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TAustralian Army Journal h h h h

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TAustralian Army Journal :

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criticism or review (as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968), and with standard source

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Inquiries should be directed to the Director, Land Warare Studies Centre, Geddes

Bd, I Cb Rd, D C 200.

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy o the inormation contained in their

articles; the Editorial Advisory Board accepts no responsibility or errors o act. Permission

to reprintAustralian Army Journalarticles will generally be given by the Editor aer

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Te views expressed in theAustralian Army Journalare the contributors and not necessarily

those o the Australian Army or the Department o Deence. Te Commonwealth o

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Australian Army Journal Volume VI, Number 1 page 3

Contents

Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Crossfire

Kw T E & T: Udd h Gv T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bob Wurth

Current Operations

k cc h b: cc Pc Cd . . . . . . 2Major Michael Bassingthwaighte

Doctrine and Concepts

Dd h Idb: T Dc S Od W C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Warrant Ocer Class wo Brad Copelin

T R h M Pc Ehc DF-FPIb Pc d Sb O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Captain Damian Eaton

Cv-M C Cx Ec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Susan Hutchinson

H-Cc O: T W Fwd LdFc Cx Ev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Major Brett Mousley

P Dcc h Cb EEq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

Antony rentini

Operational AnalysisOvc Fc: Md P-Cc O . . . . . . . 2Katherine Phillips and Oriana Scherr

B ? I Mkh d Cb Ecv V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dr Bob Hall and Dr Andrew Ross

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Contents

page 4 Volume VI, Number 1 Australian Army Journal

Personnel Issues

T Bd B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Hoglin

International Events

L B P: I d P Dc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dr Rodger Shanahan

ilitary istory

C Sd Id Bh d h FWd W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Captain imothy C Winegard

evie EssayCh R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Major Imogen Serontein

oo evies

Ethics Education in the Militaryb P Rb, N d L dD C c k ( d . ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Jointly reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) Alan Howes,

Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hampson, Chaplain David Jackson CSM,

Dr Stephen Coleman, Chaplain Clyde Appleby RAN, and Flight

Lieutenant Alyssa BadgeryDuty First: A History o the Royal Australian Regiment (2nd edition)

b Dvd H d B (d.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Reviewed by Karl James

o Conquer Hell: Te Meuse-Argonne, 1918 b Edwd G L . . . . . . . . . 220Reviewed by Dr Douglas V Johnson II

Te Punishment o Virtue: Inside Aghanistan aer the alibanb Sh Ch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Glenn Kerr

Te Battle or Wau: New Guineas Frontline 194243 b Ph Bd . . . . . . 22Reviewed by John Moremon

Carry Me Home: Te Lie and Death o Private Jake Kovco b D Bx . . . . . . 22Reviewed by Wing Commander erence OConnor

IE O NOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

NOE O CONIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

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Editorial

T

his edition o the Australian Army Journalappears amidst a challenging h . W c vd c dd

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Since the last edition o this Journal a number o our soldiers have paid the cc wh h cb d d h.At the other end o the operational spectrum, Army made a signicant contributionto the relie eort in the wake o the bushre emergency in Victoria in February.And o course we continue to provide Army Force elements and individuals or h S Id, L, Iq, d v cd h Mdd E. O d c xc ch h vd h c h d .

Te most signicant development since the publication o the last edition o theArmy Journalhas been the release o the Deence White PaperDeending Australiain the Asia Pacic Century: Force 2030. I h Od h D k h

o the White Paper, the Chie o the Army expressed his satisaction with its keyprovisions. Lieutenant General Gillespie noted that all the key projects, which heconsidered to have constituted Armys vital ground during the development othe White Paper, had been endorsed. In particular, he reerred to those projectswhich were designed to empower our people, especially through networking.Key enablers o Armys close combat capability, such as enhanced protection orindividual soldiers as well as improved mobility, survivability and lethality, also

received approval. Above all, the Chie conrmed that the White Paper would set thecd d whch h Hdd d Nwkd , h Ehcd LdFc, d h dv cd b cc d.

Te environment created by such long-term grand strategic planning and ademanding current operational tempo requires considerable institutional agility andexibility rom the Army. In particular, the most reliable measure o our adaptabilityd v h d d c b d d .

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Editorial

I h w chw h c h d hcv c h h Ch h dvd

the Adaptive Army. Te implementation oAdaptive Armyis proceeding apace.Forces Command (FORCOMD) will be stood up on July this year. In his mostrecent directive about the Adaptive Army the Chie o Army has described its h wd:

Te success o Army in the conduct o contemporary (and uture) operations, orce

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is explicitly linking our dierent temporal adaptation cycles, or learning loops, with our

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I h wAdaptive Armyw v c c -tions, while maintaining its axis o advance on the process o continuous modernisa-. h Ch h wd b h bc dd, cannot aord to allow the demands o persistent irregular conict to erode ourconventional warghting skills and higher ormation manoeuvre competencies.T k b v h wk h xcd Wh Ph h d k -- cc.

In our last edition we described the Adaptive Army as the most signicantc h c h H . Mv,the Adaptive Armyrepresents proound cultural change. Army, like many large,hierarchical institutions, is grappling with the challenges presented by the revolution

in inormation technology. How can we best preserve our powerul collective ethos,wh w dvd x h vb h?

TArmy Journal h c d d- . W c fc d d c their experience on operations, and to debate issues o proessional concern. We

encourage every member o the Army, regular and reserve alike, to consider submit-ting articles or the Journal. However, we do request that members only submitoriginal articles that have not been published in other publications. Tere have been c wh w hv bhd c h hv d

in other journals or blogs without the appropriate acknowledgment. Tis has thecc d h h d h .

In our last edition we incorrectly identied the author o the article Flying a

Plane While in the Process o Building it: Reections on Iraq as the same Major

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Editorial

Michael Scott who had been awarded the 2007 Chauvel Essay Prize. Tis was an. T h h c w Mj Mch Sc wh dd h

Royal Military College Duntroon to the Royal Australian Armoured Corps in 997.He served in Iraq as a sta ofcer with Multi-National Security CommandIraqbetween June and December 2007. Te Major Michael Scott who was awardedh Chv E Pz fc h R E. T Army

Journal bh Mj Sc h dd.W cd h c h 200 d . W c

provide a orum or ofcers and soldiers to disseminate lessons rom operations. Inthat regard we are grateul to the publishers oAustralian Inantry Magazine or their h c Mj Mck Bhwh dw h c xc h.

In this edition we also publish a response rom Bob Wurth to Peter Stanleysarticle challenging the view that there was a Battle or Australia in the Second WorldW. T xcd h P S c wd k cv dinvited responses. We publish Bob Wurths article in that spirit o airness andbc. W cd h db w cd.

Since the last edition the ollowing soldiers o the Australian Army have beenkilled in action: Lieutenant Michael Fussell, Private Gregory Sher, Corporal MatthewHopkins and Sergeant Brett ill. o their amilies and loved one we extend ourc cdc d h h h .

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Crossfire

Know thy enemy & thyselfUnderstanding the gravity

of our Japanese threat

Bob Wurth

T

he wording might have changed a little since Chinese general Sun zu

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I you argue that an enemy never harboured desires or your soil, one wouldthink that, had you the opportunity, you would go to the sources o the ormer v c. Rb h hv , dd ch. I , v

d kw c h bhd-h-c v d cho our ormer enemy and the thinking o that countrys militaristic leaders towardsus, especially in those heady and crucial days o early 942, when Japan seemedb d w b cv dbd.

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minute or even that it did not exist, and thus a Battle or Australia commemorationhas no validity, might well demonstrate that on Sun zus score, apart rom our lacko knowledge about Japans intentions, we also know little o ourselves. Sun zu

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How dierent things are today in our relationship with Japan; with our closeeconomic ties, Australia now has a strategic deence partnership with Japan based onhh d, cd dcc v, c h h, d

and the rule o law, and attributes such as mutual respect, trust and deep riendship, q h b .

