Abuja City Profile

Abstract

Abuja, the most rapidly growing city in Africa, is not just a modern capital city of Nigeria. It is a

city that is being contested by the elites who desire to realize their modernist vision of an orderly

and beautiful city and the poor who struggle to stitch together a living largely in the informal

sector. Abuja is also the destination of innumerable unemployed people who migrate to the city

in search of perceived employment opportunities and of those who see the city as much safer

than other parts of the country. It is within this context, coupled with limited resources, that the

city administration is struggling to cope with the increasing challenges of providing housing,

basic public services and an efficient transportation system. The key issue is whether the

government's partnership with the private sector in the development of Abuja in the last decade

can meet these challenges.

Key words: Abuja; capital city; housing; infrastructure development; services; transportation;

informal sector; exclusion; urban planning; Nigeria

Introduction

Like many major cities in developing countries, Abuja is experiencing an astronomical rate

of population growth. Indeed its urbanization rate of 8.32% per annum makes it the fastest

growing city in Africa (Myers, 2011). While the current population of the city is estimated at

over 3 million people, its day-time population often reaches up to 7 million (Iro, 2007). This

makes Abuja the fourth largest urban area in Nigeria after Lagos, Kano and Ibadan. Moreover,

the city’s rapid rate of urban growth is more astounding in its satellite settlements which are

growing at about 20% per annum (Abubakar & Doan, 2010). Even though natural population

increase is part of this growth, the major force underlying this overwhelming growth is in-

migration due to perceived better economic opportunities in Abuja, rural people’s quests for

urban life, lack of investment in Nigeria’s smaller towns and villages, and the believe that the

city is much safer than other parts of the country.

The results of this explosive growth is the acute shortage of housing (Abdullahi & AbdAziz,

2010; Umoh, 2012), the proliferation of informal settlements (Amba, 2010; Jibril, 2006),

occupation of uncompleted buildings (Abubakar & Doan, 2010), water scarcity (Abubakar,

2012), dilapidated sewer systems (Ilesanmi, 2006; Ojo, 2011) and traffic congestion (Benna

Associates, 2009). Amid these challenges, and coupled with limited resources, the city

administration is surprisingly trying to realize its elitist vision of an orderly and beautiful modern

city. However, this vision is constantly being thwarted by hordes of poor people that are trying to

make a living mainly in the city’s informal sector.

This article, therefore, analyses the three and a half decades of urban development in Abuja

with particular emphasis on recent initiatives aimed at meeting these challenges. The specific

objectives of the paper are to: (a) review Abuja’s geography, historical development, and

planning and urban form in order to best understand the context within which these challenges

occur; (b) discuss the major challenges facing the city and critically evaluate how its recent

partnerships with the private sector private sector in housing provision, garbage collection and

public transportation services is attempting to meet these challenges; and (c) to offer some

recommendations on the way forward.

Geographical Background

Abuja city is located in the central part of Nigeria north of the confluence of the Niger and

Benue Rivers (Figure 1). The city is part of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) whose land area

of about 8,000 km2 makes it almost two and a half times the size of Lagos State, the former

capital territory of Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa and the sixth most populated in

the world. The geography of the area is defined by two renowned rock formations— the Zuma

Rock from whose base the FCT begins and the Aso Rock that is located to the east of the city.

Abuja lies at latitude 9.07oN and longitude 7.48oE, and at an elevation of 840m (2,760 ft)

above sea-level. This elevation and tropical location gives Abuja a mild weather which contrasts

sharply with the humid weather of Lagos, which is located on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean at

35 m (11 ft) above sea-level. The Abuja area has two distinct seasons: the rainy season that lasts

from April to October with rainfall ranging from 305-762 mm (12-30 inches) and temperatures

raising up to 40oC in May; and the dry season that lasts from November through March with dry

winds lowering the temperature to as low as 12oC. Because of its abundant rainfall, rich soil and

the location within the Guinea-Savanna vegetation zone, the region is agriculturally productive,

with maize and tubers as the dominant crops.

Abuja’s situation at the geographical center of Nigeria (Figure 1) and its strategic position at

the intersection of two highways linking the northern and southern parts of the country make it

more accessible than Lagos. For example, while the road distance from Maiduguri in Borno State

in the northeastern part of Nigeria to Lagos is about 1,609 km (1,000 miles), in contrast, the

distance from Abuja to all parts of the country is less than 965 km (600 miles). This centrality

and accessibility is actually one of the reasons why the new capital city was created.

