ACCEPTED 04-16-00572-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS …Cause No. 04-16-00572-CV . IN THE COURT OF...
Transcript of ACCEPTED 04-16-00572-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS …Cause No. 04-16-00572-CV . IN THE COURT OF...
Cause No. 04-16-00572-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,
FOURTH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
_________________________________________________
RONALD F. AVERY,
Appellant,
v.
GUADALUPE APPRAISAL DISTRICT,
Appellee.
_________________________________________________
Appealed from the 2nd 25th Judicial District Court of Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 15-2442-CV
The Honorable William C. “Bud” Kirkendall, Presiding
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Christopher S. Jackson
Texas Bar No. 00796816
PERDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER,
COLLINS & MOTT, L.L.P
3301 Northland Dr., Suite 505
Austin, TX 78731
Telephone: 512.302.0190
Facsimile: 512.323.6963
Email: [email protected]
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
GUADALUPE APPRAISAL DISTRICT
ORAL ARGUMENT CONDITIONALLY REQUESTED
ACCEPTED04-16-00572-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALSSAN ANTONIO, TEXAS1/12/2017 12:43:28 PM
KEITH HOTTLECLERK
i
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a) and 38.2(a)(1)(A),
the Appellee, Guadalupe Appraisal District, adopts the identities of parties and
counsel as listed by the Appellant, Ronald F. Avery, and adds the following:
Guadalupe Appraisal
District
Defendant / Appellee
Christopher S. Jackson
Texas Bar No. 00796816
PERDUE, BRANDON FIELDER, COLLINS &
MOTT L.L.P.
3301 Northland Dr., Suite 505
Austin, TX 78731
Telephone: 512.302.0190
Facsimile: 512.323.6963
Email: [email protected]
Trial and Appellate Counsel for
Guadalupe Appraisal District
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties, Counsel & Trial Court............................................................. i
Table of Contents .................................................................................................... ii
Index of Authorities ................................................................................................ vi
Statement of the Case ........................................................................................... xiv
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ................................................................ xvi
Party and Record References ........................................................................... xvii
Issue Presented ................................................................................................... xviii
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1
II. Statement of Facts ........................................................................................... 2
III. Standard of Review & Burden of Proof ....................................................... 5
A. Lack of Jurisdiction............................................................................5
B. Summary Judgment…………………………………………...........6
1. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment……………….6
2. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment……………...7
IV. Summary of the Argument ........................................................................... 9
V. Argument & Authorities ............................................................................... 9
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A. The trial court correctly dismissed a portion of Mr.
Avery’s suit for lack of jurisdiction because he did not
timely file suit within 60 days after receiving the Board’s
Final Orders on three issues he protested…………….9
B. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the
District because the ad valorem system in Texas is
constitutional and Mr. Avery’s properties were subject to
property taxation by the taxing units in Guadalupe County
for the 2015 tax year. ……………………………………….15
1. Mr. Avery’s arguments that there is no lawful source
of authority for Texas taxing units to impose an ad
valorem tax are wrong. The Texas Constitution and
Tax Code provide valid authority making real and
tangible personal private property in this State
subject to ad valorem taxation……………………....15
2. Guadalupe County, Seguin Independent School
District, and Lateral Roads all had the authority to
levy an ad valorem tax on Mr. Avery’s property for
the 2015 tax year. ……………………………….……21
3. On January 1, 2015, the subject properties in this case
were owned by Mr. Avery, had situs in the relevant
taxing units, and were not otherwise exempt.
Therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment in the District’s favor…………..……..…..22
4. Mr. Avery bore the burden of proof and did not bring
sufficient evidence on that he was exempt from
taxation. …………………………………………..…..25
VI. Conclusion & Prayer ....................................................................... 26
iv
Certificate of Compliance ..................................................................................... 29
Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 30
v
Appendix ............................................................................................................ TAB
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ....................................................... TAB A
Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) ............................................................................... TAB B
Tex. Const. art VIII, § 1(b) .............................................................................. TAB C
Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1–a .............................................................................. TAB D
Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1–e .............................................................................. TAB E
Tex. Const. art. VIII § 9 ................................................................................... TAB F
Tex. Const. art. VIII § 11 ................................................................................. TAB G
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TEXAS CONSTITUTION
Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) ....................................................................................... 21
Tex. Const. art VIII, § 1(b) ...................................................................................... 17
Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1–a ................................................................3, 14, 16, 21, 26
Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1–e ................................................................3, 14, 16, 19, 26
Tex. Const. art. VIII § 9 ........................................................................................... 21
Tex. Const. art. VIII § 9(c) ...................................................................................... 21
Tex. Const. art. VIII § 9(e) ...................................................................................... 21
Tex. Const. art. VIII § 11 ......................................................................................... 18
TEXAS STATUTES
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.152
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ............................................................... 21
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.04(12)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ............................................................... 21
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 11.01
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ............................................................... 18
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 21.01
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ............................................................... 21
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Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 32.01(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ............................................................... 22
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 32.07(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ............................................................... 22
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ............................................................... 10
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ................................ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 26
TEXAS RULES & REGULATIONS
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) .............................................................................................. 7
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) ............................................................................................... 7
U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES
Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector,
275 U.S. 87 (1927) ................................................................................................... 16
TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASES
Appraisal Review Bd. v. Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel,
719 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1986) .............................................................................. 10, 12
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,
34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) .................................................................................... 5, 6
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Bybee v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
331 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. 1960) ...................................................................................... 6
Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk,
194 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. 2006) .................................................................................... 10
Carr v. Brasher,
776 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1989) ...................................................................................... 8
Carrollton–Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) .......................................................................... 20
City of Beaumont v. Fertitta,
415 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1967) .................................................................................... 17
Cramer v. Sheppard,
167 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. 1942) .................................................................................... 17
Dallas Cty. v. Dallas Nat'l Bank,
179 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1944) .................................................................................... 19
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) .................................................................................... 17
Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist.,
922 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1996) .................................................................................... 19
Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc.,
124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003) ...................................................................................... 8
Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1992) .................................................................................... 10
Great S. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Austin,
243 S.W. 778, 780 (Tex. 1922) ................................................................................ 19
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In re Nestle USA, Inc.,
387 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2012) .................................................................................... 19
Long Distance Intern., Inc. v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.,
49 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2001) ........................................................................................ 7
Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P.,
165 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. 2005) .................................................................................... 10
Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal.,
490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016) .................................................................................... 20
N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy Cty. Appraisal Dist.,
804 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. 1991) .................................................................................... 25
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.,
690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) ...................................................................................... 7