In the deence partnership signed in March 2007 by the previous prime ministers bh c d cd b h w v d ,h w d d xd b c h

c d dc c. T cd c cd k, c, c d Nh K. Bas Australias Minister or Deence, Joel Fitzgibbon, points out, the agreementis not a treaty and does not create a mutual expectation o military support in c ch c. Nvh, h Dc F

working to deepen practical cooperation with the Japan Sel Deense Force in areasincluding unit-to-unit exchanges and combined exercising and training, according h .

Wh h dc h w v wd v, b cand limited collaboration, it is ironic that important aspects o our knowledge

about the intentions o the ormer enemy between 94 and 945 and their ullc bd d dd d. M , h ck bknowledge rom our wartime past by those who should know better and the expres-

sion o questionable theories designed to t snugly into a modern-day academichh, ch d b dcd b w d -wpropaganda, means that our uture generations are being taught inaccurate andbjcv h.

Tis lack o knowledge is preventable and unnecessary, or there is abundantand compelling evidence on the gravity o Japans threat to Australia in 942 andd bjc vb ch k, c . P

evidence includes Japans ofcial war history series, Senshi Sosho, in its 02 volumes h N I D Sd (NIDS) k, whch h policy research arm o the Ministry o Deense. (Te Australian War Memorialh d v Senshi Sosho .T c 02 v h hv h N Lb Cb.)

Primary evidence on the Japanese threat also is available in Japan and elsewherein recorded interviews and interrogations o surviving Imperial Army and Imperial

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no ty enemy tysel

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actually discussing the invasion o Australia. One oSenshi Soshos senior contribu-

tors was Sadatoshi omioka, the ormer captain and later rear admiral, who as a warplanner in the Imperial Navys General Sta, was one o the leading advocates o anv 2.

omioka also wrote on the Australia issue in his Kaisen to shusen: Hito to kiko tokeikaku (Te opening and closing o the Pacic war: the people, the mechanisms and

the planning):

Te enemy had to be beaten and victory won. In order to win, the enemy had to be

denied the use o Australia as a base, no matter what. As long as the enemy had no

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But i within the next two years the United States concentrated rapidly on aircra

production and made ull use o Australia, Japan would never be able to resist the

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W c, cd h Ud S, hv vb c hsubject too. Many interviews with omiokaare available through the Papers oGd W P h Uv Md Lb d h h P Cc h Uv Pbh.

T d hAustralian Army Journal, W 200, cc dcdh h / b D P S, W h B ? wdbe controversial. Stanleys submission was a republication o the Australian War

M v , dvd h v Rbc D ban invited audience on 0 November 2006. Putting aside the appropriateness orotherwise o using a Remembrance Day eve oration to attack ones critics, it shouldb d h h h dd S w h c h h W M (WM), bc whch wd h, q

the AWM, the intellectual reedom to research and publish his views, as you wouldxc b v h h h M.

H wd w cv ch bc h chd h c-tious idea o combining various battles or campaigns into one composite Battle or, d c d, b bc h d

what Stanley described in his work as his internationalist stance on Australiasinvolvement in the Second World War. Tis is a contentious stance which since May2002 has challenged thoughts about the very basis o Japans aims and motives in thew h kd hwd h c.

S hArmy Journalh h B w bv h w d h d h d h dv hto build an emotional saga around the Japanese menace and how AustralianSvc vd h cc:

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Crossfire o urt

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was the objective o the Japanese advance, and that 942 saw a series o crucial campaignsthat resulted in the deeat o this thrust. In some versions o the battle it is seen as

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Te point o the Pacic war, they imply, was that Australia was in danger o attack or

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Stanley and other like-minded internationalists have long preerred to seeAustralias Second World War contribution in the context o a global war, and an inter-national coalition against inter-continental enemies in an alliance in which Australiaplayed as much a part as any and any other view is parochial. Tis idea was expounded

h c b S h Grith Review 200 wh h w:

Why is it that stories o attack, invasion and incursion are so persistent? It seems to me

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that it mattered. Why cant we as a nation accept that the war the Allies ought was

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E R?

Why do we appear to want to believe that Australia really was threatened with

invasion, that it was attacked; even that Japanese commandoes really did want to

land on its shores? Set against the prosaic reality, the desire is poignant and rather

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I h nationalist historians, ch Dvd D, dpopular writers wh w

them, such as journalists Paul Ham and Peter FitzSimons, Australia aced an actual threat

o invasion, a danger dispelled by a combination o a resolute Curtin in Canberra and

heroic diggers P.

Even more colourul epitaphs, including revisionist veterans and nationalist hv b d. S h B v d x bc d , h d

in theAustralian Army Journal: It promotes relatively unimportant events close v v w, h c cc x. I h bc h w hdx h.

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instance at Kokoda or Milne Bay, that their campaign was a relatively unimportantv d wch h c. Hv h h ch wd b h

the principal historian o the Australian War Memorial, as they have, and the wordsbc v cbc.

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no ty enemy tysel

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his published views, including hate mail, some rom Australians including ex-Serv-

icemen or their amilies: Some challenged my citizenship and patriotism. I wassorry to receive letters accusing me o denigrating the service and sacrice o thosewh h. B S , h dd h d h Australian

Army Journal, that he is determined that the sacrices and the achievements o theScd Wd W, d c h , hd v b .

F 2002 wd, h hv b h h-h xdd b S d b h cdc. T pillars, as I call them, orm the oundation or opposition to the concept o the Battleor Australia. As we shall see, the pillars over recent years began a seismic shi and atleast one has all but collapsed. But essentially the tone o the debate has been: I there

was never a threat o invasion, how could there have been a Battle or Australia. BobRc, h, Mdch Uv, h cd h h:

In short, the [Imperial] navy did have an invasion plan, but it was rejected at the top

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Te popular perception in Australia in early 942 that an invasion was imminent

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Douglas MacArthur (a consummate politician) to big-note himsel. o enshrine this

mistaken and manipulated perception in a Battle or Australia commemoration is to deny

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Te changing words to outline the theory have been expressed in a variety ohues. No historian o standing believes the Japanese had a plan to invade Australia,there is not a skerrick o evidence, Stanley lectured Te Australian newspapersHh Edc c vw.

T h cdc hh c h b d:. dd c v h .2. Discussion o an invasion o Australia in Japan was an activity, quickly dismissed,

b w dd-k v fc.. dc 2 w wk.4. Australias wartime leader John Curtin, in an eort to motivate the Australian

publics war eort, resorted to lies about the threat o invasion and his deceptionkwd hk h .Stanley rst delivered a controversial paper, Hes coming south (not): the

invasion that wasnt when addressing the Australian War Memorials Remembering2 h cc M 2002. T d k h c whgusto. Te Age the ollowing day headlined the story Japanese invasion a myth:h d j Mk Fb vd h bd h b h v .

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Crossfire o urt

Pillar 1. No invasion threat from Japan

At the Remembering 2002 conerence Stanley said it was common or Australians h h v h w :

So the popular perception is that Japan planned to invade Australia, would have had not

the battle or Papua been won, and that the man responsible was the great war leader

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Few who have studied the subject would argue that orders or the invasion oAustralia were ever issued. Simply, they were not. However, there is strong evidence dc h h h h 2, wh w vc

victory, proposals to invade Australia were very actively considered by the ImperialNavy at a senior level. Indeed there were a variety o serious proposals coming romdierent naval sources. Both the Combined Fleet at Hashirajima and Naval GeneralSta in okyo had their invasion plans, which at the very least can be described as areal and signicant threat. Further, an inuential navy, which had the Pearl Harborsuccess under its belt, repeatedly and requently pressured the Imperial Army, hd db, bc vvd ch h v

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Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto; his chie o sta, Admiral Matome Ugaki; thecd--ch cd wh d h h v -

tions including the invasion o Malaya, Admiral Nobutake Kondo; the commandero the Japanese ourth eet, Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue; the commander o the second

carrier division, Admiral amon Yamaguchi; the head o the bureau o naval aairswh Nv G S, d k Ok; d w v wplanners, including the aorementioned chie o the operations section o Naval

G S, B C ( R d) Sdh k.Yamamoto told Ugaki, according to the Japanese war history series SenshiSosho, that he had three targets in mind: India, Australia and Hawaii. 1 O the

three Yamamoto counted Hawaii as the most important, because o the strategich h Pcc b d chd c . w cddin Yamamotos initial invasion plans, according to John J Stephan, because thecommander-in-chie wanted a bold strategy which he called happo yabure, or strike d.

