to undertake, an

evaluation of particular parts, sectors or segments within a domestic industry. Such a sectoral analysis

may be highly pertinent, from an economic perspective, in assessing the state of an industry as a

whole.”

Para. 196. “However, the investigating authorities' evaluation of the relevant factors must respect the

fundamental obligation, in Article 3.1, of those authorities to conduct an “objective examination”. If

an examination is to be “objective”, the identification, investigation and evaluation of the relevant

factors must be even-handed. Thus, investigating authorities are not entitled to conduct their

investigation in such a way that it becomes more likely that, as a result of the fact-finding or

evaluation process, they will determine that the domestic industry is injured.”

Para. 197. “Instead, Articles 3.1 and 3.4 indicate that the investigating authorities must determine,

objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence, the importance to be attached to each potentially

relevant factor and the weight to be attached to it. In every investigation, this determination turns on

the “bearing” that the relevant factors have “on the state of the [domestic] industry”.”

Para. 204. “We have already stated that it may be highly pertinent for investigating authorities to

examine a domestic industry by part, sector or segment. However, as with all other aspects of the

evaluation of the domestic industry, Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that such a

sectoral examination be conducted in an “objective” manner. In our view, this requirement means that,

where investigating authorities undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry, they

should, in principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up the industry, as well

as examine the industry as a whole. Or, in the alternative, the investigating authorities should provide

a satisfactory explanation as to why it is not necessary to examine directly or specifically the other

parts of the domestic industry. Different parts of an industry may exhibit quite different economic

performance during any given period. Some parts may be performing well, while others are

performing poorly. To examine only the poorly performing parts of an industry, even if coupled with

an examination of the whole industry, may give a misleading impression of the data relating to the

industry as a whole, and may overlook positive developments in other parts of the industry. Such an

examination may result in highlighting the negative data in the poorly performing part, without

drawing attention to the positive data in other parts of the industry. We note that the reverse may also

be true – to examine only the parts of an industry which are performing well may lead to overlooking

the significance of deteriorating performance in other parts of the industry.”

Para. 205. “Moreover, by examining only one part of an industry, the investigating authorities may

fail properly to appreciate the economic relationship between that part of the industry and the other

parts of the industry, or between one or more of those parts and the whole industry. (…).”

Para. 206. “Accordingly, an examination of only certain parts of a domestic industry does not ensure

a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic industry as a whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the

requirements of “objectiv[ity]” in Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

(ii) Produtores domésticos não incluídos na amostra

Mesmo que a autoridade investigadora considere uma amostra da indústria doméstica para análise do

dano, ela não é obrigada a ignorar informações disponíveis relativas às outras empresas que compõe a

indústria doméstica, uma vez que a autoridade deve basear suas conclusões em um exame objetivo

das evidências.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R (27), para. 6.181

Para. 6.181. “It is clear from the language of the AD Agreement, in particular Articles 3.1, 3.4, and

3.5, that the determination of injury has to be reached for the domestic industry that is the subject of

the investigation. Article 3.4 specifically requires that “The examination of the impact of the dumped

imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic

factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry (…)” (emphasis added). In this case,

the European Communities defined the domestic industry as 35 producers of the like product. In our

view, it would be anomalous to conclude that, because the European Communities chose to consider a

sample of the domestic industry, it was required to close its eyes to and ignore other information

available to it concerning the domestic industry it had defined. Such a conclusion would be

inconsistent with the fundamental underlying principle that anti-dumping investigations should be fair

and that investigating authorities should base their conclusions on an objective evaluation of the

evidence. It is not possible to have an objective evaluation of the evidence if some of the evidence is

required to be ignored, even though it relates precisely to the issues to be resolved. Thus, we consider

that the European Communities did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD

Agreement by taking into account in its analysis information regarding the Community industry as a

whole, including information pertaining to companies that were not included in the sample.”

(iii) Empresas não incluídas no conceito de indústria doméstica

Informações de empresas que não fazem parte da indústria doméstica, não fornecem nenhuma base

para conclusões sobre o impacto das importações objeto de dumping sobre a indústria.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R (28), para. 6.182

Para. 6.182. “(…) As we have noted, the determination of injury has to be reached for the domestic

industry as defined by the investigating authorities, in this case the 35 producers comprising the

“Community industry” as defined by the European Communities. In our view, information concerning

companies that are not within the domestic industry is irrelevant to the evaluation of the “relevant

economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry” required under Article 3.4.

This is true even though those companies may presently produce, or may have in the past produced,

the like product, bed linen. Information concerning the Article 3.4 factors for companies outside the

domestic industry provides no basis for conclusions about the impact of dumped imports on the

domestic industry itself. If other present or former bed linen producers had been considered part of the

domestic industry, the fact that some of them went out of business would be relevant to the evaluation

of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. But given that the European Communities

defined the domestic industry as 35 producers of bed linen, information concerning other companies

does not inform the evaluation of “factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry”

under Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, and thus cannot serve as the basis of findings regarding the

impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry.”

(iv) “Todos os Fatores e Índices Econômicos Relevantes que tenham Relação com a

Situação da Referida Indústria”

c) “Caráter Obrigatório ou Ilustrativo da Lista de Fatores”

O exame do impacto das importações objeto de dumping sobre a indústria doméstica em questão deve

incluir, obrigatoriamente, uma avaliação de cada um dos quinze fatores enumerados no Artigo 3.4,

mesmo que a autoridade investigadora conclua que um determinado fator não seja probatório da

situação de determinada indústria ou de determinado caso. A análise de cada um dos fatores listados

no Artigo 3.4 deve estar evidente/aparente na determinação final da autoridade investigadora.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R (29), paras. 6.154

e 6.156-6.157 e 6.159

Para. 6.154. “(…) The use of the phrase “shall include” in Article 3.4 strongly suggests to us that the

evaluation of the listed factors in that provision is properly interpreted as mandatory in all cases. That

is, in our view, the ordinary meaning of the provision is that the examination of the impact of dumped

imports must include an evaluation of all the listed factors in Article 3.4.”

Para. 6.156. “With regard to the use of the word “including”, we consider that this simply emphasises

that there may be other “relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the

industry” among “all” such factors that must be evaluated. We recall that, in the Tokyo Round AD

Code, the same list of factors was preceded by the phrase “such as”, which was changed to the word

“including” that now appears in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. The term “such as” is defined, inter

alia, as “Of the kind, degree, category being or about to be specified; for example”. (30) By contrast,

the verb “include” is defined, inter alia, to mean “enclose”; “contain as part of a whole or as a

subordinate element; contain by implication, involve”; or “place in a class or category; treat or regard

as part of a whole”. (31) We thus read the phrase “shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic

factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including (...)” as introducing a

mandatory list of relevant economic factors which must be evaluated in every case. The change in the

wording that was introduced in the Uruguay Round in our view supports an interpretation of the

current text of Article 3.4 as setting forth a list that is mandatory, and not merely indicative or

illustrative.” (32)

Para. 6.157. “The European Communities also focuses on the semicolons in the list of factors in

Article 3.4. However, in our view, neither the presence of semicolons separating certain groups of

factors in the text of Article 3.4, nor the presence of the word “or” within the first and fourth of these

groups, serves to render the mandatory list in Article 3.4 a list of only four “factors”. We further note

that the two “ors” appear within – rather than between – the groups of factors separated by semicolons.

Thus, we consider that the use of the term “or” here does not detract from the mandatory nature of the

textual requirement that “all relevant economic factors” shall be evaluated. With respect to the second

“or,” it appears in the phrase “ability to raise capital or investments”, which clearly indicates that the

factor that an investigating authority must examine is the “ability to raise capital” or the “ability to

raise investments”, or both.”

Para. 6.159. “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that each of the fifteen factors listed in Article 3.4

of the AD Agreement must be evaluated by the investigating authorities in each case in examining the

impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante EUA, WT/DS132/R (33),

para. 7.128

Para. 7.128. “In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be

considered in all cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a particular

case, consideration of which would also be required. In a threat of injury case, for instance, the

AD Agreement itself establishes that consideration of the Article 3.7 factors is also required. But

consideration of the Article 3.4 factors is required in every case, even though such consideration may

lead the investigating authority to conclude that a particular factor is not probative in the circumstances

of a particular industry or a particular case, and therefore is not relevant to the actual determination.

Moreover, the consideration of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final determination

of the investigating authority (34).”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping on Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non- Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R (35), paras. 7.225 e 7.229-7.230

Para. 7.225. “We note Thailand's argument that the list of factors in Article 3.4 is illustrative only, and

that no change in meaning was intended in the change in drafting from the “such as” that appeared in

the corresponding provision in the Tokyo Round Anti-dumping Code to the “including” that now

appears in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. (36) The term “such as” is defined as “[o]f the kind,

degree, category being or about to be specified” (…) “for example”. (37) By contrast, the verb

“include” is defined to mean “enclose”; “contain as part of a whole or as a subordinate element;

contain by implication, involve”; or “place in a class or category; treat or regard as part of a whole”.

(38) We thus read the Article 3.4 phrase “shall include an evaluation of all relevant factors and indices

having a bearing on the state of the industry, including (…)” as introducing a mandatory list of

relevant factors which must be evaluated in every case. We are of the view that the change that

occurred in the wording of the relevant provision during the Uruguay Round (from “such as” to

“including”) was made for a reason and that it supports an interpretation of the current text of Article

3.4 as setting forth a list that is not merely indicative or illustrative, but, rather, mandatory. (39)

Furthermore, we recall that the second sentence of Article 3.4 states: “This list is not exhaustive, nor

can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.” Thus, in a given case, certain

factors may be more relevant than others, and the weight to be attributed to any given factor may vary

from case to case. Moreover, there may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a

particular case, consideration of which would also be required.”

Para. 7.229. “We are of the view that the language in Article 3.4 makes it clear that all of the listed

factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all cases. The provision is specific and mandatory in this

regard. We do not consider that the presence of semi-colons separating certain groups of factors in the

text of Article 3.4, nor the presence of the word “or” within the first and fourth of these groups serve

to render the mandatory list in Article 3.4 a list of only four “factors”. We note that the two “ors”

appear within - rather than between - the groups of factors separated by semi-colons. The first “or” in

Article 3.4 appears at the end of a group of factors that may indicate declines in the domestic industry

(i.e. “actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on

investments, or utilization of capacity” (emphasis added)). In our view, the use of the word “or” here

is textually linked to the phrase “actual and potential decline”, and may indicate that such “declines”

need not occur in respect of each and every one of the factors listed in this group in order to support a

finding of injury. Thus, we do not consider that the use of the term “or” here detracts from the textual

requirement that “all relevant economic factors” be evaluated. Moreover, we note that this first group

of factors in Article 3.4 contains factors that all relate to, and are indicative of, the state of the

industry.” (40)

Para. 7.230. “With respect to the second “or,” we note that it appears in the phrase “ability to raise

capital or investments”. In our view, this “or” indicates that the factor that an investigating authority

must examine is “ability to raise capital” or “ability to raise investments”, or both.”

d) “Outros Fatores Não-Listados no Artigo 3.4”

A obrigação de avaliação imposta às autoridades investigadoras, no Artigo 3.4, não se limita aos

fatores listados, mas se estende a todos os fatores econômicos relevantes. Não há nada no Acordo

Anti-Dumping que impeça um Membro de solicitar às suas autoridades investigadoras que examinem,

em toda investigação, a potencial importância de um “outro fator”, não enumerado no Artigo 3.4,

como parte de seu exame geral sobre o estado da indústria doméstica.

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante EUA, WT/DS132/R (41),

para. 7.128

Para. 7.128. “The question which next must be answered is what is the nature of the consideration of

the Article 3.4 factors required in a threat of injury determination.” The text of Article 3.4 is

mandatory:

The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic

industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic

factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including

(…). (emphasis added).

In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all

cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a particular case,

consideration of which would also be required. In a threat of injury case, for instance, the AD Agreement

itself establishes that consideration of the Article 3.7 factors is also required. But consideration of the

Article 3.4 factors is required in every case, even though such consideration may lead the investigating

authority to conclude that a particular factor is not probative in the circumstances of a particular industry

or a particular case, and therefore is not relevant to the actual determination. Moreover, the consideration

of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final determination of the investigating

authority. (42)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-

Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R,

paras. 194

Para. 194. “As we noted, the obligations in Article 3.1 inform the obligations imposed in the remainder

of that provision. An important aspect of the “objective examination” required by Article 3.1 is further

elaborated in Article 3.4 as an obligation to “examin[e] the impact of the dumped imports on the

domestic industry” through “an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing

on the state of the industry”. Article 3.4 lists certain factors which are deemed to be relevant in every

investigation and which must always be evaluated by the investigating authorities. (43) However, the

obligation of evaluation imposed on investigating authorities, by Article 3.4, is not confined to the

listed factors, but extends to “all relevant economic factors”.”

(i) que tenham relação com

A expressão “que tenham relação com” pode significar “relevante” ou “tendo a ver com o estado da

indústria”, e nesse sentido é consistente com o fato de que muitos dos fatores enumerados no Artigo

3.4 descrevem ou indicam o estado da indústria. De forma geral, esses fatores estão mais relacionados

à natureza dos efeitos do que à natureza das causas.

Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from

Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.62-7.64

Para. 7.62. “Turkey's argument that Article 3.4 requires a full “non-attribution” analysis appears to

stem from its reading of the term “having a bearing on” as having to do exclusively with causation,

(i.e., as meaning factors having an effect on the state of the industry). There is another meaning of this

term which we find more pertinent in the overall context of Article 3.4, however. In particular, the

term “having a bearing on” can mean relevant to or having to do with the state of the industry (44),

and this meaning is consistent with the fact that many of the factors listed in Article 3.4 are descriptors

or indicators of the state of the industry, rather than being factors having an effect thereon. For

example, sales levels, profits, output, etc. are not in themselves causes of an industry's condition. They

are, rather, among the factual indicators by which that condition can be judged and assessed as injured

or not. Put another way, taken as a whole, these factors are more in the nature of effects than causes.”

Para. 7.63. “This reading of “having a bearing on” finds contextual support in the wording of the last

group of factors in Article 3.4, namely “actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,

(…)” (emphasis added). Further contextual support is found in the cross-reference to Article 3.4

contained in the first sentence of Article 3.5: “(…) the effects of dumping as set forth in paragraph[ ] 4

[of Article 3]”. (emphasis added)

Para. 7.64. “We note in addition that if Turkey were correct that the full causation analysis, including

non-attribution, were required by Article 3.4, this would effectively render redundant Article 3.5,

which explicitly addresses causation, including non-attribution. Such an outcome would not be in

keeping with the relevant principles of international treaty law interpretation, or with consistent

practice in WTO dispute settlement (45).”

e) “Avaliação dos Fatores Relevantes”

(i) Conceito de avaliação

Cada um dos fatores enumerados no Artigo 3.4 deve ser avaliado, não apenas para saber se é

“relevante” ou “irrelevante”. Tal avaliação deve ser minuciosa sobre o estado da indústria em questão

e conter uma explicação convincente de como a avaliação dos fatores relevantes levaram à

determinação do dano. Na avaliação das evidências de um determinado fator de dano, a autoridade

investigadora não deve apenas coletar dados, e sim analisar e interpretar esses dados.

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping on Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non- Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R (46), para. 7.236

Para. 7.236. “We are of the view that the “evaluation of all relevant factors” required under Article

3.4 must be read in conjunction with the overarching requirements imposed by Article 3.1 of “positive

evidence” and “objective examination” in determining the existence of injury. Therefore, in

determining that Article 3.4 contains a mandatory list of fifteen factors to be looked at, we do not

mean to establish a mere “checklist approach” that would consist of a mechanical exercise of merely

ensuring that each listed factor is in some way referred to by the investigating authority. It may well be

in the circumstances of a particular case that certain factors enumerated in Article 3.4 are not relevant,

that their relative importance or weight can vary significantly from case to case, or that some other

non-listed factors could be deemed relevant. Rather, we are of the view that Article 3.4 requires the

authorities properly to establish whether a factual basis exists to support a well-reasoned and

meaningful analysis of the state of the industry and a finding of injury. This analysis does not derive

from a mere characterization of the degree of “relevance or irrelevance” of each and every individual

factor, but rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry and, in light of the

last sentence of Article 3.4 (47), must contain a persuasive explanation as to how the evaluation of

relevant factors led to the determination of injury.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from

Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.43-7.44

Para. 7.43. “We first consider the ordinary meaning of the word “evaluation”. The Oxford English

Dictionary defines “evaluation” as follows:

(1) The action of appraising or valuing (goods, etc.); a calculation or statement

of value. (2) The action of evaluating or determining the value of (a

mathematical expression, a physical quantity, etc.), or of estimating the force

of (probabilities, evidence).” (48) (emphasis added)

The Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines “evaluation” as follows:

(1) To determine or fix the value of. (2) To determine the significance, worth,

or condition of usually by careful appraisal or study. (49) (emphasis added)

The Merriam-Webster's Thesaurus lists as synonyms for “evaluation” the following:

(1) appraisal, appraisement, assessment, estimation, valuation (with related

words: interpreting; judging, rating); (2) appraisal, appraisement, assessment, estimate, judgement, stock (with related words: appreciation;

interpretation; decision). (50)

Para. 7.44. “We find significant that all of these definitions and synonyms connote, particularly in the

context of “evaluation” of evidence, the act of analysis, judgement, or assessment. That is, the first

definition recited above refers to “estimating the force of” evidence, evoking a process of weighing

evidence and reaching conclusions thereon. The second definition recited above - to determine the

significance, worth, or condition of, usually by careful appraisal or study - confirms this meaning.

Thus, for an investigating authority to “evaluate” evidence concerning a given factor in the sense of

Article 3.4, it must not only gather data, but it must analyze and interpret those data.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (EC - Tube or Pipe), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R (51), para. 7.314

Para. 7.314. “The term “evaluate” is defined as: “To work out the value of (…); To reckon up,

ascertain the amount of; to express in terms of the known;” (52) “To determine or fix the value of; To

determine the significance, worth of condition of usually by careful appraisal or study.” (53) These

definitions reveal that an “evaluation” is a process of analysis and assessment requiring the exercise of

judgement on the part of the investigating authority. (54) It is not simply a matter of form, and the list

of relevant factors to be evaluated is not a mere checklist. (55) As the relative weight or significance of

a given factor may naturally vary from investigation to investigation, the investigating authority must

therefore assess the role, relevance and relative weight of each factor in the particular investigation.

Where the authority determines that certain factors are not relevant or do not weigh significantly in the

determination, the authority may not simply disregard such factors, but must explain their conclusion

as to the lack of relevance or significance of such factors. (56) The assessment of the relevance or

materiality of certain factors, including those factors that are judged to be not central to the decision,

must therefore be at least implicitly apparent from the determination. Silence on the relevance or

irrelevance of a given factor would not suffice. (57) Moreover, an evaluation of a factor, in our view,

is not limited to a mere characterisation of its relevance or irrelevance. (58) Rather, we believe that an

“evaluation” also implies the analysis of data through placing it in context in terms of the particular

evolution of the data pertaining to each factor individually, as well as in relation to other factors

examined. (59)(60)

(ii) Avaliação de todos os fatores listados

A avaliação de todos os fatores listados deve ser evidente nas conclusões das autoridades

investigadoras. As autoridades podem determinar que alguns fatores não são relevantes ou não têm um

peso significativo na sua decisão. No entanto, não podem simplesmente ignorar tais fatores, devendo

explicar a sua conclusão quanto à falta de relevância destes.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R (61), para. 6.162

Para. 6.162. “In other words, while the authorities may determine that some factors are not relevant or

do not weigh significantly in the decision, the authorities may not simply disregard such factors, but

must explain their conclusion as to the lack of relevance or significance of such factors. We agree.

Thus, we are of the view that every factor in Article 3.4 must be considered, and that the nature of this

consideration, including whether the investigating authority considered the factor relevant in its

analysis of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, must be apparent in the final

determination.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.283

Para. 8.283. “Before turning to Guatemala's analysis with respect to the factors in Article 3.4 we

would like to outline what is the task before us in this review. We note that Article 3.4 lists a series of

factors which it characterizes as relevant in an examination of whether the dumped imports had an

impact on the domestic industry. It also mentions that the list is non exhaustive, in other words, there

may also be other factors which although not listed may give guidance on the state of the industry. We

also note that Article 3.4 provides that the examination “shall include” all relevant economic factors

and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry and specifies that among those factors which

are considered relevant are those which listed therein. Thus, it is essential, in order to satisfy the

requirements in Article 3.4, to examine each of the factors listed in that provision. In our view

Article 3.4 establishes a rebuttable presumption that those factors listed are relevant in giving guidance

on whether the dumped imports have had an effect on the domestic industry. It is only after

consideration of the listed factors that the investigating authority may dismiss some of them as not

being relevant for the particular industry, thus in effect rebutting the presumption established in

Article 3.4. We are also of the view that the consideration of the factors in Article 3.4 must be

apparent in the determination so the Panel may assess whether the authority acted in accordance with

Article 3.4 at the time of the investigation.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R

(62), para. 161

Para. 161. “Accordingly, because Articles 3.1 and 3.4 do not regulate the manner in which the results

of the analysis of each injury factor are to be set out in the published documents, we share the Panel's

conclusion that it is not required that in every anti-dumping investigation a separate record be made of

the evaluation of each of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4. Whether a panel conducting an

assessment of an anti-dumping measure is able to find in the record sufficient and credible evidence to

satisfy itself that a factor has been evaluated, even though a separate record of the evaluation of that

factor has not been made, will depend on the particular facts of each case. Having said this, we believe

that, under the particular facts of this case, it was reasonable for the Panel to have concluded that the

European Commission addressed and evaluated the factor “growth”.”

5. Artigo 3.5

a) “Requisitos para a autoridade investigadora”

Esta disposição exige que as autoridades investigadoras examinem, em primeiro lugar, “todos os

fatores conhecidos”, “além das importações objeto de dumping”, as quais estão causando dano à

indústria nacional, “na mesma ocasião”. Em segundo lugar, as autoridades investigadoras devem

assegurar que os danos causados à indústria nacional por fatores conhecidos, outros que não as

importações objeto de dumping, não sejam “atribuídos às importações objeto de dumping”.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-

Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R,

paras. 221-222

Para. 221. “We observe that the issue raised on appeal is confined to the Panel's interpretation and

application of the non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and does

not relate to the Panel's finding that there is no requirement that dumped imports alone be capable of

causing injury.” The relevant part of Article 3.5 reads:

It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of

dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning

of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the

dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an

examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities

shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at

the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by

these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.

Para. 222. “This provision requires investigating authorities, as part of their causation analysis, first,

to examine all “known factors”, “other than dumped imports”, which are causing injury to the

domestic industry “at the same time” as dumped imports. Second, investigating authorities must

ensure that injuries which are caused to the domestic industry by known factors, other than dumped

imports, are not “attributed to the dumped imports.”

b) “Não atribuição”

Esse texto se aplica “apenas à situações em que as importações objeto de dumping e outros fatores

conhecidos estejam causando dano à indústria doméstica ao mesmo tempo”. Logicamente, essa

avaliação envolve a separação e a distinção do dano causado por outros fatores, daquele dano causado

pelas importações a preços de dumping. A ausência de tal separação não fornece às autoridades

investigadoras uma base racional para concluir que o dano está sendo causado pelas importações a

preços de dumping, justificando a imposição de direitos anti-dumping.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-

Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R,

para. 223

Para. 223. “The non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies

solely in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing injury to the domestic

industry at the same time. In order that investigating authorities, applying Article 3.5, are able to

ensure that the injurious effects of the other known factors are not “attributed” to dumped imports,

they must appropriately assess the injurious effects of those other factors. Logically, such an

assessment must involve separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from

the injurious effects of the dumped imports. If the injurious effects of the dumped imports are not

appropriately separated and distinguished from the injurious effects of the other factors, the authorities

will be unable to conclude that the injury they ascribe to dumped imports is actually caused by those

imports, rather than by the other factors. Thus, in the absence of such separation and distinction of the

different injurious effects, the investigating authorities would have no rational basis to conclude that

the dumped imports are indeed causing the injury which, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement,

justifies the imposition of anti-dumping duties.”

c) “Importações a preços de dumping”

A determinação do dumping é feita com base na análise de operações de venda que envolva um

produto específico de determinados produtores/exportadores. Se a conclusão desse exame for de que o

produto em questão é exportado a preços de dumping, tal conclusão se aplicará a todas as importações

desse produto com origem idêntica. Assim, a autoridade investigadora tem o direito de considerar

todas as importações em sua análise de “importações objeto de dumping”, nos termos dos Artigos 3.1,

3.4 e 3.5 do Acordo Acordo Anti-Dumping. O Painel no caso EC - Bed Linen rejeitou o argumento de

que “as importações objeto de dumping” deveriam ser entendidas como referentes apenas às

importações em operações cujo preço de exportação estava abaixo do valor normal.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R (63), paras. 6.134-

6.136

Para. 6.134. “There is no dispute between the parties as to the facts with respect to the consideration

of imports as dumped during the period of the dumping investigation. The European Communities

explicitly acknowledges that it considered all imports from the three countries investigated, India,

Egypt and Pakistan, as dumped, and considered the volume and price effects of all imports from those

countries during that period in evaluating whether injury was caused by dumped imports. India asserts

that the European Communities was only entitled to consider as dumped imports in its injury analysis

those imports attributable to specific transactions as to which dumping was actually found during the

period of the dumping investigation.”

Para. 6.135. “Thus, we are faced with the question of the interpretation of the term “dumped imports”

in Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, rather than an assessment of the facts as such. If we

were to conclude that the term “dumped imports” may be understood to comprise the volume of

imports of the product in question from the country for which an affirmative determination of

dumping has been made then we must, under the standard of review set forth in Article 17.6 (ii), find

in favor of the European Communities on this issue, at least with respect to the consideration of

imports during the period of the dumping investigation. On the other hand, to sustain India's position,

we would have to conclude that the phrase “dumped imports” must be understood to refer only to

imports which are the subject of transactions in which export price was below normal value, which

India considers to be “dumping” transactions.”

Para. 6.136. “However, consideration of the ordinary meaning of the phrase “dumped imports” in its

context, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 3 of the AD Agreement, leads us to the

conclusion that the interpretation proposed by India is not required. As discussed above, we consider

that dumping is a determination made with reference to a product from a particular producer/exporter,

and not with reference to individual transactions. That is, the determination of dumping is made on the

basis of consideration of transactions involving a particular product from particular

producers/exporters. If the result of that consideration is a conclusion that the product in question from

particular producers/exporters is dumped, we are of the view that the conclusion applies to all imports

of that product from such source(s), at least over the period for which dumping was considered. Thus,

we consider that the investigating authority is entitled to consider all such imports in its analysis of

“dumped imports” under Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.”

d) “Qualquer outro fator conhecido, além das importações a preços de dumping”

(i) Conceito de “fatores conhecidos”

Outros fatores “conhecidos” incluem variáveis “claramente suscitadas perante a autoridade

investigadora pelas partes interessadas, no curso de uma investigação anti-dumping”, e as autoridades

investigadoras não são obrigadas a buscar esses fatores por sua própria iniciativa.

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/AB/R (64), para. 7.273

Para. 7.273. “The text of Article 3.5 refers to “known” factors other than the dumped imports which

at the same time are injuring the domestic industry but does not make clear how factors are “known”

or are to become “known” to the investigating authorities. We consider that other “known” factors

would include those causal factors that are clearly raised before the investigating authorities by

interested parties in the course of an AD investigation. We are of the view that there is no express

requirement in Article 3.5 AD that investigating authorities seek out and examine in each case on their

own initiative the effects of all possible factors other than imports that may be causing injury to the

domestic industry under investigation. Of course, they would certainly not be precluded from doing so

if they chose to. We note that there may be cases where, at the time of the investigation, a certain

factor may be “known” to the investigating authorities without being known to the interested parties.

In such a case, an issue might arise as to whether the authorities would be compelled to examine such

a known factor that is affecting the state of the domestic industry. However, it has not been argued that

such factors are present in this case.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on

Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fitings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante:

Brasil, WT/DS219/AB/R, para. 178

Para. 178. “Thus, we agree with the Panel that “the European Communities did examine these factors,

and, in light of its findings, did not perceive of them as 'known' causal factors.” However, we disagree

with the Panel's apparent understanding of the term “known” in Article 3.5. We understand the Panel,

in rejecting this aspect of Brazil's claim under Article 3.5, to have stated that the alleged causal factor

was “known” to the European Commission in the context of its dumping and injury analyses, but that

the factor was nevertheless not “known” in the context of its causality analysis. In our view, a factor is

either “known” to the investigating authority, or it is not “known”; it cannot be “known” in one stage

of the investigation and unknown in a subsequent stage. This does not, however, affect our finding,

which is premised on the fact that once the cost of production difference was found by the European

Commission to be “minimal”, the factor claimed by Brazil to be “injuring the domestic industry” had

effectively been found not to exist. As such, there was no “factor” for the European Commission to

“examine” further pursuant to Article 3.5.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.289

Para. 8.269. “In our examination concerning the Ministry's evaluation of the volume of the dumped

imports we found that Guatemala acted in violation of Article 3.5 by failing to consider other factors

known to the investigating authority which may also be a cause of injury. In light of that finding, we

are of the view that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to further consider Mexico's claims

concerning a violation of Article 3.5.”

(ii) Lista ilustrativa dos “fatores conhecidos”

A lista de outros fatores conhecidos que possam estar causando dano, enumerados neste Artigo, é

meramente ilustrativa.

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R (65), para. 7.274

Para. 7.274. “We note Poland's argument that the final determination shows “no examination of all

relevant evidence before the authorities, including no examination of why the factors enumerated in

Article 3.5 Anti-Dumping Agreement were or were not themselves relevant”. We do not agree with

the apparent view of Poland that the factors enumerated in Article 3.5 AD constitute a mandatory list

of factors that must necessarily be examined by the investigating authorities in every case.

Consequently, we do not view it as necessary for the relevant documents to reflect that each and every

factor enumerated in Article 3.5 was examined. In our view, the language of the text of Article 3.5

(“factors which may be relevant… include…”) is in stark contrast to the specific and mandatory

language we have addressed above in the context of Article 3.4. The text of Article 3.5 indicates that

the list of other possible causal factors enumerated in that provision is illustrative. Thus, while the

listed factors in Article 3.5 might be relevant in many cases, and the list contains useful guidance as to

the kinds of factors other than imports that might cause injury to the domestic industry, the specific list

in Article 3.5 is not itself mandatory.”

e) “Metodologia de não atribuição”

As autoridades investigadoras devem fazer uma avaliação adequada do dano causado à indústria

doméstica por outros fatores conhecidos, e devem separar e distinguir os efeitos prejudiciais das

importações investigadas dos efeitos prejudiciais dos outros fatores. Isso requer uma explicação

satisfatória sobre a natureza e extensão dos efeitos prejudiciais dos outros fatores, distinguindo-os dos

efeitos prejudiciais das importações objeto de dumping. O Órgão de Apelação ressaltou que não há

uma previsão no Acordo Anti-Dumping sobre os métodos pelos quais os Membros da OMC realizam

esse processo de separação dos efeitos.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-

Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R,

paras. 223-224 e 228

Para. 223. “The non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies

solely in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing injury to the domestic

industry at the same time. In order that investigating authorities, applying Article 3.5, are able to

ensure that the injurious effects of the other known factors are not “attributed” to dumped imports,

they must appropriately assess the injurious effects of those other factors. Logically, such an

assessment must involve separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from

the injurious effects of the dumped imports. If the injurious effects of the dumped imports are not

appropriately separated and distinguished from the injurious effects of the other factors, the authorities

will be unable to conclude that the injury they ascribe to dumped imports is actually caused by those

imports, rather than by the other factors. Thus, in the absence of such separation and distinction of the

different injurious effects, the investigating authorities would have no rational basis to conclude that

the dumped imports are indeed causing the injury which, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement,

justifies the imposition of anti-dumping duties.”

Para. 224. “We emphasize that the particular methods and approaches by which WTO Members

choose to carry out the process of separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of dumped

imports from the injurious effects of the other known causal factors are not prescribed by the Anti-

Dumping Agreement. What the Agreement requires is simply that the obligations in Article 3.5 be

respected when a determination of injury is made.”

Para. 228. “(…) We recognize, therefore, that it may not be easy, as a practical matter, to separate and

distinguish the injurious effects of different causal factors. However, although this process may not be

easy, this is precisely what is envisaged by the non-attribution language. If the injurious effects of the

dumped imports and the other known factors remain lumped together and indistinguishable, there is

simply no means of knowing whether injury ascribed to dumped imports was, in reality, caused by

other factors. Article 3.5, therefore, requires investigating authorities to undertake the process of

assessing appropriately, and separating and distinguishing, the injurious effects of dumped imports

from those of other known causal factors.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fitings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS219/AB/R, paras. 191-192

Para. 191. “In contrast, we do not find that an examination of collective effects is necessarily required

by the non-attribution language of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In particular, we are of the view that

Article 3.5 does not compel, in every case, an assessment of the collective effects of other causal

factors, because such an assessment is not always necessary to conclude that injuries ascribed to

dumped imports are actually caused by those imports and not by other factors.”

Para. 192. “We believe that, depending on the facts at issue, an investigating authority could

reasonably conclude, without further inquiry into collective effects, that “the injury (…) ascribe[d] to

dumped imports is actually caused by those imports, rather than by the other factors.” At the same

time, we recognize that there may be cases where, because of the specific factual circumstances

therein, the failure to undertake an examination of the collective impact of other causal factors would

result in the investigating authority improperly attributing the effects of other causal factors to dumped

imports. We are therefore of the view that an investigating authority is not required to examine the

collective impact of other causal factors, provided that, under the specific factual circumstances of the

case, it fulfills its obligation not to attribute to dumped imports the injuries caused by other causal

factors.”

6. Artigo 3.6

a) “Da análise da produção da indústria doméstica”

O Acordo Anti-Dumping não determina um método específico de análise da indústria doméstica a ser

utilizado, porém, circunstâncias e segmentos específicos da indústria podem vir a ser analisados,

desde que todos os fatores relevantes sobre o estado da indústria doméstica tenham sido considerados

pelas autoridades investigadoras. Também não consta no Acordo Anti-Dumping qualquer

impedimento para uma análise setorial da indústria ou mercado. No entanto, uma análise restrita a

uma parcela da produção nacional vendida em um setor específico do mercado não será suficiente

para a determinação do dano ou da ameaça de dano à indústria doméstica. Uma vez definidas as

entidades que compõem a indústria doméstica, as autoridades investigadoras deverão procurar basear

as suas determinações nos dados dessas entidades.

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructosa Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demadndante: México, WT/DS132/R e

WT/DS132/AB/RW (66), paras. 7.154, 7.157 e 7.160

Para. 7.154. “It is important to differentiate the consideration of factors relevant to the injury analysis

on a sectoral basis, so as to gain a better understanding of the actual functioning of the domestic

industry and its specific markets and thus of the impact of imports on the industry, from the

determination of injury or threat of injury on the basis of information regarding only production sold

in one specific market sector, to the exclusion of the remainder of the domestic industry's production.

There is certainly nothing in the AD Agreement which precludes a sectoral analysis of the industry

and/or market. Indeed, in many cases, such an analysis can yield a better understanding of the effects

of imports, and more thoroughly reasoned analysis and conclusion. However, this does not mean that

an analysis limited to that portion of the domestic industry's production sold in one market sector is

sufficient for establishing injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry, consistently with the AD

Agreement. It is undisputed in this case that SECOFI defined the domestic industry as consisting of all

sugar producers. What SECOFI failed to do, however, was assess the question of injury to those

producers on the basis of their production of the like product, sugar. Instead, it assessed the question of

threat of injury only with reference to that portion of sugar producers' production that was sold in the

industrial market, and took no account of the fact that almost half of production was sold in the

household market.”

Para. 7.157. “Article 3.6 does not, on its face, allow the determination of injury or threat of injury on

the basis of the portion of the domestic industry's production sold in one sector of the domestic market,

rather than on the basis of the industry as a whole. Indeed, Article 3.6 relates to a situation different

from that at issue here. Article 3.6 provides for the situation where information concerning the

production of the like product, such as producers' profits and sales, cannot be separately identified. In

such cases, Article 3.6 allows the authority to consider information concerning production of a broader

product group than the like product produced by the domestic industry, which includes the like

product, in evaluating the effect of imports. Nothing in Article 3.6 allows the investigating authority to

consider information concerning production of a product sub-group that is narrower than the like

product produced by the domestic industry. In particular, nothing in Article 3.6 allows the

investigating authority to limit its examination of injury to an analysis of the portion of domestic

production of the like product sold in the particular market sector where competition with the dumped

imports is most direct.”

Para. 7.160. “SECOFI's approach amounts to determining threat of injury to a sector of the domestic

industry, that producing sugar for the industrial market, rather than on the basis of the domestic

industry as a whole, despite the fact that the sugar sold in one market is indistinguishable from that

sold in the other (except by the identity of the purchaser) and all sugar producers apparently sold sugar

in both markets. SECOFI's reasoning for undertaking this approach was basically that sugar

production destined for household consumption cannot be hurt by dumped imports of HFCS. In

SECOFI's view, injury or threat of injury should be determined only for that segment of domestic

production which directly competes with subject imports. As noted above, while an analysis of the

particular sector in which the competition between the domestic industry and dumped imports is most

direct is certainly allowed under the AD Agreement, such an analysis does not excuse the investigating

authority from making the determination required by that Agreement – whether dumped imports injure

or threaten injury to the domestic industry as a whole. By limiting its analysis to the portion of the

domestic industry's production sold in the industrial market, SECOFI ignored possible effects of

imports on the portion of the domestic industry's production sold in the household sector, and ignored

the effect of the household sector on the condition of the domestic producers of sugar. Thus, SECOFI

failed to make a determination of threat of material injury to the domestic industry as a whole

consistently with the requirements of the AD Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (Japan - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R e

WT/DS184/AB/R (67), para. 195

Para. 195. “In our view, the AD Agreement thus clearly requires an investigating authority to make a

final determination as to “injury” as defined in the Agreement to the industry as a whole. However, the

Agreement does not prescribe a particular method of analysis. Specific circumstances might well call

for specific attention to be given to various aspects of the industry's performance or to specific

segments of the industry, as long as the end-result of this analysis is consistent with the Agreement's

requirement to examine and evaluate all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the industry

and demonstrate a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic

industry.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from

Guatemala (Mexico - Steel Pipes and Tubes), Demandante: Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, paras.

7.325-7.326

Para. 7.325. “We turn to the issue raised by Guatemala that Mexico violated Article 3.1 and other

relevant obligations in Article 3 as it did not use a consistent and representative data-set pertaining to

the “domestic industry”, as this was defined by Economía, in conducting its injury analysis. Within

this context, we consider whether Economía's collection and reliance upon economic injury data

relating to three firms constituting 88 per cent of national production, and financial injury data

pertaining to only one firm constituting 53 per cent of national production was consistent with

Mexico's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 concerning injury to the “domestic industry”

as that term is defined in Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.326. “We are of the view that once an investigating authority defines which entities comprise

the domestic industry that will form the basis for its injury analysis, it should seek and use a consistent

data-set reflecting the performance of those entities. We understand that, in practice, an investigating

authority could have partial information to start an investigation, which might then be supplemented as

the investigation proceeds. An investigating authority may also be confronted with problematic

incomplete data furnished by one or more domestic producers. In such a case, it should request

supplementary information, or, if that is not practicable, resort to a reasonable estimation methodology

which will yield results that are reflective of the state of the domestic industry. This is because the

requirement is to determine whether the domestic industry, as defined, is injured by dumped imports

or not.’

7. Artigo 3.7

a) “Mudanças de circunstâncias”

A questão central na investigação da ameaça de dano é se haverá uma “mudança de circunstância”

que fará com que o dumping praticado comece a causar danos à indústria doméstica. Para avaliar a

probabilidade da ocorrência de mudança nas circunstâncias, é necessário conhecer em primeiro lugar

a condição da indústria nacional e avaliar também o impacto que essas importações teriam sobre os

produtores do produto investigado.

Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from

Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R (68), paras. 7.91 e 7.93

Para. 7.91. “Thus, the text of this provision makes explicit that in a threat of injury investigation, the

central question is whether there will be a “change in circumstances” that would cause the dumping to

begin to injure the domestic industry. Solely as a matter of logic, it would seem necessary, in order to

assess the likelihood that a particular change in circumstances would cause an industry to begin

experiencing present material injury, to know about the condition of the domestic industry at the

outset. For example, if an industry is increasing its production, sales, employment, etc., and is earning

a record level of profits, even if dumped imports are increasing rapidly, presumably it would be more

difficult for an investigating authority to conclude that it is threatened with imminent injury than if its

production, sales, employment, profits and other indicators are low and/or declining.”

Para. 7.93. “Applying this definition to Article 3.1, it is clear that any injury investigation, whether

the question is present material injury, threat thereof, or material retardation, must “involve an

objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped

imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these

imports on domestic producers of such products” (emphasis added). It is in turn Article 3.4 which

governs “the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry”. Thus, in

short, the Article 3.4 factors must be examined in every investigation, no matter which particular

manifestation or form of injury is at issue in a given investigation.”

b) “Exigência de se ‘considerar’ os fatores do Artigo 3.7”

A fim de se determinar se houve uma mudança nas circunstâncias, faz-se necessária a análise de todos

os fatores constantes no Artigo 3.7, cumulativamente.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Investigation of the International Trade Comission in

Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá,

WT/DS277/AB/RW, para. 158

Para. 158. “We also note that, according to Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article

15.7 of the SCM Agreement, a finding of threat of material injury must be based on the “totality of the

factors considered”. In this case, several closely inter-related factors are at play in the USITC's

determination of threat of material injury. Contested facts underlie the analysis of both the specific

threat factors and of those factors acting collectively. For example, in order to assess whether the

evidence supports the USITC's determination that imports were increasing at a “significant” rate,

indicating a likelihood of “substantially” increased importation, we would have to review the data on

the trends in the volume of imports, the effects of the SLA during the period of investigation, and the

impact of its expiration, as well as the USITC's findings concerning Canadian excess capacity. The

record indicates that the effect of the SLA is a matter that is highly contested between the participants.

Indeed, at the oral hearing, Canada referred to this as “the single most litigated issue” before the

USITC during the initial investigation. Canada also contested the USITC's findings concerning the

SLA in these Article 21.5 proceedings. (69) Likewise, Canada challenged the USITC's findings

concerning Canadian capacity in these Article 21.5 proceedings. (70) The USITC's finding of adverse

price effects is premised on its finding of likelihood of increased imports. Thus, it would not be

possible to assess the USITC's finding of price effects without having reached a conclusion on the

USITC's finding of increased importation. The task of assessing the USITC's examination of price

effects is further complicated by the need to review extremely detailed factual issues, such as the

comparability between species and the use of composite price index.”

c) “Indicativa de provável aumento substancial nas importações”

Para que se realize uma análise adequada de indicativa de provável aumento substancial nas

importações é necessário avaliar os fatos e fornecer uma explicação fundamentada das conclusões

relacionadas aos efeitos de tais indicativas de aumento das importações. Não descartar a possibilidade

de aumento das importações não é uma demonstração positiva do provável aumento substancial destas

importações.

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Frutose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (México - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R (71),

paras. 7.174-7.175 e 7.177

Para. 7.174. “A first question in this regard is whether the existence of the alleged agreement could,

or should, have been determined by SECOFI as a matter of fact on the basis of the investigative

record. Mexico asserts that SECOFI lacks authority to make determinations in this regard. In our view,

the question for purposes of an anti-dumping investigation is not whether an alleged restraint

agreement in violation of Mexican law existed, an issue which might well be beyond the jurisdiction

of an anti-dumping authority to resolve, but whether there was evidence of and arguments concerning

the effect of the alleged restraint agreement, which, if it existed, would be relevant to the analysis of

the likelihood of increased dumped imports in the near future. If the latter is the case, in our view, the

investigating authority is obliged to consider the effects of such an alleged agreement, assuming it

exists. This is the analysis Mexico argues SECOFI undertook.”

Para. 7.175. “The question before us is whether SECOFI's analysis provides a reasoned explanation

for its conclusion that, assuming such an agreement existed, there was nonetheless a likelihood of

substantially increased importation”.

Para. 7.177. “Mexico's contention that users of imported HFCS other than soft-drink bottlers could

have increased their consumption in amounts sufficient to constitute a substantial increase in imports

is in our view questionable. However, even assuming this to be the case, there is no discussion in the

final determination of the share of imports and domestic production consumed by soft-drink bottlers,

other beverage manufacturers, and other industrial users, and the degree of substitutability of HFCS

and sugar in their products. Moreover, the alleged restraint agreement affected purchasers accounting

for 68 per cent of the imports, suggesting that it would at least slow any further increases in imports.

In addition, most other purchasers' ability to substitute HFCS for sugar was limited, suggesting that, if

the alleged restraint agreement existed, any further increases in imports would be less than they had

been in the past. None of these elements is addressed in SECOFI's final determination. We note,

moreover, that the final determination states that the alleged restraint agreement does not “rule out the

possibility” (emphasis added) that bottlers and other users would continue their purchases of imported

HFCS. However, not ruling out the possibility that imports would continue does not support the

conclusion that there is a “likelihood of substantially increased importation” (emphasis added), as

provided for in Article 3.7(i).”

d) “Análise do Consequente Impacto das Importações a Preços de Dumping na Indústria

Doméstica”

Apesar do Artigo 3.7 não requerer expressamente que se faça a análise do consequente impacto das

importações a preços de dumping nos indicadores da indústria doméstica, tal análise deve ser

realizada nos termos do Artigo 3.4. Mesmo que não exista uma metodologia determinada para a

avaliação do “consequente impacto” das importações, as autoridades investigadoras devem avaliar: (i)

a evolução dos preços das importações investigadas; (ii) o efeito desses preços sobre os preços do

produto similar no mercado doméstico; e (iii) a demanda por novas importações.

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Frutose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (México - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R (72),

paras. 7.125-7.128

Para. 7.125. “Moreover, it is clear that in making a determination regarding the threat of material

injury, the investigating authority must conclude that “material injury would occur” (emphasis added)

in the absence of an anti-dumping duty or price undertaking. A determination that material injury

would occur cannot, in our view, be made solely on the basis of consideration of the Article 3.7

factors. Rather, it must include consideration of the likely impact of further dumped imports on the

domestic industry.”

Para. 7.126. “While an examination of the Article 3.7 factors is required in a threat of injury case, that

analysis alone is not a sufficient basis for a determination of threat of injury, because the Article 3.7

factors do not relate to the consideration of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic

industry. The Article 3.7 factors relate specifically to the questions of the likelihood of increased

imports (based on the rate of increase of imports, the capacity of exporters to increase exports, and the

availability of other export markets), the effects of imports on future prices and likely future demand

for imports, and inventories. They are not, in themselves, relevant to a decision concerning what the

“consequent impact” of continued dumped imports on the domestic industry is likely to be. However,

it is precisely this latter question – whether the “consequent impact” of continued dumped imports is

likely to be material injury to the domestic industry - which must be answered in a threat of material

injury analysis. Thus, we conclude that an analysis of the consequent impact of imports is required in a

threat of material injury determination.”

Para. 7.127. “Turning to the question of the nature of the analysis required, we note that Article 3.4 of

the AD Agreement sets forth factors to be evaluated in the examination of the impact of dumped

imports on the domestic industry. Nothing in the text or context of Article 3.4 limits consideration of

the Article 3.4 factors to cases involving material injury. To the contrary, as noted above, Article 3.1

requires that a determination of “injury”, which includes threat of material injury, involve an

examination of the impact of imports, while Article 3.4 sets forth factors relevant to that examination.

Article 3.7 requires that the investigating authorities determine whether, in the absence of protective

action, material injury would occur. In our view, consideration of the Article 3.4 factors in examining

the consequent impact of imports is required in a case involving threat of injury in order to make a

determination consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.7.”

Para. 7.128. “The question which next must be answered is what is the nature of the consideration of

the Article 3.4 factors required in a threat of injury determination.” The text of Article 3.4 is

mandatory:

The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic

industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic

factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including

(…). (emphasis added).

In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all

cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a particular case,

consideration of which would also be required. In a threat of injury case, for instance, the AD

Agreement itself establishes that consideration of the Article 3.7 factors is also required. But

consideration of the Article 3.4 factors is required in every case, even though such consideration may

lead the investigating authority to conclude that a particular factor is not probative in the

circumstances of a particular industry or a particular case, and therefore is not relevant to the actual

determination. Moreover, the consideration of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the

final determination of the investigating authority.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber

from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/AB/RW, para. 151

Para. 151. “Article 3.7(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.7(iv) of the SCM

Agreement state that investigating authorities should consider, as part of their determination of threat

of injury, “whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing

effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports”. These provisions do

not prescribe a particular methodology for the examination of the price effects of dumped/subsidized

imports. Regardless of the methodology followed by an investigating authority, it is clear from the

plain language of these provisions that the authority must examine: (i) the trends in the prices at which

“imports are entering”; (ii) the “effect” of those prices on “domestic prices”; and (iii) the “demand for

further imports”. Discerning the “effect” of prices of imports on domestic prices necessarily calls for

an analysis of the interaction between the two. Otherwise, the links between the prices of imports and

the depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and the consequent likelihood of a “demand

for further imports” may not be properly established.”

8. Artigo 3.8

a) “Especial cuidado”

O adjetivo “especial” é definido como: excepcional, incomum, fora do comum. E o substantivo

“cuidado” é definido como: séria atenção, cautela, esforço, respeito. Espera-se, portanto, que ao

determinar a ameaça do dano, ou seja, antes da aplicação de uma medida, seja verificada a existência

de todos os pré-requisitos para tal, agindo com cuidado reforçado.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber

from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/R (73), para. 7.33-

7.34

Para. 7.33. “The adjective “special” is defined as, inter alia, “Exceptional in quality or degree;

unusual; out of the ordinary”. The noun “care” is defined, inter alia, as “Serious attention, heed;

caution, pains, regard”. Thus, it seems clear to us that a degree of attention over and above that

required of investigating authorities in all anti-dumping and countervailing duty injury cases is

required in the context of cases involving threat of material injury. We note that Articles 3.8 and 15.8

explicitly state that “the application of measures shall be considered and decided with special care”

(emphasis added). Thus, it might be argued that the provision comes into play only after the

investigation and consideration of all the relevant factors set out in other provisions of Articles 3 and

15 concerning the analysis of injury. However, we consider that such a conclusion is not appropriate in

the context of Article 3.8 of the AD Agreement or Article 15.8 of the SCM Agreement. These

provisions are part of the Article of each Agreement, Articles 3 and 15, which, governs the overall

determination of injury, which under both Agreements is defined as including threat of material injury.

Articles 3.7 and 15.7, set forth factors specific to the determination of threat of material injury, and

state that investigating authorities shall base a determination of threat of material injury on facts and

not allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. In our view, Articles 3.8 and 15.8 reinforce this

fundamental obligation. Thus, we consider that Article 3.8 and Article 15.8 apply during the process

of investigation and determination of threat of material injury, that is, in the establishment of whether

the prerequisites for application of a measure exist, and not merely afterward when final decisions

whether to apply a measure are taken.”

Para. 7.34. “Thus, we are faced with the question of what is entailed by this obligation to act with an

enhanced degree of attention, so as to demonstrate compliance with the “special care” obligation. The

Agreements require, as noted above, an objective evaluation based on positive evidence in making any

injury determination, including one based on threat of material injury. Canada has not asserted any

specific legal requirements with respect to special care – it has made no arguments as to what it

considers might constitute the special care required by the Agreements in threat cases. It is not clear to

us what the parameters of such “special care” in the context of an objective evaluation based on

positive evidence would be. In these circumstances, we consider it appropriate to consider alleged

violations of Articles 3.8 and 15.8 only after consideration of the alleged violations of specific

provisions. While we do not consider that a violation of the special care obligation could not be

demonstrated in the absence of a violation of the more specific provision of the Agreements governing

injury determinations, we believe such a demonstration would require additional or independent

arguments concerning the asserted violation of the special care requirement beyond the arguments in

support of the specific violations.”

Footnote 26: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 27: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 28: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 29: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 30: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.

Footnote 31: Id.

Footnote 32: Article 3.2 of the DSU directs panels to clarify the provisions of the covered agreements “in accordance with

customary rules of interpretation of public international law”, which are set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna

Convention. See, e.g., Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS8/AB/R–WT/DS10/AB/R–

WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, pp.10-12. Here, we look to negotiating history pursuant to Article 32 of the

Vienna Convention in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the general rule of interpretation in

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.

Footnote 33: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já

que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 34: In this regard, we note the text of Article 12.2.2, which provides: “A public notice of conclusion or suspension

of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance

of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the

matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures (…)”.

Footnote 35: Órgão de Apelação concordou com as conclusões do Painel relativas ao Artigo 3.4

Footnote 36: As a third party, the European Communities was also of the view that the list in Article 3.4 was illustrative

despite the change in language from “such as” in the relevant Tokyo Round Code provision to “including” in current Article

3.4. See EC third party submission, Annex 3-1, para. 41 and EC Response to Panel Question 13, Annex 3-7. Japan

submitted that the change in terminology indicated that each factor listed in Article 3.4 must be evaluated. See Response of

Japan to Panel Question 13, Annex 3-8. The United States was of the view that the change in terminology “clarified the

need for the authority to evaluate each and every listed factor that is relevant to the state of the industry”. See US Response

to Panel Question 13, Annex 3-9.

Footnote 37: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1993).

Footnote 38: Id.

Footnote 39: Article 3.2 DSU directs panels to clarify the provisions of the covered agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”, which are set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See e.g.

Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, pp.10-12. Here, we look to negotiating history pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of

the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.

Footnote 40: “We note that Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, which contains a requirement that the investigating authorities “shall evaluate all relevant factors…having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, (…) changes in the level of sales,

production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment” has been interpreted to require an evaluation of each of these listed factors having a bearing on the state of the industry. See Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, para. 136 and Panel Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Footwear, WT/DS121/R, adopted 12 January 2000, para. 8.123. While the standard for injury in safeguards cases (“serious injury”) is different from that applied to injury determinations in the anti-dumping context (“material injury”), the same type of analysis is provided for

in the respective covered agreements, i.e. evaluation or examination of a listed series of factors in order to determine whether the requisite

injury exists.”

Footnote 41: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 42: In this regard, we note the text of Article 12.2.2, which provides: “A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of a price undertaking

shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which

have led to the imposition of final measures (…)”.

Footnote 43: Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Steel, supra, footnote 36, para. 128.

Footnote 44: For example, Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, 1986, at p.123, includes as a definition of “bearing”: “relevant meaning, appreciation, relation [the evidence had no bearing on the case]”.

Footnote 45: Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (“US – Gasoline”), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I,3. On page 23 of the Appellate Body Report it is stated: “(…) One of the corollaries of

the 'general rule of interpretation' in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty.

An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”

Footnote 46: Órgão de Apelação concordou com as conclusões do Painel relativas ao Artigo 3.4.

Footnote 47: This sentence reads: “This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.”

Footnote 48: Oxford English Dictionary Online: http://dictionary.oed.com.

Footnote 49: Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary online: http://www.m-w.com.

Footnote 50: Merriam-Webster's Thesaurus online: http://www.m-w.com.

Footnote 51: Órgão de Apelação concordou com as conclusões do Painel relativas ao Artigo 3.4

Footnote 52: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Footnote 53: Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary online: http://www.m-w.com.

Footnote 54: Panel Report, Egypt – Rebar, supra note.

Footnote 55: We find support for our view in Appellate Body Report, US-Lamb, para. 104.

Footnote 56: Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen , para. 6.162.

Footnote 57: Ibid., para. 6.168. Footnote 58: We find support for this view in Panel Report, Thailand-H-Beams.

Footnote 59: Panel Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note, paras. 7.232- 7.233.

Footnote 60: Thus, we agree with the view of the Appellate Body that “Articles 3.1 and 3.4 indicate that the investigating authorities must determine, objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence, the importance to be attached to each potentially relevant factor and the weight

to be attached to it. In every investigation, this determination turns on the “bearing” that the relevant factors have “on the state of the

[domestic] industry”.” See Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note, para. 197.

Footnote 61: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto

não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 62: O Órgão de Apelação concordou com as conclusões do Painel relativas ao Artigo 3.4.

Footnote 63: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto

não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 64: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 65: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 66: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 67: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.

Footnote 68: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso manteve a conclusão/determinação do Painel, embora a metodologia da análise do aumento significativo das importações para a determinação da ameaça de dano tenha sido objeto de discussão pelas partes.

Footnote 69: Canada argued before the Panel that the studies relied upon by the USITC “do not address the key issue of whether the SLA had any significant restraining effect at the time it expired.” (Panel Report, para. 4.23 (original emphasis)) Canada stated that a study

introduced by petitioners in the Section 129 proceedings had serious methodological deficiencies. (para. 4.24) At the oral hearing, the United States denied that the USITC had relied exclusively on this study. In addition, Canadian interested parties had asserted before the

USITC that the SLA had resulted in a e distribution, among Canadian provinces, of exports of softwood lumber to the United States. The

USITC concluded that “[t]he record does not show that the SLA merely led to a redistribution of exports from Canadian provinces not covered by the SLA, particularly the Maritime Provinces, and that upon its expiration, pre-SLA provincial trade patterns returned.” (Section

129 Determination, p. 26 (footnote omitted)

Footnote 70: According to Canada, the capacity of Canadian producers was projected to increase only slightly, and excess capacity would be used primarily to supply markets other than the United States. (See Panel Report, paras. 4.37-4.40) Footnote 71: O Órgão de Apelação referente a este caso concordou com a decisão do Painel.

Footnote 72: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso fez apenas um pequeno comentário sobre esse Artigo no parágrafo 96, no qual menciona que o AAD insta os membros a terem um cuidado especial na aplicação do direito anti-dumping em casos de ameaça de dano. Observa-se

que não houve qualquer alteração na determinação do Painel.

Footnote 73: O Órgão de Apelação deste caso fez apenas um pequeno comentário sobre esse Artigo no parágrafo 96, no qual menciona

que o AAD insta os membros a terem um cuidado especial na aplicação do direito anti-dumping em casos de ameaça de dano. Observa-se que não houve qualquer alteração na determinação do Painel.

Artigo 4

Tatiana Lins e Cruz

I. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 4

Definition of Domestic Industry

4.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as

referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose

collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic

production of those products, except that:

(i) when producers are related (74) to the exporters or importers or are

themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term “domestic

industry” may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers;

(ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the

production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and

the producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if

(a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production

of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that market is

not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question

located elsewhere in the territory. In such circumstances, injury may be found

to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic industry is not

injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped imports into such an

isolated market and provided further that the dumped imports are causing

injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such

market.

4.2 When the domestic industry has been interpreted as referring to the producers in a certain

area, i.e. a market as defined in paragraph 1(ii), anti-dumping duties shall be levied (75) only

on the products in question consigned for final consumption to that area. When the

constitutional law of the importing Member does not permit the levying of anti-dumping

duties on such a basis, the importing Member may levy the anti-dumping duties without

limitation only if (a) the exporters shall have been given an opportunity to cease exporting at

dumped prices to the area concerned or otherwise give assurances pursuant to Article 8 and

adequate assurances in this regard have not been promptly given, and (b) such duties cannot

be levied only on products of specific producers which supply the area in question.

4.3 Where two or more countries have reached under the provisions of paragraph 8(a) of

Article XXIV of GATT 1994 such a level of integration that they have the characteristics of a

single, unified market, the industry in the entire area of integration shall be taken to be the

domestic industry referred to in paragraph 1.

4.4 The provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 3 shall be applicable to this Article.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 4

Definição de Indústria doméstica

4.1 Para os propósitos deste Acordo, o termo “indústria doméstica” deve ser interpretado como a

totalidade dos produtores nacionais do produto similar, ou como aqueles dentre eles cuja

produção conjunta do mencionado produto constitua a maior parte da produção nacional total

do produto, a menos que:

(i) os produtores estejam relacionados (76) aos exportadores ou importadores ou

sejam eles próprios do produto que alegadamente se importa a preços de

dumping, situação em que a expressão “indústria doméstica” poderá ser

interpretada como alusiva ao restante dos produtores;

(ii) em circunstâncias excepcionais, o território de um Membro poderá, no caso do

referido produto, ser dividido em dois ou mais mercados competitivos; os

produtores em cada um desses mercados poderão ser considerados como

indústrias independentes se (a) os produtores em atividade em um desses

mercados vendem toda ou quase toda a sua produção do bem em questão no

interior desse mercado e (b) a demanda desse mercado é suprida em proporção

substancial por produtores daquele mesmo bem estabelecidos em outro ponto do

território. Em tais circunstâncias, dano poderá ser encontrado mesmo quando a

maior parte da produção nacional não esteja sofrendo dano, desde que haja

concentração das importações e, mais ainda, desde que as importações a preços

de dumping estejam causando dano aos produtores de toda ou quase toda a

produção efetuada dentro daquele mercado.

4.2 No caso de o termo indústria doméstica ter sido interpretado como o conjunto de produtores

de uma certa área, i.e., um mercado, tal como este é definido no parágrafo 1(b), direitos anti-

dumping serão aplicados (77) apenas sobre os produtos em causa destinados ao consumo final

naquela área. Quando o direito constitucional do Membro importador não permitir a aplicação

de direito anti-dumping nessas bases, o Membro importador poderá aplicar direito anti-

dumping de maneira ilimitada apenas se: (a) aos exportadores tiver sido dada a oportunidade

de cessar as exportações a preço de dumping destinadas à área em causa ou, alternativamente,

de oferecer garantias nesse sentido, de acordo com o Artigo 8, e que tais garantias adequadas

não tiverem sido imediatamente oferecidas; e (b) o direito não puder ser aplicado apenas sobre

produtos ou produtores específicos que abastecem a área em questão.

4.3 Quando dois ou mais países tiverem atingido tal nível de integração, de acordo com o disposto

no parágrafo 8(a) do Artigo XXIV do GATT de 1994, que suas economias apresentem

características de um único mercado, será a totalidade da área de integração considerada como

indústria doméstica nos termos do parágrafo 1 acima.

4.4 O disposto no parágrafo 6 do Artigo 3 será aplicável a este Artigo.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

O Artigo 4.1 em sua versão original estabelece que o termo “indústria doméstica” deve ser

interpretado como os produtores nacionais do produto similar como um todo ou “a major proportion”

da produção nacional total do produto.

Na tradução para o português, a indústria doméstica deve ser interpretada como a totalidade dos

produtores nacionais do produto similar ou a maior parte da produção nacional total do produto.

O termo “a maior parte” constante da tradução pode dar a equivocada idéia de que seria necessário

mais de 50% dos produtores nacionais do produto similar, como já sustentado pelo Brasil no DS 241

(Argentina – Poultry Anti- Dumping Duties) e não aceito pelo Painel que definiu, conforme detalhado

na Parte II, que “a major proportion” como “an important, serious or significant proportion of total

domestic production”.

Para tal interpretação, sustentou o Painel que o Artigo 4.1 menciona “a major proportion” e não “the

major proportion” e que nesse último caso, seria claro que haveria a obrigação de mais de 50% dos

produtores da indústria doméstica. A decisão do Painel menciona ainda a tradução espanhola “una

proporción importante” que se revela em consonância com a decisão do Painel e, portanto, mais

adequada que a tradução em português.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 4

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),

Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/R, paras. 6.212-6.214

A Comunidade Europeia alega que a Lei Anti-Dumping norte-americana de 1916 não obedece a uma

série de requisitos procedimentais e processuais estabelecidos no Artigo 4 do Acordo Anti-Dumping,

particularmente no requisito de que um pedido de investigação deve ser feito em nome da indústria

doméstica e ser apoiada por uma parcela mínima da indústria doméstica. Neste caso, foi concluído

que a Lei de 1916 violou os Artigos 1, 4 e 5.5 do Acordo Anti-Dumping. Houve apelação

(WT/DS136/AB/R e WT/DS162/AB/R), porém não relativa ao Artigo 4.

Para. 6.212. “The EC also claims that the 1916 Act fails to respect a number of procedural and due

process requirements set forth in Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular the

requirement that a complaint be made on behalf of the domestic industry and be supported by a

minimum proportion of the domestic industry.”

Para. 6.213. “We note that civil proceedings under the 1916 Act are available to “any person injured

in his business or property” by reason of a violation of the 1916 Act. This term is nowhere qualified

by a statement that this person should be sufficiently representative of the industry of the United

States, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We note that the 1916 Act

refers to the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the

establishment of an industry in the United States. However, we have no evidence that a minimum

representation level for a given industry must be established by the complainant before filing a case

before a federal court. On the contrary, we note that all cases so far have in fact been initiated by

individual companies under their own responsibility. In light of the terms of the 1916 Act and, in

particular, the term “any person injured in his business or property”, which is particularly clear, we

have no reason to believe that US federal courts will be in a position to interpret that provision

consistently with Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 6.214. “For that reason, we find that the 1916 Act, because it does not require a minimum

representation of a US industry, violates Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS162/R, paras. 6.255-6.257 e 6.261

O Japão alega que a Lei Anti-Dumping norte-americana de 1916 não obedece a uma série de

requisitos procedimentais e processuais estabelecidos nos Artigos 4 e 5 do Acordo Anti-Dumping. Em

particular, no que se refere ao Artigo 4, o pedido de investigação deve ser feito por ou em favor da

indústria doméstica. Para esta finalidade, o Artigo 4.1 define o conceito de “indústria doméstica.” O

Painel concluiu que houve violação dos Artigos 1, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 18.1 e 18.4 do Acordo Anti-

Dumping. Houve apelação (WT/DS162/AB/R), porém não relativa ao Artigo 4.

Para. 6.255. “Japan claims that Articles 4 and 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement set forth

requirements limiting the party or parties that may properly pursue an anti-dumping claim. Article 5.1

requires that a request for initiation of an anti-dumping investigation be made by or on behalf of the

domestic industry. Article 4.1 defines “domestic industry” for the purpose of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement. Article 5.4 requires the investigating authorities to determine that an application is

supported by “those producers which collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total

production of the like product” of those producers supporting or opposing the application. Moreover,

under no circumstances can an investigation be initiated if those supporting the application account

for less than 25 per cent of total domestic production of the like product. In contrast, as evidenced by

the most recent cases initiated under the 1916 Act, a complaint under the 1916 Act can be initiated by

a single United States producer. Article 5 also requires that applications contain evidence of the three

elements of dumping, injury and causation, and sets a de minimis threshold applicable to the dumping

element. The 1916 Act contains none of these elements. On the contrary, Japan argues that, under the

US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complainant under the 1916 Act needs only to present

a short and plain statement of its claims. Finally, Article 5.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

requires Members to complete their investigations and decide whether or not to impose duties within

18 months. The 1916 Act contains no such deadline.”

Para. 6.256. “We note that Japan's claims under Article 4 and 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are

closely linked because one of the conditions for the initiation of an investigation under Article 5.1 is

that the application be made on behalf of the domestic industry, which is defined in Article 4.1.”

Para. 6.257. “We recall that civil proceedings under the 1916 Act are available to “any person injured

in his business or property” by reason of a violation of the 1916 Act. This term is nowhere qualified

by a statement that this person should be sufficiently representative of an industry of the

United States, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We note that the

1916 Act refers to the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of

preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States. However, we have no evidence that a

minimum representation level for a given industry must be established by the complainant before

filing a case before a federal court. On the contrary, we note that all cases so far have, in fact, been

initiated by individual companies under their own responsibility. The fact that, in certain cases, these

companies may have represented a very large portion of the US industry in the economic sector

concerned does not seem to be linked to any legal requirement of representation under the 1916 Act

and is most probably fortuitous. We have not been referred to any provisions of the US Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure which would qualify the terms of the 1916 Act in line with the terms of Article 4

and 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In light of the terms of the 1916 Act, especially the term “any

person injured in his business or property” which is clear, we have no reason to believe that US

federal courts will be in a position to interpret that provision – which conflicts with the terms of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement - to meet the requirements of Articles 4 and 5 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement in terms of representation of the complainants.”

Para. 6.261. “We therefore find that the 1916 Act, because it does not require a minimum

representation of a US industry in applications for the initiation of proceedings under the 1916 Act,

violates Article 4.1 and Article 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), WT/DS184/R, paras. 7.187-7.195, 7.199, 7.204 e

7.214-7.215

O Japão alega que o tratamento dado pela Lei norte-americana no que se refere à produção cativa por

si só, e, especificamente em relação às importações de aço laminado a quente, violam os dispositivos

do Artigo 4. O Painel concluiu que na seção 771(7)(c)(iv) da Lei de Tarifas de 1930, a disposição

emendada sobre produção cativa, é inconsistente com os Artigos 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 e 4.1 do

Acordo Anti-Dumping. Ademais, entendeu que os EUA não agiram de modo inconsistente com as

suas obrigações sob os Artigos 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 e 4.1 do Acordo Anti-Dumping ao aplicar aquela

disposição na determinação de dano pela indústria norte-americana. O Painel concluiu que a

Argentina não agiu de modo inconsistente com as suas obrigações sob o Artigo 4.1 do Acordo Anti-

Dumping ao definir a indústria doméstica como os produtores domésticos que contabilizam 46% da

produção interna de frango na Argentina. Não houve apelação.

Para. 7.187. “In relevant part, Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement provides as follows:

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be

interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like

products or to those of them whose collective output of the products

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.

