Accountability in the context of EMU & EBU Judicial Review ...
Transcript of Accountability in the context of EMU & EBU Judicial Review ...
Accountability in the context of EMU & EBUJudicial Review of the ECB by the CJEU
by Rosa María Lastra
ProfessorofInternationalFinancialandMonetaryLawCCLS,QueenMaryUniversityofLondon
EBIBrexitSeminarBrussels,10January2018
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Outline• ChallengesfortheECBwiththeadventofbankingunion
– Overlappingnatureofitsfunctions,seamlessprocess– Governanceissues,independence&accountability.– Issuesofjurisdictionaldomainandcomplexity– LackofEUadministrative(procedural)leadstolackofuniformity– Applicationofnationallawanduseofnationalpowers
• Accountability• ThecaseforJudicialreview
– Understandingdiscretion– Specializedjudges– ConstitutionalcourtsandECJ– Toomuchrelianceonadministrativereview?SSMCasesandSRBcases
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ChallengesfacedbyECBwithadventofbankingunion(SSM)
– Overlappingnatureofitsfunctions:monetarypolicy,ELA/LOLR,micro-prudentialsupervision,macroprudentialpolicyandearlyintervention(preludetoresolution).
• Needforcoordinationamongstcompetentauthoritiesandconsistency.
– Balancingactbetweenprimaryobjectiveofpricestability (defined&quantified)and rediscoveredobjectiveoffinancialstability.
• WhilePSisunambiguouslymentionedinArt127.1TFEU,thetenuousreferencetofinancialstabilityinArt127.5TFEUindicatesthehesitanttoneofthetreatydraftersingivingthisgoalequalfootingtoPS
• ThesimplicityofonegoaloneinstrumentoneauthorityestablishedbytheMaastrichtTreatyinMPversusmultiplegoalsmultipleinstrumentandmultipleauthoritiesinthepursuitoffinancialstability(exampleofFSOC).
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Supervisionandresolution
– Supervisionisresourceandpersonnelintensive,litigious,pronetoreputationaldamage;a‘thanklesstask’inwhichfailuresaremagnifiedandsuccessarehidden.Itrequiresjudgment,discretion.
– Supervisionandcrisismanagementarepartofaseamlessprocess– ThediscretionaryroleoftheECBinearlyintervention(actionstaken
beforethethresholdconditionsforresolutionaremet,andbeforetheinstitutionisinsolventorlikelytobecomeinsolvent)andinpullingthetrigger(andifnationalELAdoesnotgetECBGCfiat… alea jacta est)providesanadditionalchallenge.
• Art4.1(i)oftheSSMRegulationempowersthetheECB:“Tocarryoutsupervisorytasksinrelationtorecoveryplans,andearlyinterventionwhereacreditinstitutionorgroupinrelationtowhichtheECBistheconsolidatingsupervisor,doesnotmeetorislikelytobreachtheapplicableprudentialrequirements (…)excludinganyresolutionpowers.”
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Bankingunionandmissingpillars
Banking Union (based upon the Single Rulebook)
Deposit guarantee
European Deposit
Insurance Scheme Proposal
published Nov 2015
Resolution*Regulation of 15 July 2014
SingleResolution Mechanism
Regulation & IGA
Commission, SRB/SRF &
national resolution authorities
Banking supervision
SSM
ECB / National
competent authorities
European Stability
Mechanism(ESM)
Direct recapitalisation
Fiscal backstop Fiscal union?
Establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)Regulation of 15 October 2013Start – 4 Nov 2014
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LOLR (the missing pillar)
This process replicates the experience of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the USA one century ago.
Governanceissues,independenceandaccountability
• TheseparationbetweenthemonetaryandthesupervisoryfunctionswithintheECBischallenging,astheprimarylawdidnotenvisageaseparatedecision-makingstructureforsupervision.– The‘non-objection’proceduregivestheGoverningCounciltheupper
handasitcanreject(objectto)adecisionpreparedbytheSupervisoryBoard,(Art.26(8)SSMRegulation).