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no ty enemy tysel

Aer much study Ugaki, in late January and early February, came down in avouro capturing Australias north, among other landings. Ugakis operational planners in

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Naval General Sta soon agreed with Yamamotos Combined Fleet. AdmiralNobutake Kondo, commander o the attack orce on Malaya and the Dutch EastIndies, was a ormer chie o sta o the Combined Fleet. He prepared a proposal orYamamoto. Kondo saw Japan as having two planning options: one was an operationto take India and the other, an operation to capture Australia: Te Australia cd b dd c d wd hv ch chc k hd c k c.

Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, a moderate, and his sta ofcers aboard thecruiser Kashima, called or Japanese expansion in the Solomon IslandsNew Guinea, h c qd d h d.

Historian Hedley Willmott recorded Admiral Inoues support or the invasion planso Baron Sadatoshi omioka: Inoue would dearly have loved it i Japan securedh bd , c h wd hv vd h h h .

Another admirals plan came to light during table manoeuvres aboard Yamamotosagship, the Yamato, anchored on the Inland Sea. It came rom a close condant oYamamoto, Rear Admiral amon Yamaguchi. Between 2023 February Yamaguchi

distributed copies o a blueprint invasion plan proposing widespread invasionsacross the Indian and Pacic oceans starting rom May 942. Tere would be anv C M. D d 2 d wd b d Fj, S, Nw Cd, Nw Zd d h .

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General omoyuki Yamashita, who had captured Singapore, was imprisoned M w w c , wh h k h w

plans or invading Australia. It was practically identical to his successul campaign inMalaya, according to author John Deane Potter who interviewed him. Yamashita saidhe intended to land on each side o the major Australian cities and cut them o, rstk d d dw h w :

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Crossfire o urt

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ministry, seemed to be out o step with many o his army colleagues when he agreed

that decisive action was necessary: National deense spheres ought to be clearlydecided; once that is done, Australia and India ought to be strategic spheres; and wehd k v wh c.

David Horner, proessor o Australian deence history, addressed the Remembering942 conerence in 2002 organised by the Australian War Memorial. But his remarks,seemingly then at divergence with the more controversial comments o Stanley, receivedlittle media attention. He said that without help rom the United States, Australia couldhv d v v h w h 2:

Australias political and military leaders were ully justied in believing that the country

was under a real threat o invasion. But, unknown to the Australians, Japanese Army and

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Horners statement about the gravity o the invasion threat is just one rom a bevy

o eminent historians, both Japanese and Western, who acknowledge that Australiaw hd. Ofc w h Gv L Te SixYears War, bhd b h W M, w:

And soon naval leaders were advocating two more ambitious ventures: invasion o Australia

and a thrust towards Hawaii. Conquest o Australia would deprive America o a well-

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Stanley has spoken o his reliance on the works o British historian HedleyW. W 2008 b h ch, S d:

I dont pretend that my Special Subject is Impractical proposals to invade Australia made

by Japanese admirals early in 942. Ive relied on the more expert work o historians

such as Hedley Willmott and Henry Frei, and on the advice o various colleagues all

more knowledgeable about imperial Japan than me. But you dont have to read more

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So let us rstly look at what Hedley Willmott wrote in Te Barrier and the Javelin whch S h d. W d:

In studying the Australia operation the Japanese had to consider the occupation o

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themselves to the Plans Division o the Naval General Sta. Te Australia option was

in many ways the brainchild o the divisions commanding ofcer, Captain Sadatoshi

omioka His was one o the nest brains in the Imperial Navy, and his idea o an attack

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no ty enemy tysel

on Australia was not as incredible as it might rst appear. Both in terms o inhabited area

and population the country was (and is) extremely small. omiokas designs on Australiaenjoyed support rom [Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi] Inoue, commander o the ourth eet,

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W cd h bw d 2, h HhCommand aced a delicate and awkward time in deciding what to do next, but oppo-sition rom the Imperial Army killed o the navys invasion o Australia plan. ButWillmott notes that the plan was not killed o quickly or entirely. He records that aninvasion o Australia was even resurrected by the navy in July 942, surprisingly aer

the Coral Sea and Midway battles. Willmott accurately records the determination Nv G S, c, dd v. T d

might be surprised at a navy that could still think about an invasion o Australia aerh w c b; b h c hh b c v.

Stanley on 3 September 2008 likewise named Henri Frei as one o the experts onwh h h d cc . F, Sw ch, w h to write at length on the invasion issue, relying strongly on Japanese documentation,especially the war historySenshi Sosho. Freis work,Japans Southward Advance and

Australia, cd b S h c bk:

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could agree to with regard to Australia was the destruction o Darwinironically,

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Invasion o Australiaand then only a temporary invasion o Port Darwinwas relegated

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In act, it meant never or the army, but certainly not the navy. Te chances o an v b h d Mch 2 dd w d dh. Irelation to Australia and India, the army allowed inclusion in the text o a proposal Mch 2 E Hh v Dw

d v w. I w c cc, vi it implied the possibility o a very limited assault on a small part o Australia.B db hd k c b bw h w vc. T vv d cc h , b h v dd d vd . h hd h c hArmy Department, Colonel akushiro Hattori noted in one o his memoirs: h Nv dd bd d bq w dc, d d h v w .

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Crossfire o urt

Te armys chie o sta General Hajime Sugiyama, who took minutes o planning Mch 2, d h :

Put simply, the Navy argued or an aggressive oensive that included attacking Australia,

whereas the Army outright opposed attacking Australia, stating that the ocus ought to be

bh h h w b bb h -.

General Sugiyama when reerring to attacking Australia was in act speakingb v bc h w, Dw w d b bbd h .

In his bookInvading Australia, Stanley contends: Again, it is important or h Hdq d wk j vAustralias ate. Certainly, the record shows that other options also were being

dbd. B -dvd d h h v, h d h hdebate on Australia and the Imperial Navys determination to see the invasionhappen. o suggest that at this time Australia was not seriously threatened is tod h c vdc.

Henry Frei rightly concludes that Imperial Army opposition was such as to eec-tively block the navys proposals to invade Australia. But he did not under-estimateh v h h. T h c wh b d bases was viewed as a strategic liability that could involve Japan in a war o exhaus-. T, F w, h Nv G S h Dcb c v j w w bjcv:

Tis would be achieved by invading the strategically most important points on the

northern and north eastern coasts o Australia. Japan would there annihilate the enemys

maritime orces, cut the American-Australian line o communication, and thereby deal

h hh bw.

Te Navy General Sta reckoned that this could be done with very little expenditure

o men and war material. Aer all, Australia had only a small population and its

b h h c w d c h , wh d h

bckd.

h d h Ud S cc b w h

bjcv. I h v c h Bh Cwh wd

h B dw.

Tus Frei, like Willmott, can hardly be quoted as a historian who dismissed a v h.

Hiromi anaka is a proessor o history at the National Deense Academy atYokosuka, okyo Bay. Te academy trains young men and women to become ofcerso the Sel-Deense Forces. When I spoke with him in August 2007, Proessor anakahd hdw db b h v h h :

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no ty enemy tysel

h w hh k fc, cd h h Nv G S,

who were arguing about attacking Australia. Also in the Combined Fleet. Arguing aboutck d vd . I w j h v j fc vvd

h k.

I w fc cv bc h Nv fc bd h . T

Navy military orders [planning] section ofcers visited the Army strategic section. Tey

w w v h h h vw bw Fb d Mch

2 b vd .