Para. 7.188. “In addressing Japan's claim that the US statute is inconsistent with the AD Agreement

on its face, we must resolve two questions. First, we must determine what is required by the

AD Agreement, that is, whether the investigating authority is in all cases required to make a

determination of injury to the domestic industry as a whole. If so, we must then consider whether the

primary focus on the merchant market with respect to market share and financial performance set out

in the “captive production” provision of the US statute is inconsistent, on its face, with this

requirement?”

Para. 7.189. “We consider that the definition of the domestic industry of Article 4.1 of the

AD Agreement provides a clear answer to the first question. The domestic industry consists of the

domestic producers as a whole of the like products, or of those producers whose collective output

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products. The terms “domestic

industry” and domestic producers are also used interchangeably in Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the

Agreement. Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement provides that a determination of injury has to involve

inter alia an objective examination of the “impact of these imports on domestic producers of such like

products”. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement expands on this obligation and provides that the

“examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned” shall include

an evaluation of all relevant economic factors having a bearing on the state of the industry.

Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement requires that a causal relationship be demonstrated “between the

dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry”. We conclude that the requirement to make a

determination of injury to the domestic industry read in light of the definition of the domestic industry

of Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, implies that the injury must be analysed with regard to domestic

producers as a whole of the like product or to those whose collective output constitutes a major

proportion of the total domestic production of those products.”

Para. 7.190. “In our view, the AD Agreement thus clearly requires an investigating authority to make

a final determination as to “injury” as defined in the Agreement to the industry as a whole. However,

the Agreement does not prescribe a particular method of analysis. Specific circumstances might well

call for specific attention to be given to various aspects of the industry's performance or to specific

segments of the industry, as long as the end-result of this analysis is consistent with the Agreement's

requirement to examine and evaluate all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the industry

and demonstrate a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic

industry.”

Para. 7.191. “We thus must examine whether the US “captive production” provision is on its face

inconsistent with the established requirement of the Agreement to determine injury for the industry as

a whole, as Japan is alleging. We note that the United States agrees with Japan that the

AD Agreement requires a determination concerning injury with respect to the industry as a whole.

According to the United States, the US statute is fully consistent with this obligation as it requires

USITC to consider the industry as a whole. The United States asserts that the captive production

provision, on its face, only affects some statutory factors required to be considered under 19

U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) and does not affect the general requirement to determine injury for the

domestic industry as a whole, which is set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) and which governs the

entire determination of injury.”

Para. 7.192. “The question before us is whether the captive production provision and the required

“primary focus” on one segment of the market, the merchant market, with respect to market share and

financial performance of the industry, is inconsistent with the obligations imposed on WTO Members

in conducting an injury analysis for the purpose of an anti-dumping investigation. It is established

GATT/WTO practice that the consistency of a law on its face may be challenged independently from

any application thereof only in so far as the law is mandatory and not discretionary in nature. In other

words, only if a law mandates WTO inconsistent action or prohibits WTO consistent action can the

legislation be challenged on its face in a dispute settlement proceeding.”

Para. 7.193. “We do not doubt that the captive production of the US statute is mandatory in nature

and may thus be challenged before a panel. The language of the provision (“shall focus primarily”)

makes it clear that USITC is required by statute to focus primarily on the merchant market in certain

circumstances and under certain conditions. The question remains however whether the statute

mandates action that is inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the

AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.194. “We recall that in relevant part, the captive production provision provides that “the

Commission, in determining market share and the factors affecting financial performance set forth in

clause (iii), shall focus primarily on the merchant market for the domestic like product”. The key to

answering the question posed lies in the ordinary meaning of the words “focus primarily”. Japan

argues that the use of the word “focus” skews the analysis to the merchant market at the expense of

the rest of the domestic industry and the modifier “primarily” narrows the focus even more.”

Para. 7.195. “The verb “to focus” is defined as “to concentrate” on something. “Primary” is defined

as “of the first importance, chief”. Literally, the captive production provision thus requires USITC to

concentrate in chief on the merchant market when considering market share and financial

performance of the industry. Such a specific direction to focus the analysis of certain factors with

attention for a particular segment of the domestic market does not, in our view, necessarily imply that

the overall injury analysis is not performed with respect to the industry as a whole. The statute does

not require a general and exclusive focus on the merchant market when considering market share and

industry performance, but only a “primary” focus. It certainly does not require a determination of

injury based only on consideration of the merchant market.”

Para. 7.199. “We therefore find that the captive production provision is not on its face inconsistent

with Articles 3 and 4 of the AD Agreement. Having reached that conclusion, we also conclude that

the United States did not act inconsistently with its obligations under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh

Agreement and Article 18.4 of the AD Agreement in maintaining this statutory provision. We next

turn to the question whether the USITC, in applying that provision in the investigation underlying this

dispute, acted inconsistently with Articles 3 and 4 of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.204. “The question before us is whether the USITC's determination of injury is consistent

with the requirements of Articles 3 and 4 of the AD Agreement, in light of the focus on the merchant

market by some Commissioners with respect to some factors examined, or whether that focus so taints

the determination that we cannot conclude that an objective and unbiased investigating authority

could make the determination the USITC made, on the basis of the facts on the record and in light of

the explanations given. Under the applicable standard of review, we are not to overturn the evaluation

of the administering authority if the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation unbiased

and objective, even though we might have reached a different conclusion.”

Para. 7.214. “We conclude that the analysis performed by USITC established injury with regard to

the industry as a whole, in spite of, or regardless of, the application of the captive production

provision by three of the Commissioners. We note that in any case all six commissioners made an

affirmative injury or threat of injury determination whether they applied the captive production

provision or not. This to us confirms our view that the application of the captive production provision

did not undermine the examination of injury to the industry as a whole which is required under the

AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.215. “We therefore find that the USITC's analysis was consistent with the obligations of the

United States under Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement in so far as it examined

and determined injury to the domestic industry as a whole.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain

Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 187-190

e 240(g)

Para. 187. “The Panel concluded by finding that the captive production provision is not, on its face,

inconsistent with Articles 3 and 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel also concluded that the

captive production provision was applied consistently with Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 4.1 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 188. “Japan appeals the Panel's findings, arguing that the captive production provision on its

face, and as applied in this investigation, distorts the USITC's analysis of the domestic industry as a

whole because only one part of the market is the subject of special examination. Further, by

“focus[ing] primarily” on the merchant market, the USITC focused on the part of the industry which

was most likely to be injured. Such an examination is not “objective” under Article 3.1 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement. Japan also argues that the Panel misunderstood the meaning of the words “focus

primarily” in the United States statute.”

Para. 189. “We recall first that the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that “injury” means “material

injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation

of the establishment of such an industry”. (emphasis added) It emerges clearly from this definition

that the focus of an injury determination is the state of the “domestic industry”.”

Para. 190. “Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement defines the term “domestic industry” as the

“domestic producers as a whole of the like products” or “[domestic producers] whose collective

output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production”. It follows that

an injury determination, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, is a determination that the domestic

producers “as a whole”, or a “major proportion” of them, are “injured”. This is borne out by the

provisions of Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 of the Agreement, which impose certain requirements

with respect to the investigation and examination leading to an injury determination. Investigating

authorities are directed to investigate and examine imports in relation to the “domestic industry”, the

“domestic market for like products” and “domestic producers of [like] products”. The investigation

and examination must focus on the totality of the “domestic industry” and not simply on one part,

sector or segment of the domestic industry.”

Para. 240. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body: “(g) upholds the Panel's finding,

in paragraph 8.2(b) of the Panel Report, that section 771(7)(C)(iv) of the United States Tariff Act of

1930, as amended, the captive production provision, is not, on its face, inconsistent with Articles 3.1,

3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; reverses the Panel's finding, in that same

paragraph, that the United States did not act inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement in its

application of the captive production provision in its determination of injury sustained by the United

States' hot-rolled steel industry; and finds, instead, that the United States acted inconsistently with

Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the application of the captive production

provision in this case.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil

(Argentina - Poultry Ant-Dumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, paras. 7.328-

7.333 e 7.337-7.344

O litígio se refere à definição do termo “indústria doméstica” contido no Artigo 4.1 do Acordo Anti-

Dumping, mais especificamente se há obrigação de interpretação do termo “indústria doméstica”

como definido no Artigo 4.1 e se a expressão “a major proportion” significa que a indústria

doméstica deve incluir os produtores domésticos que sejam a maioria da produção nacional, ou seja,

mais de 50% da produção doméstica total como alegado pelo Brasil.

Para. 7.328. “This claim concerns the definition of the term “domestic industry” contained in Article

4.1 of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.329. “Brazil notes that Article 4.1 defines the term “domestic industry” as referring to the

domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the

products constitutes “a major proportion” of the total domestic production of those products. Brazil

submits that the reference in Article 4.1 to “a major proportion” means “the majority”, or the greater

part in relation to the whole (i.e., 50+ per cent). Brazil submits that Argentina violated Article 4.1

because the CNCE defined the domestic industry as – and collected injury data for – those producers

whose collective output constitutes 46 per cent – and therefore less than the majority – of total

domestic production.”

Para. 7.330. “Argentina argues that Article 4.1 deliberately failed to define exactly what is meant by

“a major proportion”. Argentina denies that “a major proportion” must be greater than 50 per cent,

and notes that the practice of other Members supports Argentina's interpretation.”

Para. 7.331. “The United States asserts that Article 4.1 merely contains a definition of “domestic

industry”, and does not impose any obligation on Members. The United States also asserts that “a

major proportion” does not necessarily mean “the majority”, but may also mean “unusually important,

serious, or significant”. The United States further argues that the drafters of the AD Agreement were

quite explicit when they intended to impose a majority requirement for a particular obligation, such as

the 50 per cent standing requirement in Article 5.4.”

Para. 7.332. “According to the European Communities, the phrase “major proportion” does not mean

the majority of the domestic production, but rather an important part thereof, which may be less than

50 per cent. The European Communities relies on the same definition of “major proportion” as does

the United States. The European Communities also notes that Article 4.1 refers to “a” major

proportion, and not “the” major proportion, suggesting that there may be more than one major

proportion.”

Para. 7.333. “The European Communities further asserts that its interpretation is supported by

Article 5.4, which provides that an investigation shall not be initiated unless the authorities determine

that the application has been made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry (...).”

Para. 7.337. “Article 4.1 provides in relevant part:

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be

interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like

products or to those of them whose collective output of the products

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products (…).”

Para. 7.338. “We must first determine whether or not Article 4.1 imposes any obligation on

Members, i.e., whether or not Argentina could be found to have acted inconsistently with Article 4.1

(as opposed to any other provision of the AD Agreement) by using a definition of “domestic industry”

other than that prescribed by Article 4.1. We note that Article 4.1 provides that the term “domestic

industry” “shall” be interpreted in a specific manner. In our view, this imposes an express obligation

on Members to interpret the term “domestic industry” in that specified manner. Thus, if a Member

were to interpret the term differently in the context of an anti-dumping investigation, that Member

would violate the obligation set forth in Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.339. “Having found that Article 4.1 does contain an obligation that Argentina could

potentially have violated, we must now determine whether or not it did so by defining the “domestic

industry” as producers of 46 per cent of total domestic production. In particular, we must consider

whether or not the phrase “a major proportion” means that the “domestic industry” must include

domestic producers whose collective output constitutes the majority, i.e., 50+ per cent, of domestic

total production.”

Para. 7.340. “Regarding the ordinary meaning of the phrase “major proportion”, Brazil asserts that

the term “major proportion” is synonymous with “major part”, which in turn is defined as “the

majority”. Brazil submits that “the majority” is understood to mean “the greater number or part”.

Brazil submits that 46 per cent of total domestic production cannot be considered as the greater part of

100 per cent of total domestic production. The European Communities and the United States assert

that the word “major” does not necessarily mean “majority”, but may also mean “unusually important,

serious, or significant”.”

Para. 7.341. “In considering these different dictionary definitions, we note that the word “major” is

also defined as “important, serious, or significant”. Accordingly, an interpretation that defines the

domestic industry in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant proportion of

total domestic production is permissible. Indeed, this approach is entirely consistent with the Spanish

version of Article 4.1, which refers to producers representing “una proporción importante” of

domestic production. Furthermore, Article 4.1 does not define the “domestic industry” in terms of

producers of the major proportion of total domestic production. Instead, Article 4.1 refers to producers

of a major proportion of total domestic production. If Article 4.1 had referred to the major proportion,

the requirement would clearly have been to define the “domestic industry” as producers constituting

50+ per cent of total domestic production. However, the reference to a major proportion suggests that

there may be more than one “major proportion” for the purpose of defining “domestic industry”. In

the event of multiple “major proportions”, it is inconceivable that each individual “major proportion”

could – or must – exceed 50 per cent. This therefore supports our finding that it is permissible to

define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant

proportion of total domestic production. For these reasons, we find that Article 4.1 of the AD

Agreement does not require Members to define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic

producers representing the majority, or 50+ per cent, of total domestic production.”

Para. 7.342. “There is nothing on the record to suggest that, in the circumstances of this case, 46 per

cent of total domestic production is not an important, serious or significant proportion of total

domestic production. Accordingly, we reject Brazil's claim that Argentina violated Article 4.1 of the

AD Agreement by defining “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers representing 46 per

cent of total domestic production.”

Para. 7.343. “Finally, Brazil has argued that if the AD Agreement provides no specific benchmark for

what would constitute a major proportion of total domestic production, then the investigating

authorities are under the obligation to expressly elucidate how they found that a percentage lower than

50 per cent could be considered a major proportion. However, we see no basis for any such obligation

in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.344. “In light of the above, we conclude that Argentina did not violate Article 4.1 by defining

domestic industry in terms of domestic producers accounting for 46 per cent of total domestic

production.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tunes from

Guatemala (México - Steel Pipes and Tubes), Demandante: Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, paras.

7.296-7.299 e 7.313-7.324 e 8.1 (d)

Alega a Guatemala que a análise de dano baseou-se no uso seletivo e inconsistente da informação

relativa à indústria doméstica, sendo, portanto, inconsistente com a necessidade descrita no Artigo 3.1

de conduzir um “objective examination” de “positive evidence” e, consequentemente, os requisitos

dos Artigos 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 e 4.1. No que se refere ao Artigo 4.1, alega a Guatemala que há dois critérios

para a definição da indústria doméstica, os quais não poderiam ter sido utilizados de forma alternada

pelo México no decorrer da investigação.

(i) Guatemala

Para. 7.296. “Guatemala argues that Economía's injury analysis was based on the selective and

inconsistent use of information pertaining to the domestic industry. Without any proper explanation,

Economía collected and relied upon data for part of its injury analysis referring to three of the

four companies that constituted the domestic industry, and for other parts of its analysis, data referring

to only one of those companies (that is, the petitioner).”

Para. 7.297. “In Guatemala's view, the selective and inconsistent gathering and analysis of factors

indicating the state of the industry is contrary to the requirement in Article 3.1 to conduct an

“objective examination” of “positive evidence”, and consequently to the requirements Articles 3.2,

3.4, 3.5 and 4.1.”

(ii) Mexico

Para. 7.298. “Mexico argues that it complied with its obligations under Article 3.1 to conduct an

“objective examination” of “positive evidence”, and consequently with those under Articles 3.2, 3.4,

3.5 and 4.1. Mexico asserts that Article 4.1 allows two meanings for the term “domestic industry”: (i)

the domestic producers “as a whole” or (ii) those whose collective output constitutes “a major

proportion” of the total domestic production. According to Mexico, an investigating authority can

comply with the “domestic industry” requirement by using either of those definitions, that is, by

examining either the domestic producers “as a whole” or those whose collective output constitutes “a

major proportion” of total domestic production. Mexico turns to Article 5.4 to inform its interpretation

of the “major proportion” element in Article 4.1, arguing that, if a producer alone satisfies the Article

5.4 threshold of 50 per cent of the domestic industry expressing support or opposition to the

application, then an objective examination of injury factors may rely upon data pertaining solely to

that producer.”

Para. 7.299. “In this case, Mexico contends, the data collected and analysed by Economía for the

economic injury factors pertained to three firms accounting for 88 per cent of domestic production.

Furthermore, as Hylsa accounted for 53 per cent of the domestic industry, and the whole of the

domestic industry supported the request for initiation, Mexico argues that Economía was justified in

collecting and relying upon financial injury data pertaining solely to the applicant.”

Para. 7.313. “Based on the parties' evidence and arguments, the question before us is whether

Economía made an objective examination based on positive evidence, as required by Articles 3.1, 3.2,

3.4 and 3.5, in its collection and evaluation of data pertaining to injury to the “domestic industry” as

that term is defined in Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.314. “Economía defined the domestic industry for the purposes of the Final Determination as

being constituted of four firms: Hylsa, Tuberías Procarsa, Tubería Nacional y Compañía Mexicana de

Tubos. This was the domestic industry defined by Economía for the purposes of the injury analysis.

However, Economía's analysis of the economic and financial indicators was based on sets of

information that at no point referred to the whole industry as this had been defined by Economía. For

the purpose of the injury analysis in the Final Determination, Economía relied upon information on

the economic indicators of three firms constituting 88 per cent of the domestic industry. Regarding

financial information, Economía only sought and relied upon information accounting for 53 per cent

of the domestic industry, from Hylsa and/or its Tubing Division, Hylsa-DAT.”

Para. 7.315. “Therefore, the specific issue that arises before us on the facts of this case is whether

Economía's collection and reliance upon economic injury data relating to three firms constituting

88 per cent of national production, and financial injury data pertaining to only one firm constituting

53 per cent of national production was consistent with Mexico's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2,

3.4 and 3.5 concerning the determination of injury to the “domestic industry” as that term is defined in

Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.316. “At the outset, we wish to emphasize our understanding that the issue before us, as

raised by Guatemala, does not include the consistency with the cited provisions of Economía's

reliance upon financial injury data pertaining to both Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT. In our view, Economía's

reliance on data of both Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT could introduce considerable distortions into the injury

analysis, as the record indicates that Hylsa-DAT revenue accounted for 8 per cent of Hylsa's total

sales from 1998-2000. The record further indicates that Economía considered Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT's

information together for the purposes of its financial injury analysis. Apart from indicating that

Economía analysed the financial information of Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT in accordance with standard

accounting principles, we find no clear indication in the record as to how Economía ensured that it

took Hylsa-DAT's financial performance into account only once, that is, on its own, and not also

again as part of Hylsa's overall financial performance. Mexico has certainly not clarified how and the

extent to which Economía reduced the possibility of “double-counting” of Hylsa-DAT's experience as

part of the domestic industry. We are left unclear as to how the experience of Hylsa-DAT, which

accounted for a relatively small proportion of Hylsa's overall sales, could have been reflective of

Hylsa's overall situation. However, although Guatemala makes reference to the use by Economía of

various combinations of companies as sources of information, it does not specifically identify the use

of Hylsa and/or Hylsa-DAT's information as a specific issue for our consideration. Accordingly, our

findings below are without prejudice to our views on this issue. As regards Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT, the

issue before us focuses upon the consistency with the cited provisions of Economía's approach in

seeking and relying upon data relating to no more than 53 per cent of the domestic industry for the

purposes of its analysis of financial indicators in its injury analysis.”

Para. 7.317. “In addressing the issue before us, we first consider Mexico's main justification for

Economía's approach.”

Para. 7.318. “Mexico argues that, in respect of the various injury factors, Economía was justified in

examining data relating either to all (or almost all) of the domestic industry, or to “a major

proportion” thereof. According to Mexico, this was consistent with the Article 4.1 definition of

“domestic industry”, as either the totality or “a major proportion” thereof. Regarding the analysis of

economic injury indicators, Mexico argues that the use of data from three firms covering 88 per cent

of national production was “representative” of the domestic industry. In respect of the “major

proportion” element, Mexico invokes Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which sets out the

“standing” rule and threshold percentages for initiation of an investigation “by or on behalf of the

domestic industry”. According to Mexico, because Hylsa alone represented 53 per cent of the

domestic industry – that is, more than the 50 per cent threshold set out in Article 5.4 – then an

objective examination of injury factors could rely upon data pertaining solely to that producer. In

Mexico's view, this is sufficient to consider that the result of such an analysis reflects the situation of

the domestic industry.”

Para. 7.319. “Guatemala counter-argues that Article 5.4 relates to the “standing” requirement to

initiate an investigation whereas Article 4.1 defines the meaning of “domestic industry” “for the

purposes of the Agreement”.”

Para. 7.320. “We recall the relevant legal framework for our analysis. We have already cited the text

of the relevant provisions of Article 3 and of Article 4.1 above. Article 3.1 requires that a

determination of injury shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of,

inter alia, the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic producers of the like product.

Article 3.4 provides for an examination of “the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic

industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a

bearing on the state of the [domestic] industry ...” (emphasis added) and Article 3.5 states that “It

must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in

paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury ... to the domestic industry” (emphasis added). The focus of an

injury determination is thus the state of the “domestic industry”, as that term is defined in Article 4.1.

The title of Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is “Definition of domestic industry”. The term

“domestic industry” is defined in Article 4.1, which reads, in part:

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be

interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like

products or to those of them whose collective output of the products

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those

products (...).

Para. 7.321. “The provision in Article 4.1 and footnote 9, which defines injury as “material injury to

a domestic industry,[…] interpreted in accordance with the provisions of [this] Article [3]”,

inescapably requires the conclusion that the domestic industry with respect to which injury is

considered and determined must be the domestic industry as defined in accordance with Article 4.1. It

follows that an anti-dumping injury determination is, in fact, a determination that the domestic

producers “as a whole”, or a “major proportion” of them, are “injured”. Indeed, the concept of

“domestic industry” is critical to an injury determination, as it defines the framework for data

collection and analysis.”

Para. 7.322. “Article 4.1 defines the domestic industry in two ways, either as “referring to the

domestic producers as a whole of the like products” or “to those of them whose collective output of

the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products”. The

text of Article 4.1 indicates no hierarchy of preference between these two options. However, this does

not lead us to conclude that an investigating authority is permitted to switch back and forth between

these two possibilities in the course of a single injury analysis (or to DSBillate back and forth between

various allegedly “major proportions” of the domestic industry in the course of the same injury

analysis). Article 4.1, and in particular the term “a major proportion”, permits a degree of flexibility in

defining the domestic industry or “major proportion” thereof, but once an investigating authority has

identified the framework for its analysis - whether an entire domestic industry or a major proportion

thereof - it must use this identified framework consistently and coherently throughout an

investigation.”

Para. 7.323. “Article 5.4 reads:

An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the

authorities have determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of

support for, or opposition to, the application expressed by domestic producers

of the like product, that the application has been made by or on behalf of the

domestic industry. The application shall be considered to have been made “by

or on behalf of the domestic industry” if it is supported by those domestic

producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the

total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic

industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application.

However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers

expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per cent of total

production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.” (footnotes omitted)

Para. 7.324. “The introductory clause of Article 4.1 indicates that the definition of “domestic

industry” applies “[f]or the purposes of this Agreement”, i.e. throughout the Agreement. It would

therefore also define the term “domestic industry” as used in Article 5.4. Article 5.4 commences with

the phrase: “An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless ...”. This is a clear

textual indication that Article 5.4 sets out a fundamental requirement that must be respected in

initiating an investigation. However, as we have concluded that Article 4.1 does not permit an

investigating authority in the course of a single injury analysis to switch back and forth between the

two possible definitions of “domestic industry” – i.e. (i) the domestic producers as a whole of the like

products; or (ii) those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion

of the total domestic production of those products – we do not believe that Article 5.4 is strictly

germane to the issue before us. This is because the issue raised by Guatemala's claim is not the

definition of the domestic industry per se, or the identification of “a major proportion of” the domestic

industry as the “domestic industry” for the purposes of the injury analysis. Rather, Guatemala's claim

relates to the consistency and representativeness of the data set relied upon by Economía in its

analysis of the state of the domestic industry, as this had been defined by Economía. We therefore

reject the relevance of the legal premise underlying Mexico's argument pertaining to Articles 4.1 and

5.4.”

Para. 8.1. “For the reasons set out above, we conclude that Mexico's initiation of the investigation,

the conduct of the investigation and the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping measure on imports of

black and galvanized steel pipes and tubes from Guatemala is inconsistent with the requirements of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in that:

(d) Economía acted inconsistently with Mexico's obligations under Articles

3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to conduct an objective

examination on the basis of positive evidence of injury to the domestic

industry – as that term is defined in Article 4.1 – by failing to gather and

analyse representative and consistent data pertaining to the domestic industry,

in particular the data concerning the financial indicators of the domestic industry as a whole, as this had been defined by Economía;

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon

from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.107-7.125 e 8.1 (i)

Trata-se da alegação de inconsistência na determinação da indústria doméstica pela CE com base no

Artigo 4.1 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, por ter retirado empresas da definição de indústria doméstica

em desacordo com os requisitos estabelecidos no Artigo 4.1 (i) e 4.1 (ii).

Para. 7.107. “There are three basic questions raised by Norway's domestic industry claims – first,

whether the EC erred in not including certain categories of enterprises in the domestic industry based

on the nature of their specific activities (filleting-only undertakings, organic producers, and producers

of “certain kinds” of salmon), their silence concerning the investigation, or their failure to provide

information in the format requested. The second question is whether the EC's interpretation of

Article 4.1 as allowing the investigating authority to conclude that, so long as the producers included

in the domestic industry accounted for a major proportion of total domestic production, it was entitled

to ignore other producers, is permissible. The third question is whether the EC was entitled to engage

in sampling of the domestic industry in the context of its injury analysis. We will begin our analysis

by considering the text of the relevant provision, Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.108. “Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement provides, in pertinent part:

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be

interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like

products or to those of them whose collective output of the products

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products (...).”

Thus, domestic producers of the “like product” are the starting point for the determination of the

domestic industry. “Like product” is defined in Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement as:

a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under

consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which,

although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.

As discussed above, the EC defined the product under consideration in this case as “farmed (other

than wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen,” finding in addition that “all

farmed salmon constitutes a single product. The different presentations all serve the same end use and

are readily capable of being substituted between each other. Therefore, they are considered to

constitute a single product for the purposes of the proceeding.” The EC specifically excluded from the

product under consideration “other similar farmed fish products such as large (salmon) trout, biomass

(live salmon) as well as wild salmon and further processed types such as smoked salmon.”

Para. 7.109. “With respect to like product, the EC found “the basic physical characteristics of farmed

salmon produced and sold by the Community industry in the Community, farmed salmon produced

and sold on the domestic Norwegian market, and farmed salmon imported into the Community from

Norway are the same and [ ] they have the same use.” The EC therefore provisionally concluded that

“the product concerned and the farmed salmon produced and sold on the domestic market of Norway,

as well as the farmed salmon produced and sold in the Community by the Community industry have

the same basic physical characteristics and uses and are therefore considered to be alike ....” It

confirmed this conclusion in its Definitive Regulation.”

Para. 7.110. “Thus, it is clear that the EC like product was found to be coextensive with the product

under consideration. Therefore, the like product perforce included the specified “farmed (other than

wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen”. In our view, the plain language of

Article 4.1 establishes that the domestic industry in this case was therefore to be defined as producers

“as a whole” of this product, or those producers whose output of this product constitutes a major

proportion of total EC production of this product.”

Para. 7.111. “Putting aside for the moment the question of whether producers of the like product “as

a whole” or producers of a “major proportion of total domestic production” of the like product are to

be considered the domestic industry, it is clear that Article 4.1 is unqualified in providing that the term

“domestic industry” is to be interpreted by reference to “producers” of the like product. The text

subsequently sets out circumstances in which some producers of the like product may be left out of

the domestic industry. Thus, Article 4.1(i) provides for exclusion of producers related to the exporters

or importers, or producers who are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product.

Article 4.1(ii) provides that, in the exceptional circumstances of two or more competitive markets

within the territory of a Member, producers within each market may be regarded as a separate

industry if certain conditions are satisfied.”

Para. 7.112. “However, nothing in the text of Article 4.1 gives any support to the notion that there is

any other circumstance in which the domestic industry can be interpreted, from the outset, as not

including certain categories of producers of the like product, other than those set out in that provision

(NR#283). Thus, we see no basis in the text of Article 4.1 which would allow for the exclusion from

the domestic industry, as a category or group, of producers of any form of the like product – in this

case, producers of any of the “presentations” identified by the EC as the like product – “farmed (other

than wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen”.”

NR#283 By this, we do not mean to suggest that a determination based on information from fewer

than all domestic producers of the like product will necessarily be insufficient as an element of a

decision to impose anti-dumping duties. However, we do see a clear distinction between the definition

of the domestic industry as set out in Article 4.1, and whether the information obtained during the

investigation concerning the domestic industry, as defined, is sufficient to form the basis of a

determination of injury and causation.

Para. 7.113. “The EC asserts, however, that enterprises engaged in filleting are not “producers” as

“fillets do not result from a process of “production”, but merely transformation of one presentation to

another presentation.” Thus, the EC argues that filleting-only undertakings are “not really concerned

with bringing the product concerned (farmed salmon) into existence, or producing it. Rather, if

anything, they are concerned with the process of consuming it.” The EC considers that the interests of

filleting-only undertakings are properly taken into account under Article 6.12 of the AD Agreement

and focuses on the analytical problems that it considers would arise if filleting-only undertakings were

considered “producers” in this case and treated as part of the domestic industry.”

Para. 7.114. “The EC's assertion is difficult to square with the ordinary meaning of the term

“produce”. The verb “to produce” is defined, inter alia, as “[b]ring (a thing) into existence” and

““bring into existence by mental or physical labour (a material object)”. There can be no doubt, in our

view, that an enterprise engaged in, as the EC puts it, “gutting, beheading, and filleting” is engaged in

“producing”, that is, bringing into existence, by physical labour, salmon fillets. We do not dispute that

undertakings that only engage in filleting operations, as opposed to operations engaged in growing

live salmon, and selling them whole, and/or beheaded, and/or gutted, and/or filleted, and/or fresh,

and/or frozen, or any combination thereof, may have different economic interests. Thus, an

investigation concerning a domestic industry comprising enterprises with more than one of these

various economic interests may well involve complicated questions regarding data collection and

analysis. Such complications cannot, however, override the plain meaning of the text of Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.115. “There is no dispute that filleted salmon is within the scope of the like product identified

by the EC in this case. Thus, based on our interpretation of the plain language of Article 4.1, we

consider that any enterprise that produced any form of the like product should be considered, at least

in the first instance, a “producer” of the like product, and as such, part of the domestic industry.”

Para. 7.116. “It is clear that the investigating authority never considered EC producers of salmon

fillets who did not also farm salmon fish to be part of the domestic industry. This is apparent from the

fact that the volume of production cited by the EC as “total domestic production”, 22,000 tonnes, is,

as we understand it, the EC's estimate of the volume of salmon fish farmed by EC salmon growers. It

certainly does not include the volume of salmon fillets produced by enterprises that produced salmon

fillets from purchased salmon fish. In our view, this wholesale exclusion of an entire category of

producers from the domestic industry is not compatible with the definition of domestic industry as set

out in Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.117. “The EC, however, argues that since Article 4.1 is a definitional provision, it imposes no

obligation, and therefore cannot be the basis of a finding of violation. In our view, merely that

Article 4.1 sets out a definition does not preclude a panel finding that the decision of the investigating

authority concerning the appropriate domestic industry is inconsistent with the AD Agreement. The

question whether the EC defined the domestic industry in a proper manner may well be decisive in the

consideration of other claims in dispute, i.e., subsidiary claims regarding initiation, as well as claims

regarding injury and causation. In our view, it is necessary to address Norway's claims concerning the

definition of the domestic industry in order to establish whether other determinations were made in

relation to a domestic industry defined consistently with Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.118. “In our view, regardless of whether Article 4.1, as a definitional article, itself imposes

obligations on Members which can be the basis of a finding of violation, it is necessary and

appropriate to address Norway's claims under Article 4.1 in this dispute. If the EC's approach to

defining domestic industry in this case resulted in an investigation concerning a domestic industry that

did not comport with the definition set forth in Article 4.1, then it seems clear to us the EC analyzed

the wrong industry in determining the adequacy of support for the initiation of the investigation under

Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement, and in considering injury and causation under Article 3, committing

an error which is potentially fatal to the WTO-consistency of the investigating authority's

determinations on those issues.”

Para. 7.119. “We note that the question of whether definitional provisions can be the basis of a

finding of a violation under a covered agreement has been addressed by several panels, whose

decisions support our views on the matter. Thus, the Panel in United States – Softwood Lumber V

noted with respect to Article 2.6, which defines like product,

Article 2.6 is a definitional article, and as such it is not clear to us that it

contains in itself obligations on Members, or in any event that it could be the

basis for an independent violation. On the other hand, it appears to us that

Canada's claim is predicated on the proposition that DOC took an approach to

the definition of like product which deviated from that in Article 2.6. Thus, a

threshold and potentially dispositive issue is whether DOC in fact took an

approach to like product which deviated from that of Article 2.6.”

The Panel in Argentina – Poultry, considering the same provision as is at issue here, concluded that

Article 4.1 “imposes an express obligation on Members to interpret the term “domestic industry” in

that specified manner” and stated that “if a Member were to interpret the term differently in the

context of an anti-dumping investigation, that Member would violate the obligation set forth in

Article 4.1”. In US – Lamb, the Appellate Body found that the United States violated the definition of

“domestic industry” in Article 4.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the

Panel and Appellate Body both found that the United States had violated Article 2.1 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement, which defines the term “dumping”. In EC – CVDs on DRAMS, the Panel found

that the EC violated Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which defines a “subsidy”.

Para. 7.120. “The only textual basis the EC proposes in support of its view that filleting-only

enterprises were properly not considered part of the domestic industry is Article 6.12. However, that

provision deals with an entirely different issue than the definition of the domestic industry. Article 6,

as a whole, deals with various issues pertaining to evidence in an anti-dumping investigation.

Article 6.12 specifically requires an investigating authority to provide opportunities for information to

be provided by certain entities that are not “interested parties” – inter alia, industrial users of the

product under investigation. In our view, even granting that filleting-only undertakings might be

considered “industrial users” of imported salmon, in that they “use” one presentation of the like

product (salmon fish, in some form), they cannot properly be considered to be exclusively industrial

users, as they themselves are engaged in producing another presentation of the like product (fillets).

As producers of salmon fillets, which is within the scope of the like product, such enterprises should,

at least initially, be considered as part of the domestic industry. As we noted above, there may be

circumstances in which an investigating authority might conclude that certain enterprises whose

output is part of the like product should not be considered “producers”, as their level of activity is so

low as to suggest that they do not actually bring the like product into existence. There was no

consideration of any such possibility in the investigation at issue here, however, and thus we need not

resolve this question, either as a matter of law or on the facts of this case.”

Para. 7.121. “We recognize that, as argued by the EC, this conclusion has certain implications which

may need to be addressed by an investigating authority, particularly with respect to the collection and

analysis of data for different presentations of the like product. However, we do not see how problems

of data collection and evaluation could possibly trump the plain meaning of the text of Article 4.1.

Moreover, there is no prohibition in the AD Agreement on the examination of different sectors of a

domestic industry, so long as all sectors are included in the analysis and determination on an even-

handed basis, without favoring any one sector. Thus, we see no bar to gathering and analysing

information for different categories of producer in the course of an investigation. That this might

result in a more complicated investigation and more complex analysis does not undermine our

conclusion based on the text of Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.122. “Similar considerations apply to our consideration of the EC's treatment of producers of

organic salmon, which again is within the like product as defined by the EC, and “silent” producers.

The EC has not argued that these enterprises are not producers of the like product, and has not made

any argument concerning the different nature of these producers, as it did for filleting-only

undertakings. Thus, in our view, there is no support for the exclusion of these producers, as a group,

from the domestic industry.”

Para. 7.123. “With respect to producers of “certain types” of salmon, producers of organic salmon,

“silent” producers of salmon, and producers of salmon that did not provide information in the format

requested, the EC argues that since the producers it did include in the domestic industry accounted for

a major proportion of domestic production of the like product, it was entitled to not include producers

of these types. These arguments raise the second question which we identified above, whether once

producers of the like product accounting for a major proportion of domestic production of that product

are included in the domestic industry, other producers need not even be considered. While this is a

very interesting issue, of some import, it is not necessary for us to decide it in the context of this

dispute. We have concluded that the EC erred in excluding certain enterprises from the domestic

industry. Thus, it is clear that the EC's assessment of whether the producers it did include accounted

for a “major proportion” of domestic production of the like product is based on incorrect information

concerning the volume of total domestic production of the domestic like product. The EC not having

even obtained information on, insofar as we can determine, much less made a determination of the

proportion of total production of the domestic like product accounted for by individual producers, any

assessment by us would be entirely de novo, which is, of course, an exercise we are prohibited from

undertaking. Therefore, we exercise judicial economy in not addressing this aspect of Norway's

claims.”

Para. 7.124. “We therefore conclude that the EC's approach to defining the domestic industry in this

case resulted in an investigation concerning a domestic industry that did not comport with the

definition set forth in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement. As a consequence, the EC's determination of

support for the application under Article 5.4 was based on information relating to a wrongly-defined

industry, and is therefore not consistent with the requirements of that Article. Furthermore, the EC's

analyses of injury and causation were based on information relating to a wrongly-defined industry,

and are therefore necessarily not consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5.”

Para. 7.125. “Having concluded that the EC's approach to defining domestic industry was erroneous,

we also consider that the sample of that industry relied upon by the EC necessarily is itself erroneous,

as it relates to a wrongly-defined domestic industry. Nonetheless, we consider it appropriate to

address Norway's claims on the issue of sampling in more detail, as they fall within the range of

issues which we believe it appropriate to address despite our exercise of judicial economy. This is

because this issue may well arise in the context of any actions taken by the EC in implementing our

decision. We therefore go on to consider it.”

Para. 8.1. “In the light of the findings we have set out in the foregoing sections of our Report, we

conclude that the European Communities Acted inconsistently with:

(i) Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement because its approach to defining the

domestic industry in this case resulted in an investigation concerning a

domestic industry that did not comport with the definition set forth in Article

4.1 of the AD Agreement, and consequently

- Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement in determining support for the application

for initiation of the basis of information relating to wrongly-defined domestic

industry, and

- Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement in undertaking injury and

causation analyses on the basis of information relating to a wrongly-defined

domestic industry”;

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on

Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fastners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R,

paras. 7.209-7.219, 7.222-7.230 e 8.3 (b)

O Painel analisa a alegação de que a União Europeia teria agido de forma inconsistente com o Artigo

4.1 do Acordo Anti-Dumping ao definir como indústria doméstica o conjunto de produtores que

representam 27% do total estimado da produção de prendedores da União Europeia.

Para. 7.209. “Before turning to the parties' arguments, we set out below our conclusions with respect

to the facts surrounding the definition of domestic industry in this case. Some of these facts were

disputed by the parties, and we have resolved those disputes as necessary in order make our decision.”

Para. 7.210. “In this anti-dumping investigation, the Commission did not specifically set out a

“definition” of the domestic industry per se. However, its views on the subject are clear from the

Definitive Regulation. First, the Commission defined the “product concerned” in the investigation, as:

certain iron or steel fasteners, other than of stainless steel, i.e. wood screws

(excluding coach screws), self-tapping screws, other screws and bolts with

heads (whether or not with their nuts or washers, but excluding screws turned

from bars, rods, profiles or wire, of solid section, of a shank thickness not

exceeding 6 mm and excluding screws and bolts for fixing railway track

construction material), and washers, originating in the People's Republic of China (all together hereinafter referred to as fasteners or product concerned).

The product concerned is normally declared within CN codes 7318 12 90,

7318 14 91, 7318 14 99, 7318 15 59, 7318 15 69, 7318 15 81, 7318 15 89, ex 7318 15 90, ex 7318 21 00 and ex 7318 22 00.

Fasteners are used to mechanically join two or more elements in construction, engineering, etc., and

are used in a wide variety of industrial sectors, as well as by consumers. Based on their basic physical

and technical characteristics and end uses, all fasteners are considered to constitute a single product for

the purpose of the proceeding. Within the same national or international standards, fasteners should

comply with the same basic physical and technical characteristics including notably strength,

tolerance, finishing and coating.”

Para. 7.211. “At paragraphs 48-56 of the Definitive Regulation, the Commission addressed various

arguments of the parties to the investigation concerning the issue of like product, and concluded at

paragraph 57 that:

the fasteners produced and sold by the Community industry in the

Community, fasteners produced and sold on the domestic market in the PRC

and those produced and sold on the domestic market in India, which served as

an analogue country, and fasteners produced in the PRC and sold to the

Community are alike within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic

Regulation.”

Para. 7.212. “Referring to the indication at the outset of the investigation, in the Notice of Initiation,

that sampling might be used, the Definitive Regulation states that:

in view of the large number of producers, sampling of the domestic industry

was proposed... In order to enable the Commission to decide whether

sampling would be necessary, and if so to select a sample, Community

producers were requested to make themselves known within 15 days from the

date of the initiation of the investigation and to provide basic information on

their production and sales, and the names and activities of all their related

companies involved in the production and/or selling of the product

concerned.... Community producers that produced the product concerned in

the Community during the investigation period and expressed a wish to be

included in the sample within the aforesaid period were considered as

cooperating companies and were taken into account in the selection of the

sample.... These Community producers represented over 30% of the estimated

production in the Community in 2006. These producers are considered to constitute the Community industry as mentioned in recital 114.”

The Commission concluded, at recital 114 of the Definitive Regulation, that:

The production of the Community producers that supported the complaint and

fully cooperated in the investigation represents 27,0% of the production of the

product concerned in the Community. It is therefore considered that these

companies constitute the Community industry within the meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation.

Para. 7.213. “In response to questions from the Panel, the European Union clarified that, at the time

of initiation, it sent sampling forms to 318 EU producers of fasteners, asking for certain basic

information concerning their operations, which could be used to determine the composition of the

intended sample, and setting a 15-day deadline. Five national associations of producers were also sent

letters, and the Notice of Initiation invited any other domestic producers who so wished to come

forward and provide the requested information within the 15-day period. Another 54 producers,

whose names had been provided by exporters, were subsequently contacted by the Commission,

which sent sampling forms to 45 and received 10 completed forms in return, but none of these

producers were ultimately included in the domestic industry. The sampling forms do not contain any

questions concerning support for or opposition to the application. China asserts that this does not

mean the EU investigating authority was not aware of the positions of all companies with respect to

the investigation. In this respect, China notes that the Information Document, sent to the parties at the

time it was decided not to impose provisional measures, indicates that of 114 companies who came

forward with relevant information, those who produced the product under investigation and expressed

a wish to be included in the sample were considered as “cooperating” and were taken into account in

the selection of the sample. Of these cooperating companies, 86, representing 36 per cent of estimated

EU production, supported the complaint, while 25, accounting for 9 per cent of EU production,

opposed the complaint, and three did not express an opinion.”

Para. 7.214. “We note that the Definitive Regulation suggests, by using the term “producers that

supported the complaint”, that, as alleged by China, only producers expressing support for the

complaint were included in the domestic industry. While the Information Document also seems to

support this conclusion, we accept that, as asserted by the European Union, this is a working

document reflecting progress in the investigation to that point, with no legal status in EU law, which

was made available to the parties despite there being no obligation to do so, and is not the measure

before us. Thus, we do not consider the representations in the Information Document as constituting

part of the measure which we must evaluate. We note that the European Union indicates that at least

one producer which was not a complainant, and had remained silent prior to initiation, was not only

included in the domestic industry, but was selected for the sample. The European Union indicates

that, based on arguments made by Chinese exporters, it continued to consider the question of standing

after the initiation, that this continued examination confused the question of the definition of the

domestic industry, and that the “unfortunate standard formulation” in the Definitive Regulation

(referring to the use of the term “producers that supported the complaint” with respect to the domestic

industry), did not affect the definition of the domestic industry, with respect to which no distinction

was made between producers who supported the complaint and those that did not.”

Para. 7.215. “We are sympathetic to China's position with respect to the question of whether

producers who do not support the complaint may be excluded from the domestic industry in the

abstract. Issues might arise should an investigating authority systematically exclude from the domestic

industry companies that produce the like product but do not support the complaint. On the other hand,

we also have sympathy for the European Union's view that producers who do not support the

complaint are not likely to cooperate, and thus cannot effectively be considered as part of the

domestic industry unless they specifically come forward and agree to participate in the investigation.

We consider that, on the facts before us, China has not demonstrated that the EU investigating

authority in this case did, in fact, exclude producers that did not support the complaint from the

domestic industry. In our view, this is demonstrated by the fact that at least one producer who did not

affirmatively state support for the complaint was included in the domestic industry. In addition, while

it seems clear that producers who did not make themselves known within the 15-day period

established at initiation were not included in the domestic industry, we find that the investigating

authority did not act to exclude such producers. There seems to have been a process of considering

additional producers for inclusion in the domestic industry, based on arguments made by the

exporters. While none of the producers so considered were in the end included in the domestic

industry, in our view, the fact that the Commission considered including them the domestic industry

supports our view that it did not simply exclude producers who did not come forward within the 15-

day period.”

Para. 7.216. “Finally, we note that the Definitive Regulation indicates that the Commission chose the

sample by selecting, from the 46 producers constituting the Community industry, those with the

largest production volumes, “so as to achieve the largest representative volume of production of the

like product produced in the Community which could reasonably be investigated within the time

available”. From the completed sampling forms received from domestic producers, the investigating

authority selected a sample comprising seven producers, accounting for approximately 70 per cent of

the production of the Community industry, as defined by the Commission, that is, the 46 producers.

Subsequently, one sampled producer was considered as not cooperating, and dropped from the

sample, resulting in a sample comprising six producers accounting for approximately 65 per cent of

the production of the Community industry as defined by the Commission. Questionnaires were sent to

the sampled companies and replies from all of them were received within the deadlines established by

the Commission.”

Para. 7.217. “Turning to the first aspect of China's claim, we recall that Article 4.1 of the

AD Agreement provides:

4.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be

interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like

products or to those of them whose collective output of the products

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those

products, except that:

(i) when producers are related (78) to the exporters or importers or are

themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term “domestic

industry” may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers;

(ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for

the production in question, be divided into two or more competitive

markets and the producers within each market may be regarded as a

separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost

all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the

demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by

producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory. In

such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major

portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a

concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated market and

provided further that the dumped imports are causing injury to the

producers of all or almost all of the production within such market.”

Para. 7.218. “Thus, the plain language of Article 4.1 makes it clear that domestic producers of the

“like product” are the starting point for the definition of the domestic industry. It is also clear from the

plain language of Article 4.1 that the domestic industry is to be defined as producers “as a whole” of

the like product defined in the investigation, or, in the alternative, those producers whose output of

that product constitutes a major proportion of total domestic production of this product. In addition, it

is clear that Article 4.1 sets out circumstances in which some producers of the like product may be

left out of the domestic industry. Thus, Article 4.1(i) provides for exclusion of producers related to the

exporters or importers, or producers who are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product,

while Article 4.1(ii) provides that, in the exceptional circumstances of two or more competitive

markets within the territory of a Member, producers within each market may be regarded as a separate

industry if certain conditions are satisfied. However, we agree with the views of the panel in EC –

Salmon (Norway), that:

nothing in the text of Article 4.1 gives any support to the notion that there is

any other circumstance in which the domestic industry can be interpreted,

from the outset, as not including certain categories of producers of the like

product, other than those set out in that provision. (79) Thus, we see no basis

in the text of Article 4.1 which would allow for the exclusion from the

domestic industry, as a category or group, of producers of any form of the like product (...).”

Para. 7.219. “On its face, it is clear that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not establish any

particular procedure or methodology for investigating authorities in defining the domestic industry.

There is nothing in Article 4.1which would preclude investigating authorities from establishing

deadlines for companies to come forward in order to be considered for inclusion in the domestic

industry. We have concluded, on the basis of the facts before us, that the Commission, the EU

investigating authority, did not act to exclude the “category” of producers asserted by China, that is,

“producers that did not support the complaint”, from the definition of the domestic industry. As noted,

at least one producer that did not support the complaint was, in fact, included in the domestic industry,

and in the sample. In addition, we consider, and China does not disagree, that it is reasonable for

investigating authorities to impose deadlines for domestic producers to make themselves known and

then define the domestic industry on the basis of those that come forward within that deadline. While

China suggests that the 15-days allowed by the Commission was insufficient, it does not substantiate

this position, and we see no basis for concluding that the 15-day period was necessarily insufficient.

Moreover, it seems clear that the Commission did consider the possible inclusion of additional

producers in the domestic industry, although it ultimately did not include any. In our view, the mere

fact that the domestic industry as ultimately defined does not include any particular proportion of

producers expressing different views with respect to the complaint, or producers who did not come

forward within the 15-day period, does not demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently

with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement in defining the domestic industry. Thus, we find that China has

failed to demonstrate that the European Union excluded producers that did not support the complaint,

and has failed to demonstrate that the definition of the domestic industry was inconsistent with

Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement in this regard.”

Para. 7.222. “China's second allegation of error has two aspects: (a) whether, in the circumstances of

this investigation, the Eurostat data considered by the Commission constituted a reliable basis for

estimating total EU production of fasteners in assessing whether the producers included in the

domestic industry accounted for a “major proportion” of total domestic production of the like product,

and (b) whether the 27 per cent of total EU production accounted for by the producers found to

constitute the domestic industry was sufficient to constitute a “major proportion” of total domestic

production of the like product, under Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.”

Para. 7.223. “We note that China's arguments concerning the first aspect essentially reprise its

arguments in the context of its claim with respect to standing. As discussed in more detail above, and

for the same reasons, we do not consider that the European Union erred in relying on the Eurostat data

in estimating total EU production of fasteners. China acknowledges that the specific data used,

PRODCOM statistics, are gathered according to objective rules, but asserts that these rules themselves

make the data unsuitable for calculating domestic production. However, similar to the standing

determination, the definition of the domestic industry takes place at an early stage of the proceedings,

when the information available to the investigating authority is necessarily limited. In our view,

reliance on a set of data gathered and maintained on an objective basis for reasons not linked to the

anti-dumping investigation is a reasonable basis for an investigating authority to make decisions

concerning the definition of the domestic industry, including whether a group of producers accounts

for a sufficient proportion of total domestic production to be considered a “major proportion” of that

production. We do not preclude the possibility that such a decision might be revisited at a later stage

of the proceedings, when more information has become available to the investigating authority.

However, there is nothing in the facts before us that would support the view that the Commission

should have approached the Eurostat data with suspicion.”

Para. 7.224. “China contends that the alleged underestimation of production volumes in the data was

confirmed by evidence provided by interested parties during the investigation. Even assuming that to

be true, we fail to see how this could be taken into account at the beginning stages of the investigation

when the Commission was assessing whether producers considered for inclusion in the domestic

industry accounted for a major proportion of total EU production of fasteners. Although China asserts

that other information was available to the investigating authority on EU production of fasteners, we

note that this information at best relates to only some production, in Italy and for the automotive

industry, and we cannot see how such partial information would constitute a more appropriate basis

for estimating total domestic production than the data actually relied upon. Thus, we conclude that the

European Union did not violate Article 4.1 by relying on Eurostat data in estimating total EU

production for purposes of defining the domestic industry.”

Para. 7.225. “The principal issue raised by China is whether the European Union violated Article 4.1

in defining producers accounting for 27 per cent of estimated total EU production of fasteners as the

domestic industry on the basis that these producers accounted for a “major proportion” of total

domestic production within the meaning of Article 4.1. China argued that the Commission wrongly

relied on a presumption that producers accounting for 25 per cent of total domestic production

constitute a major proportion of domestic production. Whether or not the Commission relied on such

a presumption, it is for China to make a prima facie case that the Commission's definition of domestic

industry is inconsistent with Article 4.1 in the investigation in dispute. Although China's first written

submission asserted that a “major proportion” must be as close as possible to domestic production “as

a whole”, at the first meeting of the Panel, China's representative acknowledged that there is no

proportion, in the abstract, that must be satisfied to constitute a “major proportion”, and that

depending on the circumstances, even something less than 25 per cent might be sufficient. In our

view, the assertion that the Commission relied on a presumption is not alone sufficient to demonstrate,

prima facie, that the definition of domestic industry in this case is inconsistent with Article 4.1 of the

AD Agreement.We therefore do not consider it necessary to address China's argument that the

European Union erred by presuming that producers accounting for 25 per cent of total domestic

production will constitute a major proportion, and thus satisfy the requirements of Article 4.1 in this

regard. We now turn to the question whether, in this case, the European Union erred in concluding

that producers of 27 per cent of estimated total EU production of fasteners accounted for a “major

proportion” of total domestic production within the meaning of Article 4.1.”

Para. 7.226. “We recall the provisions of Article 4.1, quoted above, which do not define the term

“major proportion”. As the parties have recognized, a “major” proportion is one that is “important,

serious, or significant”. The parties also agree that the “major proportion” referred to in Article 4.1 of

the AD Agreement may be something less than 50 per cent, and that the lower limit is not

determinable in the abstract, but will depend on the facts of the case. This is consistent with the views

of the panel in Argentina – Poultry, which concluded:

an interpretation that defines the domestic industry in terms of domestic

producers of an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic

production is permissible. Indeed, this approach is entirely consistent with the

Spanish version of Article 4.1, which refers to producers representing “una

proporción importante” of domestic production. Furthermore, Article 4.1 does

not define the “domestic industry” in terms of producers of the major

proportion of total domestic production. Instead, Article 4.1 refers to

producers of a major proportion of total domestic production. If Article 4.1

had referred to the major proportion, the requirement would clearly have been

to define the “domestic industry” as producers constituting 50+ per cent of

total domestic production. (80) However, the reference to a major proportion

suggests that there may be more than one “major proportion” for the purpose

of defining “domestic industry”. In the event of multiple “major proportions”,

it is inconceivable that each individual “major proportion” could – or must –

exceed 50 per cent. This therefore supports our finding that it is permissible to

define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers of an

important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production. For

these reasons, we find that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not require

Members to define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers representing the majority, or 50+ per cent, of total domestic production.”

The panel in that case went on to observe that there was “nothing on the record to suggest that, in the

circumstances of this case, 46 per cent of total domestic production is not an important, serious or

significant proportion of total domestic production”, and accordingly rejected Brazil's claim that

Argentina violated Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement by defining “domestic industry” as consisting of

domestic producers accounting for 46 per cent of total domestic production.”

Para. 7227. “We agree with these views, and consider it appropriate to apply them in our analysis in

this dispute. Thus, the question for us is whether, in light of the facts on the record of the anti-

dumping investigation before us, there is anything that supports China's contention that 27 per cent of

estimated EU production of fasteners is not an important, serious, or significant proportion of total

domestic production of that product.”

Para. 7.228. “In its first written submission, China did not make any arguments with respect to the

facts of this case, but did raise such arguments at the first meeting of the Panel with the parties, and in

subsequent submissions. We note that the European Union asserts that China fails to make a prima

facie case with respect to this claim, as it failed to provide any relevant evidence of why 27 per cent of

total domestic production does not constitute a “major proportion” of total domestic production. In its

second written submission, China asserted the following specific circumstances in support of its

contention that 27 per cent of domestic production did not satisfy the major proportion requirement:

(a) that the domestic producers included in the domestic industry are not representative of the whole

of domestic production, (b) that it was feasible, as a practical matter, to include more domestic

producers, (c) that the producers included represent only a small portion of the total number of

domestic producers, and (d) that the domestic industry definition excluded producers other than those

referred to in Article 4.1(i) and (ii). China also argues that investigating authorities are required to

examine and determine, in light of the specific circumstances of each case whether the major

proportion test has been satisfied, including not only quantitative elements, but also aspects such as

those set out in (a) – (d) above. According to China, the EU investigating authority simply failed to

consider the circumstances of the case, and instead rested on the fact that 27 per cent is more than

25 per cent, and therefore was sufficient. China asserts that this failure cannot be cured by the fact that

the domestic industry as defined did, in fact, include large and smaller companies and producers of

different types of the like product.”

Para. 7.229. “We recall that Article 4.1 is a definitional provision. Thus, while it does impose an

obligation on an investigating authority to ensure that it defines a “domestic industry” in a manner

consistent with that provision, Article 4.1 does not set out any requirements with respect to how an

investigating authority is to do this. We see no basis in the text of Article 4.1 for the proposition put

forward by China that an investigating authority must, of its own accord, “examine and determine”

whether the major proportion test has been satisfied by considering the specific circumstances of the

case with reference to the criteria proposed by China. We do not mean to suggest that an investigating

authority may ignore relevant evidence, and in particular arguments made by interested parties,

suggesting that a particular definition of domestic industry is inconsistent with Article 4.1. But the

only requirement clearly set out in that provision is that the domestic industry consist of “domestic

producers of the like product”, either as a whole, or those of them accounting for a major proportion

of total domestic production. We see no basis in the text of the AD Agreement to impose on

investigating authorities an affirmative obligation to examine non-quantitative factors in defining a

domestic industry on the basis of producers accounting for a major proportion of domestic production

of the like product. Nor, in our view, does the report in Argentina – Poultry suggest otherwise. While

the panel in that dispute did note that “[t]here is nothing on the record to suggest that, in the

circumstances of this case, 46 per cent of total domestic production is not an important, serious or

significant proportion of total domestic production”, we do not understand this to impose an

affirmative obligation on the investigating authority to examine and determine unspecified

“circumstances” in defining the domestic industry.”

NR#497 We note that this does not mean that we agree that any domestic industry which includes

producers accounting for more than 25 per cent of total domestic production will necessarily be

consistent with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, nor that an examination of injury to such an industry

will necessarily be consistent with the provisions of Article 3 of the AD Agreement.

Para. 7.230. “Even assuming non-quantitative factors are relevant to the definition of a domestic

industry under Article 4.1, we do not consider that the factors China raises in this regard are relevant

in this case, or in general. For instance, we see nothing in Article 4.1 that would require an

investigating authority, in defining the domestic industry, to examine and determine whether

producers accounting for a major proportion, are, in addition, somehow “representative” of the whole

of domestic production. Nor do we see anything in the text of Article 4.1 that would require an

investigating authority to include as many producers as is “practically feasible”, so long as the

producers that are included account for a sufficient quantity of domestic production to be considered a

“major proportion”. Similarly, we consider irrelevant whether the number of producers included in the

domestic industry is a small or a large portion of the total number of producers. Article 4.1 refers to

the volume of production accounted for by producers, a consideration which is, in our view, not

addressed by taking account of the number of producers. Moreover, as the European Union observes,

it is precisely in the situation of a “fragmented” industry with many producers that a definition of the

domestic industry based on the “major proportion” is most likely, and to require that an industry in

that situation must include a major proportion of the number of the producers would vitiate the

effectiveness of the major proportion option. Finally, as noted above, we have rejected as a matter of

fact China's contention that the Commission wrongly excluded certain categories of producers. We

therefore conclude that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the

AD Agreement in defining a domestic industry comprising producers accounting for 27 per cent of

total estimated EU production of fasteners.”

Para. 8.3. “In the light of the findings we have set out in the foregoing sections of our Report, we

conclude that China has not established that the European Union acted inconsistently with:

(b) Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the AD Agreement with respect to the definition of domestic industry in the fasteners investigation”;

III. Comentários

Da análise acima apresentada, três contenciosos se destacam por trazerem importante análise pelo

Painel (81) para a interpretação do Artigo 4.1 e definição do termo “indústria doméstica”.

Inicialmente, cabe destacar o caso Argentina – Poultry Anti-dumping Duties (82), em que o Painel foi

assertivo ao afirmar que o Artigo 4.1 estabelece que o termo “indústria doméstica” deve ser

interpretado de forma específica e que na opinião do Painel, impõe-se uma obrigação expressa aos

Membros de interpretar o termo “indústria doméstica” de forma específica. Portanto, segundo o

Painel, se um Membro interpretar o termo diferentemente em uma investigação anti-dumping, este

Membro violaria a obrigação contida no Artigo 4.1.

Essa interpretação foi confirmada pelo Painel nos casos EC – Salmon (83) e EC – Fastners (84), que

destacou ser o Artigo 4.1 um “definitional provision”. Outra importante contribuição trazida pelo

Painel no caso Argentina - Poultry Anti-dumping Duties diz respeito à interpretação do termo “a

major proportion” no Artigo 4.1, ao estabelecer que tal termo não significa mais de 50% dos

produtores nacionais (ou “a maior parte”), mas sim proporção importante, séria ou significante da

produção doméstica total, não havendo, portanto, percentual definido para tanto (85).

Nesse sentido, vide comentários sobre a tradução em português do acordo. Essa interpretação foi

confirmada pelo Painel no caso EC – Fastners. Outro contencioso que também merece destaque é o

caso EC - Salmon, em que o Painel esclareceu que o Artigo 4.1 é claro ao definir as circunstâncias que

permitem que alguns produtores do produto similar possam não ser considerados como indústria

doméstica. Tais circunstâncias estão definidas no Artigo 4.1 (i) e 4.1 (ii). Concluiu o Painel que nada

no Artigo 4.1 dá suporte à noção de que exista outra circunstância que permita exclusões.

Essa interpretação foi confirmada pelo Painel no caso EC - Fastners. Por fim, conforme visto acima, o

caso EC - Fastners também merece destaque, pois confirmou a decisão de Painéis anteriores no que

se refere à obrigação de interpretação do Artigo 4.1, definição do termo “major proportion” e que

apenas nas circunstâncias definidas no Artigo 4.1 (i) e 4.1 (ii) os produtores do produto similar podem

ser excluídos da indústria doméstica.

Footnote 74: For the purpose of this paragraph, producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers only if

(a) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third

person; or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for believing or

suspecting that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from non-

related producers. For the purpose of this paragraph, one shall be deemed to control another when the former is legally or

operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction over the latter. Footnote 75: As used in this Agreement “levy” shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment or collection of a duty or

tax. Footnote 76: Para os efeitos deste parágrafo, produtores serão considerados relacionados com os exportadores apenas no

caso de a) um deles direta ou indiretamente controlar o outro; ou b) ambos serem controlados direta ou indiretamente por um

terceiro; ou c) juntos, ambos controlarem, direta ou indiretamente, um terceiro, desde que haja motivos para acreditar-se, ou

disto suspeitar-se, que tal relação pode levar o produtor em causa a comportar-se diferentemente dos que não integram tal

relação. Para fins deste parágrafo, considera-se que um controla o outro quando o primeiro está em condições legais ou

operacionais de impedir ou induzir as decisões do segundo. Footnote 77: No contexto deste Acordo, “aplicados” significa a determinação ou recebimento legais, finais ou definitivos, de imposto ou taxa.

Footnote 78: For the purpose of this paragraph, producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers only if (a) one of them

directly or indirectly controls the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they

directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is

such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers. For the purpose of this paragraph, one shall be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction over the latter.

Footnote 79: By this, we do not mean to suggest that a determination based on information from fewer than all domestic producers of the like product will necessarily be insufficient as an element of a decision to impose anti-dumping duties. However, we do see a clear

distinction between the definition of the domestic industry as set out in Article 4.1, and whether the information obtained during the investigation concerning the domestic industry, as defined, is sufficient to form the basis of a determination of injury and causation.

Footnote 80: If Article 4.1 had referred to “the” major proportion, we may have been required to accept Brazil's interpretation of Article 4.1.”

Footnote 81: Não houve apelação em nenhum destes casos.

Footnote 82: WT/DS241/R.

Footnote 83: WT/DS337/R.

Footnote 84: WT/DS397/R.

Footnote 85: Vide Comentários à tradução, item IC.

Artigo 5

Luciano Inácio de Souza

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 5

Initiation and Subsequent Investigation

5.1 Except as provided for in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence, degree and

effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of

the domestic industry.

5.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury within the

meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and (c) a causal link

between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by

relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph.

The application shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on

the following:

(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the

domestic production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written

application is made on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify

the industry on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known

domestic producers of the like product (or associations of domestic producers of the

like product) and, to the extent possible, a description of the volume and value of

domestic production of the like product accounted for by such producers;

(ii) a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the country or

countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or

foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question;

(iii) information on prices at which the product in question is sold when destined for

consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin or export

(or, where appropriate, information on the prices at which the product is sold from

the country or countries of origin or export to a third country or countries, or on the

constructed value of the product) and information on export prices or, where

appropriate, on the prices at which the product is first resold to an independent

buyer in the territory of the importing Member;

(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the

effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the

consequent impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by

relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry,

such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3.

5.3 The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the

application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an

investigation.

5.4 An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the authorities have

determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the

application expressed (86) by domestic producers of the like product, that the application has

been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. (87) The application shall be considered

to have been made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry” if it is supported by those

domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total

production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing

either support for or opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated

when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per

cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.

5.5 The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to initiate an investigation, any

publicizing of the application for the initiation of an investigation. However, after receipt of a

properly documented application and before proceeding to initiate an investigation, the

authorities shall notify the government of the exporting Member concerned.

5.6 If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation

without having received a written application by or on behalf of a domestic industry for the

initiation of such investigation, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of

dumping, injury and a causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation of an

investigation.

5.7 The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in the

decision whether or not to initiate an investigation, and (b) thereafter, during the course of the

investigation, starting on a date not later than the earliest date on which in accordance with the

provisions of this Agreement provisional measures may be applied.

5.8 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated

promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence

of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. There shall be immediate

termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is

de minimis, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is

negligible. The margin of dumping shall be considered to be de minimis if this margin is less

than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price. The volume of dumped imports

shall normally be regarded as negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a particular

country is found to account for less than 3 per cent of imports of the like product in the

importing Member, unless countries which individually account for less than 3 per cent of the

imports of the like product in the importing Member collectively account for more than 7 per

cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member.

5.9 An anti-dumping proceeding shall not hinder the procedures of customs clearance.

5.10 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no

case more than 18 months, after their initiation.

IA. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 5

Início e Condução das Investigações

5.1 Com exceção do disposto no parágrafo 6, uma investigação para determinar a existência, o

grau e o efeito de qualquer dumping alegado será iniciada por meio de petição formulada por

escrito pela indústria doméstica, ou em seu nome.

5.2 A petição mencionada no parágrafo 1 deverá incluir demonstração de (a) dumping, (b) dano,

no sentido do disposto no artigo VI do GATT 1994, tal como interpretado neste Acordo, e (c)

nexo causal entre as importações a preços de dumping e o dano alegado. Simples declarações,

desacompanhadas de demonstração bem fundamentada, não poderão ser consideradas

suficientes para satisfazer o requerido neste parágrafo. Dentro dos limites que se possa

razoavelmente esperar estejam ao alcance do peticionário, a petição deverá conter

informações sobre os seguintes pontos:

(a) identidade do peticionário e indicação do volume e do valor da produção doméstica

peticionário do similar nacional. No caso de a petição escrita ter sido feita em nome

da indústria doméstica, o documento deverá indicar a indústria em nome da qual foi

feita a petição por meio de lista com todos os produtores domésticos conhecidos do

similar (ou associações de produtores nacionais do similar) e, na medida do

possível, incluir indicação do volume e do valor da produção doméstica do similar

nacional por que respondem aqueles produtores;

(b) descrição completa do produto alegadamente introduzido a preços de dumping,

nomes do país ou dos países de origem ou de exportação, identidade de cada

exportador ou produtor estrangeiro conhecido e lista das pessoas conhecidas que

importam o produto em questão;

(c) informação sobre os preços pelos quais o produto em questão é vendido quando

destinado ao consumo no mercado doméstico do país ou países de origem ou de

exportação (ou, quando for o caso, informação sobre o preço pelo qual o produto é

vendido pelo país ou países de origem ou de exportação a um terceiro país ou países,

ou sobre o preço construído do produto) e informação sobre o preço de exportação

ou, quando for o caso, sobre os preços pelos quais o produto é vendido ao primeiro

comprador independente situado no território do Membro importador;

(d) informação sobre a evolução do volume alegadamente importado a preços de

dumping, os efeitos de tais importações sobre os preços do similar no mercado

doméstico e o conseqüente impacto das importações sobre a indústria doméstica, tal

como demonstrado por fatores e índices significativos que tenham relação com o

estado da indústria doméstica, a exemplo daqueles arrolados nos parágrafos 2 e 4 do

Artigo 3.

5.3 As autoridades examinarão a correção e a adequação das comprovações oferecidas na petição

com vistas a determinar a existência de suficientes motivos que justifiquem o início de uma

investigação.

5.4 Não se deverá iniciar investigação nos termos do parágrafo 1 a menos que as autoridades

tenham confirmado, com base em exame do grau de apoio ou de rejeição à petição, expresso

pelos produtores domésticos do similar, que a petição foi efetivamente feita pela indústria

doméstica ou em seu nome. Considerar-se-á como feita “pela indústria doméstica ou em seu

nome” a petição que for apoiada por aqueles produtores cuja produção agregada constitua 50

por cento da produção total do similar, produzida por aquela porção da indústria doméstica

que tenha expressado seu apoio ou sua rejeição à petição. No sentido oposto, nenhuma

investigação será iniciada quando os produtores nacionais que expressamente apóiam a

petição reúnam menos de 25 por cento da produção total do similar realizada pela indústria

nacional.

5.5 A menos que se tenha tomado a decisão de iniciar a investigação, as autoridades evitarão

divulgar a petição que solicita início de investigação. Após receber petição devidamente

documentada, porém, e antes de proceder ao início da investigação, as autoridades deverão

notificar o Governo do Membro exportador respectivo.

5.6 Se, em situação especial, as autoridades responsáveis decidem iniciar investigação sem ter

recebido petição por escrito apresentada pela indústria doméstica, ou em seu nome, em que se

solicite o início de tal investigação, aquelas autoridades somente poderão agir se tiverem

suficiente comprovação de dumping, dano e nexo causal, conforme descritos no parágrafo 2,

que justifiquem início de investigação.

