Accounting for the Emergence of Violent Activism among Irish Revolutionaries, 1916-21

Irish Historical Studies Publications Ltd

Accounting for the Emergence of Violent Activism among Irish Revolutionaries, 1916-21Author(s): Joost AugusteijnSource: Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 35, No. 139 (May, 2007), pp. 327-344Published by: Irish Historical Studies Publications LtdStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20547455 .

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Irish Historical Studien, xxxv, no. 139 (May 2007)

Accounting for the emergence of violent activism among Irish revolutionaries, 1916?21

Why

certain Irishmen came to use violence to obtain their political objectives during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-21 has proved a difficult question. A

number of local studies of the experience of volunteers, following the example of David Fitzpatrick, have provided insights into the process of .radica?sation but have not dealt with this aspect of the subject explicitly.1 A more systematic approach has been taken in the attempt to explain the strong variations in the intensity of activity throughout the country. What caused these variations has indeed been a matter of contention ever since the Anglo-Irish War itself. Michael Collins often voiced complaints about 'slack' areas in language that left little to the imagination.2 Since the publication of Erhard Rumpfs Nationalismus und Sozialismus in Irland in 1959 historians have sought to explain the unequal distribution of violence by comparing the level of LRA. activity in a particular county with certain geographically distributed social and economic variables.3 Hitherto these attempts have been unable to produce a full explanation for

regional variations. The most exhaustive analysis, by Peter Hart, in an article that was first published in Past and Present in 1997, has shown that local involvement in, and traditions of, radical political and Gaelic cultural activity may be correlated with a greater willingness to resort to violence,4 To understand how these factors work together, Hart calls at the end of his impressive article for a

mapping of the 'identities and interactions of the men of violence*. By critically evaluating the debate and statistics concerning the geography of violence, in die

1 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish life, 1913-1921.'provincial experience of war and

revolution (Dublin, 1977); Joost Augusteijn, From public defiance to guerrilla warfare: the experience of ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence, 1916^1921

(Dublin, 1996); Peter Hart, The LRA. and its enemies: violence and community in Cork,

1916-1923 (Oxford, 1998); Michael Farry, The aftermath of revolution: $ligo> 1921-23 (Dublin, 2000); Marie Coleman, County Longford and the Irish Revolution* 1910-1923 (Dublin, 2003).

1 G.H.Q. reports (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P17/A/17); Peter Hart, The IK A. at war,

1916-1923 (Oxford, 2003), p. 43. 3 Erhard Rumpf and A. C. Hepburn, Nationalism and socialism in twentieth<enHtry

Ireland (Liverpool, 1977), pp 49-58; Herman van der W?sten,.-Urs verzet tegm de

staatkundige eenheid der Britse eilandenf 1800-1921. Een politiek-geografische Studie

van integratie en desintegratie processen (Amsterdam, 1977), pp 188-98; David

Fitzpatrick, 'The geography of Irish nationalism, 1910-1921* in Past ? Present, no. 78

(Feb. 1978), pp 113-44; Tom Garv?n, The evolution of Irish nationalist politics (Dublin, 1981), pp 120-25. 4 Peter Hart, The geography of revolution in Ireland, 1917-1923' in Past and Present, no. 155 (May 1997), pp 142-76, repr. in idem, I HA. at war, pp 30-41, esp. 58^9.

327



328 Irish Historical Studies

light of theoretical works based on other revolutions, material published since

Hart's article first appeared, and some fresh data, this article attempts to do just that and establish the context in which revolutionaries were created.

I

That the statistical approach does not yield conclusive results can simply be

explained by the fact that the premises underlying it make it impossible to do so, the primary problem being that assessing the features of life in an entire county can never adequately explain why a small number of its inhabitants turned to the use of physical force. After all, political violence is not committed by a county's entire population, but by a few individuals who are by definition atypical of the

population among whom they operate. Looking at general characteristics of a

county can therefore never make clear why some of its inhabitants turned to the use of physical force when confronted with favourable circumstances, while most did not,

The second fundamental problem with this approach is that the correlations can

only provide meaningful answers if Volunteers in the various counties acted in isolation from each other, Local variables can only fully explain local violence if the violence in each county developed on its own terms and there were no variable outside influences. In reality, however, the intensity of conflict in each area was strongly influenced by a number of outside forces. Apart from the

impact of a certain amount of central co-ordination and interference, these included the operations of radical Volunteers outside their own county, the

response of crown forces to their actions, and government policy in general. Although,.as most historians agree, there was almost no central leadership

during the initial phases of conflict between 1917 and 1919, and the impetus for the military campaign which followed depended primarily on local activists ready to act without authorisation from the national leadership, none of these activities would have taken place if there had not been an overarching body with a history of the use of force and the implicit threat of using it again in the future. Peter Merkl has put this most succinctly, on the basis of a general analysis of a number of different terrorist and national liberation groups: Tf it were not for the organisations and their stated collective purpose of armed struggle, the violent individuals and their deeds would seem insane to the public and, perhaps, to their perpetrators as well.'5 The existence of a paramilitary organisation linked to a political movement demanding independence thus already exerted pressure on its members to engage in violent activities. This influence cannot, of course, be quantified, but although it would affect individual Volunteers everywhere to a roughly similar extent, membership figures diverged, and more Volunteers would be activated by it in well-organised areas. Active involvement by G.H.Q. also differed substantially between areas.

Although G.H.Q. refused to control and co-ordinate the unfolding conflict, it had, contrary to Hart's assertion,6 decisive influence on some local units. In the period

.s Feter Merkl, Political violence and terror: motifs and motivations (Berkeley, Calif, 1986), p, 362.