Proessor anaka, a ellow o the JapanAustralia Research Project at theAustralian War Memorial, emphasised the illogicality o the Imperial Navy at a timewh d v hk d hd b b bdd:

You must understand that the Imperial Japanese Navy was such an irresponsible

organisation; they never wanted to take responsibility. Coming to Australia and

occupying one small beach was considered a Navy responsibility, but aer the takeover,

h wd hv whdw, d h h , h w

b

Teir attitude was, we would land the troops to take part in the invasion o Australia

d h h wd v h d h wk. T h cd

hk b h v w h h dd hv hk c.

Tere are numerous reerences in Senshi Sosho to the proposed invasion o

, cd h v:T v w h bh dv w ddv h

execution o long-term strategies Te reasons or the armys opposition to this policy

were that the invasion o Australia was expected to require 2 army divisions, in addition

to transport shipping requirements. Reecting on the bitter experience o the China

Incident, the chances were high that an invasion would extend over the whole o the

c.

Prime Minister Hideki ojo is oen quoted, in his last days, as saying Japanhad no intention o invading Australia. Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, an uncle

E Nk, w cd D Cd d b hS W Cc.In his diary, Higashikuni said he told ojo aer the initial successes that he should

start peace overtures with Britain and the United States. According to Higashikuni,j w d, : I hk w w hv w b cc

Java and Sumatra but also Australia i things go on like this. We shouldnt thinkb c h .

h h S hh:

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page Volume VI, Number 1 Australian Army Journal

Crossfire o urt

Pillar 2. Invasion of Australia: a few middle-rankingofficers

In his address at Remembering 942, Stanley dismissed a Japanese invasion o wh h wd:

In the euphoria o victory early in 942 some visionary middle-ranking naval sta

ofcers in okyo proposed that Japan should go urther. In February and March they

proposed that Australia should be invaded Te plans got no urther than some

c dc.

w hv , h w h cd dd-k v fc k. T cdd d, cd h

Combined Fleet, and some generals. Stanley was ollowing a awed line expoundedby the magisterial Frei, who simply got it wrong, about the middle-rankers. Stanley, h 2008 bk, h dd h dv dd-k .

Pillar 3. Australias defences were not weak in 1942

h c dw h h v, wh bcb Chch vw h C hd b ck b v, S h -d h 2 cd hv ddd h:

Tere is an exaggerated perception these days that Australias deences were weak:

Australia stood utterly deenceless, writes Brian McKinley. But even beore the

v Kkd b, h fc h hh h v h M hd

b w dw.

Te contention that Australia was not weak in 942, especially at the outbreak owar, is unsustainable. Willmott is among dozens o experts who dier with Stanley:Both dominions [Australia and New Zealand] were desperately weak, as their c h v d d hwd w.

Stanley contends that Australias Army commander-in chie, General TomasB, d cd hd h . I c, B w:

Had the Japanese wished to seize it, Western Australia, with its vast potential wealth,might have allen an easy prey to them in 942. While it would have extended their

commitment to a tremendous degree, it would have given them great advantages. At

that time it could probably have been captured and controlled by a orce no greater than

h d c M.

Te cream o Australias armed orces was overseas in the rst months o the war.P M h C, h Ph, w d b d h

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no ty enemy tysel

w d wh bck, h w Fk Fd:

In other words it was contended that a large proportion o the troops would not

w wh whch h dd hv.Forde responded that there was a national shortage o 8,000 ries, but recondi-

d F Wd W wd b vb.

Pillar 4. Curtin deceived Australia about the Japanesethreat

Stanley began his criticism o wartime Prime Minister John Curtin at theRemembering 942 history conerence in 2002. Te criticism lasted until

2008, when it underwent a sea change. Stanley initially spoke o Curtin lying to

h bc:

Curtin did not save Australia rom any real threat. Instead, one o the lasting legacies

o his whipping up o the ear o invasion has been a persistent heritage o bogus

v .

H k C d dc:

Im arguing that there was in act no invasion plan, that the Curtin Government

exaggerated the threat, and that the enduring consequences o the reality o its deception

w kw dd h h v c 2.

S h cd h wh c h w hddd h c d/ ccd C x.

Indeed, it was Stanley, by his own rank admission, who got it wrong. In

September 2008, Stanley ended this particular line o criticism o Curtins bogus d dc wh k BC Rd:

I d wh . I 2002 I w h C w v h

people by gingering them up about a possibility that there was an invasion and that that was

q db . d I hv h I hv chd d h.

In the research or this book over the last couple o years, I gained a deeper appreciation

d c h C. d I w bv h h w b c.Ddd h, b c d h w .

bw d w c c q: Scch !

Now that Australia and Japan are on perhaps the best deence terms since thed h w, wd b j d b dvc hh d dd d h x d h menace to Australia, especially in that key period o 942. During our research

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Crossfire o urt

v , w c, I hv b b the strong evidence in my most recent book, 1942, Australias Greatest Peril,but

ch cd b d.Te ew historians insisting that the Japanese invasion threat to Australia in early

942 was merely a myth and the product o wartime Australian ears o Japan mustv h db b ch, cc c.

Te Australian War Memorial has declined my suggestion that it sponsor a majorseminar on the invasion issue where historians and others, particularly Japanese,cd v vw, cb bcd d cv dc- d b h WM. T M hd hd cc on the broad issue since June 2002, and thus the view that had been emanating rom

the AWM was primarily an expression o only one side o the issue. Te teaching o

cc h h k b h d well or the comprehension o uture generations. At the very least this is an area o d Gv c.

T dc h WM, S N Gw, d :

We o course encourage and oster research and debate on a wide range o issues in Australian

military history. Te issues you comment upon [the invasion threat to Australia] have been

hh cvd h fc h d bc b

c h c h 80. T cv d h, d

dd h d bc d wh h w dcd v

cc h M d h N Uv.

S w h B ? k c wh, h cbdv h h 2 dc h h c w. B d ?

Surely Australians should eel ree to commemorate the sacrice in any way they wh b bd ch wh h .

Endnotes

S z, Te Art o War, d b T C, Shbh, Nw Yk, .

2 Dc Sc C d k

Mch 200 b P M Shz b d h Hwd, d B Wh b h M Dc, Fzbb, Nvb 2008.

Sdh k, Kaisen to shusen: Hito to kiko to keikaku, (T d c

h w: h , h ch, d h ), Mch Shbh, k,

8, . 8.

Ic d, L S N Gw, Dc h W M,

B Wh, 2 Ocb 2008.

D P S, Wh h B ?,Australian Army Journal, W, 200.

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no ty enemy tysel

D P S, T d , Grith Review, S 200, . 2. (h

h)

S, Wh h B ?8 S, T d , . 20.

P Bb Rc, L, Weekend Australian Review, Sb 2008.

0 D P S vwd b Sh Mch 0 2008, Hh Edc

c, Te Australian, 0 2008.

S, H c h (): h v h w, Rb 2

h cc, W M, Cb, M 2002.

2 Y E O d Uk Dcb h

w h Senshi sosho, Daihonei Kaigunbu: Daitoa senso kaisen keii, V. 2,

. 22, 00, 8.

h Sh, Hawaii Under the Rising Sun, Uv Hw P, H,8, . 2.

B, B Khj, Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho: Minami aiheiyo Rikugun Sakusen (W

H S: Sh Pcc O (), P Mb-Gdc

c), V. , N I D Sd, Shbh, k,

8, . .

Nbk Kd, S O Cc h W, d d Gd

W P dd 28 Fb d d b Mk Chh, Gd

d D (d.), Te Pacic War Papers, Pc Bk, Wh, 200, . .

I H P W, Te Barrier and the Javelin, Japanese and Allied Pacic

Strategies February to June 1942, Nv I P, , 8, . . Yh h D P,A Soldier Must Hang: Te Biography o an Oriental

General, F Sq, Ld, , . .

8 M Hj S, Sugiyama Memo/Sanbo Honbu hen, H Shb, k,

8, . .

P Dvd H, Hh cd d h Kkd c, Rb

2, h cc, d b h W M, M 2002.

20 Gv L, Te Six Years War, Australia in the 193945 War, Gv

Pbh Svc, Cb, , . .