5.7 As comprovações de dumping e de dano serão consideradas simultaneamente (a) na tomada

de decisão sobre se se deve ou não iniciar investigação; e (b) posteriormente, durante os

procedimentos de investigação, em data não posterior àquela em que, de acordo com o

disposto neste Acordo, direitos provisórios venham a ser aplicados.

5.8 Deverá ser rejeitada a petição que se faça sob a égide do parágrafo 1, e deverá ser

imediatamente encerrada a investigação, sempre que as autoridades responsáveis estejam

convencidas de que não há suficiente comprovação quer de dumping quer de dano que

justifique o prosseguimento do caso. Deverá ocorrer imediato encerramento da investigação

naqueles casos em que as autoridades determinem que a margem de dumping é de minimis,

ou que o volume de importações a preços de dumping, real ou potencial, ou o dano causado, é

desprezível. A margem de dumping deverá ser considerada como de minimis quando for

inferior a 2 por cento, calculados sobre o preço de exportação. O volume de importações a

preços de dumping deverá ser habitualmente considerado como desprezível caso tal volume,

proveniente de um determinado país, seja considerado como responsável por menos de 3 por

cento das importações do similar pelo Membro importador, a menos que o conjunto de países

que, tomados individualmente, representem, cada um, menos de 3 por cento das importações

do similar pelo Membro importador, atinja, se tomado agregadamente, mais de 7 por cento

das importações do similar pelo Membro importador.

5.9 Investigações anti-dumping não deverão constituir entrave aos procedimentos de liberação

alfandegária.

5.10 As investigações, exceto em circunstâncias especiais, deverão ser concluídas no prazo de um

ano após seu início, e nunca em mais de 18 meses.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 5

1. Artigo 5

a) “Treaty interpretation”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating

Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidade Europeia, WT/DS294/R,

para. 7.222

Para. 7.222. “Based on an analysis in accordance with customary rules of treaty interpretation, we

conclude that the scope of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement is limited to the establishment of the

existence of margins of dumping in the context of investigations under Article 5 of the AD Agreement.

In any event, we cannot find that an interpretation that restricts the scope of application of Article

2.4.2 to investigations within the meaning of Article 5, thereby excluding its application to Article

9.3, is not permissible within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii).”

2. Artigo 5.2

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R, para. 7.66

Para. 7.66. “Article 5.2 governs the contents of an application for initiation of an AD investigation.

The chapeau of Article 5.2 requires that an application must include “evidence” of dumping, injury

and a causal link. The subsequent paragraphs of Article 5.2 list certain specific information regarding

a series of factors which must be included in the application.”

(ii) Evidence of…dumping

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.35

Para. 8.35. “(…) We further observe that the only clarification of the term “dumping” in the AD

Agreement is that contained in Article 2. In consequence, in order to determine that there is sufficient

evidence of dumping, the investigating authority cannot entirely disregard the elements that configure

the existence of this practice as outlined in Article 2. This analysis is done not with a view to making

a determination that Article 2 has been violated through the initiation of an investigation, but rather to

provide guidance in our review of the Ministry's determination that there was sufficient evidence of

dumping to warrant an investigation. We do not of course mean to suggest that an investigating

authority must have before it at the time it initiates an investigation evidence of dumping within the

meaning of Article 2 of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to support a preliminary or

final determination. (..). However, the evidence must be such that an unbiased and objective

investigating authority could determine that there was sufficient evidence of dumping within the

meaning of Article 2 to justify initiation of an investigation (88).”

(iii) Evidence of …injury

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.45

Para. 8.45. “(…) Thus, when considering whether there is sufficient evidence of threat of injury to

justify the initiation of an investigation, an investigating authority cannot totally disregard the

elements that configure the existence of threat of injury outlined in Article 3. (89) We do not mean to

suggest that an investigating authority must have before it at the time it initiates an investigation

evidence of threat of material injury within the meaning of Article 3 of the quantity and quality that

would be necessary to support a preliminary or final determination of threat of injury. However, the

investigating authority must have before it evidence of threat of material injury, as defined in Article

3, sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.”

(iv) Evidence of…a causal link

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.57

Para. 8.57. “We are of the view that, having determined that the Ministry did not have sufficient

evidence of dumping and injury to justify the initiation of an investigation, it follows logically that

there was also insufficient evidence of the causal link between the two to justify initiation.”

(v) Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia

WT/DS122/R, para. 7.89/7.90

Para. 7.76. “(…) However, the fact that the application contains data that is relevant to dumping but

does not contain explanation or analysis of much of this data does not, in and of itself, lead to a

violation of Article 5.2 AD.”

Para. 7.77. “(…) We consider that raw numerical data would constitute “relevant evidence” rather

than merely a “simple assertion” within the meaning of this provision. (…) While paragraph (iv) of

Article 5.2 requires the application to contain “information”, in the sense of evidence, on certain

identified factors, we do not read this provision as imposing any additional requirement that the

application contain analysis of the data submitted in support of the application.”

(vi) subparágrafo (ii) - significado de “ou”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-dumping measures on farmed Salmon

from Norway (EC – Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.171-7.173

Para. 7.171. “(…) Because of the nature of the functions of the word “or”, its meaning in different

provisions of the AD Agreement will very much depend upon the obligations at issue and the specific

context in which it appears (…).”

Para. 7.173. “Likewise, the ordinary meaning of the word “or” does not imply that it must have a

conjunctive meaning, in all circumstances, in the context of Articles 5.2(ii) and 9.5. In the case of

Article 5.2(ii), we see no reason why an applicant must be compelled to provide information on the

identity of both known exporters and producers, especially if it considers that it would be appropriate

to focus the investigation only on one or the other interested parties. Likewise, we see no reason why

an investigating authority that focused its original investigation on only producers in accordance with

Article 6.10, could not also permissibly focus on producers for the purpose of any newcomer review

conducted pursuant to Article 9.5.”

(vii) subparágrafo (iv) - “relevant” e “such as”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras.

7.73-7.76

Para. 7.73. “However, the inclusion in Article 5.2(iv) of the word “relevant” and the phrase “such as”

in the reference to the factors and indices in Articles 3.2 and 3.4 in our view makes it clear that an

application is not required to contain information on all the factors and indices set forth in Articles

3.2 and 3.4. Rather, Article 5.2(iv) requires that the application contain information on factors and

indices relating to the impact of imports on the domestic industry, and refers to Articles 3.2 and 3.4 as

illustrative of factors which may be relevant.”

Para. 7.74. “Obviously, the quantity and quality of the information provided by the applicant need not

be such as would be required in order to make a preliminary or final determination of injury.

Moreover, the applicant need only provide such information as is “reasonably available” to it with

respect to the relevant factors.”

Para. 7.76. “(…) However, Article 5.2 does not require an application to contain analysis, but rather

to contain information, in the sense of evidence, in support of allegations. (…)”

3. Artigo 5.3

a) “Distinção dos requisitos do Artigo 5.2”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.35

Para. 8.35. “(…) In other words, Article 5.2 requires that the application contain sufficient evidence

on dumping, injury and causation, while Article 5.3 requires the investigating authority to satisfy itself

as to the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence to determine that it is sufficient to justify initiation.

(…)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para.

7.77

Para. 7.77. “(…) Nevertheless, we note that an application which is consistent with the requirements

of Article 5.2 will not necessarily contain sufficient evidence to justify initiation under Article 5.3.” (90)

(i) accuracy and adequacy of the evidence

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.198-

6.200

Para. 6.198. “(…) Thus, we must determine what the parameters are of the requirement to “examine”

the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence, and on what basis can it be assessed whether the

necessary examination was carried out. It is difficult to see a basis on which a violation of Article 5.3

could be found based purely on the claim that the investigating authorities failed to examine the

accuracy and adequacy of the evidence in the application unless we conclude that the text of Article

5.3 establishes a specific process requirement, that is, a requirement as to how the examination of the

evidence must be conducted. Further, it is difficult to see a basis on which a violation of Article 5.3

could be found on the basis of India's claim unless we conclude that Article 5.3 establishes how the

fact of and sufficiency of that examination must be made known, beyond the notice required by

Article 12.1, which as noted is not at issue here. We can find no such requirements in the text of

Article 5.3. It is clear that Article 5.3 requires an investigating authority to examine the evidence, and

that the examination has a purpose – to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify

initiation of the investigation. However, Article 5.3 says nothing regarding the nature of the

examination to be carried out. Nor does it say anything requiring an explanation of how that

examination was carried out.”

Para. 6.199. “The only basis, in our view, on which a panel can determine whether a Member's

investigating authority has examined the accuracy and adequacy of the information in the application

is by reference to the determination that examination is in aid of - the determination whether there is

sufficient evidence to justify initiation. That is, if the investigating authority properly determined that

there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation, that determination can only have been made based

on an examination of the accuracy and adequacy of the information in the application, and

consideration of additional evidence (if any) before it.”

Para. 6.200. “However, in this case India has made no claim that the European Communities violated

Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by initiating this investigation without sufficient evidence to justify

doing so. Even assuming that India had actually raised such a claim, India has failed to present a

prima facie case that the European Communities erred in concluding that there was sufficient

evidence to justify initiation. India has presented no arguments or evidence to support such a

contention - rather, it has relied on the particular argument that the European Communities failed to

examine the evidence. It is difficult to imagine how a defending Member might demonstrate that it

has “examined” evidence in the face of India's allegations in this dispute, except by reference to the

determination that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation, which is not at issue before us.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para.

7.105

Para. 7.105. “Thus we conclude that Article 5.3 does not establish a requirement for the investigating

authority to state specifically the resolution of questions concerning the exclusion of certain producers

involved in defining the relevant domestic industry in the course of examining the accuracy and

adequacy of the evidence to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation.”

(ii) Sufficient evidence

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.31

Para. 8.31. “(…) It is however the sufficiency of the evidence, and not its adequacy and accuracy per

se, which represents the legal standard to be applied in the case of a determination whether to initiate

an investigation.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from

Guatemala (México - Steel Pipes and Tubes), Demandante: Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, para.

7.230

Para. 7.24. “(…) In this context, we are mindful that a piece of evidence that on its own might appear

to be of little or no probative value could, when placed beside other evidence of the same nature, form

part of a body of evidence that, in totality, was “sufficient”.”

4. Artigo 5.4

a) “Degree of support for or opposition”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset

Act (Byrd Amendment) (US – Offset Act), Demandantes: Australia, Brasil, Chile, Comunidades

Europeias, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, Coreia e Tailândia, WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 283

Para. 283. “A textual examination of Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 11.4 of

the SCM Agreement reveals that those provisions contain no requirement that an investigating

authority examine the motives of domestic producers that elect to support an investigation. Nor do

they contain any explicit requirement that support be based on certain motives, rather than on others.

The use of the terms “expressing support” and “expressly supporting” clarify that Articles 5.4 and

11.4 require only that authorities “determine” that support has been “expressed” by a sufficient

number of domestic producers. Thus, in our view, an “examination” of the “degree” of support, and

not the “nature” of support is required. In other words, it is the “quantity”, rather than the “quality”, of

support that is the issue.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-dumping Duties on imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from Índia (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.211-

6.216

Para. 6.211. “Article 5.4 thus sets up two separate calculations to determine that a minimum level of

“support” for the application is shown by domestic producers. The first requires that producers

accounting for more than 50 per cent of production of those producers expressing either support or

opposition express support for the application (…).”

Para. 6.212. “The second calculation requires that producers accounting for at least 25 per cent of

total production of the like product by the domestic industry support the application. It is the

European Communities' determination in this regard, both as a legal and as a factual matter, that is

challenged by India.”

Para. 6.213. “(…) As with Article 5.3, Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement requires that the

investigating authorities make certain determinations before an investigation may be initiated, and

establishes the substance of the determinations to be made, including that the application is supported

by producers accounting for at least 25 per cent of domestic production, but does not set out any

specific requirements as to the process by which that determination must be made. In our view,

whether the necessary examination of the degree of support for the application was carried out prior to

the initiation can only be assessed by reference to the determination that was actually made, and the

evidence before the authority at the time it made the determination. In this case, the EC investigating

authority clearly concluded that the application was supported by producers accounting for more than

25 per cent of total EC production of bed linen, and we have before us documents which it asserts

contain the relevant evidence on which it relied. We therefore turn first to the facts of this matter.”

Para. 6.214. “We have carefully examined the documents submitted by both parties. These

documents are photocopies, and in some cases photocopies of photocopies, of faxes of (1) letters of

support sent by individual producers of bed linen to the investigating authority indicating support for

the application, (2) letters of support sent by national associations of producers of bed linen to the

investigating authority expressing support on behalf of individual producers listed in annexes, and (3)

letters of support from national associations of producers of bed linen sent to the investigating

authority expressing support on behalf of their members. It appears that these letters of support were

first sent, by fax, to Eurocoton, which then sent them on, again by fax, to the EC investigating

authority. All of the letters themselves are dated prior to the initiation of the investigation by the

European Communities on 13 September 1996. Based on the letters themselves, individual producers

of bed linen individually communicating support for the application directly to the investigating

authorities accounted for 26.7 per cent of total EC production of bed linen. This is more than the

minimum necessary under Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement to find sufficient support for the

application.”

Para. 6.215. “India asks us to conclude that these letters were not, in fact, received by the EC

investigating authority prior to initiation, that the EC investigating authority did not, in fact, examine

them prior to initiation, and that the European Communities has tried to cover this fundamental error

by manufacturing evidence post hoc and misrepresenting the facts before us. This we decline to do.

We recognise that the dates in the fax headers and footers in the photocopied documents submitted to

us are inconsistent with one another and with the dates of the letters themselves. However, all these

dates are prior to the relevant date, that of initiation on 13 September 1996. We note that the

European Communities has offered to submit the originals of the faxes for our (and India's) inspection

in this dispute, should we deem it necessary to resolve this issue.”

Para. 6.216. “As noted above, India bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to

make a prima facie case that the European Communities failed to act consistently with its obligations

under Article 5.4 to determine the necessary level of support prior to initiation. We presume that

Members act in good faith in the context of dispute settlement proceedings, and are unwilling to

assume possible malfeasance in the absence of evidence to that effect. We consider that the “doubts”

which India has as to the European Communities' actions in this regard do not establish the necessary

prima facie case in this context – the “evidence” of the fax headers relied on by India does not, in our

view, constitute evidence of fraud sufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith. Moreover,

we believe it is more probable that these inconsistencies in the photocopies are attributable to the

photocopying itself, rather than to the perpetration of a massive fabrication of fax headers and footers

by the EC investigating authority to hide a failure to make a determination of standing prior to

initiation. We therefore do not consider it necessary to examine the originals of the documents in

question.”

(ii) Impact of a wrongly-defined industry

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measures on farmed Salmon

from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.124

Para. 7.124. “We therefore conclude that the EC's approach to defining the domestic industry in this

case resulted in an investigation concerning a domestic industry that did not comport with the

definition set forth in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement. As a consequence, the EC's determination of

support for the application under Article 5.4 was based on information relating to a wrongly-defined

industry, and is therefore not consistent with the requirements of that Article. Furthermore, the EC's

analyses of injury and causation were based on information relating to a wrongly-defined industry,

and are therefore necessarily not consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5.”

5. Artigo 5.5

a) “Notify the government of the exporting Member”

(i) oral notification

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R, para. 7.89-7.90

Para. 7.89. “Article 5.5 AD does not specify the form that the notification must take. The Concise

Oxford Dictionary defines the term “notify” as: “inform or give notice to (a person)”; “make known,

announce or report (a thing)”. We consider that the form of the notification under Article 5.5 must be

sufficient for the importing Member to “inform” or “make known” to the exporting Member certain

facts. While a written notification might arguably best serve this goal and the promotion of

transparency and certainty among Members, and might also provide a written record upon which an

importing Member could rely in the event of a subsequent claim of inconsistency with Article 5.5 of

the AD Agreement, the text of Article 5.5 does not expressly require that the notification be in

writing.”

Para. 7.90. “We consider that a formal meeting between government officials could satisfy the

notification requirement of Article 5.5, provided that the meeting is sufficiently documented to

support meaningful review by a panel. For these reasons, we find that the fact that Thailand notified

Poland under Article 5.5 orally in the course of a meeting between government officials, rather than in

written form, does not render the notification inconsistent with Article 5.5.”

b) “Content of notification”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of

Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,

WT/DS122/R, para. 7.91

Para. 7.91. “(…) The text of Article 5.5 does not specify the contents of the notification. It provides:

“after receipt of a properly documented application and before proceeding to initiate an investigation,

the authorities shall notify the government of the exporting Member concerned”. Because the text of

the provision specifies that notification necessarily follows the receipt of a properly documented

application, we consider that the fact of the receipt of a properly documented application would be an

essential element of the contents of the notification.”

(ii) before proceeding to initiate

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 7.34

Para. 7.34. “In our view, footnote 1 to the ADP Agreement is helpful in this regard. Footnote 1

defines the term “initiated” as follows:

The term “initiated” as used in this Agreement means the procedural action

by which a Member formally commences an investigation as provided in

Article 5.

When combined with this definition of “initiated”, Article 5.5 requires a Member to notify the

government of the exporting Member before proceeding to the “procedural action by which it

formally commences the investigation”.”

(iii) Harmless error

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 7.43

Para. 7.43. “(…) Thus, we do not consider that the assertion that an error is “harmless” should

prevent us from reaching the issue whether a violation of a provision of the ADP Agreement nullifies

or impairs benefits under that Agreement. However, we do not preclude that the notion of “harmless

error” could be relevant to the question of what steps a Member should take in order to implement the

recommendation of a panel in a particular dispute. Since we do not view the principle of harmless

error as one which would prevent us from determining that there was a violation of the ADP

Agreement which nullified or impaired benefits under that Agreement, we believe it would be

improper for us to fail to make a recommendation under Article 19.1. However, the effects of a

particular error may, we believe, be relevant in determining what remedial actions might be

appropriate - that is, what if any suggestions a panel might make as to how its recommendation may

be implemented.”

6. Artigo 5.7

a) “Both dumping and injury”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Anti-dumping Duties on

Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia,

WT/DS141/RW, para. 6.112-6.115

Para. 6.112. “As always, we apply the rules of the Vienna Convention to elucidate our understanding

of this provision.”

Para. 6.113. “Article 5.7 requires that the evidence of dumping and injury be considered

simultaneously in certain circumstances. It is found in Article 5 of the AD Agreement, which is

entitled “Initiation and Subsequent Investigation”. Thus, at first glance, Article 5.7 would be expected

to apply in those two situations – initiation and investigation. Of course, a closer look must be taken at

the specific text of Article 5.7, in its context and in light of its object and purpose, to see whether it

should be understood to apply in other situations.”

Para. 6.114. “It is clear to us that the text of Article 5.7 is specific as to when it applies. As might be

anticipated from the title of Article 5, Article 5.7 specifies that the obligation in that provision applies

first, in the initiation decision, and subsequently, during the course of the investigation. We agree with

the view stated by another panel that, “In the context of Article 5 of the AD Agreement, it is clear to

us that the term “investigation” means the investigative phase leading up to the final determination of

the investigating authority”. Thus, we consider that the obligation set out in Article 5.7 to consider

evidence of dumping and injury simultaneously simply does not apply in the circumstances of the

redetermination and subsequent Regulations at issue here.”

Para. 6.115. “We note, moreover, that to find otherwise could have absurd consequences. Assume a

dispute under the AD Agreement in which only the determination of injury is challenged. Assume

further that the Panel finds a violation of the AD Agreement in the determination of injury, and the

DSB recommends that the measure be brought into conformity with the requirements of the AD

Agreement. In principle, the Member whose measure was found to be inconsistent with the AD

Agreement may undertake to bring its measure into conformity by re-examining the injury

determination and issuing a redetermination. There would be no need in such a case to re-examine the

calculation of the dumping margin, as the finding of violation in connection with the injury

determination could have no effect on the calculation of the margin. Yet under India's theory, the

redetermination in such a situation would violate Article 5.7. India, in response to this proposition,

asserts that “once both dumping and injury are under review the synchronicity requirement should be

respected”. However, while this might be a useful principle, it finds no support in the text of Article

5.7. We therefore consider that the obligation of Article 5.7 applies only during the course of original

investigations, and thus that India’s claim under Article 5.7 does not have merit.”

7. Artigo 5.8

a) “Rejection of an application to initiate an investigation”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.72

Para. 8.72. “(…) We are of the view that, if the drafters intended that Article 5.8 apply only after

initiation, the reference to promptly terminating an investigation would have sufficed. By referring to

the rejection of an application Article 5.8 addresses the situation where an application has been

received but an investigation has not yet been initiated. That the text of Article 5.8 continues after the

quoted section to describe situations in which an initiated investigation should be terminated, does not

support Guatemala's argument that the whole of Article 5.8 applies only after the investigation has

been initiated. On the contrary, the second sentence of Article 5.8, by specifying that “there shall be

immediate termination in cases” confirms that the first sentence of Article 5.8 expressly contemplates

its application pre-initiation by including a reference to the rejection of an application. Otherwise,

mere reference to the termination of an investigation, as in the second sentence of Article 5.8, would

have been all that was needed in the first sentence to make it clear that it applied once an investigation

was underway.”

(i) margin “de minimis”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measures on farmed Salmon

from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.625

Para. 7.625. “We consider that imports attributable to a producer or exporter for which a de minimis

margin of dumping is calculated may not be treated as “dumped” for purposes of the injury analysis in

that investigation. Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides that there shall be “immediate

termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis”.

Thus, it is clear that no anti-dumping duties can be imposed on such imports. In our view, a finding of

de minimis dumping margins is a finding that there is no legally cognizable dumping by the producer

or exporter in question.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access

Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US – DRAMS),

Demandante: República da Coreia, paras. 6.85-6.91

Para. 6.85. “Essentially, the parties disagree as to whether the second sentence (and therefore the de

minimis standard contained in the third sentence) of Article 5.8 applies to both anti-dumping

investigations and Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures (referred to in US parlance as

“administrative reviews”), or only to anti-dumping investigations.”

Para. 6.86. “In our view, the scope of the obligation in the second sentence of Article 5.8 is defined

by the term “cases”. However, the ordinary meaning of that term does not clarify whether it refers to

both anti-dumping investigations and Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, or only to the former.

To resolve this matter, therefore, we must consider the following context of Article 5.8, second

sentence.”

Para. 6.87. “First, the term “case” is used in the first sentence of Article 5.8. The first sentence is

concerned explicitly and exclusively with the circumstances in which an “application” (“under

[Article 5,] paragraph 1”) shall be rejected and an “investigation” terminated as a result of insufficient

evidence to justify proceeding with the “case”. As the treatment of the “application” and conduct of

the “investigation” is dependent on the sufficiency of evidence concerning the “case”, we consider

that the term “case” in the first sentence must at least encompass the notions of “application” and

“investigation”. In our view, it would meaningless for the term “case” in the first sentence to also

encompass the concept of an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure, since we fail to see how the

sufficiency of evidence concerning a subsequent duty assessment could be relevant to the treatment of

an “application” or the conduct of an “investigation”, both of which precede the Article 9.3 duty

assessment procedure. As we consider that the term “case” in the first sentence of Article 5.8 does not

include the concept of “duty assessment”, we see no reason to adopt a different approach to the term

“cases” in the second sentence of that provision.”

Para. 6.88. “Second, we consider that note 22 of the AD Agreement effectively provides that a

finding in a US duty assessment procedure that no duty is to be levied “shall not by itself require the

authorities to terminate the definitive duty.” According to note 22, therefore, a finding in an Article

9.3 duty assessment procedure of a zero percent margin of dumping, which is de minimis under both

the US 0.5 percent standard and the 2 percent standard advocated by Korea on the basis of Article 5.8,

shall not by itself lead to termination of the duty. Nevertheless, by arguing that Article 5.8, including

the second sentence thereof, applies in the context of Article 9.3 duty assessments, Korea is

effectively arguing that a zero percent, i.e., de minimis, margin of dumping shall lead to “immediate

termination” of the duty. Thus, to the extent that Korea's interpretation of Article 5.8, second

sentence, requires “immediate termination” of the duty in circumstances where termination “shall not”

be required by note 22 of the AD Agreement, Korea's interpretation renders note 22 meaningless.”

Para. 6.89. “For these reasons, we conclude that Article 5.8, second sentence, does not apply in the

context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures. As Article 5.8, second sentence, does not require

Members to apply a de minimis test in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, it certainly cannot

require Members to apply a particular de minimis standard in such procedures.”

Para. 6.90. “Korea argues that there is “no logical reason why the de minimis level during the [Article

9.3.1] review stage of a proceeding should be different than at the investigation stage. That which is

the legal equivalent of a zero margin for purposes of determining whether to impose an anti-dumping

duty is also the legal equivalent of zero for collecting anti-dumping duties.” As explained above, we

consider that the text of Article 5.8, when read in its context, does not require that a Member apply the

Article 5.8 de minimis test in an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure. In any event, there are

possible logical explanations for applying different de minimis standards in investigations and Article

9.3 duty assessment procedures. Article 5.8 requires the termination of investigations in cases where

the margin of dumping is de minimis. Thus, in the context of Article 5.8, the function of the de

minimis test is to determine whether or not an exporter is subject to an anti-dumping order. In the

context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, however, the function of any de minimis test

applied by Members is to determine whether or not an exporter should pay a duty. A de minimis test

in the context of an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure will not remove an exporter from the scope

of the order. Thus, the implications of the de minimis test required by Article 5.8, and any de minimis

test that Members choose to apply in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, differ significantly.

Accordingly, we are not convinced that Korea's policy argument requires us to abandon our

conclusion that the text of Article 5.8, when read in its context, does not require that a Member apply

the Article 5.8 de minimis test in an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure.”

Para. 6.91. “In light of our conclusion that Article 5.8, second sentence, does not apply in the context

of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, we reject Korea's claim that the United States violates

Article 5.8 by applying a 0.5 percent de minimis standard in the context of Article 9.3 duty assessment

procedures.”

(ii) volume negligenciável

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice

(Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/R, para. 7.141

Para. 7.141. “(…) According to Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, negligibility is to be determined in

respect of the volume of dumped imports “from a particular country”. In short, in Article 5.8 of the

AD Agreement, the margin of dumping is juxtaposed to the volume of dumped imports. While it is

expressly stipulated that the latter is to be examined on a country-wide basis, no such stipulation is

made with regard to the margin of dumping. This further confirms our view that the reference to the

margin of dumping in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement is, as is the case in the other provisions of the

AD Agreement referred to above, a reference to the individual margin of dumping which is to be

determined on an exporter-specific basis.”

(iii) cases

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access

Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS),

Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 6.87

Para. 6.87. “First, the term “case” is used in the first sentence of Article 5.8. The first sentence is

concerned explicitly and exclusively with the circumstances in which an “application” (“under

[Article 5,] paragraph 1”) shall be rejected and an “investigation” terminated as a result of insufficient

evidence to justify proceeding with the “case”. As the treatment of the “application” and conduct of

the “investigation” is dependent on the sufficiency of evidence concerning the “case”, we consider

that the term “case” in the first sentence must at least encompass the notions of “application” and

“investigation”. In our view, it would meaningless for the term “case” in the first sentence to also

encompass the concept of an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure, since we fail to see how the

sufficiency of evidence concerning a subsequent duty assessment could be relevant to the treatment of

an “application” or the conduct of an “investigation”, both of which precede the Article 9.3 duty

assessment procedure. As we consider that the term “case” in the first sentence of Article 5.8 does not

include the concept of “duty assessment”, we see no reason to adopt a different approach to the term

“cases” in the second sentence of that provision.”

8. Artigo 5.10

a) “Período das informações a serem consideradas pelas autoridades”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from

Guatemala (Mexico - Steel Pipes and Tubes), Demandante: Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, para.

7.230

Para. 7.230. “(…) However, we consider that the investigating authority should rely upon

information pertaining to a period approaching, as close as practicable, the date of initiation of the

investigation. This is particularly important because the Agreement envisages that an investigation

may last 12 - or, in special circumstances 18 - months”.

Footnote 86: In the case of fragmented industries involving an exceptionally large number of producers, authorities may

determine support and opposition by using statistically valid sampling techniques.

Footnote 87: Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members employees of domestic producers of the like

product or representatives of those employees may make or support an application for an investigation under paragraph 1.

Footnote 88: Original footnote: On this question we concur fully with the reasoning of the Guatemala - Cement I panel

when they state that: “In our view, the reference in Article 5.2 to “dumping” must be read as a reference to dumping as it is

defined in Article 2. This does not, of course, mean that the evidence provided in the application must be of the quantity and

quality that would be necessary to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping. However, evidence of the relevant

type is, in our view, required in a case such as this one where it is obvious on the face of the application that the normal

value and export price alleged in the application will require adjustments in order to effectuate a fair comparison. At a

minimum, there should be some recognition that a fair comparison will require such adjustments.” Guatemala - Cement I,

WT/DS60/R, para. 7.64.

Footnote 89: Original footnote: “We recall that, at para. 136 of its first written submission, Guatemala asserted that it is not

suggesting that Articles 2 and 3 are totally irrelevant during the initiation phase. Articles 2 and 3 contain definitions which

give meaning to the expressions 'dumping', 'injury' and 'causal link' used in Article 5.2. When the authorities examine the

accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted in the application, those definitions help to establish whether there is

'sufficient evidence' in the meaning of Article 5.3 to justify the initiation of the investigation.”

Footnote 90: Original footnote: Guatemala-Cement Panel Report, para. 7.49-7.51. As the Panel noted in that case, the

investigating authority may, but is not required to, obtain additional information which, together with that provided in the

application, constitutes sufficient evidence to justify initiation under Article 5.3. Id. para. 7.53.

III.Comentários

II. Artigo 6

Marina Pantoja

Artigo 7

Lucas Spadano

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 7

Provisional Measures

7.1 Provisional measures may be applied only if:

a) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, a

public notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given

adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments;

b) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent

injury to a domestic industry; and

c) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being

caused during the investigation.

7.2 Provisional measures may take the form of a provisional duty or, preferably, a security - by

cash deposit or bond - equal to the amount of the anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated,

being not greater than the provisionally estimated margin of dumping. Withholding of

appraisement is an appropriate provisional measure, provided that the normal duty and the

estimated amount of the anti-dumping duty be indicated and as long as the withholding of

appraisement is subject to the same conditions as other provisional measures.

7.3 Provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of

the investigation.

7.4 The application of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a period as possible, not

exceeding four months or, on decision of the authorities concerned, upon request by exporters

representing a significant percentage of the trade involved, to a period not exceeding six

months. When authorities, in the course of an investigation, examine whether a duty lower

than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury, these periods may be six

and nine months, respectively.

7.5 The relevant provisions of Article 9 shall be followed in the application of provisional

measures.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 7

Medidas Provisórias

7.1 Medidas provisórias só poderão ser aplicadas se:

a) uma investigação tiver sido iniciada de acordo com o disposto no Artigo 5, um aviso

tiver sido publicado nesse sentido e às partes interessadas tiver sido oferecida

oportunidade adequada de apresentar suas informações e fazer comentários;

b) uma determinação preliminar afirmativa de dumping e respectivo dano à indústria

nacional tiver sido alcançada; e

c) as autoridades competentes julgarem que tais medidas são necessárias para impedir

que ocorra dano durante as investigações.

7.2 As medidas provisórias poderão assumir a forma de direitos provisórios ou preferivelmente a

de garantia - por meio de depósito em dinheiro ou certificado - igual ao montante do direito

anti-dumping provisoriamente estimado, desde que não seja superior à margem de dumping

provisoriamente calculada. Considera-se medida provisória adequada a suspensão de

valoração aduaneira, desde que os direitos normais e o montante de direitos anti-dumping

sejam indicados e que a suspensão de valoração aduaneira esteja sujeita às mesmas condições

das demais medidas provisórias.

7.3 Não serão aplicadas medidas provisórias antes de decorridos 60 dias da data de início das

investigações.

7.4 A aplicação de medidas provisórias será limitada ao mais curto período possível, não

excedendo este a 4 meses, ou, por decisão das autoridades competentes e a pedido de

exportadores que representem percentual significativo do comércio em questão, ao período de

6 meses. Na hipótese de as autoridades no curso de uma investigação examinarem se um

direito inferior à margem de dumping seria suficiente para extinguir o dano, tais períodos

passam a 6 e 9 meses respectivamente.

7.5 Na aplicação de medidas provisórias, serão observadas as disposições pertinentes do Artigo 9.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 7

1. Questões Gerais

a) “Economia processual”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS156/R, para. 8.298

Neste caso, embora o México tenha alegado que a Guatemala violou o Artigo 7.1 porque não fora

dada oportunidade adequada para que uma empresa mexicana apresentasse comentários sobre

informações fornecidas à autoridade investigadora, o Painel considerou desnecessário examinar tal

pleito, uma vez que já havia concluído que a medida definitiva e uma decisão sobre a medida

provisória resultariam, no máximo, em uma decisão a respeito de parte da medida definitiva já

examinada.

Para. 8.298. “At most, Mexico’s claims concerning the provisional measure could only result in a

ruling with respect to part of the definitive measure insofar as it relates to retrospective collection of

the provisional measure (i.e., where it is mandated that the ‘provisional anti-dumping duties collected

would remain in favor of the treasury’). Since we have already made findings that give rise to a

recommendation concerning the totality of the definitive measure, we do not consider it necessary to

further address claims (i.e. concerning the provisional measure) that could only result in a ruling

concerning only part of the definitive measure.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

b) “Desnecessidade de identificar medida de aplicação de direito provisório

separadamente no requerimento de instauração de Painel, para que seja possível

apresentar argumentos de violação do Artigo 7”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras.

7.52-7.53

Nesta controvérsia, o Painel esclareceu que não é necessário identificar uma medida de aplicação de

direitos anti-dumping provisórios no requerimento de instauração do Painel para que seja possível

alegar que houve violação ao Artigo 7.4, se esta alegação tiver relação com a medida definitiva de

aplicação de direitos anti-dumping identificada. No caso, o demandante identificou somente a medida

definitiva. A discussão foi considerada pelo Painel como parte do escopo de seus Termos de

Referência.

Para. 7.52. “The Appellate Body Report in Guatemala - Cement indicates that a complainant may,

having identified a specific anti-dumping duty in its request for establishment, bring any claims under

the AD Agreement relating to that specific measure. That there should be a relationship between the

measure challenged in a dispute and the claims asserted in that dispute would appear necessary, given

that Article 19.1 of the DSU requires that, “where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a

measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned

bring the measure into conformity with the agreement” (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, we must

consider whether the United States' claim under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement relates to Mexico's

definitive anti-dumping duty or whether the United States, having failed to identify the provisional

measure as a specific measure being challenged in its request for the establishment of a panel, is now

precluded from pursuing this claim.”

Para. 7.53. “A claim regarding the period for which a provisional measure was applied does not, at

first glance, constitute a challenge to the definitive anti-dumping duty in this dispute. However, we

consider that the United States' claim under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement is nevertheless related

to Mexico's definitive anti-dumping duty. In this regard, we recall that, under Article 10 of the

AD Agreement, a provisional measure represents a basis under which a Member may, if the requisite

conditions are met, levy anti-dumping duties retroactively. At the same time, a Member may not,

except in the circumstances provided for in Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement, retroactively levy a

definitive anti-dumping duty for a period during which provisional measures were not applied.

Consequently, because the period of time for which a provisional measure is applied is generally

determinative of the period for which a definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied retroactively, we

consider that a claim regarding the duration of a provisional measure relates to the definitive anti-

dumping duty.”

2. Limite dos prazos para aplicação de medidas provisórias

a) “Impossibilidade de extensão da aplicação de medidas provisórias para além dos

períodos definidos no Artigo 7.4”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United Staes (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras.

7.182-7.183

Nesta controvérsia, o Painel recusou a tentativa do México de justificar uma extensão de 28 dias no

período de aplicação de medida provisória (para além de 6 meses) com base em “boas intenções” e no

fato de que este teria sido o “período mais curto possível”, em conformidade com o espírito do

Acordo. Conforme denota o Relatório do Painel, os prazos-limite definidos no Artigo 7.4 são

vinculantes e não comportam interpretação flexível.

Para. 7.182. “The language of Article 7.4 is clear and explicit on the question of the allowable

duration of a provisional measure. Unless exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade

involved request an extension of the period of application, a situation which undisputedly did not arise

in this case, Article 7.4 limits the period of application of a provisional measure to a period no longer

than six months, and provides no basis for extension of that period. Indeed, Mexico has made no legal

argument to the contrary, relying instead on general assertions of its good intentions and that the

additional period of application of the provisional measure was for the shortest time possible.”

Para. 7.183. “The AD Agreement contains specific rules for the implementation of Article VI of

GATT 1994 with respect, inter alia, to the period of application of provisional measures. Those rules

are binding on all Members, and arguments based on references to the “spirit” of the GATT 1994 are

unavailing to justify a failure to comply with those rules. We conclude that, in light of the specific

limitation on the period of application of provisional measures contained in Article 7.4, the

application of the provisional measure beyond the six month period is inconsistent with Mexico's

obligations under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement.” (nota de rodapé omitida)

III. Comentários

Proporcionalmente à quantidade de disputas na OMC envolvendo a aplicação de direitos anti-

dumping, é reduzido o número de casos relacionados à medidas provisórias. Como se trata de medidas

aplicadas em um período relativamente curto de tempo, a realidade é que dificilmente haverá tempo

hábil para que uma disputa sobre direitos anti-dumping provisórios chegue à fase do Painel, sem que

eles tenham sido revogados ou convertidos em direitos definitivos.

Nesse sentido, como os remédios do sistema de solução de controvérsias são prospectivos (não

retroativos), os aspectos em disputa costumam girar em torno da aplicação de direitos definitivos, o

que tende a tornar desnecessário o exame de argumentos sobre as medidas provisórias anteriormente

aplicadas. Isso não retira, porém, a importância que as normas contidas no Artigo 7 possam ter para a

manutenção do cumprimento das regras em investigações anti-dumping, ou para a solução de

eventuais violações na fase de consultas.

De todo modo, a pouca jurisprudência construída a respeito do tema evidencia ao menos um ponto

importante: o compromisso da OMC em exigir a aplicação rigorosa dos prazos máximos para adoção

de medidas provisórias dispostas no Artigo 7.4, sem que haja espaço para prorrogações baseadas em

argumentos de razoabilidade ou outros fundamentos. Assegura-se, assim, maior previsibilidade às

investigações e eventuais aplicações provisórias de direitos anti-dumping.

Artigo 8

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 8

Price Undertakings

8.1 Proceedings may (91) be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional

measures or anti-dumping duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any

exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that

the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated. Price

increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the margin

of dumping. It is desirable that the price increases be less than the margin of dumping if such

increases would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.

8.2 Price undertakings shall not be sought or accepted from exporters unless the authorities of the

importing Member have made a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and injury

caused by such dumping.

8.3 Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities consider their acceptance

impractical, for example, if the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other

reasons, including reasons of general policy. Should the case arise and where practicable, the

authorities shall provide to the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider

acceptance of an undertaking as inappropriate, and shall, to the extent possible, give the

exporter an opportunity to make comments thereon.

a) If an undertaking is accepted, the investigation of dumping and injury shall

nevertheless be completed if the exporter so desires or the authorities so decide. In

such a case, if a negative determination of dumping or injury is made, the undertaking

shall automatically lapse, except in cases where such a determination is due in large

part to the existence of a price undertaking. In such cases, the authorities may require

that an undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period consistent with the

provisions of this Agreement. In the event that an affirmative determination of

dumping and injury is made, the undertaking shall continue consistent with its terms

and the provisions of this Agreement.

8.5 Price undertakings may be suggested by the authorities of the importing Member, but no

exporter shall be forced to enter into such undertakings. The fact that exporters do not offer

such undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall in no way prejudice the likely

to be realized if the dumped imports continue.

8.6 Authorities of an importing Member may require any exporter from whom an undertaking has

been accepted to provide periodically information relevant to the fulfilment of such an

undertaking and to permit verification of pertinent data. In case of violation of an undertaking,

the authorities of the importing Member may take, under this Agreement in conformity with

its provisions, expeditious actions which may constitute immediate application of provisional

measures using the best information available. In such cases, definitive duties may be levied in

accordance with this Agreement on products entered for consumption not more than 90 days

before the application of such provisional measures, except that any such retroactive

assessment shall not apply to imports entered before the violation of the undertaking.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 8

Compromissos sobre Preços

8.1 Poderão19

suspender-se ou dar-se por encerrados os procedimentos sem imposição de medidas

provisórias ou direitos anti-dumping se qualquer exportador comunica sua disposição de

assumir voluntariamente compromisso satisfatório no sentido de rever seus preços ou de

cessar as exportações a preços de dumping destinadas à região em apreço, de forma a que as

autoridades fiquem convencidas de que o efeito danoso do dumping será eliminado. Os

aumentos de preço que se realizem sob tais compromissos não deverão ser mais altos do que o

necessário para eliminar a margem de dumping. Seria desejável que o aumento de preço fosse

menor do que a margem de dumping, caso esse aumento seja suficiente para cessar o dano

causado à indústria doméstica.

8.2 Os exportadores não deverão buscar ou aceitar compromissos sobre preços a menos que as

autoridades do Membro importador tenham chegado a uma determinação preliminar

afirmativa de dumping e dano por ele causado.

8.3 As autoridades não precisam aceitar ofertas de compromissos sobre preços se consideram que

sua aceitação seria ineficaz como, por exemplo, no caso de o número de exportadores efetivos

ou potenciais ser excessivamente elevado ou, por outras razões, entre as quais a existência de

princípios de política geral. Na ocorrência de semelhante situação, e caso seja possível, as

autoridades deverão fornecer ao exportador as razões pelas quais julgam inadequada a

aceitação do compromisso e deverão, na medida do possível, oferecer ao exportador

oportunidade para tecer comentários sobre o assunto.

8.4 Se um compromisso sobre preços é aceito, poder-se-á, não obstante, completar a investigação

sobre dumping e dano caso o exportador assim o deseje ou as autoridades assim o decidam.

Nessa hipótese, se se chega a uma determinação negativa de dumping ou dano, o

compromisso será automaticamente extinto, exceto quando aquela determinação negativa

resulte em grande parte da existência mesma do compromisso sobre preços. Em tais casos, as

autoridades poderão requerer que o compromisso seja mantido por período de tempo razoável

e conforme as disposições deste Acordo. Na hipótese contrária, de que se chegue a uma

determinação positiva de dumping e dano, o compromisso será mantido conforme os termos

em que tiver sido estabelecido e as disposições deste Acordo.

8.5 As autoridades do Membro importador poderão sugerir compromissos sobre preços, mas

nenhum exportador poderá ser forçado a aceitá-los. O fato de que os exportadores não

ofereçam compromissos sobre preços ou não os aceitem, quando oferecidos pelas autoridades,

não poderá prejudicá-los na consideração do caso. As autoridades terão liberdade, porém, para

concluir que uma ameaça de dano será mais provável se continuarem a ocorrer as importações

a preços de dumping.

8.6 As autoridades de um Membro importador poderão requerer a qualquer tempo do exportador

com o qual se estabeleceu um compromisso sobre preços que o mesmo forneça

periodicamente informação relativa ao cumprimento do compromisso e que permita

verificação dos dados pertinentes. No caso de violação de compromisso, as autoridades do

Membro importador poderão, por força do presente Acordo e em conformidade com o

disposto nele, tomar prontas providências que poderão consistir na imediata aplicação de

medidas provisórias apoiadas na melhor informação disponível. Nesses casos, direitos

definitivos poderão ser percebidos, ao abrigo deste Acordo, sobre produtos que tenham

entrado para consumo até 90 dias antes da aplicação das referidas medidas provisórias, não

podendo essa cobrança retroativa, porém, atingir importações que tenham entrado antes da

violação do compromisso.

19 Não se deverá interpretar a palavra “poderão” no sentido de ser permitida a continuação dos procedimentos simultaneamente à implementação do compromisso sobre o preço, com exceção do disposto no parágrafo 4.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

8.1 A primeira sentença do item 8.1 seria mais bem vertida ao português com o seguinte texto:

“Procedimentos podem ser suspensos ou encerrados sem a imposição de medidas provisórias

ou direitos anti-dumping mediante o recebimento de compromissos voluntários satisfatórios

de qualquer exportador (...).” (g.n.)

Ao invés do texto oficial:

“Poderão suspender-se ou dar-se por encerrados os procedimentos sem imposição de

medidas provisórias ou direitos anti-dumping se qualquer exportador comunica sua

disposição de assumir voluntariamente compromisso satisfatório (...)”.

Porque não é a comunicação da disposição de assumir um compromisso voluntário que suspende ou

encerra uma investigação, mas sim o recebimento do próprio compromisso em termos satisfatórios

sob a ótica das autoridades no sentido de eliminar os efeitos danosos. Os termos do Acordo Anti-

dumping são mais estritos que os da versão do governo brasileiro.

A última frase do item 8.1 seria igualmente melhor vertida se recebesse a seguinte redação, mais fiel

aos termos do texto original:

“É desejável que os aumentos de preços sejam inferiores à margem de dumping se tais

aumentos são adequados para eliminar o dano à indústria doméstica.”

Ao invés de:

“Seria desejável que o aumento de preço fosse menor do que a margem de dumping, caso

esse aumento seja suficiente para cessar o dano causado à indústria doméstica.”

8.2 A despeito da inversão do sujeito e predicado da frase na versão do texto em português deste

Artigo, não há comprometimento no sentido do dispositivo original.

8.3 A versão deste Artigo mostra-se bastante problemática, desvirtuando o texto original com

repercussões práticas relevantes. Destacam-se abaixo a versão fiel ao dispositivo do Acordo, e

transcreve-se o texto oficial internalizado pelo Decreto 1.355:

“As autoridades não precisam aceitar ofertas de compromissos sobre preços se consideram

impraticável a sua aceitação como, por exemplo, no caso de o número de exportadores

efetivos ou potenciais ser excessivamente elevado ou, por outras razões, incluindo de política

geral. Se a situação surgir, e caso seja possível, as autoridades deverão fornecer ao

exportador as razões pelas quais julgam inadequada a aceitação do compromisso e deverão,

na medida do possível, oferecer ao exportador oportunidade para tecer comentários sobre o

assunto.”

Ao invés de:

“As autoridades não precisam aceitar ofertas de compromissos sobre preços se consideram

que sua aceitação seria ineficaz como, por exemplo, no caso de o número de exportadores

efetivos ou potenciais ser excessivamente elevado ou, por outras razões, entre as quais a

existência de princípios de política geral. Na ocorrência de semelhante situação, e caso seja

possível, as autoridades deverão fornecer ao exportador as razões pelas quais julgam

inadequada a aceitação do compromisso e deverão, na medida do possível, oferecer ao

exportador oportunidade para tecer comentários sobre o assunto.”

O termo “impractical” da primeira frase deste Artigo, por exemplo, foi traduzido como “ineficaz” em

português, alterando o motivo pelo qual as autoridades investigadoras poderiam não aceitar uma

oferta de compromisso de preços. “Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities

consider their acceptance impractical, for example, if the number of actual or potential exporters is

too great, or for other reasons, including reasons of general policy”. O termo “ineficaz” indica que o

compromisso sobre preços não estaria cumprindo a sua função, enquanto o termo “impraticável”

indica que mesmo que um compromisso seja eficiente, seria impraticável, por condições que não

permitiriam que ele fosse aplicado, monitorado, entre outros. Concretamente, no caso de haver

diversos modelos de um produto objeto de dumping, o acompanhamento periódico previsto por um

compromisso de preços exigiria um extenso trabalho, o qual tornaria a oferta impraticável, porém, não

necessariamente ineficaz.

Além disso, não há nada no texto original em inglês sobre “princípios de política geral”, como

indicado na versão em português em vigor do Acordo Anti-Dumping.

8.4 A versão do texto oferecida novamente causa imprecisões sobre o texto original do Acordo.

Não há nada no dispositivo do Acordo Anti-Dumping que sugira que as autoridades irão oferecer

compromissos, mas sim que convidarão, sugerirão que os exportadores assim o façam.

Assim, a tradução correta seria:

“O fato de que os exportadores não ofereçam tais compromissos ou não aceitem a sugestão

para oferecê-los não poderá prejudicá-los na consideração do caso.”

Ao invés de:

“O fato de que os exportadores não ofereçam compromissos sobre preços ou não os aceitem,

quando oferecidos pelas autoridades, não poderá prejudicá-los na consideração do caso.”

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 3

1. Artigo 8.3

a) “Da aceitação de ofertas de compromissos sobre preços”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000

(US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), (WT/DS217/R - Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile,

Comunidade Europeia, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, Coreia do Sul e Tailândia) e (WT/DS234/R,

Demandantes: Canadá e México), paras. 7.80-7.81 (e)

O Painel em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) concluiu que, mesmo que a indústria doméstica

recomende que as autoridades não aceitem a oferta de compromissos sobre preços, as partes

interessadas em oferecer tal compromisso não são afetadas de maneira a desistir da oferta e o

compromisso poderá ser aceito pelas autoridades. Entretanto, conclui que não há exigência relativa a

um exame objetivo do compromisso oferecido e as razões de política geral para a recusa pelas

autoridades podem ser as mais diversas.

Para. 7.80. “The decision to accept an undertaking or not under the Agreements is one the

investigating authority is to take, and it may reject an undertaking for various reasons, including

reasons of general policy. The fact that domestic producers may or may not be influenced by the

CDSOA to suggest to the authority not to accept the undertaking, does not affect the possibility for

interested parties concerned to offer an undertaking or for that undertaking to be accepted, in light of

the non-decisive role of the domestic industry in this process.”

Para. 7.81. “In addition we note that the text of AD Article 8.3 (…) does not require the authority to

examine objectively any undertaking offered. Rather, it stresses that undertakings offered need not

be accepted and that the reasons for rejecting an undertaking may be manifold and include reasons of

general policy. In our view, the CDSOA cannot be found to impede the objective examination of the

appropriateness of accepting an undertaking, in the absence of any such obligation under AD Article

8 and SCM 18.”

Footnote 91: The word “may” shall not be interpreted to allow the simultaneous continuation of proceedings with the

implementation of price undertakings except as provided in paragraph 4.

III. Comentários

Artigo 9

Lucas Spadano

Bruno Herwig Rocha Augustin

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 9

Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties

9.1 The decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements

for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the amount of the anti-

dumping duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less, are decisions to be

made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is desirable that the imposition be

permissive in the territory of all Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such

lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.

9.2 When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping duty

shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on

imports of such product from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury, except as to

imports from those sources from which price undertakings under the terms of this Agreement

have been accepted. The authorities shall name the supplier or suppliers of the product

concerned. If, however, several suppliers from the same country are involved, and it is

impracticable to name all these suppliers, the authorities may name the supplying country

concerned. If several suppliers from more than one country are involved, the authorities may

name either all the suppliers involved, or, if this is impracticable, all the supplying countries

involved.

9.3 The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established

under Article 2.

9.3.1 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, the

determination of the final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties shall take

place as soon as possible, normally within 12 months, and in no case more than 18

months, after the date on which a request for a final assessment of the amount of the

anti-dumping duty has been made.20 Any refund shall be made promptly and

normally in not more than 90 days following the determination of final liability made

pursuant to this sub-paragraph. In any case, where a refund is not made within 90

days, the authorities shall provide an explanation if so requested.

9.3.2 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a prospective basis,

provision shall be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess

of the margin of dumping. A refund of any such duty paid in excess of the actual

margin of dumping shall normally take place within 12 months, and in no case more

than 18 months, after the date on which a request for a refund, duly supported by

evidence, has been made by an importer of the product subject to the anti-dumping

duty. The refund authorized should normally be made within 90 days of the above-

noted decision.

9.3.3 In determining whether and to what extent a reimbursement should be made when

the export price is constructed in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 2,

authorities should take account of any change in normal value, any change in costs

incurred between importation and resale, and any movement in the resale price

which is duly reflected in subsequent selling prices, and should calculate the export

price with no deduction for the amount of anti-dumping duties paid when conclusive

evidence of the above is provided.

9.4 When the authorities have limited their examination in accordance with the second sentence

of paragraph 10 of Article 6, any anti-dumping duty applied to imports from exporters or

producers not included in the examination shall not exceed:

(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the

selected exporters or producers or,

(ii) where the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties is calculated on the

basis of a prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted

average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and the export

prices of exporters or producers not individually examined,

provided that the authorities shall disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any zero and de

minimis margins and margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of

Article 6. The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values to imports from any exporter

or producer not included in the examination who has provided the necessary information during the

course of the investigation, as provided for in subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.

9.5 If a product is subject to anti-dumping duties in an importing Member, the authorities shall

promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping

for any exporters or producers in the exporting country in question who have not exported

the product to the importing Member during the period of investigation, provided that these

exporters or producers can show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers

in the exporting country who are subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product. Such a

review shall be initiated and carried out on an accelerated basis, compared to normal duty

assessment and review proceedings in the importing Member. No anti-dumping duties shall

be levied on imports from such exporters or producers while the review is being carried out.

The authorities may, however, withhold appraisement and/or request guarantees to ensure

that, should such a review result in a determination of dumping in respect of such producers

or exporters, anti-dumping duties can be levied retroactively to the date of the initiation of

the review.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 9

Imposição e Cobrança de Direitos Anti-Dumping

9.1 São da competência das autoridades do Membro importador a decisão sobre a imposição ou

não de direito anti-dumping, quando estiverem preenchidos os requisitos necessários, e a

decisão sobre se o montante do direito anti-dumping a ser imposto será a totalidade da

margem de dumping ou menos do que esse valor. É desejável que o direito seja facultativo

no território de todos os Membros e que seu montante seja menor do que a margem de

dumping, caso tal valor inferior seja suficiente para eliminar o dano à indústria nacional.

9.2 Quando direito anti-dumping é imposto sobre um produto, será o mesmo cobrado nos valores

adequados a cada caso, sem discriminação, sobre todas as importações do produto julgadas

serem praticadas a preço de dumping e danosas à indústria nacional, qualquer que seja sua

procedência, com exceção daquelas origens com as quais foram acordados compromissos de

preços sob a égide deste Acordo. As autoridades indicarão o nome do fornecedor ou

fornecedores do referido produto. Se, no entanto, se tratar de diversos fornecedores do

mesmo país e se for impraticável designá-los a todos pelo nome, as autoridades poderão

limitar-se a indicar o nome do país fornecedor respectivo. Se se trata de diversos

fornecedores de mais de um país de origem, as autoridades poderão, alternativamente,

indicar o nome de todos os fornecedores envolvidos ou, se tal for impraticável, indicar todos

os países fornecedores envolvidos.

9.3 O valor do direito anti-dumping não deverá exceder a margem de dumping, tal como

estabelecida no Artigo 2:

(a) Quando o valor do direito anti-dumping for estabelecido de forma retrospectiva, o

montante devido para seu pagamento deverá estabelecido o mais rapidamente

possível, normalmente dentro de 12 meses, mas nunca em mais de 18 meses, após a

data na qual se tenha formulado petição para a fixação definitiva do montante

daqueles direitos anti-dumping.20 Qualquer reembolso deverá ser efetuado

prontamente e, de maneira geral, em prazo não superior a 90 dias após a

determinação do valor definitivo devido de acordo com este subparágrafo. Em

qualquer caso, sempre que o reembolso não for efetuado no prazo de 90 dias, as

autoridades deverão fornecer esclarecimentos, caso lhes sejam solicitados2;

(b) Quando o valor do direito anti-dumping for estabelecido de forma prospectiva,

tomar-se-ão as devidas medidas preventivas para o caso de ser devido pronto

reembolso, caso solicitado, de qualquer direito anti-dumping cobrado em excesso,

além da margem de dumping. O reembolso desse direito excedente sobre a margem

de dumping deverá normalmente ocorrer dentro de 12 meses, e nunca além de 18

meses, após a data em que solicitação de reembolso, devidamente fundamentada,

tenha sido formulada pelo importador do produto objeto do direito anti-dumping. O

reembolso autorizado deverá efetuar-se dentro de 90 dias a contar da decisão a que

se faz referência acima;

(c) Quando o preço de exportação for construído de acordo com o parágrafo 4 do Artigo

2, as autoridades, na determinação da aplicabilidade e do alcance de um reembolso,

levarão em conta toda alteração no valor normal, alteração nos custos incorridos

entre a importação e a revenda e qualquer alteração no preço de revenda que se tenha

refletido devidamente nos subseqüentes preços de venda, e calcularão o preço de

exportação sem dedução dos direitos anti-dumping pagos, se demonstração

conclusiva do que precede for apresentada.

9.4 Quando as autoridades tiverem limitado seu exame conforme o disposto no segundo período

do parágrafo 12 do Artigo 6, os direitos anti-dumping aplicados às importações dos

exportadores ou produtores não incluídos no exame não poderão exceder:

(a) a média ponderada da margem de dumping estabelecida para o grupo selecionado de

exportadores ou produtores; ou

(b) a diferença entre a média ponderada do valor normal praticado pelos exportadores ou

produtores selecionados e os preços de exportação dos exportadores ou produtores

que não tenham sido individualmente examinados, sempre que o montante devido

para o pagamento dos direitos anti-dumping for calculado de forma prospectiva

sobre o valor normal;

entendido que as autoridades não levarão em conta, para o propósito deste parágrafo, margens zero

ou de minimis ou, ainda, as margens estabelecidas nas circunstâncias a que faz referência o parágrafo

10 do Artigo 6. As autoridades aplicarão direitos individuais ou valores normais às importações de

2 Nota de Rodapé 20: Fica entendido que, caso o produto em questão esteja submetido a procedimento de revisão judicial, poderá não ser

possível a observância dos prazos mencionados neste subparágrafo e no subparágrafo 3(b).

qualquer exportador ou produtor incluído na investigação que tenha fornecido as necessárias

informações durante seu curso, tal como disposto no subparágrafo 13(b) do Artigo 6.

9.5 Se um produto está sujeito a direitos anti-dumping aplicados por um Membro importador, as

autoridades deverão prontamente proceder a exame com vistas a determinar margens

individuais de dumping para quaisquer exportadores ou produtores do país exportador em

questão que não tenham exportado o produto para o Membro importador durante o período

da investigação, desde que esses exportadores ou produtores possam demonstrar não ter

qualquer relação com qualquer dos exportadores ou produtores no país de exportação que

estejam sujeitos aos direitos anti-dumping estabelecidos sobre seu produto. Tal exame será

iniciado e realizado de forma mais acelerada do aquela prevista para o cálculo dos direitos

normais e procedimentos de revisão no Membro importador. Não poderão ser cobrados

direitos anti-dumping sobre as importações provenientes de tais exportadores ou produtores

enquanto se está realizando o exame. As autoridades poderão, entretanto, suspender a

valoração aduaneira e/ou requerer garantias para assegurar que, no caso de as investigações

concluírem pela determinação de dumping com relação a tais produtores ou exportadores,

seja possível perceber direitos anti-dumping retroativos à data em que se iniciou o exame.

Footnote 92: It its understood that the observance of the time-limits mentioned in this subparagraph and in subparagraph

3.2 may not be possible where the product in question is subject to judicial review proceedings.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

No original em inglês, o número dos incisos vem acompanhado do número 9, relativo ao Artigo, o

que não ocorre na versão em português. Além disso, a versão em português passou a usar letras nas

subdivisões dos incisos, que a versão original utiliza-se de números. Isso pode gerar, para o leitor da

versão traduzida, alguma dificuldade na identificação de referências normativas feitas, por exemplo,

pelos Painéis e Órgão de Apelação da OMC.

No Artigo 9.2, a frase “except as to imports from those sources from which price undertakings under

the terms of this Agreement have been accepted” foi traduzida por “com exceção daquelas origens

com as quais foram acordados compromissos de preços sob a égide deste Acordo”. Especificamente

em relação à palavra origem, usualmente entendida no comércio internacional como referente a um

determinado país, há risco de que a tradução provoque interpretação distinta da pretendida no texto

original. O sujeito de um compromisso de preços no contexto de investigações antidumping, como se

sabe, é o exportador. A tradução poderia ter mantido o sentido originalmente tencionado, por

exemplo, da seguinte forma: “com exceção daquelas originárias de exportadores com os quais foram

acordados compromissos de preços sob a égide deste Acordo”.

As referências cruzadas contidas nos Artigos 9.3.3 e 9.4 da versão original não coincidem

literalmente com aquelas encontradas no texto traduzido. Isso se dá, não por erro de referência, mas

sim em função da metodologia distinta de numeração adotada no texto promulgado no Brasil,

conforme comentado acima.

Há uma diferença substancial de redação entre a versão original e a tradução, no que diz respeito à

última frase do Artigo 9.4. Na versão original, lê-se:

“The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values to imports from any

exporter or producer not included in the examination who has provided the necessary

information during the course of the investigation”. [destaque nosso]

Na tradução para o português, foi indevidamente suprimida a palavra “not”, lendo-se:

“As autoridades aplicarão direitos individuais ou valores normais às importações de

qualquer exportador ou produtor incluído na investigação que tenha fornecido as

necessárias informações durante seu curso”.

Além da ausência do termo “exportador ou produtor não incluído”, nota-se que o mais adequado

seria fazer referência àquele não incluído no exame ou na seleção (e não na investigação), tanto para

manter coerência com o tema do Artigo 6.10.2 (na tradução, subparágrafo 13.b), quanto para evitar

que se entenda que a investigação só se aplica a alguns produtores. Não se trata disso. A investigação

ocorre em relação a todos os fabricantes do produto investigado de determinado país, mas pode

haver a necessidade de selecionar apenas alguns deles, de modo que seja factível examinar os dados

necessários para a determinação de dumping e dano.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 9

1. Artigo 9.1: Direito antiidumping inferior à margem de dumping

Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear

from China (EU – Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.924

Este caso trata da aplicação de direitos anti-dumping pela União Europeia à importações de calçados

de couro oriundos da China. O Painel analisa, em seu relatório, a imposição e coleta de direitos anti-

dumping abaixo da margem de dumping estabelecida.

Para. 7.924. “While the term “lesser duty” is not defined in the AD Agreement, it is clear that this

term refers to the concept of an anti-dumping duty less than the full amount of the margin of

dumping, as described in Article 9.1. It is also clear from the text of Article 9.1, and China does not

dispute, that the imposition of a lesser duty is “desirable”, but is not an obligation for WTO

Members. Beyond stating that a lesser duty is desirable, if such lesser duty would be “adequate to

remove the injury to the domestic industry”, Article 9.1 says nothing about how the amount of a

lesser duty should be established. Moreover, Article 9.1 also establishes that a Member may choose

not to impose any anti-dumping duty at all, even where all the requirements for imposition have been

fulfilled, suggesting that there is no lower limit on the amount of duty that a Member may impose if

all the requirements for imposition have been fulfilled. Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement, on the

other hand, establishes a clear upper limit on the amount of anti-dumping duty that may be imposed.

It requires Member to ensure that the “amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin

of dumping as established under Article 2”. This is consistent with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994,

which provides that “[i]n order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any

dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect

of such product.” There is no equivalent to Article 9.1 in the GATT 1994, which does not even

mention the possibility of levying an anti-dumping duty in any lesser amount. In our view it is clear,

and indeed, China does not contend otherwise, that Article 9.1 does not prescribe any methodology

or criteria for the determination of the amount of a lesser duty, should a Member choose to apply

one.” [nota de rodapé omitida]

2. Artigo 9.2: Significado da expressão “montante apropriado”

a) “Montante apropriado e valor normal”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed

Salmon from Norway (EC – Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.704-7.705

Nesse caso, a Noruega argumentou que a imposição e coleta de direitos anti-dumping, adotada pela

União Europeia, era inconsistente por diversos motivos, dentre eles o cálculo de montante não

apropriado, nos termos do Artigo 9.2. O Painel, em seu relatório, discutiu a relação entre a expressão

“montante apropriado” e valor normal.

Para. 7.704. “Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement is one of several provisions in Article 9 addressing

the “Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties”. One of its requirements is that any anti-

dumping duties imposed must be collected “in the appropriate amounts”. However, Article 9.2 does

not explain how to determine the “appropriate” amounts of any anti-dumping duty to be collected.

The dictionary definitions of the word “appropriate” include “specially suitable (for, to); proper,

fitting”. This suggests that the “appropriate” amount of anti-dumping duty is the amount of duty that

is “proper” or “fitting” in the context of an anti-dumping investigation.”

Para. 7.705. “Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 reveals that the purpose of imposing and collecting

anti-dumping duties is to “offset or prevent dumping”. This principle is reflected in Article 9.1 of the

AD Agreement, which provides that an anti-dumping duty may only be imposed when “all

requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled”. It follows that the “appropriate” amount of anti-

dumping duty must be an amount that results in offsetting or preventing dumping, when all other

requirements for the imposition of anti-dumping duties have been fulfilled. Dumping is defined in

both Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement, in essentially the same

terms, as the introduction of a product into the commerce of another country at a price which is “less

than its normal value”. Thus, to the extent that an anti-dumping duty may be imposed to offset or

prevent dumping, it follows that it may only be collected when the price of the imported product is

less than its normal value. No anti-dumping duty may be imposed (and therefore collected) when the

price of an imported product is above its normal value. To this extent, normal value constitutes a

point of reference for determining when anti-dumping duties may or may not be imposed and

collected.”

b) “Montante apropriado” e obrigatoriedade de nomeação de fornecedores

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping

Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China,

WT/DS397/AB/R, paras. 336, 338-340 e 354

Nesse caso, a União Europeia impôs direitos anti-dumping contra importações de ferro e aço

oriundas da China. A China considerou que a regulamentação da União Europeia, relativa ao cálculo

da margem de dumping para países com economias não predominantemente de mercado, viola

determinadas regras da OMC. Conforme os Artigos 9.1 e 9.2 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, o cálculo

deve ser feito em relação ao país como um todo, e não em relação a cada exportador, com a exceção

daqueles que demonstrarem preencher os critérios da regulamentação destinados a esse fim, e no

caso do uso de amostragem. O Órgão de Apelação analisa em sua decisão, entre outros, o sentido do

termo “montante apropriado”, e sua relação com a obrigação de nomear os exportadores.

Para. 336. “Article 9.2 states that anti-dumping duties “shall be collected in the appropriate amounts

in each case” and that “authorities shall name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned”. It

is thus clear from the wording of this provision, which uses the auxiliary verb “shall”, that the

collection in appropriate amounts of anti-dumping duties and the naming of the supplier are of a

mandatory nature. The mandatory nature of the first and second sentences of Article 9.2 can be

contrasted with the preference expressed in the second sentence of Article 9.1 for duties lesser than

the margin of dumping, if lesser duties are adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.

To express such a preference, Article 9.1 uses the expression “it is desirable”.” [nota de rodapé

omitida]

Para. 338. “We note that Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that anti-dumping

duties be collected on a non-discriminatory basis from “all sources” found to be dumped and causing

injury, except from “those sources” from which price undertakings have been accepted. We agree

with the Panel that the term “sources”, which appears twice in the first sentence of Article 9.2, has

the same meaning and refers to individual exporters or producers and not to the country as a whole.

This is indicated by the fact that price undertakings mentioned in the first sentence of Article 9.2 are

accepted, according to Article 8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, from individual exporters and not

from countries. Therefore, the requirement under Article 9.2 that anti-dumping duties be collected in

appropriate amounts in each case and from all sources relates to the individual exporters or producers

subject to the investigation.” [notas de rodapé omitidas]

Para. 339. “We have concluded above that Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains an

obligation to determine individual dumping margins for each exporter or producer, except when

sampling is used or if a derogation is otherwise provided for in the covered agreements. We observe

that, where an individual margin of dumping has been determined, it flows from the obligation

contained in the first sentence of Article 9.2 that the appropriate amount of anti-dumping duty that

can be imposed also has to be an individual one. We do not see how an importing Member could

comply with the obligation in the first sentence of Article 9.2 to collect duties in the appropriate

amounts in each case if, having determined individual dumping margins, it lists suppliers by name,

but imposes country-wide duties. In other words, unless sampling is used, the appropriate amount of

an anti-dumping duty in each case is one that is specified by supplier, as further clarified and

confirmed by the obligation to name suppliers in the second sentence of Article 9.2.” [nota de rodapé

omitida]

Para. 340. “The second sentence of Article 9.2 contains a requirement that authorities name the

supplier or suppliers of the product concerned. It is not clear from the terms of the second sentence

alone what the purpose of naming suppliers would be, considering that the term “name” can be

defined simply as “mention or specify by name”. However, in our view, the content of the obligation

“to name” is clarified by the requirements in the first sentence that anti-dumping duties be collected

in the appropriate amounts on a non-discriminatory basis from all sources.” [nota de rodapé omitida]

Para. 354. “We thus conclude that Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires

investigating authorities to specify an individual duty for each supplier, except where this is

impracticable, when several suppliers are involved. We reach this conclusion by reading the first

sentence of Article 9.2 in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 9.2. The first sentence

requires investigating authorities to collect anti-dumping duties in the appropriate amounts in each

case and on a non-discriminatory basis on imports from all sources – that is, suppliers – while the

second sentence requires investigating authorities to name the supplier or suppliers of the product

concerned. We also consider that the exception in the third sentence of Article 9.2 does not allow the

imposition of a single country-wide anti-dumping duty in investigations involving NMEs where the

imposition of individual duties is alleged to be “ineffective”, but is not “impracticable”.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear

from China (EU – Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.91

Este caso, trata da aplicação de direitos anti-dumping pela União Europeia em relação à importações

de calçados de couro oriundos da China. O Painel analisa em seu relatório o tratamento individual

conferido aos exportadores e fornecedores e a relação entre o termo “impraticável” e a eficácia das

medidas anti-dumping a serem impostas.