• ThewideningoftheECB’smandateposesachallengetotheindependenceoftheinstitutionitself,asitismorelikelytobesubjecttoexternalpressureespeciallywhenitcomestosupervisionandthepre-resolutionphase.
• Thebalancebetweenindependenceandaccountabilityisdifferentinmonetarypolicy,supervisionandresolution.Ittiltstowardsindependencemonetarypolicyandtowardsaccountability(andliability)insupervisionandevenmoresoinresolution(fiscalbackstop).
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ExpandedCBmandateandlegitimacy
n Expandedmandate- CBshavegonebeyondtheiroriginalmandateandwidenedtheirscopeofaction.ECB,Fed,BofE.InterpretingwhetheraCBabidesbyitsmandatebecomesmoredifficultasthemandategetsfuzzier,broaderandmorecomplicated.• Bernanke2009:“TheFedhasdone,andwillcontinuetodo,everythingpossiblewithinthe
limitsofitsauthoritytoassistinrestoringournationtofinancialstability”whilePresidentDraghiproclaimedin2012his‘whateverittakes’…withinthelimitsofourmandate…
• Givenits‘instrumental’nature,questioningthegoalleadsalsoleadstoquestioningspecificcentralbankpolicies,takentoachievesuchgoal/s,e.g.,‘bail-outs’,QE.IftheconsensuswhichsurroundsthegoalcrumbleswithittheimportanceofCBIindependence
n Legitimacy pre-existsandisarequisiteofaccountability.Thereis‘formal’legitimacy(inademocracythecreationofanindependentcentralbankmustbethefruitofademocraticact:statute,constitutionaldecisionortreatyprovision)andthereisalso‘societal’legitimacy,determinedbythepublicacceptanceoforloyaltytothesystem...Whensocietallegitimacyweakensorisnolongerpresentachangeinthelawisboundtohappen.
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Rethinking accountable independence
• Thedesignofaccountableindependenceisabalancingact:Toomuchindependenceleadstoanundesirablestatewithinthestate.Toomuchaccountabilitythreatenstheeffectivenessofindependence.
• Forms of accountability – Lawyers tend to emphasize the institutional dimension, the placing
theCBwithintheexistingsystemofchecksandbalances,inrelationtothethreebranchesofthestate– legislative,executive,judiciary.
• Input or process – particularly relevant in MP (ex ante) – explanatory• AnaccountableCBshouldbejudgedforthereasonablenessofitsactions,byParliament,theExecutive,thecompetentCourtsofJustice andthepublic.
• Checks and balances depending on the institutional balance– Economists – focus on performance accountability and
transparency. Output or outcomes – in supervision (ex post,liability) – amendatory. And de facto dimension
8Prof Rosa M Lastra
AframeworkforFedaccountability(ThomasBaxter,Sullivan&Cromwell)
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TypeofCentralBankFunction
NatureofAccountability
Legislative Judicial Executive
MonetaryPolicy Yes No No
BankingSupervision Yes Yes No
PaymentsSystems Yes Yes Depends
FinancialStability Yes Yes Yes
Influence Control
Judicialreviewofcentralbanksactionsanddecisions
• Upuntiltheglobalfinancialcrisis,courtsdealtsparselywithcentralbankingactionsanddecisions.IntheUSA,there’snomechanismprovidedbystatuteorjudicialdecisiontoreviewFedMPactionsincourt.
• However,thesituationhaschangedinthelastdecadeonthissideoftheAtlantic.IntheUK,theNorthernRockcaseledtoalivelydebateaboutdiscretion,financialstabilityandmoralhazardwithregardtotheLOLRoftheBankofEngland.SRMGlobalMasterFundLPvTheCommissionersofHMTreasury[2009]EWCACiv 788
• IntheEU,withPringle&Gauweiler,theroleofCJEUintheformationofeconomicandMPhasbecomethesubjectoflegalandpoliticaldebate.BeforePringletheonlytwomaterialECJdecisionsrelatedtoEMUwerethe2003OLAFcaseonthestatusandindependenceoftheECBandthe2004judgmentontheStabilityandGrowthPact.