2 D P S, Wh B ? ABC Unleashed, , Sb 2008.22 W, Te Barrier and the Javelin, . 0.

2 D P S, Invading Australia, Japan and the Battle or Australia, 1942, Vk,

Mb, 2008, . , .

2 US c kh H, Dai oa Senso Zenshi, (Te

Complete History o the Great East Asia War), . , hd b Uv

Md. S Ex w dc, [

db, c b ], Sugiyama Memo, d b K H, k, . .

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Current Operations

Taking Tactics FromThe TalibanTactical Principles For Commanders *

Major Michael Bassingthwaighte

Abstract

Tis article lays down the authors experiences commanding RF-3s Security ask Group in

h d 200 d 2008. F c d h Mjhd d b

prior to his deployment, the author was able to determine eleven tactical principles that

dd h h c, d h vdd h c h b

cd. T h h h v c, d h xc

employing them, clearly proved the enduring wisdom o the Australian Armys doctrine and

demonstrated that the collective wisdom it represents is an asset that all ofcers should draw

wh hk b hw h w c h d wh.

* This article first appeared in Australian Inantry Magazine, April-October 2009.

Reprinted with permission.

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Current Operations aor iael assingtaigte

It is said that i you know your enemies and know yoursel, you will not

be imperilled in a hundred battles; i you do not know your enemies butdo know yoursel, you will win one and lose one; i you do not know your

enemies nor yoursel, you will be imperilled in every single battle.

S (0020 BC)

Introduction

I

n October 2007, Reconstruction ask Force 3 (RF-3) deployed to southernAghanistan; its mission was to conduct protected reconstruction operations

in Uruzgan province as part o the ongoing struggle to assist local Aghansto achieve some degree o sel reliance. 1 RF-3 was a versatile mix, comprising aconglomerate o elements rom the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment, the 2nd and 6thB T R R, h 2d/h Lh H R(QMI), the 4th Field Regiment, and other units rom the broad spectrum o the Dc Fc.

Uruzgan is one o Aghanistans thirty-our provinces and lies in the heart othat rugged and strie-torn land. Te province is culturally and tribally linkedto Kandahar and thus oen considered part o southern rather than centralAghanistan. Uruzgan is aliban country, regarded, like the Helmand and Kandahar

regions, as the birthplace o the insurgency. Te aliban ghters are overwhelminglyethnic Pashtunspredominantly Durrani Pashtuns. Teir leader, Mullah Omar, wasb S v Uz.

Uz vc h d h bd Hd Kh d h

distinct types o terrain. Bare rocky peaks that tower over the valleys, known collo-quially by the soldiers on the ground as the mountains, are inaccessible to most

vhc, b xc v bv d b dd. T dch d bd d h bw h ck k dthe area known as the green zone and is ideally suited to mounted manoeuvre,boasting clear elds o re. Te green zone is the irrigated agricultural area that sits

astride the major permanent water courses where the vast majority o the populationv cd cd q. T hh cx b d characterised by close vegetation, similar, in some areas, to primary jungle. Tis is aterrain that oers little opportunity or mounted manoeuvre and promises only thed h d d c c cb.

I was deployed as the Ofcer Commanding the Security ask Group which

ormed Combat eam (C) Spear, part o RF-3. In the lead-up to my deploymentwith its endless briengs and conerences, I snatched some valuable time to read into

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aing atis rom e alian

h h d d h cc h. Wh dw

were the avoured tactics, techniques and procedures o the Aghan insurgents and

c h: h Mjhdd h b. M d v w ormulate a set o my own tactical principlesmy version o their tactics, techniquesd cd d cb h h bd -. M bjcv w h b w cc d h.

Tis article describes those general principles uncovered in my research thatestablished the oundation or those tactical operating principles that I used duringmy deployment with C Spear. My aim was twoold: to derive tactical principlesbased on this generaland provenoundation and to develop a set o tacticalc c h b cc d h cb . Ihave not described my own principles in isolation, but have used supporting

v x h d bdan accurate picture o the campaign scenario as itunolded. Perhaps my most signicant discoveryw h c, dvd h w Coalition partners lessons learnt, historical and

academic sources, consistently conrmed the prin-ciples expressed in the Australian Armys owndoctrinethe documented product o the experi-c dc.

The principles

I read extensively on the ghting tactics o the Mujahideen and aliban prior tomy deployment and made copious notes. I then rened my notes, listing what Icdd b h c bk. I vwd h c

constantly as my deployment progressed, matching them with available intelligenceand my combat teams experiences in an attempt to remain ahead o our opponent.T j h c w v d v h d the operation either through our experiences or those o other Coalition orces. Terst set o principles relates specically to the Mujahideen war o resistance against

h Sv v : DuringtheSovietoccupation,insurgentswouldwaitforarmouredcolumnstob d ck h k. h q dresistance tactic was to allow a Soviet column to enter a valley along a single trackd h d h vhc h h wh c.

Sovietmotorisedinfantrywerereluctanttoleavetheirvehiclesandwerethus

unable to dominate the little terrain suitable or mechanised orces on thehh d.

y objective was to

use the alibans own

tactics to deeat them.

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RestrictingSovietforcestostaticbasesprovidedresistanceforcesenormous

d v, c hh h w h. T Kh d

Urgun garrisons in Paktia province were besieged throughout the winter o82/8.

ResistanceinAfghanistanwasquitedierenttothatoftheVietConginVietnam.

Wh h d h c d h , h w v central control, unlike in Vietnam where the North Vietnamese governmentcd h c . T Mjhdcbd b cc b d d .

eMujahideenoperated in groups o thirty to orty men with some semblanceo order. Within their ranks were small, ull-time hard core groups used consist-ently or both oensive and deensive duties. Tey avoured guerrilla tactics such

as setting ambushes near bridges or deles, disrupting roads and destroyingbd, d hh d k dv h dv Sv w.

TroopsinSovietmotorisedformationsconditionedtoridingandghtingintheir

d vhc w cd v h vhc d h .

OneparticularlysuccessfulMujahideencc vvd h b bx c c. T hc d z h d vc wdh b d, wh vd xv dvc (IED), bhd h c vc hc.

TeMujahideenwould use similar tactics and the same ambush sites months

, c c w v k. Mujahideenorces routinely used darkness to conceal their approach to and

d h . I drew a number o general principles rom other sources, including the US Center

or Army Lessons Learnt which documented many o the tough lessons learned by USc h c h d h h h b 200:

Anti-coalitionmilitia(ACM)forcesareadeptatsettingambushestointercept

reaction orces responding to shelling attacks on bases and other xedbh.

ACMforcestypicallyrespondwithimmediatemortarre,theirprimaryre

w. ControlofhighelevationsiskeytoACMdefensivepositions.M ch h dcd b c h hd cd

previous campaigns and that I considered retained their currency in todays ght h b:

Telimitednumberofaccessroadsandtheirappallingconditionmakesit

dfc cc cv d/chd c. V w d dv chd c h b v.

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Afghansarewellawareofpsychologicalandinformationoperationscampaigns

d d d c dvd.

IndividualAfghanstendtochangesidesatwhim. Mostconvoyambushesoccuronreturntrips. Helicopter(or,morerecently,uninhabitedaerialvehicle)supportiscrucialin

v bh.

eAfghanistancampaignisverymuchaplatoonleaderswarofndingand

c wh , d c whch w d d h wh h d ccc vb.

Countering Taliban tactics: CT Spear tacticaloperating principles in action

From the general principles I noted during my research, I derived my own set ov cc c b C S. S h w c, b I bvd h h dd b cd dplanning, orders groups and addresses toensure that the combat team remainedcd. T c hd h w hC S dd b cc dh d d.

My rstand perhaps primarytactical

operating principle involved the time-honoured practice o maintaining constantpressure through patrolling in depth. 1Australian orces have established a reputa-tion or patrolling the green zone in strength and reacting aggressively whenckd b h c h Sc O k Gd RF-2 d cd b C S. Dc wh c h d -ligence sources supported the anecdotal evidence that aliban ghters preer notto engage Australians. Tis is not to say that the aliban would not attack i theyw ; hwv, h w h

h h C c h h N Sc Fc. O h bI dvd cd cc c: c dc cc vvrapid aggressive oensive manoeuvre. I used aggressive patrolling to orce theb b c cv d d b v c.