6 Hart, LRA.aiwar, p. 85.



AUGUSTEIJN ? The emergence of violent activism, 1916-21 329

1917-19, when a political strategy predominated, it prevented many operations, while at the same time applauding military activity that did not directly implicate the movement.7 This was more influential in areas geographically close to or strategically important to G.H.Q.8 Through its organisers, who were most numerous in the active south-west, G.H.Q. also directly initiated activities,9 The uneven distribution of arms sent out by GJLQ., again favouring units in the south-west, also had a clear impact on I.R.A. activity.10 The best indication of the power of G.H.Q. over the activity of local units is the

major increase in engagements and casualties following its sanction of attacks on

police barracks in January 1920. This is evident in all areas, but most notably in Connacht, where I.R.A. violence increased ninefold at the beginning of 1920." G.H.Q. also managed to obtain a large measure of control over the radicalisation of Volunteers and institute an increasing professionalisation of the organisation by taking up military developments in active units and introducing them in others from the autumn of 1920 onwards,12 My own research has shown that such direct interference was practically non-existent in western areas such as County Mayo during the entire period, but was very extensive in Dublin, and decisive in Counties Wexford and Londonderry towards the end of the War of Independence, when most casualties occurred.13 Marie Coleman has also shown that GJH.Q. largely determined the timing and shape of I JR. A actions in Longford, one of the

most active counties during 1920-21.H The development of conflict in one county was also directly and indirectly

influenced by what happened in other counties. Operations by local IXA. units and the counter-measures of crown forces often had a direct impact on

neighbouring counties. Volunteers from one county frequently attacked crown forces and civilians in other counties, and although the Royal Irish Constabulary was originally organised on a county basis, the military were not, and their

response to local LR.A. activity often extended to adjoining areas, initiating a

response from the LR.A. there. The introduction of a division structure for the RJ.C. early in 1920 also shows that the authorities recognised the fact that county

7 Kenneth Griffith and Timothy E. O'Grady (eds), Curious journey: an oral history of Ireland's unfinished revolution (London, 1982), p, 187; Augusteijn, Public defiance, chs 2-3.

H Hart, IJiA. at war, p. 38, map 3; Garvin, Evolution, pp 8-22; G.H.Q. reports

(U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P17/A/17-23); reports to G.H.Q. (N.L.I., Collins papers,

P921). 9 Augusteijn, Public defiance, chs 1-4. The role of outside forces has been found to be

important in many revolutions: see Rod Aya, Rethinking revolutions and collective

violence: studies on concept, theory, and method (Amsterdam, 1990), p. 59. 10 Charles Townshend, 'The Irish Republican Army and the development of guerrilla

warfare, 1916-21' in EJUR? xciv (1979), p. 325. 11 Overall number of indictable offences recorded: RXC. Inspector-General's monthly

reports (The National Archives [U.K.] (henceforth TOA.), P.R.O., CO 904); Hart, 1JIA, at war, pp 69-70, Table 5. The percentage increase in Munster was 290, in Leinster 200.

The big increase in Dublin came in the second quarter, with 400 per cent, and in Ulster with 200 per cent,

12 Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch. 4. 13 Ibid. 14 Coleman, Co. Longford, pp 164-5.




borders were confining police operations. Furthermore, the extension of martial law in 1921 from the most active counties in the south-west to

neighbouring inactive counties, with the stated objective of preventing activists from moving out to them, indicates that the crown forces themselves assumed that I.R.A. members did not recognise county borders. In a process of emulation, LR.A, activists also copied the actions of Volunteers in more distant counties and often reacted violently to reports of 'atrocities' by crown forces elsewhere. Influenced

by the same reports, members of the crown forces in places where the I.R.A. was

inactive often felt as threatened as those in active areas, and thereby, through overreaction, could activate the local I.R.A.15

Government policies designed to counteract the I.R.A. campaign also influenced the development of violence locally. One of the main problems with these counter-measures was that they were implemented indiscriminately throughout Ireland and rarely took account of local differences in the problems they tried to address. As a result, a number of government initiatives actually activated Volunteers in areas previously unaffected by violence. The indiscriminate arrests of radical nationalists throughout the country after 1916, and again following the very localised public defiance of late 1917 and early 1918, were among the main causes for the re-establishment of the wish to use

physical force after the failure of the Easter Rising. The abandonment of almost one-third of all police barracks throughout Ireland from late 1919 to early 1920, in response to a relatively small number of attacks in a few areas, gave Volunteer units free rein in rural areas, which strengthened their resolve.16 The large-scale arrests and subsequent release of many leading Volunteers, following hunger strikes and a three-day general strike in April 1920, intensified the radicalisation of some Volunteers in all parts of Ireland. The introduction of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act in August 1920 and the subsequent decision to intern all known republican activists in December 1920 forced many I.R.A. officers, under orders from G?Q,, to go on the run to avoid arrest even in areas where little or no violence had taken place previously. This in turn led to the formation of flying columns in some of these areas. The shifting focus and indiscriminate nature of

!i I, have described the impact, of these reactions more extensively in Joost Augusteijn,

lWhy did they fight for Ireland?' in idem (ed.), The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp 103-7. Although Hart has shown that in most localities casualties fell first among the crown forces, this does not discount the possibility that police repression, without casualties, could have led to LR.A. violence (Hart, IJtA, at war, p. 83). Most telling in this regard is the beating the Plant brothers received from the RLC. in 1919, causing both young Protestant farmers' sons to join the LR.A. and become longstanding gunmen (interview with Elizabeth Plant, Co. Tipperary, 9 Apr. 1990). For the impact of violence by crown forces on the developing conflict see David Fitzpatrick, Ireland since 1870' in Roy Foster (ed.), The Oxford illustrated history of Ireland (Oxford, 1989), p. 250, In general, government repression has tended to trigger support tor terrorists among the lower social strata: see Merkl, Political violence,?, 364,

7?V??e to?al number of R1C* P?sts in 1914 was 1,400 (T.C.D., Goulden papers, MS

7382/2). According to official sources, a total of 447 vacated barracks and 30 courthouses were damaged or destroyed between 1 January 1919 and 1 July 1920: see Charles lownshend, The British campaign in Ireland 1919-21: the development of political and

mihmy policies (Oxford, 1975), app. V.



AUGUSTEIJN ? The emergence of violent activism, 1916-21 331

government policy thus served to extend the conflict to areas that were previously inactive.17

Although few historians would doubt the existence of these outside influences, their impact on the development of the use of force at local level has not really been taken into account. Regardless of whether they increased or decreased IJR..A.

activity, they all affected the development of violence in various counties

independently of local circumstances. Their impact also becomes clear if we look at changes over time in the number of casualties. If the development of LRA. violence was wholly dependent on local characteristics, the levels of violence should have remained roughly in the same proportion to each other, with some areas becoming more and more violent and others remaining entirely quiet. However, this was clearly not the case, and the disparity becomes particularly obvious in 1921 when casualty figures among the crown forces in counties outside Munster began to rise steeply. Between the last quarter of 1920 and the first quarter of 1921 they rose by 21 per cent in Munster (from 225 to 273), while in Connacht

they went up by 113 per cent (23 to 49), in Leinster by 50 per cent (32 to 48), in Ulster by 68 per cent (31 to 52), and in Dublin city by 77 per cent (35 to 62),18

