About the Author · the ‘Act East Policy’ has taken shape through regular Malabar Exercises and...

About the Author

Asha Sundaramurthy is a young professional with the Viveka-

nanda International Foundation. She is a PhD Scholar in Indo-Pacific

Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and a visiting scholar at the

University of Malaya. Having worked on the China factor in India-

Australia relations, India-ASEAN relations and Pacific Island States,

she is currently working on India's engagement in the Indo-Pacific

region.

Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the

India-Indonesia Maritime Border

Introduction

India and Indonesia have displayed a steady increase of synergy in bilateral

relations as the two countries overcome the differences of the past. The two coun-

tries were key players in the post-colonial independence era and showed a keen

interest in developing their cordial relations as early as the Asian Relations Confer-

ence of 1947. The opening up of Indonesia in the early 1990s coincided with India’s

‘Look East Policy’, to emphasise the commonalities of diverse multicultural compo-

sitions and linkages of maritime cooperation that have roots in ancient history.

Despite India and Indonesia diverging due to the regional security architecture com-

pulsions of the Cold War divide, bilateral relations still continued unabated between

the two countries.

The most notable development in bilateral relations during the Cold War

period was the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Amongst the various maritime

delimitation agreements concluded by India, the India-Indonesia maritime border for

the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has recently resurfaced as a

point of discussion and emphasis in bilateral relations. While India and Indonesia

have concluded a continental shelf agreement; the EEZ delimitation, for which there

exists a separate legal regime, remains pending. In this paper, a closer look at the

issues behind the delimitation of the EEZ through an analysis of the Indian and the

Indonesian experience with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) will be taken. The differences between the continental shelf and the EEZ

in the UNCLOS, the concerns behind the demarcation of the EEZ and the impact of

concluding the maritime agreement in the larger Indo-Pacific will be examined.

A Contemporary Glance at India-Indonesia Interactions

The Act East Policy introduced in India in 2014 under Shri Narendra Modi’s

Government, has placed a strong emphasis on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

A key aspect has been to uplift India’s geopolitical stature in Southeast Asia and

East Asia through deepening maritime engagements in the Bay of Bengal, South

China Sea and increasing its interactions in the Pacific Ocean. There is an increasing

focus on deepening the cooperation in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-

http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation

Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border


Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), building Indian Ocean

linkages through the ‘SAGAR’ and ‘Project Mausam’, to highlight the growing

importance of the seas in Indian foreign policy. The maritime outreach imbibed in

the ‘Act East Policy’ has taken shape through regular Malabar Exercises and more

recently through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India, USA, Japan

and Australia. Ideas of an expanded Quad Plus amongst other countries, specifically

includes Indonesia, as a primary player in the ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific region.

The President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, unveiled his maritime axis doctrine

called the Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy and the Indonesian Ocean Policy in his

speech at the East Asian Summit of 2014, to highlight Indonesia as a maritime

fulcrum that seeks to utilise its archipelagic state to cement its global stature. The

Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy has five tenets, ranging from maritime culture;

maritime infrastructure and connectivity; protection of maritime resources; maritime

diplomacy and maritime defence and two added pillars of maritime governance and

maritime environment.1

India and Indonesia, in May 2018, concluded a document that expressed their

shared vision for India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This

vision acknowledges the increasing convergences between the two countries across

various sectors of bilateral cooperation ranging from historical civilizational

maritime linkages, enhancing maritime cooperation in order to ensure peace and

stability for economic development in the Indo-Pacific region, adhering to interna-

tional law on maritime seas in accordance to the UNCLOS, freedom of navigation

and overflight, and ensuring a fair international trade and investment order that is

beneficial to all. The Shared vision document refers to the pending negotiations

between India and Indonesia on the delimitation of the maritime boundary agree-

ment, calling for a mutually acceptable solution: “Concurring to build on the existing

maritime boundary agreements and reaffirming support to the Technical Meetings

for expeditious negotiations for a mutually acceptable solution on the delimitation of

maritime boundaries between the two countries based on the principles of interna-

tional law, including UNCLOS.”2

Both countries also signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with new

entrenched mechanisms for bilateral and trilateral security dialogues. India and

Indonesia have been prior Chairs to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and



have worked together to ensure a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indian Ocean