7.91. “Article 9.2, which has remained unchanged since it was negotiated in the Kennedy Round, is a

predecessor to the more detailed rules set out in Article 6.10, which was added to the AD Agreement

following the Uruguay Round, and further elaborates on the basic principle of individual treatment

established in the earlier provision. While the language is somewhat different, in our view, the

similar structure of the two provisions supports the conclusion that they concern the same basic

principle, that individual exporters and producers in anti-dumping investigations should be treated

individually in the determination and imposition of anti-dumping duties. Moreover, we see nothing

in the text of Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement, or in its context, that would suggest that the notion of

“impracticable” in that provision may relate to the effectiveness of anti-dumping measures imposed.”

3. Relação entre os Artigos 9.2 e 9.3

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil

(Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.365

Nesse caso, ao discutir o argumento do Brasil de que a margem de dumping a ser calculada para os

propósitos do Artigo 9.3 deveria ser a margem obtida durante o período de investigação, o Painel

concordou com a tese defendida pelo Brasil de que uma violação ao Artigo 9.3 implica,

necessariamente, uma violação ao Artigo 9.2, este mais geral que aquele. Porém, não tendo

identificado uma violação ao Artigo 9.3, o Painel concluiu que o Artigo 9.2 também não havia sido

violado.

Para. 7.365. “We note that Article 9.3 contains a specific obligation regarding the amount of anti-

dumping duty to be imposed, whereas Article 9.2 employs far more general language in referring to

the collection of duties in ‘appropriate’ amounts. In particular, Article 9.2 provides no guidance on

what an ‘appropriate’ amount of duty may be in a given case. In the absence of any other guidance

regarding the appropriateness of the amount of anti-dumping duties, it would appear reasonable to

conclude that an anti-dumping duty meeting the requirements of Article 9.3 (i.e., not exceeding the

margin of dumping) would be ‘appropriate’ within the meaning of Article 9.2 agreed with the

argument made by one of the parties that a violation of Article 9.2 is entirely dependent on a

violation of Article 9.3.”

4. Artigo 9.3: Sentido do termo “margem de dumping”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from

Mexico (US - Stainless Steel Mexico), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 96

O caso trata da aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA contra importações mexicanas.

O Painel analisou, na parte relevante, a relação entre os termos “margem de dumping” e dumping,

concluindo que eles possuem somente uma definição, para todos os efeitos, em todo o Acordo

Antidumping.

Para. 96. “We also disagree with the proposition that the term “margin of dumping” has a different

or special meaning in the context of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As we stated

earlier, a margin of dumping measures only the degree or magnitude of dumping. Article 9.3 refers

to the margin of dumping as established in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 2.1 of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement defines “dumping”, and the opening phrase of that Article makes it

clear that the definition applies “[f]or the purpose of this Agreement”. Therefore, “dumping” and

“margin of dumping” have the same meaning throughout the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article 9.3

does not indicate, either expressly or by implication, that “margin of dumping” has a different

meaning in the context of duty assessment proceedings than it does under Article 2. Nor does any

other provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement suggest a special or particular meaning for this term

for any stated purpose. Although transaction-based multiple comparisons may be necessary in

periodic reviews to calculate an importer's liability for payment of anti-dumping duties, this cannot

impart a different or special meaning to the term “margin of dumping” in Article 9.3.”

a) “Natureza do termo margem de dumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of

Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS350/R,

para. 286

Nesse caso, a União Europeia contestou a continuidade de uso pelos EUA da metodologia de

aplicação de direitos anti-dumping, conhecida como zeroing, aplicada em ao menos 18 casos,

inclusive em revisões administrativas.

Para. 286. “Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is subject to the overarching requirement

in Article 9.3 that the amount of anti-dumping duty “shall not exceed the margin of dumping as

established under Article 2” of that Agreement. Based on an examination of the context of Article

VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body has

found that the term “margin of dumping”, as used in those provisions, relates to the “exporter” of the

“product” under consideration. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has clarified that the definitions of

“dumping” and “margin of dumping” apply in the same manner throughout the Anti-Dumping

Agreement and do not vary under the various provisions of the Agreement. Thus, under Article VI:2

and Article 9.3, the margin of dumping established for an exporter in accordance with Article 2

operates as a ceiling for the total amount of anti-dumping duties that can be levied on the entries of

the subject merchandise from that exporter. The Appellate Body has seen no basis in Article VI:2 of

the GATT 1994 or in Articles 2 and 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement for disregarding the results

of comparisons where the export price exceeds the normal value. As the Appellate Body has said,

“other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are explicit regarding the permissibility of

disregarding certain matters”.” [notas de rodapé omitidas]

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from

Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 102

O caso trata da aplicação de medidas anti-dumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações

mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que o termo “margem de

dumping” relaciona-se com o exportador e o produto que este exporta, assim como, os conceitos de

dumping e margem de dumping são aplicados de maneira uniforme em todo o acordo anti-dumping.

Para. 102. “Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is subject to the overarching requirement

in Article 9.3 that the amount of anti-dumping duty “shall not exceed the margin of dumping as

established under Article 2” of that Agreement. We recall that our examination of the context of

Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the Anti Dumping Agreement confirmed that the

term “margin of dumping”, as used in those provisions, relates to the “exporter” of the “product”

under consideration and not to individual “importers” or “import transactions”, and, furthermore, that

the concepts of “dumping” and “dumping margin” apply in the same manner throughout the Anti-

Dumping Agreement and do not vary under the various provisions of the Agreement. Thus, under

Article VI:2 and Article 9.3, the margin of dumping established for an exporter in accordance with

Article 2 operates as a ceiling for the total amount of anti-dumping duties that can be levied on the

entries of the subject merchandise from that exporter.”

b) “Proibição de zeroing em revisões periódicas”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet

Nam (US – Shrimp), Demandante: Vietnam, WT/DS404/R, paras. 7.137-7.138

O caso, diz respeito à aplicação de medidas anti-dumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações

oriundas do Vietnam. O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a aplicação da metodologia de “zeroing”

simples em revisões administrativas é, como tal, inconsistente com o Artigo 9.3 do Acordo Anti-

dumping e o Artigo VI:2 do GATT 1994.

Para. 7.137. “On this basis, the Appellate Body has found that “simple zeroing” in periodic reviews

– as it is applied by the USDOC – is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement

and with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body has held that zeroing results in the

levy of an amount of anti-dumping duty that exceeds an exporter's margin of dumping. This, the

Appellate Body has explained, is because when the USDOC applies simple zeroing in periodic

reviews, the USDOC compares the prices of individual export transactions against monthly weighted

average normal values, and disregards the amounts by which the export prices exceed the monthly

weighted average normal values when aggregating the results of the comparisons to calculate the

cash deposit rate for the exporter and the duty assessment rate for the importer concerned. We note,

however, that the Appellate Body has made it clear that its rulings with respect to zeroing in periodic

reviews concern the amount of anti-dumping duty that can be levied in accordance with Article 9.3

of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and not the issue of how this amount is to be collected from the

importers. Specifically, the Appellate Body has clarified that the prohibition of simple zeroing in

periodic reviews does not preclude Members from carrying out an importer-specific inquiry to

determine the duty liability, as long as the duty collected does not exceed the exporter-specific

margin of dumping established for the product under consideration as a whole.” [notas de rodapé

omitidas]

Para. 7.138. “In the present dispute, the United States asserts that the Anti-Dumping Agreement and

the GATT 1994 do not prohibit zeroing in the context of periodic reviews. In particular, the United

States argues that it is possible to interpret the terms or concepts of “dumping” and “margin of

dumping” as referring not only to the product as a whole, but also to specific export transactions. The

United States also rejects the notion that dumping is necessarily an exporter-specific concept, and

argues that dumping may also be determined for individual importers. While we have carefully

reviewed and considered these arguments of the United States, we note that the Appellate Body has

considered, and rejected, these very same arguments in prior dispute settlement proceedings. Indeed,

in two such prior cases – US – Zeroing (Japan) and US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) – the Appellate

Body found that zeroing in the context of administrative reviews is, as such, inconsistent with Article

9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.” [nota de rodapé omitida]

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from

Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 109

O caso, refere-se à aplicação de medidas anti-dumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações

mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que a prática de “zeroing”,

além de não ser permitida, por si só, em relação ao estabelecimento da margem de dumping, também

não é admitida nas decisões relativas à revisões periódicas.

Para. 109. “In addition, as we see it, a reading of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that

permits simple zeroing in periodic reviews would allow WTO Members to circumvent the

prohibition of zeroing in original investigations that applies under the first sentence of Article 2.4.2

of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This is because, in the first periodic review after an original

investigation, the duty assessment rate for each importer will take effect from the date of the original

imposition of anti-dumping duties. Consequently, zeroing would be introduced although it is not

permissible in original investigations. We further note that, if no periodic review is requested, the

final anti-dumping duty liability for all importers will be assessed at the cash deposit rate applicable

to the relevant exporter. When the initial cash deposit rate is calculated in the original investigation

without using zeroing, this means that the mere act of conducting a periodic review would introduce

zeroing following imposition of the anti-dumping duty order.”

c) “Inexistência de permissão para a prática de zeroing no Artigo 9.3”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from

Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 103

O caso, trata da aplicação de medidas anti-dumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações

mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que não há, no Acordo Anti-

Dumping, permissibilidade para a prática de “zeroing” e que, caso os negociadores do tratado

quisessem permitir tal prática, o teriam feito de maneira expressa.

Para. 103. “We see no basis in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 or in Articles 2 and 9.3 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement for disregarding the results of comparisons where the export price exceeds the

normal value when calculating the margin of dumping for an exporter. The Appellate Body has

previously noted that other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are explicit regarding the

permissibility of disregarding certain matters. For example, Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement expressly directs investigating authorities to disregard “any zero and de minimis

margins” under certain circumstances, when calculating the weighted average margin of dumping to

be applied to exporters that have not been individually investigated. Similarly, Article 2.2.1, which

deals with the calculation of normal value, sets forth the only circumstances under which sales of the

like product in the exporting country can be disregarded. Thus, when the negotiators sought to permit

investigating authorities to disregard certain matters, they did so explicitly.”

d) “Relação com o Artigo 5.8 – Teste de minimis”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access

Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS),

Demandante: Coreia, WT/DS99/R, paras. 6.89-6.90

Nesse caso, exportações coreanas para os EUA foram alvo de medidas anti-dumping. O Painel não

aceitou o argumento da Coreia de que a margem para a aplicação da regra de minimis de 2%, listada

no Artigo 5.8, deveria ser aplicada também às situações que se encaixassem no Artigo 9.3.

Para. 6.89. “Article 5.8, second sentence, does not apply in the context of Article 9.3 duty

assessment procedures. As Article 5.8, second sentence, does not require Members to apply a de

minimis test in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, it certainly cannot require Members to apply

a particular de minimis standard in such procedures.”

Para. 6.90. “(...) A de minimis test in the context of an Article 9.3 duty assessment will not remove

an exporter from the scope of the order. Thus, the implication of the de minimis test required by

Article 5.8, and any de minimis test that Members choose to apply in Article 9.3 duty assessment

procedures, differ significantly.”

e) “Aplicação de diversos direitos anti-dumping”

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil

(Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.355 e

7.361

Nesse caso, o Brasil posicionou-se contrariamente à imposição de direitos anti-dumping variáveis,

argumentando que a margem de dumping a ser calculada no contexto do Artigo 9.3 deve ser a

margem obtida durante o período de investigação, já que o Artigo 9.3 remete ao Atigo 2, o qual, no

item 2.4.2, trata aa margem de dumping como sendo aquela obtida durante o período de

investigação. O Painel, contudo, afirmou que não há nada no Artigo 9.3 que proíba a imposição de

direitos anti-dumping variáveis. Conforme o entendimento do Painel, o foco do Artigo é outro, qual

seja, o de evitar que haja cobrança em excesso de direitos anti-dumping, bem como a restituição de

um eventual pagamento excessivo, o qual é regulado nos subparágrafos 1 a 3. Dessa maneira, nem o

significado ordinário, nem o contexto do Artigo levam à conclusão de que a imposição de direitos

anti-dumping variáveis é proibida. Ademais, o Painel observa que há outras situações previstas no

Artigo 9, especificamente aquelas relativas aos itens 9.3.1 e 9.3.2, que permitem a imposição de

direitos anti-dumping com margem baseada em momentos que não o da investigação.

Para. 7.355. “In addressing this claim, we note that nothing in the AD Agreement explicitly

identifies the form that anti-dumping duties must take. In particular, nothing in the AD Agreement

explicitly prohibits the use of variable anti-dumping duties. Brazil’s Claim 29 is based on Article 9.3

of the AD Agreement. As the title of Article 9 of the AD Agreement suggests, Article 9.3 is a

provision concerning the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties. Article 9.3 provides that

a duty may not be collected in excess of the margin of dumping as established under Article 2. The

modalities for ensuring compliance with this obligation are set forth in sub-paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of

Article 9.3, each of which addresses duty assessment and the reimbursement of excess duties. The

primary focus of Article 9.3, read together with sub-paragraphs 1–3, is to ensure that final anti-

dumping duties shall not be assessed in excess of the relevant margin of dumping, and to provide for

duty refund in cases where excessive anti-dumping duties would otherwise be collected. Our

understanding that Article 9.3 is concerned primarily with duty assessment is confirmed by the fact

that the broadly equivalent provision in the SCM Agreement (i.e., Article 19.4) refers to the

‘lev[ying]’ of duties, and footnote 51 to that provision states that ‘“levy” shall mean the definitive or

final legal assessment or collection of a duty or tax’ (emphasis added). When viewed in this light, it

is not obvious that — as Brazil effectively argues — Article 9.3 prohibits variable anti-dumping

duties by ensuring that anti-dumping duties do not exceed the margin of dumping established during

‘the investigation phase’ pursuant to Article 2.4.2. Neither the ordinary meaning of Article 9.3, nor

its context (i.e., sub-paragraphs 1–3), supports that view. If Article 9.3 were designed to prohibit the

use of variable customs duties, presumably that prohibition would have been clearly spelled out.”

Para. 7.361. “This therefore further undermines Brazil’s argument that the only margin of dumping

relevant until such time that there is an Article 11.2 review is the margin established during the

investigation. If the basis for duty refund is the margin of dumping prevailing at the time of duty

collection, we see no reason why a Member should not use the same basis for duty collection. Brazil

has noted that refunds do not imply modification of the duty, and are only available if requested by

the importer. While these points may be correct, they do not change the fact that the refund

mechanism operates by reference to the margin of dumping prevailing at the time of duty collection.

It is this aspect of the refund mechanism that renders it contextually relevant to the issue before us.

Accordingly, we see no reason why it is not permissible for a Member to levy anti-dumping duties

on the basis of the actual margin of dumping prevailing at the time of duty collection.”

f) “Diversas margens de dumping para cada transação individual”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from

Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, paras. 99 e 112

O caso, aborda a aplicação de medidas anti-dumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações

mexicanas. O Órgão de Apelação reverteu a decisão do Painel de que o Artigo 9.3 permitiria o

estabelecimento de margens de dumping para cada transação de cada importador, o que resultaria em

diversas margens de dumping no nível de transações individuais.

Para. 99. “Secondly, if it were permissible to determine a separate margin of dumping for each

individual transaction, several margins of dumping would exist for each exporter and for the product

under consideration. However, the existence of “dumping” and several “margins of dumping” at the

transaction-specific level cannot be reconciled with a proper interpretation and application of several

provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We do not see how, for example: the determination of

injury under Article 3; the establishment of an individual margin of dumping for each exporter under

Articles 5.8, 6.10, 6.10.2, 9.4, and 9.5; the acceptance of voluntary undertakings from an exporter

under Article 8; and a review under Article 11.2 or 11.3 for continuation or revocation of an anti-

dumping duty order, can be done at the transaction- or importer-specific level. The Panel's

interpretation appears to us to be premised on the notion that the concept of transaction- and

importer-specific dumping and margin of dumping could be confined to the stage of duty assessment

and collection under Article 9.3. However, we find no textual or contextual basis for such an

interpretation.”

Para. 112. “It appears to us that the United States and the Panel have not correctly understood the

Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 9.3 in previous disputes. First, the Appellate Body has not

recognized the notion of “an importer's dumping margin” and has not held that “an importer's

dumping margin must be averaged out”. Rather, the Appellate Body has consistently held that

“margin of dumping” is an exporter-specific concept, and that, whatever methodology is followed

for assessment and collection of anti-dumping duties, the total amount of anti-dumping duties

assessed and collected from all importers must not exceed the total amount of dumping found in all

the sales made by the exporter concerned, calculated according to the margin of dumping established

for that exporter without zeroing. Secondly, the Appellate Body has also consistently held that

“dumping” and “margin of dumping” do not exist at the level of individual transactions, and that,

therefore, the terms “dumping” and “margin of dumping” cannot be interpreted as applying at an

individual transaction level, as the United States suggests. Thirdly, with respect to assessment of

anti-dumping duty, however, the Appellate Body has recognized that, under Article 9.3, anti-

dumping duty liability can be assessed in relation to a specific importer on the basis of its

transactions from the relevant exporter.”

g) “Cálculo da margem de dumping”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from

Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, paras. 113-114

O caso trata da aplicação de medidas anti-dumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações

mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que o cálculo da margem de

dumping de um determinado produto, tem que levar em conta todas as transações relativas àquele

produto, inclusive aquelas em que o valor de exportação é superior ao valor normal.

Para. 113. “We do not agree that the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 9.3 would favour

“importers with high margins of dumping (…) at the expense of importers who do not dump or who

dump at a lower margin”, as the Panel suggests. In our view, it is not correct to say that, under the

Appellate Body's interpretation, an “offset” is provided for the so-called “non-dumped” transactions.

A margin of dumping is properly calculated under the Anti-Dumping Agreement only if all

transactions are taken into account, including those where the export prices exceed the normal value.

Moreover, our interpretation does not preclude a WTO Member applying a retrospective system

from assessing an importer's final anti-dumping duty liability on the basis of its own transactions,

subject, however, to the legal requirement that the prescribed overall margin of dumping for the

exporter is respected.”

Para. 114. “In sum, the Appellate Body has ruled on the amount of anti-dumping duty that can be

levied in accordance with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and not on how this amount

is to be collected from the importers. In addition, the Appellate Body has recognized that WTO

Members have flexibility in choosing their duty assessment and collection system within the

parameters highlighted above.”

5. Artigo 9.3.2.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of

Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS350/R,

para. 294

Nesse caso, a União Europeia contestou a continuidade de uso pelos EUA da metodologia de

aplicação de direitos anti-dumping, conhecida como zeroing, aplicada em ao menos 18 casos,

inclusive em revisões administrativas.

Para. 294. “In addressing similar arguments by the United States in previous appeals, the Appellate

Body has emphasized that the anti-dumping duty collected at the time of importation, “under a

prospective normal value system, does not represent the 'margin of dumping' under Article 9.3,

which, as the Appellate Body has found, is the margin of dumping for an exporter for all of its sales

of the subject merchandise into the country concerned.” This is not changed by the fact that, in such

a system, the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties may be final at the time of importation.

Rather, Article 9.3.2 contemplates that the amount of duties collected on a prospective basis is

subject to review pursuant to Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that “[t]he

amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under

Article 2.” [nota de rodapé omitida]

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from

Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 120

O caso, trata da aplicação de medidas anti-dumping por parte dos EUA contra importações

mexicanas. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu a distinção existente entre, por um lado, a

coleta de direitos anti-dumping no momento da importação (no caso, em um sistema prospectivo de

estabelecimento do valor normal), e por outro lado, a determinação final da responsabilidade pelo

pagamento do direito pelo importador em vista da margem do dumping praticado pelo exportador, a

qual é apurada com base em todas as suas vendas.

Para. 120. “As Mexico, the European Communities, and Japan point out, the Panel has failed to

distinguish between duty “collection” at the time of importation, on the one hand, and determinations

of the final duty liability of an importer and the margin of dumping for an exporter, on the other

hand. The anti-dumping duty collected from each importer at the time of importation, under a

prospective normal value system, does not represent the “margin of dumping” under Article 9.3,

which, as the Appellate Body has found, is the margin of dumping for an exporter for all of its sales

of the subject merchandise into the country concerned. As the Panel itself observed, under Article

9.3.2, the amount of duties collected on a prospective basis also is subject to review. Under a

prospective normal value system, a review can be triggered as well if the prospective normal value

has been improperly determined and thereby the ceiling prescribed under Article 9.3 is breached.

Article 9.4(ii) does not exempt prospective normal value systems from the requirement set out in

Article 9.3.” [nota de rodapé omitida]

6. Artigo 9.4

a) “Objetivo do Artigo 9.4”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain

Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 123

Nesse caso, tanto o Japão quanto os EUA apelaram do relatório do Painel. Em parte relevante,

discute-se a aplicação do Artigo 9.4 do Acordo Anti-dumping. O limite criado pelo Artigo 9.4 tem

como objetivo proteger os produtores/exportadores, os quais involuntariamente não participam das

investigações e poderiam de alguma forma serem prejudicados pela falta de colaboração de outros

produtores/exportadores conhecidos. A estes conhecidos produtores/exportadores é possível aplicar o

disposto no Artigo 6.8.

Para. 123. “Article 9.4 seeks to prevent the exporters, who were not asked to cooperate in the

investigation, from being prejudiced by gaps or shortcomings in the information supplied by the

investigated exporters.”

b) Limites à margem “all others”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on

Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 116

Discute-se, no trecho abaixo, a amplitude do limite estabelecido pelo Artigo 9.4 ao cálculo da

margem anti-dumping. O Órgão de Apelação, seguindo o raciocínio desenvolvido pelo Painel,

afirmou que o Artigo 9.4 estabelece um limite para a margem de dumping, calculada no contexto do

Artigo 6.10, denominada “all others margin”. Não se trata de um método de cálculo da margem anti-

dumping, mas sim um limite para a coleta do direito. Tal limite, contudo, é qualificado por duas

situações que não podem ser consideradas para seu cálculo: margens zero e margens definidas com

base no Artigo 6.8, isto é, com base em fatos disponíveis quando uma parte interessada se recusar, ou

simplesmente não entregar, informações necessárias.

Para. 116. “Article 9.4 does not prescribe any method that WTO Members must use to establish the

‘all others’ rate that is actually applied to exporters or producers that are not investigated. Rather,

Article 9.4 simply identifies a maximum limit, or ceiling, which investigating authorities ‘shall not

exceed’ in establishing an ‘all others’ rate. Subparagraph (i) of Article 9.4 states the general rule that

the relevant ceiling is to be established by calculating a ‘weighted average margin of dumping

established’ with respect to those exporters or producers who were investigated. However, the clause

beginning with ‘provided that’, which follows this sub-paragraph, qualifies this general rule. This

qualifying language mandates that, ‘for the purpose of this paragraph’, investigating authorities

‘shall disregard‘, first, zero and de minimis margins and, second, ‘margins established under the

circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6.’ Thus, in determining the amount of the ceiling

for the ‘all others’ rate, Article 9.4 establishes two prohibitions. The first prevents investigating

authorities from calculating the ‘all others’ ceiling using zero or de minimis margins; while the

second precludes investigating authorities from calculating that ceiling using ‘margins established

under the circumstances referred to’ in Article 6.8.”

c) Artigo 9.4 (i) – “weighted average margin of dumping with respect to selected exporters

or producers”

(i) margins

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain

Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 118

Para interpretar o significado do termo “margens”, no contexto do Artigo 9.4, o Órgão de Apelação

fez referência à interpretação pelo Painel do mesmo termo no contexto de outro Artigo, o 2.4.2, no

caso EC - Bed Linen, concluindo que ele significa a margem de dumping, individualizada,

determinada para cada um dos exportadores e produtores do produto investigado, para aquele

produto específico.

Para. 118. “[W]e recall that the word ‘margins’, which appears in Article 2.4.2 of that Agreement,

has been interpreted in European Communities - Bed Linen. The Panel found, in that dispute, and we

agreed, that ‘margins’ means the individual margin of dumping determined for each of the

investigated exporters and producers of the product under investigation, for that particular product.

This margin reflects a comparison that is based upon examination of all of the relevant home market

and export market transactions. We see no reason, in Article 9.4, to interpret the word ‘margins’

differently from the meaning it has in Article 2.4.2, and the parties have not suggested one.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed

Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.428

Nesse caso, a Noruega argumentou que a medida anti-dumping adotada pela União Europeia era

inconsistente por diversos motivos. A decisão do Painel, nesse ponto, esclareceu que a média

ponderada de que trata o Artigo 9.4(i) é afetada por eventuais revisões de margens de dumping que

reduzam essas margens. Ademais, o Órgão reafirmou o que já havia decidido em outras

oportunidades, de que as margens estabelecidas por meio de fatos disponíveis não são levadas em

conta para o cálculo do limite de que trata o Artigo 9.4(i).

Para. 7.428. “In this light, to the extent that it determined the fixed duty on the basis of an

assessment that relied upon a weighted average margin of dumping for investigated parties that (i)

was overstated because it did not take into account downward revisions to the margins of dumping of

three individually examined producers; and (ii) was calculated with reliance on a margin of dumping

that was based on “facts available”, we find that the investigating authority acted inconsistently with

Article 9.4(i) of the AD Agreement.”

(ii) exporters or producers

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of

Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para.

6.72

Em EC - Bed Linen, o Painel interpreta que a média ponderada da margem de

exportadores/produtores (no plural), a que faz referência o inciso (i) do Artigo 9.4, necessária para o

estabelecimento do limite de margem anti-dumping, não implica necessariamente a existência de

mais de um exportador/produtor. Contudo, o Órgão de Apelação, nesse mesmo caso (paras. 74 et

seq.), reverteu a interpretação do Painel em relação ao mesmo termo (média ponderada) no contexto

do Artigo 2.2.2(ii). No caso, o Órgão afirmou que, no Artigo 2.2.2(ii) em particular, o termo “média

ponderada” impede a interpretação do termo produtores/exportadores na forma singular. Porém,

enfatizou que se trata de outro Artigo e que a linguagem do Órgão foi a de interpretar o termo no

contexto específico do Artigo 2.2.2(ii).

Para. 6.72. “Article 9.4(i) provides that the dumping duty applied to imports from

producers/exporters not examined as part of a sample shall not exceed ‘the weighted average margin

of dumping established with respect to the selected exporters or producers’. We consider that this

provision does not become inoperative if there is only one selected exporter or producer - rather, the

dumping margin for that exporter or producer may be applied.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed

Salmon from Norway (EC – Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.431-7.432

Ao impor medidas anti-dumping, a União Europeia dividiu os exportadores/produtores em duas

categorias distintas: partes que não foram investigadas, mas que cooperaram com as investigações,

ao responder questionários elaborados pela União Europeia; e partes que não cooperaram, ao não

responderem os questionários ou não se fazerem conhecidas às autoridades investigadoras. A decisão

do Painel esclareceu que o Artigo 9.4 é aplicável somente àqueles exportadores/produtores que

poderiam potencialmente ter sido incluídos na lista de partes investigadas. Destas, excluem-se

aquelas partes que não cooperaram ou não se fizeram conhecidas, pois estas não poderiam ser

potenciais partes investigadas.

Para. 7.431. “As we have already noted, Article 9.4(i) applies when an investigating authority has

not determined an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer, within the

meaning of the first sentence of Article 6.10, and instead determines individual margins of dumping

for a limited number of interested parties selected from the known exporters or producers, in

accordance with the second sentence of Article 6.10. The focus of Article 9.4 is therefore on the

“exporters or producers not included in the examination” that could have been potentially included in

the selection of parties to investigate pursuant to the second sentence of Article 6.10. In our view,

this does not include exporters or producers that did not identify themselves to the investigating

authority for the purpose of being selected in the limited investigation because such exporters or

producers could not have been potentially included in the selection of the parties to investigate. Thus,

the disciplines in Article 9.4(i) apply only in respect of non-investigated parties that cooperated with

the investigating authority for the purpose of selection of the parties that would be subject to a

limited investigation. It does not apply in respect of parties that did not cooperate for this purpose.”

Para. 7.432. “In the present investigation, the non-cooperating companies were identified as

companies which “did not cooperate or did not make themselves known”. This may be contrasted

with the non-investigated cooperating companies, which were identified as “[c]ompanies which

cooperated, but which were not selected in the sample, and which are not related to any of the

companies included in the sample”. It follows that the non-cooperating companies included any

investigated company that did not cooperate in the investigation and any non-investigated company

that did not make itself known to the investigating authority for the purpose of being selected in the

limited investigation. We note that none of the investigated companies were found to be non-

cooperating. Thus, the margin of dumping attributed to non-cooperating companies was assigned

only to companies that did not make themselves known to the investigating authority for the purpose

of being selected in the limited investigation.”

d) Artigo 9.4(i): “Prohibitions in the calculation of “all others” rate: zero and de minimis

margins, margins based on facts available”

(i) Margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of

Article 6

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain

Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 119

Em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Japão argumentou que os EUA violaram o Artigo 9.4 ao não

observarem a proibição relativa ao cálculo do limite estabelecido no inciso (i), nos casos de margens

de dumping calculadas pelo Artigo 6.8. Os EUA argumentaram que essa proibição referia-se,

somente, àquelas margens calculadas inteiramente com base em fatos disponíveis. Ao contrário dos

EUA, o Órgão de Apelação, seguindo o raciocínio do Painel, adotou uma interpretação ampla do

termo “sob as circunstâncias do Artigo 6.8”. Assim, a proibição relativa à aplicação do limite

imposto pelo Artigo 9.4 foi entendida como ampla, abarcando todos aqueles produtores/exportadores

que, de alguma forma, tivessem se negado a prestar informações, ou simplesmente não tivessem

prestado tais informações. Isso significa que, mesmo aquelas margens calculadas parcialmente com

base em fatos disponíveis, estariam excluídas da base de cálculo do limite determinado pelo Artigo

9.4(i).

Para. 119. “We proceed to examine the phrase ‘margins established under the circumstances

referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6.’ This provision permits investigating authorities, in certain

situations, to reach ‘preliminary or final determinations (…) on the basis of the facts available’.

There is, however, no requirement in Article 6.8 that resort to facts available be limited to situations

where there is no information whatsoever which can be used to calculate a margin. Thus, the

application of Article 6.8, authorizing the use of facts available, is not confined to cases where the

entire margin is established using only facts available. Rather, under Article 6.8, investigating

authorities are entitled to have recourse to facts available whenever an interested party does not

provide some necessary information within a reasonable period, or significantly impedes the

investigation. Whenever such a situation exists, investigating authorities may remedy the lack of any

necessary information by drawing appropriately from the ‘facts available’ (…)”

(ii) established

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain

Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 121-123

Em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação procedeu à interpretação do termo “established” sob

as circunstâncias do Artigo 6.8, referenciado no Artigo 9.4, e decidiu que uma margem não deixa de

ser estabelecida sob tais circunstâncias, simplesmente porque uma parte dos dados utilizados para

fins de seu cálculo foi baseada em informações concretas submetidas e não nas “melhores

informações disponíveis”.

Para. 121. “We turn to the word ‘established’ in the phrase ‘margins established under the

circumstances’ referred to in Article 6.8. The essence of the United States’ argument is that this word

should be read as if it were qualified by the word ‘entirely’, or ‘exclusively’, or ‘wholly’: only where

a margin is established ‘entirely’ under the ‘circumstances’ of Article 6.8 must that margin be

disregarded.”

Para. 122. “We have noted that Article 9.4 establishes a prohibition, in calculating the ceiling for the

all others rate, on using ‘margins established under the circumstances referred to’ in Article 6.8.

Nothing in the text of Article 9.4 supports the United States’ argument that the scope of this

prohibition should be narrowed so that it would be limited to excluding only margins established

‘entirely’ on the basis of facts available. As noted earlier, Article 6.8 applies even in situations where

only limited use is made of facts available. To read Article 9.4 in the way the United States does is to

overlook the many situations where Article 6.8 allows a margin to be calculated, in part, using facts

available. Yet, the text of Article 9.4 simply refers, in an open-ended fashion, to ‘margins established

under the circumstances’ in Article 6.8. Accordingly, we see no basis for limiting the scope of this

prohibition in Article 9.4, by reading into it the word ‘entirely’ as suggested by the United States. In

our view, a margin does not cease to be ‘established under the circumstances referred to’ in Article

6.8 simply because not every aspect of the calculation involved the use of ‘facts available’.”

Para. 123. “Our reading of Article 9.4 is consistent with the purpose of the provision. Article 6.8

authorizes investigating authorities to make determinations by remedying gaps in the record which

are created, in essence, as a result of deficiencies in, or a lack of, information supplied by the

investigated exporters. Indeed, in some circumstances, as set forth in paragraph 7 of Annex II of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement, “if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is

being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to

the party than if the party did cooperate.” (emphasis added) Article 9.4 seeks to prevent the

exporters, who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation, from being prejudiced by gaps or

shortcomings in the information supplied by the investigated exporters. This objective would be

compromised if the ceiling for the rate applied to “all others” were, as the United States suggests,

calculated – due to the failure of investigated parties to supply certain information – using margins

“established” even in part on the basis of the facts available.”

e) Artigo 9.4 (ii) – “Limites”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed

Salmon from Norway (EC – Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.707

Nesse caso, a Noruega argumentou que a medida antidumping adotada pela União Europeia era

inconsistente por diversos motivos. A Noruega argumentou que, pela forma como a margem

antidumping foi calculada, tornou-se excessiva, não sendo, portanto, apropriada.

Para. 7.707. “We find important contextual support for this conclusion in Article 9.4. Article 9.4

explicitly recognizes that a “prospective normal value” may be applied for the purpose of collecting

anti-dumping duties from parties not included in a limited investigation undertaken pursuant to

Article 6.10. To this end, Article 9.4(ii) establishes that for such non-investigated parties, an

investigating authority will be entitled to apply anti-dumping duties in an amount not greater than the

“difference between the weighted average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and

the export prices” of the non-investigated parties. Article 9.4(ii) thereby sets the maximum level of

the “prospective normal value” that could be applied to non-investigated parties at the weighted

average of the normal values of the investigated parties. In our view, it would make sense to consider

that essentially the same benchmark – normal value – should be equally relevant when applying a

“prospective reference price” to investigated parties. In this regard, we find the last sentence of

Article 9.4 to be particularly instructive.” This sentence reads:

The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values to imports

from any exporter or producer not included in the examination who has

provided the necessary information during the course of the investigation, as

provided for in subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6. (Emphasis added).

f) Artigo 9.4 (ii) – “Relação com o Artigo 9.3.2”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of

Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS350/R,

para. 295

Nesse caso, a União Europeia contestou a continuidade de uso pelos EUA da metodologia de

aplicação de direitos anti-dumping, conhecida como zeroing, aplicada em ao menos 18 casos,

inclusive em revisões administrativas.

Para. 295. “Thus, Article 9.4(ii) does not mean that the basic disciplines governing the calculation of

margins of dumping, contained in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement, no longer apply. The collection of anti-dumping duties on the basis of a prospective

normal value is only an intermediate stage of collection, since it is subject to final assessment and “a

prompt refund, upon request”, under Article 9.3.2. There is nothing in Article 9.4 that exempts

prospective normal value systems from the obligations under Article 9.3, including with respect to

refund procedures in respect of duties assessed on a prospective basis.” (93)

7. Artigo 9.5 - Uso de zeroing em revisões para estabelecimento de margens individuais

para novos exportadores

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and

Sunset Reviews (US – Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 165

Em US – Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação, revertendo a decisão do Painel, conclui que o uso da

metodologia de zeroing no estabelecimento de margens individuais de que trata o Artigo 9.5 não é

permitido.

Para. 165. “Article 9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement makes it clear that, upon request,

investigating authorities “shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual

margins of dumping” for exporters or foreign producers that did not ship the subject product during

the period of investigation. As noted above, under the Anti Dumping Agreement, dumping

determinations relate to the exporter, and both “dumping” and “margins of dumping” relate to the

pricing behaviour of the exporter. Moreover, negative comparison results may not be disregarded

when calculating a margin of dumping for an exporter. For the same reasons, we consider that

zeroing, in establishing “individual margins of dumping” for new shippers, is also inconsistent with

Article 9.5 of the Anti Dumping Agreement.” [notas de rodapé omitidas]

Footnote 93: “It is true that in a prospective normal value system individual export transactions at prices less than normal

value can attract liability for payment of anti-dumping duties, regardless of whether prices of other export transactions

exceed normal value. Similarly, under its retrospective system of duty collection, the United States is free to assess duty

liability on a transaction-specific basis, but the total amount of anti-dumping duties that are levied must not exceed the

exporters' or foreign producers' margins of dumping. (See Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 161 and

162).”

III. Comentários

A jurisprudência dos órgãos do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC esclarece diversos

pontos relativos ao Artigo 9 do Acordo Anti-Dumping. Note-se, antes de tudo, que o escopo do

Artigo 9 diz respeito à imposição e coleta de direitos anti-dumping, não ao cálculo da margem de

dumping.

A linguagem do Artigo é clara, no sentido de que é preferível, portanto, conforme a jurisprudência,

não obrigatório, impor direitos anti-dumping em montantes inferiores à margem de dumping, caso tal

montante seja suficiente para afastar o prejuízo causado pelo dumping. Posto de outra maneira, a

jurisprudência é pacífica no sentido de que a chamada “regra do menor direito” não é, hoje,

obrigatória para os Membros da OMC.

No contexto do Artigo 9.2, discute-se o que constitui o montante necessário a ser recolhido. A

começar, o montante necessário não deve exceder a própria margem de dumping, ou seja, não se

admite “punir” o produtor/exportador além do ponto em que economicamente se iguala o preço de

exportação ao valor normal.

Além disso, como regra geral, devem ser nomeados todos os fornecedores que terão montantes

recolhidos a título de direitos anti-dumping, em contraposição à coleta de direitos relacionados a um

país como um todo, a não ser que isso seja impraticável, caso em que será nomeado o país, ou países,

dos fornecedores. Nesse ponto, foi esclarecido em caso recente que não se justifica a imposição de

uma margem de dumping para o país como um todo, caso tal imposição seja considerada

simplesmente “ineficaz” (e mesmo que se trate de economias não predominantemente de mercado).

A jurisprudência determina que é necessário que tal imposição seja impraticável, como ocorre, por

exemplo, quando a autoridade investigadora precisa se valer de seleção ou amostragem de

produtores/exportadores – conforme autoriza, em certos casos, o Acordo – para viabilizar a condução

de investigações envolvendo um grande número de produtores.

Outra regra a ser observada na imposição dos direitos anti-dumping é o dever de coletá-los de todos

os exportadores/produtores, à exceção daqueles que tenham celebrado compromissos de preços.

Verifica-se, aqui, mais uma hipótese de aplicação do princípio da não-discriminação nos Acordos da

OMC.

No contexto do Artigo 9.3, a jurisprudência posicionou-se firmemente no sentido de condenar a

prática de “zeroing” em revisões administrativas, a exemplo do que ocorre nas determinações de

dumping. Entende-se que, nas revisões administrativas, a prática de “zeroing” também é, por si só,

proibida. Além disso, esclareceu-se que a prática de “zeroing” não é implicitamente permissível. Se

fosse permissível, o seria de forma explícita, a exemplo de outras regras do Acordo Anti-Dumping.

Uma outra questão levantada com relação a tal Artigo, diz respeito à possibilidade da

imposição/coleta de direitos anti-dumping em montantes variáveis, e não estritamente naquele

determinado no período de investigação. Nesse sentido, nota-se que não há nada no Artigo 9.3 que

proíba a imposição de direitos anti-dumping variáveis, contanto que não se exceda a margem de

dumping apurada. A jurisprudência entende, inclusive, que o foco do Artigo é justamente o de evitar

que haja cobrança em excesso de direitos anti-dumping, bem como fornecer um mecanismo de

restituição de um eventual pagamento excessivo.

Já no contexto do Artigo 9.4 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, estabelece-se um limite para os direitos anti-

dumping coletados com base na margem de dumping calculada nos termos do Artigo 6.10, isto é, a

chamada “all others rate”, aferida nos casos em que é inviável, devido ao grande número de

produtores/exportadores, calcular margens individualizadas, procedendo-se, dessa forma, ao cálculo

de uma margem geral. A jurisprudência esclarece, em particular, que o objetivo do mencionado

limite é evitar prejuízo aos produtores/exportadores, os quais involuntariamente não tenham suas

informações analisadas, vis-à-vis produtores/exportadores não colaborativos. A estes, pode ser

eventualmente aplicada margem de dumping superior, baseada nas “melhores informações

disponíveis” (Artigo 6.8).

Assim, a interpretação do citado Artigo, em conjunto com os Artigos 6.8 e 6.10, resulta na seguinte

divisão em três grupos, para fins didáticos, entre os exportadores que potencialmente praticam

dumping em determinado caso: (i) aqueles exportadores que respondem questionários e prestam

informações, sendo-lhes atribuídas margens calculadas individual e especificamente; (ii)

exportadores que não são chamados a colaborar na investigação, ou que participam, mas têm sua

margem calculada com base em seleção/amostragem; (iii) exportadores que não participam do exame

de dados por se negarem a colaborar, ou simplesmente por deixarem de entregar as informações

requeridas. O limite para o cálculo da margem de dumping, definido no Artigo 9.4, está circunscrito

aos produtores/exportadores do grupo (ii), acima indicado. Para os produtores/exportadores do grupo

(iii) (não colaborativos), o que determina o limite são as chamadas “informações disponíveis”. Já o

limite para os exportadores do grupo (i) é a própria margem individualmente calculada.

8. Artigo 9.5

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Na segunda sentença, faltou a palavra “que” antes da expressão “aquela prevista”. Assim, a sentença

completa ficaria como segue: “tal exame será iniciado e realizado de forma mais acelerada do que

aquela prevista para o cálculo dos direitos normais e procedimentos de revisão no Membro

importador”.

III. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 9.5

1. Contestação de norma em abstrato

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for

Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS294/AB/R, para. 243

No litígio US - Zeroing (EC), o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que é possível que uma norma da

legislação doméstica de um Membro da OMC seja contestada em abstrato em relação ao Acordo Anti-

Dumping, ou seja, não é necessário esperar a ocorrência de um caso concreto para somente então se

alegar infringência ao Acordo em tela. Com efeito, o Órgão de Apelação deixou explicitado que:

Para. 243. “The Appellate Body has previously emphasized that “as such” challenges against a

Member's measures in WTO dispute settlement proceedings are particularly “serious challenges” that

seek to prevent a Member ex ante from engaging in a certain conduct. The European Communities

has submitted only limited arguments and evidence relating to the meaning of Section 351.414(c)(2),

its scope of application, and its alleged inconsistency with the covered agreements. We also note that

the Panel Report does not contain factual findings regarding the meaning of Section 351.414(c)(2). In

these circumstances, we decline to complete the analysis to determine whether Section 351.414(c)(2)

is inconsistent, as such, with Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 9.5, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 18.4 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement, Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, and Article XVI:4 of the WTO

Agreement” (nota de rodapé omitida).

2. Zeroing e Produtores não-atuantes

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for

Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 165

A técnica do zeroing não pode ser aplicada no cálculo das margens de dumping de exportadores não-

atuantes, os quais não foram considerados nas investigações iniciais do procedimento anti-dumping,

conforme entendimento do Órgão de Apelação no litígio US – Zeroing (Japan):

Para. 165. “Article 9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement makes it clear that, upon request,

investigating authorities “shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual

margins of dumping” for exporters or foreign producers that did not ship the subject product during

the period of investigation. As noted above, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, dumping

determinations relate to the exporter, and both “dumping” and “margins of dumping” relate to the

pricing behaviour of the exporter. Moreover, negative comparison results may not be disregarded

when calculating a margin of dumping for an exporter. For the same reasons, we consider that

zeroing, in establishing “individual margins of dumping” for new shippers, is also inconsistent with

Article 9.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement” (notas de rodapé omitidas).

3. Contestação do zeroing em tese e âmbito de sua aplicação

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating

Dumping Margins (Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 7.186

No caso US - Zeroing (Japan) [art. 21.5(P)], o Painel consignou que a possibilidade de impugnação

do zeroing em tese e a esfera de incidência dessa prática são situações distintas. Nesse sentido, o

Painel expressou que:

Para. 7.186. “We are unable to accept the United States' argument, for it confuses (1) the existence of

the zeroing procedures as a measure that can be challenged as such, and (2) the scope of application of

that measure. In this regard, we note the Appellate Body's conclusion that “the 'zeroing procedures'

under different comparison methodologies, and in different stages of anti-dumping proceedings, [ ]

reflect different manifestations of a single rule or norm.” We understand this to be a reference to the

fact that, although the zeroing procedures are a single rule or norm, that single rule or norm applies in

different contexts, or “manifestations”. To the extent that the December 2006 Notice eliminates

zeroing in W-to-W comparisons in original investigations, the Notice certainly addresses one

“manifestation” of the single rule or norm. However, the Notice does not address the three remaining

“manifestations” of that rule or norm which were the object of findings by the Appellate Body,

namely T-to-T comparisons in original investigations, periodic reviews, and new shipper reviews.

Thus, although the scope of application of the rule or norm has been reduced, the rule or norm per se

has not been eliminated and, as noted below, zeroing continues to be applied in contexts other than

W-to-W comparisons in original investigations. In order to eliminate the zeroing procedures per se,

the Notice would have had to eliminate zeroing in the context of all of the “different manifestations”.

The Notice fails to do this” (notas de rodapé omitidas).

4. Procedimento de produtores não-atuantes - inadmissibilidade de imposição de condições

não previstas no Acordo Anti-Dumping

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef

and Rice (Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/AB/R,

paras. 323-324

Quando da posterior investigação de produtores não-atuantes no procedimento inicial destinado à

apuração da prática de dumping, a lei doméstica de um Membro da OMC não pode determinar

requisitos não-previstos no Acordo Anti-Dumping. No litígio Mexico - Rice Anti-Dumping Measures,

o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que é inadmissível, por iniciativa de leis internas, a imposição da

demonstração de representatividade do volume das exportações durante o interstício da revisão

prevista no Artigo 9.5 do Tratado em apreço. Nesta quadra, o Órgão de Apelação asseverou o

seguinte:

Para. 323. “We examine now the consistency of Article 89D with the above treaty provisions. The

Panel found that Article 89D permits Economía to conduct an expedited review provided that, inter

alia, the respondent make a showing of a “representative” volume of exports to Mexico during the

period of review. By so requiring, Article 89D, like Article 68 of the FTA, imposes a condition not

provided for in the relevant provisions of the Agreements. As such, Article 89D prevents Economía

from granting a review in instances where the conditions set out in the relevant WTO provisions have,

in fact, been met by a respondent.”

Para. 324. “For these reasons, we uphold the Panel’s findings, in paragraphs 7.269 and 8.5(d) of the

Panel Report, that Article 89D of the FTA is inconsistent, as such, with Article 9.5 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement” (notas de rodapé omitidas).

III. Comentários

O procedimento para averiguação da ocorrência de dumping costuma ser complexo. As nuances

presentes na investigação podem ter inúmeras formas. Ademais, as autoridades administrativas devem

ter não só conhecimento de direito, mas igualmente de economia. Ao término do procedimento, as

empresas estrangeiras que foram investigadas, se tiverem praticado preço inferior ao valor normal,

podem dar margem à imposição de direitos anti-dumping.

Entretanto, pode acontecer de, posteriormente, surgirem empresas que não foram objeto da

investigação inicial. Para esses produtores específicos, as autoridades nacionais devem determinar

margens individuais de dumping. Enquanto essas margens não forem estabelecidas, não se deve, por

medida de justiça, cobrar os direitos anti-dumping. Sucede, todavia, que se cuida de:

uma garantia relativa, uma vez que a determinação da margem individual de

dumping pode ser estipulada em breve espaço de tempo, e ainda porque

existe a possibilidade de cobrança retroativa, à data do início do exame

individual do caso, de direitos anti-dumping (94).

Boa parte dos casos envolvendo o Artigo 9.5 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, dizia respeito à prática do

zeroing, executada principalmente pelos EUA. Por meio desta técnica, as autoridades administrativas,

na hipótese de detectam a superioridade do preço de exportação em relação ao valor normal, passam a

desprezar a diferença entre os dois preços. Esta diferença é conhecida como margem negativa de

dumping. Embora os EUA tenham sido acionados basicamente por países desenvolvidos nas

contendas acerca do zeroing, esta temática também é de interesse de países em desenvolvimento,

conforme assinalam Bown e Prusa:

(…) developing countries are increasingly affected by U.S. AD… The stock

of measures affecting developing country exports has been increasing over

time, as exports from many emerging economies have continued to expand.

Looking forward, it is reasonable to think that this emerging pattern of AD

measures involving developing countries will also be seen in the pattern of

zeroing complaints at the WTO AB. Even though developing countries have

currently only filed a few complaints challenging the practice, in all

likelihood if the U.S. continues its non-compliance stance there will be more

and more zeroing cases against the U.S., especially given that the AB’s

position toward zeroing is well established (95)

A evolução da jurisprudência do Órgão de Apelação no tocante ao zeroing demonstra que os

julgamentos tendem a ser contextuais, ou seja, o Órgão de Apelação limita-se, em cada litígio, a

perquirir sobre a compatibilidade do zeroing com apenas uma ou algumas das modalidades de cálculo

da margem de dumping (média ponderada do valor normal com média ponderada do preço de

exportação, transação-transação ou média ponderada do valor normal com preço de uma exportação

específica) ou fases de investigação (inicial, de revisão ou de produtores não-atuantes), ao invés de

decidir, de imediato e em uma única oportunidade, acerca da liceidade do zeroing para todas as

modalidades ou fases. Tal comportamento, no estilo conta-gotas, tem gerado certa instabilidade no

Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC, dispêndio de recursos financeiros por parte dos países

demandantes e expediente protelatório dos praticantes do zeroing, que esperam uma condenação

definitiva para somente então suprimirem ou alterarem o procedimento do zeroing adotado.

No litígio US - Zeroing (EC), o Órgão de Apelação reconheceu que uma norma interna de um

Membro da OMC pode ser impugnada em tese ou “enquanto tal” (“as such”) por suposta afronta ao

Acordo Anti-Dumping. Vale frisar que o país demandante tem a opção de esperar a ocorrência de um

caso concreto que implique desrespeito ao Acordo Anti-Dumping ou a impugnação da lei em abstrato.

Nem sempre, contudo, é fácil decidir qual estratégia seguir, mormente porque as consequências

podem ser diferentes na fase de implementação das recomendações do DSB. Neste ponto, é

importante anotar que “often, a Member challenges a measure both as such and as applied, leaving

the panel to rule on the two challenges separately. This gives the Member a ‘fallback’ position in the

event that the as such challenge fails for reasons such as insufficient evidence”.

Na contenda mencionada no parágrafo acima, o Órgão de Apelação invocou o precedente US – Oil

Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, o qual abordou de maneira pormenorizada o tema da norma

em tese. Neste precedente, o Órgão de Apelação realçou a necessidade de que os Membros

demandantes enunciem de forma clara as normas (leis, regulamentos e demais atos administrativos)

os quais serão contestados “enquanto tal”. Assim, se o Painel ou Órgão de Apelação entenderem

inviável a identificação da norma questionada em abstrato, o demandante será prejudicado. Nesta

senda, é relevante citar a seguinte passagem do aludido precedente:

The presumption that WTO Members act in good faith in the implementation

of their WTO commitments is particularly apt in the context of measures

challenged “as such”. We would therefore urge complaining parties to be

especially diligent in setting out “as such” claims in their panel requests as

clearly as possible. In particular, we would expect that “as such” claims state

unambiguously the specific measures of municipal law challenged by the

complaining party and the legal basis for the allegation that those measures

are not consistent with particular provisions of the covered agreements

(WTO, WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 173).

Footnote 94: BARRAL, Welber. Dumping e comércio internacional: a regulamentação anti-dumping após a Rodada

Uruguai, Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2000, p. 219. Footnote 95: BOWN, Chad P.; PRUSA, Thomas J. US Anti-dumping: much ado about zeroing. World Bank Policy

Research Working Paper 5352, jun/2010, pp. 8-9.

Artigo 10

Lucas Spadano

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 10

Retroactivity

10.1 Provisional measures and anti-dumping duties shall only be applied to products which enter

for consumption after the time when the decision taken under paragraph 1 of Article 7 and

paragraph 1 of Article 9, respectively, enters into force, subject to the exceptions set out in

this Article.

10.2 Where a final determination of injury (but not of a threat thereof or of a material retardation of

the establishment of an industry) is made or, in the case of a final determination of a threat of

injury, where the effect of the dumped imports would, in the absence of the provisional

measures, have led to a determination of injury, anti-dumping duties may be levied

retroactively for the period for which provisional measures, if any, have been applied.

10.3 If the definitive anti-dumping duty is higher than the provisional duty paid or payable, or the

amount estimated for the purpose of the security, the difference shall not be collected. If the

definitive duty is lower than the provisional duty paid or payable, or the amount estimated for

the purpose of the security, the difference shall be reimbursed or the duty recalculated, as the

case may be.

10.4 Except as provided in paragraph 2, where a determination of threat of injury or material

retardation is made (but no injury has yet occurred) a definitive anti-dumping duty may be

imposed only from the date of the determination of threat of injury or material retardation, and

any cash deposit made during the period of the application of provisional measures shall be

refunded and any bonds released in an expeditious manner.

10.5 Where a final determination is negative, any cash deposit made during the period of the

application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds released in an

expeditious manner.

10.6 A definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied on products which were entered for

consumption not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures,

when the authorities determine for the dumped product in question that:

(i) there is a history of dumping which caused injury or that the importer was, or

should have been, aware that the exporter practises dumping and that such

dumping would cause injury, and

(ii) the injury is caused by massive dumped imports of a product in a relatively

short time which in light of the timing and the volume of the dumped imports

and other circumstances (such as a rapid build-up of inventories of the

imported product) is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the

definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied, provided that the importers

concerned have been given an opportunity to comment.

10.7 The authorities may, after initiating and investigation, take such measures as the withholding

of appraisement or assessment as may be necessary to collect anti-dumping duties

retroactively, as provided for in paragraph 6, once they have sufficient evidence that the

conditions set forth in that paragraph are satisfied.

10.8 No duties shall be levied retroactively pursuant to paragraph 6 on products entered for

consumption prior to the date of initiation of the investigation.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 10

Retroatividade

10.1 Só poderão ser aplicadas medidas provisórias e direitos anti-dumping a produtos destinados

ao consumo que entrem após o momento em que entre em vigor a decisão prevista no

parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7 e no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9, respectivamente, sujeita às exceções

estabelecidas neste Artigo.

10.2 Poderão ser percebidos direitos anti-dumping retroativos pelo período durante o qual medidas

provisórias, caso tenham existido, tenham sido aplicadas sempre que uma determinação final

de dano (mas não de ameaça de dano ou de retardamento sensível no estabelecimento de uma

indústria) seja feita, ou sempre que se conclua pela determinação final de ameaça de dano, em

que as importações a preço de dumping, na ausência de medidas provisórias, teriam por efeito

determinar a existência de dano.

10.3 Se o direito anti-dumping definitivo é mais alto do que os direitos provisórios pagos ou

pagáveis ou do que o valor estimado para fins de garantia, a diferença a maior não será

cobrada. Se o direito definitivo é inferior ao direito provisório pago ou pagável ou ao valor

estimado para fins de garantia, a diferença deverá ser reembolsada ou o direito recalculado

conforme o caso.

10.4 Exceto nos casos previstos no parágrafo 2, sempre que se determine a existência de ameaça de

dano ou atraso sensível no estabelecimento de uma indústria (mas não tenha ainda ocorrido

nenhum dano real), só se poderá impor direito anti-dumping definitivo a partir da data de

determinação da ameaça de dano ou de retardamento sensível, e todo depósito em espécie

efetuado durante o período de aplicação de medidas provisórias será reembolsado, e todo o

depósito em fiança será prontamente liberado.

10.5 No caso de se chegar a conclusões negativas, todo depósito em espécie efetuado durante o

período de aplicação de medidas provisórias será reembolsado e todo o depósito em fiança

será prontamente liberado.

10.6 Poder-se-á cobrar retroativamente direito anti-dumping definitivo sobre produtos que tenham

entrado para consumo até 90 dias antes da data de aplicação das medidas provisórias, sempre

que as autoridades determinem o seguinte acerca do produto importado a preços de dumping:

a) há antecedentes de dumping causador de dano, ou o importador estava consciente, ou

deveria ter estado consciente, de que o exportador pratica dumping e de que tal

dumping causaria dano; e

b) o dano é causado por volumosas importações a preços de dumping em período de

tempo relativamente curto, o que, à luz da velocidade e do volume das importações a

preço de dumping e também de outras circunstâncias (como o rápido crescimento dos

estoques do produto importado), levará provavelmente a prejudicar seriamente o

efeito corretivo dos direitos anti-dumping definitivos aplicáveis no futuro, desde que

aos importadores envolvidos tenha sido dada a oportunidade de se manifestar sobre a

medida.

10.7 As autoridades poderão, após iniciada uma investigação, tomar medidas que estimem

necessárias, como suspender a valoração aduaneira ou a liqüidação de direitos, para perceber

direitos anti-dumping retroativos, tal como previsto no parágrafo 6, sempre que tenham

indicação suficiente de que as condições estabelecidas naquele parágrafo estejam preenchidas.

10.8 Não se poderão perceber retroativamente direitos ao abrigo do parágrafo 6 sobre produtos que

tenham entrado para consumo antes da data de início da investigação.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

A expressão “subject to the exceptions set out in this Article”, constante na versão original em inglês

do Artigo 10(1), e traduzida como “sujeita às exceções estabelecidas neste Artigo”, teria sentido mais

claro em português se fosse traduzida como “observadas as exceções estabelecidas neste Artigo”.

Ademais, a expressão “sufficient evidence” disposta no Artigo 10.7 foi traduzida indevidamente como

“indicação suficiente”. Juridicamente, há uma diferença relevante entre provas ou evidências e

indícios, razão pela qual a tradução deveria ter sido “evidências suficientes” ou “provas suficientes”.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 10

1. Artigo 10.7

a) “Natureza das medidas que podem ser tomadas pelas autoridades ao amparo do

Artigo 10.7”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.155-

7.156

O Painel manifestou o entendimento de que as medidas autorizadas pelo Artigo 10.7 têm natureza

cautelar, no sentido de que seu propósito é preservar a possibilidade de posteriormente exigir o

pagamento de direitos anti-dumping.

Para. 7.155. “Article 10.7 provides that once the authorities have sufficient evidence that the

conditions of Article 10.6 are satisfied, they may take such measures as, for example, the withholding

of appraisement or assessment, as may be necessary to collect anti-dumping duties retroactively. We

read this provision as allowing the authority to take certain necessary measures of a purely

conservatory or precautionary kind which serve the purpose of preserving the possibility of later

deciding to collect duties retroactively under Article 10.6. Unlike provisional measures, Article 10.7

measures are not primarily intended to prevent injury being caused during the investigation. They are

taken in order to make subsequent retroactive duty collection possible as a practical matter. Measures

taken under Article 10.7 are not based on evaluation of the same criteria as final measures that may be

imposed at the end of the investigation. They are of a different kind - they preserve the possibility of

imposing anti-dumping duties retroactively, on the basis of a determination additional to the ultimate

final determination.”

Para 7.156. “Our understanding in this regard is confirmed by the fact that, unlike provisional

measures, which can only be imposed after a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and

injury, Article 10.7 measures may be taken at any time “after initiating an investigation (…).”

b) “Evidências suficientes” da existência das condições previstas no Artigo 10.6”

(i) Conceito de “evidências suficientes”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.153-

7.154

Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que, na ausência de uma definição no Artigo 10.7 sobre o que

constituiria “evidências suficientes”, faz-se necessário avaliar a questão caso a caso, à luz do

momento e dos efeitos da medida imposta ou decisão tomada pelas autoridades.

Para 7.153. “Article 10.7 of the AD Agreement does not define “sufficient evidence”. However,

Article 5.3 also reflects this standard, in requiring that the authorities examine the accuracy and

adequacy of the evidence provided in the application “to determine whether there is sufficient

evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation”. The Article 5.3 requirement of “sufficient

evidence to initiate an investigation” has been addressed by previous GATT and WTO panels. Their

approach to understanding this standard has been to examine whether the evidence before the

authority at the time it made its determination was such that an unbiased and objective investigating

authority evaluating that evidence could properly have made the determination. These Panels have

noted that what will be sufficient evidence varies depending on the determination in question. The

Panel in Mexico – HFCS quoted with approval from the Panel's report in the Guatemala – Cement I

case that “the type of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that needed to make a

preliminary or final determination of threat of injury, although the quality and quantity is less”.”

(notas de rodapé omitidas)

Para. 7.154. “(…) We are of the view that what constitutes “sufficient evidence” must be addressed

in light of the timing and effect of the measure imposed or the determination made. Evidence that is

sufficient to warrant initiation of an investigation may not be sufficient to conclude that provisional

measures may be imposed. In a similar vein, the possible effect of the measures an authority is

entitled to take under Article 10.7 of the AD Agreement informs what constitutes sufficient evidence.

Whether evidence is sufficient or not is determined by what the evidence is used for. In sum, whether

evidence is sufficient to justify initiation or to justify taking certain necessary precautionary measures

under Article 10.7 is not a standard that can be determined in the abstract. (…)”

(ii) Desnecessidade de determinação de dumping e dano previamente à aplicação das

medidas previstas no Artigo 10.6

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, para. 7.156

O Painel entendeu não ser necessário, para fins de demonstrar as “evidências suficientes de que as

condições do Artigo 10.6 foram cumpridas”, que a autoridade investigadora chegue primeiramente a

uma determinação preliminar afirmativa de dumping.

Para. 7.156. “In light of the timing and effect of the measures that are taken on the basis of

Article 10.7, we consider that the Article 10.7 requirement of “sufficient evidence that the conditions

of Article 10.6 are satisfied” does not require an authority to first make a preliminary affirmative

determination within the meaning of Article 7 of the AD Agreement of dumping and consequent

injury to a domestic industry. If it were necessary to wait until after such a preliminary determination,

there would, in our view, be no purpose served by the Article 10.7 determination. The opportunity to

preserve the possibility of applying duties to a period prior to the preliminary determination would be

lost, and the provisional measure that could be applied on the basis of the preliminary affirmative

determination under Article 7 would prevent further injury during the course of the investigation.

Moreover, the requirement in Article 7 that provisional measures may not be applied until 60 days

after initiation cannot be reconciled with the right, under Article 10.6, to apply duties retroactively to

90 days prior to the date on which a provisional measure is imposed, if a preliminary affirmative

determination is a prerequisite to the Article 10.7 measures which preserve the possibility of

retroactive application of duties under Article 10.6.”

(iii) Evidências suficientes no contexto dos Artigos 10.7 e 5.3

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.158

Neste trecho, o Painel notou que o Japão não havia questionado, na disputa em questão, a abertura da

investigação anti-dumping com base em “evidências suficientes” de dumping, nos termos do Artigo

5.3; observou, diante disso, que as mesmas evidências a justificarem a abertura da investigação

deveriam servir como evidências para os fins das medidas acautelatórias previstas no Artigo 10.7.

Para. 7.158. “We note that Japan did not challenge the initiation of the investigation, which was,

pursuant to Article 5.3, based on a determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping,

injury, and a causal link. We can perceive of no reason, given the precautionary nature of the

measures that may be taken under Article 10.7, why that same information might not justify a

determination of sufficient evidence of dumping and consequent injury in the context of Article 10.6

as required by Article 10.7.”

c) “Condições estabelecidas” no Artigo 10.6

(i) Consciência dos importadores sobre o dumping

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.160

Neste trecho, o Painel manifestou aa opinião de que é aceitável presumir que importadores tenham

ciência da prática de dumping, especificamente quando se encontram margens de dumping

significativas (no caso, acima de 25%).

Para. 7.160. “USDOC determined that the importers knew or should have known that exporters were

dumping and that such dumping would cause injury. USDOC normally considers dumping margins of

25 per cent or more and a USITC preliminary determination of material injury to impute knowledge

of dumping and the likelihood of consequent material injury. USDOC determined that the information

in the petition indicated that the estimated dumping margins were over 25 per cent for the Japanese

respondents. The evidence of dumping in the petition was, in our view, sufficient for an unbiased and

objective investigating authority to reach this conclusion. We note, in this regard, that Japan has not

alleged that an imputed knowledge of dumping is, per se, inconsistent with Article 10.7, but rather

argues that USDOC did not have sufficient evidence of dumping at all, for the purposes of

Article 10.7.”

(ii) Provocação de dano

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.162-

7.163

Neste caso, o Painel concluiu que a ameaça de dano se enquadra no conceito de dano para o fim de

satisfazer as condições do Artigo 10.6, conforme exigido pelo Artigo 10.7.

Para 7.162. “(…) we note that Article 10.6 itself refers to a determination that an importer knew or

should have known that there was dumping that would cause injury. The term “injury” is defined in

footnote 9 to Article 3 of the Agreement to include threat of material injury or material retardation of

the establishment of an industry, unless otherwise specified. Article 10.6 does not “otherwise

specify”. Consequently, in our view, sufficient evidence of threat of injury would be enough to justify

a determination to apply protective measures under Article 10.7.”

Para. 7.163. “The role of Article 10.7 in the overall context of the AD Agreement confirms this

interpretation. This provision is clearly aimed at preserving the possibility to impose and collect anti-

dumping duties retroactively to 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures.

Thus, Article 10.7 preserves the option provided in Article 10.6 to impose definitive duties even

beyond the date of provisional measures. Assume arguendo Article 10.7 were understood to require

sufficient evidence of actual material injury. In a situation in which, at the time Article 10.7 measures

are being considered, there is evidence only of threat of material injury, no measures under

Article 10.7 could be taken. Assume further that in this same investigation, there was a final

determination of actual material injury caused by dumped imports. At that point, it would be

impossible to apply definitive anti-dumping duties retroactively, even assuming the conditions set out

in Article 10.6 were satisfied, as the necessary underlying Article 10.7 measures had not been taken.

(96) Thus, in a sense, Article 10.7 measures serve the same purpose as an order at the beginning of a

lawsuit to preserve the status quo - they ensure that at the end of the process, effective measures can

be put in place should the circumstances warrant.”

(iii) Volumosas importações em período de tempo relativamente curto

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.165-

7.167

Nesta disputa, o Painel, embora reconhecendo a inexistência de uma determinação no Artigo 10 sobre

o período a ser considerado para a determinação da ocorrência ou não de importações volumosas com

dumping, em um período de tempo relativamente curto, atribuiu peso significativo ao fato de que as

importações volumosas não foram feitas in tempore non suspectu, mas sim num período em que já

havia conhecimento público de que uma investigação estava iminente. O Painel ressaltou que isto

pode ser uma circunstância levada em conta para os fins da avaliação da legalidade de medidas ao

amparo do Artigo 10.7. Enfatizou, no entanto, que não estava questionando a adequação de se levar

em conta tais fatores, para fins de uma aplicação retroativa de direitos, nos termos do Artigo 10.6.

Para. 7.165. “The Agreement does not determine what period should be used in order to assess

whether there were massive imports over a short period of time. Japan asserts that the latter part of

Article 10.6 (ii) of the AD Agreement, referring to whether the injury caused by massive imports is

likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the duty, implies that the period for comparison is

the months before and after the initiation of the investigation. Japan argues that since the duty cannot

be imposed retroactively to the period before the initiation, the remedial effect of the duty cannot be

undermined by massive imports before initiation.”

Para. 7.166. “We disagree with this conclusion. Article 10.7 allows for certain necessary measures to

be taken at any time after initiation of the investigation. In order to be able to make any

determination concerning whether there are massive dumped imports, a comparison of data is

obviously necessary. However, if a Member were required to wait until information concerning the

volume of imports for some period after initiation were available, this right to act at any time after

initiation would be vitiated. By the time the necessary information on import volumes for even a brief

period after initiation were available, as a practical matter, the possibility to impose final duties

retroactively to initiation would be lost, as there would be no Article 10.7 measures in place.

Moreover, as with the situation if a Member were required to wait the minimum 60 days and make a

preliminary determination under Article 7 before applying measures under Article 10.7, the possibility

of retroactively collecting duties under Article 10.6 at the final stage would have been lost.”

Para. 7.167. “Moreover, in our view, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the remedial effect of the

definitive duty could be undermined by massive imports that entered the country before the initiation

of the investigation but at a time at which it had become clear that an investigation was imminent.

We consider that massive imports that were not made in tempore non suspectu but at a moment in

time where it had become public knowledge that an investigation was imminent may be taken into

consideration in assessing whether Article 10.7 measures may be imposed. Again, we emphasize that

we are not addressing the question whether this would be adequate for purposes of the final

determination to apply duties retroactively under Article 10.6.”

Footnote 96: We note that our findings concern the obligations regarding determinations of whether to apply “such

measures … as may be necessary” under Article 10.7. We are not ruling on the obligations regarding retroactive application

of final anti-dumping duties under Article 10.6.