Rhone–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel,
997 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1999) ...................................................................................... 7
State v. Whittenburg,
265 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1954) .................................................................................... 19
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S.,
858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993) ...................................................................................... 8
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ...................................................................................... 6
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ...................................................................................... 6
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. White,
46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) ........................................................................................ 6
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Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish,
286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2009) ...................................................................................... 7
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett,
164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) .................................................................................. 6, 8
Vinson v. Burgess,
773 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1989) .................................................................................... 19
Webb Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel,
792 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1990) .................................................................................... 10
4TH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL CASES
Avery v. Murphy,
No. 04-07-00244-CV, 2007 WL 2479822
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 5, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ............................ 1
Hurst v. Guadalupe Cty. Appraisal Dist.,
752 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) .................................... 12
Seguin v. Bexar Appraisal Dist.,
373 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) ............................... 25
OTHER TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL CASES
A.B.T. Galveston Ltd. P’ship v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
137 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ........................... 10
Brooks v. Bachus,
661 S.W. 2d 288 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ............................. 12
xi
City of San Angelo v. Smith,
69 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) ............................................ 6
City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper,
170 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1943, writ ref'd) .................................... 17
Dallas Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Lal,
701 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) .................................... 10
Dolenz v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
259 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 2008, pet. denied) ........................................ 12
El Paso Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan
Soc’y, Inc., 762 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, no writ) .......................... 12
First Bank of Deer Park v. Harris Cty.,
804 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) .......................... 13
Fisher v. Cty. of Williamson,
No. 03-05-00584-CV, 2006 WL 1649262
(Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) ......................................... 24
Flores v. Fort Bend Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
720 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) ........................ 12
Fountain Parkway, Ltd. v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist.,
920 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied)................................. 12
Gregg Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc.,
907 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, writ denied) ...................................... 10, 12
Haley v. Harris Cty.,
No. 14–11–01051–CV, 2012 WL4955257
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op) .................... 24
Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Tex. Nat'l Bank of Baytown,
775 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) .................. 9, 10, 11
xii
Hood v. Hays Cty.,
836 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) .............................................. 10
Mendoza v. Fiesta Mart, Inc.,
276 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) .................... 8
Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Plains Mktg.,
202 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) ..................................... 11
Poly-America, Inc. v. Dallas Cty. Appraisal Dist.,
704 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986, no writ) ................................................ 12
Pub., Inc. v. Cty. of Galveston,
264 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ......................... 17
Quorum Int’l v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist.,
114 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) ................................. 13
Scott v. Harris Methodist HEB,
871 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ) ....................................... 10
Sierra Stage Coaches, Inc. v. La Porte Indep. Sch. Dist.,
832 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) ........................ 10
Tex. Architectural Aggregates, Inc. v. Adams,
690 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, no writ) .............................................. 12
Townsend v. Montgomery Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
No. 14–14–00103–CV, 2015 WL 971313
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 3, 2015, no pet.) ....................................... 24
Travis Central Appraisal District v. Marshall Ford Marina, Inc.,
No. 03–05–00784–CV, 2009 WL 2900743
(Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) .......................................... 13
Watson v. Robertson Cty. Appraisal Review Bd.,
795 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no writ) ................................................ 10
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SECONDARY SOURCES
Biennial Property Tax Report - Tax Years 2014 and 2015,
https://www.comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/docs/96-1728.pdf. ............. 16
Richard T. Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities 109-111 (1888),
https://www.questia.com/read/85780469/taxation-in-american-states-and-
cities ......................................................................................................................... 15
Glen W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United States,
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-property-taxes-in-the-united-states/............ 15
Jerome H. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation,
Cases and Materials, 97 (8th ed. 2001) .................................................................... 16
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(d) and
38.2(a)(1)(B), the District states as follows:
Nature of
The Case:
This is an ad valorem tax case regarding the 2015 tax
year. Mr. Avery filed suit against the District on six
grounds, regarding his three properties, on December 14,
2015. C.R. 3-48. The District answered. C.R. 49-52.
Mr. Avery received final orders from the Guadalupe
appraisal Review Board on July 24, 2015 on three issues
on his three properties. C.R. 337-340, 342-345, 347-350,
352, 356, 360. Pursuant to the Tax Code, he had sixty
days from the date he received the final orders to file suit
on those three issues or judicial review would be barred.
Did the trial court correctly conclude it lacked
jurisdiction of those three issues for Mr. Avery’s three
properties?
Mr. Avery received final orders from the Guadalupe
appraisal Review Board on October 22, 2015 on three
other issues centering on the unconstitutionality or
applicability of ad valorem taxation on his properties.
C.R. 384-390. Did the trial court correctly conclude that
ad valorem taxation is constitutional and applicable to
Mr. Avery’s property, based on the District’s evidence,
in granting summary judgment in the District’s favor?
Trial Court:
Cause No. 15-2442-CV
2nd 25th Judicial District, Guadalupe County, Texas
The Honorable, William C. “Bud” Kirkendall, Presiding
xv
Course of
Proceedings:
On December 14, 2015, Mr. Avery filed his Original
Petition for Review. C.R. 3-48. The District answered.
C.R. 49-52. On January 8, 2016, Mr. Avery filed his
First Amended Original Petition for Review. C.R. 53-98.
The Parties conducted discovery. C.R. 99-131. On June
9, 2016, the District filed its First Amended Original
Answer, Plea to the Jurisdiction, and Specific Denial of
Condition Precedent. C.R. 132-137. On June 9, 2016, the
District filed its Traditional and No Evidence Motions
for Summary Judgment and Exhibits. C.R. 138-285. On
June 9, 2016, the District also filed a Motion to Partially
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Exhibits. C.R. 286-
399. Mr. Avery filed Responses. C.R. 400-469. On July
14, 2016, the Court held hearings on the District’s
Motions. C.R. 479-480; R.R. 1-18. The Court took the
District’s Motions under advisement. C.R. 2; R.R. 10:25-
11:2, 15:20-24.
Trial
Court’s
Disposition:
On July 29, 2016, the Court sent the Parties notice via
letter that it granted the District’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction and granted the District’s Motions
for Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment.
C.R. 470. On August 10, 2016, the Court signed and had
filed an Order Granting the Defendant’s Motion to
Partially Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. C.R. 471-472.
On the same date, the Court signed and had filed a final
Judgment grating the District’s Motions for Traditional
and No Evidence Summary Judgment. C.R. 473-474. On
September 7, 2016, Mr. Avery timely filed his Notice of
Appeal. C.R. 475-476.
xvi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
This case presents important questions and would extend the jurisprudence
on: 1) the exhaustion of administrative remedies on singular issues determined by
appraisal review boards and the deadline to timely file suit to contest them; 2) the
constitutionality, validity, and applicability of ad valorem taxation; and 3) the
proof necessary for appraisal districts and taxing units to prove taxability within
the jurisdiction of the Fourth Court of Appeals and provide assistance on such
issues throughout Texas.
The District contends that this case is limited to pure questions of law. The
issues presented require review of the Texas Constitution, relatively simple
statutes, and cases from the Texas Supreme Court, this Honorable Court, and its
sister courts of appeal. Thus, Tex. R. App. P. 39.1(b), (c), or (d) may be applicable
to this case.
Mr. Avery has requested oral argument. The District conditionally requests
oral argument. It believes that its briefing and Mr. Avery’s should be sufficient for
the Court to address this case on submission. The District, however, will gladly
participate in oral argument if the Court would find it helpful.
xvii
PARTY & RECORD REFERENCES
In this brief, the Appellant, Ronald F. Avery, will be referred to as “Appellant” or
“Mr. Avery.”
The Appellee, Guadalupe Appraisal District, will be referred to as “Appellee” or
“the District.”
The Guadalupe Appraisal Review Board, whose actions are important regarding
this matter, will be referred to as “the Board.”
In this brief, the following record citation forms will be used:
Clerk’s Record will be cited as “C.R. [page].”
Reporter’s Record will be cited as R.R. [page : line]
xviii
ISSUE PRESENTED
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B), the Appellee is dissatisfied with
the issue(s) presented by the Appellant.
The issues for this Court to resolve are:
1. When a party fails to file suit in district court within sixty days after
receiving notice of an appraisal review board’s final orders on specific protested
issues, does the Court lack jurisdiction to hear and determine those particular
matters?
2. Contrary to Mr. Avery’s positions, the Texas Constitution and Tax
Code provide ample and valid authority for ad valorem taxation of his real
property. Did the trial court correctly grant a traditional and a no-evidence
summary judgment in the District’s favor when it cited to and provided this
authority, proved Mr. Avery owned the subject properties on January 1, 2015,
proved the locations of the properties on that date, and proved that they were not
otherwise exempt?