Figure 1: Abuja is more centrally located and accessible from all parts of Nigeria than

Lagos

Historical Development

Abuja is a young city that begun its existence on 3rd February 1976 when the federal military

government established the FCT after accepting the recommendation that Lagos – the Nigerian

capital since 1914 and also the country’s major port and commercial and industrial center– could

no longer effectively perform the dual role of state and federal capital. The Lagos’ main

problems were shortage of land for expansion, chronic housing and traffic congestion,

overstretched and dilapidated infrastructure, unhygienic environment and poor drainage (the city

being only 10 feet above sea-level) and domination by one ethnic group – the Yoruba (IPA,

1979; Morah, 1993; Schatz, 2003). In addition, though Nigeria was not facing any war threat

when Abuja was created, Obateru (2004) believes that Lagos is vulnerable to attacks in the event

of military aggression from other countries and hence unsuitable to be Nigeria’s capital.

In order to create a new capital city that is free from Lagos’ problems, the federal territory

that contains Abuja city was carved out of Plateau, Kwara, Niger and Kaduna states in the

middle of the country (Figure 1) and an agency, Federal Capital Development Authority

(FCDA), was established to plan and develop the city and the entire FCT. As such, FCDA

selected and commissioned an American planning consortium, International Planning Associates

(IPA), to prepare a master plan for Abuja City, which was completed in 1979 and the

development of the city began the following year. At that time, there were about 300,000 people

from indigenous tribes residing in 500 to 600 villages without access to roads and basic services

within the FCT. Those villages located on the sites earmarked for the capital city, the game

reserve area, the reservoir watersheds and Abuja airport were recommended for relocation while

the rest were to be upgraded and integrated into the satellite settlements (IPA, 1979).

In terms of administration, there are six local area councils created within the FCT – Abuja

Municipal, Abaji, Bwari, Kuje, Gwagwalada, and Kwali (Figure 2). While Abuja city is sited

within the Abuja Municipal area, the city is directly administered by the Federal Capital

Territory Administration (FCTA), which is headed by a minister appointed by the president. The

FCTA has several departments and agencies, supervised by directors, including the Abuja Water

Board, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board that is responsible for solid and liquid waste

management, the Abuja Geographic Information System that is responsible for land

administration, and the Transportation Secretariat.

Planning and Urban Form

The Abuja Master Plan of 1979

The development of Abuja is the product of the implementation of the provisions of the

Abuja Master Plan, which consist of the capital city and the regional plans and manuals

specifying design and development standards. According to IPA (1979), the development of

Abuja is based on seven important principles: equal access, equal citizenship, environmental

conservation, the garden city, functional city, effective regional development, and rapid national

economic growth. Likewise, the master plan provides the reasons for the relocation of the federal

capital city from Lagos to Abuja as:

- Availability of adequate land and natural resources that can provide a promising base for

urban development;

- A new capital at a more central location where it can provide equal access to Nigeria's

diverse ethnic and cultural groups; and

- A modern capital to serve as a symbol of national integration and unity (p. 27).

The plan’s projections envision a capital city of 3.2 million inhabitants with an average

household size of between 5 and 6 persons to be accommodated within the city boundary of 256

km2 and thereafter any additional population would be settled in satellite settlements. The master

plan divides the development of Abuja city into four Phases that form a crescent-shaped urban

form with Phases II, III and IV radiating outward from Phase I located at the center (Figure 2).

This centrally-oriented plan focuses on Phase I, which is now fully developed and home to

federal government agencies like the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the central

business district (CBD) and the cultural center that contains the National Mosque, National

Ecumenical Centre, National Theatre and library as well as the International Conference Center

(IPA, 1979).

Phase I also consists of the residential districts of Maitama, Wuse, Garki, Asokoro and

Guzape for Abuja’s who-is-who, as well as several foreign embassies, international agencies,

and multi-national corporations. With the concentration of these activities in Phase I, the

decision makers in Abuja tend to bias investment in amenities and infrastructure to the fully

developed area to the detriment of other developing areas that need far more investments. Thus,

it is not surprising that some people refer to this area as ‘the city’ and the suburbs where the

junior civil servants and the poor reside as ‘villages’. However, one disadvantage of this

concentration of activities is crowdedness and traffic congestion as workers who live in other

areas commute daily to their offices there.

Figure 2: The area councils within the FCT and four phases of Abuja’s development

(Source: www.abujagis.org.ng)

In Phase II, which was expected to accommodate about half a million people in fifteen

residential districts, only the five districts of Kado, Jabi, Utako, Wuye, and Gudu/Apo are nearly

fully developed. The rest are at different stages of development because of the sluggish pace of

infrastructural development. Phase III, which has nineteen residential districts was meant to

bring the total population of Abuja to 1.64 million when completed by 2000 (IPA, 1979, p. 74).

However, this dream is yet to be realized as only two districts (Gwarimpa I and Life Camp) have

been fully developed and Nbora and Lokogoma are currently underway, while the remaining

districts are in their infancy. Phases II and III radiate outward from Phase I while Phase IV which

is proposed to house about 1.6 million people in twenty-nine districts is located at the two ends

of the Abuja city crescent (Figure 2).

