Abstract:

The green ‘superpowers’: the climate policies of the Nordic countries

The Nordic countries are very often seen as leaders in climate policies; a leadership which is demonstrated both by their ambitious goals when it comes to GHG reduction targets as well as renewable energy. Rather than further underpinning this claim this paper, which is a comparative study of the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland) aims at finding the root causes of this long-time leadership. Furthermore, the article tries to explain the uniformity of the climate policies of the Nordic countries, which is quite surprising given the very different geographical/geological preconditions of the different countries.

The answer to the first question is found in the combination of strong popular support of green policies, and a strong hegemonic ecological modernization discourse enabling broad compromises on ambitious climate policies by combining them with strategies for economic growth based on green technologies.

In answering the second question it is firstly demonstrated that the Nordic countries are quite uniform when it comes to GHG reduction targets as well as choice of policy instruments. Secondly, it is shown that this uniformity is produced by a number of different institutions constituting a framework for collaboration among the Nordic countries in the area of climate and energy policies. These institutions were found to be The Nordic Council of Ministers, the European Union, the municipalities in the Nordic countries and different market based arrangements, like for example the Scandinavian common market for electricity.

Keywords: climate policy, Nordic countries, renewable energy, welfare state, public support, local government.

Jens HoffDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Copenhagen,Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1014 København K. DenmarkE-mail: jh@ifs.ku.dkPhone: +45 3532 3386Mobile: +45 2487 7082

Paper presented at UACES Conference, Dublin, Ireland, June 2016.

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1. Introduction

There seems to be an almost global consensus about the fact that the Nordic countries1

are frontrunners in environmental and climate policies (Tobin 2015, Lafferty &

Meadowcroft 2000, Lundqvist 2004, Nordic Council 2015). Depending on who is

asked, or what literature one reads, this fact is underpinned by reference to a number

of different factors or events, all highlighting this leadership position: the Nordic

countries were among the first in the world to establish Ministries of Environment

(between 1987 and 1972). The establishment of these ministries can be seen as a

reaction to a growing popular concern with environmental problems, and in some

cases strong social movements concerned with the environment and the sources of

energy supply. This first mover position led Nordic governments, in this phase

dominated by Social-democratic parties concerned with questions of equity and global

solidarity, to take on a global leadership role concerning questions of environment

and sustainability. It is therefore no coincidence that the first global conference on the

environment was held in Stockholm in 19722. The torch lid was carried on by the

Norwegian Minister of Environment, later Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland,

who was the driving force behind the influential UN Report ‘Our Common Future’

published in 1987. At the next important global event concerning environment and

sustainability, the Rio World Summit on Environment and Development in 1992,

Danish Minister of Environment Svend Auken, played an active role in bringing both

the UNFCCC treaty as well as the Agenda21 agreement to the decision phase, and

recently the Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven has taken on a very active role in

organizing a group of prime ministers to actively engage in the Sustainability

Development Goals 2030 agreed upon by UN’s General Assembly in 2015.

The Rio Summit and the ensuing Kyoto protocol agreed upon at COP3 in

1997 catapulted the question of climate change to the top of the global political

agenda (Hoff 2016), and the formulation and implementation of policies concerning

climate change mitigation has further cemented the frontrunner position of the Nordic

countries. Facts often mentioned to illustrate this point is: a) that the Nordic countries

have ‘cracked the nut’ of simultaneous economic growth and reductions in

greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. Figures show that in the period from 1990 to 2011

GDP in the Nordic countries increased by 55%, while GHG emissions were reduced

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with 9% (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014:9, see fig. 1 below), b) the Nordic

countries have been able to implement the world’s highest taxation on carbon tax;

Sweden topping the list with a tax of 139 Euro per ton of CO2, which have had

significant impacts on consumption of fossil fuels and energy efficiency (Nordic

Council of Ministers 2014), c) the Nordic countries have some of the most ambitious

goals in the world concerning GHG reductions ranging between 15% and 40% as

national targets for 2020 (30-40% for Denmark, Norway and Sweden; baseline 1990),

and goals of being 100% fossil free in 2050 (50-80% for Iceland and Finland), d)

finally, and maybe most significantly, the Nordic countries are famous for their efforts

in stimulating and implementing renewable energy in their energy mix. The share of

renewable energy in the electricity mix was more than 63% in 2010, while the share

of renewable energy in the total energy consumption was 30% in 2010 (Nordic

Council of Ministers 2014:22-24). While these figures conceal considerable variations

between the Nordic countries especially due to their different geographical conditions,

they none the less demonstrate a strong determination to use and develop renewable

energy thereby reducing GHG emissions.

Even though the examples above are somewhat sketchy and anecdotic, we take

them to indicate that the Nordic countries can indeed be considered as ‘green

superpowers’; countries who are frontrunners when it comes to policies of

environment and climate. What this article does is therefore not to further underpin

this claim, but to try to find the root causes of this long-time leadership. Furthermore,

the article will investigate the puzzle of the apparent Nordic consensus or unity

concerning especially climate policies. Such consensus is quite surprising given the

fact that both Norway and Denmark are oil and natural gas producing and –exporting

countries, while the other Nordic countries have no oil or gas. Also the Nordic

countries have widely different preconditions when it comes to renewable energy:

Norway and Sweden being blessed with plentiful hydropower resources, Iceland with

geothermal energy, while Denmark and Finland are less fortunate in this respect. One

should think that these very different geographical preconditions would result in

different climate and energy policies if each country were to pursue its own interests.

However, this is apparently not the case. So what is the factor or the factors that

contribute to the similarity of the climate policies of the Nordic countries? This is the

second question that this article will deal with.

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Fig.1. Nordic CO2 emissions per capita and Nordic GDP per capita.

2. How did the Nordic countries become frontrunners in environmental and

climate policy?