Appellee’s Brief Page 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Avery contends that Texas citizens are not subject to ad valorem taxation
on their property. See Appellant’s Brief at pg. 3. He also argues that political
subdivisions in Texas lack authority from any source to impose such taxation on
Texas property owners. See Appellant’s Brief at pg. 5. In short, he believes this tax
to be unconstitutional—a point he has unsuccessfully made to this Court, in some
variation, before. See Avery v. Murphy, No. 04-07-00244-CV, 2007 WL 2479822
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 5, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
This case involves the 2015 tax year. Mr. Avery brought several iterations of
his contentions above, in addition to protests that the values the Guadalupe Appraisal
District (hereinafter “District”) placed on his three properties were over market value
and unequally appraised, before the Guadalupe Appraisal Review Board (hereinafter
“Board”). His suit presents two questions.
The first question involves jurisdiction. When a party fails to file suit in
district court within sixty days after receiving notice of an appraisal review board’s
final orders of specific protested issues, does the Court lack jurisdiction to hear and
determine those particular matters?
The second question involves taxability. Contrary to Mr. Avery’s positions,
the Texas Constitution and Tax Code provide ample and valid authority for ad
Appellee’s Brief Page 2
valorem taxation of his real property. Did the trial court correctly grant a traditional
and no-evidence summary judgment in the District’s favor when it cited to and
provided this authority, proved Mr. Avery owned the subject properties on January
1, 2015, proved the locations of the properties on that date, and proved that they
were not otherwise exempt?
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 2015, Mr. Avery owned three properties. The first two tracts
total “5.34 acres of land more or less” in the “Moses Baker Survey, Abstract #4,
Guadalupe County, Texas.” C.R. 228-234. These two tracts individually are
approximately 3.74 acres and 1.6 acres, and are known to the District as accounts
50610 and 50612. C.R. 161, 164, 170-172, 175-177, 189, 196, 273 RFAR 3 – 275
RFAR 13. Account 50610 also has an improvement known as “the Silver Eagle
Taphouse.” C.R. 274 RFAR 5.
Additionally, Ronald F. Avery and Cynthia G. Avery, as Trustees for the
Ronald F. Avery and Cynthia G. Avery Revocable Living Trust owned a tract that
is approximately “2.658 acres of land out of the John Sowell Survey, Guadalupe
County, Texas.” C.R. 236-238. This tract is known to the District as account 59576.
C.R. 167, 180-182, 203, 275 RFAR 14 – 276 RFAR 20.
Appellee’s Brief Page 3
On May 22, 2015, Mr. Avery, for himself and as a trustee on one property,
filed protests with the Board on accounts 59576, 50612, and 50610, for the 2015 tax
year. C.R. 304-320, 276 RFAR 21 - 277 RFAR 23.
Mr. Avery’s protest for each property stated five reasons or issues. Those
were: 1) his property was over market value (excessively appraised); 2) his property
was unequal compared to other properties (unequal appraisal); 3) his property should
not be taxed in the jurisdiction of Texas; 4) his property should not be taxed in the
Guadalupe Appraisal District or in one or more taxing units; and 5) the property
should not be taxed based on the Texas Constitution, including Article VIII, §§ 1(a),
1-e, and other laws. C.R. 305-306, 309-311, 314-316, 276 RFAR 21 - 277 RFAR
23.
Mr. Avery also listed nine points in another section on his protest forms,
entitled: “Step 4: Give Facts That May Help Resolve Your Case.” C.R. 306, 311,
316. Mr. Avery later categorized this as a sixth issue of protest: 6) principles of
unlawfulness of ad valorem property taxes in America according to the Founders
(the feudal system). C.R. 305-306, 309-311, 314-316, 360, 4.
On July 21, 2015, the Board heard Mr. Avery’s protests. C.R. 322, 327, 332,
277 RFAR 24-26, 278 RFAR 30-31. On July 22, 2015, the Board issued Final Orders
on his three properties. C.R. 337-350. These Final Orders addressed: 1) value is over
Appellee’s Brief Page 4
market value; 2) value is unequal compared with other properties; and 3) “reject[ing]
the appeal to the Texas Constitution as a viable cause for appeal of appraised value.”
C.R. 337-340, 342-345, 347-350, 360. Mr. Avery received the Board’s Final Orders
on those issues on July 24, 2015. C.R. 337-340, 342-345, 347-350, 352, 356, 360.
On August 13, 2015, Mr. Avery wrote to the District’s Chief Appraiser. C.R.
360. He asserted that he made six separate claims and produced evidence on these
at his July 21st hearing. He stated that he had received Orders on: 1) value is over
market value; 2) value is unequal compared with other properties; and 3) other – Art.
VIII, §§ 1(a), 1-e, and other laws. Although the Orders can be read that they do
address all issues, Mr. Avery claimed that the Board’s Final Orders did not address
three of his other issues: 4) the property should not be taxed in Texas; 5) the Property
should not be taxed in the Guadalupe Appraisal District or taxing units; and 6) the
unlawfulness of the ad valorem property tax in America according to the Founders.
C.R. 360, 281, RFAR 39. Mr. Avery’s letter requested a ruling so he could timely
appeal all issues to district court. C.R. 360.
On August 26, 2015, the Board instead sent Mr. Avery notice that it had set
another hearing. C.R. 89. On October 14, 2015, the Board held its hearing on Mr.
Avery’s remaining issues on his three properties, presumably to clarify its Orders
and fully provide him with due process. C.R. 366, 370, 375, 380, 280 RFAR 39.
Appellee’s Brief Page 5
After hearing from Mr. Avery, the Board voted: 1) the land was located in
Guadalupe County; 2) the taxing entities reflected on the record are correct; and 3)
the Texas Constitution and Texas Tax Code allow the Guadalupe Appraisal District
to appraise the property and the taxing entities are entitled to tax the property. C.R.
366. On October 16, 2015, the Board issued Final Orders to Mr. Avery on his three
properties on these three issues in accordance with its vote. C.R. 370-382. Mr. Avery
received the Board’s Final Orders on the remaining three issues, for his three
properties, on October 22, 2015. C.R. 384-390
Sixty days after July 24, 2015 is September 22, 2015. C.R. 392. Sixty days
after October 22, 2015 is December 21, 2015. C.R. 396. On December 14, 2015 Mr.
Avery filed his “Plaintiff’s Original Petition for Review” appealing all the Board’s
Final Orders. C.R. 3-48.1
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW & BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Lack of Jurisdiction.
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the Court’s authority to determine a cause
of action. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). To
1 Mr. Avery’s Original Petition and First Amended Petition are not clear if he is pursuing
excessive appraisal and unequal appraisal. C.R. 3-48, 53-98. Mr. Avery has noted he is not
appealing the issues of excessive appraisal and unequal appraisal. C.R. 284, RFAR 58; C.R. 403-
404, ¶ 2.8.2. Also, Mr. Avery sold two of his properties in the Moses Baker Survey in June 2016
and has stated he “no longer has any interest in them and unsuits any claims regarding them.” C.R.
400, ¶ 1. However, he has never formally non-suited these from his case.
Appellee’s Brief Page 6
invoke a Court’s authority, a plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively
demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the cause. Tex. Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Air
Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). To prevail on a plea to the
jurisdiction, a defendant must show an incurable jurisdictional defect apparent from
the face of the pleadings, making it impossible for a plaintiff’s petition to confer
jurisdiction on the Court. Bybee v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 331 S.W.2d 910, 914
(Tex. 1960); City of San Angelo v. Smith, 69 S.W.3d 303, 305 (Tex. App.—Austin
2002, pet. denied). Courts must consider evidence when necessary to decide
jurisdictional issues. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 221; Tex. Natural Res. Conservation
Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2001); Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554-55. If
the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the
jurisdictional issue, a Court is to rule on the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
B. Summary Judgment.
1. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.