After approving the Master Plan, some indigenous communities were compensated and

resettled within the FCT (Iro, 2007), still majority are yet to be provided with alternative land

(Amba, 2010). Thereafter, construction of federal ministries and staff housing in Phase I started

in 1980 with the intention of relocating to the new capital city in 1985. With the completion of

some of these projects, federal agencies gradually moved and the federal government finally

relocated to Abuja in December, 1991.

Although no comprehensive review of Abuja Master Plan was ever undertaken, between

2006 and 2008 the central area urban design was reviewed by Albert Speer & Partner (n.d);

ideally the plan should have been reviewed at least every ten years as far as good planning

practice is concerned. Instead of focusing on how to deal with Abuja’s challenges of rapid

urbanization, poverty, informality and scarcity of basic services in the suburban areas, the review

largely focused on redesigning the central district, reviewing land use plans, and the

development controls. This is not surprising as the city elites desire to realize their modernist

vision of an orderly and beautiful Abuja city.

Urban Form

The design of Abuja, similar to other modernist cities, is clearly based on the garden city

concept of low density development and landscaping as the master plan dedicated a whopping

32% of land area to open space and parks. Specifically, the land use allocation is as follows:

33.2% for residential, 21.9% for commercial and services, 25% for open spaces, 19.9% for

roads, and 7% for parks (IPA, 1979). We can see that this kind of urban form is undeniably a

Western concept that is alien to African culture, which encourages neighborliness and high level

of interaction (Abubakar & Doan, 2010). Another disadvantage of such low density development

is the high cost of infrastructure provision, especially for a city relying heavily on federal

budgetary allocations.

Figure 3: A sector consisting of four districts and residential neighborhoods (IPA,

1979)

The envisaged city structure is based on the creation of hierarchies of development that serve

as the main framework for organizing social and economic activities. At the top of the hierarchy

are the four phases that each consists of 3-4 sectors. Each sector, which serves as a mini-city of

between 100,000 to 250,000 people, is subdivided into four residential districts surrounding the

sector center, which provides secondary employment and a variety of non-residential land uses

such as governmental offices, secondary school and recreational activities (Figure 3). On the

other hand, the residential district consists of local residential communities around the district

center, which comprises of primary schools, a health clinic, a library, parks, a retail market,

informal service job centers and restaurants. The decision to concentrate commercial activities at

the district centers, rather than to allow them to develop into strips similar to other Nigerian

cities was aimed at minimizing their impact on traffic and adjacent residential areas (Benna

Associates, 2009). In terms of layouts, Abuja city is dominated by curvilinear and grid iron

patterns.

The city’s local residential neighborhoods are not defined for a specific population or area of

land. Rather, they are planned by the local planners in order to provide a range of housing

alternatives within the framework allowed by service and transportation systems and specified

residential densities. In each neighborhood, a center provides facilities such as a kindergarten, a

shopping center and a park.

Key Challenges and Recent Initiatives

Land Administration

Land in Abuja is subject to all types of speculation. Thousands of serviced and unserviced

plots allocated to individuals by the government at well below market prices have been sold and

resold on the open market for significantly higher returns. To low-income citizens, land in the

city is unaffordable because obtaining a parcel of land entails the initial payment of an

application fee of ₦100,000 or US$ 6501 (Daily Trust, 2009, August 17) followed by expensive

land premium if the land is eventually allocated (Abuja Geographic Information Systems, 2013).

Given that the land premium is currently ₦20,000 (US$ 125) per square meter in Phase I, a

450m2-plot costs about USD 5,625, which exceeds the annual salary of over 95% of households

in Abuja, since according to 2007 figures only 4.4% of households in Abuja have monthly

income above ₦80, 000 or US$ 500 (Adama, 2012, p. 997). Apart from the prohibitive land

premium, there is also the bureaucratic hurdle of obtaining building permits not to mention the

1 Based on exchange rate of US$1.00 equivalent to ₦160 (Nigerian Naira)

high cost of labor and construction materials in the city. Moreover, the land allocation process is

marred by corruption, politics and personal interests that undermine land allocation according to

the stipulated guidelines (Daily Trust, 2010, April 15). Consequently, low-income residents

resort to buying land from the natives at the outskirt of the city. However, this is a risky endeavor

as only the government legally owns all the land within the territory and can (at any moment)

demolish any erected structures on lands purchased informally.

An attempt to address these land issues began when Nigeria elected a democratic government

in 1999. The government expressed interest in Abuja’s development after a prolonged period of

master plan distortion and abuse of land records through forgery of land certificates, multiple

allocations, appropriation of lands earmarked for infrastructure and recreation for personal use,

encroachment into public lands, and unauthorized construction and land use changes (Iro, 2007).