III. Comentários

No principal caso envolvendo o Artigo 10, US - Hot Rolled Steel, as discussões restringiram-se ao

conteúdo do parágrafo 7. A percepção de que a natureza deste é cautelar, isto é, de que funciona como

uma garantia da possibilidade de recolher direitos retroativamente em certas circunstâncias, parece

contribuir para que o dispositivo seja interpretado de modo relativamente flexível, em favor da

autoridade investigadora.

Como exemplos desta consideração, a ser confirmada em futuros casos, pode-se notar a aceitação da

presunção de que importadores têm conhecimento da prática do dumping a partir de determinada

margem de dumping (25%), bem como a conclusão do Painel de que as informações que

fundamentam a abertura de investigações podem ser basicamente as mesmas que fundamentam as

medidas de garantia de eventual recolhimento retroativo, previstas no Artigo 10.7.

Artigo 11

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 11

Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and Price Undertakings

11.1 An anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to

counteract dumping which is causing injury.

11.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where

warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed

since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any interested party

which submits positive information substantiating the need for a review. (97) Interested

parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued

imposition of the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a result of the review under this

paragraph, the authorities determine that the anti-dumping duty is no longer warranted, it shall

be terminated immediately.

11.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive anti dumping duty shall

be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the

most recent review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both dumping and injury, or

under this paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date

on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the

domestic industry within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the

duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. (98) The

duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review.

11.4 The provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any review

carried out under this Article. Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and shall

normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review.

11.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to price undertakings accepted

under Article 8.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 11

Duração e Revisão dos Direitos Anti-Dumping e dos Compromissos de Preços

11.1 Direitos anti-dumping só permanecerão em vigor enquanto perdurar a necessidade de

contrabalançar a prática de dumping causadora de dano.

11.2 Quando justificado, as autoridades deverão rever a necessidade de conservar os direitos

impostos, quer por sua própria iniciativa, quer, se um período razoável de tempo se tiver

passado desde a imposição de direitos anti-dumping definitivos, por requerimento de qualquer

parte interessada, que deverá apresentar informação positiva comprobatória da necessidade de

revisão3. As partes interessadas deverão ter o direito de requerer às autoridades que examinem

se a manutenção do direito é necessária para evitar o dumping, se há probabilidade de que

continue o dano, ou, ainda, de sua reincidência se o direito for extinto ou alterado, ou ambos.

3 Tomada em si mesma a determinação definitiva da quantia do direito anti-dumping a que se refere o parágrafo 3 do Artigo 9 não constitui exame no sentido do presente Artigo.

Se, como resultado da revisão prevista nesse parágrafo, as autoridades concluem que não mais

se justifica a manutenção do direito anti-dumping, deve o mesmo ser imediatamente extinto.

11.3 Em que pese ao disposto nos parágrafos 1 e 2, todo direito anti-dumping definitivo será

extinto em data não posterior a 5 anos a contar de sua imposição (ou da data da mais recente

revisão prevista no parágrafo 2, caso tal revisão tenha abarcado tanto o dumping quanto o

dano, ou à luz do disposto neste parágrafo), a menos que as autoridades determinem, em

revisão iniciada em data anterior àquela, quer por sua própria iniciativa, quer em resposta a

requerimento devidamente fundamentado feito pela indústria nacional ou em seu nome que

tenha sido apresentado dentro de prazo razoavelmente anterior àquela data, que a extinção dos

direitos levaria muito provavelmente à continuação ou retomada do dumping e do dano4. O

direito poderá manter-se em vigor enquanto se espera o resultado do exame.

11.4 O disposto no Artigo 6 relativamente às provas e aos procedimentos aplicar-se-á a toda e

qualquer revisão efetuada sob a égide deste Artigo. Tal revisão será efetuada de maneira

expedita e deverá ser normalmente concluída dentro de 12 meses contados a partir de seu

início.

11.5. O disposto neste Artigo deverá aplicar-se, mutatis mutandis, aos compromissos de preços

aceitos sob o disposto no Artigo 8.

Footnote 97: When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, a finding in the most recent

assessment proceeding under subparagraph 3.1 of Article 9 that no duty is to be levied shall not by itself require the

authorities to terminate the definitive duty.

Footnote 98: A determination of final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article

9, does not by itself constitute a review within the meaning of this Article.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

“To counteract” significa “to do something to reduce or prevent the bad or harmful effects of

something”. Assim, o verbo “contrabalançar” deveria ser alterado para “neutralizar”.

A expressão “an anti-dumping duty”, presente no Artigo 11.1, da versão original, foi traduzida no

plural. No original, a ideia é de que são os direitos anti-dumping em geral. Logo, traduzir como “um

direito anti-dumping” ou “direitos anti-dumping” pouco importa, posto que a ideia é geral em ambos

os casos.

Quanto às expressões “as long as” e “to the extent necessary”, é perfeitamente aceitável a tradução

como foi feita. Deve-se notar que algumas expressões em inglês são repetidas como uma forma de

ênfase. Entende-se que é o caso. Por fim, pelas regras gramaticais em vigor, a grafia correta da palavra

“anti-dumping” seria “antidumping” (sem hífen e itálico).

No Artigo 11.3, a expressão “would be likely to lead” foi traduzida como “levaria muito

provavelmente”, quando o correto seria “levaria provavelmente”.

Na nota de rodapé 22, consta “segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(a) do Artigo 9”, sendo que a

tradução deveria ser: “segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(1) do Artigo 9”. Embora os

subparágrafos ou alíneas do Artigo 9 tenham sido traduzidas por letras, na versão original esses

subparágrafos ou alíneas correspondem a números.

4 Quando se calcula o montante do direito anti-dumping de forma retrospectiva, a mera constatação de que não há direito a cobrar, verificada

durante o mais recente procedimento de cálculo do valor devido segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(a) do Artigo 9, não será suficiente para que se requeira das autoridades a extinção dos direitos definitivos.

Deve-se notar que enquanto o Artigo 11.4 refere-se a “compromissos de preços”, o Artigo 8, do

Acordo Anti-Dumping, o qual cuida de disciplinar os compromissos de preços, emprega a expressão

“compromissos sobre preços”.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 11.1

1. O preceito do Artigo 11.1 é cláusula geral

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Maleable Cast Iron

Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil:

WT/DS219/R, para. 7.113

Ao dispor que os direitos anti-dumping devem ser utilizados na medida do necessário para neutralizar

a prática nociva do dumping, o Artigo 11.1, do Acordo Anti-Dumping, constitui cláusula geral que

orienta a aplicação dos parágrafos 2 e 3 do mesmo Artigo. Com efeito, o Painel do litígio EC - Pipe

Fittings asseverou que:

Para. 7.113. “By virtue of Article 11.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, an anti-dumping duty may

only continue to be imposed if it remains “necessary” to counteract injurious dumping. Article 11.1

contains a general, unambiguous and mandatory requirement that anti-dumping duties “shall remain

in force only as long as and to the extent necessary” to counteract injurious dumping. It furnishes the

basis for the review procedures contained in Article 11.2 (and 11.3) by stating a general and

overarching principle, the modalities of which are set forth in paragraph 2 (and 3) of that Article”

(nota de rodapé omitida).

2. Desnecessidade de determinação de margens individuais para todos os exportadores e

produtores conhecidos em todos os casos

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet

Nam (US - Shrimp), Demandante: Viet Nam, WT/DS404/R, para. 7.167

O Artigo 11.1 não impõe às autoridades administrativas a obrigação de perquirir acerca das margens

individuais para todos os exportadores e produtores conhecidos em todos os casos, tendo em vista o

contido na segunda sentença do Artigo 6.10, do Acordo Anti-Dumping. Nesta senda, o Painel do caso

US - Shrimp (Viet Nam) rechaçou a pretensão vietnamita nos seguintes termos:

Para. 7.167. “Viet Nam's claims are premised on the view that Articles 9.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement require the determination of individual margins, notwithstanding the

legitimate use of a limited examination. To interpret these other provisions of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement in this way would render the second sentence of Article 6.10 meaningless. Indeed,

Viet Nam would effectively have us interpret the first sentence of Article 6.10, and Articles 9.3, 11.1

and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in isolation, as if the second sentence of Article 6.10 did

not exist. There is no doubt that, generally, there is a preference for individual margins to be

determined for each known exporter and producer. This is the very essence of the first sentence of

Article 6.10. However, the exception provided for in the second sentence of Article 6.10 makes it

clear that, despite the general preference for individual margins, investigating authorities need not

determine individual margins for all known exporters and producers in all cases. Since neither the first

sentence of Article 6.10, nor Articles 9.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, impose any

additional restrictions on the use of limited examinations, there is no basis for us to find that the

USDOC's legitimate (i.e. consistent with the second sentence of Article 6.10) use of limited

examinations is inconsistent with those provisions” (nota de rodapé omitida).”

III. Comentários

Os direitos anti-dumping são permitidos pela legislação da OMC como forma de remediar o Membro

que sofre os efeitos deletérios da prática de dumping. Entretanto, para que esses direitos não passem a

exercer uma função meramente protecionista, atrapalhando o livre fluxo de mercadorias, é necessário

que se sujeitem a um processo de revisão e duração, que é o escopo do Artigo 11 do Acordo Anti-

Dumping. Apesar de introduzir melhorias como a “sunset clause”, o artigo em apreço não é imune a

críticas, como as abaixo reproduzidas:

The lack of procedural requirements in Article 11 of the Agreement has often

caused problems of legal certainty to companies from both developed and

developing countries. From the outset, a much-needed amendment is one that

sets time limits upon administering authorities in which to make a formal

decision of whether or not to accept a request of review (99).

A natureza do parágrafo 1, como cláusula geral, implica que este parágrafo deve ser considerado vetor

para a operacionalização dos demais parágrafos do Artigo 11, os quais prevêem formas específicas de

revisão dos direitos anti-dumping. Além do caso EC - Pipe Fittings, a função do parágrafo 1 como

cláusula geral foi também reafirmada nos litígios US - DRAMS e US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel

Sunset Review. Em razão da natureza do parágrafo 1, nota-se a partir do exame da jurisprudência

relacionada, a sua invocação simultaneamente com outros dispositivos do Acordo Anti-Dumping ou

os restantes parágrafos do Artigo 11. Quando isto ocorreu, para se evitar repetição na transcrição dos

julgamentos, opetou-se, na maior parte das vezes, por analisar as decisões a partir da pesquisa dos

outros parágrafos do Artigo 11.

Por derradeiro, no litígio US – Shrimp (Viet Nam), a análise conjunta dos Artigos 6.10 e 11.1 mostrou-

se interessante. Segundo consignado pelo Painel, o método preferencial acolhido pelo Acordo Anti-

Dumping é o da análise de todos produtores ou exportadores. Somente quando inviável tal empreitada

(“impracticable”), será possível limitar o exame a um número razoável de produtos ou partes

interessadas. Sucede que, no caso acima aventado, o Painel entendeu que a delegação vietnamita não

questionava a decisão de as autoridades norte-americanas terem considerado a primeira metodologia

impraticável, mas sim que o uso repetido da exceção prevista na segunda parte do Artigo 6.10

acabava por minar os direitos dos exportadores e produtores previstos em outros dispositivos do

Acordo Anti-Dumping que são influenciados pelo fato de exportadores ou produtores possuírem

margens individuais de dumping (WTO, WT/DS404/R, § 7.164).

Apesar de o Painel ter negado, no ponto ora focado, a interpretação que Vietnã almejava fazer

prevalecer, tópico que permanece aberto é o critério a ser definido para se concluir que a análise de

todos os exportadores ou produtores, como enunciada na primeira parte do Artigo 6.10, revela-se

inviável de sorte a permitir a incidência da exceção contida na segunda parte do aludido Artigo 6.10.

Embora o melhor critério seja mesmo a averiguação do caso concreto, evitando-se as reduções que

respostas apriorísticas possam ocasionar, deve-se entender que o Artigo 11.1 pode servir de auxiliar

nessa análise, em virtude de sua natureza de cláusula geral.

Footnote 99: KONSTANTINOS, Adamantopoulos; NOTARIS, Diego De. “The Future of the WTO and the Reform of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement: a Legal Perspective”, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 24:30, 2000, pp. 55-56.

3. Artigo 11.3

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

a) “País que é ‘economia de não mercado’ – estabelecimento do preço normal”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear

from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.266

Na investigação anti-dumping proposta pela União Europeia em face da China, a demandante havia

considerado a China um país de economia de não mercado. Assim, na fase de determinação do preço

normal, adotou o Brasil como o país análogo, o qual ofereceria condições típicas de uma economia de

mercado. Beijing alegou que, ao proceder dessa maneira, a União Europeia havia ofendido o Acordo

Anti-Dumping, alegação que foi afastada pelo Painel.

Para. 7.266. “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that China has failed to demonstrate that the

European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 17.6(1) of the AD Agreement, or with

Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 in the original investigation as a result of the analogue country

selection procedure and the selection of Brazil as the analogue country. We also conclude that China

has failed to demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the

AD Agreement in the expiry review as a result of the analogue country selection procedure and the

selection of Brazil as the analogue country.”

b) “Eventual aplicação do Artigo 3 ao Artigo 11.3, ambos do Acordo Anti-Dumping”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear

from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.333

Neste litígio, o Painel entendeu que nem todos os fatores importantes na determinação do dano ao

pálio do Artigo 3 o são na averiguação de continuidade ou recorrência de dano, ao abrigo do Artigo

11.3.

Para. 7.333. “However, we recall that a determination of injury under Article 3 is not required under

Article 11.3. Thus, we do not consider that all factors relevant to an injury determination under

Article 3 are necessarily relevant to a determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of

injury under Article 11.3.”

c) “Vício em apuração de dano realizada com base no Artigo 3 e eventual contaminação de

nova apuração efetuada com arrimo no Artigo 11.3”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear

from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.337

Se uma autoridade realiza uma determinação de dano, com fulcro no Artigo 3 do Acordo Anti-

Dumping, e, em posterior apuração, efetuada em novo processo de revisão, determina a probabilidade

de continuação ou reincidência de dano com apoio na determinação inicial, o vício presente nesta

contamina aquela. Com efeito, o Painel consignou:

Para. 7.337. “We recognize that dumping and injury are distinct concepts, and that the findings of

dumping and injury are different in nature. Nevertheless, we consider that, a similar result should be

reached with respect to the effect of reliance on an inconsistent determination of injury in the context

of an expiry review with respect to the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of

injury as has been reached in the dumping context. That is, in our view, if in the course of an expiry

review, an investigating authority makes a determination of injury that is inconsistent with Article 3,

and relies on that injury determination in making its determination of likelihood of continuation or

recurrence of injury, the inconsistency with Article 3 taints the likelihood determination, because by

relying upon the inconsistent determination of injury the investigating authority fails to make a

likelihood determination based on a “sufficient factual basis” allowing it to draw “reasoned and

adequate conclusions” concerning the likelihood of injury. We see no basis in the text of Article 11.3

that would support the conclusion that a different conclusion should be reached in this regard in the

context of determinations of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury than in the context of

determinations of continuation or recurrence of likelihood of dumping.”

d) “Desnecessidade de determinação de margens individuais para todos os exportadores e

produtores conhecidos em todos os casos”

O Artigo 11.3 não impõe às autoridades administrativas a obrigação de perquirir acerca das margens

individuais para todos os exportadores e produtores conhecidos em todos os casos, tendo em vista o

contido na segunda sentença do Artigo 6.10 do Acordo Anti-Dumping. Com efeito, o Painel do caso

US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) rechaçou a pretensão vietnamita nos seguintes termos:

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet

Nam (US - Shrimp), Demandante: Viet Nam, WT/DS404/R, para. 7.167

Para. 7.167. “Viet Nam's claims are premised on the view that Articles 9.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement require the determination of individual margins, notwithstanding the

legitimate use of a limited examination. To interpret these other provisions of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement in this way would render the second sentence of Article 6.10 meaningless. Indeed,

Viet Nam would effectively have us interpret the first sentence of Article 6.10, and Articles 9.3, 11.1

and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in isolation, as if the second sentence of Article 6.10 did

not exist. There is no doubt that, generally, there is a preference for individual margins to be

determined for each known exporter and producer. This is the very essence of the first sentence of

Article 6.10. However, the exception provided for in the second sentence of Article 6.10 makes it

clear that, despite the general preference for individual margins, investigating authorities need not

determine individual margins for all known exporters and producers in all cases. Since neither the

first sentence of Article 6.10, nor Articles 9.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, impose

any additional restrictions on the use of limited examinations, there is no basis for us to find that the

USDOC's legitimate (i.e. consistent with the second sentence of Article 6.10) use of limited

examinations is inconsistent with those provisions” (nota de rodapé omitida).

e) “A utilização de margens de dumping calculadas em investigações anteriores como base

para a revisão lastreada no art. 11.3 fica na dependência do contexto da nova determinação”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US

- Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/RW, paras. 7.228 e 7.229

O aproveitamento de margens de dumping, verificadas na investigação original, em novo

procedimento de revisão, deve ocorrer à luz das circunstâncias deste novo procedimento, conforme

asseverado pelo Painel na controvérsia US – Zeroing (Japan).

Para. 7.228. “Having reached this conclusion, there is no need for the Panel to determine whether

certain of the margins relied upon in the 1999 sunset review were WTO-consistent. We do not

disagree with the United States' argument that United States – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset

Review supports the notion that it can rely on previously calculated dumping margins that were not

challenged by Japan in the original proceedings. However, the previously calculated margins can be

relied upon only in the context of a new determination. United States – Corrosion-Resistant Steel

Sunset Review does not require the Panel to accept a simple assertion that the 1999 sunset review may

be justified on the basis of previously calculated margins.

Para. 7.229. “Therefore, we conclude that the United States has failed to comply with the DSB

recommendations and rulings with respect to the 1999 sunset review, and that the violation of

Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement continues.”

f) “Sunset review” nos EUA

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for

Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidade Europeia,

WT/DS294/AB/RW, para. 377

Nos EUA, uma “sunset review” deve passar tanto pelo United States Department of Commerce

(USDOC), como pela United States International Trade Commission (USITC), conforme constatou o

Painel de Arbitragem no litígio US – Zeroing (EC) (Artigo 21.5).

Para. 377. “We observe that, while the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determinations should be

consistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, a sunset review is not completed in the

United States until both the USDOC and the USITC have made likelihood-of-dumping and

likelihood-of-injury determinations. We further note that these are compliance proceedings and that

whether or not the United States has ultimately failed to comply with the recommendations and

rulings of the DSB depends on whether any allegedly WTO-inconsistent likelihood-of-dumping

determinations by the USDOC have actually resulted in the continuation of the anti-dumping duty

orders.”

g) “Impugnação da determinação preliminar de probabilidade de dumping – prematuridade”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for

Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidade Europeia,

WT/DS294/AB/RW, paras. 373, 374 e 375

No caso US - Zeroing (EC) (Artigo 21.5), o Órgão de Apelação considerou que o questionamento, por

parte das Comunidades Européias, de uma decisão preliminar do USDOC, no sentido de

probabilidade de dumping, era precipitado, dada a natureza provisória de tal decisão. Nesta quadra, o

Órgão de Apelação deixou assentado que:

Para. 373. “We observe that, in its preliminary likelihood-of-dumping determination in Case 3, the

USDOC stated that it “preliminarily determines that revocation of the antidumping duty order on

[stainless steel bar] from Germany is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping” at

specified margins, and invited interested parties to submit comments on the preliminary results within

certain deadlines. The USDOC also explained that it would “issue a notice of final results of this

sunset review, which will include the results of its analysis of issues raised in any [comments

submitted by the interested parties], no later than September 29, 2007.”

Para. 374. “In US - Continued Zeroing, the Appellate Body found that the European Communities'

challenge of a preliminary determination of likelihood of dumping in a sunset review was premature,

considering that such preliminary results could be modified by the final results. The Appellate Body

reasoned that, due to the preliminary nature of the USDOC's determination, it failed to see how the

European Communities could establish that “the USDOC would have relied on the margin calculated

with zeroing in deciding to continue the duty.”

Para. 375. “In our view, the evidence before the Panel in these compliance proceedings regarding the

sunset review determination in Case 3 does not warrant a conclusion different from the one reached

by the Appellate Body in US - Continued Zeroing. In view of the preliminary nature of the

determination by the USDOC in Case 3, we consider that the European Communities' challenge of the

USDOC's preliminary determination was premature. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err in

finding, in paragraph 8.140 of the Panel Report, that the European Communities has not demonstrated

that the United States failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in respect of

the sunset review in Case 3.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

h) “Emendas a decisão em “sunset review” efetuadas após o estabelecimento de painel –

possibilidade de análise desde que ditas emendas não alterem a natureza da decisão

emendada”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for

Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidade Europeia,

WT/DS294/AB/RW, para. 383

O Órgão de Apelação, em US – Zeroing (EC) (Artigo 21.5), explicitou que é possível a análise de

emendas à decisão tomada após a criação de Painel, observada a condição de que tais emendas não

mudem a essência da decisão, nos seguintes termos:

Para. 383. “We recall that, in Chile – Price Band System, the Appellate Body found that a panel could

examine amendments to a measure that post-dated its establishment, provided they did not change the

essence of the measure at issue. In the present case, we observe that, even if the continuation order post-

dated the establishment of the Panel, it was issued only a few days after this date and does not change

the essence of the determinations under this sunset review. We consider that the continuation order is

relevant in judging compliance by the United States with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

We also observe that, at the time the Panel was established, both determinations required by

Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in a sunset review had been made and, therefore,

considering that both determinations were affirmative, the sunset review would result in a

continuation order by operation of law in the United States' anti-dumping system” (notas de rodapé

suprimidas).

i) “Margens de dumping aferidas por meio da técnica do “zeroing” em procedimentos

anteriores – inadmissibilidade de emprego destas margens em “sunset review”“

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for

Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS294/AB/RW, para. 396

As autoridades, em procedimentos de “sunset review”, não podem se valer de margens de dumping

calculadas em investigações originais mediante “zeroing”, posto que a irregularidade, presente no

procedimento inicial, macula a decisão tomada no procedimento posterior.

Para. 396. “Based on the Panel's findings and on undisputed evidence in the Panel record, we have

reached the conclusion that, in the likelihood-of-dumping determinations in the sunset reviews in

Cases 19, 28, 29, 30, and 31, the USDOC relied on margins of dumping calculated using zeroing in

previous administrative reviews and original investigations. We, therefore, conclude that, because the

likelihood-of-dumping determinations in these sunset reviews relied on margins of dumping

calculated inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, they are inconsistent with Article 11.3 of

that Agreement and undermine compliance by the United States.”

j) “Provas coligidas em outro processo – admissibilidade das mesmas em processo

posterior, atendida a autonomia dos novos julgadores”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of

Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 190

Em US – Continued Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação aceitou o argumento de que é possível a

apresentação de provas produzidas em outro feito. Todavia, os novos julgadores não estão obrigados a

dar a mesma apreciação que foi concedida às referidas provas no julgamento anterior.

Para. 190. “(…) Factual findings made in prior disputes do not determine facts in another dispute.

Evidence adduced in one proceeding, and admissions made in respect of the same factual question

about the operation of an aspect of municipal law, may be submitted as evidence in another

proceeding. The finders of fact are of course obliged to make their own determination afresh and on

the basis of all the evidence before them. But if the critical evidence is the same and the factual

question about the operation of domestic law is the same, it is likely that the finder of facts would

reach similar findings in the two proceedings. Nonetheless, the factual findings adopted by the DSB in

prior cases regarding the existence of the zeroing methodology, as a rule or norm, are not binding in

another dispute. In themselves, they do not establish that zeroing was used in all the successive

proceedings in each of the 18 cases listed in the European Communities' panel request.”

k) “Complementação, pelo Órgão de Apelação, de análise feita por Painel – postura

cautelosa do Órgão de Apelação”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of

Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 195

Em US – Continued Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação expressamente aduziu que estava adotando uma

atitude cautelosa ao proceder à análise de tema que um Painel deveria ter abordado.

Para. 195. “We recognize the important limitation on our ability to complete the analysis. We have

accordingly adopted, for the purpose of this dispute, a cautious approach. Thus, only where the Panel

has made clear findings of fact concerning the use of the zeroing methodology, without interruption,

in different types of proceedings over an extended period of time, have we considered these findings

sufficient for us to complete the analysis and to make findings regarding the continued application of

zeroing in these cases. By contrast, we have not completed the analysis where the factual findings are

absent in respect of the use of the zeroing methodology in each of the successive proceedings

whereby the duties are maintained, or where there are insufficient factual findings to indicate that

zeroing has been repeatedly applied. In such circumstances, an examination of the facts, as well as a

determination as to what conclusions may be drawn from the remaining evidence in the record, would

be more appropriately conducted by a panel, with the assistance of the parties.”

l) “Condições para que possa ser prorrogada uma determinação de medida antidumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties

on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel

Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/AB/R, para. 104

Regra geral, uma medida anti-dumping deve ser extinta em até cinco anos após a sua aplicação.

Entretanto, o Artigo 11.3 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, permite a extensão desta medida, atendidas três

condições, mencionadas pelo Órgão de Apelação em US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review:

Para. 104. “[F]irst, that a review be initiated before the expiry of five years from the date of the

imposition of the duty; second, that in the review the authorities determine that the expiry of the duty

would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping; and third, that in the review the

authorities determine that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence

of injury. If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, the duty must be terminated.”

m) “Conclusões específicas para empresas e peso dessas conclusões na determinação de

uma medida anti-dumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on

Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel Safeguards), Demandante: Nova Zelândia,

WT/DS268/AB/RW, para. 121

Em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), discutiu-se se as investigações direcionadas

especificamente às empresas seriam decisivas na imposição de uma medida anti-dumping. Na

controvérsia em apreço, o Órgão de Apelação se posicionou no sentido de que as autoridades norte-

americanas, quando da conclusão das investigações acerca de uma empresa, deveriam se basear em

uma declaração do exportador de que ele provavelmente praticaria dumping se a determinação de

dumping fosse revogada ou a investigação concluída.

Para. 121. “In sum, on the basis of the evidence on the Panel record, we are not persuaded that the

amended waiver provisions preclude the USDOC from making a reasoned determination with a

sufficient factual basis, as required by Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Under the

amended waiver provisions, a company-specific finding is not based on an assumption but, rather, on

a statement by the waiving exporter indicating that it is likely to dump if the order were revoked or the

investigation terminated. Moreover, the amended waiver provisions do not preclude the USDOC from

considering other evidence on the record of the sunset review. Indeed, under Article 11.3 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement, the USDOC would have to consider any other evidence on the record, and

assess the statement of waiver in the light of that other evidence, before making the order-wide

determination. If it failed to do so, it would not exercise the degree of diligence required of

investigating authorities, nor could it make a reasoned determination with a sufficient factual basis, as

required by Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

n) “Novas provas relativas ao período de uma “sunset review” para os fins de

implementação das recomendações do DSB”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on

Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel Safeguards), Demandante: Nova Zelândia,

WT/DS268/AB/RW, paras. 167, 168 e 175

O Órgão de Apelação, em US – OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), afirmou que as autoridades que

conduzem uma investigação anti-dumping podem produzir novas provas afetas ao lapso temporal de

uma “sunset review” anterior, com a finalidade de levar a cabo as recomendações feitas pelo DSB.

Para. 167. “Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not refer to the steps that an

investigating authority may take to implement DSB recommendations and rulings or to the collection

of evidence at that stage. Article 11.4 states that the provisions of Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement regarding evidence and procedure are applicable to sunset reviews. Article 6 contains

several provisions relating to the collection of evidence, including several time periods. However, like

Articles 11.3 and 11.4, Article 6 does not specifically refer to the collection of evidence for purposes

of implementing DSB recommendations and rulings. Therefore, we do not consider that Articles 11.3

and 11.4 address the specific question of whether an investigating authority can develop a new

evidentiary basis when implementing DSB recommendations and rulings.”

Para. 168. “Neither do Articles 11.3 and 11.4 provide a basis for drawing a distinction between

allowing an investigating authority to clarify information, or provide further explanations, on the one

hand, and to develop a new factual basis, on the other hand (…)”.

Para. 175. “In the light of the above, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.60 and 8.1(b) of

the Panel Report, that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with the United States' obligations under

Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ”by developing a new factual basis pertaining

to the original review period for purposes of its Section 129 Determination”. Furthermore, we do not

find error in the Panel's consideration of certain provisions of the DSU as appropriate context and,

therefore, reject Argentina's claim that the Panel did not make an objective assessment of the matter

before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU.”

o) “Sunset review” inconsistente com o Artigo 11.3 do Acordo Anti-Dumping – “questões

sistêmicas”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on

Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel Safeguards), Demandante: Nova Zelândia,

WT/DS268/AB/RW, para. 174

O Órgão de Apelação denominou de “questões sistêmicas” os problemas resultantes da afronta ao

Artigo 11.3 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, durante a fase de execução das medidas emanadas do DSB em

virtude de uma “sunset review”. Informou que estas questões não foram ainda solucionadas pelo

Painel ou pelo Órgão de Apelação.

Para. 174. “Before concluding, we note that the implementation of DSB recommendations and

rulings in cases where a sunset review was found to be inconsistent with Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement raises systemic questions. For example, on what basis may an anti-

dumping duty order be maintained after a sunset determination has been found to be inconsistent with

Article 11.3 or 11.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement? (100) These questions do not fall within the

scope of the issue appealed by Argentina that the USDOC was precluded from developing a new

evidentiary basis in the Section 129 Determination. Therefore, we do not address them further in this

appeal.”

p) “Mudanças nas circunstâncias financeiras de uma empresa, assim como na situação

econômica global de um país exportador”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods),

WT/DS282/R, para. 7.79

Mudanças nas circunstâncias financeiras de uma empresa, assim como na situação econômica global

de um país exportador, são pormenores que devem ser levados em consideração na decisão acerca da

continuação ou reincidência de dano, conforme obtemperou o Painel no caso US - Anti-Dumping

Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods.

Para. 7.79. “The United States argues that the inference that dumping would continue or recur based

on declines in import volumes following the imposition of the anti-dumping order is “an exercise in

logic.” We do not dispute that an investigating authority may draw inferences in support of its

conclusions, through the exercise of logic, based on the evidence presented. However, where

information is presented that suggests that the inference is not appropriate in a particular case, then the

investigating authority is obligated, under Article 11.3, to at least consider that information and take it

into account before making its determination. In our view, information regarding changes in the

financial circumstances of a company previously found to have been dumping, and changes in the

overall economic situation of the exporting country, would appear to be relevant to whether the

inference relied upon by USDOC is reasonable. This is particularly true where, as here, intervening

reviews had resulted in findings of zero dumping margins. Thus, in our view, consideration of such

evidence is necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.3. USDOC did not do so in this

case.”

q) “Desnecessidade de nexo causal entre dumping provável e dano provável numa “sunset

review”“

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/R, paras. 123, 124 e 125)

Ao contrário do que sucede numa investigação original, não é preciso haver liame de causa entre

dumping provável e dano provável numa “sunset review”, segundo apurou o Painel em US - Anti-

Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods.

Para. 123. “As we stated earlier, in a sunset review determination under Article 11.3, the nexus to be

demonstrated is between “the expiry of the duty” on the one hand, and the likelihood of “continuation

or recurrence of dumping and injury” on the other hand. We note that Article 11.3, in fact, expressly

postulates that, at the time of a sunset review, dumping and injury, or either of them, may have

ceased, but that expiration of the duty may be likely to lead to “recurrence of dumping and injury”.

Therefore, what is essential for an affirmative determination under Article 11.3 is proof of likelihood

of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury, if the duty expires. The nature and extent of the

evidence required for such proof will vary with the facts and circumstances of the case under review.

Furthermore, as the Appellate Body has emphasized previously, determinations under Article 11.3

must rest on a “sufficient factual basis” that allows the investigating authority to draw “reasoned and

adequate conclusions”. These being the requirements for a sunset review under Article 11.3, we do

not see that the requirement of establishing a causal link between likely dumping and likely injury

flows into that Article from other provisions of the GATT 1994 and the

Anti-Dumping Agreement. Indeed, adding such a requirement would have the effect of converting the

sunset review into an original investigation, which cannot be justified.”

Para. 124. “Our conclusion that the establishment of a causal link between likely dumping and likely

injury is not required in a sunset review determination does not imply that the causal link between

dumping and injury envisaged by Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement is

severed in a sunset review. It only means that re-establishing such a link is not required, as a matter of

legal obligation, in a sunset review.”

Para. 125. “For these reasons, we are unable to agree with Mexico that there is a requirement to

establish the existence of a causal link between likely dumping and likely injury, as a matter of legal

obligation, in a sunset review determination under Article 11.3, and that, therefore, the USITC was

required to demonstrate such a link in making its likelihood-of-injury determination in the sunset

review at issue in this dispute.”

r) “Análise cumulativa de dano – importações no mercado e competindo entre si”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 153)

O Órgão de Apelação, em US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, entendeu que

as autoridades encarregadas das investigações, caso optem por efetuar uma apuração cumulativa de

dano, não estão compelidas a perscrutar se as importações ocorrem simultaneamente no mercado e em

relação de competição umas com as outras.

Para. 153. “This is not to say that it is never necessary for an investigating authority, performing a

cumulative analysis of injury caused by imports from all sources, to examine whether imports are “in

the market together and competing against each other”. In order to arrive at a reasoned and adequate

conclusion, an examination of whether imports are in the market together and competing against each

other may, in certain cases, be needed in a likelihood-of-injury determination where an investigating

authority chooses to cumulate the imports from several countries. But the need for such an

examination flows from the particular facts and circumstances of a given case and not from a legal

requirement under Article 11.3.”

s) “Importações e correspondente dano provável – desnecessidade de especificação de

prazo”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 166

De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, as autoridades encarregadas de uma investigação anti-dumping,

ao pálio do Artigo 11.3, não estão obrigadas a determinar o prazo no qual a “presença simultânea” de

importações e o respectivo dano provável sucederia.

Para. 166. “On its face, Article 11.3 does not establish a requirement for an investigating authority to

specify the time-frame within which the “simultaneous presence” of subject imports and the

corresponding likely injury would occur. As the Appellate Body found in US - Oil Country Tubular

Goods Sunset Reviews, “the mere fact that the timeframe of an injury analysis is not presented in a

sunset review determination is not sufficient to undermine that determination.” The Appellate Body

noted in that case that a determination of likelihood-of-injury “can be properly reasoned and rest on a

sufficient factual basis even though the timeframe for the [likelihood-of-injury] determination is not

explicitly mentioned.” As long as a likelihood-of-injury determination rests on a sufficient factual

basis, the mere fact that an investigating authority does not specify the time-frame within which the

“simultaneous presence” of subject imports and the corresponding injury would be likely to occur,

does not, in our view, undermine that determination. Therefore, we do not agree with Mexico that the

USITC's likelihood-of-injury determination is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement because the USITC did not indicate the time period that it considered to be applicable for

its likelihood-of-injury determination.”

t) “Artigo 3.3 do Acordo Anti-Dumping – incidência tão-somente em investigações

originais”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, paras. 301 e 302

As condições do Artigo Anti-Dumping, as quais versam sobre investigações anti-dumping

simultâneas, ficam adstritas à investigações originais, não sendo aplicadas no caso de “sunset

reviews”, consoante quedou explanado pelo Órgão de Apelação em US – OCTG Sunset Reviews. No

entanto, isso não significa que investigações simultâneas sejam vedadas em “sunset reviews”, como

será abordado mais adiante.

Para. 301. “Turning to Argentina's argument that the prerequisites specified in Article 3.3(a) and (b)

should be satisfied by investigating authorities when performing cumulative analyses in sunset

reviews, we note that Argentina offers no textual support for its claim. Indeed, as we observed above,

the opening text of Article 3.3 plainly limits its applicability to original investigations.”

Para. 302. “(…) As the Appellate Body has observed, a sunset review determination under

Article 11.3 must be based on a “rigorous examination” leading to a “reasoned conclusion”. Such a

determination must be supported by “positive evidence” and a “sufficient factual basis”. These

requirements govern all aspects of an investigating authority's likelihood determination, including the

decision to resort to cumulation of the effects of likely dumped imports. As a result, Argentina's

concerns that investigating authorities will be given “carte blanche” to resort to cumulation when

making likelihood-of-injury determinations is unfounded. We, therefore, conclude that the conditions

of Article 3.3 do not apply to likelihood-of-injury determinations in sunset reviews.”

u) “Grande número de “sunset reviews” – análise probatória deficiente do Painel”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 203

Em US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que

o Painel fez uma apuração insatisfatória do elevado número de “sunset reviews” objeto do litígio, fato

que prejudicou o julgamento pelo Órgão de Apelação no tocante à matéria fática.

Para. 203. “In paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, the Panel considered 206 sunset reviews that were

“expedited” because “foreign respondent parties either did not participate at all, or did not fully

participate in the proceedings”. These constituted the bulk of the 232 cases in which the USDOC

made affirmative determinations. The Panel reviewed “a sampling” of these 206 cases and stated that,

“in each of those we considered, USDOC's final affirmative determination (...) was based on one of

the three affirmative scenarios.” The Panel Report does not reveal the size of the sample, which

individual determinations it reviewed, which of the factual scenarios were involved, or whether other

factors ought to have been taken into account in any of them. More importantly, the Panel merely

speculated that “there may well have been other facts that might [have been] relevant or probative [in

these 206 cases], but they were not before USDOC, and thus were not addressed.” Therefore, even in

respect of the “sampling” of cases that the Panel reviewed, the Panel Report does not reveal whether

the USDOC excluded or disregarded evidence or factors that might have outweighed the probative

value of the factual scenarios of the SPB. Nor does the Panel's analysis indicate whether, in those

cases, the USDOC wrongly relied on one of the scenarios in the SPB, despite the evidence before it.

It is quite possible that a number of these 206 cases were cases where the dumping had continued for

the entire life of the anti-dumping duty order or for a substantial period after the issuance of the order.

In such cases, unless the respondent interested parties had adduced evidence to show that the dumping

would not continue or recur, the USDOC could well have had reason to make an affirmative

determination. We simply do not know. In respect of these 206 cases, the Panel Report does not

reveal that the USDOC's affirmative determinations, although based on one of the factual scenarios,

were made in disregard or to the exclusion of other factors because of the SPB.”

v) “Aplicação de certos critérios, com base na legislação doméstica, na investigação da

probabilidade de dano em detrimento de outros critérios – possibilidade de ofensa ao Artigo

11.3”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, paras. 208 e 209

Em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, discutiu-se se a aplicação de certos critérios, em prejuízo de outros,

quando da apuração da probabilidade de dano, violaria o Artigo 11.3. O Órgão de Apelação sinalizou

no sentido de que, para tanto, deveria ficar provado que a aplicação dos critérios previstos na lei

interna é mecânica/automática, sendo desconsideros, assim, outros critérios importantes na

investigação de uma “sunset review”.

Para. 208. “(…) The importance of the two underlying factors (import volumes and dumping

margins) for a likelihood-of-dumping determination cannot be questioned; however, our concern here

is with the possible mechanistic application of the three scenarios based on these factors, such that

other factors that may be of equal importance are disregarded.”

Para. 209. “In our view, therefore, in order to objectively assess, as required by Article 11 of the

DSU, whether the three factual scenarios of Section II.A.3 of the SPB are regarded as

determinative/conclusive, it is essential to examine concrete examples of cases where the likelihood

determination of continuation or recurrence of dumping was based solely on one of the scenarios of

Section II.A.3 of the SPB, even though the probative value of other factors might have outweighed

that of the identified scenario. Such an examination requires a qualitative assessment of the likelihood

determinations in individual cases.”

x) “Investigação em “sunset review” – uso de presunções – inadmissibilidade”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 234

Em uma investigação em “sunset review”, o Órgão de Apelação, em US – OCTG Sunset Reviews

entendeu ser intolerável o emprego de presunções.

Para. 234. “We agree with the Panel's analysis of the impact of the waiver provisions on order-wide

determinations. Because the waiver provisions require the USDOC to arrive at affirmative company-

specific determinations without regard to any evidence on record, these determinations are

merely assumptions made by the agency, rather than findings supported by evidence. The United

States contends that respondents waiving the right to participate in a sunset review do so

“intentionally”, with full knowledge that, as a result of their failure to submit evidence, the evidence

placed on the record by the domestic industry is likely to result in an unfavourable determination on

an order-wide basis. In these circumstances, we see no fault in making an unfavourable order-wide

determination by taking into account evidence provided by the domestic industry in support thereof.

However, the USDOC also takes into account, in such circumstances, statutorily-mandated

assumptions. Thus, even assuming that the USDOC takes into account the totality of record evidence

in making its order-wide determination, it is clear that, as a result of the operation of the waiver

provisions, certain order-wide likelihood determinations made by the USDOC will be based, at least

in part, on statutorily-mandated assumptions about a company's likelihood of dumping. In our view,

this result is inconsistent with the obligation of an investigating authority under Article 11.3 to “arrive

at a reasoned conclusion” on the basis of “positive evidence”.”

y) “Investigação anti-dumping cumulativa em “sunset review” – permissibilidade”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, paras. 297 e 300

O Órgão de Apelação entendeu, em US – OCTG Sunset Reviews, que o Acordo Anti-Dumping

permite que investigações anti-dumping cumulativas sejam realizadas na fase de “sunset reviews”.

Para. 297. “Therefore, notwithstanding the differences between original investigations and sunset

reviews, cumulation remains a useful tool for investigating authorities in both inquiries to ensure that

all sources of injury and their cumulative impact on the domestic industry are taken into account in an

investigating authority's determination as to whether to impose — or continue to impose — anti-

dumping duties on products from those sources. Given the rationale for cumulation — a rationale that

we consider applies to original investigations as well as to sunset reviews — we are of the view that it

would be anomalous for Members to have limited authorization for cumulation in the Anti-Dumping

Agreement to original investigations.”

Para. 300. “Given the express intention of Members to permit cumulation in injury determinations in

original investigations, and given the rationale behind cumulation in injury determinations, we do not

read the Anti-Dumping Agreement as prohibiting cumulation in sunset reviews.”

z) “Não é função do Painel ou do Órgão de Apelação substituir a análise das autoridades

anti-dumping acerca dos fatos”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 322

O Órgão de Apelação em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews entendeu que, embora os demandantes possam

questionar se as autoridades investigaram de maneira objetiva os fatos e provas em procedimento sob

o abrigo do Artigo 11.3, não deve o Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação substituir a avaliação que as

autoridades fizeram acerca dos fatos.

Para. 322. “The task of the panel is to assess whether the investigating authorities properly

established the facts and evaluated them in an unbiased and objective manner. We agree with the

Panel that “[its] task [was] not to perform a de novo review of the information and evidence on the

record of the underlying sunset review, nor to substitute [its] judgment for that of the US authorities”.

If the panel is satisfied that an investigating authority's determination on continuation or recurrence of

dumping or injury rests upon a sufficient factual basis to allow it to draw reasoned and adequate

conclusions, it should conclude that the determination at issue is not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement (101)”.

a1) “Incidência da expressão “muito provavelmente”“

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 333

A expressão “muito provavelmente”, inserida no Artigo 11.3, deve ser aplicada na investigação anti-

dumping como um todo, segundo asseverou o Órgão de Apelação em US – OCTG Sunset Reviews.

Para. 333. “(…) the “likelihood” standard set out in Article 11.3 applies to a likelihood-of-injury

determination as a whole, not to each and every factor that the investigating authority considers in the

course of its analysis.”

b1) “As provas colhidas não precisam enunciar certeza absoluta”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country

Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular

Goods), WT/DS282/AB/R, paras. 340 e 341

O Órgão de Apelação, em US – OCTG Sunset Reviews, sustentou não ser necessário que, em uma

“sunset review”, as provas coligidas revistam o julgador de certeza absoluta.

Para. 340. “We observe that most of the arguments put forward by Argentina on appeal with respect

to the application by the USITC of the standard of likelihood is centred on the premise that some of

the factors presented by the USITC are speculative. In particular, Argentina seems to assume that

positive evidence requires absolute certainty on what is likely to occur in the future. We have some

difficulty with this line of reasoning (…).”

Para. 341. “The requirements of “positive evidence” must, however, be seen in the context that the

determinations to be made under Article 11.3 are prospective in nature and that they involve a

“forward-looking analysis”. Such an analysis may inevitably entail assumptions about or projections

into the future. Unavoidably, therefore, the inferences drawn from the evidence in the record will be,

to a certain extent, speculative (…)”.

c1) “Inaplicabilidade dos padrões probatórios no tocante às investigações originais iniciadas

pelas autoridades (Artigo 5.6 do Acordo Anti-Dumping às “sunset reviews”)”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-

Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review),

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, paras. 7.27 e 7.38

Caso as autoridades domésticas resolvam começar uma investigação anti-dumping, os padrões em

relação às provas, contidas no Artigo 5.6 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, não incidem numa “sunset

review”, consoante explanado pelo Painel na controvérsia US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset

Review.

Para. 7.27. “We also note that the text of Article 11.3 does not contain any cross-reference to the

evidentiary rules relating to initiation of investigations contained in Article 5.6 of the Anti-dumping

Agreement. Therefore, Article 11.3 itself does not explicitly provide that the evidentiary standard of

Article 5.6 (or any other evidentiary standard) is applicable to sunset reviews. Although paragraphs 4

and 5 of Article 11 contain several cross-references to other articles in the Anti-dumping Agreement,

no such cross-reference has been made in the text of Article 11 to Article 5.6. These cross-references

(as well as other cross-references in the Anti-dumping Agreement, such as, for example, in

Article 12.3) indicate that, when the drafters intended to make a particular provision also applicable in

a different context, they did so explicitly. Therefore, their failure to include a cross-reference in the

text of Article 11.3, or, for that matter, in any other paragraph of Article 11, to Article 5.6 (or vice

versa) demonstrates that they did not intend to make the evidentiary standards of Article 5.6

applicable to sunset reviews (…).”

Para. 7.28. “If original investigations and reviews existed for the same purposes and served the same

functions, it would appear to us illogical that the same obligations did not apply to both processes.

However, as we have already indicated supra, investigations and reviews are different processes

which serve distinct purposes. These considerations underlie, and are apparent in, the text of the Anti-

dumping Agreement. It is therefore unsurprising to us that the textual obligations applicable to the two

are not identical. The Appellate Body, in US – Carbon Steel, acknowledged the differences between

original investigations and sunset reviews, recognizing that they are “distinct processes” with

“different purposes”. The qualitative differences between the two processes may explain the

differences in the specific WTO obligations that apply to each of them.”

d1) “Não-incidência do padrão de minimis, previsto no Artigo 5.8, às “sunset reviews”“

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-

Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review),

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, para. 7.71

Em US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, o Painel manifestou que o percentual de 2%,

insculpido no Artigo 5.8, não precisa ser seguido em “sunset reviews”. Na hipótese, o padrão de

minimis da legislação norte-americana era inferior, qual seja, de 0,5%.

Para. 7.71. “Furthermore, although paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 11 contain several cross-references

to other articles of the Anti-dumping Agreement, no such cross-reference has been made to Article 5.8.

We consider the existence of these cross-references in Article 11 to indicate that when the drafters

intended to have certain provisions in a given article of the Anti-dumping Agreement also apply in

different contexts, they did so in a clear manner. Therefore, the absence of a cross-reference that

would make the de minimis standard of Article 5.8 also applicable to sunset reviews is a further

indication that the drafters did not intend to make that standard applicable to sunset reviews (…)”.

e1) “Dumping do Artigo 11.3 – o mesmo significado de dumping no Artigo 2.1”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties

on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel

Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/AB/R, para. 126

O Órgão de Apelação informa que deve ser utilizado o conceito de dumping no tocante ao Artigo

11.3, tal como referido no Artigo 2.1 do Acordo Anti-Dumping.

Para. 126. “However, as we have already observed, the opening words of Article 2.1 (“[f]or the

purpose of this Agreement”) go beyond a cross-reference and indicate that Article 2.1 applies to the

entire Anti-Dumping Agreement. By virtue of these words, the word “dumping” as used in Article

11.3 has the meaning described in Article 2.1. We do not read the Panel Report as suggesting

otherwise.”

f1) “Sunset review” – desnecessidade de determinação específica para empresas

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-

Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review),

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/AB/R, para. 150

Em procedimento de “sunset review”, as autoridades não estão obrigadas a fazer

conclusões/investigações voltadas exclusivamente para cada empresa, como informou o Órgão de

Apelação no caso US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review.

Para. 150. “The United States argues that the meaning of the word “duty” in Article 11.3 is explained

in Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which “makes clear that the definitive duty is imposed

on a product-specific (i.e., order-wide) basis, not a company-specific basis.” As the United States

points out, Article 9.2 refers to the imposition of “an anti-dumping duty (...) in respect of any

product”, rather than the imposition of a duty in respect of individual exporters or producers. We

agree that this reference in Article 9.2 informs the interpretation of Article 11.3. We also note that

Article 9.2 allows investigating authorities, in imposing a duty in respect of a product, to “name the

supplier or suppliers of the product concerned” or, in certain circumstances, “the supplying country

concerned.” This suggests that authorities may use a single order to impose a “duty”, even though the

amount of the duty imposed on each exporter or producer may vary. Therefore, Article 9.2 confirms

our initial view that Article 11.3 does not require investigating authorities to make their likelihood

determination on a company-specific basis. (102)

Footnote 100: This question, in turn, raises other issues, such as: when does a sunset review reach an “outcome” for the

purpose of Article 11.3, last sentence; and what is implied by the requirements in Article 11.4 that the review “be carried out

expeditiously” and that it “shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation”?”

Footnote 101: There are analogies between this description of the panel's task and what the Appellate Body stated in US –

Lamb in the context of the application of safeguard measures. In that case, the Appellate Body recalled that the applicable

standard is neither de novo review, nor total deference, but rather the objective assessment of the facts. (Appellate Body

Report, US – Lamb, para. 101) The Appellate Body went on to state that “[f]irst, a panel must review whether competent

authorities have evaluated all relevant factors, and, second, a panel must review whether the authorities have provided a

reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts support their determination.” (Ibid., para. 103) (original emphasis;

footnote omitted)

Footnote 102: Ibid., para. 87. “While an analysis on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the words “investigation” and

“review” would also lead us to the conclusion that they are different, we did not deem it necessary in this case to rely on this

consideration in light of the clear Appellate Body language, which unequivocally states that investigations and reviews are

two distinct proceedings. In this respect, we note that investigations and reviews deal with two different substantive

determinations. Article 5.6 requires “sufficient evidence” of dumping, injury and causal link in order to self-initiate an

investigation in which dumping, injury and causal link must be established in order to make an affirmative determination. As

Article 11.3 sunset reviews deal with determinations of “likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping”, the

substantive considerations surrounding initiation would logically also be different.” “We have previously held that Article

9.4 is of little relevance for interpreting Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because “the right to impose anti-

dumping duties under Article 9 is a consequence of the prior determination of the existence of dumping margins, injury, and

a causal link.” (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 123-124 (original emphasis), referring

to Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen, footnote 30 to para. 62) In contrast, the requirement to terminate an anti-

dumping duty under Article 11.3 unless investigating authorities make an affirmative likelihood determination in a sunset

review is a consequence of the prior imposition of that duty under Article 9.”

III. Comentários

O lapso temporal de cinco anos para a extinção de uma medida anti-dumping, conhecido como

“sunset review”, previsto no Artigo 11.3, tem a finalidade de não permitir que uma medida anti-

dumping seja uma proteção indevida utilizada pela indústria doméstica. Grosso modo, as autoridades

que conduzem uma investigação ao abrigo do Acordo Anti-Dumping são provocadas pela indústria

nacional atingida pelo dumping. Nesta esteira, é válido afirmar que a continuação de uma

determinação anti-dumping para além do interregno de cinco anos depende, muitas vezes, de nova

incitação da indústria doméstica, conforme observa LOWENFELD (103):

It seems clear (as it did not previously) that in a ‘sunset review’, the domestic

industry seeking continuation of a five-year-old order has the burden of

persuasion and proof. Under the European Community practice, if no

substantial request is received by the Commission, the order will expire

without need for any determination by the Commission. Under US practice,

initiation of a five-year review by the agencies is required both as to dumping

and as to injury, but if no request is received after 90 days, a final

determination revoking or terminating the order will be issued.

A jurisprudência ínsita ao Artigo 11.3 demonstra que a prova do sentido ou significado de uma

legislação anti-dumping interna é uma questão bastante complexa. Não raro, o Membro demandante

alega que as autoridades investigadoras são tendenciosas na aplicação da sua lei doméstica,

prejudicando, assim, os interesses dos exportadores para aquele mercado. Na tentativa de direcionar

ao tema, o Órgão de Apelação em US – Carbon Steel (104) asseverou:

The party asserting that another party's municipal law, as such, is inconsistent

with relevant treaty obligations bears the burden of introducing evidence as to

the scope and meaning of such law to substantiate that assertion. Such

evidence will typically be produced in the form of the text of the relevant

legislation or legal instruments, which may be supported, as appropriate, by

evidence of the consistent application of such laws, the pronouncements of

domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal experts

and the writings of recognized scholars. The nature and extent of the evidence

required to satisfy the burden of proof will vary from case to case.

Mesmo diante dos vetores de exegese mencionados pelo Órgão de Apelação, em US - Carbon Steel,

percebe-se que o peso atribuído a cada prova coligida pode ser, frequentemente, alvo de discórdia. O

Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação detém competência para esposar certo entendimento com arrimo em

prova parcial apresentada pelo demandante, ignorando ou concedendo baixa credibilidade a outros

aspectos do quadro probatório do processo. Nesse diapasão, o Órgão de Apelação, em US – OCTG

Sunset Reviews, obtemperou que as provas materializadas em um feito não precisam demonstrar

certeza absoluta. Logo, denota-se que as autoridades investigadoras, seja o Painel ou o Órgão de

Apelação, possuem certo grau de discricionariedade ao atribuir valor aos fatos comprovados no

processo; entendimento anteriormente reconhecido pelo Órgão de Apelação em EC – Hormones

(105):

(…) the determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to

(that is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and parcel of the

fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the discretion of a panel as the

trier of facts (…).

Embora os julgadores tenham uma margem de liberdade na aferição das provas, o objetivo último é

sempre o alcance da verdade. A reconstrução de todo o iter dos fatos necessários para permitir o

deslinde da controvérsia almeja, em síntese, o convencimento. Entretanto, o conceito de verdade

absoluta é algo utópico em muitas ocasiões, mesmo em outros campos distintos do direito. A análise

do conjunto probatório é carregada de subjetivismo, na medida em que o julgador possui a sua própria

maneira de apreciar aquilo que lhe é submetido.

Assim, em razão da relavitização do instituto da verdade, qual poderia ser o critério por meio do qual

o julgador se basearia para sopesar os fatos objeto das provas? Segundo Miguel Reale, o fenômeno da

reconstrução da verdade basea-se em juízos de plausabilidade, o que se coaduna com o entendimento

do Órgão de Apelação, de que as provas não necessitam transmitir aos julgadores um grau de certeza

de cem por cento. Com efeito, Reale afirma que “a conjetura, como suposição segundo razões de

verossimilhança e plausabilidade, desenvolve-se no plano das idéias, como esquema regulativo,

destinado a validamente ordenar o que não se mostra ordenável segundo conceitos, nem

demonstrável analitacamente” (106).

Segundo assentado pela jurisprudência do DSB, a análise do Painel ou do Órgão de Apelação não

pode substituir a apreciação das autoridades domésticas. O Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação devem

apenas verificar se as autoridades lastrearam as suas fundamentações em provas adequadas e

razoáveis. Todavia, em termos práticos, isto revela-se extremamente espinhoso, mormente porque os

demandantes com frequência alegam que as referidas autoridades são tendenciosas nas suas

apurações. Os EUA, por exemplo, que são, em muitas oportunidades, réus em processos no OSC da

OMC, já tiveram a qualidade das suas investigações anti-dumping questionadas, conforme dispõe Moore:

Instead the DOC uses a perfunctory approach – it always rules that dumping

is likely to recur and (almost) always reports the original investigation’s

margin as the likely dumping margin in the event of revocation. This

unsophisticated approach certainly calls into question whether the margins

reported by the DOC contain any useful information whatsoever for use by

the ITC in its material injury decisions (107).

A referir-se ao Artigo 11.3, o Órgão de Apelação constata a sua impossibilidade em se posicionar e/ou

decidir, devido à insuficiência da análise fática realizada pelo Painel. Saliente-se que o Órgão de

Apelação está adstrito ao conteúdo fático do relatório do Painel. Some-se a isto a postura cautelosa

seguida pelo Órgão de Apelação, na complementação da análise emitida pelo Painel, quando

habilitado para tanto. Além disso, diante da existência de vários casos de “sunset reviews” em um

mesmo litígio, o Painel poderá não apurar aprofundadamente o modo pelo qual as autoridades

domésticas sopesaram as circunstâncias das investigações. Todos estes fatores negativos contribuem

para dificultar uma decisão final favorável para os demandantes, e invariavelmente pode minar a

credibilidade do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC.

Nota-se, ainda, que é comum tentar-se, nas contendas gravitando em torno do Artigo 11.3, invocar a

aplicação de outros artigos do Acordo Anti-Dumping nas “sunset reviews”. O critério mais utilizado

pelos julgadores para solucionar este tópico é o da “cross-reference”, ou seja, se o Artigo ou a

expressão que se quer seja aplicado(a) não é invocado(a) expressamente pelo Artigo de origem, tende-

se a entender que não é hipótese de incidência do dispositivo ou da expressão em “sunset review”.

Por derradeiro, o problema da China não ser considerada uma economia de mercado para fins do

Acordo Antid-Dumping por um número significativo de países. O governo chinês tem trilhado o

caminho da liberação progressiva de seu mercado sem deixar de lado, no entanto, a sua autonomia

política. Em razão disso, várias empresas internacionais têm enxergado o mercado chinês avidamente.

Entretanto, não raro, questiona-se o fato de não ser um hábito do governo chinês manter regras

acordadas anteriormente em uma mesa de negociação. Entende-se que, considerando-se a opção pela

liberalização contínua de seu mercado (e a entrada de Beijing na OMC é indício desta tendência), a

cooperação do governo chinês no fornecimento de informações corretas às autoridades do país sede

das investigações anti-dumping adquire realce. Por conseguinte, Sohn aduz:

If a country aspires to enjoy the market economy status, it should not find any

difficulty in disclosing the information. And once such participation by the

government is secured, the investigating authority should act in an unbiased

and objective manner in calculating the dumping margins. Only through such

reconfiguring of the roles of the parties, can one anticipate a meaningful

application of WTO anti-dumping regime to the NME issue (108).

Footnote 103: LOWENFELD, Andreas F. International Economic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2008,

pp. 313-14.

Footnote 104: WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 157.

Footnote 105: WT/DS26/AB/R e WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 132.

Footnote 106: REALE, Miguel. Nova fase do direito moderno. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2.ed., 1998, p. 132.

Footnote 107: MOORE, Michael O. Department of Commerce Administration of Antidumping Sunset Reviews: A First

Assessment. Journal of World Trade, Genebra, vol. 36, n. 4, 2002, p. 696.

Footnote 108: SOHN, Changho. “Treatment of Non-market Economy Countries under the World Trade Organization Anti-

dumping Regime”. Journal of World Trade, vol. 39, n. 4, p. 786, 2005.

4. Artigo 11.4

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

a) “Novas provas relativas ao período de uma “sunset review” para os fins de

implementação das recomendações do DSB”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping

Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset

Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, paras. 167-168 e 175

O Órgão de Apelação, em US – OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), afirmou que as autoridades que

conduzem uma investigação anti-dumping podem produzir novas provas afetas ao lapso temporal de

uma “sunset review” anterior, com a finalidade de levar a cabo as recomendações feitas pelo DSB.

Para. 167. “Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not refer to the steps that an

investigating authority may take to implement DSB recommendations and rulings or to the collection

of evidence at that stage. Article 11.4 states that the provisions of Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement regarding evidence and procedure are applicable to sunset reviews. Article 6 contains

several provisions relating to the collection of evidence, including several time periods. However, like

Articles 11.3 and 11.4, Article 6 does not specifically refer to the collection of evidence for purposes

of implementing DSB recommendations and rulings. Therefore, we do not consider that Articles 11.3

and 11.4 address the specific question of whether an investigating authority can develop a new

evidentiary basis when implementing DSB recommendations and rulings.”

Para. 168. “Neither do Articles 11.3 and 11.4 provide a basis for drawing a distinction between

allowing an investigating authority to clarify information, or provide further explanations, on the one

hand, and to develop a new factual basis, on the other hand (…).”

Para. 175. “In the light of the above, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.60 and 8.1(b) of

the Panel Report, that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with the United States' obligations under

Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement “by developing a new factual basis pertaining

to the original review period for purposes of its Section 129 Determination”. Furthermore, we do not

find error in the Panel's consideration of certain provisions of the DSU as appropriate context and,

therefore, reject Argentina's claim that the Panel did not make an objective assessment of the matter

before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU.”

b) “Sunset review” inconsistente com o Artigo 11.4 do Acordo Anti-Dumping – “questões

sistêmicas”“

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping

Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset

Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, paras. 174

Como mencionado anteriormente, quando da fase de execução das medidas emanadas do DSB em

virtude de uma “sunset review” em afronta ao Artigo 11.4 do Acordo sobre Anti-Dumping, há

problemas, denominados de “questões sistêmicas” pelo Órgão de Apelação, ainda não deslindados

pelo Painel ou pelo Órgão de Apelação.

Para. 174. “Before concluding, we note that the implementation of DSB recommendations and

rulings in cases where a sunset review was found to be inconsistent with Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement raises systemic questions. For example, on what basis may an anti-

dumping duty order be maintained after a sunset determination has been found to be inconsistent with

Article 11.3 or 11.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement? (109) These questions do not fall within the

scope of the issue appealed by Argentina that the USDOC was precluded from developing a new

evidentiary basis in the Section 129 Determination. Therefore, we do not address them further in this

appeal.”

Footnote 109: “This question, in turn, raises other issues, such as: when does a sunset review reach an “outcome” for the

purpose of Article 11.3, last sentence; and what is implied by the requirements in Article 11.4 that the review “be carried out

expeditiously” and that it “shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation”?”

III. Comentários

O Artigo 11.4 prevê a incidência do Artigo 6, o qual trata da regulação das provas, às diversas

espécies de revisão contidas ao longo do Artigo 11. A ideia é a de que os princípios e diretrizes

básicas acerca da prova, aplicados nas investigações originais, também atuem em procedimentos em

que é reavaliada a necessidade de manutenção de uma medida anti-dumping.

Constatando o órgão julgador (Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação) que uma “sunset review”, prevista no

Artigo 11.3, foi realizada de modo incompatível com algum dispositivo do Acordo Amti-Dumping, as

autoridades nacionais não ficam impedidas de produzir novas provas, referentes ao período da “sunset

review”, para dar cumprimento às recomendações do DSB. Como a ideia do sistema normativo da

OMC é a liberalização progressiva das barreiras comerciais, não faria sentido impossibilitar as

autoridades de anti-dumping de se dedicarem à realização de novo conjunto probatório,

principalmente diante de constatação de irregularidade na investigação de origem.

Por fim, no litígio US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), o Órgão de Apelação deixou em aberto

problemas que deverão em algum momento ser enfrentados, por não terem sido objeto da contenda

em apreço, como a aparente contradição entre a determinação de que as revisões do Artigo 11 deverão

ser concretizadas de maneira expedita e de que não poderão, em geral, ultrapassar os doze meses de

duração.

Artigo 12

Luciano Inácio de Souza

IA. Texto do Artigo em Português

Article 12

Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations

12.1 When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an

anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or Members the products of

which are subject to such investigation and other interested parties known to the investigating

authorities to have an interest therein shall be notified and a public notice shall be given.

12.1.1 A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or otherwise make

available through a separate report (110), adequate information on the following:

(i) the name of the exporting country or countries and the product involved;

(ii) the date of initiation of the investigation;

(iii) the basis on which dumping is alleged in the application;

(iv) a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based;

(v) the address to which representations by interested parties should be directed;

(vi) the time-limits allowed to interested parties for making their views known.

12.2 Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative or

negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 8, of the termination of

such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive anti-dumping duty. Each such

notice shall set forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient

detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material

by the investigating authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the

Member or Members the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking

and to other interested parties known to have an interest therein.

12.2.1 A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or otherwise

make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations for the

preliminary determinations on dumping and injury and shall refer to the matters of

fact and law which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected. Such a notice or

report shall, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of

confidential information, contain in particular:

(i) the names of the suppliers, or when this is impracticable, the supplying

countries involved;

(ii) a description of the product which is sufficient for customs purposes;

(iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for

the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price

and the normal value under Article 2;

(iv) considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 3;

(iv) the main reasons leading to the determination.

12.2.2 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an

affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the

acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a

separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons

which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price

undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of

confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the

information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance

or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and

the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.

12.2.3 A public notice of the termination or suspension of an investigation following the

acceptance of an undertaking pursuant to Article 8 shall include, or otherwise make

available through a separate report, the non-confidential part of this undertaking.

12.3 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to the initiation and completion of

reviews pursuant to Article 11 and to decisions under Article 10 to apply duties retroactively.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Artigo 12

Aviso Público e Explicação das Determinações

12.1 Sempre que as autoridades estejam seguras de que há suficientes elementos para justificar o

início de uma investigação anti-dumping de acordo com o disposto no Artigo 5, serão

notificados o Membro ou os Membros cujos produtos serão objeto de tal investigação, bem

como aquelas partes cujo interesse na ação seja do conhecimento das autoridades

investigadores, e será publicado um aviso correspondente.

12.2 O aviso público do início da investigação deverá conter, ou alternativamente tornar acessível

por meio de informe em separado, informação adequada sobre os seguintes pontos:

(a) o nome do país ou países exportadores e o produto em questão;

(b) a data do início da investigação;

(c) a base da alegação de dumping formulada na petição;

(d) resumo dos fatos sobre os quais se baseia a alegação de dano;

(e) o endereço a que devem ser dirigidas as representações das partes interessadas;

(f) os prazos dentro dos quais as partes interessadas podem dar a conhecer suas opiniões.

12.3 Far-se-á publicar aviso de qualquer determinação, preliminar ou final, positiva ou negativa, de

qualquer decisão de aceitar compromissos sobre preços ao abrigo do Artigo 8, do término de

tais compromissos e da extinção de direito anti-dumping definitivo. Cada um de tais avisos

informará, ou deles constará por meio de informe em separado, com suficiente pormenor, as

determinações e conclusões estabelecidas sobre cada matéria de fato e de direito que se tenha

considerado como relevante pelas autoridades investigadoras. Todos esses avisos e informes

serão serão encaminhados ao Membro ou Membros cujos produtos tenham sido objeto de

determinação ou compromisso e também às outras partes interessadas de cujo interesse se

tenha conhecimento.

12.4 (a) Do aviso público sobre a imposição de medidas provisórias, ou do informe em

separado a ele relativo, constarão, com suficiente pormenor, explicações sobre as

determinações preliminares acerca do dumping e do dano e referências às matérias de

fato e de direito que levaram à aceitação ou à rejeição dos argumentos apresentados.

O aviso ou informe, reservado o direito de requerimento de confidencialidade para as

informações prestadas, deverá conter em particular:

(i) os nomes dos fornecedores, ou, quando isso for impossível, o dos países

envolvidos;

(ii) suficiente descrição do produto para fins aduaneiros;

(iii) as margens de dumping encontradas e completa explicação das bases da

metodologia utilizada para estabelecimento e comparação do preço de exportação

com o valor normal conforme o disposto no Artigo 2;

(iv) as considerações que se julguem necessárias à determinação do dano, conforme

estabelecido no Artigo 3;

(iv) as principais razões em que se baseia a determinação.

(b) O aviso público que informe sobre a conclusão ou a suspensão de uma investigação,

caso se tenha chegado a determinação afirmativa que implique imposição de direitos

definitivos ou aceitação de compromisso sobre preço, conterá, ou trará consigo

informe em separado que contenha, todas as informações relevantes sobre as matérias

de fato e de direito e sobre os motivos que levaram à imposição das medidas

definitivas ou à aceitação do compromisso sobre preço, reservado o direito de

requerimento de confidencialidade para as informações prestadas. Em especial, o

aviso ou informe deverá conter as informações descritas no subparágrafo 4(a), assim

como as razões para aceitação ou rejeição dos argumentos pertinentes ou alegações

dos exportadores e importadores e a base de toda decisão adotada à luz do disposto no

subparágrafo 13 (b) do Artigo 6.

(c) O aviso público que informe sobre o encerramento ou a suspensão de uma

investigação em conseqüência da aceitação de compromisso conforme estabelecido

no Artigo 8 deverá conter, ou trará consigo informe em separado que contenha,

transcrição da parte não confidencial do compromisso.

12.5 O disposto neste Artigo aplicar-se-á, mutatis mutandis, ao início e ao encerramento das

revisões contempladas no Artigo 11 e às decisões tomadas sob os auspícios do Artigo 10

acerca da aplicação retroativa de direitos.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 12

1. Artigo 12.1

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.87 e

8.89

Para. 8.87. “In our view, this provision can most reasonably be read to require notification and public

notice once a Member has decided to initiate an investigation. This interpretation is confirmed by the

fact that the public notice to be provided is a “notice of initiation of an investigation”. We can

conceive of no logical reason why the AD Agreement would require a Member to publish a notice of

the initiation of an investigation before the decision had been taken that such an investigation should

be initiated.”