Looking at environmental and climate politics and policies in the Nordic countries

since the 1960’s especially two factors seem to have been of importance for

establishing the Nordic countries as global frontrunners. The first factor is the strong

popular support of environmental or ‘green’ policies, and the other factor is the almost

complete hegemony of so-called ‘ecological modernization’ (later ‘green growth’) as

the dominant discourse legitimizing ambitious environmental and climate policies by

combining them with strategies for economic growth partly based on exports of

‘green (or ‘clean’) technologies embodying a significant element of R & D.

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Strong popular support for environmental policies

The Nordic countries are rich in areas of great natural beauty, and there is plenty of

untouched nature, clean water and fresh air. Traditionally, the populations of the

Nordic countries have a close relationship to nature, and have for centuries been

dependent on it for food production, housing, energy, etc. Care for the environment is

therefore embodied in the culture of the Nordic counties, and it is of little surprise that

conservation, maintenance of biodiversity as well as sustainable consumption and -

production are high on the agenda in all Nordic countries (Nordic Council of

Ministers 2015).

Apart from a possible cultural bias towards nature conservation and biospheric

values (Stern et al. 2000) there are also other, more contemporary and politically

determined reasons for why there is strong public support for ‘green policies’

including policies concerning renewable energy in the Nordic countries. Denmark is a

case in point here, and like the other Nordic countries Denmark was taken by surprise

when the first oil crises hit in 1972. Denmark was at that time heavily dependent on

imported oil, and a first reaction to the chock was to change the energy supply from

oil to coal, and to start investigating the possibilities for the introduction of nuclear

power. However, especially the attempt at introducing nuclear power, supported

strongly by several parties in Parliament, met resistance in the population. In 1974 the

Organisation for Information about Nuclear Power (Organisationen til Oplysning om

Atomkraft, OOA) was formed, and it became one of the strongest and broadest

popular movements in Denmark in the post-war period. It success seem to hinge on

the fact that it was not only a protest movement - it was also a constructive

movement developing alternatives to nuclear power. Thus, as part of the movement

engineers, students and craftsmen began to work with how renewable energy (RE)

could be scaled up from small RE experiments (wind turbines, straw-fired district

heating systems, solar power, etc.). This work resulted in the establishment of the

Organisation for Renewable Energy (Organisationen for Vedvarende Energi, OVE) in

1978. Together, OOA, OVE and other green forces developed a three-pronged

strategy meant to ensure that nuclear power would never become a part of the Danish

energy mix and that coal would gradually be phased out. The elements in the strategy

were: a) support of RE, b) promotion of energy savings, and c) use of natural gas until

demand could be met solely by RE (Ege 2009?:37)

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Originally, industry as well as the energy companies were very sceptical

towards this strategy, but their position changed gradually as it turned out to be

possible to scale up RE facilities, especially wind turbines, and as Danish natural gas

production started in the North Sea. Indeed, today the biggest Danish energy company

DONG is one of the major proponents of (offshore) wind turbines. Underlying this

shift in the attitude of industry and energy companies was also the fact that the

popular movement headed by OOA and OVE was powerful enough to lead the

Danish parliament to give up plans for establishing nuclear power facilities in

Denmark in 1984. Instead, parliament facilitated local plans for heating (Hoff & Kjer

2016) and Denmark was divided into three type of areas: a) district heating areas – the

bigger towns, b) natural gas areas – smaller towns and certain suburbs, and c) rural

district – with free choice of heating source; most often oil or electricity. These plans

were bolstered by measures making it compulsory to connect to the district heating

system when established in one’s neighbourhood3, and by establishing feed-in tariffs

for wind power and public funds for R & D concerning RE and energy savings.

While the combined efforts of OOA and OVE might be a particularly vivid

example of what Connolly et al. (2012:95ff) calls the ‘‘new’ environmental

movements of the 1970s’, the Nordic countries as such exhibits the full range of

environmental movements ranging from conservation groups and green parties to

1990s type radical activists and local coalitions/local Agenda 21 groups (LA21; see

below), all bearing witness to the strong popular support for the green agenda.

Like in the USA and the UK the conservationist groups are the oldest and

most well-established among the green movements (Connolly et al. 2012:xx). All

together they have around 375,000 members and around 500 local divisions (ref.).

The Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature (Naturskyddsföreningen) was

established in 19094. Its Danish counterpart (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening) was

established in 19115, the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature

(Naturvernsforbundet) in 19146 and the Finnish somewhat later7. They are all an

integrated part of the political system as they are typically heard by public authorities

in relation to lawmaking concerning (protection of) nature and the environment. In

Denmark the Society has hearing rights in relation to the laws on protection of nature

and of the environment. The Societies also take independent initiatives and raise

questions concerning protection of the environment as well as broader issues

concerning climate and sustainability. The Societies also have funds coming from

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members and donations, parts of which are used for buying land considered worthy of

conservation. Furthermore, the local divisions of the Societies are typically a standard

partner in the LA21 work.

The strong public support for green policies is also reflected in the political

arena. Even though parties that have ‘Green’ in their party-name have fared somewhat

differently in the different Nordic countries, the fate of the parties is also a reflection

of the extent to which the green agenda have been integrated in the agenda of other

parties. Typically, the green agenda is also part of the platform of the different left-

wing and centre-parties, and the extent to which green issues are salient on the

platform of these parties, as well as the electoral successes or failures of these parties

have (had) repercussions for the electoral fate of the Green parties.

In Finland the Green Party (Gröna Forbundet)8 was created in 1987. It became

the first party in the Nordic countries to form part of a government, which happened

in 1995. The party was in government in coalition with the Socialdemocrats till 2002,

after which they left the government in protest over decisions establishing nuclear

power as part of the Finnish energy mix. They received 8.7% of the vote in the 2007

national elections, however very unevenly distributed with 20.1% of the votes in the

capital Helsinki and only a few percent in rural districts.