Accordingly, in 2003 the Abuja Geographic Information System (AGIS) was created to replace

the previous system of land management through a manual land registry. The AGIS, a

completely computerized cadastral system, restored most land uses to the original master plan

(Akingbade et al, 2012). Despite this reform, land speculation and corrupt allocation of land

persist. For instance, while land allocation is supposedly based on applicant’s state of origin and

position on a waiting list, some applicants get allocations within months of registering while

others are on the waiting list for several years (Daily Trust, 2010, April 15).

Housing

Though there is no available data on housing demand or supply in Abuja, the city is facing an

acute housing shortage. This is partially because of the relocation of federal government

employees from Lagos to Abuja started in the 1980s without adequate provision for their

accommodation through public or private sector channels (Ikejiofor, 1998; Morah, 1993). The

city’s housing shortage has been fuelled by constant in-migrants since 1991 when the federal

government finally relocated from Lagos to Abuja. This rapid population growth has

overwhelmed a range of public housing schemes including the government’s construction of

22,000 housing units in Phase I in the 1980s and the 1990s construction of the Gwarimpa

Housing Estate in Phase III (Ukoha & Beamish, 1997). While most of these houses were

intended for junior public employees, they were eventually occupied by senior officers who later

owned them through the federal government’s monetization program. In the process, this initial

housing policy that was based on the master plan’s aim of prioritizing public provision of

affordable housing for government employees failed because of inadequate housing supply,

occupation of the housing by senior employees, and its exclusion of non-state employees.

On the other hand, the housing units produced by the private sector have proved to be

unaffordable for the city’s poor as building codes and planning standards have ensured that the

units’ rents are well beyond their reach. This situation is exacerbated by the difficulty of getting

housing mortgages given most people’s lack of collateral and the high mortgage interest rates of

over 20% (Abubakar & Doan, 2010). In addition, the current housing scarcity is also caused by

the inability of private developers to obtain land from the government beyond that allocated to

individuals.

One reason why most people cannot afford housing inside Abuja city is because according to

a demographic survey by FCTA, about 47% of Abuja households earn ₦360, 000 (US$ 2,250)

annually (Punch Newspaper, 2012, November 8) while renting a one-room apartment in the city

costs at least three times that amount. Moreover, rent must be paid one or two years in advance.

However, in the satellite towns, a similar apartment is more affordable —renting around ₦250,

000 (US$ 1,560) per annum— although roads are dilapidated and water and sanitation are often

grossly inadequate in these communities. In such areas, people make do by sharing dwelling

units with other families or by squatting on undeveloped land here or at the periphery (Ikejiafor,

1998).

By 2004 when the city’s housing shortage had become severe, the city administration was

compelled to enter into a public-private partnership (PPP) to provide mass housing in Phase III

(Umoh, 2012). According to the guidelines of the PPP, the city was to provide serviced land,

while private developers were to construct housing units and tertiary infrastructure within the

housing estates according to specifications agreed in the partnership. After three years, the

developers were to finish the development, sell the houses and pay for the public site and

services provided (Abdullahi & AbdAziz, 2010). Since the inception of the scheme, 314 sites

have been prepared and allocated to private developers by 2010 (Thisday Online, 2010, June 20).

Even though the actual quantity of houses supplied is not known, this initiative has

undoubtedly eased housing shortages to some extent and it seems that more of these PPPs would

substantially reduce the existing housing shortages in Abuja. Despite the fact that the developers

that obtained serviced land cheaply from the FCDA under this scheme, they built houses whose

cost was way beyond the means of the average Abuja resident. For example, the cost of a

cheapest bungalow in Lokogoma district is ₦15 million (US$ 94,000) notwithstanding

bungalow’s low quality finishing, plumbing and other fittings that frequently break down

(Abubakar, 2012). To ease the housing problem, there is thus a need to adopt a new policy that

can support low-income people’s own efforts to build their own houses. This could include

providing affordable mortgages, easing some zoning regulations (like increasing residential

density) and encouraging the use of local building materials and technology (Abubakar & Doan,

2010; Myers, 2011).

Basic Public Services

Abuja also faces many challenges when it comes to the delivery of basic infrastructure like

water, garbage collection and disposal and sanitation services. According to the master plan,

“next to housing and the availability of employment opportunities, the most important element of

a city is the quality and access of a wide variety of public services” (IPA, 1979, p. 117). In spite

of this affirmation, several neighborhoods in Durumi, Gwarimpa and Nbora in Phase III and

Kado and Utako districts in Phase II are yet to be connected to the central sewer system or with

tap water although they are fully inhabited. Residents of these areas therefore rely on septic tank

systems and alternative sources of water. Complicating the situation further is the unauthorized

subdivision of houses into smaller apartments, which further stretch the capacity of any available

infrastructure. Below is a brief discussion of the city’s challenges in meeting its water, garbage

management, and sanitation needs.