Region. As a continuation of its close maritime linkages and strong friendship, the

2018 shared vision document refers to the convergences between India and Indonesia

to build ties in trade and investment, sustainable development of oceanic resources,

enhancing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) cooperation, and

building tourism and cultural exchange.3 Furthermore, Indonesia is not a member of

the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery

against Ships (ReCAAP), which further complicates non-traditional security (NTS)

cooperation through established regional forums. Therefore, the bilateral cooperation

between India and Indonesia becomes more important in ensuring regional security

against NTS threats.

India, Indonesia and the UNCLOS

India and Indonesia, as peninsular and archipelagic states, respectively, have

substantial coastlines and EEZ. The National Institute of Oceanography in India

claims that India has a coastline length of 7500 km and a corresponding EEZ of 2.7

million sq. km, whereas Indonesia has 17,508 islands with a coastline of 54716 km

and a corresponding EEZ of approximately 6.2 million sq. km.4 India and Indonesia

had primary stakes in the first negotiation regarding the laws governing the interna-

tional seas, as both countries are sea-faring nations that have a thriving ocean-based

economy. The first UNCLOS was pertinent in raising the issue of archipelagic states,

as requiring different legislation from land-locked and coastal states. Similarly, with

examples of interference in its Indian Ocean backyard, India had challenged certain

aspects of the freedom of navigation of warships in the UNCLOS.

In the case of India, the ‘Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive

Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act’ of 1976 also known as the Maritime

Zones Act required foreign warships to notify even in innocent passage through the

territorial water.5 However, the UNCLOS III conference claimed that prior authori-

sation of innocent passage was not required, resulting in India adding a declaration

upon the ratification of the UNCLOS in 1995. The official declaration states that “…

India understands that the provisions of the convention do not authorise other states

to carry out in the EEZ and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeu-

vres, in particular those including the use of weapons or explosions, without the

consent of the coastal state.6” Nevertheless, the national Maritime Zones Act,



enacted six years prior, has not been amended or put in conformity with the UN-

CLOS, due to other legal differences, such as that of designated areas. The

‘designated areas’ subsection of the Maritime Zones Act allows for India to establish

traffic separation schemes and fairways, etc. to ensure that the freedom of navigation

clause is not contrary to core national interest.7 India began the demarcation of its

maritime boundaries in the early 1970s and settled boundaries bilaterally with Thai-

land, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, and trilaterally with Myanmar and Thailand,

and Maldives and Sri Lanka. The delimitation with Pakistan and Bangladesh has

been comparatively long-drawn, with Bangladesh’s arbitration being concluded in

Dhaka’s favour in 2014 and Islamabad’s being unresolved, with the last discussions

held in 2011.8

Figure 1: Map of India-Indonesia-Thailand Continental Shelf Boundaries with the Trijunction point at ‘0’

(Source: Vivekananda International Foundation)

In the case of Indonesia, the Djuanda Declaration of 1957 marked Indonesia’s

initiative to assert its maritime boundaries. The Declaration claimed ‘absolute sover-

eignty’ for archipelagic states for straight baselines over waters drawn from the

outermost islands of Indonesia.9 Jakarta passed the Djuanda Declaration into national

legislation in 1960, raising concerns of regional neighbours such as Malaysia,

Singapore and Australia.10 The most vociferous protests came from the Western



states such as United States, at the time, which feared the potential to restrict passage

of naval forces and world shipping, condemning it a violation of freedom of seas.