• TheCJEU‘hasdevelopedafairlyconsistentstandardofjudicialreviewofcrisis-relatedmeasures(…).Itcomprisesaclosescrutinyofthepurposesofamandateorcompetence,acheckwhethertheinstrumentsdeployedservethemandate,andananalysiswhethertheeffectsareproportionatetotheobjectives’(Goldmann)
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ThecaseforJudicialreview• JusticiabilityofMPanddistributionaljustice- sinceCBmandatehasbeen
stretched(eg.QE)andhasarguablybecomelessaccountableandtransparent,thisalterstheexistinginstitutionalbalance.– UKandUS– nojudicialreviewofMPbutinUKjudicialreviewofLOLR– EUdifferentapproach– Distributionaljustice– UnderstandingthedomainofMP.
• ThoughParliamentaryaccountability(exanteandexpost)remainsfundamental,whenparliamentisdominatedbytheexecutivebranchofgovernmentorwhenparliamentaryaccountabilityislimitedweshouldconsiderothermechanismstoholdthecentralbanktoaccount.EU….
• InGauweiler (OMT)- TheCJEUexercisedjudicialrestraintbydeferringtothediscretionofcentralbankers– expertise.
• WhenitcomestosupervisionandresolutionintheEU,inthewordsofSabinoCassese(ECBLegalConference2017)therehasbeenashiftofcompetence‘bystealth’totheadministrative.Adequatesafeguards… voice….
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JudicialreviewoftheECB
• Theriskof‘supplantingtheBank’justifiesthe‘degreeofcaution’thatshouldcharacterizetheintensityofjudicialreview.“Judgesshouldnotoverstepthelimitsoftheircompetencesinordertoenforcethelimitsofotheractors’competences.”However,thedeferencetotheECB’s‘broaddiscretion’onthebasisofthelatter’sexperienceandtechnicalexpertisestrengthensthecaseforexpertiseandadequatepreparationofthejudgesthatwillassessthosecomplexissues.Thishappensinotherareasofeconomicregulation.JudicialactivismhasbecomethenorminthefieldofEUcompetitionpolicy.
• USSupremeCourtJusticeStephenBreyer hasarguedthatitisnotpossibletounderstandandevaluatewhatagenciesdowithouthavingsomesenseoftheregulatorypolicyaswell.TheneedforspecificexpertisewhenitcomestotheadjudicationofcomplexfinancialandmonetarymattersisarelevantissuenotonlyfortheCJEUbutalso,forexample,fortheUKSupremeCourt.Ifjudicialrestraintinmonetarymattersisadvocatedonthebasisof[limited]technicalexpertiseandqualificationsofthejudgesadjudicatingsuchmatters,thecounter-argumenttonot‘beingequipped’istoactuallyequipjudges.
• Giventhespecificityandcomplexityofmonetarypolicyandothercentralbankingfunctions(andtheaddeddifficultyintheEUcontextofdeterminingwhetherameasureisofmonetarypolicy– anexclusivecompetenceoftheUnion– oreconomicpolicy)andconsideringthatonlytheCJEUcanjudgetheECB(Article35ESCBStatute),theneedforcompetenceandexpertiseintheexerciseofjudicialreviewcouldbeservedbytheestablishmentofaspecialisedchamberwithintheCJEUtodealwiththeseissues.HavingdedicatedspecialisedjudgeswithexpertiseinfinancialandmonetarymatterswhenadjudicatingcasesrelatedtotheECBwouldenhancethelegalframeworkofECBaccountabilityinlightofthesignificantlyexpandedmandateoftheECB.
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Understandingdiscretion• Centralbankdiscretionisthefreedomtoactwithinalegalframework.Judicial
reviewdoesnotextendtothe‘contentofthedecision’(theaimoftheCourtisnottosupplantorreplacethedecisiontaken),butitdoesextendtotheparametersandlegalframeworkthatsurroundsuchdecisioninordertodeterminewhetherornotthecentralbankmandatehasbeenexceeded.– The‘rulesversusdiscretion’debatehasalong-standingtraditionin
administrativelaw.Thereareproceduralelementsthatdeterminethelegalityofanadministrativeact,e.g.thecompetenceoftheentitythatissuestheact,theproceduretoprepare&approvesuchact,theexistenceofapublicinterest.Themoredifficultissueisthestandardofreviewjudgesshouldapplywhentheyconcludethattheadministrativeacttheyarereviewingisnotlegalorlegitimateandmustbechangedorsubstituted.