Questions have also been raised as to whether Hart's spatial distribution of casualties, or the previously used spread of I.R.A. operations on county level, adequately reflects the activities of local I.R.A. men,19 The use of the county as a unit of analysis has been justified by pointing to the fact that it was the standard administrative division and that originally it was also the basic unit on which the LRA, was organised: '[brigade territory] very rarely crossed county lines and was jealously guarded. As a result, operations within a county were almost

always carried out by local men,'20 Although this is true in a general sense, the use of county borders is ultimately inspired by the opportunity it provides to obtain comparable data and not by an inherent logic from an LRA, activist's

point of view.21 When looking closely at the actual situation in various counties, the claim that local men were almost always responsible for LR.A. operations does not hold up. The assertion that brigades were confined to a particular county is clearly incorrect. All the brigades in the five counties I have studied had boundaries that crossed county borders.22 As men from each brigade had the right to act in its entire territory, this meant that men from one county could operate in their own

brigade area but in another county, Furthermore, although there were indeed rules

against engaging in operations in other brigade areas, these were frequently breached, particularly in the case of the I.R.A in Counties Londonderry and

Tipperary. In Ulster active Volunteers even operated as a rule away from their home area as a security measure. For instance, the two flying columns from

Deny confined their operations to County Donegal and never acted in the city,

17 Hart, IJRA. and its enemies, chs 3-4; Fitzpatrick, Politics & Ir. life, pp 216-17;

Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch. 5; Hart, IJIA. at war, p, 84. 18 Hart, IJRA. at war, pp 66-70, Tables 4-5.

19 Charles Townshend, 'Telling the Irish Revolution' in Augusteijn (ed.), Ir, Revolution, p. 10,

20 Hart, I? A. at war, pp 34-5.

21 Townshend, Telling the Irish Revolution', p. 10. 22 Augusteijn, Public defiance,?, 27, map L (The five counties studied in this book

were: Dublin, Londonderry, Mayo, Tipperary and Wexford.)




while the column from Belfast operated in County Cavan. Similar diversions

took place in south Tipperary. In the early stages of conflict leading officers spent

much of their time in Dublin, Sean Treacy even being killed in a shoot-out in a

Dublin street During 1920-21 Tipperary activists were invited to participate in

barracks attacks in neighbouring brigades and counties, and one of its flying columns spent most of its time in County Kilkenny.23 This range of outside influences clearly undermines the explanatory power of

the correlations between local characteristics and registered levels of violence in

each county which form the core of the statistical approach, while their accuracy is limited by the fact that neither I.R.A. nor the crown forces acknowledged

county borders, These shortcomings make clear why the correlations can never

provide a full answer to why some men turned to the use of force. Nevertheless,

although Marie Coleman has brought forward some methodological objections to the way data were collected,24 Hart does provide the most reliable overall

picture of the spatial distribution of the use of violence, while his and others' search for correlations has highlighted a number of influences on LR.A. activists which can aid in understanding the dynamics behind the turn to the use of violence.

II

In line with the suggestion put forward in Hart's article, we will take a closer look at LR.A. activists and their interactions with the community and the crown forces. This approach has been informed by recent developments in the study of

political violence. To explain such violence, revolutionary theorists originally concentrated on the background and actions of individuals, in so-called actor oriented theories, In reaction to this personality-driven approach, others have

emphasised the importance of structural conditions necessary for the outbreak of revolutions. These two approaches have later been combined in what is termed the conjunction theory, to which still more recently has been added the importance of the interaction between revolutionaries and their environment, opponents as well as supporters, leading to a process-based method.25 Within this continuum the statistical analysis used to explain regional variation in the levels of violence in Ireland can be characterised as a structuralist-type approach, as it measures the conjunction of certain static conditions with the occurrence of violent action. Here I want to take the analysis a step further. Based on the actual events, it can be safely assumed that Ireland in this period fulfilled many of the conditions conducive for the outbreak of a revolution.26 These circumstances put pressure on all those living in Ireland, and particularly on members of the Volunteers, to act. The regional variation in the use of force does,

w Idem, 'Radical nationalist activity in Co. Derry' in Gerard O'Brien (ed.), Derry and

Londonderry: history and society ... (Dublin, 1999), pp 589-90; idem, 'The operations of the south Tipperary LRA., 1916-1921* in Tipperary Hist. Jn., no. 9 (1996), pp 151,157. 24 Coieman, Co. Longford, pp 174-7.

21> Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary change (Stanford, Calif., 1982), pp 168-94. * lam?s DtFro?ZQi Revolutions and revolutionary movements (Boulder, Colo,, 1996),

pp 10-22.



Augusteijn ? The emergence of violent activism, 1916-21 333

however, indicate that there was a range of reactions possible to these pressures. The present article therefore concentrates on the process by which individuals, through interaction with their environment, became revolutionaries between 1916 and 1921. The analysis of this interplay has been inspired by some practical concepts developed by theorists such as Peter Merkl, Fathali Moghaddam and Rod Aya.27

Ill

To determine what was particular about the circumstances in which I.R.A. activists found themselves, we first have to identify who they were. Unfortunately information is sketchy, and no full comparison exists of the backgrounds of LR.A. activists, ordinary Volunteers and the general population in specific areas. However, from my own comparison of the backgrounds of LR.A. and non-I.R.A. members in a number of company areas, and Peter Hart's analysis of the background of all identifiable I A.A. activists, it becomes clear that, similar to the profile of members of revolutionary organisations elsewhere,

Volunteers were broadly representative of Irish male Catholic males, albeit with fewer members drawn from the richest and poorest classes of society.21 This does not provide us with many clues about LR.A. activists, but one feature of Hart's analysis does, namely that men living in urban areas were represented much more

strongly among activists than those from rural areas, and that this became more

pronounced as violence grew.29 Towns were apparently breeding places for radical republicans, However, Hart

has shown that the level of urbanisation on its own is statistically not a very strong explanatory factor for the turn to violence.30 Clearly not all towns

generated activists and there were a variety of circumstances in which people became violent. The fact that in general urban men were more likely to become active, particularly when violence developed, nevertheless arouses curiosity, After all, explaining this difference between urban and rural Volunteers might provide us with an answer to what it is that made people use political violence.

If it Is not town life of itself, there must have been other factors at work, Hart

again provides a suggestive piece of information, one that is confirmed by my 27 Merkl, Political violence,passim-, Fathali M.Moghaddam, 'Cultural preconditions for

potential terrorist groups: terrorism and societal change' in idem and Anthony J. Marsella

(eds), Understanding terrorism: psychosocial roots, consequences and interventions

(Washington, D.C, 2004), pp 103-17. Aya suggests what he calls the 'vicarious problem solving approach* which takes the activists1 perspective (Aya, Rethinking revolutions, pp

95-102). For Ireland such an approach has also been suggested by Richard English, 'Socialist intellectuals and the Irish Revolution' in Augusteijn, Ir. Revolution, p. 206.