In Sweden the Green Party (Miljöpartiet De Grønne, usually just Miljöpartiet)9

was established in 1981 being the first Green Party in the Nordic countries. They were

established as a reaction to the Swedish referendum on nuclear power in 1980, which

made nuclear power a part of Swedish energy policy. The party was first represented

in Parliament in 1988 where they received 5.5% of the vote. At the 1991 national

election they did not exceed the 5% threshold, as was therefore not represented in

Parliament from 1991 to 1994. In 1994 they became represented again and have been

represented in Parliament since. In 2014 they formed a coalition government with the

bigger Socialdemocratic Party, and got 6 ministers in the Löfven government. Their

best national election result was in 2010 where they received 7.3% of the vote, and at

the elections for the European Parliament in 2014 they received as much as 15.4% of

the vote.

The Norwegian Green Party (Miljöpartiet De Grønne)10 was formed in 1988

and have participated in all national and local elections since. However, they did not

get represented in the Norwegian Parliament till 2013, where they got 2.8% of the

vote, which amounted to only one MP due to the Norwegian election rules. However,

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they got somewhat of a breakthrough at the local elections in 2015 with 4.2% of the

total vote and 285 representatives in different local councils.

The Green Party in Denmark (Miljøpartiet De Grønne)11 was formed in 1983,

and ran for national Parliament at the elections in 1987, 1988 and 1990. It never

became represented in Parliament, but obtained representation in some local councils.

The weak position of the Green Party in Denmark, especially in comparison to its

sister parties in the other Nordic countries is probably, as hinted at above, a result of

other parties promoting the green agenda on their platform thus ‘crowding out’ the

Green party. In Denmark the green agenda also has a prominent position in the party

programmes as well as on the election platforms of the two left-wing parties; the Red-

Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) and the Socialist Peoples Party, and also been salient

on the platform of the centre parties; the Radical Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre) and

the Conservative Party (Konservativt Folkeparti). The left-wing parties have been

quite successful at recent elections; especially the Red-Green alliance, which obtained

7.8 % of the votes at the 2015 national election, resulting in 14 MP’s.

Concerning Denmark, it may also be argued that the newly established party

‘Alternativet’ (the Alternative) is a green party on par with the green parties in the

other Nordic Countries. Thus, issues around sustainability and climate constitutes a

huge part of their party programme12. The party ran for parliament for the first time in

2015 and obtained 4.8% of the vote resulting in 9 MP’s. If one adds the elections

results of the Red-Green Alliance, the Socialist Peoples party, and the Radical-Liberal

Party to this number it adds up to 21.4% of the total vote. As the Socialdemocratic

Party is also buying into the green agenda one could add their share of the vote

(26.3%) to this number, totalling 47.7% of the vote, making the case for a strong

popular support of an ambitious green agenda. The same argument could be made

concerning the other Nordic countries where green issues also figures prominently in

the party programmes of the left-wing parties; the Left Party in Sweden

(Vänsterpartiet), The Socialist Left Party in Norway (Sosialistisk Venstrepartiet) and

the Left Alliance in Finland (Vänsterförbundet). Also in these countries green issues

play an important role on the platforms of the Socialdemocratic parties, bolstering the

case for broad popular support of an ambitious green agenda.

Further supporting the reputation of the Nordic countries as pioneers regarding

environmental policies is the collaboration of the Nordic green parties particularly in

relation to the EU. Since 2004 the Nordic green parties have been organised in the

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European Green Party. Such collaboration is also found among the Nordic red-green

parties, which are organised in the Nordic Green Left consisting of 7 left-wing parties

(the left-wing parties mentioned above except the Red-Green Alliance in Denmark,

which is an anti-European party, but including red-green parties in Iceland, the Faroe

Islands and Greenland). These parties are organised in the European United Left –

Nordic Green Left Alliance in the European Parliament.

The Nordic countries also have their share of more radical, non-

parliamentarian action groups and movements concerned with environmental issues,

sustainability, climate change and animal rights. Some of these groups, for example

animal rights activists, and spontaneous movements created in relation to events like

for example the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen in 2009, only exist for a period and

are difficult to pin down. Others, like for example Greenpeace a have a more

permanent existence. However, Greenpeace and the more mainstream WWF seem to

have been most prosperous in the 1980s and -90s, and have lost members since (van

Koppel & Markham 200x). The Swedish section of Greenpeace was down to 65,000

members in 2005 (Greenpeace 2005), and in order to make the organisation more

efficient the Nordic Greenpeace sections merged in the late 1990s.

While popular support of a green agenda is manifested by the existence and

actions of the movements and parties mentioned above, such support can also be

traced to the level of local governments and communities. We noticed above that the

conservationist organisations as well as most of the (red-)green parties have a local

presence. This presence has made it easy to engage these organisations as well as

other local green activists in the more systematic action on sustainable develop laid

out by LA21. As is well known the Agenda 21 Convention was adopted at the Rio

Earth Summit in 199213. The Convention recognised that because local government is

the level of government closest to the general population, its functions and ability to

mobilise support are seen as essential to any move towards a sustainable future. In

fact, at the time of the Summit it was estimated that over two-thirds of the actions

needed to realise the Agenda 21could not be delivered without the commitment and

collaboration of local governments (Connolly et al. 2012:xx).

Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK are often mentioned as being among the

pioneering nations in developing and implementing the ideas of LA21 (ibid.: 367),

whereas otherwise environmentally active nations such as Norway, Denmark and

Germany engaged with LA21 relatively late. This late engagement may be explained

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by the fact that they were already involved in a range of environmental initiatives, and

therefore saw no reason to relaunch these as LA21 initiatives. None the less, LA21

seem to have become a much more permanent feature of local government practices

in the Nordic countries than in many other (European) countries. This is probably due

to the fact that Nordic local authorities are seen as stronger and have a higher degree

of autonomy in many policy areas than their counterparts in other countries (Rose & ?