Para. 8.89. “(…) Given the function and context of Article 12.1 in the AD Agreement, we interpret

this provision as imposing a procedural obligation on the investigating agency to publish a notice and

notify interested parties after it has taken a decision that there is sufficient evidence to proceed with an

initiation. The Panel is of the view that Article 12.1 is not concerned with the substance of the

decision to initiate an investigation, which is dealt with in Article 5.3.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil

(Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.132

Para. 7.132. “(…) we consider that the nature of the Article 12.1 notification obligation is such that

the investigating authority should make all reasonable efforts to obtain the requisite contact details.

Sending a letter with only a very general request for assistance, without specifying the exporters for

which contact details are required, does not satisfy the need to make all reasonable efforts.”

b) “Artigo 12.1.1”

(i) Separate report

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.95-

8.96

Para. 8.95. “(…) Under Article 12.1.1, it is the “public notice”, and not the Member, that must “make

available through a separate report”, certain information. We take this to mean that the public notice

must at a minimum refer to a separate report. This conclusion is logical in that the separate report is a

substitute for certain elements of the public notice and thus should perform a notice function

comparable to that of the public notice itself.

Para. 8.96. “(…) It cannot be said that the separate report was “readily available” to the public, if the

public is not informed about where, when and how to have access to this report, leave alone if they

were not even publicly informed of its existence (…).”

(ii) Conteúdo

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para.

7.87

Para. 7.87. “We recall, however, that Article 12.1.1(iv) merely requires that the notice of initiation

contain “a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based” (emphasis added). It

does not require a summary of the conclusion of the investigating authority regarding the definition of

the relevant domestic industry. Nor does it require a summary of the factors and analysis on which

the investigating authority based that conclusion.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-dumping measures on farmed Salmon

from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.830

Para. 7.830. “(...) In our view, it follows from our finding that there is no violation of Article 12 in

the fact that the EC did not provide an explanation of an analysis and determination it was not

required to make. The Definitive Regulation sets forth the conclusions of the investigating authority

as to the product under consideration. To the extent that Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 require an

explanation of aspects of the determination not required by the AD Agreement, we consider that the

Definitive Regulation contains an adequate explanation of this aspect of the EC's determination.”

2. Artigo 12.2

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on

Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R,

para. 7.544

Para. 7.544. “(…) We consider as a general matter that, where there is a substantive inconsistency

with the provisions of the AD Agreement, it is not necessary to consider whether there is a violation

of Article 12, as the question of whether the notice is “sufficient” under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 is

immaterial. (111)

b) “Comparação entre conteúdo 12.1. e 12.2”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para.

7.103

Para. 7.103. “(...) in notices of preliminary and final determinations, pursuant to Articles 12.2 and

12.2.2, the investigating authority is required to set forth findings and conclusions reached on all

issues of fact and law considered material, as well as respond to the arguments of parties. That is, a

notice of preliminary or final determination must set forth explanations for all material elements of

the determination. A notice of initiation, on the other hand, pursuant to Article 12.1, must set forth

specific information regarding certain factors, but need not contain explanations of or reasons for the

resolution of all questions of fact underlying the determination that there is sufficient evidence to

justify initiation.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-dumping Duties on imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from Índia (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.260

Para. 6.260. “(…) Moreover, in our view, it would be anomalous to interpret Article 12.2 as also

requiring, in addition to the detailed information concerning the decisions of which notice is being

given, explanations concerning the initiation of the investigation, of which notice has previously been

given under Article 12.1.”

(i) Artigo 12.2.1

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland

Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.120

Para. 8.120. “(...) No such obligation is included in Article 12.2.1, concerning the contents of public

notices on the imposition of provisional measures. We consider that Article 12.2.1 constitutes useful

context when examining Mexico's claim under Article 6.1. In particular, the fact that there is no

requirement for investigating authorities to include time-limits for the submission of evidence in the

public notice of their preliminary determinations confirms the conclusion set forth in the preceding

paragraph.”

(ii) Artigo 12.2.2

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-dumping Duties on imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from Índia (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.260

Para. 6.260. “(...) We do not believe that Article 12.2.2 requires a Member to explain, in the notice of

final determination, aspects of its decision to initiate the investigation in the first place.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast

Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Índia,

WT/DS219/R, para. 7.424

Para. 7.424. “(…) Nevertheless, the phrase “have led to”, implies those matters on which a factual or

legal determination must necessarily be made in connection with the decision to impose a definitive

anti-dumping duty. While it would certainly be desirable for an investigating authority to set out steps

it has taken with a view to exploring possibilities of constructive remedies, such exploration is not a

matter on which a factual or legal determination must necessarily be made since, at most, it might lead

to the imposition of remedies other than anti-dumping duties. We believe that contextual

considerations also support this interpretation since, the only matters referred to “in particular” in

subparagraph 12.2.2 are, in addition to the information described in subparagraph 2.1, the reasons for

acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or claims, and the basis for certain decisions.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on

Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R,

para. 7.547

Para. 7.547. “It is clear to us that the obligations with respect to explanation of determinations are not

limited only to determinations that are unfavourable to a particular interested party or group of

interested parties. On the other hand, however, it is also clear to us that the nature and content of the

explanation given may well differ depending on the nature of the determination or decision in

question. We do not exclude that, in a situation where a relevant provision establishes detailed

requirements for factual criteria that must be satisfied in order to justify a particular decision, an

explanation that the party in question satisfied the relevant criteria may be sufficient under Article

12.2.2.”

Footnote 110: Where authorities provide information and explanations under the provisions of this Article in a separate

report, they shall ensure that such report is readily available to the public.

Footnote 111: Original footnote: Panel Report, EC– Bed Linen, para. 6.259

III. Comentários

Artigo 13

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 13

Judicial Review

Each Member whose national legislation contains provisions on anti-dumping measures shall

maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the

prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews of

determinations within the meaning of Article 11. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent

of the authorities responsible for the determination or review in question.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 13

Revisão Judicial

Todo Membro cuja legislação nacional contenha disposições sobre medidas anti-dumping

deverá manter tribunais arbitrais, administrativos ou ligados ao judiciário, ou, ainda, prever

procecimentos com vistas a, inter alia, realizar pronta revisão das medidas administrativas relativas

às determinações finais e às revisões das determinações, de acordo com o dispositivo no Artigo 11.

Esses tribunais ou os procedimentos mencionados deverão ser independentes das autoridades

responsáveis pelas determinações ou revisões aludidas.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a comentar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 13

O Artigo 13 não foi objeto de análise pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC.

Artigo 14

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 14

Anti-Dumping Action on Behalf of a Third Country

14.1 An application for anti-dumping action on behalf of a third country shall be made by the

authorities of the third country requesting action.

14.2 Such an application shall be supported by price information to show that the imports are

being dumped and by detailed information to show that the alleged dumping is causing

injury to the domestic industry concerned in the third country. The government of the third

country shall afford all assistance to the authorities of the importing country to obtain any

further information which the latter may require.

14.3 In considering such an application, the authorities of the importing country shall consider the

effects of the alleged dumping on the industry concerned as a whole in the third country; that

is to say, the injury shall not be assessed in relation only to the effect of the alleged dumping

on the industry’s exports to the importing country or even on the industry’s total exports.

14.4 The decision whether or not to proceed with a case shall rest with the importing country. If

the importing country decides that it is prepared to take action, the initiation of the approach

to the Council for Trade in Goods seeking its approval for such action shall rest with the

importing country.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 14

Medidas Anti-Dumping em Nome de Terceiro País

14.1 Petição para adoção de medidas anti-dumping em nome de terceiro país será apresentada

pelas autoridades do terceiro país que solicite a adoção de tais medidas.

14.2 Essa petição deverá ser substanciada por informações sobre preços que permitam demonstrar

que a importações estão-se realizando a preços de dumping e por informações

pormenorizadas que demonstrem que o dumping alegado está causando dano à indústria

nacional respectiva no terceiro país. O Governo do terceiro país deverá oferecer toda

assistência às autoridades do país importador para que obtenha quaisquer informações

adicionais que este último requeira.

14.3 As autoridades do país importador, ao analisar petição dessa natureza, deverão levar em

consideração os efeitos do alegado dumping sobre a indústria em apreço como um todo no

território do terceiro país; isso significa que o dano não deverá ser avaliado apenas em

relação ao efeito do aleado dumping sobre as exportações da produção destinadas ao país

importador, nem tampouco em relação às exportações totais do produto.

14.4 A decisão sobre dar ou não andamento ao caso é de responsabilidade do país importador. Se

este decide que está disposto a tomar semelhantes medidas, competirá a ele a iniciativa de

dirigir-se ao Conselho para o Comércio de Bens para obter-lhe a aprovação.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a comentar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 13

O Artigo 14 não foi objeto de análise pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC.

Artigo 15

Rubens Romero

Luciana Maria de Oliveira

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 15

Developing Country Members

It is recognized that special regard must be given by developed country Members to the

special situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping

measures under this Agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this

Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the

essential interests of developing country Members.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 15

Países em Desenvolvimento Membros

Fica aqui reconhecido que os países Membros desenvolvidos deverão dar especial atenção à

particular situação dos países em desenvolvimento Membros no tratamento da aplicação de medidas

anti-dumping ao abrigo deste Acordo. As possibilidades de soluções construtivas previstas neste

Acordo deverão ser exploradas antes da aplicação de direitos anti-dumping sempre que estes afetem

interesses essenciais dos países em desenvolvimento Membros.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 15

Sobre o entendimento geral a respeito do Artigo 15 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, a Conferência

Ministerial reconhece o seu caráber mandatório, e dispõe que as modalidades para a sua adoção

conferem esclarescimento à sua aplicação.

“Paragraph 7.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001 on Implementation-Related

Issues and Concerns states that the Ministerial Conference “recognizes that, while Article 15 of the

Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

is a mandatory provision, the modalities for its application would benefit from clarification.

Accordingly, the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices is instructed, through its working group on

Implementation, to examine this issue and to draw up appropriate recommendations within twelve

months on how to operationalize this provision.”

1. Extensão da obrigação dos Membros

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel

Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.110

Em US - Steel Plate, o Painel entendeu que a letra do Artigo 15 é ampla, não possuindo indicações

legais específicas sobre a ação esperada para o seu efetivo cumprimento. Nesse sentido, não se espera

que os Membros cumpram à risca uma obrigação que não é bem definida pelo Artigo.

Para. 7.110. “In US - Steel Plate, in a decision not reviewed by the Appellate Body, the Panel

considered that there are no specific legal requirements for specific action in the first sentence of

Article 15 and that, therefore, “Members cannot be expected to comply with an obligation whose

parameters are entirely undefined”. According to the Panel, “the first sentence of Article 15 imposes

no specific or general obligation on Members to undertake any particular action”. (112) (113)

Footnote 112: “In this regard, we note the decision of the GATT Panel that considered similar arguments in the EEC-Cotton

Yarn dispute. That Panel, in considering Article 13 of the Tokyo Round Agreement, which is substantively identical to it

successor, Article 15 of the AD Agreement, stated: “582. (…) The Panel was of the view that Article 13 should be

interpreted as a whole. In the view of the Panel, assuming arguendo that an obligation was imposed by the first sentence of

Article 13, its wording contained no operative language delineating the extent of the obligation. Such language was only to

be found in the second sentence of Article 13 whereby it is stipulated that ‘possibilities of constructive remedies provided for

by this Code shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of

developing countries’.” Panel Report, European Economic Community - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of

Cotton Yarn from Brazil (“EEC - Cotton Yarn”), adopted 30 October 1995, BISD42S/17, para. 582 (emphasis added).

Footnote 113. Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.110. Uma interpretação similar àquela dada no caso US - Steel Plate

foi feita no caso EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, como se pode observar a seguir:

Para. 7.78. “We agree with Brazil that there is no requirement for any specific outcome set out in the first sentence of Article

15. We are furthermore of the view that, even assuming that the first sentence of Article 15 imposes a general obligation on

Members, it clearly contains no operational language delineating the precise extent or nature of that obligation or requiring a

developed country Member to undertake any specific action. The second sentence serves to provide operational indications

as to the nature of the specific action required. Fulfilment of the obligations in the second sentence of Article 15 would

therefore necessarily, in our view, constitute fulfilment of any general obligation that might arguably be contained in the first

sentence. We do not see this as a ‘reduction’ of the first sentence into the second sentence, as suggested to us by Brazil.

Rather the second sentence articulates certain operational modalities of the first sentence.”

2. Quando e para quem deveria ser concedida uma “atenção especial”

Neste caso, o Painel analisou a questão de quando e para quais Membros dever-se-ia conceder uma

atenção especial. Entendeu que a atenção especial deverá ser concedida aos Membros em

desenvolvimento, mas não às sediadas em países em desenvolvimento. Com efeito, deverá ser

analisado no caso concreto. O Painel também se pronunciou a respeito dos momentos de oferecimento

de atenção especial. Concluiu que esta deverá ser dada após a aplicação da medida final de anti-

dumping, e não durante a fase ou decisão intermediária.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel

Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.111

Para. 7.111. “India’s arguments as to when and to whom this ‘special regard’ must be given disregard

the text of Article 15 itself. Thus, the suggestion that special regard must be given throughout the

course of the investigation, for instance in deciding whether to apply facts available, ignores that

Article 15 only requires special regard ‘when considering the application of anti-dumping measures

under this Agreement’. In our view, the phrase ‘when considering the application of anti-dumping

measures under this Agreement’ refers to the final decision whether to apply a final measure, and not

intermediate decisions concerning such matters as investigative procedures and choices of

methodology during the course of the investigation. Finally, India’s argument focuses on the exporter,

arguing that special regard must be given in considering aspects of the investigation relevant to

developing country exporters involved in the case. However, Article 15 requires that special regard

must be given ‘to the special situation of developing country Members’. We do not read this as

referring to the situation of companies operating in developing countries. Simply because a company

is operating in a developing country does not mean that it somehow shares the ‘special situation’ of

the developing country Member.”

3. Segunda sentença do Artigo 15

a) “Remédios construtivos fornecidos pelo acordo”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel

Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.112

Neste caso, foi possível análisar o conceito e alcance da expressão “remédios construtivos”. O Painel

entendeu ser aqueles utilizados como meio para a retirada de elementos indesejados, realocação e

alívio de preços que geraram dano, em decorrência do dumping.

Para. 7.112. “Remedy’ is defined as, inter alia, ‘a means of counteracting or removing something

undesirable; redress, relief’. (114) ‘Constructive’ is defined as ‘tending to construct or build up

something non-material; contributing helpfully, not destructive’. (115) The term ‘constructive

remedies’ might consequently be understood as helpful means of counteracting the effect of injurious

dumping. However, the term as used in Article 15 is limited to constructive remedies ‘provided for

under this Agreement’. (…) In our view, Article 15 refers to ‘remedies’ in respect of injurious

dumping.” (116)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.229

Ainda em relação à interpretação da segunda sentença do Artigo 15, no caso EC - Bed Linen, o Painel

entendeu que remédios construtivos podem ser aplicados como formas alternativas resolução do dano

provocado pelo dumping. Com efeito, a imposição menos grave da medida ou a mudança do preço do

produto, podem ser favoráveis à resolução do dumping, em detrimento da aplicação implacável do

valor total alegado pelo Membro demandante. O Painel entendeu ainda, que além da redução da

obrigação e da modificação do preço, outros remédios podem existir, e apenas não foram delimitados

em decisões porque novos casos ainda não foram analisados pelo Painel.

Para. 6.229. “The Agreement provides for the imposition of antidumping duties, either in the full

amount of the dumping margin, or desirably, in a lesser amount, or the acceptance of price

undertakings, as means of resolving an anti-dumping investigation resulting in a final affirmative

determination of dumping, injury, and causal link. Thus, in our view, imposition of a lesser duty, or a

price undertaking would constitute ‘constructive remedies’ within the meaning of Article 15. We

come to no conclusions as to what other actions might in addition be considered to constitute

‘constructive remedies’ under Article 15, as none have been proposed to us.” (117)

b) “Poderá ser explorado”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.233

Dado o caráter vago da expressão “explorer”, o Painel não chegou a nenhuma conclusão em

particular. Entendeu que, à luz do Artigo 15, devem ser exploradas novas possibilidades de remédios

para a solução do problema, em detrimento dos remédios construtivos. Com efeito, as autoridades dos

países desenvolvidos deveriam agir de maneira construtiva, no sentido de explorar as possibilidades

de remédios para o alcance de resultados positivos. Nesse contexto, o Painel entendeu que os

Membros não possuem a obrigação de aceitar os remédios construtivos, mas de buscar possibilidades

de solução.

Para. 6.133. “In our view, while the exact parameters of the term are difficult to establish, the concept

of ‘explore’ clearly does not imply any particular outcome. We recall that Article 15 does not require

that ‘constructive remedies’ must be explored, but rather that the ‘possibilities’ of such remedies must

be explored, which further suggests that the exploration may conclude that no possibilities exist, or

that no constructive remedies are possible, in the particular circumstances of a given case. Taken in its

context, however, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 15, we do consider that the

‘exploration’ of possibilities must be actively undertaken by the developed country authorities with a

willingness to reach a positive outcome. Thus, in our view, Article 15 imposes no obligation to

actually provide or accept any constructive remedy that may be identified and/or offered. (118) It

does, however, impose an obligation to actively consider, with an open mind, the possibility of such a

remedy prior to imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect the essential interests of a

developing country.” (119)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.238

Em EC - Bed Linen, o Painel expressou claramente que a passividade não é suficiente para comprovar

que um Membro está explorando as possibilidades de remédios construtivos, especialmente quando

um Membro já tenha demonstrado interesse em solucionar a questão do dumping.

Para. 6.238. “[p]ure passivity is not sufficient, in our view, to satisfy the obligation to ‘explore’

possibilities of constructive remedies, particularly where the possibility of an undertaking has already

been broached by the developing country concerned.” The Panel consequently regarded the failure of

a Member “to respond in some fashion other than bare rejection particularly once the desire to offer

undertakings had been communicated to it” as a failure to “explore constructive remedies”. (120)

Relatório do Panel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel

Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.116

Em US - Steel Plate, os preceitos do direito internacional público “autodeterminação” e “não

intervenção em assuntos internos” foram respeitados. Nesse sentido, reforçou-se o compromisso de

respeito e de adequação destes princípios às normas da OMC. Contudo, o Acordo Anti-Dumping não

estabelece que os remédios construtivos detêm caráter mandatório. O Painel entendeu que é

extremamente desejável que os Membros apliquem medidas menos gravosas ao dumping, como uma

tentativa de promoção do comércio. Nesse caso, em particular, embora a Índia tenha alegado que as

medidas deveriam ser menos gravosas, a legislação interna dos EUA não permitiu tal flexibilização.

Em consequência, a Índia arcou com o valor total, deixando claro que, na sua opinião, os remédios

construtivos são desejáveis, porém não mandatórios.

Para. 7.116. In US - Steel Plate, India had argued that the United States authorities should have

considered applying a lesser duty in this case, despite the fact that US law does not provide for

application of a lesser duty in any case. The Panel, in a decision not reviewed by the Appellate Body,

noted that “consideration and application of a lesser duty is deemed desirable by Article 9.1 of the

[Anti-Dumping] Agreement, but is not mandatory.” Therefore, it stated, a Member is not obligated to

have the possibility of a lesser duty in its domestic legislation. The Panel concluded that “the second

sentence of Article 15 [cannot] be understood to require a Member to consider an action that is not

required by the WTO Agreement and is not provided for under its own municipal law.” (121)

c) “antes da aplicação do direito anti-dumping”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.231–

6.232

Em EC – Bed Linen o Painel deixa claro que o termo “before applying anti-dumping” será

interpretado como uma medida aplicada na fase definitiva do processo. Assevera ainda, que todas as

vezes em que o termo foi utilizado, referia-se à medida final do processo. Em contrapartida, a

expressão utilizada para medidas anti-dumping, durante o processo, é conhecida como “provisional

measures”, sendo constantemente adotada durante o processo investigativo. Com efeito, medidas

provisionais são determinacões preliminares e direitos anti-dumping são medidas definitivas no

processo. Não obstante essas classificações, o Painel recomendou aos Membros a mudança de preço

ao invés da aplicação de determinacões preliminares, para explorar as possibilidades de remédios

construtivos em detrimento de medidas imediatistas.

Para. 6.231. “In our view, [Article 1] implies that the phrase ‘before applying anti-dumping duties’

(…) means before the application of definitive anti-dumping measures. Looking at the whole of the

AD Agreement, we consider that the term ‘provisional measures’ is consistently used where the

intention is to refer to measures imposed before the end of the investigative process. Indeed, in our

view, the AD Agreement clearly distinguishes between provisional measures and anti-dumping duties,

which term consistently refers to definitive measures. We find no instance in the Agreement where

the term ‘anti-dumping duties’ is used in a context in which it can reasonably be understood to refer to

provisional measures. Thus, in our view, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘anti-dumping duties’ in

Article 15 is clear — it refers to the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures at the end of the

investigative process.”

Para. 6.232. “Consideration of practical elements reinforces this conclusion. Provisional measures are

based on a preliminary determination of dumping, injury, and causal link. While it is certainly

permitted, and may be in a foreign producer’s or exporter’s interest to offer or enter into an

undertaking at this stage of the proceeding, we do not consider that Article 15 can be understood to

require developed country Members to explore the possibilities of price undertakings prior to

imposition of provisional measures. In addition to the fact that such exploration may result in delay or

distraction from the continuation of the investigation, in some cases, a price undertaking based on the

preliminary determination of dumping could be subject to revision in light of the final determination

of dumping. However, unlike a provisional duty or security, which must, under Article 10.3, be

refunded or released in the event the final dumping margin is lower than the preliminarily calculated

margin (as is frequently the case), a ‘provisional’ price undertaking could not be retroactively revised.

We do not consider that an interpretation of Article 15 which could, in some cases, have negative

effects on the very parties it is intended to benefit, producers and exporters in developing countries, is

required.” (122)

Footnote 114: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.

Footnote 115: Id.

Footnote 116: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, para. 6.228. In US - Steel Plate, the Panel agreed with the above conclusions

and, applying it in the circumstances of this case, “consider[ed] that the possibility of applying different choices of

methodology is not a ‘remedy’ of any sort under the AD Agreement”. Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.112.

Footnote 117: A similar view was expressed by the Panel on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.71–7.72. The Panel on EC -

Tube or Pipe Fittings considered that Article 15 does not impose any obligation to explore undertakings other than price

undertakings in the case of developing country Members. Panel Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.78.

Footnote 118: “We note that our interpretation of Article 15 in this regard is consistent with that of a GATT Panel which

considered the predecessor of that provision, Article 13 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, which provision is

substantively identical to present Article 15. That Panel found: “The Panel noted that if the application of anti-dumping

measures ‘would affect the essential interests of developing countries’, the obligation that then arose was to explore the

‘possibilities’ of ‘constructive remedies’. It was clear from the words ‘[p]ossibilities’ and ‘explored’ that the investigating

authorities were not required to adopt constructive remedies merely because they were proposed.” EC - Cotton Yarn, para.

584 (emphasis added).

Footnote 119: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, para. 6.233. See also Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, paras. 7.113-7.115

and Panel Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.72. With respect to the related concept of good faith in general, see

Chapter on DSU, Section III.B.1 (vi).

Footnote 120: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, para. 6.238.

Footnote 121: Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.116.

Footnote 122: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, paras. 6.231–6.232. Also see Panel Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings,

para. 7.82.

III. Comentários

O Artigo 15 do Acordo Anti-Dumping não detém natureza mandatória, pois versa sobre os aspectos

gerais da implementação do direito anti-dumping e da especial atenção que deve ser dada aos

Membros em desenvolvimento. Com efeito, diante da ausência de clareza do Artigo 15, o Painel e o

Órgão de Apelação têm interpretando as principais expressões reunidas no Artigo em questão.

Observam que o Artigo 15 possui uma linguagem operacional, e que a “atenção especial” deve ser

direcionada aos países em desenvolvimento, de acordo com o caso concreto e ao final das

investigações.

Nesse sentido, os remédios construtivos auxiliam no combate ao dumping danoso, na medida em que

figuram como um meio voltado à retirada de elementos indesejados, uma imposição menos grave, ou

por ensejarem a mudança do preço do produto. Embora exista o desejo da OMC de aplicação de

medidas menos gravosas de anti-dumping, como forma de remédio construtivo, o fato é que esta parte

do Artigo 15 não é mandatória, existindo, portanto, a necessidade de que os Membros elaborem leis

internas dispondo sobre o dumping em sua legislação interna.

Fica claro, portanto, que o Acordo sobre implementação do Artigo VI do GATT busca materializar e

diferenciar dos direitos anti-dumping a figura dos países em desenvolvimento, sendo estes os maiores

beneficiários de tal medida. Dispõe, nesse sentido, que os países desenvolvidos devem ter essa

conciência e flexibilização em relação ao dispositivo, possibilitando a aplicação e disponibilizando-se

para investigações.

Ocorre que, os países desenvolvidos, desde longa data, vêm desenvolvendo suas indústrias nacionais,

e possuem um arcabouço legal e infraestrutura logística-operacional para a exportação de seus

produtos. Além do mais, muitos dos países desenvolvidos subsidiam algumas parcelas do mercado,

fazendo com que determinados produtos detenham preços muito baixos nos países em

desenvolvimento, prejudicando assim a indústria nacional dos países em desenvolvimento.

Não obstante esse fato, o contrário pode acontecer (embora seja raro), como no caso de produtos

oriundos de países em desenvolvimento prejudicarem produtos de países desenvolvidos. De fato, o

objetivo primordial deste Artigo 15 foi deixar claro a especial atenção que deve ser conferida aos

países em desenvolvimento, levando-se em conta o desenvolvimento retardatário e visando um mundo

mais igualitário. Configura, portanto, uma típica política internacional de ação afirmativa.

Artigo 16

Rubens Romero

Luciana Maria de Oliveira

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 16

Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices

16.1 There is hereby established a Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices (referred to in this

Agreement as the “Committee”) composed of representatives from each of the Members.

The Committee shall elect its own Chairman and shall meet not less than twice a year and

otherwise as envisaged by relevant provisions of this Agreement at the request of any

Member. The Committee shall carry out responsibilities as assigned to it under this

Agreement or by the Members and it shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on

any matters relating to the operation of the Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives.

The WTO Secretariat shall act as the secretariat to the Committee.

16.2 The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies as appropriate.

16.3 In carrying out their functions, the Committee and any subsidiary bodies may consult with

and seek information from any source they deem appropriate. However, before the

Committee or a subsidiary body seeks such information from a source within the jurisdiction

of a Member, it shall inform the Member involved. It shall obtain the consent of the Member

and any firm to be consulted.

16.4 Members shall report without delay to the Committee all preliminary or final anti-dumping

actions taken. Such reports shall be available in the Secretariat for inspection by other

Members. Members shall also submit, on a semi-annual basis, reports of any anti-dumping

actions taken within the preceding six months. The semi-annual reports shall be submitted

on an agreed standard form.

16.5 Each Member shall notify the Committee (a) which of its authorities are competent to

initiate and conduct investigations referred to in Article 5 and (b) its domestic procedures

governing the initiation and conduct of such investigations.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 16

Comitê sobre Práticas Anti-Dumping

16.1 Fica aqui estabelecido o Comitê sobre Práticas Anti-Dumping (a partir de agora referido como

'Comitê' neste Acordo) integrado pelos representantes de cada um dos Membros. O Comitê

elegerá seu próprio Presidente e deverá reunir-se pelo menos duas vezes por ano e sempre que

lhe seja solicitado por qualquer dos Membros, segundo o que está previsto nas disposições

pertinentes deste Acordo. O Comitê desempenhará as funções a ele atribuídas pelo presente

Acordo ou pelos Membros e deverá propiciar a estes últimos a oportunidade de consulta sobre

quaisquer matérias relativas ao funcionamento do Acordo ou à consecução de seus objetivos.

Os serviços de secretaria do Comitê serão prestados pelo Secretariado da OMC.

16.2 O Comitê poderá estabelecer os órgãos subsidiários que julgar apropriados.

16.3 No cumprimento de suas funções, o Comitê e qualquer de seus órgãos subsidiários poderá

consultar qualquer fonte que julgar apropriada e buscar Informação junto à mesma. O Comitê

deverá, porém, antes de buscar informações junto à fonte que se situe dentro da jurisdição de

um Membro, informar o Membro em questão. O Comitê deverá obter prévia autorização do

Membro e de qualquer empresa que deseje consultar.

16.4 Os Membros deverão informar sem tardança o Comitê de todas as medidas anti-dumping

preliminares ou finais que tenham tomado. Esses relatórios estarão disponíveis no

Secretariado para fins de inspeção por qualquer outro Membro. Os Membros deverão,

igualmente, apresentar relatórios semestrais sobre toda medida anti-dumping tomada nos 6

meses precedentes. Os relatórios semestrais serão apresentados em forma padronizada

convencionada.

16.5 Cada Membro devera notificar o Comitê com respeito: a) à identificação de suas autoridades

competentes para iniciar e conduzir as investigações a que se refere o Artigo 5; e b) aos

procedimentos nacionais que dispõem sobre o início e o andamento de tais investigações.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

No Artigo 16.4, sugere-se a utilização da preposição “ao”, a fim de concordar com o verbo

“informar”, adotado, neste caso, na forma indireta. A sentença seria transcrita da seguinte maneira:

“Os membros deverão comunicar sem tardança ao Comitê (...).” Ademais, sugere-se que a palavra

“tardança”esteja entre vírgulas.

No Artigo 16.5, o verbo “devera” deve ser acentuado, pois está sendo conjugado no futuro do

presente.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 16

1. Artigo 16.1

a) “Regras procedimentais”

G/C/M/10, Seção 1 (ii) – O texto contendo as regras procedimentais adotadas pode ser

encontrado em G/ADP/4 e G/L/143

O documento versa as regras procedimentais estabelecimentas pelo Artigo 16.1 para a medida anti-

dumping, as quais são estabelecidas pelo Comitê (integrado por um representante de cada um dos

Membros). O item 16.1 dispõe sobre como será feita a escolha do presidente e sobre a agenda de

encontros. Entende que as regras procedimentais disposta no Artigo 16.1, foram estabelecidas em

1996, por ocasião do encontro do Conselho para Comércio e Bens (123).

b) “deverão encontrar não menos que duas vezes ao ano, ou quando apropriado”

G/L/143, Capítulo I, Artigo 1

O documento preconiza que as reuniões do Comitê deverão ocorrer duas vezes ao ano, podendo, no

entanto, ocorrer mais de duas vezes caso seja apropriado. Autoriza qualquer Membro a convocar uma

nova reunião do Comitê, caso julgue necessário (124).

2. Artigo 16.4

a) “informações mínimas, seja sobre medidas anti-dumping preliminares ou finais, a serem

fornecidas sem demora por meio de relatório”

O Comitê elaborou, em 30 de outubro de 1995, um documento estabelecendo os procedimentos sobre

as “informações mínimas” a serem oferecidas nos relatórios, seja ele preliminar ou final, conforme

indicado no Artigo 16.4.

b)”Os relatórios semestrais serão apresentados na forma padronizada convencionada”

G/ADP/M/4, Seção D – O texto sobre o formato e informações a serem adotadas, pode ser

encontrado nos relatórios Semi-anuais.

Em reunião ocorrida em 30 de outubro de 1995, o Comitê, em atenção às regras estabelecidas no

Artigo 16.4, elaborou um guia dispondo sobre o formato a ser adotado, assim como sobre as

informações a serem fornecidas nos relatórios semestrais.

Footnote 123: At its meeting of 22 May 1996, the Council for Trade in Goods approved rules of procedure for the meetings

of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices (the “Rules of Procedure”).

Footnote 124: The Rules of Procedure require that the Committee “shall meet not less than twice a year in regular session,

and otherwise as appropriate.”

III. Comentários

O Artigo 16 como um todo, trata do Comitê sobre práticas anti-dumping. Estabelece as regras sobre

eleição do presidente do órgão, sobre a agenda de encontro, e sobre os procedimentos formais a serem

padronizados. Apesar de estarem previstas reuniões anuais e relatórios semestrais, qualquer Membro

poderá pedir reunião extraordinária.

Ademais, interpretou-se que o Artigo 16 concebe que qualquer medida anti-dumping, tomada por um

Membro, deverá ser informada ao Comitê para que este avalie. As medidas poderão ser analisadas

tanto pelo Comitê, como por outro Membro, e esse relatório seguirá a forma padronizada

convencionada.

Com efeito, deverão haver regras procedimentais e reuniões não menos do que duas vezes ao ano, ou

quando os Membros julgarem apropriado. Os relatórios sobre o direito anti-dumping deverão fornecer

as informações mínimas estabelecidas pelo Comitê. De forma geral, o Artigo 16, ao iniciar a parte II

do Acordo sobre Anti-Dumping, apresenta a figura do Comitê, e lhe atribui a responsabilidade pela

parte procedimental. Neste Artigo estabelecem-se as regras procedimentais e os padrões relativos à

forma das informações relacionadas ao direito anti-dumping.

Artigo 17

Rubens Romero

Luciana Maria de Oliveira

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 17

Consultation and Dispute Settlement

17.1 Except as otherwise provided herein, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to

consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement.

17.2 Each Member shall afford sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity

for consultation regarding, representations made by another Member with respect to any

matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.

17.3 If any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this

Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the achievement of any objective is being

impeded, by another Member or Members, it may, with a view to reaching a mutually

satisfactory resolution of the matter, request in writing consultations with the Member or

Members in question. Each Member shall afford sympathetic consideration to any request

from another Member for consultation.

17.4 If the Member that requested consultations considers that the consultations pursuant to

paragraph 3 have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and if final action has been

taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to levy definitive anti-

dumping duties or to accept price undertakings, it may refer the matter to the Dispute

Settlement Body (“DSB”). When a provisional measure has a significant impact and the

Member that requested consultations considers that the measure was taken contrary to the

provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7, that Member may also refer such matter to the DSB.

17.5 The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to examine the

matter based upon:

(i) a written statement of the Member making the request indicating how a

benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this Agreement has been

nullified or impaired, or that the achieving of the objectives of the Agreement

is being impeded, and

(ii) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures

to the authorities of the importing Member.

17.6 In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5:

(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether

the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their

evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of

the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even

though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation

shall not be overturned;

(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in

accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.

Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of

more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities'

measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those

permissible interpretations.

17.7 Confidential information provided to the panel shall not be disclosed without formal

authorization from the person, body or authority providing such information. Where such

information is requested from the panel but release of such information by the panel is not

authorized, a non-confidential summary of the information, authorized by the person, body or

authority providing the information, shall be provided.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 17

Consultas e Solução de Controvérsias

17.1 Salvo disposição em contrário neste Artigo, será aplicado às consultas e à solução de

controvérsias no âmbito do presente Acordo o disposto no Entendimento sobre Solução de

Controvérsias.

17.2 Todo Membro examinará com boa vontade as representações que lhe sejam dirigidas por

outro Membro em relação a qualquer assunto relativo ao funcionamento deste Acordo, bem

como oferecerá oportunidades adequadas para consultas sobre tais representações.

17.3 O Membro que considere estar sendo anulada ou prejudicada alguma vantagem que lhe é

devida, direta ou indiretamente em virtude do presente Acordo, ou estar sendo comprometida

a consecução de qualquer de seus objetivos por outro Membro ou Membros, poderá, com

vistas a alcançar solução mutuamente satisfatória sobre o assunto, requerer consultas por

escrito com o Membro ou Membros em apreço. Todo Membro examinará com boa vontade

qualquer pedido de consultas formulado por outro Membro.

17.4 Se o Membro que requereu consultas considera que as mesmas, segundo o disposto no

parágrafo 3, não alcançaram solução mutuamente satisfatória, e se medidas definitivas

tiverem sido tomadas pelas autoridades administrativas do Membro importador no sentido de

cobrar direitos anti-dumping definitivos ou de aceitar compromissos de preços, o Membro

poderá elevar o assunto ao órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC). Na hipótese de uma

medida provisória ter impacto significativo e de o Membro que tiver solicitado consultas

considerar ter sido a medida provisória tomada ao arrepio do disposto no parágrafo 1 do

Artigo 7, poderá esse Membro elevar o assunto à consideração do OSC.

17.5 O OSC, a pedido da parte reclamante, deverá estabelecer grupo especial para examinar o

assunto com base:

(a) em declaração escrita do Membro reclamante, onde se indica como terá sido anulada

ou prejudicada vantagem a que tem direito, direta ou indiretamente, ao abrigo do

presente Acordo, ou como se está impedindo a consecução dos objetivos do Acordo; e

(b) nos fatos comunicados às autoridades do Membro importador, de conformidade com

os procedimentos nacionais apropriados.

17.6 O grupo especial, ao examinar a matéria objeto do parágrafo 5:

(a) ao avaliar os elementos de fato da matéria, determinará se as autoridades terão

estabelecido os fatos com propriedade e se sua avaliação dos mesmos foi imparcial e

objetiva. Se tal ocorreu, mesmo que o grupo especial tenha eventualmente chegado a

conclusão diversa, não se considerará inválida a avaliação;

(b) interpretará as disposições pertinentes do Acordo segundo regras consuetudinárias de

interpretação do direito internacional público. Sempre que o grupo especial conclua

que uma disposição pertinente do Acordo admite mais de uma interpretação aceitável,

declarará que as medidas das autoridades estão em conformidade com o Acordo se as

mesmas encontram respaldo em uma das interpretações possíveis.

17.7 Informação confidencial fornecida ao grupo especial não poderá ser revelada sem autorização

formal da pessoa, órgão ou autoridade que a forneceu. Na hipótese de uma informação dessa

natureza ser solicitada ao grupo especial, mas de não ter autorizada sua revelação deverá ser

fornecido resumo não-confidencial da informação devidamente autorizado pela pessoa, órgão

ou autoridade que a tenha trazido.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Entendemos que um breve comentário em relação ao Artigo 17.4 deve ser feito. Primeiramente, a

expressão “medida provisória”, referente à expressão em inglês “provisional mesure”. Como sabido,

existe no Brasil uma espécie normativa chamada “Medida Provisória”, a qual trata da possibilidade de

o Poder Executivo exercer sua iniciativa extraparlamentar de iniciar o processo legislativo. Tal

espécie é bastante conhecida no Brasil, e pode trazer algum tipo de interpretação errônea. Com efeito,

no nosso entender, uma tradução mais clara poderia ser “medidas provisionais”, no sentido de serem

medidas temporárias.

Ainda no Artigo 17.4, a expressão “tomada ao arrepio do disposto no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7”,

também merece atenção. A tradução teve o intuito de dizer que as medidas provisionais “contrárias”

ao disposto no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7, poderão ser levadas ao conhecimento do DSB para que este

tome conhecimento sobre a matéria.

Ademais, a expressão em inglês “matter”, contida no Artigo 17.4, foi traduzida como “assunto”; e,

especificamente tratada em interpretação do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação. Acreditamos que a

palavra “assunto” não reflete a intensidade do fato, tendo utilizada na tradução a figura de linguagem

eufêmica. Sugere-se a substituição pela palavra “problema”.

Por fim, no texto do Artigo 17.6, não há a mensão ao “grupo especial”. Seguere-se a substituição do

termo “Painel” por “grupo especial”, para efeito de uniformização com todo o texto do Acordo.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 17

1. Geral

a) “aplicações concorrentes do Artigo 17 no Acordo Anti-Dumping e as regras e

procedimentos do Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, para.

7.16.

O Painel entendeu que as provisões do Artigo 17 seriam específicas aos casos anti-dumping. Com

efeito, o Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala-Cement I seguiu entendimento contrário, rejeitando

tal interpretação do Painel (125).

Para. 58. “The Panel reached this conclusion on the basis of two alternative lines of reasoning.

Under the first line of reasoning, it found the following:

This interpretation of the provisions of Article 17 provides for a coherent set

of rules for dispute settlement specific to anti-dumping cases, taking account

of the peculiarities of challenges to anti-dumping investigations and

determinations, that replaces the more general approach of the DSU. (…) In

anti-dumping cases, the matter in dispute may not be the final measure in and

of itself (or the provisional measure or any price undertaking), but may rather

be an action taken, or not taken, during the course of the investigation. (…)

(emphasis added) (…)

Thus, we read Article 17.4 as a timing provision, establishing when a panel

may be requested, rather than a provision setting forth the appropriate subject

of a request for establishment of a panel (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R,

paras. 65-66

O Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala-Cement I, entendeu que regras especiais e adicionais

relativas às consultas e solução de controvérsias devem prevalecer sobre as regras de solução de

controvérsias gerais, dispostas no Artigo 1.2 do DSU. Nesse sentido, as regras sobre implementação

do Artigo VI são concebidas como regras adicionais ou especiais e, portanto, devem prevalecer sobre

a regra geral do DSU. Porém, o Órgão de Apelação, ao dispor que aquelas regras prevalecerão apenas

na extenção em que houver diferença entre os dois diplomas, estabelece uma restrição. Com efeito,

em não havendo diferenças entre as regras especiais e os procedimentos do DSU, este Acordo será

aplicado em conjunto com as regras especiais sobre consultas e solução de controvérsias. Apenas nos

itens em que as dispocições não forem complementares, deverá prevalecer o diploma específico, ou

seja, caso haja conflito de normas ou violação da outra provisão. Assim, antes de concluir pela

prevalência de um Acordo sobre outro, o intérprete deve delinear claramente a diferença, no caso

concreto em questão.

Para. 65. “Article 1.2 of the DSU provides that the ‘rules and procedures of this Understanding shall

apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in

the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding.’ (emphasis added) It

states, furthermore, that these special or additional rules and procedures ‘shall prevail’ over the

provisions of the DSU ‘[t]o the extent that there is a difference between’ the two sets of provisions

(emphasis added) Accordingly, if there is no ‘difference’, then the rules and procedures of the DSU

apply together with the special or additional provisions of the covered agreement. In our view, it is

only where the provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures of a covered

agreement cannot be read as complementing each other that the special or additional provisions are to

prevail. A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU

in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that

is, in the case of a conflict between them. An interpreter must, therefore, identify an inconsistency or a

difference between a provision of the DSU and a special or additional provision of a covered

agreement before concluding that the latter prevails and that the provision of the DSU does not

apply.”

Para. 66. “We see the special or additional rules and procedures of a particular covered agreement as

fitting together with the generally applicable rules and procedures of the DSU to form a

comprehensive, integrated dispute settlement system for the WTO Agreement. The special or

additional provisions listed in Appendix 2 of the DSU are designed to deal with the particularities of

dispute settlement relating to obligations arising under a specific covered agreement, while Article 1

of the DSU seeks to establish an integrated and comprehensive dispute settlement system for all of the

covered agreements of the WTO Agreement as a whole. It is, therefore, only in the specific

circumstance where a provision of the DSU and a special or additional provision of another covered

agreement are mutually inconsistent that the special or additional provision may be read to prevail

over the provision of the DSU.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, para.

67

O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala-Cement I, entendeu que as disposições específicas

constantes no Artigo 17 não irão substituir as disposições gerais do DSU, e sim complementá-las no

que for necessário ao caso concreto. Entendeu, ademais, que reconhecer a suposta substituição das

provisões de natureza integrada do DSU por normas específicas seria uma afronta negatória ao

sistema de solução de controvérsias preconizado no Artigo 1.1 do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC. Com

efeito, o entendimento em vários outros casos, interpretados ora pelo Painel ora pelo Órgão de

Apelação, caminha no sentido de que os dois diplomas serão aplicados conjuntamente. No que forem

contraditórios, seguir-se-á o disposto no Acordo de Implementação do Artigo VI.

Para. 67. The Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I then found that Article 17 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement does not replace the “more general approach of the DSU”. “Clearly, the

consultation and dispute settlement provisions of a covered agreement are not meant to replace, as a

coherent system of dispute settlement for that agreement, the rules and procedures of the DSU. To

read Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as replacing the DSU system as a whole is to deny

the integrated nature of the WTO dispute settlement system established by Article 1.1 of the DSU. To

suggest, as the Panel has, that Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement replaces the ‘more general

approach of the DSU’ is also to deny the application of the often more detailed provisions of the DSU

to antidumping disputes. The Panel’s conclusion is reminiscent of the fragmented dispute settlement

mechanisms that characterized the previous GATT 1947 and Tokyo Round agreements; it does not

reflect the integrated dispute settlement system established in the WTO.”(126)

c) “Desafios contra legislações anti-dumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 62

Ainda no litígio US - 1916 Act, restava a dúvida se o sistema de solução de controvérsias do Acordo

Anti-Dumping versaria apenas sobre temas relativos a direitos anti-dumping, ou se aquele sistema

seria utilizado em outros casos não relativos a dumping. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação dispôs

que cada sistema versará sobre as matérias próprias do litígio. Com efeito, as controvérias

relacionadas a dumping deverão fazer uso do sistema e de regras estabelecidas no Acordo Anti-

Dumping.

Para. 62. “Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement addresses dispute settlement under that

Agreement. Just as Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 create a legal basis for claims in

disputes relating to provisions of the GATT 1994, so also Article 17 establishes the basis for dispute

settlement claims relating to provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the same way that Article

XXIII of the GATT 1994 allows a WTO Member to challenge legislation as such, Article 17 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement is properly to be regarded as allowing a challenge to legislation as such,

unless this possibility is excluded. No such express exclusion is found in Article 17 or elsewhere in

the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 64-65 e 68

No caso US - 1916 Act, surgiu a dúvida sobre se a instauração da disputa versaria sobre as medidas

anti-dumping ou se iria discutir a legislação dos Membros sobre a matéria. Entendeu-se que o Artigo

17.1 não distingue uma possibilidade da outra. Em verdade, o Artigo 17.2 deixa claro que as consultas

poderão versar sobre qualquer problema que afete as regras do Acordo sobre Anti-Dumping, isto é, o

Artigo deixa em aberto as possibilidades de queixa seja da legislação interna dos Membros seja sobre

as medidas anti-dumping. No entendimento do Órgão de Apelação, poderão sim ser indagadas as

legislações dos Membros, exceto se esta prerrogativa for de alguma forma excluída.

Para. 64. “In considering whether Article 17 contains an implicit restriction on challenges to anti-

dumping legislation as such, the Appellate Body, in US - 1916 Act, noted the following: “Article 17.1

refers, without qualification, to ‘the settlement of disputes’ under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

Article 17.1 does not distinguish between disputes relating to Anti-Dumping legislation as such and

disputes relating to anti-dumping measures taken in the implementation of such legislation. Article

17.1 therefore implies that Members can challenge the consistency of legislation as such with the

Anti-Dumping Agreement unless this action is excluded by Article 17.”

Para. 65. “Similarly, Article 17.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not distinguish between

disputes relating to antidumping legislation as such and disputes relating to anti-dumping measures

taken in the implementation of such legislation. On the contrary, it refers to consultations with respect

to ‘any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement’.”

Para. 68. “Article 17.3 does not explicitly address challenges to legislation as such. (…) Articles

XXII and XXIII allow challenges to be brought under the GATT 1994 against legislation as such.

Since Article 17.3 is the ‘equivalent provision’ to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, Article

17.3 provides further support for our view that challenges may be brought under the Anti-Dumping

Agreement against legislation as such unless such challenges are otherwise excluded.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 74

Com a mesma linha de entendimento, o Órgão de Apelação expressa que o Artigo 17.4 estabelece

condições anteriores às investigações perante um Membro. Não obstante esse fato, o que se procura é

a consistência das alegações para que se alcance um resultado satisfatório.

Para. 74. “After finding that Article 17.3 supported its view that challenges may be brought under the

Anti-Dumping Agreement against legislation as such, unless such challenges are explicitly excluded,

the Appellate Body also addressed Article 17.4: “Article 17.4 sets out certain conditions that must

exist before a Member can challenge action taken by a national investigating authority in the context

of an anti-dumping investigation. However, Article 17.4 does not address or affect Member’s right to

bring a claim of inconsistency with the Anti-Dumping Agreement against anti-dumping legislation as

such.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 78-82

Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação faz conexão entre o Artigo 17, o qual dispões sobre solução de

controvérsias, e o Artigo 18, ambos do Acordo Anti-Dumping, demostrando a clara interligação entre

as disposições e a possibilidade de um Membro interpor queixa em face do OSC questionando a

legislação anti-dumping dos demais Membros.

Para. 78. The Appellate Body in US - 1916 Act finally referred to Articles 18.1 and 18.4 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement as contextual support for its reading of Article 17 as allowing Members to bring

claims against anti-dumping legislation as such: “Nothing in Article 18.4 or elsewhere in the

AntiDumping Agreement excludes the obligation set out in Article 18.4 from the scope of matters that

may be submitted to dispute settlement.”

Para. 79. “If a Member could not bring a claim of inconsistency under the Anti-Dumping Agreement

against legislation as such until one of the three anti-dumping measures specified in Article 17.4 had

been adopted and was also challenged, then examination of the consistency with Article 18.4 of anti-

dumping legislation as such would be deferred, and the effectiveness of Article 18.4 would be

diminished.”

Para. 80. “Furthermore, we note that Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement states: No specific

action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the

provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.”

Para. 81. “Article 18.1 contains a prohibition on ‘specific action against dumping’ when such action

is not taken in accordance with the provisions of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping

Agreement. Specific action against dumping could take a wide variety of forms. If specific action

against dumping is taken in a form other than a form authorized under Article VI of the GATT 1994,

as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping Agreement, such action will violate Article 18.1. We find nothing,

however, in Article 18.1 or elsewhere in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to suggest that the consistency

of such action with Article 18.1 may only be challenged when one of the three measures specified in

Article 17.4 has been adopted. Indeed, such an interpretation must be wrong since it implies that, if a

Member’s legislation provides for a response to dumping that does not consist of one of the three

measures listed in Article 17.4, then it would be impossible to test the consistency of that legislation,

and of particular responses thereunder, with Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 82. “Therefore, we consider that Articles 18.1 and 18.4 support our conclusion that a Member

may challenge the consistency of legislation as such with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R, para. 7.90

Para. 7.90. “in so far as it requires the consideration of margins based in part on facts available in the

calculation of the all others rate”. The Panel further found that, in maintaining this Section following

the entry into force of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the United States had acted inconsistently with

Article 18.4 of this Agreement as well as with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.” (127)(128)

c) “legislação mandatória versus legislação discricionária” (129)

(i) Geral

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 91

O Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - 1916 Act, entendeu que a lei interna dos EUA não era mandatória

e sim discricionária, pois os EUA teriam a prerrogativa de iniciar ou não o caso, com base no Ato de

1916. Ademais, interpretou que, de acordo com o Artigo 16.6 do Acordo Anti-Dumping da Rodada

Tóquio, os Membros deveriam confirmar em suas leis, regulações e procedimentos administrativos o

que foi acordado no Acordo Anti-Dumping da Rodada Tóquio.

Para. 91. “The EC also refers to the panel report in EC - Audio Cassettes, which was not adopted.

(130) This report stated why the mere fact that the initiation of anti-dumping investigations was

discretionary would not make the EC legislation non-mandatory.” The panel stated that:

‘[it] did not consider in any event that its task in this case was to

determine whether the EC’s Basic Regulation was non-mandatory in

the sense that the initiation of investigations and impositions of duties

were not mandatory functions. Should panels accept this approach,

they would be precluded from ever reviewing the content of a party’s

anti-dumping legislation.’ (131)

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),

Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ R, para. 6.168

O Painel, em EC - Audio Cassettes, entendeu que o Artigo 16.6 do Acordo Anti-Dumping da Rodada

Tóquio dispunha que as partes deveriam tornar as suas leis, regumentos e procedimentos

administrativos em conformidade com as disposições do Acordo Anti-Dumping da Rodada Tóquio.

(132) Indicou que tal entendimento também é encontrado no Artigo 18.4 do Acordo Anti-Dumping da

OMC (…).

Para. 6.168. “Since we found that Article VI and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement are applicable

to the 1916 Act, we consider that the reasoning of the panel in the EC — Audio Cassettes case should

apply in the present case. Interpreting the provisions of Article 18.4 differently would undermine the

obligations contained in that Article and would be contrary to the general principle of useful effect by

making all the disciplines of the Anti-Dumping Agreement non-enforceable as soon as a Member

would claim that the investigating authority has discretion to initiate or not an anti-dumping

investigation.” (133)

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access

Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS),

Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 6.53

Neste caso, a Coreia entra com um pedido de revogação de atos dos EUA, baseado em um certo

requerimento de certificado que segundo a lei de anti-dumping dos EUA seria necessário. O Painel

rejeitou tal pedido por considerar como não mandatório o dispositivo alegado pelos EUA.

Para. 6.53. “We note section 751(b) of the 1930 Tariff Act (as amended) and section 353.25(d) of the

DOC’s regulations, whereby an anti-dumping order may be revoked on the basis of ‘changed

circumstances’. We note that neither of these provisions imposes a certification requirement. In other

words, an anti-dumping order may be revoked under these provisions absent fulfilment of the section

353.25(a)(2)(iii) certification requirement. We also note that Korea has not challenged the consistency

of these provisions with the WTO Agreement. Thus, because of the existence of legislative avenues

for Article 11.2 type reviews that do not impose a certification requirement, and which have not been

found inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, we are precluded from finding that the section

353.25(a)(2)(iii) certification requirement in and of itself amounts to a mandatory requirement

inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements

Act (US - Section 129(c)(1) URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, paras. 6.22-6.25

Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que a queixa do Canadá era bastante similar à anterior dos EUA e

decidiu aguardar a decisão do caso dos EUA, e somente após, com maior propriedade, analisar o

litígio proposto pelo Canadá.

Para. 6.22. “As concerns Canada's principal claims, we note that Canada in this case is challenging

section 129(c)(1) “as such”, that is to say independently of a particular application of

section 129(c)(1). It is clear to us that a Member may challenge, and a WTO panel rule against, a

statutory provision of another Member “as such” (for example, section 129(c)(1)), provided the

statutory provision “mandates” the Member either to take action which is inconsistent with its WTO obligations (134) or not take action which is required by its WTO obligations (135). In accordance

with the normal WTO rules on the allocation of the burden of proof, it is up to the complaining

Member to demonstrate that a challenged measure mandates another Member to take

WTO-inconsistent action or not to take action which is required by its WTO obligations.” (136)

Para. 6.23. “In the light of the foregoing, it will be clear that Canada's principal claims will be

sustained only if Canada succeeds in establishing that section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to

take action which is inconsistent with the WTO provisions which form the basis for those claims or

mandates the United States not to take action which is required by those WTO provisions. In other

words, for Canada to discharge its burden with respect to its principal claims, it must demonstrate

both of two elements: first, that section 129(c)(1) mandates that the United States take or not take the

action identified by Canada, and second that this mandated behaviour is inconsistent with the WTO

provisions that it has invoked.”

Para. 6.24. “We consider that the issue of whether section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to

take certain action or not to take certain action is distinct from the issue of whether such behaviour

would be inconsistent with the WTO provisions relied on by Canada. As a result, those two issues

appear to us to be capable of independent examination.”

Para. 6.25. “We think that we need not address both of the aforementioned issues if we find that

Canada has failed to meet its burden with respect to either one of them. As for the sequence in which

we will address those issues, we find it appropriate, in the circumstances of this case, to analyse first

whether section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to take specified action or not to take specified

action.” (137)

(ii) rejeição da distinção?

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties

on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel

Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, paras. 87–89

No caso US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review o entendimento do Painel gerou uma quebra de

paradigma. No entanto, embora tenha considerado não ser da sua competência discutir sobre Artigo

cuja regra não detém caráter mandatório, o Órgão de Apelação, considerou que é possível sim interpor

uma reclamação com base em regra não mandatória, alegando, no caso, tratar-se de norma

mandatória. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Painel e o Órgão de Apelação detêm a prerrogativa de

dizer se a regra é mandatória ou não. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 18.4 do Acordo de

Implementação do Artigo VI do GATT, estabelece que todas as medidas necessárias, gerais ou

particulares deverão ser tomadas para assegurar que as leis, regulamentos e procedimentos

administrativos estejam em conformidade com as obrigação dispostas no Acordo Anti-Dumping.

Assim, interpretou o Artigo 18.4 ampliando o direito dos Membros de invocar todas as regras

possíveis para submeter tal matéria à solução de controvérsias, modificando, portanto, a interpretação

anterior, a qual diferenciava o conceito das regras mandatórias do empregado para as regras

discricionárias. Entendeu que nenhum diploma expõe de forma clara o fundamento ou critério de

definição para as regras mandatórias e regras discricionárias. Com efeito, diante da inexistência de

uma base normativa, os Membros detêm o direito de reclamar sobre qualquer lei, regulamento ou

procedimento administrativo que considerem em desconformidade com o GATT ou com o Acordo

Anti-Dumping. Ainda no mesmo caso, o Órgão de Apelação concebeu ser direito dos Membros

recorrer ao DSB, sendo tal direito mandatório ou não, e que o único preceito a balizar tal direito dos

Membros é o princípio da “boa fé”, disposto nos Artigos 3.7 e 3.10 do DSU.

Para. 87. “We also believe that the provisions of Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are

relevant to the question of the type of measures that may, as such, be submitted to dispute settlement

under that Agreement. Article 18.4 contains an explicit obligation for Members to ‘take all necessary

steps, of a general or particular character’ to ensure that their ‘laws, regulations and administrative

procedures’ are in conformity with the obligations set forth in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Taken

as a whole, the phrase ‘laws, regulations and administrative procedures’ seems to us to encompass the

entire body of generally applicable rules, norms and standards adopted by Members in connection

with the conduct of anti-dumping proceedings. (138) If some of these types of measure could not, as

such, be subject to dispute settlement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it would frustrate the

obligation of ‘conformity’ set forth in Article 18.4.”

Para. 88. “This analysis leads us to conclude that there is no basis, either in the practice of the GATT

and the WTO generally or in the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for finding that only

certain types of measure can, as such, be challenged in dispute settlement proceedings under the Anti-

Dumping Agreement. Hence we see no reason for concluding that, in principle, non-mandatory

measures cannot be challenged ‘as such’. To the extent that the Panel’s findings in paragraphs 7.145,

7.195, and 7.246 of the Panel Report suggest otherwise, we consider them to be in error.”

Para. 89. “We observe, too, that allowing measures to be the subject of dispute settlement

proceedings, whether or not they are of a mandatory character, is consistent with the comprehensive

nature of the right of Members to resort to dispute settlement to ‘preserve [their] rights and

obligations (…) under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those

agreements’. (139) As long as a Member respects the principles set forth in Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of

the DSU, namely, to exercise their ‘judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be

fruitful’ and to engage in dispute settlement in good faith, then that Member is entitled to request a

panel to examine measures that the Member considers nullify or impair its benefits. We do not think

that panels are obliged, as a preliminary jurisdictional matter, to examine whether the challenged

measure is mandatory. This issue is relevant, if at all, only as part of the panel’s assessment of

whether the measure is, as such, inconsistent with particular obligations. It is to this issue that we now

turn.” (140)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties

on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel

Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, para. 93

O Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, teve a oportunidade de

mencionar o caso anterior US - 1916 Act, do qual importou a orientação de divir as normas entre

regras discricionárias e regras mandatórias. Em US - 1916 Act, tal distinção não havia sido

esclarecida. Ao longo dos seus posicionamentos, o Painel sempre adotou a distinção como técnica

balizadora para a interpretação dos casos concretos. O Órgão de Apelação, por sua vez, não havia se

pronunciado sobre a questão em nenhum caso anterior, e, em caráter inovador, no caso US -

Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, considerou a ferramenta útil para diferenciar as regras

mandatórias das regras discricionárias, a partir da análise do caso concreto e da aplicação mecânica do

procedimento.

Para. 93. “We explained in US — 1916 Act that this analytical tool existed prior to the establishment

of the WTO, and that a number of GATT panels had used it as a technique for evaluating claims

brought against legislation as such. (141) As the Panel seemed to acknowledge (142), we have not, as

yet, been required to pronounce generally upon the continuing relevance or significance of the

mandatory/discretionary distinction. (143) Nor do we consider that this appeal calls for us to

undertake a comprehensive examination of this distinction. We do, nevertheless, wish to observe that,

as with any such analytical tool, the import of the ‘mandatory/ discretionary distinction’ may vary

from case to case. For this reason, we also wish to caution against the application of this distinction in

a mechanistic fashion.” (144)

d) “Desafios de uma “prática” como tal”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel

Plate from India (US – Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, paras.

No caso US - Steel Plate, os EUA argumentaram que, sob o seu ponto de vista, uma prática não pode

ser arguida em uma reclamação por si só, devendo existir um caso concreto para fundamentá-la. De

outra sorte, a Índia defende que uma prática que se torna um costume poderia sim tornar-se por si só

uma medida e, portanto, ser passível de contestação. Com efeito, no caso US - Export Restraints o

Canadá reclamou que as práticas utilizadas pelos EUA deveriam ser consideradas medidas violadoras

e que poderiam ser indagadas como tal. O Canadá, por seu turno, alegou que tais práticas seguiam

sempre uma mesma metodologia, como algo institucional e, nesse sentido, as práticas norte-

americanas poderiam ser consideradas um sistema operacional por si só. Por fim, o Painel considerou

que as limitações sobre as exportações feitas pelos EUA não podem configurar medidas ilícitas por si

só, restando como um sistema operacional. Segundo o Painel, embora o Canadá possa estar correto

em suas alegações sobre a prática dos EUA, o fato é que as leis norte-americanas não poderiam ser

consideradas ainda parte de um sistema operacional independente, a ponto de violar o sistema da

OMC. Em caso similar, US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Japão indagou sobre as práticas gerais seguidas pelas

autoridades investigativas dos EUA referentes à disponibilização de todos os fatos. Novamente, o

Painel entendeu que a reclamação do Japão se encontrava fora dos termos de referência e que tal

alegação de prática ilícita não poderia ser feita de modo separado. (145)(146)(147)(148)(149)

Para. 7.14. “Second, the United States argues that India's claim regarding US “practice” in the

application of total facts available is not properly before the Panel. The United States argues that the

“practice” referred to is nothing more than individual instances of the application of the relevant

statutory and regulatory provisions. The United States notes that, under US law, an agency such as

USDOC may depart from established “practice” if it gives a reasoned explanation for doing so. The

United States relies on the Panel's decision in United States - Measures Treating Exports Restraints as

Subsidies for the proposition that its total facts available practice does not have “independent

operational status”, i.e., that it is not a “measure.” Consequently, the United States argues, US

“practice” cannot be the subject of a claim. Moreover, the United States argues that even if such

“practice” could be the subject of a claim, the challenged practice would still not be properly before

this Panel, as India did not identify this “practice” in its consultation request. The United States notes

that it raised this point in the DSB in response to India's request for the establishment of a Panel.

Accordingly, the United States maintains that India's claim fails to conform to Articles 4.7 and 6.2 of

the DSU and must be rejected for that reason alone.”

Para. 7.15. “India argues that a “practice” becomes a “measure” through repeated similar responses to

the same situation, and that therefore the US practice it challenges is properly before the Panel. India

asserts that USDOC always applies total facts available in particular factual circumstances, and has

done so consistently since 1995. Parties to a USDOC investigation can predict that USDOC will apply

this “practice”. In India's view, where such a practice is established over a long period of time, it takes

on the character of a measure, because a similar response to similar circumstances can be predicted

(or threatened) in the future. India considers that the point at which a pattern of similar conduct takes

on the character of a measure is to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. But in

India's view, the label of “practice”, as opposed to administrative procedure, regulation or law,

coupled with the assertion that it can be changed at any time, does not render the “practice” in

question immune to challenge. To accept this possibility would, India asserts, open the door for

potential abuse of the obligations imposed by the AD and other WTO Agreements.”

Para. 7.23. “In this context, we note particularly the decision of the Panel in US – Export Restraints.

In that case, the Panel faced the question whether the measures identified by Canada, including US

practice, with respect to the treatment of export restraints as subsidies, required the USDOC to treat

export restraints in a certain way. The Panel addressed the question whether the measures identified

could give rise to a violation of WTO obligations by considering whether each measure constituted

“an instrument with a functional life of its own, i.e., that it would have to do something concrete,

independently of any other instruments, for it to be able to give rise independently to a violation of

WTO obligations.” In answering this question, the Panel considered the status, under US law, of each

measure identified, including the challenged US practice. With respect to that practice, the Panel

observed that USDOC could depart from it, so long as it explained its reasons for doing so, and

concluded that this fact “prevents such practice from achieving independent operational status in the

sense of doing something or requiring some particular action …US “practice” therefore does not

appear to have independent operational status such that it could independently give rise to a WTO

violation as alleged by Canada”. The challenged practice in this case is, in our view, no different from

that considered in the US – Export Restraints case. It can be departed from so long as a reasoned

explanation is given. It therefore lacks independent operational status, as it cannot require USDOC to

do something, or refrain from doing something.”

2. Articles 17.1

O Órgão de Apelação, em US – 1916 Act, manifestou-se a respeito da existência ou não de restrição

implícita no Acordo Anti-Dumping para o ajuizamento de reclamações.

a) “resolução de controvérsias”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 64

Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, em US – 1916 Act, o Artigo 17.1 do Acordo Anti-Dumping não

distingue reclamações relativas à legislação anti-dumping daquelas atinentes às medidas anti-dumping

adotadas na implementação desta lei. O Artigo, contudo, assegura que os Membros podem questionar

a consistência da legislação interna com as regras do Acordo Anti-Dumping, a não ser que o Artigo

17 exclua tal possibilidade.

Para. 64. “Article 17.1 refers, without qualification, to “the settlement of disputes” under the Anti-

Dumping Agreement. Article 17.1 does not distinguish between disputes relating to anti-dumping

legislation as such and disputes relating to anti-dumping measures taken in the implementation of

such legislation. Article 17.1 therefore implies that Members can challenge the consistency of

legislation as such with the Anti-Dumping Agreement unless this action is excluded by Article 17.”

3. Article 17.2

a) “qualquer questão que contrarie disposição deste acordo”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 65

Conforme entendimento do Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 17.2 do Acordo Anti-Dumping não faz

distinção entre as controvérsias relativas à legislação anti-dumping daquelas relacionadas às medidas

adotadas na implementação de tal legislação. Em qualquer um dos casos, as consultas dizem respeito

a qualquer questão que afete disposição deste acordo.

Para. 65. “Similarly, Article 17.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not distinguish between

disputes relating to anti-dumping legislation as such and disputes relating to anti-dumping measures

taken in the implementation of such legislation. On the contrary, it refers to consultations with respect

to “any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement”.

4. Article 17.3

a) “equivalente provision”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 65

De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, em US – 1916 Act, o Artigo 17.3 corresponde à disposição

equivalente aos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994. Com efeito, as reclamações sobre dumping

devem ser fundadas no Artigo 17.3, a não ser determinadas situações expressamente excluídas.

Para. 68. “Article 17.3 does not explicitly address challenges to legislation as such. (…) Articles

XXII and XXIII allow challenges to be brought under the GATT 1994 against legislation as such.

Since Article 17.3 is the ‘equivalent provision’ to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, Article

17.3 provides further support for our view that challenges may be brought under the Anti-Dumping

Agreement against legislation as such unless such challenges are otherwise excluded.”

b) “Exclusão do Artigo 17.3 do Acordo Anti-Dumping do Apendix 2 do DSB”

Relatório do caso Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from

Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, paras. 64

O Painel, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, aduz que as regras do DSU aplicam-se às consultas e

disputas ajuizadas com base no Artigo 17.3 do Acordo Anti-Dumping. Da mesma forma, é

considerada a disposição do Acordo Anti-Dumping equivalente aos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT

1994, os quais servem como base para as consultas e resolução de controvérsias sob o GATT 1994.

Para. 64. “The Anti-Dumping Agreement is a covered agreement listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU; the

rules and procedures of the DSU, therefore, apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and

dispute settlement provisions contained in Article 17 of that Agreement (…) [Article 17.3] is not

listed [in Appendix 2 of the DSU,] precisely because it provides the legal basis for consultations to be

requested by a complaining Member under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Indeed, it is the equivalent

provision in the Anti-Dumping Agreement to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, which

serve as the basis for consultations and dispute settlement under the GATT 1994, under most of the

other agreements in Annex 1A of the (…) WTO Agreement, and under the (…) TRIPS Agreement.”

5. Article 17.4

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),

Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/R, para. 5.27

Os EUA, ora demandados, alegaram que uma demanda não poderia ter início sob o fundamento de

inconsistência da legislação interna em relação ao Acordo Anti-Dumping, se não estivesse

fundamentada no rol taxativo do Artigo 17.4, o qual estabele 3 (três) possibilidades para a instauração

de Painel: (i) a aplicação definitiva de um direito anti-dumping; (ii) a redução nos preços; ou, ainda,

(c) uma medida provisional. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I,

considerou que uma controvérsia apenas seria recebida pelo DSB se o pedido fosse amparado em uma

das três possibilidades delineadas no Artigo 17.4.

Para. 5.27. “We therefore conclude that Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not prevent

us from reviewing the conformity of laws as such under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The same

applies, a fortiori, with respect to Article VI of the GATT 1994. In that respect, we consider that the

findings of the panel and the Appellate Body in Brazil – Desiccated Coconut referred to by the United

States are not applicable to this case, since those findings referred to the non-applicability of the

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to existing measures or investigations initiated

pursuant to applications made before the entry into force of that Agreement.” (150)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 55

Para. 55. “[When a Member has] a law which [provides for the imposition of] duties to counteract

dumping and, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, if [another Member wishes] to challenge that law,

then [the other Member must] wait until one of the three measures [referred to in Article 17.4 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement] is in place.” (151)

Os EUA apoiaram o seu argumento nas conclusões do Órgão de Apelação em Guatemala - Cement I,

o qual assegurou que o questionamento de dumping apenas seria legítimo se amparado em uma das

três hipóteses de medidas anti-dumping contidas no Artigo 17.4.