Courts of appeal review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Valence
Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). In a traditional
summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant met the summary
Appellee’s Brief Page 7
judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c);
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985). A plaintiff
moving for summary judgment on its claim must conclusively prove all the elements
of its cause of action as a matter of law. Rhone–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d
217, 223 (Tex. 1999). A defendant that moves for a traditional summary judgment
must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff’s
causes of action, or must conclusively establish each element of an affirmative
defense. Long Distance Intern., Inc. v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 49 S.W.3d
347, 350–51 (Tex. 2001).
2. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is basically a motion for pretrial
directed verdict and is governed by the standards of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
166a(i). Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). Under Rule
166a(i), after an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof
can move for summary judgment on the ground that the respondent has presented no
evidence supporting one or more element essential to the respondent's claim or
defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The respondent must then present more than a
scintilla of probative evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact supporting
Appellee’s Brief Page 8
each element contested in the motion. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124
S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when
reasonable and fair-minded individuals could differ in their conclusions. Mendoza
v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
pet. denied). Less than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence creates no more
than a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact regarding a challenged element. Id.
In determining whether a material fact issue exists which precludes summary
judgment, the reviewing court takes as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant,
indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the non-movant’s
favor. Valence Operating, 164 S.W.3d at 661.
When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the
grounds upon which it was granted, a reviewing court will affirm the judgment if
any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569
(Tex. 1989). When there are multiple grounds for summary judgment and the order
does not specify the ground on which the summary judgment was granted, an
appellant must negate all grounds on appeal. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858
S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex. 1993).
Appellee’s Brief Page 9
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Avery failed to timely appeal three issues, on his three properties, within
60-days of receipt of the Board’s Final Orders addressing those specific matters.
Thus, judicial review of those issues was barred. The trial court correctly determined
it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine those matters and therefore correctly
granted the District’s partial motion to dismiss.
Mr. Avery is incorrect that ad valorem taxation is unconstitutional or that
political subdivisions lack authority to impose such taxation. The Texas Constitution
and Tax Code provide ample and valid authority for such taxation. Because the
District cited to and provided this authority, proved Mr. Avery owned the three
subject properties on January 1, 2015, proved the locations of the properties on that
date, and proved that they were not otherwise exempt, the trial court correctly
granted traditional and no-evidence summary judgment in the District’s favor.
V. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
A. The trial court correctly dismissed a portion of Mr. Avery’s suit for lack
of jurisdiction because he did not timely file suit within 60 days after
receiving the Board’s Final Orders on three issues he protested.
To contest the determinations of an appraisal review board, a party must
follow the procedures outlined by the Tax Code. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Tex.
Nat'l Bank of Baytown, 775 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989,
Appellee’s Brief Page 10
no writ). These administrative remedies are exclusive and jurisdictional. Tex. Tax
Code Ann. § 42.09(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Cameron Appraisal
Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006); Tex. Nat'l Bank of Baytown, 775
S.W.2d at 69; Gregg Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 907 S.W.2d
12, 16 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, writ denied); Scott v. Harris Methodist HEB, 871
S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ); Hood v. Hays Cty., 836
S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ); Watson v. Robertson Cty.
Appraisal Review Bd., 795 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no writ).
If a party fails to exhaust its administrative remedies, judicial review of its
claims is barred. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d at 502; Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist. v.
Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P., 165 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. 2005); Gen. Elec. Credit
Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. 1992); Webb
Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, 792 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. 1990);
Appraisal Review Bd. v. Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel, 719 S.W.2d 160, 160
(Tex. 1986); A.B.T. Galveston Ltd. P’ship v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 137
S.W.3d 146, 152 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Dallas Cty.
Appraisal Dist. v. Lal, 701 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d
n.r.e.); Sierra Stage Coaches, Inc. v. La Porte Indep. Sch. Dist., 832 S.W.2d 191,
193 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); Tex. Nat’l Bank of Baytown,
Appellee’s Brief Page 11
775 S.W.2d at 69; Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Plains Mktg., 202 S.W.2d 469,
474- 475 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied).
Beating the clock, by timely appealing the Board’s Final Order determining a
protested issue, is one of the most important exhaustion requirements. Tax Code
Section 42.21(a) is clear that the clock to file suit on an issue starts ticking when the
party “receives notice that a final order has been entered from which an appeal may
be had….” Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.)(emphasis added). Mr. Avery received, what are clearly marked as, Final
Orders, on three issues, for his three properties, that an appeal could be had. C.R.
337-340, 342-345, 347-350. He admitted his receipt of these final orders on these
three issues. C.R. 360. Therefore, Mr. Avery’s clock started ticking on July 24, 2015
for those three issues.
The clock stops ticking at 60 days to timely file a petition appealing each issue
that is finally determined by Board order. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)(emphasis added). 2
2 The Texas Legislature amended Tax Code Section 42.21(a), effective June 19, 2009, to
extend the time to file a petition for review from 45 days to 60 days after the party receives notice
that a final order has been entered from which an appeal may be had, or at any time after the
hearing, but before the 60-day deadline. See Act of May 29, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 905, §§ 1,
5, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2435, 2435-36 (current version at Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)).
Appellee’s Brief Page 12
When the clock stops ticking, the appeal is barred and the Court is deprived
of jurisdiction on those issues. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Int'l Church of the Foursquare Gospel, 719 S.W.2d at
160-161; Hurst v. Guadalupe Cty. Appraisal Dist., 752 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ); Dolenz v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 259
S.W.3d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 2008, pet. denied); Flores v. Fort Bend Cent.
Appraisal Dist., 720 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no
writ); Poly-America, Inc. v. Dallas Cty. Appraisal Dist., 704 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1986, no writ); El Paso Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Evangelical Lutheran
Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc., 762 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, no
writ); Fountain Parkway, Ltd. v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist., 920 S.W.2d 799, 801-802
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied); Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 907 S.W.2d
at 16.
Even though this may seem harsh, Texas Courts have held that Tax Code
Sections 42.21 and 42.09 are constitutional and meet due process requirements. Tex.
Architectural Aggregates, Inc. v. Adams, 690 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. App.—Austin
1985, no writ); Brooks v. Bachus, 661 S.W. 2d 288, 290 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Appellee’s Brief Page 13
To call “time-out,” and keep the clock from ticking, Mr. Avery argues that the
Board’s July 2015 orders were not final orders, but instead were partial orders. See
Appellant’s Brief at pgs. 13-14. He cites Travis Central Appraisal District v.
Marshall Ford Marina, Inc., No. 03–05–00784–CV, 2009 WL 2900743 (Tex.
App.—Austin Sept. 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) as support. This case, however,
supports the District’s position. In Marshall Ford, several protests and issues were
determined by the Travis County Appraisal Review Board. Two rounds of Final
Orders were issued, much like in this case. The Third Court determined that because
the Legislature provided an exclusive remedy, the Travis County Appraisal District,
as the Plaintiff, could not simply ignore the First ARB Orders and was required by
the Tax Code to timely appeal the issues in the first orders to district court to contest
them. Because the Travis County Appraisal District did not do so, it waived its
remedy to attack those orders. Id. at *5. Other caselaw is clear that to preserve a
specific issue for review in the district court, the same issue must be raised at, and
determined by, the appraisal review board. Quorum Int’l v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist.,
114 S.W.3d 568, 572, 573 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); First Bank
of Deer Park v. Harris Cty., 804 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1991, no writ). Tax Code Section 42.21(a) is equally clear that the clock to file suit
on an issue starts ticking when the property owner “receives notice that a final order
Appellee’s Brief Page 14
has been entered from which an appeal may be had….” Tex. Tax Code Ann. §
42.21(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)(emphasis added). Mr. Avery
received final, not partial, orders on three issues, for his three properties, that an
appeal could be had. C.R. 337-340, 342-345, 347-350. Mr. Avery’s clock started
ticking on July 24, 2015 for those three issues and did not “time-out.”