Te aliban employed three basic tactics during our deployment: the calculatedor indiscriminate use o IEDs, the re pocket and the swarm. By ar the mostcommon tactic employed by the aliban was the asymmetric threat o the IED.

Tese devices can assume many orms and can be carried by suicide bombers or

nti-coalition militia

(C) orces are adept

at setting ambushes to

intercept reaction orces

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planted in vehicles. Most o the IEDs in Uruzgan were activated by a pressure plate,wh h w cd w dd b c cd w.

Suicide bombs were largely used against troop concentrations close to built-up areas.IED w d c h vc d bh d ,

near the edges o the green zone but also on the dascht along the approaches to the z d h dch vwch h cvd h z.

Te IED threat was real and omnipresent and C Spear countered this threatthrough deliberate manoeuvre using the doctrinal advance as a baseline. Ideveloped this tactic urther in my third tactical principle: combined armsgrouping should be employed at the lowest level possible (usually platoon teams). As a result, the advance guard was broken down into the vanguardconsisting cb d d h

dc cv d h C cc hdq.T bd cdd h C hdq, cc

elements and the echelon. Te rearguard comprised an inantry platoon and acavalry patrol while an uninhabited aerial vehicle screened the ront and anks. Te

vd cd h cdc h ccc chck ( chck) db ch ( ch), dd h cc, wh h d d hd k . T body then moved rom secured location to secured location until it reached itsdestination, a manoeuvre supported by my ourth tactical principle: cavalry andmounted elements must conduct dismounted

clearance o all track and water coursejunctions. Clearing and securing each locationw cc wd v.

I C Spear was hit by an IED, all vehicleswd h. vhc cc xdposition would then manoeuvre to a position cc dv d cdc d 2 check beore dismounting. My h tacticalprinciple was overarching and designed tocover this contingency: vehicles must not enter the green zone without inantry

support. 1 Te manoeuvre commander would conduct a clearance, setting up a hastydc wh h ; h , h cb wd bhan incident control point and clear the incident site o secondary devices. Once thisw cd c vc d cv wd cc.

Having reached the area o operations, the team would employ a deliberate

deception plan, creating the impression that it was resting overnight and moving h x d, dcv h b. T dc w c- b bc C S d h C c wd

uicide bombs were

largely used against troop

concentrations close to

built-up areas.

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transit similar routes due to the restrictive nature o the terrain. Tis deceptionsucceeded on almost every occasion, surprising the local Aghans during the

w- h wh h wd ch h z h -dwdarkness and conduct deliberate cordon and visit operations. Tese diered slightly,but signicantly, rom the established cordon and search practicea necessarydierence given the stigma and higher command ocus on the term search. As a, w dd w ch , , h w fc support a search approval rom the higher levels o ISAF command. Oen we wouldsimply establish a cordon and visit specic compounds with the aim o ushingout persons o interest, conducting a mini-shura (consultation) or nding evidence ch. T cc wd xh c: c c

be everywhere, but it can sow uncertainty in the mind o the enemy by creating the

c h cd b wh . Wh h cv dd chv h kc c k d c cch, h -kcch c h wdvd vb.

Once these preliminary actions had been completed, the combat team wouldmove into an area deence posture around the worksite, taking into account theprinciples o key point deence, and commence a deensive routine o digging in andpatrolling while the construction engineers began their work. Te combatengineers were always in high demand. Initially they would conduct deliberatesearches o all positions prior to occupation, then establish observed cleared routesbetween battle positions and support by re locations to enable rapid mounted

manoeuvre during deensive actions. Tey wouldh h cc d vd

splinter teams to the inantry patrols or cachech d d.

Te avourite aliban deensive tactic is there pocket, used to protect either a commandand control node or the location o a majorcache. Te re pocket itsel is an engagementarea on the likely avenue o approach. Qualas h h ck w c

a one or two-man aliban piquet with small arms. Approaching patrols will receivelittle or no warning as qualas do not need initial coordination and will immediately c h ck w h d. T ck

sometimes mistaken or a aliban swarm, but diers in that there are ewer ghtersd w ck-d d (RPG) hv w.

Te swarm is the aliban oensive tactic, usually employed against dismountedelements in the green zone that remain static or too long (two to three hours) anddeensive positions such as overwatch and patrol bases. Some warning o a swarm is

a small orce cannot

be everywhere, but it can

sow uncertainty in the

mind o the enemy

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oenbut not alwaysprovided by the exodus o local Aghans rom the area some

ten to twenty minutes prior to the attack and an increase in intelligence warning

o an oensive. During a swarm, aliban ghters will manoeuvre on two to ourk h x d wh d ch- dRPGs who attack simultaneously. Tis was a tactic with which C Spear became

v d cc qd c. I dvd vh ccprinciple as a response to the aliban re pocket and swarm: dismounted patrols w wh .

C S cd h b j cc wh c d cc its own. Te team deeated the re pocket by ghting into one side while suppressingthe other ring points and then rolling them up rom the ank. Te aliban ghterswould occasionally withdraw to alternate ring points as the team advanced and the

commander would then decide how ar he wanted to pursue them given his existingbd d k.

Te team used the same tactic to counter the swarm, although a platoon wasunlikely to be able to handle a larger orce on its own and such a conrontationwd -dd cb . T

contact would go into, or remain in, all round deence and allow its JAC or JFO tocall in indirect re and close air support to buy time or the combat team commander v h cv d . M hh d h csupported this and carried the necessary corollaries: any orce must contain at leastthree elements that can support one another while patrolling deep in the green

z. Dd c wh 00 h dplatoons within 000 metres o one another, particularly i they are operating awayrom the protection o overwatch. Use o this tacticacilitated rapid oensive manoeuvre in support o

an element in contact. In essence, we aimed toswarm the swarm, in keeping with my tenthprinciple: ght the most likely course o action,b b d h d.

Te aliban are masters o battleeld clearanceand rarely leave their dead where they all.

Ecv bd d c cconly through immediate ollow-up or careul h, hh cc d c c v h d.T h k b h dd qck d dc cc vh wk w h ccb h wd.

C Spears patrol program not only perormed the usual task o denying the h b bc cc, b w d cv -ment with the locals to support the inormation operations plan. Tis activity

e aliban are masters

o battleeld clearance

and rarely leave their

dead where they all.

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d vh d c: , d d ch

with the locals to build understanding and respect. Critical support was provided

by an engagement team comprising a mix o specialists rom inormation opera-, c d h Pvc Rcc . T w qd cdc k dh d h and needs-based analysis in order to provide inormation and also as a base or cc .

Conclusion

Te majority o the principles garnered through my research were clearly in evidencev h d C S d. T cc c h

I dvd h vd hh cv d C S h cdc its mission. As a situation changed, the team adapted these principles and tactics . T cv h c w v d h d h b c cv vd h h

Australians. Teir perception that Australians patrolled the green zone in strengthand reacted aggressively when attacked was constantly vindicated. At the same time,C Spear developed a good rapport with the local Aghans through a rm, air andd ch d dv d d h.

For me, the time-honoured trio o doctrine coupled with knowledge and experi-ence worked. Te doctrinal wisdom that underpins our own tactics, techniques

and procedures is developed rom many years o operational experience such as d I c h h . M xc h

taught me that this operational wisdom retains its relevance and eectiveness inh h h h d . Cd h .

Endnotes

S h c dc D Dc, Reconstruction ask

Force 3, S D, Bb, 2008, . 2.

2 F d d h h h, h US Nv PdSch C C d Cc Sd .

dcbd L W G, Te Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat

actics in Aghanistan, Rd, Ld, 8, . xx.

I dw h c Ed OBc wk,Aghan Wars:

Battles in a Hostile Land: 1839 to the Present, B, Ld, 2002, . 0.

Oh c dcd h cc.

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S G, Te Bear Went Over the Mountain,. , dc h c

Sv wk.

G vd xc v dcb h cqc Sv cc v h vhc. Ibd., . 20.