Para. 79. “In Guatemala - Cement, Mexico had challenged Guatemala’s

initiation of anti-dumping proceedings, and its conduct of the investigation,

without identifying any of the measures listed in Article 17.4 (…).” (152)

Paras. 71-72. “Nothing in our Report in Guatemala - Cement suggests that Article 17.4 precludes

review of anti-dumping legislation as such. Rather, in that case, we simply found that, for Mexico to

challenge Guatemala’s initiation and conduct of the anti-dumping investigation, Mexico was required

to identify one of the three anti-dumping measures listed in Article 17.4 in its request for

establishment of a panel. Since it did not do so, the panel in that case did not have jurisdiction.” (153)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 73-74

Conforme a interpretação do Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 17.4 prevê determinadas condições

necessárias para que um Membro inicie um procedimento de investigação no contexto do Acordo

Anti-Dumping. Não obstante este fato, o Artigo em questão não direciona ou afeta o direito de um

Membro propor uma reclamação no mecanismo de solução de controvérsias questionando a

inconsistência da legislação nacional do outro Membro em relação ao Acordo Anti-Dumping.

Para. 73. “In the context of dispute settlement proceedings regarding an anti-dumping investigation,

there is tension between, on the one hand, a complaining Member’s right to seek redress when illegal

action affects its economic operators and, on the other hand, the risk that a responding Member may

be harassed or its resources squandered if dispute settlement proceedings could be initiated against it

in respect of each step, however small, taken in the course of an anti-dumping investigation, even

before any concrete measure had been adopted. (154) In our view, by limiting the availability of

dispute settlement proceedings related to an anti-dumping investigation to cases in which a Member’s

request for establishment of a panel identifies a definitive anti-dumping duty, a price undertaking or a

provisional measure (155), Article 17.4 strikes a balance between these competing considerations.”

Para. 74. “Therefore, Article 17.4 sets out certain conditions that must exist before a Member can

challenge action taken by a national investigating authority in the context of anti-dumping

investigation. However, Article 17.4 does not address or affect a Member’s right to bring a claim

inconsistency with the Anti-Dumping Agreement against anti-dumping legislation as such.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 75-83

Segundo análise do Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 17 do Acordo Anti-Dumping possibilita aos

Membros intentar reclamações questionando a incoerência entre leis internas anti-dumping e o

Acordo Anti-Dumping da OMC, desde que atendidos os limites estabelecidos no Artigo 18.4. Este

Artigo conclama todos os Membros a tomarem as providências necessárias para adaptar a sua

legislação anti-dumping às normas do Acordo Anti-Dumping, a partir da entrada em vigor da OMC.

No entanto, conforme entendeu o Órgão de Apelação, apenas é possível ao Membro propor uma

reclamação para questionar a consistência da legislação interna de um Membro com as regras do

Acordo Anti-Dumping, quando tal reclamação for compatível com uma das três medidas anti-

dumping especificadas no Artigo 17.4. Contudo, quando se tratar de ação questionando dumping em

exportações, o pedido apenas terá legitimidade se amparado em disposição do GATT 1994. Nesse

sentido, uma ação geral contra o dumping, deverá ser fundada no Acordo Anti-Dumping, e uma ação

específica contra dumping, segundo o Artigo 18.4, deverá obrigatoriamente estar amparada em

disposições do GATT 1994.

Para. 75. “Moreover, as we have seen above, the GATT and WTO case law firmly establishes that

dispute settlement proceedings may be brought based on the alleged inconsistency of a Member's

legislation as such with that Member's obligations. We find nothing, and the United States has

identified nothing, inherent in the nature of anti-dumping legislation that would rationally distinguish

such legislation from other types of legislation for purposes of dispute settlement, or that would

remove anti-dumping legislation from the ambit of the generally-accepted practice that a panel may

examine legislation as such.”

Para. 76. “Our reading of Article 17 as allowing Members to bring claims against anti-dumping

legislation as such is supported by Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”

Para. 77. Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement states: “Each Member shall take all necessary

steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of the

WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the

provisions of this Agreement as they may apply for the Member in question.”

Para. 78. “Article 18.4 imposes an affirmative obligation on each Member to bring its legislation into

conformity with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement not later than the date of entry into

force of the WTO Agreement for that Member. Nothing in Article 18.4 or elsewhere in the Anti-

Dumping Agreement excludes the obligation set out in Article 18.4 from the scope of matters that

may be submitted to dispute settlement.”

Para. 79. “If a Member could not bring a claim of inconsistency under the Anti-Dumping Agreement

against legislation as such until one of the three anti-dumping measures specified in Article 17.4 had

been adopted and was also challenged, then examination of the consistency with Article 18.4 of anti-

dumping legislation as such would be deferred, and the effectiveness of Article 18.4 would be

diminished.”

Para. 80. “Furthermore, we note that Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement states: No specific

action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the

provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.”

Para. 81. “Article 18.1 contains a prohibition on “specific action against dumping” when such action

is not taken in accordance with the provisions of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping

Agreement. Specific action against dumping could take a wide variety of forms. If specific action

against dumping is taken in a form other than a form authorized under Article VI of the GATT 1994,

as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping Agreement, such action will violate Article 18.1. We find

nothing, however, in Article 18.1 or elsewhere in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, to suggest that the

consistency of such action with Article 18.1 may only be challenged when one of the three measures

specified in Article 17.4 has been adopted. Indeed, such an interpretation must be wrong since it

implies that, if a Member's legislation provides for a response to dumping that does not consist of one

of the three measures listed in Article 17.4, then it would be impossible to test the consistency of that

legislation, and of particular responses thereunder, with Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.”

Para. 82. “Therefore, we consider that Articles 18.1 and 18.4 support our conclusion that a Member

may challenge the consistency of legislation as such with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.”

Para. 83. “For all these reasons, we conclude that, pursuant to Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 and

Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the European Communities and Japan could bring

dispute settlement claims of inconsistency with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping

Agreement against the 1916 Act as such. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding that it had

jurisdiction to review these claims.”

Footnote 125: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 58, quoting from the Panel Report on Guatemala -

Cement I, para. 7.16.

Footnote 126: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 67. The Panels on US - 1916 Act followed the

approach of the Appellate Body. Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (EC), para. 5.21; and Panel Report on US - 1916 Act

(Japan), para. 6.85. See also Appellate Body Report on US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 51.

Footnote 127: The Appellate Body Report on US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 129, upheld these findings.

Footnote 128: Para mais informações sobre desafiar legislações como tais, ver seção VI.B.3 (c)(ii) do capítulo sobre DSB.

Footnote 129: This Section only refers to the analysis of this issue in anti-dumping related disputes. For a detailed analysis

of this issue in the WTO jurisprudence, see paras. VI.B.3(c)(ii).

Footnote 130: Panel Report on EC - Audio Cassette, para. 4.1. On the legal value of unadopted panel reports, see footnote

358 above and its reference to the Appellate Body Report on Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II.

Footnote 131: Panel Report on EC - Audio Cassette, para. 362.

Footnote 132: Article 16.6(a) (“National Legislation”) of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Agreement provided as follows:

“Each government accepting or acceding to this Agreement shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character,

to ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of this Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and

administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply to the Party in question.”

Footnote 133: Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.168. See also Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (Japan), paras.

6.188–6.189. See also, Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, paras. 7.88–7.89 and 8.3. In this case, the Panel concluded that the

“practice” of the US authorities concerning the application of “total facts available” (Article 6.8 Anti-dumping Agreement)

is not a measure which can give rise to an independent claim of violation of the AD Agreement. See also, Panel Report on

US - Section 129(c)(1) URAA, para. 6.22.

Footnote 134: Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – 1916 Act ), WT/DS136/AB/R,

WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, paras. 88-89. We note that both parties agree that the issue of whether

section 129(c)(1) is a mandatory or discretionary provision is relevant to this dispute.

Footnote 135: Both parties agree that a statutory provision may be challenged “as such” not only if it mandates WTO

inconsistent action, but also if it “precludes” action that is required by WTO rules. Canada's Second Oral Statement, para.

17; US Second Submission, para. 7. We understand the parties to this dispute to use the term “preclude” in the sense of

“mandate not to”. Whereas we are aware that another panel spoke of statutory provisions “precluding WTO-consistency”

which could, as such, violate WTO provisions (see Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974

(US – Section 301 Trade Act ), WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000, footnote 675), we will, in the interests of clarity, use

the expression “mandate not to” rather than “preclude”.

Footnote 136: Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act, supra, paras. 96-97; Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing

Programme for Aircraft – Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU (Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada

II)), WT/DS46/RW/2, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 5.50.

Footnote 137: We note that the Panel in United States - Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies first considered

whether certain action was in conformity with WTO requirements and only then addressed whether the measure at issue

mandated such action. See Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (US – Export

Restraints), WT/DS194/R and Corr.2, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 8.14. In the circumstances of the case at hand, where

there is a major factual dispute regarding whether section 129(c)(1) requires and/or precludes certain action, we think that a

panel is of most assistance to the DSB if it examines the factual issues first. Moreover, we do not see how addressing first

whether certain actions identified by Canada would contravene particular WTO provisions would facilitate our assessment of

whether section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to take certain action or not to take certain action. Finally, we have

taken into account the fact that, in the present case, our ultimate conclusions with respect to Canada's claims would not differ

depending on the order of analysis we decided to follow.

Footnote 138: We observe that the scope of each element in the phrase “laws, regulations and administrative procedures”

must be determined for purposes of WTO law and not simply by reference to the label given to various instruments under the

domestic law of each WTO Member. This determination must be based on the content and substance of the instrument, and

not merely on its form or nomenclature. Otherwise, the obligations set forth in Article 18.4 would vary from Member to

Member depending on each Member’s domestic law and practice.

Footnote 139: Article 3.2 of the DSU.

Footnote 140: Appellate Body Report on US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 87–89.

Footnote 141: Appellate Body Report, US - 1916 Act, paras. 61 e 88.

Footnote 142: In footnote 95 to para. 7.114, the Panel quoted the following statement from para. 7.88 of the Panel Report in

US - Steel Plate: “[t]he Appellate Body has recognized the distinction, but has not specifically ruled that it is determinative

in consideration of whether a statute is inconsistent with relevant WTO obligations.”

Footnote 143: In our Report in US - 1916 Act, we examined the challenged legislation and found that the alleged

“discretionary” elements of that legislation were not of a type that, even under the mandatory/discretionary distinction,

would have led to the measure being classified as “discretionary” and therefore consistent with the Anti-Dumping

Agreement. In other words, we assumed that the distinction could be applied because it did not, in any event, affect the

outcome of our analysis. We specifically indicated that it was not necessary, in that appeal, for us to answer “the question of

the continuing relevance of the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation for claims brought under the

Anti-Dumping Agreement”. (Appellate Body Report, US - 1916 Act, para. 99) We also expressly declined to answer this

question in footnote 334 to paragraph 159 of our Report in US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products.

Furthermore, the appeal in US - Section 211 Appropriations Act presented a unique set of circumstances. In that case, in

defending the measure challenged by the European Communities, the United States unsuccessfully argued that discretionary

regulations, issued under a separate law, cured the discriminatory aspects of the measure at issue.

Footnote 144: Appellate Body Report on US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 93.

Footnote 145: In US - Export Restraints, Canada had claimed that the US “practice” of treating export restraints as meeting

the “financial contribution” requirement of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement was a measure and could be

challenged as such. Canada defined US “practice” as “an institutional commitment to follow declared interpretations or

methodologies that is reflected in cumulative determinations” and claimed that this “practice” has an “operational existence

in and of itself”. The Panel considered whether the alleged US practice required the US authorities to treat export restraints

in a certain way and therefore had “independent operational status”. The Panel, which concluded that there was no measure

in the form of US practice, indicated: “[W]hile Canada may be right that under US law, ‘practice must normally be followed,

and those affected by US [CVD] law (…) therefore have reason to expect that it will be’, past practice can be departed from

as long as a reasoned explanation, which prevents such practice from achieving independent operational status in the sense

of doing something or requiring some particular action. The argument that expectations are created on the part of foreign

governments, exporters, consumers, and petitioners as a result of any particular practice that the DOC ‘normally’ follows

would not be sufficient to accord such a practice an independent operational existence. Nor do we see how the DOC’s

references in its determinations to its practice gives ‘legal effect to that “practice” as determinative of the interpretations and

methodologies it applies’. US ‘practice’ therefore does not appear to have independent operational status such that it could

independently give rise to a WTO violation as alleged by Canada.”Panel Report on US - Export Restraints, para. 8.126.

Footnote 146: In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, Japan had also challenged the “general” practice of the US investigating authorities

regarding total facts available. The Panel did not rule on whether a general practice could be challenged separately from the

statutory measure on which it is based because it concluded that Japan’s claim in this regard was outside its terms of

reference. Indeed, the Panel found that there was no mention of such a claim in Japan’s request for the establishment of a

panel. Panel Report on US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.22.

Footnote 147: Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.14.

Footnote 148: Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.15.

Footnote 149: Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.23.

Footnote 150: Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (EC), para. 5.27; Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.91.

Footnote 151: Appellate Body Report on US - 1916 Act, para. 55.

Footnote 152: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 79.

Footnote 153: Appellate Body Report on US – 1916 Act, paras. 71–72.

Footnote 154: An unrestricted right to have recourse to dispute settlement during an anti-dumping investigation would allow

a multiplicity of dispute settlement proceedings arising out of the same investigation, leading to repeated disruption of that

investigation.

Footnote 155: Once one of the three types of measure listed in Article 17.4 is identified in the request for establishment of a

panel, a Member may challenge the consistency of any preceding action taken by an investigating authority in the course of

an anti-dumping investigation.

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico-Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para.

O Painel no caso Mexico - Corn Syrup concluiu que um pedido estabelecido nos termos do Artigo 6.2

do DSU, também preencherão os requisitos constantes no Artigo 17.4 do Acordo Anti-Dumping.

(156)(157)

Footnote 156: Panel Report on Mexico - Corn Syrup, para. 7.14.

Footnote 157: Panel Report on Mexico - Corn Syrup, para. 7.14. With respect to specificity of requests for the establishment

of a panel pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, see Chapter on DSU, Sections VI.B.3(d) and XXII.3(a).

b) “Termos de Referência do Painel”

(i) conceito de “assunto/ problema”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R,

para. 70

No caso Guatemala - Cement I, o Órgão de Apelação teve a oportunidade de analisar o termo

“matter”, constante nos parágras 2, 3, 5 e 6 do Artigo 17. A decisão reconheceu a necessidade da

reclamação ser baseada em um dos três pré-requisitos descritos no Artigo 17.4. Segundo o Órgão de

Apelação, as regras de interpretação dispostas no Artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena dispõem que o

significado de um termo deve ser estabelecido a partir de seu significado ordinário, lido à luz de seu

contexto e do objeto e propósito do tratado.

Para. 70. “In view of the fact that we have reversed both of the Panel's findings that led it to conclude

that this dispute was properly before it, we must now address this question ourselves. Article 17.4 of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement allows a Member to refer a “matter” to the DSB when certain specified

conditions are satisfied. The word “matter” also appears in paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 17. It is

the key concept in defining the scope of a dispute that may be referred to the DSB under the Anti-

Dumping Agreement and, therefore, in identifying the parameters of a panel's terms of reference in an

anti-dumping dispute. According to the rules of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna

Convention, the meaning of a term is to be determined by reference to its ordinary meaning, read in

light of its context, and the object and purpose of the treaty.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R,

para. 71

Ao analisar a palavra “matter” o Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, reconhece o seu

significado amplo e, nesse sentido, tenta estabelecer parâmetros mais claros. Com efeito, entende que

que o significado mais apropriado, no sentido de significado ordinário, neste contexto, vem a ser

“substância” ou “assunto de uma disputa”. O Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu uma conexão entre o o

termo “matter” e os termos de referência do Painel sob o Artigo 7 do DSU e definiu “mater” como: (i)

medidas específicas em questão; e (ii) a base legal de uma reivindicação ou queixa.

Para. 71. “The word ‘matter’ appears in Article 7 of the DSU, which provides the standard terms of

reference for Panels. Under this provision, the task of a Panel is to examine ‘the matter referred to the

DSB’. These words closely echo those of Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, in view of

the integrated nature of the dispute settlement system, form part of the context of that provision.

Article 7 of the DSU itself does not shed any further light on the meaning of the term ‘matter’.

However, when that provision is read together with Article 6.2 of the DSU, the precise meaning of the

term ‘matter’ becomes clear. Article 6.2 specifies the requirements under which a complaining

Member may refer a ‘matter’ to the DSB: in order to establish a Panel to hear its complaint, a Member

must make, in writing, a ‘request for the establishment of a Panel’ (a ‘Panel request’). In addition to

being the document which enables the DSB to establish a Panel, the Panel request is also usually

identified in the Panel’s terms of reference as the document setting out ‘the matter referred to the

DSB’. Thus, ‘the matter referred to the DSB’ for the purposes of Article 7 of the DSU and Article

17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement must be the ‘matter’ identified in the request for the

establishment of a Panel under Article 6.2 of the DSU. That provision requires the complaining

Member, in a Panel request, to ‘identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of

the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.’ (emphasis added) The

‘matter referred to the DSB’, therefore, consists of two elements: the specific measures at issue and

the legal basis of the complaint (or the claims).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R,

paras. 72-73

O Órgão de Apelação em Guatemala - Cement I chama a atenção para o fato de que na decisão

emitida em Brazil - Coconut, houve concordância com a interpretação dos Paineis anteriores,

estabelecidos durante o GATT 1947, assim como sob o Acordo Anti-Dumping, de que o termo

“matter”, sob a consideração de um Painel, consiste em uma reivindicação específica declarada pelas

partes para a disputa em um documentos importantes especificados nos ‘termos de referência’. (158)

Declarações em dois relatórios do mencionado Painel esclarecem a relação entre ‘matter’, ‘medidas’

em questão e ‘reivindicações’. No caso United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports

of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (159), o Painel entendeu que “matter” consistiu

em reivindicações específicas feitas pela Noruega, sobre a imposição de tais medidas. A distinção

deve, portanto, ser feita entre ‘medida’ e ‘reclamações’. Consideradas juntas, a ‘medida’ e as

‘reclamações” feitas com relação àquela medida constitui o ‘matter relativo ao DSB’, os quais

formam a base para os ‘termos de referência’ do Painel. (160)

Footnote 158: Appellate Body Report on Brazil — Desiccated Coconut, p. 22.

Footnote 159: Panel Report on US — Norwegian Salmon AD, para. 342.

Footnote 160: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, paras. 72–73.

(ii)Relação com o Artigo 6.2 do DSB: “medidas específicas em questão”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R,

paras. 77 e 79-80

O Painel, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, reconheceu as especificidades do Artigo 17.4, e o seu caráter

sui generis. Nesse sentido, diferentemente de outros Artigos similares, o Artigo 17.4 estabelece

exatamente quando poder-se-á iniciar uma disputa sobre direitos anti-dumping. Ao propor um

parâmetro, a partir do Artigo 6.2 do GATT, o Órgão de Apelação analisou que este Artigo diz que as

questões levadas ao crivo do Painel devem ser “específicas”. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo

diz que as medidas devem ser específicas no sentido de esclarecer as possibilidade de instauração de

um Painel. Restou claro, que as medidas relacionadas a direitos anti-dumping são três: direito anti-

dumping definitivo; aceitação de uma redução nos preços; ou, medida provisional. Ao analisar a

linguagem utilizada pelo Acordo Anti-Dumping, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que em que pese

serem apenas três as possibilidades de “especificar” uma medida anti-dumping, tal parâmetro não

limita a possibilidade de queixas, as quais poderão ser feitas em relação à violações a direitos anti-

dumping.

Para. 77. “According to Article 17.4, a ‘matter’ may be referred to the DSB only if one of the relevant

three anti-dumping measures is in place. This provision, when read together with Article 6.2 of the

DSU, requires a Panel request in a dispute brought under the Anti-Dumping Agreement to identify, as

the specific measure at issue, either a definitive antidumping duty, the acceptance of a price

undertaking, or a provisional measure. This requirement to identify a specific anti-dumping measure

at issue in a Panel request in no way limits the nature of the claims that may be brought concerning

alleged nullification or impairment of benefits or the impeding of the achievement of any objective in

a dispute under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As we have observed earlier, there is a difference

between the specific measures at issue - in the case of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, one of the three

types of anti-dumping measure described in Article 17.4 - and the claims or the legal basis of the

complaint referred to the DSB relating to those specific measures. In coming to this conclusion, we

note that the language of Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is unique to that Agreement.”

Paras. 79-80. “[I]n disputes under the Anti-Dumping Agreement relating to the initiation and conduct

of anti-dumping investigations, a definitive anti-dumping duty, the acceptance of a price undertaking

or a provisional measure must be identified as part of the matter referred to the DSB pursuant to the

provisions of Article 17.4 of the AntiDumping Agreement and Article 6.2 of the DSU.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras.

7.52-7.53

No caso Mexico - Corn Syrup, o Painel manifesta-se sobre a possibilidade de imposição de medidas

provisionais enquanto não é aplicada a medida anti-dumping definitiva. Contudo, caso a medida

provisional imposta cause um impacto significativo por afrontar o Artigo 7.1 e prejudicar, de

imediato, o outro Membro, este poderá intentar reclamação ao DSB. O Órgão de Apelção, por sua

vez, entendeu, apoiado no Artigo 10 do Acordo Anti-Dumping, que a medida provisional

representaria a base por meio da qual um Membro (desde que cumpridos todos os requisitos

necessários para a aplicação da medida) arrecadaria os direitos anti-dumping de forma retroativa, para

somente ao final equacionar o valor total e aplicar a medida definitiva.

Para. 7.52. “The Appellate Body Report in Guatemala - Cement indicates that a complainant may,

having identified a specific anti-dumping duty in its request for establishment, bring any claims under

the AD Agreement relating to that specific measure. That there should be a relationship between the

measure challenged in a dispute and the claims asserted in that dispute would appear necessary, given

that Article 19.1 of the DSU requires that, ‘where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a

measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned

bring the measure into conformity with the agreement’.”

Para. 7.53. “[W]e consider that the United States’ claim under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement is

nevertheless related to Mexico’s definitive anti-dumping duty. In this regard, we recall that, under

Article 10 of the AD Agreement, a provisional measure represents a basis under which a Member

may, if the requisite conditions are met, levy anti-dumping duties retroactively. At the same time, a

Member may not, except in the circumstances provided for in Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement,

retroactively levy a definitive anti-dumping duty for a period during which provisional measures were

not applied. Consequently, because the period of time for which a provisional measure is applied is

generally determinative of the period for which a definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied

retroactively, we consider that a claim regarding the duration of a provisional measure relates to the

definitive anti-dumping duty.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para.

7.54

O Painel, em Mexico - Corn Syrup, considerando o fato de o Artigo 17.4 referir-se apenas ao

parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7, e entendendo ser incorreto interpretar o Artigo 17.4 como proibitivo ao

direito do Membro prejudicado intentar uma reclamação ao DSB alegando violação ao Acordo Anti-

Dumping, concluiu pela permissão de tal reclamação.

Para. 7.54. “Read literally, this provision could be taken to mean that in a dispute where the specific

measure being challenged is a provisional measure, the only claim that a Member may pursue is a

claim under Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement (and not a claim under Article 7.4 of the AD

Agreement). If this conclusion is correct, a ruling that a claim under Article 7.4 could not be pursued

in a dispute where the specific measure challenged is a definitive anti-dumping duty would mean that

a Member would never be able to pursue an Article 7.4 claim. In our view, it would be incorrect to

interpret Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement in a manner which would leave Members without any

possibility to pursue dispute settlement in respect of a claim alleging a violation of a requirement of

the AD Agreement.”

(iii) Medidas não identificadas em termos de referência

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R, para. 7.22

Em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Painel enfatiza a relevância do conteúdo dos termos de referência,

oferecido quando da instauração do Painel, para o restante do procedimento junto ao DSB. Conclui,

nesta demanda, que o requerimento do Japão estava fora dos termos de referência, pois não havia

nenhuma menção a tal indagação no momento da instauração do Painel.

Para. 7.22. The Appellate Body has noted: “As a panel request is normally not subjected to detailed

scrutiny by the DSB, it is incumbent upon a panel to examine the request for the establishment of the

panel very carefully to ensure its compliance with both the letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the

DSU. It is important that a panel request be sufficiently precise for two reasons: first, it often forms

the basis for the terms of reference of the panel pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU; and, second, it

informs the defending party and the third parties of the legal basis of the complaint.” (emphasis

added)

(iv) Abandonado de pedido

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel

Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, paras. 7.27-7.29

Neste caso, a Índia deixou de fazer constar em sua petição inicial todos os pedidos os quais tinha a

intenção de buscar esclarecimento junto ao Painel. No entanto, em momento posterior, informou que

desejava oferecer uma reclamação, na oportunidade da primeira reunião substantiva; o que foi negado

pelo Painel. Para constestar o posicionamento do Painel, a Índia importou a interpretação do Órgão

de Apelação em EC – Bananas, o qual permitiu o oferecimento de pedido posteriormente à

apresentação da Petição inicial, desde que submetido por um terceiro Membro. Muito embora haja

aparatos técnicos, o fato é que no caso em tela a Índia perdeu a oportunidade de alegar todas as suas

queixas e, posteriormente, tal atitude foi entendida como abandono de pedido, nos termos dos

parágrafos 4 e 7 do apêndice 3 do DSU, ao dispor que a parte deve informar todos seus argumentos e

fatos na primeira submissão escrita.

Para. 7.27. “This situation is not explicitly addressed in either the DSU or any previous panel or

Appellate Body report. We do note, however, the ruling of the Appellate Body in Bananas to the

effect that a claim may not be raised for the first time in a first written submission, if it was not in the

request for establishment. (161) One element of the Appellate Body’s decision in that regard was the

notice aspect of the request for establishment. The request for establishment is relied upon by

Members in deciding whether to participate in the dispute as third parties. To allow a claim to be

introduced in a first written submission would deprive Members who did not choose to participate as

third parties from presenting their views with respect to such a new claim.”

Para. 7.28. “The situation here is, in our view, analogous. That is, to allow a party to resurrect a claim

it had explicitly stated, in its first written submission, that it would not pursue would, in the absence of

significant adjustments in the Panel’s procedures, deprive other Members participating in the dispute

settlement proceeding of their full opportunities to defend their interest with respect to that claim.

Paragraphs 4 and 7 of Appendix 3 to the DSU provide that parties shall ‘present the facts of the case

and their arguments’ in the first written submission, and that written rebuttals shall be submitted prior

to the second meeting. These procedures, in our view, envision that initial arguments regarding a

claim should be presented for the first time in the first written submission, and not at the meeting of

the panel with the parties or in rebuttal submissions.”

Para. 7.29. “With respect to the interests of third parties, the unfairness of allowing a claim to be

argued for the first time at the meeting of the panel with the parties, or in rebuttal submissions, is even

more pronounced. In such a circumstance, third parties would be entirely precluded from responding

to arguments with respect to such a resurrected claim, as they would not have access to those

arguments under the normal panel procedures set out in paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the DSU.

Further, India has identified no extenuating circumstances to justify the reversal of its abandonment of

this claim. (162) Thus, in our view, it would be inappropriate in these circumstances to allow India to

resurrect its claim in this manner. Therefore, we will not rule on India’s claim under AD Agreement

Articles 6.6 and 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7 regarding failure to exercise special circumspection in

using information supplied in the petition. (163)”

Footnote 161: Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (“EC - Bananas III “), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591, at para. 143.

Footnote 162: This is not, for example, a case where a complainant obtained, through the dispute settlement process,

information in support of a claim to which it did not otherwise have access.

Footnote 163: We note that, since we do not reach India’s alternative claims in this dispute, as discussed below in para.

7.80, we also would not have reached this claim in any event.

6. Artigo 17.5

a) “Artigo 17.5(i)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), WT/DS132/R, para. 7.26

O Painel, em Mexico - Corn Syrup, entendeu, com base no Artigo 17.5(i), não ser necessário constar

na petição inicial palavras como “anular” ou “prejudicar”. No entanto, segundo o Painel deve-se

deixar claro no requerimento inicial que a alegação de anulação ou de dano está sendo feita, assim

como quais os benefícios do demandante estão sendo anulados ou prejudicados.

Para. 7.26. “In our view, Article 17.5(i) does not require a complaining Member to use the words

‘nullify’ or ‘impair’ in a request for establishment. However, it must be clear from the request that an

allegation of nullification or impairment is being made, and the request must explicitly indicate how

benefits accruing to the complaining Member are being nullified or impaired.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup

(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), WT/DS132/R, para. 7.28

Em Mexico - Corn Syrup, o Painel interpretou que um pedido de violação ao Acordo Anti-Dumping,

o qual fundamenta a anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios no Artigo 3.8 do DSU, encontra

conformidade com os termos do Artigo 17.5(i) do Acordo Anti-Dumping. Esclareceu ainda, sobre a

necessidade de indicação, pelo demandante, na petição inicial, dos benefícios anulados ou

prejudicados.

Para. 7.28. “At least one GATT Panel has described the presumption of nullification or impairment

arising from a violation of GATT provisions “in practice as an irrefutable presumption”. In our view,

a request for establishment that alleges violations of the AD Agreement which, if demonstrated, will

constitute a prima facie case of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8 of the DSU, contains a

sufficient allegation of nullification or impairment for purposes of Article 17.5(i). In addition, as

noted above, the request must indicate how benefits accruing to the complaining Member are being

nullified or impaired.”

b) “Artigo 17.5(ii)”

(i) Documentos indisponíveis às autoridades investigadoras

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel

Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R, paras. 7.6-7.7

Como restou decidido pelo Painel, em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, e em conformidade com o Artigo

17.5(ii) do Acordo Anti-Dumping (164), o Painel não irá apreciar novos fatos, detentores de novas

evidências quando, de fato, já houver os trabalhos. No entanto, deverá tomar conhecimento de

informações disponíveis sobre a questão, durante a investigação, desde que guardem conformidade

com as regras doméstica apropriadas. (165)(166)

Para. 7.6. “A panel is obligated by Article 11 of the DSU to conduct “an objective assessment of the

matter before it”. In this case, we must also consider the implications of Article 17.5(ii) of the AD

Agreement as the basis of evidentiary rulings. That Article provides:

The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to

examine the matter based upon: …

(ii) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic

procedures to the authorities of the importing Member.

It seems clear to us that, under this provision, a panel may not, when examining a claim of violation

of the AD Agreement (167) in a particular determination, consider facts or evidence presented to it

by a party in an attempt to demonstrate error in the determination concerning questions that were

investigated and decided by the authorities, unless they had been made available in conformity with

the appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the investigating country during the

investigation. Thus, for example, in examining the USITC's determination of injury under Article 3 of

the AD Agreement, we would not consider any evidence concerning the price effects of imports that

was not made available to the USITC under the appropriate US procedures. Japan acknowledges that

Article 17.5(ii) must guide the Panel in this respect, but argues that it “complements” the provisions

of the DSU which establish that it is the responsibility of the panel to determine the admissibility and

relevance of evidence offered by parties to a dispute. We agree, to the extent that it is our

responsibility to decide what evidence may be considered. However, that Article 17.5(ii) and the DSU

provisions are complementary does not diminish the importance of Article 17.5(ii) in guiding our

decisions in this regard. It is a specific provision directing a panel's decision as to what evidence it

will consider in examining a claim under the AD Agreement. Moreover, it effectuates the general

principle that panels reviewing the determinations of investigating authorities in anti-dumping cases

are not to engage in de novo review. (168)

Para. 7.7. “The conclusion that we will not consider new evidence with respect to claims under the

AD Agreement flows not only from Article 17.5(ii), but also from the fact that a panel is not to

perform a de novo review of the issues considered and decided by the investigating authorities. We

note that several panels have applied similar principles in reviewing determinations of national

authorities in the context of safeguards under the Agreement on Safeguards and special safeguards

under Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. There is no corollary to Article 17.5(ii) in

those agreements. Nonetheless, these panels have concluded that a de novo review of the

determinations would be inappropriate, and have undertaken an assessment of, inter alia, whether all

relevant facts were considered by the authorities (169). In that context, the Panel in United States -

Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities (“United

States – Wheat Gluten”) recently observed that it was not the panel's role to collect new data or to

consider evidence which could have been presented to the decision maker but was not.” (170)

Footnote 164: We note that there is no claim under Article VI of GATT 1994 in this case, so we need not consider whether

Article 17.5(ii) has implications for the evidence a panel may consider in that context.

Footnote 165: Panel Report on US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.6.

Footnote 166: Panel Report on US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.7. See also Panel Report on Egypt - Steel Rebar, paras. 7.15–

7.21.

Footnote 167: We note that there is no claim under Article VI of GATT 1994 in this case, so we need not consider whether

Article 17.5(ii) has implications for the evidence a panel may consider in that context.

Footnote 168: See, for example, Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement

from Mexico (Guatemala – Cement II), WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, para. 8.19.

Footnote 169: Panel Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European

Communities (United States - Wheat Gluten), WT/DS166/R, para. 8.6, adopted as modified (WT/DS166/AB/R) 19 January

2001; Panel Report, Korea-Dairy Safeguard, para. 7.30, Panel Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Footwear (Argentina - Footwear Safeguard), WT/DS121/R, para. 8.117, adopted as modified (WT/DS121/AB/R), 12

January 2000.

Footnote 170: Panel Report, United States - Wheat Gluten, para. 8.6.

(ii) fatos não revelados

Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H

Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para.

O Órgão de Apelação, em Thailand - H-Beams, - contrariando o que restou decidido pelo Painel, no

sentido de que a determinação de dano deve basear-se exclusivamente em uma prova demonstrada, ou

discernível, pelas partes da controvérsia -, explicou que o exame do Painel deve levar em

consideração os fatos disponíveis às autoridades domésticas, sem, no entanto, preocupar-se em buscar

fatos externos àqueles contidos na reclamação.

Para. 115. “Article 17.5 specifies that a panel’s examination must be based upon the ‘facts made

available’ to the domestic authorities. Anti-dumping investigations frequently involve both

confidential and non-confidential information. The wording of Article 17.5 does not specifically

exclude from panel examination facts made available to domestic authorities, but not disclosed or

discernible to interested parties by the time of the final determination. Based on the wording of Article

17.5, we can conclude that a panel must examine the facts before it, whether in confidential

documents or non-confidential documents.”

(iii) Documentos criados com propósito de uma disputa

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-

type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para.

Em EC - Bed Linen, o Painel entendeu que poderá aceitar documentos probatórios que não estejam

exatamente no formato em que eles foram originariamente disponibilizados à autoridade

investigadora.

Com relação à possibilidade de novos documentos serem trazidos ao processo, restou claro no caso

EC - Bed Linen que isso será possível. Nesse sentido, naquela disputa o Painel entendeu que este

poderá aceitar documentos probatórios que não sejam exatamente no formato em que eles foram

originariamente disponibilizados à autoridade investigativa. Segundo o Painel, a finalidade das

submissões de provas pelas partes é esclarecer e levar ao conhecimento do Painel os fatos relevantes,

de maneira organizada e compreensível às partes. Portanto, o formato do documento não impede que

se analise o seu conteúdo.

Para. 6.43. “Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement provides that a panel shall consider a dispute under

the AD Agreement “based upon: (…) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate

domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member”. It does not require, however, that a

panel consider those facts exclusively in the format in which they were originally available to the

investigating authority. Indeed, the very purpose of the submissions of the parties to the Panel is to

marshal the relevant facts in an organized and comprehensible fashion in support of their arguments

and to elucidate the parties' positions. Based on our review of the information that was before the

European Communities at the time it made its decision, in particular that presented by India in its

Exhibits, the parties' extensive argument regarding this evidence, and our findings with respect to

India's claim under Article 5.4, we conclude that the Exhibit in question does not contain new

evidence. Thus, we conclude that the form of the document, (i.e., a new document) does not preclude

us from considering its substance, which comprises facts made available to the investigating authority

during the investigation. There is in our view no basis for excluding the document from consideration

in this proceeding, and we therefore deny India's request.

7. Article 17.6

a) “Relação com o padrão revisto no Artigo 11 do DSU”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-

Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R,

para.

No caso US - Hot Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação comparou os padrões de análise contidos nos

Artigos 17.6 do Acordo Anti-Dumping e do Artigo 11 do DSU e, dessa forma, estabeleceu possíveis

conflitos entre os dois. (170) O Órgão de Apelação explicou, que enquanto o Artigo 17.6 é utilizado

apenas em controvérsias relacionadas ao Acordo Anti-Dumping, o Artigo 11 do DSU pode ser

utilizado em qualquer controvérsia, por ter caráter geral. Com efeito, o Artigo 11 impõe a obrigação

de “avaliação objetiva da controvérsia”, e leva em consideração todos os aspectos legais e factuais da

demanda. Por outro lado, o Artigo 17.6 está subdividido em dois sub-parágrafos, sendo que o primeiro

versa sobre a avaliação dos fatos da controvérsia, e, o segundo, sobre a interpretação das disposições

relevantes. Nesse sentido, enquanto o Artigo 11 do DSU possui caráter geral, o Artigo 17.6 é bem

mais específico e delimitado.

Para. 53. “The second threshold aspect follows from the first and concerns the relationship between

Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 11 of the DSU. Article 17.6 lays down

rules relating to a panel's examination of “matters” arising under one, and only one, covered

agreement, the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In contrast, Article 11 of the DSU provides rules which

apply to a panel's examination of “matters” arising under any of the covered agreements. Article 11

reads, in part: (…) a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it,

including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability

of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements (…) (emphasis

added)

Para. 54. “Article 11 of the DSU imposes upon panels a comprehensive obligation to make an

“objective assessment of the matter”, an obligation which embraces all aspects of a panel's

examination of the “matter”, both factual and legal. Thus, panels make an “objective assessment of

the facts”, of the “applicability” of the covered agreements, and of the “conformity” of the measure at

stake with those covered agreements. Article 17.6 is divided into two separate sub-paragraphs, each

applying to different aspects of the panel's examination of the matter. The first sub-paragraph covers

the panel's “assessment of the facts of the matter”, whereas the second covers its “interpret[ation of]

the relevant provisions”. (emphasis added) The structure of Article 17.6, therefore, involves a clear

distinction between a panel's assessment of the facts and its legal interpretation of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.”

Footnote 170: In this analysis, the Appellate Body applied its conclusions on the relationship between the provisions of the

DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures of a covered agreement developed in Guatemala - Cement II, paras.

65–67.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Investigation of the International Trade Commission

in Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá,

WT/DS277/AB/R, paras. 7.15-7.18

Em US - Softwood Lumber VI, o Painel questionou se a aplicação de padrão de revisão sob o Artigo

11 do DSU para uma determinação poderia, em circunstâncias factuais apropriadas, conduzir a

resultados discordantes, se comparado à aplicação conjunta, para a mesma determinação, dos padrões

presentes no Artigo 11 do DSU e no Artigo 17.6(i) do Acordo Anti-Dumping.

Para. 7.15. “Under the Article 17.6 standard, with respect to claims involving questions of fact,

Panels have concluded that whether the measures at issue are consistent with relevant provisions of

the AD Agreement depends on whether the investigating authority properly established the facts, and

evaluated the facts in an unbiased and objective manner. This latter has been defined as assessing

whether an unbiased and objective decision maker, taking into account the facts that were before the

investigating authority, and in light of the explanations given, could have reached the conclusions that

were reached. A panel’s task is not to carry out a de novo review of the information and evidence on

the record of the underlying investigation. Nor may a panel substitute its judgment for that of the

investigating authorities, even though the Panel might have arrived at a different determination were it

considering the record evidence for itself.”

Para. 7.16. “Similarly, the Appellate Body has explained that, under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel’s

role is not to substitute its analysis for that of the investigating authority. (171) The Appellate Body

has stated:

We wish to emphasize that, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de

novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those

of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply

accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. (172)

Para. 7.17. “In light of Canada’s clarification of its position, and based on our understanding of the

applicable standards of review under Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement,

we do not consider that it is either necessary or appropriate to conduct separate analyses of the USITC

determination under the two Agreements.”

Para. 7.18. “We consider this result appropriate in view of the guidance in the Declaration of

Ministers relating to Dispute Settlement under the AD and SCM Agreements. While the Appellate

Body has clearly stated that the Ministerial Declaration does not require the application of the Article

17.6 standard of review in countervailing duty investigations, (173) it nonetheless seems to us that in

a case such as this one, involving a single injury determination with respect to both subsidized and

dumped imports, and where most of Canada’s claims involve identical or almost identical provisions

of the AD and SCM Agreements, we should seek to avoid inconsistent conclusions.”

Footnote 171: Appellate Body Report, United States - Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from

Pakistan (“US - Cotton Yarn”), WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 November 2001, para. 74; Appellate Body Report, United

States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (“US -

Lamb”), WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, para. 106.

Footnote 172: Appellate Body Report, US - Cotton Yarn, para. 69, nº 42, citing Appellate Body Report, US - Lamb, para.

106.

Footnote 173: Appellate Body Report, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and

Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (“US - Lead and Bismuth II”), WT/DS138/AB/R,

adopted 7 June 2000, DSR 2000:V, 2601 at para. 49.

b) “Artigo 17.6(i)”

(i) Geral

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey

Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/AB/R,

para.

Em Guatemala - Cement II, o Painel definiu o padrão de revisão aplicável em virtude do Artigo

17.6(i).

Para. 8.19. “We consider that it is not our role to perform a de novo review of the evidence which

was before the investigating authority in this case. Rather, Article 17 makes it clear that our task is to

review the determination of the investigating authorities. Specifically, we must determine whether its

establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective.

(174) In other words, we must determine whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority

evaluating the evidence before it at the time of the investigation could properly have made the

determinations made by Guatemala in this case. In our review of the investigating authorities’

evaluation of the facts, we will first need to examine evidence considered by the investigating

authority, and second, this examination is limited by Article 17.5(ii) to the facts before the

investigating authority. That is, we are not to examine any new evidence that was not part of the

record of the investigation. (175)” (176)

Footnote 174: We note that, in the context of safeguard measures, the panel in Korea - Dairy, said the following of the need

for a panel to perform an objective assessment pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU: “7.30 We consider that for the Panel to

adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as

foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with

this issue. However, we do not see our review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating

authorities. Rather, we consider that the Panel’s function is to assess objectively the review conducted by the national

investigating authority, in this case the KTC. For us, an objective assessment entails an examination of whether the KTC had

examined all facts in its possession or which it should have obtained in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on

Safeguards (including facts which might detract from an affirmative determination in accordance with the last sentence of

Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards), whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole

supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international

obligations of Korea. Finally, we consider that the Panel should examine the analysis performed by the national authorities at

the time of the investigation on the basis of the various national authorities’ determinations and the evidence it had

collected.”

Footnote 175: We note that this standard is consistent with the approach followed by the panel in Guatemala - Cement I in

para. 7.57 of its report. In that instance the panel was of the opinion that its role was: “(…) to examine whether the evidence

relied on by the Ministry was sufficient, that is, whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating that

evidence could properly have determined that sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causal link existed to justify

initiating the investigation.”

Footnote 176: Panel Report on Guatemala - Cement II, para. 8.19. See also Panel Report on US - Stainless Steel, para. 6.18,

Panel Report on Argentina - Ceramic Tiles, paras.6.2–6.3 and Panel Report on Egypt - Steel Rebar, paras. 7.8–7.14.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable

Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS219/AB/R, para. 127

O Órgão de Apelação, em EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), deixa claro que o Membro que busca

a defesa do seu direito anti-dumping, deverá tentar persuadir o Órgão de Apelação com o máximo de

argumentos plausíveis, contribuindo de modo ativo com a sua decisão, e rejeição do entendimento do

Painel. (177)(178) No entanto, no caso EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, o Órgão de Apelação regeitou os

argumentos do Brasil, por não considerá-los insuficientes para esclarecer a controvérsia e para

demonstrar a alegada falha do Painel na avaliação dos fatos. (179)

Para. 127. “This excerpt demonstrates that the Panel took into account the European Communities'

responses to its questions before reaching its finding. It also indicates that the Panel did not rely

exclusively on the presumption of good faith, as Brazil suggests, given that some of the Panel's

questions were directed at the validity of Exhibit EC-12. If the Panel had placed total reliance on the

presumption of good faith, it would have simply accepted the European Communities' assertion that

Exhibit EC-12 formed part of the record of the investigation and would not have posed questions to

assess the consistency of Exhibit EC-12 with other evidence contained in the record. Therefore, we

are satisfied that the Panel “took steps to assure [itself] of the validity of [Exhibit EC-12] and of the

fact that it forms part of the contemporaneous written record of the EC investigation.”

Footnote 177: Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), para. 169, quoting Appellate Body Report, US

- Wheat Gluten, para. 151.

Footnote 178: Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), para. 170.

Footnote 179: Appellate Body Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 127.

(ii) Estabelecimento dos fatos forem adequados

Arquivos da autoridade investigadora

Uma reclamação crida não consistente por um membro foi analisada pelo Painel no caso Guatemala

— Cement. Neste caso o Painel DSUrutinou todas as informações arquivadas ante o Ministério no

momento da iniciação para analisar se os resultados alcançados pelo Ministério eram realmente

imparciais. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o procedimento não foi devidamente seguido ante o

Painel pois teria sido reverso, não alcansando a ideal interpretação e conclusão do artigo 17 pelo

Painel. Em outros casos foi decidido apenas no momento da da determinação final. De forma geral, de

acordo com o artigo 17.5 o Painel deve considerar nas disputas submetidas ao acordo AD os fatos

baseados nos arquivos das autoridades investigadoras.

631. In Guatemala — Cement I, in order to examine the claim that the initiation of an investigation

was not consistent with Article 5, the Panel “scrutinized all the information which was on the record

before the Ministry at the time of initiation in examining whether an unbiased and objective

investigating authority could properly have made the determination that was reached by the

Ministry.”(815) The Appellate Body found that the dispute was not properly before the Panel and

therefore did not reach a conclusion on the interpretation of Article 17 by the Panel.(816)

Accordingly, the Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I was adopted as reversed by the Appellate

Body.(817) However, the panels on EC — Bed Linen, US — Stainless Steel, Guatemala — Cement II,

and Thailand — H-Beams also based their factual review of decisions of the investigating authority on

the evidence before the authority at the time of the determination.(818) See also paragraphs 622–624

above dealing with Article 17.5(ii) which orders Panels to consider a dispute under the Anti-Dumping

Agreement on the basis of the facts made available to the investigating authorities.

815. Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 7.60.

816. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 89.

817. WT/DSB/M/51, section 9(a).

818. Panel Report on EC — Bed Linen, para. 6.45; Panel Report on US — Stainless Steel, para. 6.3;

Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement II, para. 8.19; and Panel Report on Thailand — H-Beams,

para. 7.51; Panel Report on Argentina — Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.27.

tratamento dos fatos não revelados

Uma análise hermenêutica foi feita pelo Órgão de Apelação no Caso Thailand — H-Beams para saber

se a análise dos danos seria baseada apenas nas evidências não reveladas às partes em uma

investigação. Ao analisar o termo “establishment”, aquele órgão entendeu ser uma ação assertiva

perante a disputa. A palavra “proper” foi interpretada como preciso ou correto. Nesse sentido,

entendeu o órgão que a expressão do estabelecimento preciso dos fatos não teriam uma lógica clara

se se traria de fatos não revelados ou discernidos pelas partes ao final da investigação.

632. In Thailand — H-Beams, in discussing whether an injury determination must be based only

upon evidence disclosed to the parties to the investigation, the Appellate Body interpreted the term

“establishment of the facts was proper”, as follows:

“The ordinary meaning of ‘establishment’ suggests an action to ‘place beyond dispute;

ascertain, demonstrate, prove’; the ordinary meaning of ‘proper’ suggests ‘accurate’ or

‘correct’. Based on the ordinary meaning of these words, the proper establishment of the

facts appears to have no logical link to whether those facts are disclosed to, or discernible by,

the parties to an anti-dumping investigation prior to the final determination.”(819)

819. Appellate Body Report on Thailand — H-Beams, para. 116. With respect to a related topic under

Article 3.1, see also paras. 111–114 of this Chapter.

O objetivo do artigo 17.6 é exatamente previnir “segundas avaliações”. Nesse sentido, o órgão de

apelação estabeleceu a conexão existente entre os artigos 17.6 e o artigo 17.5. Com efeito, enquanto

aquele refere-se aos “problemas”existentes”, este estabelece o procedimento que deve ser em

conformidade com o disposto pelas autoridades domésticas. Não obstante a existências dos fatos do

processo, esses fato poderão ser não- confidenciais ou mesmo confidenciais de acordo com os artigos

6.5 e 12 (parágrafos 2.1,2.2 e 2.3). Com efeito não excluem-se a análise de todos os fatos

disponibilizados às autoridades do país importador, podendo inclusive ser ao final de todo

procedimento, tratando-se, portanto, de cunho processual e conforme o devido processo legal,

respeitando a possibilidade de haverem fatos não revelados.

633. The Appellate Body elaborated on the aim of Article 17.6(i), stating that its function is to

“prevent a panel from ‘second-guessing’ a determination of a national authority when the

establishment of the facts is proper and the evaluation of those facts is unbiased and objective”:

“There is a clear connection between Articles 17.6(i) and 17.5(ii). The facts of the matter

referred to in Article 17.6(i) are ‘the facts made available in conformity with appropriate

domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member’ under Article 17.5(ii). Such

facts do not exclude confidential facts made available to the authorities of the importing

Member. Rather, Article 6.5 explicitly recognizes the submission of confidential information

to investigating authorities and its treatment and protection by those authorities. Article 12,

in paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, also recognizes the use, treatment and protection of

confidential information by investigating authorities. The ‘facts’ referred to in Articles

17.5(ii) and 17.6(i) thus embrace ‘all facts confidential and non-confidential’, made available

to the authorities of the importing Member in conformity with the domestic procedures of

that Member. Article 17.6(i) places a limitation on the panel in the circumstances defined by

the Article. The aim of Article 17.6(i) is to prevent a panel from ‘second-guessing’ a

determination of a national authority when the establishment of the facts is proper and the

evaluation of those facts is unbiased and objective. Whether evidence or reasoning is

disclosed or made discernible to interested parties by the final determination is a matter of

procedure and due process. These matters are very important, but they are comprehensively

dealt with in other provisions, notably Articles 6 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.”(820)

820. Appellate Body Report on Thailand — H-Beams, para. 117. With respect to a related topic under

Article 3.1, see also paras. 111–114 of this Chapter.

(iii) “avaliação dos fatos sejam imparciais e objetivos”

No caso US — Stainless Steel, o Painel rejeitou o pedido da Korea que não cria que a avaliação das

vendas em dollar ou won poderia ser um fato objetivo de acordo com o artigo 17.6. Nesse context, o

Painel decidiu que este artigo fala não somente sobre o estabelecimento de fatos mas também sua

avaliação. Com efeito o Painel não deve checar meramente se a autoridade nacional estabeleceu

propriamente os fatos relevantes, mas também o peso vinculado a esses fatos e se foram oferecidos de

uma forma imparcial e objetiva.

634. In US — Stainless Steel, the Panel examined the determinations of the United States

authorities on the issue of whether certain local sales were in dollars or won. The Panel rejected

Korea’s argument that Article 17.6(i) did not apply to the examination of this issue because the United

States decision on this point was not a factual determination. The Panel stated:

“Korea’s view appears to be that Article 17.6(i) applies only in respect of the establishment

of certain objectively-ascertainable underlying facts, e.g., did the invoices express the sales

values in terms of dollars or won, in what currency payment was made, etc. We consider that

this interpretation does not however coincide with the language of Article 17.6(i). That

Article speaks not only to the establishment of the facts, but also to their evaluation.

Therefore, the Panel must check not merely whether the national authorities have properly

established the relevant facts but also the value or weight attached to those facts and whether

this was done in an unbiased and objective manner. This concerns the according of a certain

weight to the facts in their relation to each other; it is not a legal evaluation.”(821)

821. Panel Report on US — Stainless Steel, para. 6.18.

Na oportunidade do caso Thailand — H-Beams, o Órgão de Apelação teve a oportunidade de analisar

se um dano deveria ser analisado apenas com base nas informações postas a disposição pelo membro.

Nessa mesma oportunidade o Órgão avaliou a expressão “unbiased” e “objective”, isto é “imparcial” e

“objetivo”, e chegou a conclusão que analisadas de uma forma comum realmente essa duas palavras

não dão uma clareza lógica se seria os fatos disponibilizados os discernidos como um todo pelos

membros ao tempo da determinação final.

635. In Thailand — H-Beams, in discussing whether an injury determination must be based only

upon evidence disclosed to the parties to the investigation, the Appellate Body touched on the term

“unbiased and objective”. The Appellate Body stated that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the words

‘unbiased’ and ‘objective’ also appears to have no logical link to whether those facts are disclosed to,

or discernible by, the parties to an anti-dumping investigation at the time of the final

determination.”(822) See also the excerpt from the Appellate Body Report on Thailand — H-Beams

referenced in paragraph 633 above.

822. Appellate Body Report on Thailand — H-Beams, para. 116.

(iv) Relevância dos diferentes papéis dos Painéis e das autoridades investigadoras

No caso US — Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação definiu a meta do Painel ressaltando a

importancia dos diferentes papéis exercidos pelas autoridades investigadoras e pelos painéis. Nesse

sentido, o artigo 17.6 estabelece a obrigação do Painel e define quando as autoridades investigadoras

poderão estar agindo de forma inconsistente. Dessa forma o artigo 17.6 estabelece um padrão

apropriado para o acordo AD. Com efeito o Painel deve avaliar se o estabelecimento dos fatos

oferecidos pelas autoridades investigativas foi feito de forma apropriada, assim como objetiva e

imparcial. Caso o Painel decida que não está inconsistente com o acordo AD poderá negar a

continuação do processo.

636. In US — Hot-Rolled Steel, when defining the task of panels under Article 17.6(i), the

Appellate Body recalled the importance “to bear in mind the different roles of panels and

investigating authorities”.(823)

“Although the text of Article 17.6(i) is couched in terms of an obligation on panels — panels

‘shall’ make these determinations the provision, at the same time, in effect defines when

investigating authorities can be considered to have acted inconsistently with the Anti-

Dumping Agreement in the course of their ‘establishment’ and ‘evaluation’ of the relevant

facts. In other words, Article 17.6(i) sets forth the appropriate standard to be applied by

panels in examining the WTO-consistency of the investigating authorities’ establishment

and evaluation of the facts under other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Thus,

panels must assess if the establishment of the facts by the investigating authorities was

proper and if the evaluation of those facts by those authorities was unbiased and objective. If

these broad standards have not been met, a panel must hold the investigating authorities’

establishment or evaluation of the facts to be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.”(824)

823. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 55.

824. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 56.

637. Com relação aos diferentes papeis das autoridades investigadoras e dos paineis no contexto do

artigo 3.7 (ameaça de danos sérios), olhar parágrafo 199 acima.

(v) ex post não poderão ser racionalizadas

Ao analisar se a racionalização poderia ou não ser tomada em conta na avaliação das autoridades,

sendo essa tomadas de forma imparcial e objetiva. Ao rever se a avaliação foi feita ao tempo da

determinação em uma manifestação pública do membro ou em qualquer outro documento público ou

de natureza confidencial. Com efeito, o entendimento é que ao rever uma avaliação da autoridade

investigadora, deverá ser levado em consideração argumentos e razões que não formaram partena

avaliação do processo pela autoridade investigadora. Esses novos fatos seriam considerados ex post

facto que não foram trazidos ao processo ao tempo das determinações.

638. On the question of whether ex post rationalization should be taken into account in order to

assess an authority’s compliance with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel on

Argentina — Ceramic Tiles stated:

“Under Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement we are to determine whether the DCD established

the facts properly and whether the evaluation performed by the DCD was unbiased and

objective. In other words, we are asked to review the evaluation of the DCD made at the time

of the determination as set forth in a public notice or in any other document of a public or

confidential nature. We do not believe that, as a panel reviewing the evaluation of the

investigating authority, we are to take into consideration any arguments and reasons that did

not form part of the evaluation process of the investigating authority, but instead are ex post

facto justifications which were not provided at the time the determination was made.”(825)

(emphasis in original)

825. Panel Report on Argentina — Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.27.

No caso Argentina — Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, se confirmou que quando o Painel for rever uma

avaliação feita pelas autoridades investigadora, aquele não deverá levar em consideração argumentos

e razões que não foram demonstradas ao formarem parte da avaliação do processo de investigação das

autoridades. Com efeito, no caso já citado o Painel entendeu que ex post facts não seriam aceitos

como argumento.

639. The Panel on Argentina — Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties agreed with the view expressed by

the Panel on Argentina — Ceramic Tiles, concluding that as a panel reviewing the evaluation of the

investigating authority, it did not believe it was to “take into consideration any arguments and reasons

that are not demonstrated to have formed part of the evaluation process of the investigating

authority”(826)

826. Panel Report on Argentina — Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.49. The Panel thus rejected

various arguments that were based on an ex post rationalization by the defendant, such as those put

forward with respect to the evaluation of the magnitude of the margin of dumping as an Article 3.4

factor:

“We note that Argentina has failed to indicate where such arguments are set forth in the CNCE’s

Record No. 576, or to point us to any other document in which the CNCE is alleged to have

considered such arguments. Such arguments therefore constitute ex post rationalization which we are

precluded from taking into account. […]” Panel Report on Argentina — Poultry Anti-Dumping

Duties, para. 7.321.

(vi) Relação do artigo 17.6 com o artigo 11 do DSB

No caso US — Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação definiu os objetivos do Painel com relação ao

artigo 17.6 ao comparar este artigo com o artigo 11 do DSB. De acordo com aquele artigo o objetivo

do Painel é simplesmente rever o estabelecimento e avaliação dos fatos disponibilizados pelas

autoridades investigadoras. De fato, é exatamente esse o mandamento do artigo 11 do DSB em dizer

que o Painel deverá avaliar ‘objetivamente’ os fatos. Nesse sentido as provisões do artifo 17.6 e 11

estão em total conformidade, não podendo se falar em conflito entre os dois.

640. In US — Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body defined the task of panels under Article 17.6(i)

by comparing it to their task under Article 11 of the DSU:

“Under Article 17.6(i), the task of panels is simply to review the investigating authorities’

‘establishment’ and ‘evaluation’ of the facts. To that end, Article 17.6(i) requires panels to

make an ‘assessment of the facts ‘. The language of this phrase reflects closely the obligation

imposed on panels under Article 11 of the DSU to make an ‘objective assessment of the facts

‘. Thus the text of both provisions requires panels to ‘assess’ the facts and this, in our view,

clearly necessitates an active review or examination of the pertinent facts. Article 17.6(i) of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not expressly state that panels are obliged to make an

assessment of the facts which is ‘objective’. However, it is inconceivable that Article 17.6(i)

should require anything other than that panels make an objective ‘assessment of the facts of

the matter’. In this respect, we see no ‘conflict’ between Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement and Article 11 of the DSU.”(827)

827. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 55.

Em oportunidade de uma demanda da Índia no caso US — Steel Plate, o Painel entendeu que não

existe conflito entre os artigos 17.6 e o artigo 11.

641. In US — Steel Plate, India requested the Panel to conduct an “active review” of the facts

before the US investigating authorities pursuant to both Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6(i).

India based its request in the Appellate Body’s decisions on the application of Article 11 in US —

Cotton Yarn(828) and of Article 17.6(i) in US — Hot-Rolled Steel.(829) The US was opposed to such

a request since it considered that India was trying to add to the obligations of investigating authorities.

The Panel considered that there was no question that it had to apply Article 17.6 to the dispute and

recalled the Appellate Body’s decision in US — Hot-Rolled Steel to the effect that Article 17.6(i) is

not in conflict with Article 11 of the DSU(830) and that Article 17.6(ii) supplemented Article 11 of

the DSU.(831) (832) The Panel found:

“[W]e do not consider that India’s reference to Article 11 of the DSU constitutes an

argument that we apply some other or different standard of review in considering the factual

aspects of this dispute than that set out in Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, which India

recognizes is applicable in all anti-dumping disputes. That standard requires us to assess the

facts to determine whether the investigating authorities’ own establishment of facts was

proper, and to assess the investigating authorities’ own evaluation of those facts to determine

if it was unbiased and objective. What is clear from this is that we are precluded from

establishing facts and evaluating them for ourselves — that is, we may not engage in de novo

review. However, this does not limit our examination of the matters in dispute, but only the

manner in which we conduct that examination. In this regard, we keep in mind that Article

17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement establishes that we are to examine the matter based upon ‘the

facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of

the importing Member.’ “(833)

828. See Section XI of the Chapter on DSU.

829. See para. 640 of this Chapter.

830. See para. 640 of this Chapter.

831. See para. 644 of this Chapter.

832. Panel Report on US — Steel Plate, paras. 7.1–7.5.

833. Panel Report on US — Steel Plate, para. 7.6.

(c) Artigo 17.6(ii)

(i) Primeira sentença : regras habituais de interpretação

Com relação a primeira sentença do artigo 17.6 o OA entendeu como se as previsões desse artigo se

assemelhassem a algo muito próximo do artigo 3.2 do DSB. Essas regras habituais estariam dentro do

artigo 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viena sobre Direito dos Tratados . O OA entendeu que além de não

estarem em conflito esses artigos, eles até se confirmam no sentido de que as regras habituais

aplicáveis a interpretação do DSB, também se aplicam ao acordo AD.

642. In US — Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body looked into the first sentence of Article 17.6(ii)

which provides that the Panel “shall” interpret the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement “in

accordance with customary rules of interpretation”, and considered that it echoed closely Article 3.2

of the DSU (See Section III.B.1 of the Chapter on the DSU). The Appellate Body stated that such

customary rules are embodied in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the

Treaties. On a further note, the Appellate Body indicated that “[c]learly, this aspect of Article 17.6(ii)

involves no ‘conflict’ with the DSU but, rather, confirms that the usual rules of treaty interpretation

under the DSU also apply to the Anti-Dumping Agreement”.(834)

834. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 57. See also Panel Report on US — Steel

Plate, para. 7.7.

(ii) Segunda sentença : mais de uma interpretação permissiva

Ao analisar a segunda sentença do artigo 17.6 o OA, no caso US — Hot-Rolled Steel, chegou a

conclusão de que podem haver mais de uma interpretação sobre as provisões do acordo AD. Nesse

contexto, o OA entendeu que o termo “interpretações permissivas” quer dizer que qualquer

interpretação que seja considerada apropriada pode ser permissivo. Nesse contexto, os Painéis são

obrigados a determinar se uma medida seria entendida como relevante, e essa obrigação é permitida

de acordo com os artigos 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viana sobre Direito dos Tratados.

643. The second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) deals with the situation where there is more than one

permissible interpretation of a provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.(835) In US — Hot-Rolled

Steel, the Appellate Body defined the term “permissible interpretation” as “one which is found to be

appropriate after application of the pertinent rules of the Vienna Convention”.(836) The Appellate

Body considered:

“This second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) presupposes that application of the rules of treaty

interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention could give rise to, at least, two

interpretations of some provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which, under that

Convention, would both be ‘permissible interpretations’. In that event, a measure is deemed

to be in conformity with the Anti-Dumping Agreement ‘if it rests upon one of those

permissible interpretations.’

It follows that, under Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, panels are obliged to

determine whether a measure rests upon an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement which is permissible under the rules of treaty interpretation in

Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.”(837)

835. In EC — Bed Linen, the EC argued that the Panel had failed to apply the standard of review laid

down in Article 17.6(ii) because it had not established that the interpretation of Article 2.4.2 of the

Anti-Dumping Agreement was “impermissible”. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding and

indicated that the Panel had not viewed the interpretation given by the EC of Article 2.4.2 as a

“permissible interpretation” within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii). The Appellate Body considered

that “the Panel was not faced with a choice of multiple ‘permissible’ interpretations which would have

required it, under Article 17.6(ii), to give deference to the interpretation relied upon by the European

Communities. Rather, the Panel was faced with a situation in which the interpretation relied upon by

the European Communities was, …, ‘impermissible’.” Appellate Body Report on EC — Bed Linen,

paras. 63–66. 836. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 60.

837. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, paras. 59–60.

(iii) Relação com o padrão de análise do artigo 11 do DSB

Ao analisar o caso US — Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação chegou a conclusão que além de não

suplementar, na verdade o artigo 17.6 complementa o artigo 11 do DSB. Nesse contexto, as

controvérsias sujeitas ao DSB, os Painéis deverão fazer uma avaliação objetiva do problema, sua

aplicabilidade e conformidade com as medidas cobertas pelo acordo AD. Com efeito, a análise de

uma controvérsia deve levar em conta os dois artigos, poise les se complementam.

644. In US — Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body considered the relationship between Article

17.6(ii) and the DSU, in particular Article 11. The Appellate Body stated:

“[A]lthough the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement imposes

obligations on panels which are not found in the DSU, we see Article 17.6(ii) as

supplementing, rather than replacing, the DSU, and Article 11 in particular. Article 11

requires panels to make an ‘objective assessment of the matter’ as a whole. Thus, under the

DSU, in examining claims, panels must make an ‘objective assessment’ of the legal

provisions at issue, their ‘applicability’ to the dispute, and the ‘conformity’ of the measures

at issue with the covered agreements. Nothing in Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement suggests that panels examining claims under that Agreement should not conduct

an ‘objective assessment’ of the legal provisions of the Agreement, their applicability to the

dispute, and the conformity of the measures at issue with the Agreement. Article 17.6(ii)

simply adds that a panel shall find that a measure is in conformity with the Anti-Dumping

Agreement if it rests upon one permissible interpretation of that Agreement.”(838)

838. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 62.

No caso US — Softwood Lumber VI, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que de acordo com as regras do

acordo AD, o Painel deverá seguir as mesmas regras de interpretação dos tratados. A diferença com

relação ao acordo AD especificamente é que o Painel encontra mais de uma interpretação permissiva.

Não se sabe até que ponto a análise de uma controvérsia poderia ter resultados diferentes se baseado

em diferentes artigos de diferentes acordos. O Órgão de Apelação ressalta que apesar da suposição,

este não seria o caso, poise m nenhuma instância tal violação foi alegada, isto é , se haveriam mais de

uma interpretação permissiva nos acordos mais relevantes.

645. With respect to the question of the legal interpretation under Article 17.6 (ii), the Panel on US

— Softwood Lumber VI considered that under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, a panel is to follow the

same rules of treaty interpretation as in any other dispute:

“Thus, it is clear to us that under the AD Agreement, a panel is to follow the same rules of

treaty interpretation as in any other dispute. The difference is that if a panel finds more than

one permissible interpretation of a provision of the AD Agreement, it may uphold a measure

that rests on one of those interpretations. It is not clear whether the same result could be

reached under Articles 3.2 and 11 of the DSU. However, it seems to us that there might well

be cases in which the application of the Vienna Convention principles together with the

additional provisions of Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement could result in a different

conclusion being reached in a dispute under the AD Agreement than under the SCM

Agreement. In this case, it has not been necessary for us to resolve this question, as we did

not find any instances where the question of violation turned on the question whether there

was more than one permissible interpretation of the text of the relevant Agreements.”(839)

839. Panel Report on US — Softwood Lumber VI, para. 7.22.

(d) Relação entre os sub-parágrafos (i) e (ii) do artigo 17.6

No caso Mexico-Corn Syrup, o OA entendeu que os requisitos para o padrão estabelecidos pelo art.

17.6 (i) e (ii) são cumuativos. Deverá haver uma determinação feita pelas autoridades investigativas

que devem ser consistentes com as provisões relevantes do acordo AD, assim como deverão ser

propriamente estabelecidos e avaliados de forma imparcial e objetiva sobre uma interpretação

pemissiva.

646. In Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US), the Appellate Body ruled that “the requirements

of the standard of review provided for in Article 17.6(i) and 17.6(ii) are cumulative. In other words, a

panel must find a determination made by the investigating authorities to be consistent with relevant

provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement if it finds that those investigating authorities have properly

established the facts and evaluated those facts in an unbiased and objective manner, and that the

determination rests upon a ‘permissible’ interpretation of the relevant provisions.”(840)

840. Appellate Body Report on Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US), para. 130.

8. Relação com outros artigos

(a) Artigo 3

647. No caso Thailand — H-Beams, o Órgão de Apelação localizou a relação entre os artigos 3.1, e

o artigo 17.6. olhar o parágrafo 113 acima.

(b) Artigo 5

O Painel no caso Guatemala — Cement I, estabeleceu a relação entre os artigos 5.3 e 17.6

determinando o que seria constituir “ evidências suficientes para justificar a iniciação de uma

investigação”. Com efeito, de acordo com o artigo 5.3 o Painel estabeleceu o padrão estabelecido pelo

artigo 17.6. Nesse mesmo caso, o Painel entendeu que os padrões do artigo 5 são menos estritos que

aqueles estabelecidos estabelecidos nas investigações primárias ou finais relacionadas a dumping,

dano ou causa em tela. Mesmo expondo detalhes e fazendo interpretações, o OA naquele caso decidiu

extinguir o processo por falta de conclusões sobre as interpretações do artigo 17.6.

648. The Panel on Guatemala — Cement I addressed the relationship between Articles 5.3 and

17.6. In determining what constitutes “sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation”

under Article 5.3, the Panel on Guatemala — Cement I applied the standard of review set out in

Article 17.6(i).(841) The Panel also considered that the standard of review for the initiation of an

investigation under Article 5 is less strict than that for preliminary or final determination of dumping,

injury and causation.(842) However, the Appellate Body found that the dispute was not properly

before the Panel and therefore did not reach a conclusion on the interpretation of Article 17.6. See

paragraph 256 above.

841. Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 7.57.

842. Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 7.57.

(c) Artigo 7

649. Relação entre os artigos 7.1 e 17.4 foram discutidos no caso Mexico — Corn Syrup. Olhar

acima 616 acima.

650. Olhar também a relação entre os artigos 7.4 e 17.4. Essa relação foi discutida também no caso

Mexico — Corn Syrup. Olhar parágrafos 615-616 acima.

(d) Artigo 18

651. Ademais, a relação entre os artigos 17.4, 18.1 e 18.4 foi discutida no caso US — 1916 Act.

Olhar parágrafo 596.

9. Relação com outros acordos da OMC

(a) GATT 1994

(i) Artigos XXII e XXIII

Foi feita a relação entre o artigo 17 e os artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994. Nesse sentido

entendeu-se que esses artigos não estão expressamente incorporados no acordo AD, ao contrário do

que ocorre com os outros acordos do Anexo 1A que contemplam os artigos XXII e XXIII.

652. The Appellate Body in Guatemala — Cement I noted the following regarding the relationship

between Article 17 and Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994:

“Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 are not expressly incorporated by reference

into the Anti-Dumping Agreement as they are into all of the other Annex 1A agreements …

As a result, … Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 does not apply to disputes brought under the

Anti-Dumping Agreement. On the contrary, Articles 17.3 and 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement are the ‘consultation and dispute settlement provisions’ pursuant to which

disputes may be brought under that covered agreement.”(843)

843. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 64, fn 43.

653. O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala — Cement I, avaliou essa questão. Ver parágrafo

607 acima. També, esse assunto foi avaliado no caso US — 1916 Act. Ver parágrafo 593-594 acima.

(b) DSB

(i) Artigo 1

654. O OA no caso Guatemala — Cement I considerou a aplicação concorrente do artigo 17 e as

regras e procedimentos do DSB. Ver parágrafo 591 acima.

(ii) Artigo 3.8

655. No caso Mexico — Corn Syrup, o Painel comentou sobre a relação entre o artigo 17.6 do

acordo AD e o artigo 3.8 do DSB. Ver parágrafo 621 acima.

(iii) Artigo 6.2

O Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a conclusão do Painel que havia aceitado a prevalência do artigo 17.5

sobre o artigo 6.2 do DSB, dizendo que ao contrário do que o Painel havia entendo, esses dois artigos

agiriam conjuntamente. Ao analisar tal caso em tela, o OA explicou que mesmo que o artigo 17.5

tenha mais informações que o 6.2, isso não é suficiente para dizer ou nulificar as questões específicas

trazidas por este ultimo artigo nas disputas que envolvam o acordo AD, não havendo, portanto,

inconcistência entre os dois artigos.

656. The Appellate Body in Guatemala — Cement I rejected the Panel’s conclusion that Article

17.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement prevails over Article 6.2 of the DSU and went on to state that

both provisions apply cumulatively:

“The fact that Article 17.5 contains these additional requirements, which are not mentioned

in Article 6.2 of the DSU, does not nullify, or render inapplicable, the specific requirements

of Article 6.2 of the DSU in disputes brought under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In our

view, there is no inconsistency between Article 17.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the

provisions of Article 6.2 of the DSU. On the contrary, they are complementary and should be

applied together. A Panel request made concerning a dispute brought under the Anti-

Dumping Agreement must therefore comply with the relevant dispute settlement provisions

of both that Agreement and the DSU. Thus, when a ‘matter’ is referred to the DSB by a

complaining party under Article 17.4 of the AntiDumping Agreement, the Panel request must

meet the requirements of Articles 17.4 and 17.5 of the AntiDumping Agreement as well as

Article 6.2 of the DSU.”(844)

844. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 75.

657. O Painel no caso Mexico — Corn Syrup discutiu a relação entre o artigo 17.4 do acordo AD, e

o artigo 6.2 do DSB. Ver parágrafo 611 acima.

658. Essa questão foi discutida também pelo Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala — Cement I.

Ver parágrafo 656 acima.

(iv) Artigo 7

A palavra “matter” se encontra tanto no artigo 7 do DSB, como no artigo 17.4 do acordo AD. No caso

Guatemala — Cement I , o OA entendeu que os padrões dos termos de referência para Painéis

deverão interpretar aquela palavra da mesma forma, tendo portanto, um mesmo significado em ambos

dispositivos, qual seja o siginificado: que as “medidas” e “reclamações” devem ser identificadas em

um Painel.

659. The Appellate Body in Guatemala — Cement I linked the term “matter” in Article 7 of the

DSU, which provides the standard terms of reference for Panels, to the same word in Article 17.4 of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement.(845) It specifically stated:

“[T]he word ‘matter’ has the same meaning in Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as

it has in Article 7 of the DSU. It consists of two elements: the specific ‘measure’ and the

‘claims’ relating to it, both of which must be properly identified in a Panel request as

required by Article 6.2 of the DSU.”(846)

845. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 72.

846. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 76.

660. O Órgão de Apelação avaliou mais sobre o assunto em tela. Ver parágrafo 613 acima.

(v) Artigo 11

661. Para a relação entre o artigo 17.6 e o padrão de avaliação das provisões do DSB, ex: artigo 11,

Ver parágrafos 626, 640, 644 3 627 acima. Ver também seções XI do capítulo do DSB.

(vi) Artigo 19.1

Em disputa no caso Guatemala — Cement I, surgiu a dúvida se uma queixa que não se encontra em

conformidfade com o disposto no acordo AD poderia ser analisada pelo Painel . Com efeito, a não

conformidade seria o caso de nenhum dos três pré-requisitos dispostos no ponto 612 não serem

satisfeitos, quais sejam: um dever provisional, um dever final ou uma diminuição dos preços. Nesse

caso, a Guatemala alegou que nenhum desses três elementos foi identificado e, portanto, não poderia

ser analisado o caso. O Painel rejeitou o alegado. Nesse sentido, por mais que não haja os requisitos,

isso não limitará o Painel de aplicar medidas específicas.

662. In Guatemala — Cement I, it was disputed whether a complaint of non-compliance in an

antidumping investigation should be examined even if neither a final anti-dumping measure, a

provisional measure nor a price undertaking is identified in the request for panel establishment, as

referenced in paragraph 612 above. In this regard, the Panel rejected Guatemala’s argument that a

final or provisional duty or a price undertaking must be identified in a request for panel establishment

in order for a panel to be able to issue a recommendation in terms of Article 19.1 of the DSU:

“This [argument] is clearly in conflict with our conclusion regarding the interpretation of the

provisions of the ADP Agreement as not limited to disputes involving only specific

‘measures’. A restrictive reading of Article 19.1 would mean that, while the ADP Agreement

provides for consultations and establishment of a Panel to consider a matter without

limitation to a specific ‘measure’, the Panel so established is not empowered to make a

recommendation with respect to that matter. This would clearly run counter to the intention

of the drafters of the DSU to establish an effective dispute resolution system for the WTO. In

addition, it would undermine the special or additional rules for dispute settlement in anti-

dumping cases provided for in the ADP Agreement. A broader reading of Article 19.1, on

the other hand, would give effect to the special or additional dispute settlement provisions of

the ADP Agreement, by allowing Panels in anti-dumping disputes to consider the ‘matter’

referred to them, and issue a recommendation with respect to that matter. As discussed

below, the DSU provisions relied on … do not, in our view, limit Panels to the consideration

only of certain types of specified ‘measures’ in disputes.”(847)

847. Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 7.21. With respect to the issue of repayment of

anti-dumping duties under Article 19.1 of the DSU, see Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement II,

paras. 9.4–9.7.

O Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala — Cement I chego a conclusão queo pedido não foi feito de

maneira adequada de acordo com o artigo 19.1 e portanto não chegou em nenhuma conclusão. Nesse

caso, o querelante não identificou as medidas relevantes de anti-dumping.

663. The Appellate Body in Guatemala — Cement I found that the dispute was not properly before

the Panel and therefore did not come to any conclusion as to the broad reading of Article 19.1 by the

Panel.(848) The Appellate Body concluded that the Panel did not consider whether the complainant,

Mexico, had properly identified a relevant anti-dumping measure in its panel request, and the Panel

had therefore erred in finding the dispute properly before it.(849)

848. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 89.

849. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 88.

III. Comentários

A importância do artigo 17 é inconteste, tratando-se este da solução das controvérsias que surgirem

referentes a direitos anti-dumping. Sem embargo, temos que, não apenas as controvércias relacionadas

ao dumping serão analisadas à luz daquele artigo, este foi o exato entendimento no caso Guatemala-

Cement I . Neste contexto o artigo 17 se mostra bastante amplo e prova disso é que houveram 72

(setenta e duas) interpretações do artigo 17 e seus parágrafos, número este acima da média dos outros

artigos, o que mais uma vez revela sua importância.

A importância do artigo 17 se revela ainda maior quando a controvérsia versar sobre direitos anti-

dumping. Com efeito, é sabido que existem outras disposições que tratam sobre a solução de

controvérsias em outros diplomas (inclusive do DSB da OMC). Nesse sentido, quando em um caso

concreto de direitos anti-dumping surgir algum conflito entre normas de solução de controvérsias, irá

prevalecer o disposto no artigo 17 sobre outros. Nas partes convergentes os dois sistemas irão operar

em conformidade. Essas regrar que prevalecerão são conhecidas como regras especiais e adicionais e

prevalecem sobre a norma geral de outro diploma.

Outra questão importante em relação ao artigo 17, isto é, em relação a resolução de controvérsias que

surgem referentes ao dumping, é saber se o Painel e o Órgão de Apelação podem julgar a legislação

interna dos membros. Nesse contexto, o artigo 17.2 deixa claro que consultas poderão ser feitas a

medidas que afetem a operação do acordo de implementação do artigo VI. Nesse sentido, de forma

geral os países segundo a rodada Tókio devem transformar suas leis, regulações e procedimentos

administrativos ao que foi acordado no acordo anti-dumping. Não obstante o fato de os membros

terem que compatibilizar suas legislações internas ao acordo, ainda não se é possível que estes orgãos

exijam de forma coercitiva que os membros hajam dessa forma.

De forma geral as regras mandatórias e discricionárias_ analisando-se quais regras são mandatórias e

quais são discricionárias sempre no caso concreto_ poderão ser analisadas pelo Painel e pelo OA pois

Segundo o artigo 18.4 todas as medidas necessárias, gerais ou particulares deverão ser tomadas para

assegurar as leis, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos estejam em conformidade com o

acordo AD, seguindo sempre, obviamente, o princípio da boa-fé.

Outra questão que merece comentário, é se uma prática dentro do ordenamento interno poderia por sí

só justificar uma reclamação perante o Painel ou o OA, isto é, se poderia a legislação de um país ser

levada ao DSB. O entendimento é de que para configuração de uma reclamação, essas práticas

deveriam enquadrar em um sistema operacional independente e divergente do estabelecido pelo

acordo AD, ou seja, na prática a configuração desse sistema operacional independente seria

dificilmente aceito pelo Painel, e , de fato, não foi aceito no caso US — Steel Plate. O que se tem por

certo até então são os 3 (três) elementos do rol taxativo do artigo 17.4, quais sejam: a aplicação

definitiva de um direito anti-dumping; uma redução nos preços ou ainda uma medida provisional.

Com efeito, o Painel não julgará procedimentos internos sem estar vinculado a um caso concreto, e

para que se inicie um caso concreto, na instauração inicial das investigações deve restar claro uma

daquelas três previsões listadas acima. Neste ponto o Órgão de Apelação menciona que o acordo

Anti-dumping falhou ao não prever além das três possibilidade de instauração do Painel, a

possibilidade de um membro poder indagar sobre a legislação de outro membro. Afirma o órgão que

tal possibilidade já está evidenciada tanto no GATT como na OMC e foi uma falha em não ter

previsto isso no acordo anti-dumping.

Nesse sentido, baseado em um dos três fatos referidos acima, deve ser feito um pedido formal e

DSUrito com o pedido de instauração de um Painel. Além disso, deverão haver os documentos

probatórios com os termos de referência que indicarão o problema direcionado ao DSB. Nessa

reclamação deverão ser identificadas as medidas desejadas especificadamente em questão e um breve

resumo da base legal, suficientes para apresentar o problema de forma clara.

Em relação a esse pedido formal, existe a possibilidade do Painel entender que houve abandono de

pedido, caso o membro venha a alegar fatos novos em momentos posteriores. Isso ocorreu no caso US

— Steel Plate, em que a Índia alega fato novo posterior ao pedido de investigação inicial, ou quando

as autoridades investigativas já tenham concluído os trabalhos. A exceção é feita quando as

informação são disponíveis em conformidade com as regras domesticas apropriadas durante a

investigação. Nesse sentido, conclui-se que o Painel não considerará novas evidências sob o DSUopo

do acordo AD (esse foi o entendimento do caso US-Hot-Rolled steel).

Embora o OA não possa aceitar uma análise “de novo” nem substituir suas conclusões pelas das

autoridades competentes, isso não significa que o Painel deve simplesmente aceitar a conclusão das

autoridades competentes. Nesse contexto, o Painel deverá determiner a função e objetivo dos órgãos

julgadores no sentido de fazer determinações baseadas nos fatos produzidos pelas autoridades

competentes e especificamente determinar se o estabelecimento dos fatos foi feito com imparcialidade

e objetividade. Em suma, nenhuma nova evidência que esteja fora do registro feito pelas investigações

será examinado.

Outra questão relevante é se o dano a ser análisado será com base apenas nos fatos disponibilisados

pelo membro ou poderão ser explorados fatos não disponibilizados pelas autoriades investigadoras.

Nesse sentido, o entendimento geral é que poderão ser analisados argumentos e razões que não

formaram parte na avaliação do processo pela autoridade investigadora. Esses novos fatos seriam

considerados ex post facto que não foram trazidos ao processo ao tempo das determinações. Nesse

contexto, os Painéis são obrigados a determinar se uma medida seria entendida como relevante, e essa

obrigação é permitida de acordo com os artigos 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viana sobre Direito dos

Tratados.

Muito embora o entendimento geral é que deverão ser levados em consideração vários dispositivos de

vários diploma o que se tem como certo é que o Painel deverá seguir as mesmas regras de

interpretação dos tratados. A diferença com relação ao acordo AD especificamente é que o Painel

encontra mais de uma interpretação permissiva. Não se sabe até que ponto a análise de uma

controvérsia poderia ter resultados diferentes se baseado em diferentes artigos de diferentes acordos.

O Órgão de Apelação ressalta que apesar da suposição, este não seria o caso, pois em nenhuma

instância tal violação foi alegada, isto é, se haveriam mais de uma interpretação permissiva nos

acordos mais relevantes. Nesse contexto o OA entendeu que os requisitos para o padrão estabelecido

pelo art. 17.6 (i) e (ii) são cumuativos. Deverá haver uma determinação feita pelas autoridades

investigativas que devem ser consistentes com as provisões relevantes do acordo AD, assim como

deverão ser propriamente estabelecidos e avaliados de forma imparcial e objetiva sobre uma

interpretação permissiva. Ademais, para que se instaure um procedimento de acordo com o artigo 17,

alguns critérios devem existir, até mesmo para institucionalizar e trazer segurança juridical.

Nesse contexto o Painel no caso Guatemala — Cement I, estabeleceu a relação entre os artigos 5.3 e

17.6 determinando o que seria constituir “ evidências” suficientes para justificar a iniciação de uma

investigação”. Com efeito, de acordo com o artigo 5.3 o Painel estabeleceu o padrão estabelecido pelo

artigo 17.6. Nesse mesmo caso, o Painel entendeu que os padrões do artigo 5 são menos estritos que

aqueles estabelecidos estabelecidos nas investigações primárias ou finais relacionadas a dumping,

dano ou causa em tela. Para todos os efeitos, no caso de controvérsia que envolva direito anti-

dumping, ir-se-á dar especial atenção ao artigo 17 por ser o artigo mais especializado nesse tipo de

controvérsia, porém não haverá prevalência do artigo 17, pois este agirá conjuntamente aos demais

artigos que possam ajudar na resolução da controvérsia.

De forma geral, como pode ser percebido, o artigo 17 é bastante complexo possuindo muitas

interpretações. Será, portanto, no caso concreto em que mais análises serão feitas. De forma

específica, o sistema de resolução de controvérsias do acordo AD visa trazer segurança jurídica ao

direito anti-dumping. Nesse contexto, quando certo produto, seja por meio de subsídios ou por outro

meio qualquer, chega ao país importador de forma a causar algum dado ao Mercado local daquele

determinado produto, surge a possibilidade do membro que está sofrendo o dano começar um

processo de investigação segundo os critérios vistos ao longo dessa interpretação do acordo anti-

dumping.

ARTIGO 18

I.A. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 18

Final Provisions

18.1 No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in

accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.24

18.2 Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement without

the consent of the other Members.

18.3 Subject to subparagraphs 3.1 and 3.2, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to

investigations, and reviews of existing measures, initiated pursuant to applications which have

been made on or after the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement.

18.3.1 With respect to the calculation of margins of dumping in refund procedures under paragraph 3

of Article 9, the rules used in the most recent determination or review of dumping shall apply.

18.3.2 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 11, existing anti-dumping measures shall be

deemed to be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a Member of the

WTO Agreement, except in cases in which the domestic legislation of a Member in force on

that date already included a clause of the type provided for in that paragraph.

18.4 Each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not

later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws,

regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may

apply for the Member in question.

18.5 Each Member shall inform the Committee of any changes in its laws and regulations relevant

to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws and regulations.

18.6 The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this Agreement

taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee shall inform annually the Council

for Trade in Goods of developments during the period covered by such reviews.

18.7 The Annexes to this Agreement constitute an integral part thereof.

(footnote original) 24 This is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT

1994, as appropriate.

I.B. Texto em português

Artigo 18

Disposições Finais

1. Não se poderá adotar nenhuma medida específica contra dumping em exportações praticado

por outro Membro que não esteja em conformidade com o disposto no GATT 1994, tal como

interpretado por este Acordo 24

.

2. Não poderão ser formuladas quaisquer reservas relativamente a qualquer disposição do

presente Acordo sem o consentimento dos outros Membros.

3. Reservado o disposto no parágrafo 4, as disposições deste Acordo aplicar-se-ão a

investigações e revisões de medidas em vigor que tenham sido iniciadas segundo petições

apresentadas na data ou após a data de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC para

determinado Membro.

4. (a) No que diz respeito ao cálculo das margens de dumping nos procedimentos de reembolso

previstos no parágrafo 3 do Artigo 9, serão aplicadas as regras utilizadas na última

determinação ou revisão da existência de dumping.

(b) Para os efeitos do parágrafo 3 do artigo 11, considerar-se-á que as medidas anti-dumping

existentes terão sido impostas em data não posterior à data de entrada em vigor da OMC

para determinado Membro, exceto quando a legislação nacional do Membro em vigor

naquela mesma data já inclua disposição do tipo previsto no mencionado parágrafo.

5. Cada Membro tomará as providências necessárias, genéricas ou específicas, para garantir até a

data de entrada em vigor para ele do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, a conformidade de sua

legislação, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos com o disposto neste Acordo,

segundo sejam aplicáveis ao Membro em causa.

6. Cada Membro informará o Comitê sobre qualquer modificação em sua legislação e

regulamentos relacionada com este Acordo e sobre a aplicação de tais leis e regulamentos.

7. O Comitê reverá anualmente a aplicação e o funcionamento deste Acordo, levando em conta

seus objetivos. O Comitê informará anualmente o Conselho para o Comércio de Bens sobre os

desenvolvimentos registrados durante o período coberto por tais revisões.

8. Os anexos ao presente Acordo formam parte integrante do mesmo.

24

A presente cláusula não tem por objetivo excluir a adoção de medidas ao amparo de outras

disposições pertinentes do GATT 1994, segundo seja apropriado.

I.C – Comentários sobre a tradução

No artigo 18.1, entendemos ser apropriado (para que haja concordância nominal) a utilização do da

palavra “praticadas” para concordar com a palavra anterior a ela “exportações”.

É de se notar que na versão em inglês, dividi-se o artigo 18 (dezoito) de forma distinta da forma

dividida na versão em português. Com efeito, na versão em inglês divide-se em 18.3.1 e 18.3.2; já na

versão em português a tradução preferiu abrir novo tópico, nominando-os de 18.4 e trazendo um

reflexo sobre a sequência de todo artigo 18.

No parágrafo sexto do texto em português, o verbo “informar” necessita de preposição. Nesse sentido,

o correto em nosso ponto de vista seria informar “ao” Comitê, e não, informar “o” Comitê.

II. Interpretação e aplicação do artigo 18

1. Geral

(a) Regras sobre à interpretação do acordo anti-dumping

Como regra de interpretação do acordo anti-dumping o Painel no caso US — DRAMS refere-se ao

costume ou direito consuetudinário. O costume, que é fonte do Direito Internacional Público de

acordo com o artigo 38 do estatudo da Corte Internacional de Justiça, é fonte primária de Direito

Internacional Público, e aqui, mais uma vez, deve ser utilizado como regra balizadora para

interpretação do acordo AD e consequentemente de todas as questões que tangenciam o acordo.

665. Regarding the interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel on US — DRAMS

referred to Article 3.2 of the DSU:

“[W]e bear in mind that Article 3.2 of the DSU requires Panels to interpret ‘covered

agreements’, including the AD Agreement, ‘in accordance with customary rules of

interpretation of public international law’. We recall that the rules of treaty interpretation set

forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention expressly defines the context of the treaty to

include the text of the treaty. Thus, the entire text of the AD Agreement may be relevant to a

proper interpretation of any particular provision thereof.”(850)

850. Panel Report on US — DRAMS, para. 6.21.

2. Artigo 18.1

(a) “ações específica contra o dumping”

No caso US — 1916 Act o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o artigo VI do GATT 1994 fica

exclarecido, particularmente, pelo artigo 18.1. Nesse sentido, o que o artigo 18.1 demanda é

exatamente que ações específicas contra o dumping deverão além de estar de conforme o acordo AD,

deve estar de acordo com o artigo VI do GATT. A interpretação referente a expressão “ações

específicas contra dumping” segundo o artigo 18.1 são aquelas ações tomadas em resposta aos casos

específicos de dumping, e em que hajam os elementos constitutivos para tanto. Cabe ressaltar que a

interpretação de ação referente a nota de rodapé é mais geral, ao contrário das ações específicas do

artigo 18.1. Note-se que as ações específicas contra dumping deverão estar de acordo com o acordo

geral do GATT, isto é, de acordo com o artigo VI sobre dumping. Nesse contexto as disposições

específicas deverão estar de acordo com o artigo 18.1 e consequentemente de acordo com todo o

acordo sobre implementação do artigo VI, o acordo AD.

666. The Appellate Body in US — 1916 Act considered that “the scope of application of Article VI

[of the GATT 1994] is clarified, in particular, by Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement”.(851)

The Appellate Body then found “that Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that any

‘specific action against dumping’ be in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of the GATT

1994 concerning dumping, as

those provisions are interpreted by the Anti-Dumping Agreement”:

“In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘specific action against dumping’ of

exports within the meaning of Article 18.1 is action that is taken in response to situations

presenting the constituent elements of ‘dumping’. ‘Specific action against dumping’ of

exports must, at a minimum, encompass action that may be taken only when the constituent

elements of ‘dumping’ are present. Since intent is not a constituent element of ‘dumping’,

the intent with which action against dumping is taken is not relevant to the determination of

whether such action is ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports within the meaning of

Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

…

We note that footnote 24 refers generally to ‘action’ and not, as does Article 18.1, to

‘specific action against dumping’ of exports. ‘Action’ within the meaning of footnote 24 is to

be distinguished from ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports, which is governed by

Article 18.1 itself.

Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains a prohibition on the taking of any

‘specific action against dumping’ of exports when such specific action is not ‘in accordance

with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement’. Since the only

provisions of the GATT 1994 ‘interpreted’ by the Anti-Dumping Agreement are those

provisions of Article VI concerning dumping, Article 18.1 should be read as requiring that

any ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports from another Member be in accordance

with the relevant provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-

Dumping Agreement.

We recall that footnote 24 to Article 18.1 refers to ‘other relevant provisions of GATT 1994’

(emphasis added). These terms can only refer to provisions other than the provisions of

Article VI concerning dumping. Footnote 24 thus confirms that the ‘provisions of GATT

1994’ referred to in Article 18.1 are in fact the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994

concerning dumping.

We have found that Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that any ‘specific

action against dumping’ be in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of the GATT

1994 concerning dumping, as those provisions are interpreted by the Anti-Dumping

Agreement. It follows that Article VI is applicable to any ‘specific action against dumping’

of exports, i.e., action that is taken in response to situations presenting the constituent

elements of ‘dumping’.(852)

851. Appellate Body Report on US — 1916 Act, para. 121.

852. Appellate Body Report on US — 1916 Act, paras. 122–126. See also Panel Report on US — 1916

Act (Japan), paras. 6.214–218 and 6.264; and Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (EC), paras. 6.197–

6.199.

No caso US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), o OA reiterou o que foi visto no caso US — 1916 Act

dizendo que seguir-se-á o artigo 18.1 apenas quando houver os elementos consitutivos ou subsídios,

ou seja, deverão haver correlação direta com os elementos constitutivos de dumping.

667. In US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), the Appellate Body reiterated its view that “a measure

that may be taken only when the constituent elements of dumping or a subsidy are present, is a

‘specific action’ in response to dumping within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement”.(853) This implied that the measure must be inextricably linked to, or have a strong

correlation with, the constituent elements of dumping. According to the Appellate Body, “such link or

correlation may, as in the 1916 Act, be derived from the text of the measure itself”.(854) However,

not all action taken in response to dumping is necessarily action against dumping.(855) The Panel on

US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) took the position that an action operates “against” dumping or a

subsidy within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement if it has an adverse

bearing on dumping.(856) The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel’s interpretation of the term

“against” and reached the following conclusion with respect to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy

Offset Act (CDSOA):

“All these elements lead us to conclude that the CDSOA has an adverse bearing on the

foreign producers/exporters in that the imports into the United States of the dumped or

subsidized products (besides being subject to antidumping or countervailing duties) result in

the financing of United States competitors — producers of like products — through the

transfer to the latter of the duties collected on those exports. Thus, foreign

producers/exporters have an incentive not to engage in the practice of exporting dumped or

subsidized products or to terminate such practices. Because the CDSOA has an adverse

bearing on, and, more specifically, is designed and structured so that it dissuades the practice

of dumping or the practice of subsidization, and because it creates an incentive to terminate

such practices, the CDSOA is undoubtedly an action ‘against’ dumping or a subsidy, within

the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and of Article 32.1 of the SCM

Agreement.”(857)

853. Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 239.

854. Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 239. As the Appellate

Body underlined, “Our analysis in US — 1916 Act focused on the strength of the link between

the measure and the elements of dumping or a subsidy. In other words, we focused on the degree of

correlation between the scope of application of the measure and the constituent elements of dumping

or of a subsidy.”Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 244.

855. See Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 247. 856. Panel Report

on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), paras. 7.17–7.18.

857. Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 256.

Enfatizou-se no caso US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) que, não é necessário ou relevante que se

examine as condições nem os impactos de competição no plano domestico. Para o OA a análise estará

mais direcionada na estrutura e forma da medida, não sendo necessária uma avaliação econômica das

implicações da medida.

668. In US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), the Appellate Body also emphasized that in order to

determine whether a specific action is “against” dumping or subsidization, it is neither necessary, nor

relevant, to examine the conditions of competition under which domestic products and

dumped/subsidized imports compete, and to assess the impact of the measure on the competitive

relationship between them. An analysis of the term “against”, in the view of the Appellate Body, “is

more appropriately centred on the design and structure of the measure; such an analysis does not

mandate an economic assessment of the implications of the measure on the conditions of competition

under which domestic product and dumped/subsidized imports compete”.(858) However, as the

Appellate Body also clearly stated, “a measure cannot be against dumping or a subsidy simply

because it facilitates or induces the exercise of rights that are WTO-consistent”(859), such as the

filing of antidumping applications.

858. Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 257.

859. Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 258.

(b) “exceto de acordo com as provisões do GATT 1994”

669. O Painel no caso US — 1916 Act (EC) considerou que o artigo 18.1 do acordo anti-dumping

confirma o propósito de artigo VI como “definir as condições sobre as quais neutralizar o dumping é

permitido”. (860)

860. Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.114.

(c ) nota de rodapé 24

No caso US — 1916 Act houve uma interpretação sobre a nota de rodapé do artigo 18.1. Nessa

oportunidade entendeu-se que esta nota não impede que um membro enderece ou adote outro tipo de

medida relacionada a causa ou efeito do dumping baseado em outro dimploma da OMC. Muito

embora esse fato, a conclusão que se chega é que se o membro se baseia sua demanda no artigo VI, é

de se esperar que se siga os requerimentos e procedimentos previstos no artigo VI e no acordo de

implementação do AD.

670. The Panel on US — 1916 Act (Japan) considered that “footnote 24 does not prevent Members

from addressing the causes or effects of dumping through other trade policy instruments allowed

under the WTO Agreement. Nor does it prevent Members from adopting other types of measures

which are compatible with the WTO Agreement. Such a possibility does not affect our conclusion

that, when a law of a Member addresses the type of price discrimination covered by Article VI and

makes it the cause for the imposition of anti-dumping measures, that Member has to abide by the

requirements of Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”(861)

861. Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.218.

671. The Appellate Body on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) clarified that footnotes 24 and 56

are clarifications of the main provisions, and were added so as to avoid ambiguity:

“[T]hey confirm what is implicit in Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and in

Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, namely, that an action that is not ‘specific’ within the

meaning of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and of Article 32.1 of the SCM

Agreement, but is nevertheless related to dumping or subsidization, is not prohibited by

Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.”(862)

862. Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 262.

672. No caso US — 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação referiu-se à nota de rodapé 24 para clarificar o

DSUopo do artigo VI do GATT 1994. Ver parágrafo 666 acima.

3. Article 18.3

(a) “revisões de medidas existentes “

Com relação a questão do acordo anti-dumping aplicar-se apenas em relação a medidas existentes

durante ou depois a vigência deste acordo, o Painel do caso US — DRAMS fez uma comparação a

outro caso, o caso Brazil — Desiccated Coconut. Nessa oportunidade, notou-se que artigos de outro

acordo eram compatíveis ao determinado pelo artigo 18.1.

673. Referring to its statement that the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies only to “reviews of

existing measures” initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of entry into force of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement for the Member concerned, the Panel on US — DRAMS drew a

comparison with the findings of the Panel on Brazil — Desiccated Coconut:

“We note that this approach is in line with that adopted by the Panel on Desiccated Coconut

in respect of Article 32.3 of the SCM Agreement, which is virtually identical to Article 18.3

of the AD Agreement. That Panel stated that ‘Article 32.3 defines comprehensively the

situations in which the SCM Agreement applies to measures which were imposed pursuant

to investigations not subject to that Agreement. Specifically, the SCM Agreement applies to

reviews of existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of

entry into force of the WTO Agreement. It is thus through the mechanism of reviews

provided for in the SCM Agreement, and only through that mechanism, that the Agreement

becomes effective with respect to measures imposed pursuant to investigations to which the

SCM Agreement does not apply’ (Brazil — Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,

WT/DS22/R, para. 230, upheld by the Appellate Body in WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted on 20

March 1997).”(863)

863. Panel Report on US — DRAMS, para. 6.14, fn 477.

(c ) Aplicação do acordo anti-dumping

Com relação a aplicação do acordo anti-dumping relativo a medidas prévias e posteriores às medidas

da OMC, o Painel do caso US — DRAMS enfatizou que dever-se-á seguir este critério de que

medidas prévias não serão analisadas simplesmente porque essas medidas continuam a ser aplicadas

durante ou depois da entrada em vigor do acordo da OMC. Nesse contexto, de acordo com o artigo

18.3, a revisão de medidas existentes serão aplicadas somentes durante ou depois da entrada em vigor

do acordo. Não obstante esse fato, aquelas medidas que são parte do DSUopo de uma medida

posterior ao acordo e que estejam ligadas a uma medida prévia ao acordo, nesses casos poderá ser

verificada a medida prévia, somente nesses casos.

674. Regarding the application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to pre-and post-WTO measures, the

Panel on US — DRAMS emphasized that the Anti-Dumping Agreement applies only to reviews and

existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of entry into force of the

Agreement with respect to the Member concerned:

“In our view, pre-WTO measures do not become subject to the AD Agreement simply

because they continue to be applied on or after the date of entry into force of the WTO

Agreement for the Member concerned. Rather, by virtue of the ordinary meaning of the

terms of Article 18.3, the AD Agreement applies only to ‘reviews of existing measures’

initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of entry into force of the AD

Agreement for the Member concerned (‘post-WTO reviews’). However, we do not believe

that the terms of Article 18.3 provide for the application of the AD Agreement to all aspects

of a pre-WTO measure simply because parts of that measure are under post-WTO review.

Instead, we believe that the wording of Article 18.3 only applies the AD Agreement to the

post-WTO review. In other words, the scope of application of the AD Agreement is

determined by the scope of the post-WTO review, so that pursuant to Article 18.3, the AD

Agreement only applies to those parts of a pre-WTO measure that are included in the scope

of a post-WTO review. Any aspects of a pre-WTO measure that are not covered by the scope

of the post-WTO review do not become subject to the AD Agreement by virtue of Article

18.3 of the AD Agreement. By way of example, a pre-WTO injury determination does not

become subject to the AD Agreement merely because a post-WTO review is conducted

relating to the pre-WTO determination of the margin of dumping.”(864)

864. Panel Report on US — DRAMS, para. 6.14.

4. Artigo 18.4

(a) permanência da legislação inconsistente depois da entrada em vigor do acordo da OMC

Neste caso, o Japão desafiou os métodos de cálculo utilizados para calcular as taxas, alegando que

estes métodos utilizados pelos EUA eram inconsistentes a vários dispositivos, incluso o artigo 18.4 do

acordo de implementação do artigo VI. Nesse contexto, o Painel aceitou tal alegação, dizendo que , de

fato, o método dos EUA estavam inconsistentes.

675. In US — Hot-Rolled Steel, Japan had challenged Section 735(c)(5)(A) of the United States

Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which provided for a method for calculating the “all others” rate (see

paragraphs 471–473 above) as inconsistent with Article 9.4 and, accordingly with Articles XVI:4 of

the WTO Agreement and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel found that Section

735(c)(5)(A), as amended, was, on its face, inconsistent with Article 9.4 “in so far as it requires the

consideration of margins based in part on facts available in the calculation of the all others rate”. The

Panel further found that, in maintaining this Section following the entry into force of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement, the United States had acted inconsistently with Article 18.4 of this Agreement

as well as with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.(865) The Appellate Body upheld these

findings.(866)

865. Panel Report on US — Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.90.

866. Appellate Body Report on US — Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 129.

(b) Legislação Mandatória versus Legislação discricionária

676. No caso US — 1916 Act (EC), o Painel referiu-se ao artigo 18.4 estabelecendo que o mero fato

de a iniciação das investigações sobre anti-dumping serem discricionárias não faria com que a

legislação em questão fosse considerara não mandatória automaticamente. Ver parágrafo 599 acima.

(c) Medidas impostas ao crivo de disputa

Para o Órgão de Apelação no caso US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, todas as leis,

regulações e procedimentos administrativos mencionados no artigo 18.4 deverão se submeter ao órgão

de resolução de controvérsias. Nesse sentido , abranger-se-á todo o corpo de normas conexas

aplicáveis para a devida condução dos procedimentos anti-dumping, caso contrário, o não

cumprimento frustraria as disposições do artigo 18.4.

677. In the view of the Appellate Body on US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, all laws,

regulations and administrative procedures mentioned in Article 18.4 may, as such, be submitted to

dispute settlement. The Appellate Body considered that “the phrase ‘laws, regulations and

administrative procedures’ seems to us to encompass the entire body of generally applicable rules,

norms and standards adopted by Members in connection with the conduct of anti-dumping

proceedings.(867) If some of these types of measure could not, as such, be subject to dispute

settlement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it would frustrate the obligation of ‘conformity’ set

forth in Article 18.4.”(868)

867. (footnote original) We observe that the scope of each element in the phrase “laws, regulations

and administrative procedures” must be determined for purposes of WTO law and not simply by

reference to the label given to various instruments under the domestic law of each WTO Member.

This determination must be based on the content and substance of the instrument, and not merely on

its form or nomenclature. Otherwise, the obligations set forth in Article 18.4 would vary from

Member to Member depending on each Member’s domestic law and practice.

868. Appellate Body Report on United States — Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 87.

678. Como disposto, o conceito de medidas submetidas ao Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da

OMC, ver seção VI.B (c) do Capítulo do DSB. Ver também seção XVII.B.1 (b) e ( c ) deste Capítulo.

5. Artigo 18.5

De acordo com o artigo 18.5, cada membro deverá informar ao Comitê qualquer mudança nas suas

leis ou regulações internas referentes ao acordo AD. Conforme decisão do Comitê em 1995, este foi o

exato entendimento no sentido de que qualquer mudança, seja parcial ou completa, referente as

investigações, deverá notificar o texto ao Comitê. Caso o membro ainda não tenha nenhuma

legislação ou regulação, este membro deverá também informar ao Comitê de que não possui

legislação referente a esta matéria. Ademais, os governos que são apenas observadores deverão

também seguir a obrigação de informar o Comitê.

679. Article 18.5 of the Agreement provides that “Each Member shall inform the Committee of any

changes in its laws and regulations relevant to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws

and regulations”. Pursuant to a decision of the Committee in February 1995, all Members having new

or existing legislation and/or regulations which apply in whole or in part to anti-dumping duty

investigations or reviews covered by the Agreement are requested to notify the full and integrated text

of such legislation and/or regulations to the Committee. Changes in a Member’s legislation and/or

regulations are to be notified to the Committee as well. Pursuant to that same decision of the

Committee, if a Member has no such legislation or regulations, the Member is to inform the

Committee of this fact. The Committee also decided that Observer governments should comply with

these notification obligations.

Ainda referente ao tema da notificação da mudança de legislação ou a não existência de tal legislação,

temos que, em Outubro de 2004, 105 membros haviam notificado ao Comitê sobre a regulação do

acordo anti-dumping. Dos 105, 29 notificaram ao Comitê que não tinham nenhuma legislação sobre o

tema.

680. As of 29 October 2004, 105 Members had notified the Committee regarding their domestic

antidumping legislation.(869) Of these 105 Members, 29 had notified the Committee that they had no

antidumping legislation. Members’ communications in this regard can be found in document series

G/ADP/N/1/… . 28 Members had not, as yet, made any notification of anti-dumping legislation and/or

regulations. Annex A sets out the status of notifications concerning legislation under Article 18.5 of

the Agreement, and sets out the reference symbol of the document(s) containing each Member’s

current notification in this regard.

869. The European Communities is counted as one Member.Prior to 1 May 2004, the member-States

of the EC were the following: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. As of

1 May 2004, the member-States of the EC included in addition to the afore-listed, the following:

Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak

Republic, and Slovenia. This annual report includes a period both before and after the accession of

these Members to the European Communities. Therefore, these Members’ separate notifications of

legislation, submitted prior to their accession to the EC, are listed in this report. See document

G/ADPN/1/ EEC/2/Suppl.6 for updated information on the current status of laws and regulations of

these Members.

6. Artigo 18.6

(a) Revisão Anual

O parágrafo 7.4 da decisão ministerial de Doha menciona que o artigo 18.6 do acordo de

implementação do artigo VI do GATT 1994 exige que o Comitê reveja anualmente a implementação e

operação do acordo, tendo como meta os objetivos do mesmo. Nesse contexto, o Comitê é instruído a

elaborar guias para o melhoramento da revisão anual, assim como recomendações ao Conselho Geral

para decisões subsequentes dentro de 12 (doze) meses.

681. Paragraph 7.4 of the Doha Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001 on Implementation-

Related Issues and Concerns states that the Ministerial Conference “[t]akes note that Article 18.6 of

the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

1994 requires the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices to review annually the implementation and

operation of the Agreement taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee on Anti-

dumping Practices is instructed to draw up guidelines for the improvement of annual reviews and to

report its views and recommendations to the General Council for subsequent decision within 12

months.”(870)

870. WT/MIN(01)/17.

No mandato de Doha o Comitê adotou várias recomendações no sentido de trazer maior transparência

ao acordo anti-dumping. Para esse relatório, o Comitê deverá além de incluir no resumo anual a lista

dos casos iniciados pelos membros, deverá incluir também uma coluna comparativa listando o

número de revogações apresentadas por cada membro durante o período analisado. Caso o membro

não alegue nada, esse dado aparecerá no relatório. Neste relatório deverá haver também uma carta

comparando a quantidade de medidas preliminares e finais submetidas ao secretariado por cada

membro. Com efeito, os países desenvolvidos deverão incluir no relatório semi anual como

diferenciaram suas medidas em relação aos países em desenvolvimento com respeito aos

mandamentos do artigo 15, ou seja, dando especial atenção à particular situação dos países em

desenvolvimento.

682. Further to the Doha mandate, the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices adopted on 27

November 2002, the “Recommendation regarding Annual Reviews of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement”.(871) In its recommendation, the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices considers that

“improvements in the reporting of anti-dumping activity under the Agreement and in the Committee’s

annual reviews are important to promoting transparency”. Accordingly, the Recommendation includes

the following improvements aimed at providing useful information to Members and the public, and

enhancing transparency under the Agreement:

“1. The Committee’s annual report under Article 18.6 should include in the Summary of

Anti-Dumping Actions(872), in addition to the column currently included that lists the

initiations reported by each Member, a comparable column listing the number of anti-

dumping revocations reported by each Member during the reporting period. Where a

Member has not provided such information, the report should note this omission. Members

are already requested to report the number of revocations in a separate table as an annex to

their semi-annual reports of anti-dumping activity. Consequently, such information should be

included in the Article 18.6 annual report.

2. The Committee’s Article 18.6 annual report should also include a chart comparing for

each Member the number of preliminary and final measures reported in its semi-annual

reports with the number of notices of preliminary and final measures the Member submitted

to the Secretariat for the comparable period.

3. Developed country Members should include, when reporting anti-dumping actions in

the semi-annual report that Members are required to submit under Article 16.4, the manner in

which the obligations of Article 15 have been fulfilled. Without prejudice to the scope and

application of Article 15, price undertakings and lesser duty rules are examples of

constructive remedies that could be included in such Members’ semi-annual reports. The

Committee’s annual report under Article 18.6 should include, in a separate table, a

compilation of the information reported by each Member in this respect during the reporting

period. Where a Member has not provided such information, the report should note this

omission.

4. This recommendation does not prejudge the ability of Members to submit other

proposals and to agree in the future on other recommendations aimed at improving annual

reviews in the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices.”(873)

871. G/ADP/9.

872. (footnote original) See Report (2001) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Annex C,

G/L/495 (31 October 2001).

873. G/ADP/9.

7. Relação com outros artigos

(a) Geral

A relação do artigo 18.1 em relação às outras provisões foi discutida no caso Guatemala — Cement II.

Nesse caso o Painel entendeu que a Guatemala teria hagido de forma inconsistente com relação a

vários artigos.

683. The relationship between Article 18.1 and other provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement

was discussed in Guatemala — Cement II. The Panel found that the subject anti-dumping duty order

of Guatemala was inconsistent with Articles 3, 5, 6, 7,12, and paragraph 2 of Annex I of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement. The Panel then opined that Mexico’s claims under other articles of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement, among them Article 18, were “dependent claims, in the sense that they depend

entirely on findings that Guatemala has violated other provisions of the AD Agreement. There would

be no basis to Mexico’s claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of

GATT 1994, if Guatemala were not found to have violated other provisions of the AD

Agreement.”(874) In light of this dependent nature of Mexico’s claim, the Panel considered it not

necessary to address these claims.

874. Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement II, para. 8.296.

684. O Painel no caso US — 1916 Act (Japan) estabeleceu que “o significado que vem

imediatamente em mente ao ler o artigo 18.4 é que, quando a lei, regulação ou procedimentos

administrativos de determinado membro sejam considerados incompatíveis com as provisões do

acordo anti-dumping, este membro incorreria em rupture com suas obrigações Segundo o artigo

18.4”. (875)

875. Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.286.

685. O Painel no caso US — 1916 Act (Japan) estabeleceu em nota de rodapé que “nós não

exercemos economia judicial com relação ao artigo 18.4 porque, naquele contexto, uma violação ao

artigo 18.4 automaticamente resulta da ruptura de outra provisão do acordo anti-dumping. 876)

876. Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.286, fn 595.

(b) Artigo 17

686. No caso US — 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação referiu-se ao artigo 18.1 e ao artigo 18.4 como

artigos que servem de suporte contextual ao disposto no artigo 17.4 ao permitir que membros tragam

suas demandas contra legislações anti-dumping como tais. 877)

877. Appellate Body Report on US — 1916 Act, paras. 78–82. See also paras. 596 and 610 of this

Chapter.

8. Relação com outros acordos da OMC

(a) Artigo VI do GATT 1994

687. A relação entre o artigo 18 e o artigo VI do GATT 1994 foi discutida no caso US — 1916 Act.

Ver parágrafos 666-670 acima e 707.

(b) Acordo sobre Subsídios e medidas compensatórias

688. O Painel do caso US — DRAMS referiu-se a aplicabilidade do acordo sobre subsídios e

medidas compensatórias a medidas iniciadas antes da entrada em vigor do acordo da OMC, decidindo

de forma similar de ao disposto no acrodo anti-dumping. Ver parágrafo 673 acima.

III. Comentários

O artigo 18 é um artigo geral que dispõe sobre as orientações que devem ser dadas ao acordo AD.

Nesse contexto, o costume deve ser levado em conta, tanto de todo histórico que envolve o comércio,

como dos diplomas que tratam direta ou indiretamente sobre o tema. O costume, fonte primária de

Direito Internacional Público, baliza e guia as interpretações e procedimentos tanto do Painel quanto

do Órgão de Apelação.

Nesse sentido, seguindo o costume, os membros deverão também além de seguir as determinacões do

artigo 18.1 e de todo acordo AD, deverão seguir o artigo VI do acordo geral do GATT 1994. Além

das ações específicas contra o dumping, os membros deverão seguir as ações gerais dispostas pela

nota de rodapé de número 24. Note-se que para que se iniciem as investigações não será necessário ou

relevante que se examine as condições nem os impactos de competição no plano doméstico. Para o

OA a análise estará mais direcionada na estrutura e forma da medida, não sendo necessária uma

avaliação econômica das implicações da medida.

Com relação a aplicabilidade do disposto no acordo, seguir-se-á as medidas a partir do momento em

que o membro adentrou o acordo geral GATT 1994. As medidas posteriores que tiverem relação

direta com uma medida prévia está poderá ser analisada. Com efeito, cálculos da investigação deverão

ser feitos de acordo com o disposto no acordo AD, e especificamente no artigo 18.4. Leis, regulações

e procedimentos administrativos deverão se adequar ao acordo e caso não estejam em conformidade

poderão ser sumbetidos ao DSB, que analisará não somente o disposto no acordo mas também todos

os regulamentos conexos ao caso concreto.

Com relação a aplicabilidade Segundo o artigo 18, os membros deverão informar ao Comitê caso haja

uma mudança em suas legislações. Interessante notar que o objetivo do acordo que estabelece um

comitê é exatamente regular a atividade e ter em dados a que paço anda o avanço dos membros no

sentido de compatibilizarem a regulação interna com a regulação internacional referente ao comércio

e ao dumping. Prova disso, é que mesmo os membros que não possuem legislação deverão informar

tal “status” ao comitê. Além da previsão de informar ao Comitê disposto no artigo 18.5, o artigo 18.6

do acordo AD conjuntamente com o artigo 7.4 da decição ministerial de Doha prevêem que se reveja

anualmente a implementação e operação do acordo AD com o objetivo de fazerem recomendações

pontuais.

Por fim, cabe ressaltar que o artigo 18 ao contrário de vários outros artigos visa não só dispor sobre

medidas específicas, mas enfatizar como deverá ser interpretado o acordo AD como um todo.

Ademais, os membros devem sempre ter em mente que apesar da prerrogativa que os membros tem de

implementar direitos anti-dumping, uma especial atenção deve ser dada à particular situação dos

países em desenvolvimento. Nesse contexto, temos que o dumping é uma medida que pode ser

maléfica para o país importandor, mas que também pode ser entendida como uma medida muitas

vezes necessária para que determinado setor da economia do país exportador se mantenha vivo. Com

efeito, o que se pretende no cenário internacional é promover o comércio internacional e ao menos

tempo diminiuir as desigualdades de forma a incentivar as especialidades dos membros, porém ao

mesmo tempo criar mecanismos para que membros que estajam sendo demasiadamente prejudicados

possam buscar no DSB medidas para desincentivar subsidies exacerbados e concorrência desleal.

Pesquisador colaborador: Rubens Romero

ANEXO I

Marina Pantoja

ENTENDIMENTOS RELATIVOS A APLICACAO DO ANEXO I – ANTIDUMPING

AGREEMENT

I-A- Texto do anexo em inglês:

ANNEX I

PROCEDURES FOR ON THE SPOT INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT

TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE 6

1. Upon initiation of an investigation, the authorities of the exporting Member and the firms known to

be concerned should be informed of the intention to carry out on the spot investigations.

2. If in exceptional circumstances it is intended to include non governmental experts in the

investigating team, the firms and the authorities of the exporting Member should be so informed. Such

non governmental experts should be subject to effective sanctions for breach of confidentiality

requirements.

3. It should be standard practice to obtain explicit agreement of the firms concerned in the exporting

Member before the visit is finally scheduled.

4. As soon as the agreement of the firms concerned has been obtained, the investigating authorities

should notify the authorities of the exporting Member of the names and addresses of the firms to be

visited and the dates agreed.

5. Sufficient advance notice should be given to the firms in question before the visit is made.

6. Visits to explain the questionnaire should only be made at the request of an exporting firm. Such a

visit may only be made if (a) the authorities of the importing Member notify the representatives of the

Member in question and (b) the latter do not object to the visit.

7. As the main purpose of the on the spot investigation is to verify information provided or to obtain

further details, it should be carried out after the response to the questionnaire has been received unless

the firm agrees to the contrary and the government of the exporting Member is informed by the

investigating authorities of the anticipated visit and does not object to it; further, it should be standard

practice prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be

verified and of any further information which needs to be provided, though this should not preclude

requests to be made on the spot for further details to be provided in the light of information obtained.

8. Enquiries or questions put by the authorities or firms of the exporting Members and essential to a

successful on the spot investigation should, whenever possible, be answered before the visit is made.

I-B.TEXTO DO ANEXO EM PORTUGUES

ANEXO I

PROCEDIMENTOS PARA INVESTIGAÇÃO CONFORME PARÁGRAFO 7 DO ARTIGO 6

1-Após a abertura do inquérito, as autoridades do Membro Exportador e as empresas conhecidas

como interessadas devem ser informadas da intenção de realizar as investigações no local.

2. Se em circunstancias excepcionais houver intenção de incluir peritos não-governamentais na equipe

de investigação, as empresas e as autoridades do Membro Exportador devem ser informadas. Tais

peritos não-governamentais não devem ser sujeitos a sanções por violação de requisitos de

confidencialidade.

3. A obtenção do acordo explicito das empresas envolvidas do Membro Exportador, antes da visita

final ser marcada, deve ser pratica padrão.

4.Quanto mais cedo o acordo das empresas envolvidas for obtido, as autoridades investigadoras

deverão notificar as autoridades do Membro Exportador os nomes e os endereços das empresas que

deverão ser visitadas.

5. A notificação das empresas em questão deve ser feita com antecedência considerada suficiente.

6. Visitas para explicar o questionário devem ser feitas somente a pedido de uma empresa

exportadora. Essa visita somente poderá ser realizada se . (a) As autoridades do Membro Importador

notificarem as autoridades do membro Exportador em questão; (b) o ultimo não se opor à visita.

7. Considerando que o objetivo principal da investigação em questão é de confirmar informações

prestadas, ou a de fornecer mais detalhes, as respostas para o questionário devem ser normalmente

concedidas, a menos que a empresa não estabeleça em sentido contrario, e que o Governo do pais

exportador seja informado pelas autoridades investigadoras sobre a visita antecipada e que não se

oponha; além disso, deve ser pratica padrão das visitas o esclarecimento às empresas em questão

sobre o caráter geral da informação a ser verificada ou qualquer outra informação que precise ser

fornecida, embora isso não impeça que pedidos sejam feitos no local para obter mais detalhes sobre

tais informações.

8. Pedidos ou esclarecimentos feitos pelas autoridades ou pelas firmas dos Membros Exportadores,

que sejam essenciais para o sucesso da investigação em questão deverão, sempre que possível, ser

respondidas antes da realização da visita.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretaçao e Aplicaçao do Anexo I

Relatório do Painel no Caso Guatemala — Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland

Cement from Mexico- (Demandante México); (WT/DS60R), para. 3.1

Neste caso, o México, no painel, requereu desrespeito às regras estabelecidas no anexo I do ADA. Em

conclusão, o Painel se pronunciou pela inobservância, por parte da Guatemala, dos requisitos

necessários para inicio da investigação de dumping.

III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES

3.1 Mexico requests the Panel to make the following rulings, findings and recommendations:

(a) “reject all the preliminary objections raised by Guatemala”;

(b) “conclude that the measures adopted by Guatemala, in particular though not

exclusively those relating to the initiation of the investigation, are inconsistent with

the obligations of that Member country of the WTO under Article VI of GATT 1994

and, at least, Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and Annex I of the Anti-Dumping

Agreement”;

(c) “also conclude that the measures adopted by Guatemala in contravention of its

obligations under GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement nullify or impair

Mexico's benefits within the meaning of Article XXIII of the GATT 1994”; and

(d) “recommend to the Government of Guatemala that it revoke the anti-dumping duties

imposed on Cruz Azul's exports of grey cement to that country and refund the

corresponding anti-dumping duties”.

Guatemala — Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico- Appellate

Body Report - (Demandante Guatemala); (WT/DS60/AB/R), para. 82

82. The second and third paragraphs of Mexico's panel request state the following:

As the consultations did not produce a satisfactory solution to the

matter (as is shown by the fact that the Government of Guatemala not

only did not revoke the provisional anti-dumping duties but increased

them in the final resolution to a level of 89.54 per cent, well above the

amount claimed by the petitioner), and taking into account that the

time-period established for conducting consultations under Article 4

of the DSU has been amply exceeded, the Government of Mexico

requests that at the next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body,

scheduled for 25 February 1997, a dispute settlement panel be

established to examine the consistency of the anti-dumping

investigation by the Government of Guatemala into Guatemalan

imports of portland cement from Mexico with Guatemala's obligations

under the WTO, in particular those contained in the Anti-Dumping

Agreement.

The Government of Mexico requests that the Panel examine,

find and rule that the anti-dumping investigation in question is

incompatible with Guatemala's obligations under the AD. Mexico

considers that in the anti-dumping investigation in question actions

were taken that are inconsistent with, at least, Articles VI of the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, and 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of

the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Annex I thereto. By way of

example, the aspects of the investigation presenting the main

inconsistencies with the Anti-Dumping Agreement are highlighted

below.

III- Comentarios:

O texto do anexo I do Antidumping Agreement tem como objetivo reforçar as medidas de

admissibilidade para inicio das investigações antidumping, no sentido de que, para evitar eventuais

abusos por parte dos países exportadores, assim como das autoridades investigadoras dos países

exportadores, o anexo impõe medidas prévias para inicio, assim como para procedimento das

investigações de dumping nos países importadores.

Pode-se dizer que o anexo se concentra no procedimento de investigação de dumping, garantindo ao

pais importador toda a proteção necessária durante eventual procedimento de investigação.

ANEXO II

Marina Pantoja

IA- Texto do Anexo em Inglês

Annex II

Best Information Available in Terms of Paragraph 8 of Article 6

1 As soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating authorities

should specify in detail the information required from any interested party, and the manner in

which that information should be structured by the interested party in its response. The

authorities should also ensure that the party is aware that if information is not supplied

within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to make determinations on the basis of

the facts available, including those contained in the application for the initiation of the

investigation by the domestic industry.

2 The authorities may also request that an interested party provide its response in a particular

medium (e.g. computer tape) or computer language. Where such a request is made, the

authorities should consider the reasonable ability of the interested party to respond in the

preferred medium or computer language, and should not request the party to use for its

response a computer system other than that used by the party. The authority should not

maintain a request for a computerized response if the interested party does not maintain

computerized accounts and if presenting the response as requested would result in an

unreasonable extra burden on the interested party, e.g. it would entail unreasonable

additional cost and trouble. The authorities should not maintain a request for a response in a

particular medium or computer language if the interested party does not maintain its

computerized accounts in such medium or computer language and if presenting the response

as requested would result in an unreasonable extra burden on the interested party, e.g. it

would entail unreasonable additional cost and trouble.

3 All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be used in

the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion, and, where

applicable, which is supplied in a medium or computer language requested by the authorities,

should be taken into account when determinations are made. If a party does not respond in

the preferred medium or computer language but the authorities find that the circumstances

set out in paragraph 2 have been satisfied, the failure to respond in the preferred medium or

computer language should not be considered to significantly impede the investigation.

4 Where the authorities do not have the ability to process information if provided in a

particular medium (e.g. computer tape), the information should be supplied in the form of

written material or any other form acceptable to the authorities.

5 Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this should not justify

the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party has acted to the best of its

ability.

6 If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed forthwith

of the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further explanations

within a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time limits of the investigation. If

the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being satisfactory, the reasons for

the rejection of such evidence or information should be given in any published

determinations.

7 If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal value, on

information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in the application

for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so with special circumspection. In such

cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other

independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics

and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during

the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus

relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a

result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Anexo II

Melhor Informação Disponível em Termos do Parágrafo 8° do artigo 6°.

1 Logo que as investigações forem iniciadas, as autoridades deverão especificar em detalhes as

informações solicitadas por qualquer das partes interessadas, estruturando a maneira como a

resposta devera ser apresentada pela parte interessada. A parte interessada deve estar ciente

de que se a informação não for suprida em tempo razoável, as autoridades estarão livres para

decidir com base nas informações disponíveis, incluindo àquelas contidas no dossier para

iniciação das investigações na indústria doméstica.

2 As autoridades poderão, também, solicitar à parte interessada que esta forneça suas respostas

através de um determinado meio (e.g. linguagem computadorizada). Levando-se em

consideração o local onde o pedido é feito, as autoridades podem considerar a habilidade

razoável da parte interessada de responder através do meio preferível, na linguagem

computadorizada, ou outra que eventualmente já seja utilizada. A autoridade não devera

requerer resposta em linguagem digitalizada se a parte interessada não possuir meios digitais

apropriados e se referida modalidade de resposta resultar em custos adicionais não razoáveis

ou problemas para a parte. As autoridades não devem manter um pedido de resposta ou

linguagem computadorizada se a parte interessada não possuir contas em meio

informatizado, ou se a linguagem computadorizada resultar em uma modalidade de resposta

excessivamente onerosa para a parte interessada, ou em problemas desnecessários, por

exemplo.

3 Toda a informação que puder ser verificada, que seja apropriadamente submetida e que

possa, por consequencia, ser utilizada nas investigações sem dificuldades; que seja fornecida

tempestivamente e que, quando fornecida, seja feita em linguagem computadorizada,

condizente com àquela requerida pela autoridade investigadora, deve ser levada em

consideração para efeito das determinações. Se a parte não responder através dos meios

preferíveis, ou através de linguagem computadorizada, mas que as autoridades concluam que

as circunstancias estabelecidas no parágrafo 2 foram satisfeitas, a falta de linguagem no meio

requerido ou através de linguagem computadorizada não deve ser considerado um sério

obstáculo às investigações.

4 Se as autoridades não possuírem condições de processar as informações obtidas através de

um meio particular (e.g. linguagem computadorizada), as informações deverão ser fornecidas

de forma escrita material ou através de qualquer outra forma aceitável para as autoridades.

5 Mesmo que as informações prestadas não sejam ideais em todos os seus aspectos, isso não

devera justificar que as autoridades as rejeitem de pronto, desde que as partes interessadas as

tenham colhido da melhor maneira possível para elas.

6 Se as provas ou informações não forem aceitas, a parte ofertante devera ser imediatamente

informada sobre as razoes para tal indeferimento, e deve ter a oportunidade de fornecer

novas explicações, em prazo razoável, levando-se em conta os prazos para investigação. Se,

ainda assim, as explicações não forem consideradas pelas autoridades como satisfatórias, as

razoes para a rejeição dessas evidencias ou informações devem ser incluídas em qualquer

determinação publicável.

7 Se as autoridades precisarem basear suas conclusões, incluindo àquelas referentes aos

valores normais, em informações de uma fonte secundaria, incluindo as informações

contidas no pedido de aplicação para iniciação as investigações, tal devera ser feito com

bastante prudência. Em todo caso, as autoridades deverão, quando aplicável, checar tais

informações junto a outras fontes independentes disponíveis, tais como nas listas de preços

publicadas, estatísticas oficiais de importação e costumes, e nas informações obtidas através

de outras partes durante as investigações. Esta claro, de toda forma, que se a parte

interessada não cooperar com as investigações e que o recolhimento de provas tiver que ser

feito de maneira diversa da natural, o resultado obtido pelas autoridades será menos

favorável para a parte que se tivesse havido sua cooperação.

II- Interpretação e Aplicação do Anexo II

Relatório do Painel no caso United States — Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on

Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US- Corrosion-Resistant Steel

Sunset Review)), (Demandante: Japao), (WT/DS244/R), para. 7260

Nessa controvérsia, o Japão ofereceu reclamação quanto à tempestividade da entrega da respostas

aos questionários, o que foi acatado, em parte, pelo Painel. Em resposta, o Painel reconhece que,

embora tenha havido desrespeito quanto ao prazo, o Japão não apresentou nenhuma reclamação nos

termos do artigo 6.8.

7260. Japan argues that, since the decision of the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel

concerned time-limits applicable to the submission of responses to questionnaires, it does not apply

here because no questionnaire was sent to the parties in the sunset review at issue. Indeed, the

factual circumstances of the US – Hot-Rolled Steel case were different, in that it concerned the

submission of responses to the questionnaires sent by the investigating authority in an investigation.

Moreover, the legal claim was made and examined under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-

dumping Agreement. These treaty provisions contain different obligations and terms, including the

terms “reasonable period [of time]”. However, to the extent that the Appellate Body's reasoning in

US-Hot Rolled Steel may be relevant here, we consider that the submission of information seven

months after the established deadline and approximately two months before the date established for

the investigating authority's determination would, in any event, not be seen as timely even under the

approach set by the Appellate Body in that case. We emphasize, however, that Japan has made no

claim under Article 6.8 in this dispute.

Relatório do Painel no Caso United States — Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on

Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset

Reviews), (Demandante: Argentina), (WT/DS268/R), paras. 7223; 7224; 7225; 7226; 7236;

7237; 7238; 7240; 7245

Neste caso, a Argentina argumenta que o USDOC não observou diversas provisões do ADA,

incluindo àquelas do Anexo II. O Painel, e o Órgão de Apelação, não reconheceram qualquer

inobservância com o estabelecido pelo Anexo II por parte do United Satates Department of

Commerce.

7223- We note that Argentina also asserts that the dumping margin from the original investigation

was calculated through the so-called methodology of zeroing and therefore could not be relied upon

by the USDOC in its likelihood determination in this sunset review. It follows, in Argentina's view,

that the USDOC violated Articles 2.4 and 11.3 of the Agreement by relying on this margin in its

likelihood determinations. Having found that the USDOC erred in this sunset review by relying on

the existence of this dumping margin in its determination that dumping continued over the life of the

measure, we need not, and do not, evaluate various aspects of the methodology through which that

original dumping margin was obtained.

(a) Alleged violations of Article 6 of the Agreement

(i) Nature of the obligations in Articles 6.1, 6.2, 6.8 and Annex II of the

Agreement and their applicability in sunset reviews

7224- Argentina contends that the application of waiver provisions and the conduct of an expedited

sunset review in the OCTG sunset review violated Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Agreement. According

to Argentina, the conduct of an expedited review also violated Article 6.8 and Annex II of the

Agreement.

7225-We note that Argentina's claims here are based on the assumption that Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8

and Annex II of the Agreement apply to sunset reviews. According to Argentina, these provisions

apply to sunset reviews by virtue of the cross-reference in Article 11.4. The United States, however,

argues that this cross-reference incorporates into sunset reviews only those provisions of Article 6

that deal with evidence and procedure. According to the United States, the same holds true for the

provisions of Annex II; they also apply to sunset reviews to the extent they concern evidence and

procedure.

7226-Therefore, the initial issue that we need to resolve is whether Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.8 and

Annex II apply to sunset reviews. In this context, we recall our above observation regarding the

nature of the obligations set out in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Agreement (supra, paras. 7.113-7.117).

We also recall our finding that these two articles apply to sunset reviews because they contain rules

that deal with evidence and procedure as set out in Article 11.4 of the Agreement. In addition to

Articles 6.1 and 6.2, we consider that Article 6.8 and Annex II also apply to sunset reviews because

their provisions concern “evidence and procedure”. Article 6.8 explains under what circumstances

an investigating authority is allowed to base its determinations on the facts available. Annex II

contains detailed provisions to be followed by investigating authorities when resorting to facts

available under Article 6.8.

(ii) Examination of the consistency of the USDOC's determination with Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of

the Agreement

Conclusion

7236-We therefore find that the USDOC acted consistently with Article 6.1 of the Agreement, but

inconsistently with Article 6.2 in the OCTG sunset review.

(iii) Alleged violations of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement in the OCTG review

7237- Argentina contends that the USDOC's conduct of an expedited sunset review violated Article

6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement because the USDOC applied facts available to Siderca on the

grounds that Siderca had failed the adequacy test of US law that triggered the expedited sunset

review. According to Argentina, Article 6.8 does not permit the use of facts available on such

grounds. Siderca fully cooperated with the USDOC, thus the USDOC could not possibly use facts

available against Siderca. Argentina also asserts that the USDOC did not use facts available in the

manner set out in Article 6.8 and Annex II.

7238- The United States submits that the USDOC did not apply facts available with respect to

Siderca. Rather, it applied facts available in the context of its order-wide likelihood determination.

The United States also contends that as part of facts available the USDOC used the information

Siderca submitted in its substantive response to the notice of initiation. According to the United

States, therefore, the USDOC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 or Annex II of the

Agreement.

7240-Therefore, the issue is whether the USDOC violated Article 6.8 and therefore Annex II of the

Agreement in its use of facts available on an order-wide basis in the OCTG sunset review. In our

view, it did not.

Conclusion

7245-Under these circumstances, therefore, we find that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with

Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement in its use of facts available.

(b) Alleged violations of Article 12 of the Agreement

IIIV- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

[…]

d) In respect of the USDOC's determinations in the OCTG sunset review:

(i) The USDOC acted inconsistently with Articles 11.3 and 6.2 of the Anti-

Dumping Agreement,

(ii) The USDOC did not act inconsistently with Articles 12, 6.1, 6.8 and Annex

II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,

Relatório do Orgao de Apelaçao no Caso United States — Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping

Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US – Oil Country Tubular Goods

Sunset Reviews), (Demandante: Argentina), (WT/DS268/AB/RW),para.61

Annex II- Notification of an Other Appeal by Argentina under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under

Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review

61. According to the United States, “the sole effect of Argentina's interpretation [of Articles 11.3 and

11.4] would be to prevent reasoned and adequate affirmative redeterminations.” Further,

Argentina's interpretation would mean that, even if new factual material supported an affirmative

determination, the determination would nonetheless remain WTO-inconsistent, not because it was

not reasoned and adequate, but simply because the new evidence on which the determination was

based was collected during the process of implementation. The United States contends that nothing

in the Anti Dumping Agreement—including Article 6 and Annex II thereto, which set out various

procedural rights and obligations—suggests that this was the drafters' intention.

III- Comentários

O anexo II do Antidumping Agreement trata, exclusivamente, do procedimento para obtenção das

provas pelas autoridades e das prerrogativas de que dispõem as partes investigadas.

A importância desse anexo é crucial para que a parte investigada tenha conhecimento sobre a

maneira como as informações deverão ser fornecidas, os limites existentes para o fornecimento de

tais informações detalhadas da maneira conforme requerida pela autoridade investigadora e a forma

como as informações serão processadas e anexadas ao processo.

Embora a importância desse inciso seja incontestável, nota-se certa falta de clareza no tópico 5

(cinco). O tópico 5 estabelece que, mesmo que as informações concedidas às autoridades não sejam

suficientes, elas deverão ser consideradas, caso a parte interessada as tenha fornecido “ da melhor

maneira que lhe foi possível”. Aqui, a expressão “ da melhor forma disponível, ou da melhor

maneira possível” , além de apresentar característica extremamente subjetiva, já que não se

estabelece os modos pelos quais serão avaliados as limitações da parte interessada em fornecer tais

informações, traz também ao estudo a insegurança de uma decisão baseada em informações que não

possuem base solida, mas que deverão ser consideradas somente porque foram obtidas com base na

única forma, ou melhor forma de colheita de informações da parte interessada.

O anexo II do Antidumping Agreement possui papel substancial no processo de investigação de

dumping, estabelecendo margens importantes para a colheita e estudo das informações obtidas pelas

partes interessadas, com o escopo de atribuir transparência a um processo que, por sua própria

natureza, é delicado.