Mr. Avery was required to file his petition appealing the Board’s Final Orders
on his protested issues of: 1) excessive appraisal; 2) unequal appraisal; and 3) the
property should not be taxed based on the Texas Constitution, including Article VIII,
§§ 1(a), 1-e and other provisions of it, and other laws.3 C.R. 338, 343, 348. C.R. 360.
He had 60 days to do so after he received notice of the Board’s Final Orders on July
24, 2015. C.R. 337-358. The 60-day deadline was September 22, 2015. C.R. 392.
Mr. Avery could have timely filed his suit on his three issues for his three properties
that were final before September 22, 2015, and then timely amended in the three
issues that were finally determined later by the Board in October. He could also have
filed a second, separate, suit on those issues finally decided later by the Board in
October. Instead, Mr. Avery chose to wait. He filed his Original Petition for Review,
containing all six issues, for his three properties, on December 14, 2015. C.R. 3-48.
3 “reject[ing] the appeal to the Texas Constitution as a viable cause for appeal of
appraised value.” C.R. 338, 343, 348. C.R. 360.
Appellee’s Brief Page 15
He ran out of time on the three issues, for three of his properties, determined by the
Board in July 2015. Pursuant to Tax Code § 42.21(a) review is barred. Thus, the trial
court correctly dismissed three of Mr. Avery’s issues above, on his three properties,
from this lawsuit for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the District
because the ad valorem system in Texas is constitutional and Mr. Avery’s
properties were subject to property taxation by the taxing units in
Guadalupe County for the 2015 tax year.
1. Mr. Avery’s arguments that there is no lawful source of authority
for Texas taxing units to impose an ad valorem tax are wrong. The
Texas Constitution and Tax Code provide valid authority making
real and tangible personal private property in this State subject to
ad valorem taxation.
Always disliked, but always present, property taxation can be dated to at least
6,000 B.C. https://bftaxhelp.wordpress.com/about-property-taxes/history-of-
property-taxes/ancient-mesopotamia/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2016). Property taxation
also existed in America during colonial times. Richard T. Ely, Taxation in American
States and Cities 109-111 (1888),
https://www.questia.com/read/85780469/taxation-in-american-states-and-cities;
Glen W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United States,
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-property-taxes-in-the-united-states/. Even the
Founders, such as George Washington and John Adams, cited by Mr. Avery as
opponents of such a system, forcefully put down Shays’s and Fries’s Rebellions,
Appellee’s Brief Page 16
which were property tax revolts, in our nation’s infancy. See Appellant’s Brief at
pgs. 36-38.
Today, most local governments in the United States impose a property tax as
a principal source of revenue. Jerome H. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State
and Local Taxation, Cases and Materials, 97 (8th ed. 2001). Texas cities, counties,
school districts, and other taxing units are no exception. They too rely on property
taxes to fund their operations. Local property tax is the largest tax assessed in Texas.
Property taxes levied by taxing units statewide in Texas exceeded $49 billion in 2014
and $52 billion in 2015. Biennial Property Tax Report - Tax Years 2014 and 2015,
1, https://www.comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/docs/96-1728.pdf. As said
best by Oliver Wendell Holmes, former Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
“Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society….” Compania General de Tabacos
v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Mr. Avery contends his three properties cannot be taxed under the Texas
Constitution, including Articles VIII, §§ 1(a), 1-e, and other laws. He also makes
several other contentions regarding the alleged unlawfulness of ad valorem property
taxes in America. Respectfully, he is wrong. Since Texas became a state in 1845,
every one of its Constitutions has contained a provision where the People and their
elected representatives adopted property taxation. See Tex. Const. of 1861, art. VII,
Appellee’s Brief Page 17
§ 27 (“All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as directed by law.); Tex. Const. of 1866, art. VII, § 27 (same); Tex.
Const. of 1869, art XII, § 19 (same); Tex. Const. art VIII, § 1(b) (All real property
and tangible personal property in this State … shall be taxes in proportion to its
value, which shall be ascertained as may be provided by law). “The Texas
Constitution derives its force from the people of Texas. This is the fundamental law
under which the people of this state have consented to be governed.” 4 Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989). As aptly noted by the
trial court, “the train [has] kind of left the station on the legality of the ad valorem
tax.” R.R. 12:10-13.
Under the Texas Constitution all real and tangible personal private property
in this State is subject to ad valorem taxation unless it is barred under federal law or
comes under an exemption authorized in the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art
VIII, § 1(b); City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper, 170 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1943, writ ref'd); see City of Beaumont v. Fertitta, 415 S.W.2d 902, 909–
12 (Tex. 1967); see e.g., Pub., Inc. v. Cty. of Galveston, 264 S.W.3d 338, 345-346
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
4 The people have the sole power to change or modify the plain language of the constitution.
Cramer v. Sheppard, 167 S.W.2d 147, 154 (Tex. 1942). Until the people change it, the constitution
itself remains the supreme law of the land. Id.
Appellee’s Brief Page 18
The Texas Constitution also states:
All property, whether owned by persons or corporations shall be
assessed for taxation, and the taxes paid in the county where situated….
And all lands and other property not rendered for taxation by the owner
thereof shall be assessed at its fair value by the proper officer.
Tex. Const. art. VIII § 11 (emphasis added).
Tax Code § 11.01, in part, adds:
§ 11.01. Real and Tangible Personal Property
(a) All real and tangible personal property that this state has jurisdiction to
tax is taxable unless exempt by law.
(b) This state has jurisdiction to tax real property if located in this state.
(c) This state has jurisdiction to tax tangible personal property if the
property is:
(1) located in this state for longer than a temporary period;
(2) temporarily located outside this state and the owner resides in
this state; or
(3) used continually, whether regularly or irregularly, in this state.
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 11.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)(emphasis
added).
Since jurisdiction to tax means the legitimate power to tax, Tax Code § 11.01,
which defines the state’s taxing jurisdiction over real and tangible personal property,
Appellee’s Brief Page 19
also defines the limits of the legitimate power of political subdivisions to tax such
property. 5 See Great S. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778, 780, 782 (Tex.
1922).
Mr. Avery also complains it is impossible to achieve exact uniformity and
equality. See Appellant’s Brief at pg. 22. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized
that impossibility. State v. Whittenburg, 265 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. 1954). But, the
Court has also noted that “[a] reasonable discrepancy between the actual value of
the property and the value at which it is assessed for taxes is permissible to allow for
differences in judgment.” Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931,
935 (Tex. 1996)(citing Dallas Cty. v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 179 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex.
1944)).
Mr. Avery also argues that Article VIII, § 1–e of the Texas Constitution bars
ad valorem taxation in Texas entirely. See Appellant’s Brief at pgs. 23-28. He notes
with emphasis that this section states: “No State ad valorem taxes shall be levied
upon any property within this State.” Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1–e (emphasis added).
The Texas Supreme Court would disagree with Mr. Avery’s point and
emphasis. It has held that “[a]n ad valorem tax is a state tax when it is imposed
5 “There is always a presumption of constitutional validity with regard to legislation and it
is especially strong in respect to statutes relating to taxation.” In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d
610, 623 (Tex. 2012)(quoting Vinson v. Burgess, 773 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. 1989)).