Piped Water: Since only about 34% of households in Abuja municipal area reported to have

piped water connection in 2009 (FCT MDG Office, 2009a), residents in satellite settlements

have little hope of getting piped water in the near future. Thus water vendors and boreholes are

the main source of water in these areas. Improved water supply in Abuja would require

overcoming formidable problems that include: (a) a chronic water shortage that necessitate water

rationing for several hours or days; (b) dirty water and low pressure in high-rise apartments and

hilly residential areas such as Asokoro district, (c) dilapidated infrastructure; and (d) an

inefficient billing system that charges users a flat (estimated) rate or where several houses share

a single meter that undermines billing and repair (Abubakar, 2012; Benna Associates, 2009; Ebo,

2006; Ojo, 2011). Another issue is that payments often take months to show in the water

agency’s accounts thereby leading to frequent wrongful disconnections and interruption of

services (Abubakar, 2012).

Since 2009, a project to expand the capacity of the city’s water treatment and supply plants at

Usuman Dam has been underway and is nearing completion. While this is a laudable effort,

there is also the need to pay equal attention to the quality aspects of water delivery by improving

water purity and pressure, billing systems and the maintenance of facilities. Replacing steel

pipes that easily get rusty with PVC pipes, for instance, could reduce leakage and prevent

contamination.

Garbage Collection: The garbage collection situation in Abuja has started resembling that of

Lagos where garbage is dumped alongside roads, inside drainage channels or on empty lots

and/or incomplete buildings throughout the city and its suburbs and satellite settlements

(Abubakar, 2012; Adama, 2012). As an official survey in 2009 revealed 48% of the households

in Abuja municipal area dispose of their garbage through some of the means noted above (FCT

MDG Office, 2009a).

To improve solid waste management in the city, a partnership between Abuja Environmental

Protection Board (AEPB) and a number of private companies began in 2003. The companies

were assigned to various districts and contracted to pick up and transport garbage to various

disposal sites a number of times per week. On its part, the city collects user charges that it uses to

pay the companies (Imam et al, 2008; Solomon, 2009). Although this initiative has significantly

improved garbage collection in Abuja, it suffers from two main problems: (i) some companies

use open trucks thereby littering the pick-up sites and their trucks are inadequate and often break

down; (ii) residents are often unable to hold the companies accountable as they have no direct

contract with them and have no clear idea who to contact when garbage has not been picked up:

the companies or the utility agency (Abubakar, 2012).

Addressing these issues as well as constructing a standard garbage treatment and disposal

facility that could enable garbage sorting and recycling could greatly improve solid waste

management in the city rather than using the existing dump sites and landfills where different

kinds of waste including hazardous substances are dumped together without sorting. When

informal garbage collectors were in operation in the city, they were earning livelihoods by

scavenging for some recyclable materials before the city banned them in order to maintain the

image of a modern city.

Sanitation Services: The city is also struggling to extend the sewer system to districts like

Mabushi, Wuye, Utako in Phases II and Gwarimpa, Lokogoma and Nbora in Phase III. The

wastewater treatment plants located at Gudu, Utako and Wuye and the one under construction in

Wupa district that were meant to serve the first phase of Abuja are now serving the entire city.

Ilesanmi (2006) argued that the city administration is not giving adequate priority to wastewater

management because some treatment facilities are non-functional or are operating below

capacity. Other issues with the system include frequent blockage of sewer lines and leakage of

untreated sewage into local streams and rivers.

Although there are no current plans to tackle these problems, the city should (i) routinely

maintain the sanitation infrastructure, (ii) adequately respond to users' complaints about sewer-

related problems and (ii) encourage citizens not to flush solid objects down the sewer lines as

such objects contribute to problem of sewer blockage, and (v) be more serious in enforcing

existing environmental laws. Similarly, the city should partner with the private sector to

construct public restrooms in order to curb the problem of open air defecation and the common

use of "flying toilets" or the widespread dumping of polythene bags with feces in the city’s

garbage dumps or bins (BBC News, 2007, February 13). This unsanitary disposal of human waste

is a major health hazard in the city.

Transportation System

In order to limit traffic congestion in Abuja city, the Abuja Master Plan proposed a range of

express ways and arterial roads, light rail, and bus transit systems to connect the various district

centers and to also link the city with satellite settlements like Bwari, Gwagwalada, Kubwa, Kuje,

Nyanya, Karu, Lugbe and Suleja (Figure 4). Abuja now stands out among other African capital

cities for its high level of expressway length and quality. However, driving through the city

center is still a nightmare and commuting from the satellite settlements during peak hours is a

stressful experience, especially on the three major routes leading to the city: Kaduna-Abuja

Expressway, Abuja-Lafia Expressway, and Umaru Musa Yaradua Expressway (Airport Road).