200x), which have made them relatively more effective in producing sustainable

development alternatives. Thus, whereas the rhetoric and practice of LA21 seem to

have run its course (Kern et al. 2007, Feichtinger and Pregering 2005), and in some

places not moved beyond what Stoker and Young (1993) calls ‘superficial tokenism’

partly due to its non-statutory status and lack of financial and political support, it has

in some Nordic countries obtained a permanent, statutory status.

This is the case in for example Denmark, where LA21 has since year 2000

been regulated in the Law on Planning (chapter 6a, &33a and b). The chapter

establishes it as a duty for the councils of regions and municipalities to work out

strategies for LA21 before the first half of each 4-year election cycle. Such strategy

must contain an account of how the municipality intends to contribute to a sustainable

development in the 21st century. More concretely municipal councils have to account

for their political goals when it comes to: reduction of environmental stresses,

promotion of sustainable urban (re)development, promotion of biodiversity, how it

intends to involve the local population and businesses in the LA21 work, and how it

intends to coordinate decisions concerning environment, traffic, business, as well as

social affairs, health, education and cultural and economic conditions. The law is

administered by the Ministry of Environment, and coordination is done with Local

Government Denmark (see Hoff and Kjer 2016).

The implementation of LA21 in Denmark has many different expressions, but

areas that are typical for the municipal effort are green accounts, green procurement,

ecological kitchens in municipal institutions, waste plans and conservation of nature.

Research has shown (Hoff and Kjer op.cit.) that LA21 is organised very differently in

different municipalities. Some municipalities have ‘just’ established a LA21 board,

aided heavily by local administration, while others have created more independent

units to be in charge of the LA21 work. Some bigger municipalities, like Copenhagen

for example, have decentralised LA21 and merged it with the local environmental

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offices (Miljøpunkter)(Agger 2010). The research has also shown that the actual

content and length of the plans differs a lot.

Another last demonstration of the strong popular support for green policies in

the Nordic countries is the work done by local governments concerning climate

policies. While some of this work is contained within or coordinated with the LA21

work, the question of climate change and climate change mitigation and adaptation

has most often been conceived as a new agenda in politics from around 2000 and

onwards. In contrast to LA21, which is now statutory at least in Denmark, there are no

laws compelling local governments in the Nordic countries to take action on climate

change14 (note om andre reguleringer som tvinger klimahandling igennem). None the

less, in Denmark for example, 72% of all municipalities have climate related actions

plans. Most of these plans covers the municipalities own activities and the

municipalities as geographical units. Most of the plans also have concrete goals for

reduction of GHG. Calculated as annual reductions these goals vary between 0.9 and

5.9% in the period till 2020 (mean 2.5%, median 2%)(Hoff and Strobel 2013). The

median value of 2% is not very surprising as 2/3 of Danish municipalities have

entered a voluntary agreement with the Danish Society for the Conservation of

Nature, promising to reduce GHG with 2% annually. Signing the agreement allows a

municipality to call itself a ‘Climate municipality’ (Klimakommune). Looking at the

concrete content of the climate plans the list of initiatives is long, but measures like

energy saving, RE, sustainable transport and sustainable lifestyle figures prominently

(Hoff and Kjer 2016).

Our research has looked into the question of why municipalities in Denmark

choose to engage in such non-statutory activities. The three reasons most often cited

are: ‘to obtain cost savings related to energy use’ (32% of municipalities), ‘to develop

a ‘green municipality’ to attract businesses and improve local economy’ (20%), and

‘to assist in the global effort to reduce climate changes’ (20%)(Hoff & Kjer op. cit.).

Even though two of the three most often cited reasons relates to the economic self-

interests of the municipalities, their engagement in climate policies and their concrete

activities in the field (Hoff and Gausset 2016) bear witness to the fact that they

consider it as worthwhile to engage in such policies. Formulated differently, it is

difficult to explain the existence of local climate plans and activities if local

politicians do not sense that such plans are popular, and can contribute to their being

(re)elected.

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A conducive hegemonic discourse – ‘ecological modernization/green growth’

Maarten Hajer first formulated his famous concept of ‘ecological modernization’ in

1995 in his book ‘The Politics of Environmental Discourse’. Theoretically, his point

of departure was a Foucauldian type of discourse theory, which he combined with

Harré (1993) and Billig’s (1987) more social-psychological or what he calls ‘social-

interactive’ or ‘argumentative’ discourse theory (Hajer 1995:52-53). This in order to

be able to draw on their concept of ‘story-lines’, by which he understands the

mechanism that creates and maintains discursive order. He then goes on to develop

the concept of ‘discourse-coalitions’ (ibid.: 58ff) by which he understands the

combination of a set of story-lines15, the actors who expresses/supports these story-

lines and the practices in which this discursive activity is grounded. This

‘argumentative’ approach sees politics as a struggle for discursive hegemony in which

actors try to secure support for their definition of reality.

In analysing this struggle Hajer uses first of all the concepts of story-lines and

discourse-coalitions to present the policy discourse of ‘ecological modernization’

(EM), which he argues ‘now’ (1995) dominates the thinking about environmental

policies. Empirically, Hajer bases his analysis on a long string of reports and books

from 1972 and onwards, but also on the practices of the environmental movement, as

well as that of international agencies and governing bodies. By doing this he tries to

demonstrate (or what he calls ‘reconstruct’) the specific argumentative interplay

between the state(s), the environmental movement(s), and key expert organisations,

that made EM into such a powerful force (ibid.:73).