28 Augusteijn, Public defiance, app.; Peter Hart, 'The social structure of the I.R.A/ in

idem, IJIA. at war, pp 110-38; see also Aya, Rethinking revolutions, pp 58-60. Charles

Tilly has asserted that poorer people simply do not have the resources to participate in

revolutionary movements, particularly during the preparatory stages of a revolution

(Charles Tilly, From mobilization to revolution (Reading, Mass., 1978), pp 75-6). n

Hart, IMA. at war, pp 114-16. This picture is confirmed in Longford. The dominance

of urban professions there is not so clear, but Coleman has looked at the profession of the father or mother, not of the activists themselves (Coleman, Co. Longford,^ 149?51),

mttwtJJRA.atwar,p.42>.




own and Coleman's research. Hart has observed that I.R.A. activists saw towns

as unreliable places, and in a comparison of urban and rural companies in north

Cork he found that urban companies had far fewer so-called 'reliable' members

than rural and that urban activists were far more likely than their rural

counterparts to be on active service, on the run or in jail.31 It is clear, therefore, that while towns in general did not generate violent behaviour, nevertheless a

number of towns did provide circumstances in which a relatively large number of

activists developed from among a small number of 'reliable' members. We

therefore have to refine the question: what was so special about certain towns that

the fewer radicals present were so much more likely to become fighters than their more numerous rural and non-violent urban counterparts?

To frame an answer it is necessary to take a closer look at the history of urban activists. One of the most striking features of twentieth-century radical Irish nationalism was that its reorganisation around 1910 began in towns where remnants of the old Irish Republican Brotherhood, which had been behind the rebellion of 1867, could still be found,32 Although the LR.B. had been largely reduced to a social club by 1900, radical nationalists used its remaining structures to organise and attract new members from 1909 onwards. The I.R.B., rejuvenated in this way, as well as the Irish Volunteers set up in 1913 partly by these same

men, slowly spread from these towns to other areas in the period before the 1916

rising/3 Police records show that the level of organisation among the Irish Volunteers before 1916 was highest in Munster.34 The receptiveness to the Volunteers1 message seems also to have been associated with the presence of Christian Brothers' schools, in which an advanced nationalist interpretation of Irish history was taught.35 Apart from organising the Irish Volunteers, the main

public activities of these activists consisted of opposition to the recruiting efforts for the British army. From the distribution of anti-recruiting leaflets in 1915 it can be surmised that such radicals were most active in the south and west of Ireland.36 The aftermath of the Easter Rising emphasises the importance of urban areas

in the growth of radical nationalism. Of the 406 internees from outside the three counties where the fighting had taken place (Dublin, Galway and Wexford), 75 per cent had an urban background. Almost half of these (172) came from Munster, mainly from Cork, where most of the fighting took place in 1920-21. This can partly be explained by the fact that Munster was heavily urbanised, but it does suggest a link between early activism, these arrests and the later use of violence/7 However, the fact that neither Galway nor Wexford became particularly active in 1920-21 shows that prison experience in 1916-17 was

3 Ibid., pp 47-8; Coleman, Co. Longford, p.153; Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch, 4, 0

The original Fenians were largely an urban phenomenon: see R. V. Comerford, The Fenians in context: Irish politics and society, 1848-82 (Dublin, 1985), p. 111. n

Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch. 1 ; Coleman, Co, Longford, p. 163. M R.LC County Inspectors'monthly reports (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904). 5 Hart, IMA, at war, pp 56-7; Tom Bowden, 'The Irish underground and the War of

Independence, 1919-1921* in 7n. Contemp, Hist., viii, no, 2 (1973), pp 9-10; Augusteijn, 'Why did they fight for Ireland?', pp 109-15, 36 Ben Novick, Conceiving revolution: Irish nationalist propaganda during the First

World Ufer (Dublin,.2001), p, 47. -? Sean O'Mahony, Frongoch: university of revolution (Killiney, 1987), app. 1; Breand?n Mac Giolla Choille (ed.), Intelligence notes, 1913-16 (Dublin, 1966), p, 238.




insufficient by itself to make people violent. It may well be that the high arrest rate and the authorities' ability to identify all local radicals in these two counties effectively killed off the ability of the organisation to re-establish itself after 1916. The effectiveness of such police efficiency in dealing with the Volunteers in the early stages of the conflict has already been identified by historians.38 Radicals before 1916 were, therefore, predominant in urban areas in many

counties, but most of those perceived to be a threat to the state in 1916 came from relatively heavily urbanised Munster. Hart's correlations doindicate that almost any form of republican activism in 1917-19, either in the I.R.A, or Sinn Fein, or

previous activism in the language movement, predisposed certain areas, and

probably the people involved in these activities, to the use of violence in 1920-21 ?9 The early organisation of radical republicans in Munster towns could therefore partly explain their dominance in the conflict later on. To trace the development from activism to violence, we should examine the

activities of Volunteers after 1916. One of the main features of LR.A. activity in 1917 was open drilling. This was centred in Munster, followed by Connacht and

Dublin, with little taking place in Leinster and Ulster. In November 1917 police records show that 81 per cent of all drilling incidents took place in Munster, with Counties Clare and Cork clearly the most affected. Five months later Munster's share in drilling declined to 58 per cent and fell further in April 1918, while Connacht saw the largest increase.40 A similar distribution applies to nationalist

inspired riots and arms seizures by the I.R.A. In 1917 59 per cent of such riots took place in Munster, decreasing to 33 per cent in 1918.4i The most violent activity of the I.R.A. before 1919 was taking weapons forcibly from civilians and individual members of the crown forces. These seizures were essential to

becoming a viable military threat to British rule, and are generally identified as one of the main driving forces behind the escalation that took place after 1916.