Through extensive discussions and negotiations conducted to legitimize the claim of

archipelagic states as requiring separate legal structures to coastal and landlocked

states, the 1982 UNCLOS III incorporated recognition of Indonesia’s claim. The dip-

lomatic manoeuvring of Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal in the UNCLOS

conferences was integral in the acknowledgement of archipelagic states. Despite

USA refusing to sign the UNCLOS in 1982, it recognised the principles of archipe-

lagic states in 1988, according to Indonesia’s declaration.11

India, Indonesia and Thailand signed a maritime delimitation agreement in

1978 as a determination of the Trijunction point between the three countries that

included the related boundaries of the three countries in the Andaman Sea. While the

map (fig. 1) shows the agreements between India-Thailand, Indonesia-Thailand and

India-Thailand, the segment of the India-Indonesia border between the Sumatra

islands and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has recently been brought into atten-

tion in bilateral discussions, with various leaders and stakeholders expressing their

willingness to conclude a new EEZ agreement, one which is separate from the

continental shelf agreement.12

Why a Separate Agreement? Distinctions between an Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf

A cursory glance of the UNCLOS reads the subsections of the Exclusive

Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf as complimentary with multiple similari-

ties. Both zones coincide partially in hydrospace, both encompass the necessity to

regulate the exploration and exploitation of resources, and give coastal states primacy

over other states (limited by functional considerations). However, it is in the differ-

ences that encapsulates the Indonesian push for a separate EEZ agreement.

According to O.P. Sharma, Article 56 of the UNCLOS enshrines within it the

sovereign rights of EEZ, economic exploitation, artificial islands, installations, ma-

rine scientific research, environment and aspects included in the continental shelf

but with an added focus on fisheries and “something more”.13 The difference also lies

in the area covered. As shown in Fig (2) the EEZ does not extend beyond 200 nauti-

cal miles (nm) from the baselines of the territorial waters. In the case of the continen-

tal shelf, where it extends till within the EEZ it is complimentary, however for cer-



tain countries can extend from 200 nm and not beyond 350 nm. Another difference

lies in the resource sharing aspect, where coastal states are required to give surplus

living sources to landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states.14 However, in

the case of the continental shelf, there are no similar obligations to share the re-

sources with other countries.15

The primary difference that underlies the necessity of the agreement lies in

international law, where the EEZ and the continental shelf have been demarcated as

separate maritime zones. The continental shelf refers particularly to the seabed of

non-living resources, whereas the EEZ specifically delineates the water body and

includes living and non-living resources. The requirement of a separate agreement

becomes evident with separate legal regimes of the EEZ and the continental shelf in

the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal of the Law of the

Seas (ITLOS), tribunals and special arbitration tribunals created to settle disputes.16

Figure 2: UNCLOS Maritime and Airspace Zones. Source: Bataongbacal and Baviera (2013)

In the case of India-Indonesia relations, the trend of mutual cooperation has

ensured that disagreements have not escalated to the international courts. Notably,

the continental shelf boundary agreement and the EEZ agreement are a single mari-

time boundary line with India’s neighbouring maritime states, except for Thailand

and Indonesia. The emphasis on a separate agreement for the EEZ by Indonesia lies

in its primary concern of fisheries zones. The preservation and maintenance of fisher-

ies is of national interest to Indonesia as an archipelagic state with a heavy depend-



ence on fishing, where illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing by fishermen

of neighbouring states is a persistent concern.17 The Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy

is focused on staunchly tackling illegal fishing by destroying foreign fishing in its

waters. This stringent policy against foreign illegal fishing has garnered widespread

support for the Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti. Notably, during the Independence

Day celebrations in 2016 in Indonesia, 60 foreign ships were seized and sunk to

symbolically show the severity of punitive action against illegal fishing. In a particu-

lar case, Chinese fishermen were also detained with one sustaining injury in June

2016 as a response to the increasing presence of Chinese fishermen in their water.18

In October 2017 Anti-Illegal Fishing Task Force in Indonesia sunk 17 foreign ships

by making holes in the hulls to show a symbolic continuation of its tough policy in

protecting its fishery.19

Figure 3: Map of India-Indonesia Continental Shelf Boundary Agreement 1974


The conception of the EEZ in the UNCLOS was directly related to address

overlapping and unresolved disputes over fishing. Indonesia’s assertiveness in

concluding a separate agreement for the EEZ pertains to its national policy of secur-

ing the maritime zones to address all potential maritime security concerns including

and particularly fishing, which Jakarta holds integral.