Without going into detail here, Hajer shows how the interplay between a

number of influential texts (Limits to Growth, Blueprint for Survival, Small is

Beautiful, etc.), the environmental movement moving into the 1980s in a less radical,

more practical and policy-oriented version, and state and international organisations,

resulted in the creation of the hegemonic EM discourse. According to Hajer three

simultaneous developments led to the creation of national discourse-coalitions around

the idea of EM: 1) the publication and spread of the World Conservation Strategy

(1980) formulated and supported by UNEP, FAO; UNESCO and important NGO’s,

2) the work of OECD’s Environment Committee, which coupled thinking on the

environment with economic thinking, and 3) the Brundtland report (1987) produced

on the shoulders of the Brandt report and the Palme report. All these reports were

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ingrained with West European social-democratic ideas, stressing the need for

multilateral collaboration and global solidarity in solving global problems related to

poverty, health, the environment, etc.

Concretely, the discourse has the following characteristics: 1) environmental

problems are seen as caused by structural conditions in our societies, but can be

solved by existing political, economic and social institutions, 2) environmental

protection is a plus-sum game, 3) environmental problems are collective action

problems; meaning that they are governance problems, and 4) economic growth and

solution of environmental problems are not opposites.

Hajer goes on to demonstrate how the hegemony of this discourse can also be

read out of a number of concrete laws, institutions and techniques, especially in a

Western European context. He mentions for example: the ‘polluter pays principle’ and

the precautionary principle, which are fundamental in EU environmental law as well

as in its member states, cost-benefit analyses as a dominant way of approaching

environmental problems, risk analysis, the establishment of markets for pollution

credits (i.e. the ETS-system), and the instrument of ‘green taxes’.

As some of the main social-democratic figures in post-war Europe were

central in the formulation of EM, it is not very surprising that EM is congruent with

social-democratic ideas about the environment, and the instruments to be used in

environment and climate policies. However, what needs some explanation is how EM

has become almost completely hegemonic in the Nordic countries, thereby

marginalizing more radical as well as more neo-liberal discourses on the environment.

A good point of departure for such explanation is the relation between

sustainability and EM. Thus, the Brundtland report launched its by now famous

definition of sustainability saying that: ‘Sustainable development is development that

meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations

to meet their own needs’ (WECD 1987:41), and the report posits that by a careful and

politically steered process it is possible to have an economic growth that does not

deplete the world’s resources, and contributes to greater global equity. While this

claim has been heavily contested (see e.g. Langhelle 2009) by among others part of

the environmental movements in the form of discourses like radical ecology (Dryzek

200x), and lately in the form of the ‘planetary boundary’ discussion (see e.g. Running

2012), all claiming that the issues of the depletion of resources and the question of

global equity are not dealt with sufficiently in the EM/green growth, it is also clear

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that it is exactly the promise of a simultaneous ‘greening’ of society and economic

growth, which has given EM its broad appeal. In order to make this happen; i.e. to

have economic growth and a greener society at the same time, a more effective and

sustainable use of resources is necessary. An early realisation of this imperative led

the Nordic countries into developing ‘greener’ and ‘cleaner’ technologies to the point

where they are world leaders in some areas (wind turbines, hydraulic pumps, ball

bearings, diesel motors, etc.). Realising that this developmental path can be a win-win

situation for both businesses, employees and (presumably) the environment, breaking

for example the correlation between economic growth and GHG emissions (see

introduction) has contributed to a very wide-spread support of the new millenium’s

version of EM; the ‘green growth’ discourse (Blaxekjær 2015).

There are few more detailed studies of the development of environmental

discourses and the related political decision-making in the Nordic countries. One such

study in Denmark (Bøndergaard and Nielsen 2009), using Hajers theoretical

framework, documents that EM has indeed been the dominant discourse in Danish

environmental and climate politics except for the period from 2001-2006, where an

‘anti-environmental discourse’ dominated. Those were the early years of the Fogh

Rasmussen governments, where Bjørn Lomborg was a dominant figure in the

(Danish) environmental debate. However, even the neo-liberal Fogh Rasmussen

government reintroduced EM as a dominant reform agenda, which shows the very

broad support of this discourse among policy-actors.

Another interesting element in this study is its demonstration of the ‘fit’

between EM and consensual democracies. Thus, the multi-party systems in

Scandinavia, with their frequent coalition governments, seems a particularly

conducive environment for EM/green growth discourses, as they appeal to major

groups in society.

A Swedish study (Tobin 2015) has looked at how EM has fared in Sweden

during the Conservative /Liberal government of Frederik Reinfeldt (2006-2014). By

following the fate of the four initiatives in the 2009 Energy Bill (emissions reductions,

renewable energy production, energy efficiency and renewable transport) it is

analysed whether Sweden had moved closer to becoming a green state; where a green

state is defined as a state which promotes EM in combination with biocentric values

(op.cit.:142). It is concluded that even though Sweden did not become a green state

during his period, it continued to be what Christoff (2005) has called an ‘ecological

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welfare state’. So even during a Conservative/Liberal Alliance Government Sweden

continued and developed policies following the EM logic, thereby being able to

protect its status as a global climate pioneer.

3. Why are the climate policies of the Nordic countries so uniform?

In this paragraph we will deal firstly with the uniformity of climate policies in the

Nordic countries, looking at GHG emissions reduction targets and policy instruments.

Secondly, we will try to demonstrate that this uniformity is created by a number of

institutions, which work to integrate and streamline these policies.