– Comprehensivejudicialreview– theCourtbesidesassessingthelegalityoftheprocedurealsoappraisesthefacts
– Limitedreview– whichappliestocaseswheretheactshavebeenchallengesimplyeitheracomplexeconomicassessment,atechnicalassessmentortheexerciseofdiscretion.Controlofreasonablenesstoavoid‘arbitraryandcapricious’useofpower.(LagunadePaz2014).
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DiscretioninMPandinELA• DiscretioninthecontextofMPmeansthatthecentralbankcanchoosewhichever
monetarypolicyinstrumentitdeemsappropriateinthepursuitofthegoal;italsomeansthatthecentralbankcandefinewhatagenericgoalsuchaspricestabilityactuallymeans.Thecontentofsuchdiscretionarydecisionisnotreviewable.
– InGauweiler theCJEUfocusedontheobjectivesofmonetarypolicyratherthantheeffectsofthemeasuresunderreview.Tridimas &Xanthoulis:“Theemphasisontheobjectivesratherthantheeffectsofameasure asthedeterminingfactorfordecidingwhetheritfallswithinMPoreconomicpolicy,coupledwithalowstandardofreview,grantstheauthorofthemeasureenourmousdiscretion”(p.38)
• DiscretioninthecontextofELA,meansthatNCBsactingasLOLRinbilaterallendingoperations(marketliquidityassistanceviaopenmarketoperationsistheECBresponsibility)canchoosetoprovideassistanceornot(attheirownriskandliability),buttmust actinaccordancewiththeTreatyprovisions(Article123etc),theECBEmergencyliquidityassistance(ELA)proceduresandEUstateaidrule
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Specializedjudges
• Whilejudicialrestraintmaybejustifiableinthepresenceofotherstrongmechanismsofaccountability,itmaybelessjustifiablewhenjudicialcontrolemergesasthemainmechanismofscrutinisingthedomainofexpandedcentralbankpowers.Expertiseandcompetence.SpecialisedchamberCJEU?
• IntheEUcontext,aspecializedcourtcouldbecreatedtodealwithmattersrelatedtotheECBaccordingtoArticle257TFEUandArticle62coftheStatuteoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion.
• MonetarypolicyisanexclusiveEUcompetenceinaccordancewithArticle3(1)(c)TFEUwhileeconomicpolicyiscoordinatedattheEUlevel(positiveintegrationinaccordancewithArticle119TFEUandnegativeintegrationintermsoftheprohibitionsapplicabletoMemberStatesoftheeurozone)butthecompetenceremainsatthenationallevel.
• Specialistcourtsorinternalpilotprograminwhichcertainjudgeswouldself-specialize,bytakingonallofonecertaintypeoftechnicalcase.
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ConstitutionalCourtsandtheCJEU(citingChiaraZilioli)
O The GCC is competent for German Constitutional Law, while The CJEU is competent for EU law. The EUTreaty requires national courts to refer the issues of EU law to the CJEU.
O GAUWEILER case - Action before the German Constitutional Court in Case Gauweiler andothers and subsequently the first preliminary reference to the EU Court, C-62/14. On 16June 2015 the CJEU concluded that the OMT does not exceed the powers of the ECB in relation tomonetary policy and does not contravene the prohibition of monetary financing of Member States
O Preliminary ruling confirms the main reasoning of the AG in particular as regards thequalification of a measure as falling within the scope of monetary policy if:O The measure pursues a monetary policy objective (singleness of the monetary policy in the
euro area; safeguarding an appropriate monetary transmission mechanism);O The measure uses a monetary policy instrument.
O It cannot be treated as equivalent to an economic policy measure merely because it is likely tohave indirect effects on the realisation of certain economic policy objectives.