The EEZ Delimitation of the India-Indonesia Maritime Border

The demarcation of the EEZ maritime border is expected to follow the trend of the

continental shelf agreement, though there are possibilities of Indonesia claiming for a

slightly bigger portion of the Indian Ocean. The India-Indonesia continental shelf

agreement was first concluded in 1974 and an expanded agreement in 1977 in the

Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean.20 The first agreement (fig. 3) covered the points

1, 2, 3, and 4, whereas in the second agreement of 1977 (fig. 4), the points in the

Andaman Sea connect the points 1, to K, N and O, and in the area of the Indian

Ocean from 4 to R, S, T, and U.

Figure 4: Map of India-Indonesia Continental Shelf Boundary Agreement 1977


The Equidistance Method and the Equitable Result

While the UNCLOS outlined the necessity to demarcate maritime boundaries,

there was no consensus on any single universal set of principles by which the bound-

aries were to be set. The generally agreed principle is that of ‘equidistance’ or

‘median’ between the two opposite coastal states, which has also been applied in the

case of the India-Indonesia continental shelf agreement. The 1958 Convention

defines equidistance as “as the line every point of which is equidistance from the

nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of



the Two States is measured.21 In this method, a provisional median line is created

between the shores of two opposite states. After this equidistant line is drawn, special

circumstances are deliberated such as historical considerations, presence of smaller

islands, which would consequently shift the median line.

The aim to ensure an equitable result may not be possible by observing a line

drawn only on the principles of equidistance. The equitable principle puts forth other

geometrical criteria of delimitation to ensure that the equal division of areas remains

ideal. For example, the ICJ in Nicaragua vs Honduras, asserts that while equidistance

is the starting point of demarcation of boundaries, to ensure an equitable result, mere

adjustment of the median line is insufficient.22 Rather, the bi-sector method was used

in the case of Nicaragua vs Honduras, where a line bisecting the angle created an

approximate linearity of coastlines. The acceptable international standard for

concluding maritime boundaries is a combination of the equidistance principle and

equitable result, as there was an acknowledgement in international law, in the Gulf of

Maine case that “There has been no systematic definition of the equitable criteria

that may be taken into consideration for an international maritime delimitation, and

this would in any event, be difficult a priori, because of their highly variable adapta-

bility to different concrete situations. Codification efforts have left this field

untouched.”23

However, Indonesia’s claim for a separate EEZ agreement is based on the ICJ

ruling that the application of equidistance was not necessarily obligatory in all cases,

as it might lead to inequitable result. Moreover, in the Libya v Malta (1985) ICJ case,

it was laid down that the EEZ did not observe the continental shelf, even as they

co-existed and were complimentary.24 The ICJ in the Black Sea Case of 2009 held

that the first step was to use an equidistance line first as the hypothetical starting

point which would be provisional.25 The second step lies in examining the provision-

al line according to the relevant scenario to ensure whether the hypothetical line

needs to be adjusted to ensure a more equitable result.

The equidistant line for India begins from its coast as the baseline; however it

is different in the case of Indonesia as an archipelagic state. The provisions for

change in the baselines were only encompassed in the 1982 UNCLOS Agreement,

whereas the Continental Shelf Agreement was concluded in 1977. Jakarta asserts that

the changes in the new EEZ agreement would take into account the changed baseline



for archipelagic states that was previously not present in the 1977 agreement, leading

to minor differences from the Continental Shelf Agreement.26

The issue of equidistance and ensuring a final equitable result could potential-

ly pose differences in negotiations between India and Indonesia. Possible arguments

put forth by Indonesia could include an extension of the line in Jakarta’s favour, as

the Nicobar Islands are sparsely populated compared to Aceh. An article written for

The Wire by Devirupa Mitra, claims that Indonesia may lay claim to the water

column at one section of the border, with India receiving the sea bed. Indonesia has

similarly differed in the agreements with Australia and Malaysia.27 As a part of its

Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy, Indonesia has signed EEZ agreements with Papua

New Guinea, Philippines and Australia with negotiations pending with Malaysia and

Vietnam. With Australia, the line demarcating the water column is separate from the

sea bed whereas with Malaysia the new EEZ asserted by is also different from the

continental shelf agreement, with Kuala Lumpur seeking to retain the old line.