For many Abuja residents, a daily commute of between two to three hours in overcrowded roads

is the norm.

Figure 4: Abuja Metropolitan Public Transport Concept (Source: Ministry of FCT)

A better transportation system in Abuja will require not just expanding the lanes of these

highways from 3 to 5, as the way the city administration is currently doing, but also an efficient

public transport system. As demonstrated by the endurance of traffic congestion, road expansion

is only a short-term fix as long as automobiles dominate Abuja’s transport system. While the

public mass transit buses operated by the city are insufficient, rickety and overcrowded: the

city’s various supplementary private bus systems have generally failed to address this issue. For

example, an attempted agreement between the city and some private transport companies to

provide bus transit services on some selected routes failed due to disagreements on route

allocations and the needed number of buses.

In order to fill the gap created by the inadequacy of public transportation, some “London”

taxis (so-called because they resemble the London cabs) were introduced by a former FCT

minister in 2004. These taxis, nevertheless new, beautiful, and perfect for upholding the elite

vision of a modern city, have started disappearing from Abuja streets as the minimum fare of

₦500 (US$3.25) they charge is way beyond the affordability of the common man who can ride a

bus for about one-fifth of that amount. As such, the green mini-buses (10-passenger capacity

buses that characterize public transportation in Lagos) operated by the informal sector remained

the main mode of public transportation in Abuja until they were banned in mid-2013 for lack of

safety, contribution to traffic congestion, and use of very old vehicles that pollute the air

(Premium Times, 2013, January 28). As a survival tactic, the operators of the banned mini-buses

have now procured taxis that they operate like the old mini-buses. Ironically, the taxis, which are

often overloaded, not only pick and drop off passengers by the roadside but they also pollute the

air, unsafe, and are major contributor to traffic congestion in the city.

The latest initiative to tackle Abuja’s transportation problem is the commencement of a light

rail project in 2007 which will link the city with the Airport before extending to Kuje and

Gwagwalada satellite settlements (Figure 4). It will convey about 700,000 passengers daily

(FCTA, 2013, July 23). The first phase of the project which covers a distance of 45 km is

scheduled for completion in 2015 (Oyetomi, 2012). Another rail project that is designed to link

Abuja with Kaduna and Lagos is also going on. While the light rail transit is expected to

significantly reduce traffic congestion in the city, it remains to be seen whether the project would

be completed on time.

Light rail is a major mass transit solution in many largest cities in the world. As such, to ease

Abuja’s transportation bottleneck, its government should partner with the private sector to build

the remaining phases of the rail network that would provide transit services to the city and its

satellite settlements. This will make commuting much more comfortable, faster, and cheaper

besides reducing the pressure on the existing roads. In addition, the provision of pedestrian paths

along its roads and zebra crossings at major road intersections would encourage walking and

improve road and passenger safety.

Squatter Settlements

Squatter settlements and slums have proliferated in several parts of the city especially in the

suburbs despite the fact that the city’s master plan called for modern housing and urban

development. These communities, while unplanned, overcrowded, and lacking in basic amenities

and infrastructure, are the visible expression of the poor people’s side of the contest with the elite

on ‘who lives’ in Abuja city. Even though there is no statistics on the number or size of squatter

settlements in Abuja, there were 24 squatter settlements and informal markets measuring about

2,193 hectares within the city boundary in 2006 (Jibril, 2006). However, it is worth noting that

while these squatter areas constitute only 8% of the city, they form most of the settlements

outside the city boundary. Some squatter areas like Utako, Mabushi and Maitama villages are

actually pre-existing native settlements that have not been resettled yet. This uneven mixture of

housing types, Myers (2011) argued, was created by the disorganized treatment of pre-existing

settlements in the FCT.

Despite the difficulty of accessing affordable housing, the management’s response to squatter

settlements and informal trading in Abuja has always been on eradication rather than upgrading

and integration. This policy causes undue hardship to the poor that ranges from disruption of

livelihoods in the informal sector to loss of assets and even lives. In some demolition incidents

there were cases of violence between police and residents when homes were destroyed while

their owners watched, often before they had a chance to clear out their belongings (Ishaku &

Obasanya, 2012; Jibril, 2006). In 2006, for instance, over 800,000 people were left homeless in

the city and its environs through squatter settlement demolition by the development control unit

of FCDA (SERAC, 2008) and mostly without compensation (Leadership Newspaper, 2012,

October 28). Likewise some 12,728 illegal structures were demolished in 2012 in the FCT in

order to conform to “the dreams of the founding fathers of Abuja” (FCTA, 2013, May 22). Some

of the displaced households have since moved into nearby overcrowded satellite towns while

others have returned to the sites where their homes were demolished and have rebuild again.