Appellee’s Brief Page 20
directly by the State or when the State so completely controls the levy, assessment
and disbursement of revenue, either directly or indirectly, that the [taxing] authority
employed is without meaningful discretion.” Carrollton–Farmers Branch Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1992)
[Edgewood III]; Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d
826, 881 (Tex. 2016)(emphasis added). That is not the case here. See also id. at 885.
Guadalupe County, Seguin Independent School District, and Lateral Roads are
political subdivisions. They are not the State and can therefore constitutionally levy
ad valorem taxes on Mr. Avery’s property.
Mr. Avery further contends the District did not show lawful authority, from a
lawful source, for the taxing units to impose an ad valorem tax. See Appellant’s Brief
at pg. 17. The District showed the trial court, and again here, that the Texas
Constitution and Tax Code are valid and clearly subject Mr. Avery’s real property
to ad valorem taxation. Therefore, all the District was further required to show was
the taxing units’ authority to assess, and the location and status of the subject
properties on January 1, 2015.
Appellee’s Brief Page 21
2. Guadalupe County, Seguin Independent School District, and
Lateral Roads all had the authority to levy an ad valorem tax on
Mr. Avery’s property for the 2015 tax year.
The Tax Code states that real property is taxable by a taxing unit if the real
property is located within the boundaries of the taxing unit on the first day of January
of the tax year. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 21.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.). A taxing unit is defined as “a county, city, town, school district, a special
district or authority (including a junior college district, hospital district, district
created pursuant to the Water Code, a mosquito control district, fire prevention
district, noxious weed control district), or any other political unit of this state,
whether created by or pursuant to the constitution or a local, special, or general law,
that is authorized to impose and is imposing ad valorem taxes on property….” Tex.
Tax Code Ann. § 1.04(12) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
The Texas Constitution allows counties to levy property taxes. Tex. Const.
art. VIII, §§ 1-a, 9. It also empowers the Legislature to enact laws for the assessment
and collection of property taxes by school districts. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e); see
also Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.152 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). The
Texas Constitution also allows the Legislature to authorize ad valorem taxes for the
maintenance of public roads. Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 9(c), (e). Therefore, Guadalupe
County, Seguin Independent School District, and Lateral Roads all have
Appellee’s Brief Page 22
constitutional authority to levy and collect ad valorem taxes on the real property
owned by Mr. Avery within their jurisdiction.
3. On January 1, 2015, the subject properties in this case were owned
by Mr. Avery, had situs in the relevant taxing units, and were not
otherwise exempt. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment in the District’s favor.
On January 1 of each year a tax lien attaches to property to secure payment of
all ad valorem taxes, penalties, and interest ultimately imposed for the year on that
property. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 32.01(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
A person is obligated to pay ad valorem taxes levied on property only if they own it
on January 1 of the tax year at issue. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 32.07(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
Mr. Avery “admits there are no material fact issues related to the location of
his property.” See Appellant’s Brief at pg. 18; see also C.R. 408, ¶ 3.9.
The District also established in its summary judgment evidence that:
● the subject property consisted of real property that was physically
located at: 9301 FM 725, McQueeney, Guadalupe County, Texas, 78123 and at 2681
Tiemann Rd., Seguin, Guadalupe County, Texas, 78155 on January 1, 2015. C.R.
158, ¶¶ 28-31, 161, 164, 167.
● certified records and photographs show the subject property is real
property located in Guadalupe County, Texas. C.R. 161-226.
Appellee’s Brief Page 23
● Mr. Avery’s property was not exempt from taxation and within the
boundaries and taxing jurisdiction of Guadalupe County, Seguin ISD, and Lateral
Roads on January 1, 2015. C.R. 158, ¶¶ 32-36.
● certified copies from the Guadalupe County Clerk of deeds shows that
Mr. Ronald F. Avery is the owner of two tracts that are “5.34 acres of land more or
less” in the “Moses Baker Survey, Abstract #4, Guadalupe County, Texas.” C.R.
228-234. These two tracts are 3.74 acres and 1.6 acres, are known to the District as
accounts 50610 and 50612. C.R. 161, 164, 170-172, 175-177, 189, 196, 273 RFAR
3 – 275 RFAR 13.
● certified copies from the Guadalupe County Clerk of deeds show that
Ronald F. Avery and Cynthia G. Avery, as Trustees for the Ronald F. Avery and
Cynthia G. Avery Revocable Living Trust is the owner of a tract that is “2.658 acres
of land out of the John Sowell Survey, Guadalupe County, Texas.” C.R. 236-238.
This tract is known to the District as account 59576. C.R. 167, 180-182, 203.
● certified copies of account summaries for account numbers 50610,
50612, and 59576, from the Guadalupe Tax-Assessor-Collector for the 2015 tax
year. These list Mr. Avery as the owner of the subject property, the location of the
subject property in Guadalupe County, the legal description of the property, the
taxing units and their tax levy going back several years. C.R. 240-242, 244-246, 248-
Appellee’s Brief Page 24
250. They also establish that these properties are not exempt from taxation, and are
within the boundaries and taxing jurisdiction of Guadalupe County, Seguin ISD, and
Lateral Roads. C.R. 240-242, 244-246, 248-250.
● copies of deeds for the subject property that Mr. Avery produced in
discovery. C.R. 256-270. These also establish that the subject property is in the
Moses Baker Survey, Abstract #4, Guadalupe County, Texas and in the John Sowell
Survey, Guadalupe County, Texas. C.R. 256-270.
Based on the District’s summary judgment evidence, the subject property
meets the essential requirements of situs in the taxing units of Guadalupe County,
Seguin Independent School District, and Lateral Roads on January 1, 2015.
Mr. Avery’s arguments are not unique. Over the years, other property owners
have made similar claims regarding the unconstitutionality of their ad valorem taxes,
and took these matters to Court during some phase of the assessment or collections
process. See Townsend v. Montgomery Cent. Appraisal Dist., No. 14–14–00103–
CV, 2015 WL 971313, at *7, *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 3, 2015, no
pet.); Haley v. Harris Cty., No. 14–11–01051–CV, 2012 WL4955257, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op); Fisher v. Cty. of
Williamson, No. 03-05-00584-CV, 2006 WL 1649262, at *2, *3 (Tex. App.—
Austin June 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). These cases all cite to authority the
Appellee’s Brief Page 25
District has presented that ad valorem taxation is constitutional and address the proof
required of taxing units to assess that tax, which the District here has more than done.
The District refers the Court to, and relies upon, these cases to the extent they are
relevant and instructive in resolving this matter.
Considering the law and evidence before it, the trial court correctly granted
the District’s traditional motion for summary judgment making Mr. Avery’s
property subject to ad valorem taxation in Guadalupe County by the relevant taxing
units for the 2015 tax year as a matter of law.
4. Mr. Avery bore the burden of proof and did not bring sufficient
evidence on that he was exempt from taxation.
Although it had evidence in its traditional motion for summary judgment, that
Mr. Avery’s property was not exempt, the District, as a belt-and-suspender
approach, additionally sought a no-evidence summary judgment on the question of
whether the real property was exempt from taxation.
The person claiming an exemption bears the burden of proof. Seguin v. Bexar
Appraisal Dist., 373 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet.
denied)(citing N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy Cty. Appraisal Dist., 804
S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. 1991)). It is an appropriate question to resolve through a no-
evidence motion for summary judgment.
Appellee’s Brief Page 26
Mr. Avery did provide evidence from his Board hearing, but he did not
provide more than a mere scintilla of evidence to the trial court that his property was
entitled to, or that he was wrongfully denied, an exemption for the 2015 tax year.