While changes to the continental shelf agreement with a varied equidistant

line, as per Indonesian negotiations would be considered by India, there are several

possible arguments for also retaining the existing line. According to the UNCLOS

Article 281, the settlement of an agreement between two countries before the appli-

cation of the convention done by peaceful means of their own choice, is applicable.

As a result, India asserts that the EEZ agreement should only extend the un-delimited

waters.28 However, with Indonesia pushing for the EEZ line to be redrawn even over

the continental shelf boundary areas, New Delhi has to consequently consider its

national interests in potentially altering the new EEZ line. A coastal state has primary

jurisdiction to exploit the non-living sources of the continental shelf containing me-

tallic and non-metallic ores, oil and hydrocarbons, with India investing substantially

in exploring the deep international waters for cobalt, polymetallic nodules and hydro-

thermal sulphides.29

The argument for minor divergences to the EEZ line could also be agreed by

India as the Aceh region is more densely populated with dependency towards fishing,

as compared to the Nicobar Islands. Moreover, the changed baseline for archipelagic

states as separate from coastal states, which was not followed in the continental shelf

agreement, could be addressed in the new EEZ line. According to Indonesia, the

concession of not applying separate archipelagic rules in the 1970s was due to its



concerns of swiftly securing its maritime borders, in light of the Chinese claim of the

Spratly islands in 1974. While Indonesia is developing its maritime capabilities,

India is better equipped to extract the increasingly discovered resources in the sea

bed, which could then be potentially shared according to Article 3 of the 1974 Agree-

ment and Article 5 in the 1977 Agreement.30

Impact and Significance of the new EEZ Agreement

The final negotiations between India and Indonesia for the Exclusive Econom-

ic Zone agreement are yet to conclude. Nevertheless, the impact of signing this

agreement is bound to create a ripple in the region. India’s track record for peacefully

concluding maritime border agreements would further be reinforced, keeping in mind

New Delhi’s observance of the ICJ ruling in favour of Bangladesh in 2014, thereby

providing credibility to India’s role as a responsible regional player in the Indian

Ocean.

The signing of the agreement for Indonesia would further strengthen its fisher-

ies governance, which is at the forefront of its Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy.

Moreover, the conclusion of the agreement would also add to Jakarta’s reputation as

a rising regional player, nestled between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and increas-

ingly taking leadership in the ASEAN. Accordingly, Indonesia has sought to improve

its maritime capabilities by improving its naval infrastructure, enhancing the reach of

governance in the numerous islands and stringently applying security mechanisms

against IUU fishing.31

A similar agreement with Thailand is also pending, whose maritime border

remains under the parameters of a continental shelf agreement, but does not cover the

exclusive economic zone. It is to be noted that if India provides concessions to Indo-

nesia on its claims, there might rise an occasion that Bangkok may also potentially

revisit the agreement under altered provisions. Therefore, any negotiation with Indo-

nesia needs to consider the cascading effect on the regional neighbours. Furthermore,

the political and strategic ramifications of concluding this maritime boundary agree-

ment will open new vistas for defining maritime governance and order in the region.