The Nordic countries have all set national targets for reducing GHG

emissions, and these targets have been followed by action plans and initiatives. The

action plans are monitored, so there is an ongoing policy-loop to retain focus on the

reduction targets. Concerning the targets, the Nordic countries are all parties to the

Kyoto Protocol. Further, Denmark, Finland and Sweden also have international

emissions reduction commitments as members of the EU. The national emissions

targets as agreed internationally are shown in table 1 and 2 below. For the first

commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 2008-2012 the joint EU obligation is shown

for the Nordic countries that are members of the EU (the burden sharing commitment

in parentheses). Norway and Iceland submitted individual mitigation targets for the

first commitment period, as they are not members of the EU.

For the second commitment period, which has not been implemented, and

probably never will, the EU did not settle on a burden sharing internally. Therefore,

the table just shows the shared EU obligation of 20% reductions for the Nordic EU-

members. The EU Climate and Energy package enacted in 2009 realises the EU’s

commitments for 2020. The package includes the Effort Sharing Decision, which

codifies into binding national legislation sharing the EU overall target of a 10%

reduction in the non-ETS sectors by 2020 compared to 2005 (komplementer med

nyere tal).

15

Table 2 below shows the national targets for the Nordic EU member countries in the

non-ETS sectors. For Finland, this obligation corresponds to the national effort

sharing for 2020, while for Sweden the national target is considerably more ambitious

than the EU obligation. The Danish and the Norwegian targets are total national

emissions reductions and not just the non-ETS sectors. Despite not being members of

the EU, both Norway and Iceland participate in the EU ETS and will realise part of

their obligations through this measure.

As can be seen from the tables above while there is some variation between the

Nordic countries in the original commitments under the first commitment period of

the Kyoto Protocol, there is much more uniformity when it comes to the current

national targets for 2020 and 2050. This is especially true for the three Scandinavian

countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, whose targets are almost similar.

Looking at the policy instruments used to mitigate climate change in the

Nordic countries these are also very similar, even though there are some national

variations. Table 3 gives an overview of these policy instruments; also for instruments

only used in a few or even in one country. As noted by the Nordic Council of

16

Ministers (2014:29) information and awareness raising campaigns have also been one

of the policy instruments in all the Nordic countries, but are not mentioned in the table

below.

17

Table 3 gives an overview of specific policies implemented in the main emitting

sectors. What can be read from the table is that the combination of taxes and

incentives for renewable energy is and has been the main instruments in reducing

GHG emissions in the Nordic countries. The taxes have different levels and varying

coverage and exceptions, but cover roughly the same areas. The taxes are slightly

higher than the EU average and have been implemented earlier than in most other

European countries. While policies are in place and seem to be working in the

building and the industry sector, the emissions from (road) transport and from

agriculture constitute particularly wicked problems for the Nordic countries (as

elsewhere). Energy use in road transportation has increased 23% since 1990, and even

though policies have been applied to increase the speed with which low emitting cars

are introduced, emissions are still increasing. Norway has been the most successful of

the Nordic countries in increasing its share of zero emissions cars, giving Norway a

leading market share globally. This has been done by introducing such incentives as

registration fee exemption, public parking fee exemption, road toll exemption, free

ferry transport, permissions to use lanes reserved for public transportation and road

usage tax exemption (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014:61). Concerning agriculture,

and the whole food value chain very limited reduction policies have been introduced

in the Nordic countries despite rather high GHG emissions (note – forrige danske

regering, se side 35). This ‘omission’ probably has to do with the fact that food

exports constitute an important share of total exports especially from countries like

Denmark and Sweden.

Looking ahead projections for GHG emissions in the Nordic countries can be

seen from fig. 3

18

Fig. 3. Projections of GHG emissions reductions in the Nordic countries in MtCO2e

The figure shows that if no further policies are applied, GHG emissions are projected

to follow the upper line, more or less preserving status quo. This baseline projection

includes countries with expected increases in GHG emissions, as well as others –

mainly Sweden and Denmark – with expected emissions reductions. The second line

shows the projected emission reduction including already agreed initiatives and

policies, and the third line presents the targets from the Nordic countries as currently

decided (2014). This means that it includes the 2020 targets as well as the agreed

vision for 2050. As can be seen from the graph there is a widening gap between the

targets and the projected reduction path. Filling this gap will require further policies

and new initiatives.

The content of such policies and initiatives can probably be detected by

following the current discussions about climate policies in the Nordic countries.

Demonstrating a certain path dependency these initiatives focuses on:

1) a further exploitation of renewable sources. The use of renewable sources are

increasing in the entire Nordic region, and as examples Norway and Sweden

have a common green certificate system that will ensure considerably more

renewable electricity from their hydropower sources till 2020. At the same

time they are establishing more domestic and international transmission lines.

19

Denmark will further expand its production and use of wind power, which

already covers more than 30% of its electricity consumption, even though the

current government (2016) seem to be scaling down ambitions in this area.

2) Shifting from fossil fuels to renewables. In the energy sector this is an ongoing

effort, and in the housing sector heating will be shifted from fossil to

renewables through a mixture of incentives and regulation. Examples are ban

on individual oil burners and incentives to install heat pumps and solar power,

and the further roll-out of district heating, which already covers 50% of all

Swedish households. In the transport sector taxes and incentives are

implemented, and the other Nordic countries expected to follow the

Norwegian example.

3) Increase energy efficiency. In industry this will be implemented through

further incentives, and in Denmark a CO2 reduction target for energy suppliers

has demonstrated to be an efficient measure. The target forces energy

suppliers to buy CO2 reductions from both industry and and large housing

owners, thereby introducing them to energy savings.