Therefore, the trial court also properly granted a no-evidence summary judgment to
the District on this issue, even though it was not ultimately necessary to finally
resolve this case.
VI. CONCLUSION & PRAYER
Mr. Avery filed his original petition on December 14, 2015. This was well
after the 60-day deadline to do so after he received notice of the Board’s Final Orders
on three issues he complains of. Pursuant to Tax Code § 42.21(a), the pleadings, and
evidence submitted, the trial court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear
those three issues of: 1) excessive appraisal; 2) unequal appraisal; and 3) the property
should not be taxed based on the Texas Constitution, including Article VIII, §§ 1(a),
1-e, and other laws in granting the District’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.
Further, Mr. Avery’s claims that there is no authority making his three
properties subject to ad valorem taxation. The District has shown that pursuant to
the Texas Constitution and the Texas Tax Code, all real property located in this state
is subject to appraisal and ad valorem taxation, unless it is otherwise exempt by law.
Guadalupe County, Seguin Independent School District, and Lateral Roads all have
Appellee’s Brief Page 27
the constitutional authority to levy and collect ad valorem taxes on property located
in their jurisdiction. The District presented ample proof and authority establishing
that Mr. Avery owned the three properties at issue, they were located in Guadalupe
County, Texas, had situs in the taxing units at issue, and that they were not exempt
from taxation on January 1, 2015. Thus, the trial court correctly granted the summary
judgment in the District’s favor.
Alternatively Mr. Avery did not present sufficient evidence to support his
claims that his property was entitled to or wrongfully denied and exemption, making
it totally exempt. Accordingly, the trial court also correctly granted the District’s no-
evidence summary judgment motions.
The trial court’s decisions should be affirmed.
Appellee’s Brief Page 28
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Christopher S. Jackson
Christopher S. Jackson
Texas Bar No. 00796816
PERDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER,
COLLINS & MOTT, L.L.P.
3301 Northland Dr., Ste. 505
Austin, Texas 78731
Telephone: (512) 302-0190
Facsimile: (512) 323-6963
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE,
GUADALUPE APPRAISAL
DISTRICT
Appellee’s Brief Page 29
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1. As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), this document
complies with the 15,000-word type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 6,320 words total,
excluding the parts of the document exempted by Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
2. This document also complies with the type-face requirements of Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a proportionally
spaced type-face using Microsoft Word 2016 in fourteen (14) point “Times
New Roman” style font and twelve (12) point “Times New Roman” style font
for footnotes.
/s/ Christopher S. Jackson
Christopher S. Jackson
Appellee’s Brief Page 30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 6.3, 9.5, Tex. R. Civ. P. 21
and 21a, on the 12th day of January 2017, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellee’s Brief, was served upon Appellant pro se, via e-service and via e-mail on
the same date.
Mr. Ronald F. Avery
1933 Montclair Drive
Seguin, Texas 78155
Email: [email protected]
/s/ Christopher S. Jackson
Christopher S. Jackson
Attorney for Appellee,
Guadalupe Appraisal District
Appellee’s Brief Page 31
§ 42.21. Petition for Review, TX TAX § 42.21
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Tax Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. Property Tax Code
Subtitle F. Remedies
Chapter 42. Judicial Review (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Review by District Court
V.T.C.A., Tax Code § 42.21
§ 42.21. Petition for Review
Effective: September 1, 2013
Currentness
(a) A party who appeals as provided by this chapter must file a petition for review with
the district court within 60 days after the party received notice that a final order has been
entered from which an appeal may be had or at any time after the hearing but before the
60-day deadline. Failure to timely file a petition bars any appeal under this chapter.
(b) A petition for review brought under Section 42.02 must be brought against the owner
of the property involved in the appeal. A petition for review brought under Section
42.031 must be brought against the appraisal district and against the owner of the
property involved in the appeal. A petition for review brought under Section 42.01(a)(2)
or 42.03 must be brought against the comptroller. Any other petition for review under this
chapter must be brought against the appraisal district. A petition for review may not be
brought against the appraisal review board. An appraisal district may hire an attorney that
represents the district to represent the appraisal review board established for the district to
file an answer and obtain a dismissal of a suit filed against the appraisal review board in
violation of this subsection.
TAB A
§ 42.21. Petition for Review, TX TAX § 42.21
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
(c) If an appeal under this chapter is pending when the appraisal review board issues an
order in a subsequent year under a protest by the same property owner and that protest
relates to the same property that is involved in the pending appeal, the property owner
may appeal the subsequent appraisal review board order by amending the original
petition for the pending appeal to include the grounds for appealing the subsequent order.
The amended petition must be filed with the court in the period provided by Subsection
(a) for filing a petition for review of the subsequent order. A property owner may appeal
the subsequent appraisal review board order under this subsection or may appeal the
order independently of the pending appeal as otherwise provided by this section, but may
not do both. A property owner may change the election of remedies provided by this
subsection at any time before the end of the period provided by Subsection (a) for filing a
petition for review.
(d) An appraisal district is served by service on the chief appraiser at any time or by
service on any other officer or employee of the appraisal district present at the appraisal
office at a time when the appraisal office is open for business with the public. An
appraisal review board is served by service on the chairman of the appraisal review
board. Citation of a party is issued and served in the manner provided by law for civil
suits generally.
(e) A petition that is timely filed under Subsection (a) or amended under Subsection (c)
may be subsequently amended to:
(1) correct or change the name of a party; or
(2) not later than the 120th day before the date of trial, identify or describe the property
originally involved in the appeal.
(f) A petition filed by an owner or lessee of property may include multiple properties that
are owned or leased by the same person and are of a similar type or are part of the same
§ 42.21. Petition for Review, TX TAX § 42.21
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
economic unit and would typically sell as a single property. If a petition is filed by
multiple plaintiffs or includes multiple properties that are not of a similar type, are not
part of the same economic unit, or are part of the same economic unit but would not
typically sell as a single property, the court may on motion and a showing of good cause
sever the plaintiffs or the properties.
(g) A petition filed by an owner or lessee of property may be amended to include
additional properties in the same county that are owned or leased by the same person, are
of a similar type as the property originally involved in the appeal or are part of the same
economic unit as the property originally involved in the appeal and would typically sell
as a single property, and are the subject of an appraisal review board order issued in the
same year as the order that is the subject of the original appeal. The amendment must be
filed within the period during which a petition for review of the appraisal review board
order pertaining to the additional properties would be required to be filed under
Subsection (a).
(h) The court has jurisdiction over an appeal under this chapter brought on behalf of a
property owner or lessee and the owner or lessee is considered to have exhausted the
owner’s or lessee’s administrative remedies regardless of whether the petition correctly
identifies the plaintiff as the owner or lessee of the property or correctly describes the
property so long as the property was the subject of an appraisal review board order, the
petition was filed within the period required by Subsection (a), and the petition provides
sufficient information to identify the property that is the subject of the petition. Whether
the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the petition or whether the property needs to be
further identified or described must be addressed by means of a special exception and
correction of the petition by amendment as authorized by Subsection (e) and may not be
the subject of a plea to the jurisdiction or a claim that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust
the plaintiff’s administrative remedies. If the petition is amended to add a plaintiff, the
court on motion shall enter a docket control order to provide proper deadlines in response
to the addition of the plaintiff.