They were again most prevalent in Munster, followed at a distance by Dublin, the two main theatres of violence in the later period.42 The willingness to collect arms by increasingly violent means was dependent

on the radicalisation of activists after 1916. This was enhanced by the authorities'

policy of imprisoning for short periods those who took the lead in arms raids and acts of defiance. These were often the very same people who had been interned after 1916 on suspicion of involvement in the rising, A partisan publication listing all people arrested in this way during 1917 and 1918 again shows the dominance of Munster and Dublin.43 In 1917 43 per cent came from Munster and 33 per cent from Dublin city, while in 1918 42 per cent came from Munster, 17 per cent from Connacht and 11 per cent from Dublin. Instead of subduing these men, who had

gained the admiration of their peers because of their imprisonment and defiance,

38 Fitzpatrick, 'Geography of Ir. nationalism', pp 120-22; Hart, IMA. at war, p. 51

39 Hart, 'Geography of revolution' in idem, IM. A. at war, Farry, Aftermath, pp 100-04;

Coleman, Co. Longford, p. 161. 40

RJ.C. Inspector-General's monthly reports, Oct. 1917 - Apr 1918 (T.N.A., P.R.O.,

CO 904). 41

Hart, IRA. at war, pp 76-8. 42

Augusteijn, Public defiance, pp 17-18, Tables .1-2; Hart, IMA. at war, pp 43-4.

Regional enlistment figures up to the end of 1916, Irish Independent, 14 Nov. 1916, 43 Two years of English atrocities in Ireland [n.d.] (TCX>., Gallagher papers, MS

10050/626).




anecdotal evidence suggests that many of these activists became reluctant to

undergo further incarceration and were increasingly prepared to defend their

freedom with force. The conscription crisis of April 1918, which forced the I.R.A. underground,

and the success of Sinn Fein's political campaign, culminating in the December 1918 election victory, strengthened the resolve of these leading activists. They feared that the success of the political campaign would slowly make them

irrelevant, and this inspired them to initiate a number of violent attacks on crown forces. During the winter of 1918-19 most areas saw attempts of this kind, but casualties were only reported in a small proportion, notably for the first time on 21 January 1919 at Soloheadbeg in Tipperary.44 Willingness to use force in these operations showed strong regional variations

throughout the entire period 1917-19. There were no casualties of LRA violence in eleven of the twelve Leinster counties outside Dublin city or in six of the nine Ulster counties; there was a low level of violence in the remaining three Ulster counties and in all of Connacht, while Munster showed levels ranging from weak in Kerry and Limerick to average in most others and very strong in

County Clare. In total there were 75 casualties of I.R.A. violence in Munster and Dublin city, compared with 22 in the rest of the country. This largely foreshadows the distribution of violence after 1919.45 There is, however, no direct connexion. In 1920 Clare became less prominent, while Volunteers in Longford, which saw almost no activity before 1920, suddenly became extremely violent, mainly in response to prodding by G.H.Q46 It is nonetheless clear that men from Munster were more radical in the early period and also most likely to become involved in the use of more extreme forms of force after the general election of 1918. This was at least partly due to their early organisation before 1916, the disproportionate attention they had received from the authorities, and their greater involvement in activities such as drilling and arms raiding.

IV

The history of the movement until 1920 indeed seems to have predisposed Munster Volunteers to take up the use of violence more vigorously, particularly those from urban backgrounds. However, this is not sufficient by itself to explain the turn to violence. We have to determine what was so special about Munster, and certain of its towns in particular, that so many early activists there were willing to engage in political violence. Research on other violent political organisations has shown that in any conflict only a few people overcome the

44 See RJ.C. County Inspectors' monthly reports, 1919 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CO 904); raid

^S0l^StW11 aerodjrome in Dublin,'Pat MacCrea (UG.D.A., O'Malley papers, U7bl 10). For the fear among militarists of being sidelined by the political campaign see

Towntal, Irish Republican Army', pp 320-21; Fitzpatrick, Politics & Ir. life, pp 215-16, Such a violent response is in line with the rational collective action theory proposed by Charles Tilly and others: see John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: broken images (Oxford, 1995), pp 258-9 4

Hart, IRA .at war, p. 36, Table 1; pp 66-7, Table 5; R.LC. County Inspectors' monthly reports, 1919 (T.NA.,RR.O,, CO 904). 46

Colernan, Co, Longford, pp 164-5.




social and moral restraints attached to the use of physical force for political ends, and even then after a long period of agonising. The actions of these radicals, however, can set in motion an escalation which significantly lowers the restraints for others.47 Research on the I.R.A. shows that a lack of willingness and courage and an overwhelming desire for self-preservation pervaded Volunteers everywhere, but the situation in Munster apparently allowed an erosion of the threshold to the use of violence much earlier and made it possible for it to be more widespread than in other areas, leading to a concerted campaign of violence4f

One of the elements most often identified in the turn to violence by political activists is their existence in mental and often physical isolation. Such an environment allows a disassociation from family members and friends, important when activists encounter opposition from those around them. Functioning in groups of like-minded people, in which the social environment of activists is formed by the organisation, action becomes the only thing that counts, and moral constraints are eroded, making extreme actions, including killings, increasingly acceptable.49

In Ireland a mental and physical separation between radicals and their social environment can be detected after 1918. Activists who became deeply involved in the organisation and participated in some of the initial operations tended to isolate themselves at least intellectually from their immediate social environment

where opposition was sometimes voiced against their activities, and fraternised increasingly with like-minded men. Some of these Volunteers went on the run

during 1919 and became involved in the use of violence.50 Following the order by G.H.Q. in January 1920 to attack the R.I.C., more Volunteers involved in these actions went on the run and spontaneously formed so-called flying columns.

More of these isolated groups of activists were established following the official introduction of flying columns throughout the country after October 1920,

particularly after the government order of December 1920 to intern all activists. The greater ease with which men became involved when the conflict had

already begun is also in line with the experiences of other organisations engaged in political violence. Such so-called 'second-generation activists' were attracted

primarily by the excitement of violent action and had fewer qualms about the use of force which had been justified by the actions of the first generation,51 The violent consequences of these developments are clearly mirrored in the casualty figures among crown forces. From the conclusion of the 1916 rising to the

beginning of 1920 there were 67 casualties, but in the first six months of 1920 this number rose to 243, then to 481 in the following half-year, and 821 in the first six months of 1921.52

47 Augusteijn, Public defiance, pp 335-52; see also Merkl, Political violence, p. 350,

48 Augusteijn, Public defiance, pp 89-92, 49 Merk!, Political violence, pp 352-3, 364; Moghaddam, 'Cultural preconditions', pp

107-8. In the Irish context, the importance of this was first indicated by Fitzpatrick, Politics & Ir. life, p. 218. 50 The experience of the 'Big Four' in south Tipperary is the classic example of this

process: see Joost Augusteijn, *

Why was Tipperary so active in the War of Independence?' in Tipperary Hist. Jn., no 19 (2006), pp 207-20.