Summing up, taxes and incentives for renewable energy have, combined with energy

savings historically been the main policy instruments in the climate policies of the

Nordic countries. As demonstrated, these have been used in different ways and with

great skills in different sectors, and a good guess is that these will also be the main

policy instruments used in the near future. However, it is an open question whether

these instruments are sufficient to instigate the transition necessary to transform the

Nordic countries to fossil free or almost fossil free societies by 2050. Thus, several

authors claim that the responses to climate change so far has been dominated too

much by short-sighted CO2-reductions and market-based approaches unlikely to

produce the deep structural changes needed in order to enter a transitional pathway

towards decarbonization (see e.g. Hildingsson and Khan 2015, Levin et al. 2012)

Concerning uniformity we can therefore conclude that both when it comes to

GHG emissions reduction targets and to policy instruments the Nordic countries show

striking similarities. Concerning reduction targets this is especially true if we look at

the national emission reduction targets for 2020 and 2050 (table 2 above), and

especially when comparing Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Looking at policy

20

instruments these also exhibit many similarities and even cooperation, and are surely

a result of mutual inspiration.

So why are these GHG emissions reduction targets and the policy instruments used to

achieve them so similar? The answer provided here is that the uniformity is a result of

number of institutions constituting a framework for collaboration between the Nordic

countries in this area.

The first of these institutions is the Nordic Council of Ministers. The Council

is the official body for Nordic intergovernmental co-operation. It is the Nordic prime

ministers who have the overall responsibility for Nordic co-operation, but in practice

this responsibility is delegated to the Ministers for Nordic Co-operation and to the

Nordic Committee for Co-operation, which co-ordinates the day-to-day work of

official Nordic co-operation16. The council was founded in 1971 and, despite its name,

consists of several individual councils of ministers; among these a Nordic Council of

Ministers for Environment, and a Nordic Council for Fisheries and Aquaculture,

Agriculture, Food and Forestry. Thus, Nordic ministers for specific policy areas meet

in their respective council of ministers a couple of times a year. Corresponding to

each council of ministers there is also a Committee of Senior Officials typically

consisting of 9 members; one for each of the Nordic countries including the

autonomous territories. Thus, a Nordic Committee of Senior Officials for

Environmental Affairs and well as a Nordic Committee of Senior Officials for Energy

Policy exists.

The different Nordic Councils of Ministers as well as the Senior Officials

Committees mainly work as platforms for exchanging experiences and ideas, and

have no legal powers. However, as such platforms the councils and committees seem

to work quite well, and in for example the area of environment and climate, the

Council has produced a string of interesting reports and analyses17. Even though it is

difficult to assess exactly how influential these reports and analyses are in the

different national contexts, our claim is that these reports as well as the coordination

work going on in the Nordic Councils and Committees contribute to the uniformity of

Nordic climate policies18.

The second of these institutions is the European Union. In order to have a

bigger say in the EU the Nordic members of the EU (Denmark, Sweden and Finland)

coordinate policy proposals and positions before major EU summits. These proposals

21

and positions are also often discussed and coordinated with the Nordic non-member

states (Norway and Iceland). This is also the case in the areas of climate and energy,

which are matters of ‘shared concerns’ between the EU and the national

governments19. Above, we also noticed the coordination going on between the green

parties and the green left in the European parliament, so there is little doubt about the

fact the the EU works to unify and streamline the environment and climate policies of

the Nordic countries both at the executive and the parliamentary level.

The third of these institutions are the municipalities in the Nordic countries.

Their responsibilities are many and remarkably similar in the Nordic countries, and

compared internationally they are very autonomous. They have the right to tax both

individuals and property, and are responsible for the major part of public expenses

(Rose and ?). Concerning climate policies municipalities are under no legal

obligations to reduce GHG emissions in any of the Nordic countries. However, in all

of the countries a large number of municipalities have set up their own reductions

targets (see above for Denmark) and established action plans to meet their targets.

These plans can involve a multitude of areas, as the municipalities are responsible for

such areas as: land use planning, supply of (some) public transportation, local roads,

bicycle infrastructure, waste treatment, power production and district heating

(including biogas production or incineration), energy codes for new buildings, and

electricity production and distribution20. Looking at the GHG emissions reduction

targets of the municipalities as well as their climate change action plans, these targets

and plans have many similarities among the Nordic countries. This can be argued to

be a reflection of the similarities between the countries at the national level. Even

though there might be some truth to this, we find it more likely to be caused by the

strength and relative autonomy of the municipalities, their many interactions with

their citizens also in the area of climate and energy (Hoff and Gausset 2016), and the

coordination going on between the municipalities in the Nordic countries21.

The fourth type of institutions producing uniformity in the climate and energy

policies are different market based arrangements. The most well-known of these

arrangements is probably the common Scandinavian market for electricity.

Transmission cables connecting the Scandinavian countries (as well as Germany and

the Netherlands) creates a flexible infrastructure, which makes it possible to balance

production and consumption and maintain a market for electricity. Such flexibility is

extremely useful for countries depending on RE as much as the Scandinavian

22

countries, because RE depends on climatic conditions which cannot be steered to the

same extent as production of electricity from fossil sources. Thus, in periods of

surplus production of hydropower in Norway and Sweden this can be exported to

Denmark (and further to the Continent), while in periods of surplus wind power in

Denmark this can be exported to Norway and Sweden. A flexible infrastructure is

therefore a precondition for operating with a high level of RE in a country’s energy

mix. Establishing an infrastructure and a market for electricity is therefore a

cornerstone in the further development of RE in the Nordic countries, and establishes

a path dependency towards RE technologies. In this sense the electricity market and

infrastructure contributes to the uniformity between the Nordic countries in terms of

climate policies and policy instruments.

Another example of a market based arrangements producing unity in climate

policies are the certificates for RE, which are basically incentives given to energy

suppliers to support RE electricity production. This is a joint cross-border system

between Norway and Sweden, and also works to produce uniform climate policies at

least between those two countries.

4. Conclusion

This article has taken as its point of departure that the Nordic countries are indeed

frontrunners when it comes to environment and climate change action. It has therefore

not sought to further underpin this fact, but rather tried to find the root causes of this

long-term leadership. Furthermore, the article has sought to explain the uniformity of

the climate policies of the Nordic countries, which is quite surprising given the very

different geographical/geological preconditions of the different countries.