F cd vdc wh w cc h c

Mjhd, , Ibd., . .

8 G vd c h h w h Mjhd hd Sv

cc. Ibd., . .

S US C L L (CLL), Hdbk N. 0-, Operation

Enduring Freedom III actics, echniques and Procedures, K,200, . .

0 Dcbd d L W G, Te Other Side o the Mountain: Mujahideen

actics in the Soviet-Aghan War, M P, Ld, 2000, V. I, . 8.

Ibd., . .2 CLL, Operation Enduring Freedom III, . 0.

Ibd., . .

Ibd.

OBc,Aghan Wars, . 0.

Ibd., . 0.

Ibd., . 2.

8 CLL, Operation Enduring Freedom III,. 0. S v vdd b G,

Te Bear Went Over the Mountain, . , .

d G, Te Other Side o the Mountain, . 2. S G, Te Bear Went

Over the Mountain, . 20.20 G, Te Bear Went Over the Mountain, . xxv. S h xc cd

vdc . 0.

2 S LWP-G 3-9-3 Operations in Desert Environments, D Dc,

Pck, 200, . .

22 T cc d b h Bh. S Bh Dc N

0/, . .

2 IED w bd h dch wh h wd h b

k cv C c.

2 T dc dvc d hd cc v d

hd b djd h wh cb . T v c cd LWD 3-0-1 Formation actics, D Dc,

Pck, 200, . d LWP-G 3-9-3 Operations in Desert Environments,

. .

2 S LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup actics, D Dc, Pck, 200,

. .

2 Dcbd LWP-CA (ENGRS) 2-6-1 Engineer Search, D Dc,

Pck, 200, . 0.

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2 Sd b Bh Dc N 0/0, Convoy Operations, x E

d F.

28 Bh Dc N 0/, . .2 v d hc chck cdcd d vhc xdd

dc IED.

0 Bh Dc N 0/, . .

S d b c dc, cd: LWD 3-3-4 Employment o

Armour, D Dc, Pck, 200, . 2, 2; LWP-G 3-3-6

Cavalry Regiment, D Dc, Pck, 200, . 2, 0;

d LWP-CA (MD CB) 3-3-3 Mounted Minor actics, D Dc,

Pck, 200, . , .

2 F h fcc dc, LWP-G 3-2-2 Deception, D Dc,

Pck, . . Bh Dc N 0/, . .

ccd h d d LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup actics, k dc

vv d ch b wh h d vc k

c b cd dd. T cd , vc

d h cc bc. S LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup actics, . 2, d

Bh Dc N 0/, . 0.

LWP-G 3-3-8 Patrolling and racking, D Dc, Pck, 2002,

. .

Ibd., . 2.

Ibd.8 LWD 5-1-4 Te Military Appreciation Process, D Dc, Pck,

200, . .

LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency Operations, D Dc, Pck,

, . 20.

0 F h d, Reconstruction ask Force 3, . .

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The Author

Major Michael Bassingthwaighte is an inantry graduate o the Royal Military CollegeDuntroon. He has served in the 2nd and 3rd Battalions o the Royal Australian

Regiment, the School o Inantry, on sta at the Royal Military College Duntroon and

as the Aide de Camp to Commander Training CommandArmy. He has served as the

Reconnaissance Platoon Commander with the 3rd Battalion during INTERFET in 1999; as

the Adjutant/Battle Captain with the Al Muthanna Task Group 3 / Overwatch Battle Group

(West) 1 in Iraq in 2006; and as the Ocer Commanding the Security ask Group with

the Reconstruction Task Force 3 in Aghanistan in 2007/08. Major Bassingthwaighte is

currently posted to the 2nd Battalion o the Royal Australian Regiment and will attend US

Army Command and General Sta College in 2009. Major Bassingthwaighte was awarded

the Distinguished Service Medal in 2009 or his service in Aghanistan.

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Doctrine and Concepts

Defending The IndefensibleThe Defence Of Superior Orders For War Crimes

Warrant Officer Class wo Brad Copelin

Abstract

T w w hv w b cx d d h -

. Wh h R Dc Cc w h c -tional criminal code that has since been adopted by 06 dierent states, there is still room or

c wh v h . T c h, h h

b, wh w c -v cd h d jd, DF

personnel may simply be incapable o determining the legality or otherwise o an order and

w cv bdcj h h d h d. I h

instance, i the orders they are instinctively ollowing lead them to commit war crimes, they

w k b d c c. vd h , h h k

several practical recommendations or improving the ability o ADF personnel to judge the

d b, wh w hc c whch d

h v ch c.

Te soldier is charged with the protection o the weak and unarmed. It is

the very essence and reason or his being a sacred trust.

G D Mch,

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Doctrine and Concepts arrant ier lass o ra opelin

Introduction

On 7 July 998, the impossibly titled United Nations Conerence oPlenipotentiaries on the Establishment o an International CriminalCourtknown, ortunately, as the Rome Diplomatic Conerence

nalised the dra Statute or the International Criminal Court. 1 On July 2002,once the requisite sixty states had become parties, the Statute became law andinternational war crimes law came o age. oday, 06 states have become parties h S.

Wh h R S, k dc h d h cvd co international justice, is necessarily extensive, there are two articles in particular

Articles 28 and 33that have direct military command and leadership implications

or any armed orce. It is crucial that every military orce examine the ramications h S d c 28 d cd h Dc Fc (DF) xc. T c w b cd h c- bh c 28 d c , c c h wh bd c.

Article 28 Of The Rome Statute Of The InternationalCriminal Court

Ud h v h R S c 28:

In addition to other grounds o criminal responsibility under this Statute or crimes

wh h jdc h C:

. cd cv c cd h

b c b c wh h jdc h c cd b

orces under his or her eective command and control, or eective authority and control

h c b, h h xc c v ch

c, wh:

() T cd h kw , w h ccc

h , hd hv kw h h c w c b c

ch c; d

(b) Tat military commander or person ailed to take all necessary and reasonablemeasures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to

b h h c h v d c.

2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph ,

a superior shall be criminally responsible or crimes within the jurisdiction o the Court

cd b bd d h h cv h d c,

h h xc c v ch bd, wh:

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eening e neensile

(a) Te superior either knew, or consciously disregarded inormation which clearly

dcd h h bd w c b c ch c;(b) Te crimes concerned activities that were within the eective responsibility and

c h ; d

(c) Te superior ailed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or

her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the

c h v d c.

T cd d hh h c d c hArticle 28 covers the responsibilities o all military commanders at all levelsromv d bd j -cd fc. c 28

a direct attempt to eliminate the ability o war crimes deendants to use the deence o

obedience to superior orders in the mannero the accused at both the Nuremburg andokyo rials and, more recently, theAmerican ofcers on trial in the notoriousMy Lai massacre case and the Canadianofcers tried or abuses in Somalia. Tesec w b d d h c.

The Dilemma For Todays Military: The Legal Obligation

To Obey

Under the ADFs national military law, a soldier has a legal obligation to obey theorders o a superior soldier or ofcer. Te Deence Force Discipline Acttreats ailureto obey as a breach o military law, particularly in the case o soldiers who disobeythe commands o their superiors. Under Section 27, Disobedience o a lawulcommand, and Section 29, Failing to comply with a lawul general order, adeence member or deence civilian must ollow all orders and commands. Yetthere are exceptions and the ADF tacitly recognises this. In act, the Armys currentc cv c h c dd h h d

not have to ollowunlawulor illegalorders and that they have the right to disobeycd h d. T dc cdc h bc -c dc. T d dc, vh bc d, cv bdc d c wd

o command. Essentially, soldiers are trained to do what they are told, when they d, cv, wh q h cd. T h d: wh d xcd cd h h dthus questioning itand when is the soldier expected to act instinctively?

rticle 28 covers the

responsibilities o all military

commanders at all levels

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hh d d dcd d, bdc h d cd . I , hk c. Ud c 28, hwv, h

soldier must now discern the legality o the order prior to its enactment, and makea decision. Te question remains: when does thesoldier ollow orders and when does he or she reuse?Wh h dw?