O WEISS case - The GCC has referred to the ECJ a request against the QE of the Eurosystem (defendant isthe Parliament, accused of not having acted to impede the ECB from adopting these measures. ECBand BBk have been asked several questions as technical experts by the GGC.O Same arguments as in the OMT – (i) ultra vires? (ii) monetary financing? (iii) (hypothetical): if full
loss sharing, monetary financing and infringement of constitutional identity?O The GCC has referred only questions relating to the Public Sector Purchase Programme not to
other asset purchasing programmes – ABS, covered bonds etc16
ECBandECJ• LitigationontheapplicationofEUlawbytheECB(asanEUinstitution)requiresa
uniforminterpretationbyoneCourt,whichistheCJEU.• SupremacyofEULaw.• ItwouldleadtohavocifECBactionscouldbechallengedin19nationalcourtsorin
othercourts.InlinewithArticle263TFEUandwiththelong-standingcaselawtheCJEUshouldremainexclusivelycompetenttoassessthelegalityofactsofEUinstitutions.
• TheCJEUstatedinFoto-Frost:“DivergencesbetweencourtsintheMemberStatesastothevalidityofCommunityactswouldbeliabletoplaceinjeopardytheveryunityoftheCommunitylegalorderanddetractfromthefundamentalrequirementoflegalcertainty”].
• ThoughtheECBhasbeentakentonationalcourtsinanumberofoccasions,theECBhasalwayssuccessfullyallegedlackofjurisdiction.
• RelevantTreatyprovisions:Article263(legalityreview),Article288,Article267Article268andArticle340.
•
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IsjudicialreviewthesameforMPasBS?
• Article35ESCBStatuteandthecorrespondingTFEUprovision,namelyArt.271(d)(fulfilmentofobligationsbyNCBs)- giveexclusivejurisdictiontotheCJEUon ECBmonetarymatters,inlinewiththeexclusivecompetencetheECBhasinthesphereofmonetarypolicyoftheeurozone inaccordancewithArt.3(1)(c)TFEU.
• Intheareaof prudentialsupervision,theinterplaybetweenNCBs/NCAsandtheECBintheSSMmaymakeforadivisionofcompetenceswhich,inanactualcase,maybehardtodecipher.See https://ebi-europa.eu/publications/eu-cases-or-jurisprudence/.
• InmattersrelatedtoSSMoperationstheissueis whomtoaddressforreview whenanact,ostensiblytakenbya national authority,wasadopted uponinstructionbytheECB,and whichlawstoapply:istheECJtointerpretandapplynationallawthattheECBhasappliedbyvirtueofArticle4.3SSMRegulation?And:whatwhentheECBisconfrontedwithnationallawthatisinconsistentwithEUlaw(amanifestlyincorrecttranspositionofadirective)orthatisabsent(non-implementationofthedirective)
• http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecblegalconferenceproceedings201712.en.pdf?b452bb9c54dca55f8f5673b21631a4fe Lehmanonvaryingstandards
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AdministrativereviewandJudicialreview(RenéSmits)
• ThosewhowouldliketoseeanECBdecisionintheareaofprudentialsupervisionreviewedhave2trackstofollow:– RequestadministrativereviewfromABoR andthereafterchallengethe
resultingseconddecisionbytheECBincourt– GotoCourtDirectly,bearinginmindthatonlytheCJUEcanjudgethe
ECB.• Thoughadministrativereviewmaybefast,cheapandindependent,itdoes
notamounttojudicialscrutiny.ABoR proceedingsarepartofaseconddecisionmakingprocedureatECNandtheopinionofABoR willbeknowntotheapplicantandtotheECBbutnottotheoutsideWorld
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SSMCases• https://ebi-europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Cases-against-the-ECB-and-
preliminary-proceedings-concerning-prudential-supervision_public-sources-1-September-2017_def_.pdf
• L-BankcaseT-122/15- Landeskreditbank Baden-WürttembergvECB (whichrepresentsaverydifferentapproachfromthatofFSOCintheUSAwiththedesignationofMetLifeasSIFI)
– TheECBwascorrectinclassifyingtheGermanStateownedbankasa‘significantentity.TheCourtpointsoutthatthesupervisionofinstitutionsclassifiedas‘lesssignificant’bythenationalauthoritiesundertheSSMisnottheexerciseofautonomouscompetence,butratheradecentralisedimplementationofanexclusivecompetenceoftheECB.