51 Merkl, Political violence, p. 350.

52 Augusteijn, Public defiance, p, 18.




The timing and the extent to which Volunteers in different areas actually severed their ties with the communities in which they lived does indeed seem to

account for the varying levels of violence in Ireland.53 Many activists in Munster,

particularly those in the towns, took this step very early on, while in Connacht it was not taken until 1921 and it occurred only sporadically in Leinster and Ulster, The growing number of casualties in areas outside Munster where flying columns were formed from the end of 1920 onwards testifies to the importance of

functioning in isolated groups.54 The changed attitude of activists once they left home is also indicated by the fact that while the number of casualties rose

sharply, the monthly total of indictable offences barely increased from the spring of 1920 onwards.

The great majority of Volunteers did show themselves sensitive to the

restraining influence of their direct environment. They were often prevented from

engaging the crown forces by fear of the consequences for their family and friends, or by active efforts at containment on the part of influential members of the community, including many Volunteer officers. This was particularly strong after initial activity had taken place and people had become aware of the potential consequences.55 The central role of mothers in preventing early radicalisationis

nicely illustrated by the experience of the Volunteer Bryan Ryan who was called

upon by his friend Pat to help engage the police:

My mother locked the door. I didn't know what to do but my father opened it,.. Pat said, * We have to call Martin Dwyer.' Your man stayed at Dwyer's gate and sent me in. I hadn't

my wits about me. I knocked at his window, For I knew where I was, his mother started

giving out ? such a lacerating. 'Wait till I meet your mother, calling people out of their

beds to commit murder, and get killed yourselves. Well if you have nothing else to do Martin has, Clear off.'56

Leading Volunteers were also responsive to the demands of parents and the

community, Eamon O'Dwyer, a brigade officer in south Tipperary, recalls the pressure he was under:

A good deal of the time ? when it was known that I was home ? I had women callers who wanted to get their sons or brothers or husbands out of danger's way. They were good people, staunch enough to the cause and ready to make any sacrifices of money, means,

imprisonment, but they wished to save the lives of their dear ones, and who could blame them. Those were heartbreaking ordeals for me, and sometimes I had to intervene and

bring fellows home against their will,57

** ?bid.t passim.

54 Hart? IMA. at war, pp 66-7, Tables 4,50, 55 For examples of this in various areas see Mark Killilea (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers,

P17/B109); Dr John Madden (ibid., O'Malley papers, P17bl 13); James Chambers, 'Statement* (MS in possession of Michael McBvilly, Dublin); Michael Hughes, 'Suternent' (MS, ibid.); Jimmy Swift (U.CDA,, O'Malley papers, P17bl36); Liam Langley (ibid, PITblOl); Pat Fall?n (ibid,, MS P17M09); Tom Maguire (ibid., P17bl00); Lt M. Sheerin (NJLJ., Collins papers, P921); Peadar O'Donnell (U.C.D.A., O'Malley papers, P17b98); Wexford Brigade report (ibid., Mulcahy papers, P7/A/17/67-8); Umseann Mac Eoin (ed.),.Survivors (Dublin, 1980), p. 279; Augusteijn, 'Operations',pp 153?4, *

Bryan Ryan, A full private remembers the troubled times (Hollyford, 1969),p. 15. Eamon O'Dwyer,'Statement' (Tipperary S.R. County Museum, Clonmel).




It was difficult for sons to go against the wishes of their parents. My own analysis of Volunteers' backgrounds also shows that in the most violent county in my study (Tipperary) at least 38 per cent of all members lacked the presence of a father (with another 15 per cent unknowns), while many activists who had their fathers living at home emphasise that these were politically radical. Such families, one could argue, already functioned as an isolated group, and the restraints connected to the use of political violence were naturally much lower. The predominance of activists in certain families is particularly striking. It is also significant that up to twice as many Volunteers were independent of their parents in active Tipperary than in the slowest area (County Londonderry).58 The central role of organisers sent down by G.H.Q. in initiating attacks also shows that the willingness to fight was not widespread among established locals, but that some could be activated.59 Under what circumstances did active Volunteers break their ties with their

home communities and start to engage in violence? Why did this happen in Munster and rarely in Connacht or elsewhere, and why was it more prevalent in towns? The clearest indicator of local attitudes towards republicans comes from the 1920 local government elections. The results showed a huge difference in

support for Sinn F?in between urban and rural areas, 30 per cent against 72 per cent overall, and also a large regional variation, In Connacht 97 per cent of seats in rural areas went to Sinn F?in, but only 42 per cent in urban areas. In Munster the proportions were 87 per cent to 43 per cent, in Leinster 67 per cent to 35 per cent, and in Ulster 42 per cent to 15 per cent. The differences between rural ma urban results were somewhat exaggerated by the strenuous efforts of Volunteers to ensure the best possible results in the rural elections of June 1920 after the

relatively less successful outcome of the urban elections in January, but may also be diminished by the negative impact on republican propaganda of the growing concentration of police and military in the towns during 1919 and 192?.60 Overall, the validity of these regional variations in support for the IJR.A. is confirmed by the local success of the police boycott, the levels of adherence to the institutions of alternative Sinn F?in government, the public demonstrations of

support for the republicans, recruitment figures in the First World War, and the 1918 general election results,61 The solid support for republicanism in the Munster and Connacht countryside

was probably related to a tradition of agrarian agitation and a tendency to

political uniformity enforced by communal pressures.62 The radical tradition had

58 Augusteijn, Public defiance, app.

59 Ibid., eh. 2.

60 Van der W?sten, Iers verzet, pp.208-11; see also Augusteijn, Public defiance, eh. 7;

Arthur Mitchell, Revolutionary government in Ireland: D?il Eireann, 1919-22 (Dublin, 1995), pp 123-4. 61 Police boycott: R'J.C. County Inspectors' monthly reports (T.NA.,P.RXX, CO 904), By November 1916, of the men officially designated as available for service, 25 per cent had joined the army in Connacht, roughly 50 per cent in both Leinster and Munster, while in Ulster, enlistment far exceeded the government's targets, overrunning to 148 per cen?

of those deemed available: see Irish Independent, 14 Nov. 1916. For the 1918 election results see B. M. Walker (ed.), Parliamentary election results in Ireland, 1801-1922

(Dublin, 1978), pp 185-91; Garvin, Evolution, pp 118-22; Mitchell, Revolutionary government, pp 123-4.