Employment and Informal Trading

As shown by a survey data in Table 1, the informal sector employs 66% of the residents of

Abuja municipal area while 30% earn their living in public and private sector formal jobs (FCT

MDG Office, 2009b). The dominance of the informal sector is even higher in the FCT where it

accounts for 78% of all employments of the respondents (Table 1). Although Abuja was

conceived solely as an administrative city, the Master Plan anticipated the informal sector to

provide 2 out of every 5 predicted jobs in the city (IPA, 1979). As such, informal businesses like

clothing and grocery stores, car and electronic repair shops, tailoring, and hair salon are allowed

in designated markets and shopping centers in the city. However, because these markets/centers

are unaffordable to small-scale traders they resort to hawking or using road sides to sell their

goods.

Table 1: Employment by sector in Abuja city and the FCT, 2009

Source: FCT MDG Office (2009b).

The authorities’ response to informal trading outside the stipulated areas is similar to the

response to squatter settlements. The Abuja Environmental Protection Agency has banned water

vending, hawking and roadside trading. Those that are caught violating this law are sentenced by

a tribunal to whipping, imprisonment or fines. In some government raids in the city, vendor stalls

have been demolished and goods confiscated or burnt (Daily Trust, 2010, September 01).

Nevertheless, the informal sector persists as it supports the majority of Abuja residents.

Social Exclusion

Contrary to the dream of Abuja being a city that would provide equal access to Nigeria’s

diverse population (IPA, 1979), only the rich and political elite lives in Maitama, Asokoro and

Wuse II districts’ exclusive houses. While the middle-income and other senior government

employees often reside in Garki and Wuse I districts in Phase I and in Phases II and III, the poor

live in the city’s squatter and satellite settlements. This exclusion stems from the spatial

differentiation of residential districts by the Master Plan as well as its designation of a central

area in Phase I that serves as the seat of the Federal Government. This area receives top priority

in the provision of adequate infrastructure and amenities. As Figure 5 shows, the city center has a

skyline that is dotted with modern architecture, wide roads with streetlights, and beautiful

landscapes.

Figure 5: Abuja city center (Source: http://www.nairaland.com/356775/abuja-city-videos-

photos/10, Retrieved: 24/Nov./2013)

On the other hand, the poor are systematically excluded from the city by a housing policy that

denies them affordable housing, thus they have to live in squatter and satellite settlements that

are not significantly different from slums at the edge of the city. Development of infrastructure in

Abuja is lopsided because, unlike in the city center, in most of the sub-urban settlements, roads

are unpaved and basic infrastructure and social amenities like piped water, garbage collection,

and sanitation are either absent or in a deplorable state (Abubakar & Doan, 2010; Adama, 2012; Ebo,

2006; Ilesanmi, 2006). As a comparison of central Abuja (Figures 5) and Nyanya (the satellite

settlement near Abuja in Figure 6) shows, there is a stark disparity in roads and living conditions

between the two areas; between elites in central Abuja and the poor in the outskirts.

Figure 6: Central Nyanya, a satellite settlement of Abuja (Source: Adama, 2012, p. 995)

Rapid Growth with Slow Pace of Urban Development

Since 1991, federal agencies, state government offices, international diplomatic missions,

and many large firms and businesses have relocated or established branches in Abuja.

Consequently, the city has experienced population growth at an unprecedented rate. Everyone

wants to be in Abuja because it is where the country’s wealth is being shared. As such, the pace

of urban development in the city lags behind its rate of population growth. While the Abuja

master plan targeted the completion of Phases I through III by the year 2000 (IPA 1979), only

eleven districts had been fully developed by 2011 with a further seven under development

(FCTA, 2011): a situation due mainly to lack of infrastructure. Despite investing ₦1,300 billion

(US$ 8.13 billion) on infrastructure alone (FCTA, 2013, April 29), the city has inadequate

infrastructure and housing due to improper use of resources. Consequently, the city suffers from

overcrowded housing and overstretched infrastructure.

Moreover, overpopulation is manifest in inadequate employment opportunities for most city

residents. Unemployment stands at 21.1%, which is close to the national average of 23.9%

(National Bureau of Statistics, 2012), social apathy and crimes like armed robbery are therefore

widespread. In a nutshell, the city management is finding it increasingly difficult to contain the

city’s growth, with incessant overcrowding and proliferation of slum and squatter settlements in

spite of their recurring demolition. Part of this housing shortage is due to the initial policy of

letting the public sector alone to own FCT, land, deliver housing, and develop infrastructure.