– IfCJEUconfirmsthisjudgement,itwouldbecertainlyclassifiedasalandmarkdecisionfortheEuropeanizationofthebankingsupervisorylaw.Landeskreditbank Baden-WürttembergCaseC-450/17Phttp://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=193985&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=803401
• Trasta case/s SixpleasagainstwithdrawaloflicensefromaLatvianbankalleging,interalia,thattheECBviolatedArticle24SSMRegulationinconnectionwithABoR’s reviewofanearlierdecision,reliedoninaccuratedocumentssubmittedbytheLatviansupervisoryauthorityandviolatedtheprinciplesofproportionality,equaltreatment,legitimateexpectationsandlegalcertainty,aswellasproceduralrulesrelatingtothewithdrawalofanauthorisation(Article83SSMFrameworkRegulation),andviolateditsindependence(recital19ofthepreambleandArticle19SSMRegulation)
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AdministrativereviewandJudicialreviewofSRBcases
• DecisionsoftheSRBmaybechallengedbeforethe AppealPaneloftheSRB– ThecompetenceoftheAppealPanelisdeterminedbyArticle85(3)oftheSRM
Regulation.OnlythedecisionsoftheSRBreferredtoinArticle10(10),Article11,Article12(1),Articles38to41,Article65(3),Article71andArticle90(3)oftheSRMRegulationcanbethesubjectofanappealbeforetheAppealPanel.IfthecontesteddecisionisnotincludedinthelistofthedecisionsreferredtoinArticle85(3)oftheSRMRegulation,theappealwillnotbeadmissible.
– Anynaturalorlegalperson,includingresolutionauthorities,mayappealinaccordancewithArticle85(3)SRMRegulation.Seehttps://srb.europa.eu/en/node/41
• Orbefore theCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion– AlldecisionsoftheSRBthatarenotappealablebeforetheAppealPanel,pursuantto
Article86(1)SRMRegulation.Thisincludes,forinstance,decisionsconcerningresolutionactioninrespectofacreditinstitution.Furthermore,decisionstakenbytheAppealPanelmaybealsochallengedbeforetheCourtofJustice.
– MemberStatesandtheUnioninstitutions,aswellasanynaturalorlegalperson,whentheSRBdecisionisaddressedtothatperson,orisofdirectandindividualconcerntothatperson,inaccordancewithArticle86(2)SRMRegulation andArticle263TFEUmayappeal
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SRMcases
• BancoPopularhttps://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banco-popular
• BancaPopolare diVicenzaS.p.A.andVenetoBancaS.p.A.https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banco-popular
• Adequateguarantees?Voice?
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ELA• ThoughELAoperationsconductedbyNCBsareimputabletotheNCBin
question,totheextentthattheECBGoverningCouncil/ExecutiveBoardgiveinstructions(aspartofthenon-objectionprocedure)theyarealsoimputabletotheECB.AndonlytheCJEUcaninterpretECBrulesrelatedtoitsexclusivefieldofcompetence.
• ThefactthatanumberofECBGoverningCouncilrulesapplytoELA- suchasthe2017ELAAgreement- suggeststhatonlytheCJEUcaninterpretthoserules,whicharedirectlyrelatedtothe objectivesandtasksoftheEurosystem andthenatureoftheECB,includingthescopeofitsindependence.
• Thenon-objectionanalysisthattheGoverningCouncilconductsforeveryELArequesttakesalltheseissuesintoaccount(andotherssuchascompliancewithArticle123TFEU).ThisisbecauseELAasanationaltaskaccordingtoArticle14.4oftheESCBStatuteisverycloselyrelatedtotheECBmonetarypolicyoperations(Article14.3and18oftheESCBStatute).
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