62 Hart, IM A. at war, p, 53; Fitzpatrick, Politics ? IrJife,f.m.




established a willingness among the local population to resist government, which

made informing to the police far less likely, despite the fact that such areas were

generally allocated more policemen.63 This tradition of agitation may well be connected with a downward trend in the economic fortunes of lower-middle-class

groupings, which Tom Garvin has identified as a cause of the central position of the Munster I.R.A,64 Merkl has noted the importance of such groups in political violence elsewhere.65

My comparison of the background of rural Volunteer companies in the four

provinces confirms the picture of regional variation that emerges from the figures

presented above. The rural companies in County Mayo mobilised 34 per cent of ail available males aged between fifteen and fifty-nine and were clearly very well

integrated into local society. In County Tipperary only 13 per cent of all males in this age group were members, while in Wexford it was just 7 per cent and in

Londonderry 4 per cent. This indicates a substantially different experience for the Volunteers in different parts of the country. Other features confirm this picture. The probability that communal pressure could restrain violent activity is

suggested by the fact that Volunteer companies with a strong representation of

traditionally less rebellious social groups such as merchants and wealthier farmers tended to be less active. In areas where there was a greater propensity to violence the social composition of activists was generally more working-class.66 Levels of support are also influential in relation to the victims of the LR.A.

Overcoming the threshold to the use of violence is easier when the person shot is not seen as a member of one's own social group. It was therefore necessary to separate the police both physically and mentally from the local community, which made it easier and more acceptable to attack them. This was facilitated by the voluntary abandonment of almost one-third of police posts by July 1920,

which caused a physical separation between police and community in many areas. At the same time the ostracism of the police from Irish life became a conscious policy of the republican movement. This began in 1918, but was more actively pursued from June 1920F After a process of ignoring, warning, threatening and shunning, those who remained in the police were pushed out of the community. In this process of mental separation the police were transformed from valued members of the community to hostile outsiders who were acceptable targets of attack, politically as well as psychologically. Ultimately some of the

most actively anti-republican policemen were killed to set examples. This strategy was, of course, most successful in areas where the republicans received wholehearted support, most notably Connacht and Munster. Reports of RI.C county inspectors confirm these variations.68

ft- The popular admiration for lawbreakers is described in G. D. Zimmermann, Songs of Irish rebellion: political street ballads and rebel songs, 1780-1900 (Dublin, 1967), pp 23-7. See also Garvin, Evolution, p. 116; The memoirs of John M. Regan, a Catholic ogteer m me RI?. and R.U.C? 1909-1948, ed. Joost Augusteijn (Dublin, 2007). m

Garvin, Evolution, $$ 123-6. 65 MerM, Political violence, p. 363, 66 Augusteijn, Public defiance, app.; Hart, IMA. at war, pp 116-20. The change in class

compoMion of activists is m line with theory: see Tilly, From mobilization to revolution, pp75~6. . .

^ H&patrick, Polines & Ir. life, pp 10, 106-41; IJRA. order of June 1920, General Orders, new senes, no. 6 (NJLX, MS 739). 68 ?U.C. County Inspectors' monthly reports (T.N A., PH.O., CO 904\




All these data indicate that neither almost total support, as in Connacht, nor

widespread rejection of republicanism, as in Leinster and Ulster, provided circumstances that stimulated the use of force. When testing the connexion between support for republicans and the number of casualties, Hart indeed found a weak correlation.69 This suggests that, taking into account the experience of violent Volunteers in the various counties, provided there was a substantial group of radicalised activists present, it was the balance between the measure of support for, and opposition to, revolutionary nationalism that initiated the break between activists and community.70 Volunteers from places where republicanism was

popular but encountered serious opposition, as in western and southern towns

generally, were more likely to radicalise through the more frequent confrontation with their political opponents and the police, and were more likely to go on the run as a result of the danger of informing. The much greater urbanisation in

Munster in comparison with Connacht meant that more Volunteers in that

province went on the run. The experiences of Munster and Connacht men on the run also differed. The possibility of informing was virtually absent in rural Connacht, but quite likely in Munster. This put more pressure on activists in Munster to form flying columns and use violence to ensure their continued freedom, which caused further escalation. The relatively high level of civilian casualties of the I.R.A. in Munster as compared with Connacht indicates as much.71 The well-supported western Volunteers did not turn so easily to the use of violence, as they were rarely directly engaged or threatened even when on the run, either by the local population or by crown forces. However, activists also needed a substantial measure of support to sustain their activities during the defiant as well as in the violent stage, in urban and rural areas. The narrow base of and low level of support for the LRA. in Leinster and Ulster would explain the difficulties in sustaining activity there. The larger measure of opposition against republicans both from the police and

the population in urban areas may therefore account for the greater likelihood that activists would be radicalised and forced to leave home. Michael Farry has shown that in the Civil War the distribution of activity was primarily determined

by the presence of targets', mainly found in towns and along so-called lines of communication. In areas with solid support for one side or the other virtually no

activity took place.72 Marie Coleman's research has also given support to the idea that a larger measure of opposition led to higher levels of violence, partly by providing targets and partly arising from the active opposition from diese

groups.73 Furthermore, Hart has shown that a strong police presence actually produced more rather than less violence.74 Urban activists in particular were

69 Hart, IJt A, at war, pp 52-3.

70 Strong support and active opposition also went together with extensive IJ?. A. activity

in Longford: see Coleman, Co. Longford, pp 153-4, 71 RJ.C, County Inspectors' monthly reports, 1917-21 (TOA-, PRO., CO 904).

Although the percentage of civilians among all casualties shot either by the LRA. or crown forces between January 1920 and the truce of July 1921 is roughly equal between Connacht (31 per cent) and Munster (35 per cent), the numbers are substantially different: 21 in Connacht, 156 in Munster.