While there has been a policy change on housing and infrastructure development that has

brought in the private sector, housing and infrastructure delivery has been clogged by the

government’s continued ownership and control of all urban lands in Nigeria.

To address this challenge, an initiative named “land-swap” was introduced in late 2012 to

facilitate partnerships with private investors in the development of the city’s housing and

infrastructure through site and services schemes. Under this arrangement, the FCDA has

allocated residential districts to some selected private developers who are expected to develop

infrastructure in their districts in return for FCDA allocation of land that is commensurate in

value to the cost of their investment (FCTA, 2013, May 15). All of Phase IV and a newly created

Phase V, through the extension of the city limit along the airport road, have been earmarked for

this scheme. This initiative is intended to avoid a repeat of the problem of undeveloped plots in

some districts in Phases II and III due to the inability of the government and allottees to provide

the requisite infrastructure. It remains to be seen whether this new arrangement will work well.

An interesting and enduring question is how to deal with the native settlements in the areas

earmarked for the public-private land swap scheme and the fate of an industrial park and a

sewage treatment facility proposed by the master plan in the area that is now Phase V.

Conclusion

Abuja’s three-and-a-half decades worth of urban development have been under constant

challenge by the city’s rapid population growth due to in-migration of people in search of a

better livelihood. This in-migration is partly due to urban bias in Nigeria’s development, lack of

investment in Nigerian smaller towns and villages, and dwindling employment opportunities in

other parts of the country. The consequences of this rapid urbanization include housing

shortages, traffic congestion, unemployment, informality, social exclusion, and an overburdened

water and sanitation infrastructure. These challenges are exacerbated by over-reliance on the

public sector for urban development, mismanagement of the available resources, and the city’s

inadequate financial support allocation caused by the federal government and its agencies.

Over the course of its development, Abuja city has come to epitomize the stark contrast

between the worlds of prosperity and poverty partly due to the national elite’s desire to fashion

Abuja into a modern capital city. Thus, the central city consists of low density developments

with spectacular high-rises, many fine neighborhoods, beautiful landscapes and comfortable

places to shop and play that are powered by the countries oil wealth. Conversely, the city’s

suburbs and satellite settlements, including Dutse, Bwari, Kubwa, Durumi, Karu, Maraba,

Karmo and Nyanya, consist mainly of slums and squatter settlements that house the city’s

majority poor that are condemn to a miserable life in these communities that are characterized by

rubbish heaps, fetid smells, blocked drains, open sewers, and unlit and un-tarred roads

(Abubakar & Doan, 2010; Eerd, 2008).

The government’s responses to most of these challenges have been wanting. Its policies and

actions have always been anti poor – including squatter settlement demolitions, allocation of

low-cost public houses meant for the poor to the elites, and the banning of mini-buses and the

road-side informal businesses that are owned by the poor. When a former minister was

questioned about the suffering caused by the demolitions, he controversially noted that Abuja

was "not a city for the poor" (BBC News, 2007, February 13). Thus, demolitions continue with

no end in sight (Vanguard Newspaper, 2013, March 02). These anti-poor policies and actions

corroborate the assertion that planning is used as a tool to chase away the poor from the

modernist cities of developing countries (Watson, 2009). While the poor have been resilient in

devising survival strategies in the city’s informal sector, one wonders if there is a better way.

While the recent PPPs have certainly eased the city’s housing shortages and improved its

garbage collection and infrastructure, these initiatives should be pursued with due appreciating

for the poor and the informal sector as important stakeholders in the city. For the poor are the

junior civil servants, school teachers, the police, drivers, artisans, construction workers, market

women, and house servants of the elites and their families. In place of the unproductive contest

‘who should live in Abuja’, there should be a policy shift towards creating an inclusive city that

fosters public involvement in decision-making, especially now that Nigeria is a democracy. A

critical first step towards achieving this is to recognize the rights of the poor people that live in

and contribute to the wealth of Abuja’ urban life. Next is to pursue a policy of selectively

upgrading the city’s slum and squatter settlements and providing affordable market shops for

informal sector traders. There is also a definite need for the city administration to commit to the

development of not just the city but also the satellite towns in order to decongest Abuja and

make it more prosperous and enjoyable.

In short, the proper development of Abuja will succeed not only by focusing on the physical

environment, but also by addressing the contemporary challenges of the city’s entire population

(UN-Habitat, 2009). Only then will Abuja continue to function as a melting pot for Nigerians

and foreigners alike, as well as a home, business and tourism destination for millions of people.

Whether it succeeds in its ambition of becoming a modern world-class city and “Africa’s best

capital city” (FCTA, 2011) is not only dependent on how well Abuja addresses its daunting

housing, infrastructural, and socio-economic problems, but also on how well it tailors its future

urban development to ensure the needs of the majority of its citizens.

Acknowledgement

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Author’s Biography