The conclusion of the EEZ of the India-Indonesia maritime border agreement

also reinforces the importance of adhering to established international law and order

in Indo-Pacific, which in recent years have been challenged by regional disputes. The



contrary claims of China and the Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea,

of which Indonesia is also a claimant amongst Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines

and Vietnam; further highlights the importance of a peaceful, non-violent and coop-

erative resolution according to UNCLOS and international law, as it is the core tenets

of the India-Indonesia negotiations of the EEZ agreement. China’s increasing asser-

tiveness in militarising the disputed islands and not abiding by the Permanent Court

of Arbitration verdict, laying claim to Indonesia’s sector of the Natuna Islands has

raised concerns for Jakarta to sort all existing agreements with its neighbours to

emphasise its consistency and the significance of the UNCLOS in negotiations. This

will also demonstrate the resolve and heft of the two G20 counties and discourage

extra-regional players to dictate norms or influence other smaller countries in the

region. India-Indonesia joint endeavour will also dispel the hegemonic apprehensions

of any single country. As a result, the EEZ agreement with India and Indonesia, with

the added context of Indonesia also delimiting its maritime boundaries with its

neighbours Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and Australia sets a firm example of the

importance of adhering to UNCLOS and international law in the region.

End Notes

1. Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki, “PacNet #14A - The Meaning of Indonesia’s Global Maritime Ful-

crum” 22 February, 2018, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-14a-meaning-

indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum (Accessed 6 June, 2018).

2. Ministry of External Affairs, India (2018). Shared Vision of India-Indonesia Maritime Coopera-

tion in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, India at: https://

www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29933/

Shared+Vision+of+IndiaIndonesia+Maritime+Cooperation+in+the+IndoPacific (Accessed 7

June, 2018).

3. Ministry of External Affairs, India (2018). India-Indonesia Joint Statement during visit of Prime

Minister to Indonesia. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, India. Available at:https://

www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29932/

IndiaIndone-

sia+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Indonesia+May+30+2018 (Accessed

7 June, 2018).

4. Sea Around Us: Fisheries, Ecosystems and Biodiversity: For India and Indonesia at: http://

www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez (Accessed 22 June, 2018)

5. The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones

Act, 1976, Act No. 80 (1976) available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/

LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/IND_1976_Act.pdf (Accessed 12 June, 2018).

6. India—Declaration Upon Ratification (New York: United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs

and the Law of the Sea), available at http://www.un.org/ depts/los/convention_agreements/

convention_declarations.htm (Accessed 11 June, 2018).

https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29933/Shared+Vision+of+IndiaIndonesia+Maritime+Cooperation+in+the+IndoPacific



https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29932/IndiaIndonesia+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Indonesia+May+30+2018




http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez

http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez

http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/IND_1976_Act.pdf

http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/IND_1976_Act.pdf



7. Iskander Rehman, ‘India, China, and differing conceptions of the maritime order,’ Project on

International Order and Strategy: Brookings, June 2017 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2017/06/rehman-

india_china_and_differing_conceptions_of_the_maritime_order.pdf (Accessed 17 June, 2018).

8. Rahul-Roy Chaudhary, “Trends in the Delimitation of India's Maritime Boundaries,” Institute of

Defence Studies and Analyses at: https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan9-5.html (Accessed 15 June,

2018)

9. Iskander Rehman, no.vi.

10. United States Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scien-

tific Affairs, “Indonesia: Archipelagic and other Maritime Claims and Boundaries No. 141,”

Limits in the Seas, September 15, 2014 at: https://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/231912.pdf (Accessed 12 June, 2018).

11. John G. Butcher and R. E. Elson, “How did Indonesia become an archipelagic state?” at http://

www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesia-became-archipelagic-state/ (Accessed 11 June, 2018).

12. U.S. Department of State, “Continental Shelf Boundaries: India-Indonesia-Thailand” Limits of

the Seas No. 93 (1983).

13. O.P. Sharma, “India and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Ocean Devel-

opment and International Law 26 (1995): 153-154.

14. UNCLOS, 1982. Article 56

15. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 62.

16. Ibid.

17. John G. Butcher and R.E. Elson, no. ix.

18. BBC News, “Indonesian Navy Fires On Chinese Fishing Boat In Disputed Waters,” 20 June,

2016 at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36573291 (Accessed 14 June, 2018).