72 Farry, Aftermath, pp 100-04,

73 Coleman, Co. Longford, p, 172.

74 Hart, IJRA> at war, pp 51-2; Augusteijn, Public defiance, ch. 6,




faced with a stark choice: keep quiet so that they, their families and their

communities would not be punished by the police, or leave home and avoid the

community pressures on them to remain silent while retaining their freedom to

fight. Their personal choice was strongly influenced by the exact levels of

support and opposition they encountered. Such a role for the interplay between

opportunity and action is also suggested by the work of Charles Tilly and Rod

Aya.75. One further aspect of town-living conducive to townspeople breaking with

their community was the influx of large numbers of migrant workers from the

countryside; These men had by their very nature few ties with the local urban

community but strong ties with rural areas, features that exactly suited activists on the run. There is much incidental evidence of the presence of a large proportion of recent migrants among urban activists. In a study of over a thousand Cork Volunteers, Hart has shown that although Volunteers were mainly urban, their fathers were predominantly farmers ,76

The fact that many young men living in towns had only recently settled there and had no direct family ties with the local community also made it easier for them to join the IJR.A. Volunteering, particularly in the early stages, presented an excellent opportunity for socialising and adventure for these men. That this could lead later on to involvement in violent operations was not then obvious, but the lack of restraint on them predisposed these men to radicalisation once they had become members. The significantly higher proportion of absent fathers of Volunteers in rural areas than among the general population indicates that many fathers seem to have prevented their sons from participation in the Volunteers even at a time when the organisation was not yet involved in the use of violence. It was not something innate in rural men that made them less likely to participate in political violence so much as the circumstances in which they found themselves, subject to strong parental and community control. The more

impersonal setting of large cities, which attracted most migrants, and the importance of socialising to all urban members axe also demonstrated by the narrow age bracket of the Volunteers in Dublin.77

Of course, activists who left home could only become involved in sustained violence if there was a supportive countryside in which they could operate in relative safety, or a large city allowing relative anonymity. Thus Munster and Connacht activists who encountered serious opposition in their local area could leave and operate in more supportive areas where their actions also brought in other, often rural, activists, something readily observed by the RJ.C. county inspector in Limerick: 'Country districts were refuges for city men who went on the run when things were getting too hot for them.'78 The personal ties of recent

migrants to urban areas could also provide them with contacts and safe houses, Activists in Dublin and Cork city were able to continue to operate in the anonymous surroundings of a big city with relatively substantial pockets of

^75 Tilly, From mobilization to revolution, pp 69-99; Aya, Rethinking revolutions, pp 95-102.

76 For instance, half of the flying column men in Derry city were outsiders: see Liam A. Brady m Derry Journal, 25 May 1953. On Cork volunteers see Hart, IMA. at war, p. 116.

Hart, 'Social structure7 in idem, IMA. at war, pp 110-38. n Memoirs of John M. Regan, ed. Augusteijn, p. 157.




support. Their far less numerous counterparts in Leinster and Ulster, who faced

widespread opposition in both urban and rural areas, and were often known to the

police, were forced to remain quiet or be quickly arrested. When G.H.Q. ordered LR A. activists throughout the country at the end of 1920 to leave home and form

flying columns, those in Connacht were able to do so, while their counterparts in most of Leinster and Ulster failed, showing that circumstances in Connacht had been suitable for the formation of flying columns but that the need had not arisen. Such variations in potential for violent action are also shown by the local responses to GH.Q.'s order of January 1920 to engage the police.79

V

The differing experience of I.R.A. activists can account for the widely varying levels of violence in Ireland between 1916 and 1921 and can help us to understand how revolutionaries were created. From what we know of their

experiences we can conclude that there were a number of important activating elements at work. A local tradition of opposition to the authorities and

widespread teaching of an advanced nationalist interpretation of Irish history aided in establishing an early network of organisation and activities, such as

drilling, arms raiding and rioting. These confrontations with the authorities led to

varying levels of arrests and escalation throughout the country. To what extent escalation took place, and, more importantly, was sustained,

depended on a range of factors, including the size and outlook of the local I.R.A., the attitude of LRA. headquarters towards them, the response of the crown forces, and the impact of government policies. Crucial in this equation seems to have been the mental and often physical separation of activists from their social environment and the levels of support and opposition Volunteers encountered at local level. The level of mobilisation of the population into the Volunteers, the level of support for their activities and the level of opposition they encountered both from within the population and from the security forces were all important in a dynamic interaction. Activists needed to be part of an organisation strongly embedded in the community, and they needed a high level of support for their

objectives, particularly in rural areas, to be able to function as a violent

underground movement. It was, however, also necessary that they encountered a

certain level of opposition, both in urban areas, where most of the early confrontations took place, and to a lesser extent also in the countryside, where

they went on the run and where most of the later violence was enacted, This

opposition ensured a radicalisation which convinced them to adopt physical force and which overcame the community's initial unwillingness to condone it, In

larger urban areas both functions of opposition and support could be combined. We have seen that radical nationalists were active in most counties before

1916, but particularly in certain towns in Munster Varying numbers of men were

arrested after the rising, with a concentration in the south. A willingness to defy the police openly after the release of these prisoners was also largely concentrated in Munster, and to a lesser extent in Connacht and Dublin city,

79 Hart, /jRA. at war, pp 66-70, Tables 4-5.




apparently connected with the presence of a tradition of resistance, which made the local population more hostile to authority and limited the efficiency of the

police in dealing with offenders. The more sustained presence of organisers and arms sent down.by LRA, headquarters also helped to facilitate the planning and initiation of activities. The men arrested for leading or participating in riots, drilling parties and arms raids came largely from among early activists and again came predominantly from Munster and Dublin. The most likely place to find concentrations of men and confrontations with the police was, of course, in urban areas.

Further escalation took place, particularly in heavily urbanised Munster, where large numbers of often economically independent young men, relatively free from community constraints and in search of social interaction, were attracted to the Volunteers and were confronted with a special mix of support and opposition

from the local population and the police. After a period of confrontation these activists increasingly operated within small groups of like-minded activists, for whom action became the main object of existence. Having gone on the run to evade arrest, they found widespread support in the countryside but also substantial opposition. Here the experience in Munster and some other places contracted sharply with the situation in predominantly rural Connacht, where activists encountered an almost completely supportive countryside. In most parts of Leinster and Ulster, where activists represented only a small part of the population, they enjoyed relatively little support and encountered much more opposition from within the population in urban as well as rural areas, which made functioning as an underground organisation extremely difficult. The ability to change the local perception of the police from members of the community into representatives of an alien oppressor, which made them acceptable victims of the IRA, as well as unpopular within the wider population, was also largely connected with the level of local support and the consequences of functioning in small groups of like-minded radicals. Violence eventually spread to other areas, partly as a result of a similar escalation, but mainly as a direct consequence of the conflict in Munster, notably by direct intervention of G.H.Q. who attempted to activate other units, and through the indiscriminate policies of the British government and crown forces to curtail lawlessness.

Scrutinising the actual activities and experiences of I.R.A. activists on the basis of existing research makes it possible to identify a set of activating elements at play in the radicalisation of individuals, and offers an explanation for the reasons why Volunteers used more violence in one area than another. The model presented here needs to be tested and may have to be adapted, but it provides a liarting-point in exploring the significance of the circumstances in which those who actually used violence functioned.

Joost Augusteijn Institute of History, Leiden University



Accounting for the Emergence of Violent Activism among Irish Revolutionaries, 1916-21

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