§ 42.21. Petition for Review, TX TAX § 42.21
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
Credits
Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 2311, ch. 841, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1982. Amended by Acts 1983,
68th Leg., p. 5344, ch. 981, § 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1983; Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 760, § 1,
eff. Aug. 26, 1985; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 796, § 44, eff. June 15, 1989; Acts 1991,
72nd Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 6, § 54, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1113, § 1,
eff. June 18, 1999; Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 905, § 1, eff. June 19, 2009; Acts 2011,
82nd Leg., ch. 771 (H.B. 1887), § 15, eff. Sept. 1, 2011; Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 161
(S.B. 1093), § 19.006, eff. Sept. 1, 2013; Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 1259 (H.B. 585), §
25, eff. June 14, 2013.
Notes of Decisions (83)
V. T. C. A., Tax Code § 42.21, TX TAX § 42.21
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
§ 3. Taxes for benefit of schools; school districts, TX CONST Art. 7, § 3
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (Refs & Annos)
Article VII. Education
the Public Free Schools
Vernon’s Ann.Texas Const. Art. 7, § 3
§ 3. Taxes for benefit of schools; school districts
Currentness
Sec. 3. (a) One-fourth of the revenue derived from the State occupation taxes shall be set
apart annually for the benefit of the public free schools.
(b) It shall be the duty of the State Board of Education to set aside a sufficient amount of
available funds to provide free text books for the use of children attending the public free
schools of this State.
(c) Should the taxation herein named be insufficient the deficit may be met by
appropriation from the general funds of the State.
(d) The Legislature may provide for the formation of school districts by general laws, and
all such school districts may embrace parts of two or more counties.
TAB B
§ 3. Taxes for benefit of schools; school districts, TX CONST Art. 7, § 3
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
(e) The Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of
taxes in all school districts and for the management and control of the public school or
schools of such districts, whether such districts are composed of territory wholly within a
county or in parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature may authorize an
additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts for the
further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school
buildings therein; provided that a majority of the qualified voters of the district voting at
an election to be held for that purpose, shall approve the tax.
Credits
Amended Aug. 14, 1883, proclamation Sept. 25, 1883; Nov. 3, 1908, proclamation Feb.
2, 1909; Aug. 3, 1909, proclamation Sept. 24, 1909; Nov. 5, 1918; Nov. 2, 1920; Nov. 2,
1926, proclamation Jan. 20, 1927; Nov. 2, 1999.
Vernon’s Ann. Texas Const. Art. 7, § 3, TX CONST Art. 7, § 3
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document
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§ 1. Equality and uniformity; tax in proportion to value;..., TX CONST Art. 8, § 1
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KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Proposed Legislation
Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (Refs & Annos)
Article VIII. Taxation and Revenue
Vernon’s Ann.Texas Const. Art. 8, § 1
§ 1. Equality and uniformity; tax in proportion to value; income tax; exemption of certain tangible personal property from ad valorem taxation
Effective: December 1, 2009
Currentness
Sec. 1. (a) Taxation shall be equal and uniform.
(b) All real property and tangible personal property in this State, unless exempt as required
or permitted by this Constitution, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, other
than municipal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may
be provided by law.
TAB C
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Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (Refs & Annos)
Article VIII. Taxation and Revenue
Vernon’s Ann.Texas Const. Art. 8, § 1-a
§ 1-a. No State ad valorem tax levy; county levy for roads and flood control; tax donations
Effective: November 26, 2001
Currentness
Sec. 1-a. The several counties of the State are authorized to levy ad valorem taxes upon all
property within their respective boundaries for county purposes, except the first Three
Thousand Dollars ($3,000) value of residential homesteads of married or unmarried adults,
including those living alone, not to exceed thirty cents (30¢) on each One Hundred Dollars
($100) valuation, in addition to all other ad valorem taxes authorized by the Constitution
of this State, provided the revenue derived therefrom shall be used for construction and
maintenance of Farm to Market Roads or for Flood Control, except as herein otherwise
provided.
Credits
Adopted Nov. 8, 1932. Amended Aug. 26, 1933; Nov. 2, 1948; Nov. 6, 1973; Nov. 2, 1999;
Nov. 6, 2001, eff. Nov. 26, 2001.
Vernon’s Ann. Texas Const. Art. 8, § 1-a, TX CONST Art. 8, § 1-a
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document
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U.S. Government Works.
TAB D
§ 11. Place of assessment; value of property not rendered..., TX CONST Art. 8, § 11
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© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (Refs & Annos)
Article VIII. Taxation and Revenue
Vernon’s Ann.Texas Const. Art. 8, § 1-e
§ 1-e. Abolition of ad valorem property taxes
Effective: November 26, 2001
Currentness
Sec. 1-e. No State ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon any property within this State.
Credits
Adopted Nov. 5, 1968. Amended Nov. 2, 1982; Nov. 6, 2001, eff. Nov. 26, 2001.
Vernon’s Ann. Texas Const. Art. 8, § 1-e, TX CONST Art. 8, § 1-e
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original
U.S. Government Works.
TAB E
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (Refs & Annos)
Article VIII. Taxation and Revenue
Vernon’s Ann.Texas Const. Art. 8, § 9
§ 9. Maximum State tax; county, city and town levies; county funds; local road laws
Currentness
Sec. 9. (a) No county, city or town shall levy a tax rate in excess of Eighty Cents (80¢) on
the One Hundred Dollars ($100) valuation in any one (1) year for general fund, permanent
improvement fund, road and bridge fund and jury fund purposes.
(b) At the time the Commissioners Court meets to levy the annual tax rate for each county
it shall levy whatever tax rate may be needed for the four (4) constitutional purposes;
namely, general fund, permanent improvement fund, road and bridge fund and jury fund
so long as the Court does not impair any outstanding bonds or other obligations and so long
as the total of the foregoing tax levies does not exceed Eighty Cents (80¢) on the One
Hundred Dollars ($100) valuation in any one (1) year. Once the Court has levied the annual
tax rate, the same shall remain in force and effect during that taxable year.
(c) The Legislature may authorize an additional annual ad valorem tax to be levied and
collected for the further maintenance of the public roads; provided, that a majority of the
qualified voters of the county voting at an election to be held for that purpose shall approve
the tax, not to exceed Fifteen Cents (15¢) on the One Hundred Dollars ($100) valuation of
the property subject to taxation in such county.
TAB F
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(d) Any county may put all tax money collected by the county into one general fund,
without regard to the purpose or source of each tax.
(e) The Legislature may pass local laws for the maintenance of the public roads and
highways, without the local notice required for special or local laws.
(f) This Section shall not be construed as a limitation of powers delegated to counties, cities
or towns by any other Section or Sections of this Constitution.
Credits
Amended Aug. 14, 1883, proclamation Sept. 25, 1883; Nov. 4, 1890, proclamation Dec.
19, 1890; Nov. 6, 1906, proclamation Jan. 7, 1907; Nov. 7, 1944; Nov. 6, 1956; Nov. 11,
1967; Nov. 2, 1999.
Vernon’s Ann. Texas Const. Art. 8, § 9, TX CONST Art. 8, § 9
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document
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U.S. Government Works.
§ 11. Place of assessment; value of property not rendered..., TX CONST Art. 8, § 11
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (Refs & Annos)
Article VIII. Taxation and Revenue
Vernon’s Ann.Texas Const. Art. 8, § 11
§ 11. Place of assessment; value of property not rendered by owner
Currentness
Sec. 11. All property, whether owned by persons or corporations shall be assessed for
taxation, and the taxes paid in the county where situated, but the Legislature may, by a two-
thirds vote, authorize the payment of taxes of non-residents of counties to be made at the
office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts. And all lands and other property not rendered
for taxation by the owner thereof shall be assessed at its fair value by the proper officer.
Editors’ Notes
Vernon’s Ann. Texas Const. Art. 8, § 11, TX CONST Art. 8, § 11
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document
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U.S. Government Works.
TAB G