19. News Desk, “Indonesia sinks 17 more fishing ships” The Jakarta Post, 30 October, 2017 availa-

ble at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/10/30/indonesia-sinks-17-more-fishing-

ships.html (Accessed 16 June, 2018).

20. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Repub-

lic of Indonesia relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary between the two

Countries (8 August 1974) available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/

LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/IND-IDN1974CS.PDF(Accessed 9

June 2018). Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government

of the Republic of Indonesia on the Extension of the 1974 Continental Shelf Boundary between

the two Countries in the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean (14 January 1977) at http://

www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/IND-

IDN1977CS.PDF (Accessed 9 June 2018).

21. Convention on the High Seas, 1958 at: https://www.gc.noaa.gov/

documents/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf (Accessed 9 June, 2018).

22. United Nations Development Programme, “The Maritime Boundaries and Natural Resources of

the Republic of Lebanon: Challenges and Opportunities,” December 2014, at: http://

www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Governance/Publications/Legal%20section%201-

6.pdf (Accessed 15 June 2018).

23. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of

America), Judgment of 12 October 1984, para 157, p. 137, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/rehman-india_china_and_differing_conceptions_of_the_maritime_order.pdf



https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan9-5.html

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/231912.pdf

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/231912.pdf

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36573291

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/10/30/indonesia-sinks-17-more-fishing-ships.html

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/10/30/indonesia-sinks-17-more-fishing-ships.html

http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/IND-IDN1974CS.PDF





https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf

https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf

http://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Governance/Publications/Legal%20section%201-6.pdf





docket/files/67/6369.pdf (Accessed 14 June, 2018).

24. International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict in Libya v Malta case, 1985.

25. International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict in Black Sea Case 2009.

26. John G. Butcher and H.E. Elson, no. ix.

27. Devirupa Mitra, “In Indonesia, Modi Will Find Good Ties Also Mean a New Pact for Sharing

Oceans,” at https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-indonesia-eez-continental-shelf (Accessed 13

June, 2018).

28. UNCLOS, 1982, Article 281.

29. Devirupa Mitra, no. xxv.

30. 1974 Agreement; 1977 Agreement, no. xviii.

31. Lupita Wijaya, “The Rise of Indonesian Nationalism in Response to Illegal Fishing,” The Con-

versation, 25 January, 2018, at: http://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-indonesian-nationalism-

in-response-to-illegal-fishing-86947 (Accessed 15 June 2018).

https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-indonesia-eez-continental-shelf

http://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-indonesian-nationalism-in-response-to-illegal-fishing-86947

http://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-indonesian-nationalism-in-response-to-illegal-fishing-86947

About the VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

The Vivekananda International Foundation is an independent non-

partisan institution that conducts research and analysis on domestic and

international issues, and offers a platform for dialogue and conflict resolu-

tion. Some of India’s leading practitioners from the fields of security, mili-

tary, diplomacy, government, academia and media have come together to

generate ideas and stimulate action on national security issues.

The defining feature of VIF lies in its provision of core institutional

support which enables the organisation to be flexible in its approach and

proactive in changing circumstances, with a long-term focus on India’s stra-

tegic, developmental and civilisational interests. The VIF aims to channel-

ise fresh insights and decades of experience harnessed from its faculty into

fostering actionable ideas for the nation’s stakeholders.

Since its inception, VIF has pursued quality research and scholarship

and made efforts to highlight issues in governance, and strengthen national

security. This is being actualised through numerous activities like seminars,

round tables, interactive dialogues, Vimarsh (public discourse), conferences

and briefings. The publications of VIF form lasting deliverables of VIF’s aspi-

ration to impact on the prevailing discourse on issues concerning India’s na-

tional interest.

VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021

Phone: +91-11-24121764, 24106698

Email: [email protected], Website: http://www.vifindia.org

Follow us on twitter @vifindia

http://www.vifidia.org

About the Author · the ‘Act East Policy’ has taken shape through regular Malabar Exercises and...

Documents

Transcript of About the Author · the ‘Act East Policy’ has taken shape through regular Malabar Exercises and...