The answer to the first question was found in the combination of a strong

popular support of green policies found among grassroots as well as in both national

and local political arenas, and a strong hegemonic ecological modernization discourse

enabling broad compromises on ambitious climate policies by combining them with

strategies for economic growth based on green technologies.

In answering the second question it was sought to initially demonstrate the

uniformity of climate policies in the Nordic countries by looking at their GHG

emissions reduction targets and their policy instruments. It was found that their

national emissions targets are very similar when it comes to the targets for 2020 and

2050. Looking at policy instruments used to mitigate climate change these were also

23

found to be roughly similar, centering on different combinations of taxes and

incentives to stimulate renewable energy and on improving energy efficiency. These

also seem to be the main policy instruments to be used in the near future.

In trying to answer the question of how this uniformity has been produced it

was argued that it is a result of a number of institutions constituting a framework for

collaboration between the Nordic countries in the area of climate and energy policies.

These were found to be the Nordic Council of Ministers, the European Union, the

municipalities in the Nordic countries and different market based arrangements. In the

Nordic Council the Nordic ministers for specific policy areas meet a couple of times a

year and exchange ideas and experiences. This is also the case for senior officials in

the specific policy areas, and it was argued that the exchange of ideas and experiences

in these fora contribute to uniformity around the climate policies of the Nordic

countries. Concerning the European Union this institution was seen to contribute to

uniformity, as the Nordic countries often coordinate policies to have a stronger voice

in both the Council of Ministers as well as in the European Parliament. The

municipalities were seen to contribute to the uniformity of climate policies by

extending, and in some cases even sharpening, national climate policies through their

own climate change action plans. These plans most often follow the logic of the

national plans concerning RE and energy savings, and are often coordinated

nationally and internationally through different types of municipal networks

(Bulkeley and Newell 2009). Different types of market based arrangements were also

seen to contribute to the uniformity of climate policies in the Nordic countries. An

example of this is the common Scandinavian market for electricity, and the supporting

infrastructure of transmission cables. This flexible infrastructure is seen as a

precondition for ambitious goals concerning the further roll-out of RE in the Nordic

countries, but also as an infrastructure that establishes a path-dependency towards the

use of common policy instruments in this area.

24

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1 The Nordic countries are Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland. The terms also covers the autonomous territories of Greenland and the Færø and Åland islands. This is a vast geographical territory with approximately 25 mill. inhabitants. This article will only deal with the five countries and leave out the pecularities connected with environmental and climate policies in the autonomous territories. 2 The UN Conference on Human Environment. 3 This measure met a lot of resistance from the liberal/right-wing parties and created a political crises. As a result a political compromise was reached, which delegated the implementation of this policy to the municipalities, and gave citizens a 9-year period to comply (Ege 2009?:38). 4 See www.naturskyddsföreningen.se5 See www.dn.dk6 See www.naturvernforbundet.no. The Norwegian Society is a member of the international organisation Friends of the Earth, and in general the Nordic Society’s for the Conservation of Nature are well-connected with their international counterparts. The Nordic Society’s also collaborate concerning matters of relevance at the EU-level. 7 See www.sll.fi8 See www.vihreat.fi9 See www.mp.se10 See www.mdg.no11 See www.mdg.dk12 See www.alternativet.dk13 It has been argued that Agenda 21 was the most significant outcome of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and that it is the most thorough and ambitious attempt at the international level to specify what actions are necessary if (economic) development is to be reconciled with global environmental concerns (Connolly et al. 2012:271). Agenda 21 consists of four sections: a section on social and economic dimensions highlighting the interconnectedness of environmental problems with poverty, health, trade, debt, consumption and population; a section on the conservation and management of resources for development; a section on the need of strengthening the role of major social groups like women, indigenous populations, local authorities, etc. in the process, and an section on the means of implementation discussing the role of governments and NGO’s. As there was originally no mention of local governments in Agenda 21, leader of local authorities from around the world met a week before the Summit and endorsed the Curitiba Commitment: a declaration calling for local authorities to develop a local action plan for sustainable development centered on principles of community education and democratic participation. This became known as Local Agenda 21 (LA21). 14 While this is true in a legal sense, there is however a number of laws and regulations that indirectly puts pressure on municipalities to act on climate change. Apart from the international treaties and EU regulation, which is also binding for municipalities, it concern different laws, which gives municipalities a role in in the production and distribution of energy, as well as laws giving municipalities a possibility to affect local efforts concerning climate and sustainability; most notably Local Agenda 21plans.15 Hajer (ibid..61-62) equates the concept of story-lines to Schön’s (1979) use of generative metaphors in politics, where metaphors are seen as devices that can produce a common ground between discourses. In today’s mediatized world Hajer would probably prefer to speak of ‘frames’ (see Hajer 2009). 16 See www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/the nordic-council-of-ministers17 For some of these reports, see for example ‘Nordic Action on Climate Change’ or ‘Nordic Climate Policy’, both found at http://urn.kb.se 18 In order to further substantiate this claim, further research is needed on the inner workings of the councils and committees, their exact agendas, etc. 19 Also in this area more research is needed in order to be more precise about the exact amount of coordination going on between the Nordic countries in the areas of climate and energy.20 Power production, electricity production and district heating is often done by companies owned in partnerships between a number of municipalities, or private- public partnerships, or private companies with significant public control.21 The exact amount of coordination going on among the Nordic municipalities in the areas of climate and energy is not known and subject to further research. However, it is know that a good number of Nordic municipalities are members of ICLEI, an international umbrella organisation for local governments in the areas of environment and climate. See ICLEI homepage …………