Tis is not a problem solely aced by Australiasmilitary. In the armed orces o the United Stateso America, the Uniorm Code o Military Justice(UCMJ) mirrors the DFDA. Te UCMJ reads like h c jc cd, xc ccmilitary oences including wilully disobeying a

superior commissioned ofcer and insubordinate conduct towards a warrantofcer, non-commissioned ofcer or petty ofcer. Both these stipulations stateh c db db w cd d. Idd, h (c ) c h h dh , d d,

an oence under the UCMJ. Nowhere in this 62-page document are there grounds h bjc h cd b d. Y h D h Fd M, Te Law o Land Warare, h b h d superior ofcer does notconstitute a deence against war crimes. 1 In some attempt , d, hwv, w h c k cd h ch bdc w d h d v b h d

orces, although this carries the caveat that members o the armed orces are bound blawuld.

Is it reasonable to expect a soldier to ull both a duty to obeyand a duty to

disobey? 1 Is there an achievable balance between duty to a superior under militarylaw and the potential duty to disobey? According to the International Red Cross,everyone has a rightin act, it is their dutyto reuse to obey an order to commit v h Lw d Cc. F h v cv, h duty to ollow, as it is a undamental right under international humanitarian law,human rights law and domestic criminal law. For the soldier, however, this may wellconstitute the most difcult decision he or she ever has to makethe conscious

dc db d.

Obedience To Superior Orders In History

Te proession o arms has long demandedand long receivedthe unquestioningbdc bd h . Dbdc w fc h h h, h wh c, c

o disobedience and legal demands or independent thought by the basic soldier or

obedience to the

orders o a superior

is second nature.

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eening e neensile

inantryman were barely addressed at all. But the duty to obey or disobey hasd c h vvd hh h , hh

relies on its discrete national context. o this day, interpretations oen vary soradically that subordinates in one country may be deemed neverto have beenresponsible or actions committed under orders

while, in a neighbouring country, the same soldier hv b cdd always b h c.

In 62, King Gustavus Adolphus o Swedend h c M ww bbvd b h w. c d h NC C h cd h d

do any unlawul thing which who so does, shallbe punished according to the discretion o the

judge. 1 Similarly, under a British code promulgated in 749, obedience to superiors

was deemed legal only when the orders given were also legal. Tis provision wasnot rescinded until an updated code was introduced in 94. Interestingly, this latercd d d b dc. I 8 h Ud Sd h Instructions or the Government o the Armies o the United Statesin the Fieldwhch bc kw h Lb Cd. c h LbCd :

Whoever intentionally inicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly disabled,

or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suer death,

d cvcd, whh h b h h Ud S,

cd hv cd h dd.

In 94, however, the Americans adopted a military code that was clearlymodelled on the British system. Tis code asserted that violations o the lawso war would not be prosecuted i the actions were committed as a result o d.

Te rst German military code, adopted in 872, rejected superior orders as b dc. T v d whch h G h h Scd

Wd W d:I h xc d h c d v h c w, h

the superior ofcer giving the order will bear the sole responsibility thereore. However,

h b bd w h h h h c:

() h h xcdd h d v h,

(2) i it was within his knowledge that the order o his superior concerned an act by

whch w dd c cv c .

But the duty to obey or

disobey has emerged

as society has evolved

through the ages

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During the Second World War, both the Americans and British amendedtheir military and war crimes codes to minimise the deence o obedience to

superior orders. Tis action was regarded by cynics as an attempt to prosecutethe Germans and Japanese more eectively at Nuremberg and okyo with scantd h c cd b d c d wh w cdd b vc jc.

Article 33 And The Legality Of The Act

cd w c

case is whether the perpetrator realised that theact was illegal. Tis is particularly pertinent

to the soldier who, under the Rome Statute, isnow tasked with deciding whether the superiorsorders are legal or otherwise. Soldiers are trainedto ollow orders and to react instinctively towords o command. On the battleeld amidstthe chaos o war, unless an order is overtly, h w b cv, v b k. Sd dd hh c h cb c , d h w wv db d v h, q h h h h h. c k wc h:

. Te act that a crime within the jurisdiction o the Court has been committed by

a person pursuant to an order o a Government or o a superior, whether military or

cv, h v h c b :

() T w d b b d h Gv h

q;

(b) T dd kw h h d w w; d

(c) T d w w.

Under the provisions o the Rome Statute, orders to commit genocide or crimes h w. T v c d d h c

genocide are obviously morally wrong, contravening as they do all the undamentals h h w. T v c d dd c h h d - b haverage soldier. Yet, or most soldiers, the sub-paragraph listed as other inhumaneacts presents the greatest dilemma. Tis particular sectionand, in act, the entirec bd c h cc hd w wcd b d cc.

is action was regarded

by cynics as an attempt toprosecute the Germans

and Japanese

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eening e neensile

T R S xd cx, c h cx o war crimes law itsel. It also contains apparent inconsistencies. Te Statute describes

cd d c h w. Y h h v bch the Geneva Conventions; the twenty-six acts that violate the laws and customs o war;and the sixteen other acts listed as oences or conicts not o an internationalcharacter are treated separately. Tese are listed simply as war crimes. Tankully,the matter o crime dierentiation is not the soldiers provincethey are all warcrimes and any order to commit such acts must immediately sound a warning withinthe soldiers subconscious. Yet, the devil, as the oldadage insists, is in the detail. Orders issued in the heat b b d w c bqd b h d h .

Hw c d k d dc what constitutes a legal order when their entire ocusis on sel-preservation? It begs a simpler solutionthan that oered by the Rome Statute, which is socomplicated that arguments continue to this day overthe interpretation o its articles. Combat soldierscannot carry copies o the Statute, the Geneva Conventions, three additionalprotocols, the relevant Hague Laws and treaties, and his own military disciplinecode into battle. Soldiers have a sufciently difcult mission without concerningthemselves with the various stipulations o the laws o war. Simplicity is the answer

d, h DF, ch d bc wh h I RdCross handbookCode o Conduct or Combatants may present a neat solution. Tis pocket-sized booklet contains sufcient inormation on the laws o war to

train recruits in battleeld conduct. Having completed their basic training, soldiersshould then receive job-specic training in relation to the laws o war and theirrequirements and responsibilities under international humanitarian law. Suchtraining could increase in scope and complexity as soldiers progress through thek bc hh cd.

How Did It Happen? Examples From History

T dcc dc. I d c dmaintain discipline, you are potential murderers. So declared US General GeorgePatton to his assembled ofcers in 946. Yet the history o the ancient proession wh x h bkdw h dc d h bdc d dc ck.

Accounts survive rom medieval times which detail the trials o knights heldccb h c h d. I h Hbch,

e tatute describes

genocide and crimesagainst humanity as

unlawul.

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knight was charged with responsibility or crimes committed by those under hiscommand, including murder, rape, perjury and other heinous acts committed

during the subjugation o the citizens o Breisach in the Upper Rhine on the orders h , Dk Ch Bd. B h ad hoc b,

composed o twenty-eight judges, Hagenbachs counsel pleaded that the knight hadbeen merely ollowing the orders o his superior, DukeCharles, and that he had no right to question or disobeythose orders. Te deence was rejected. Hagenbach wasound guilty, stripped o his knighthood andcdd dh.

Another ailed attempt to assert the deence oobedience to superior orders occurred in England

in 660 ollowing the restoration o King Charles II.Colonel Axtell, commander o the guard that presided h xc Ch I, w d d d. H cd h h

was obeying the orders o his superior; the court, however, rejected his claim on theb h bdc b d b.

D h Nc W, Sch c jcd h bdc d b d wh h d kd Fch . I h c E Mxw, h c d:

I an ofcer were to command a soldier to go out to the street and to kill you or me,

he would not be bound to obey. It must be a legal order given with reerence to the

ccc whch h cd; d h v fc h dc db

d h kw w h d.

O 2 Fb 02, h h B W, w fcw xcd b qd w h cvc c hd B . h fc cvcd hd h dh

penalty commuted to lie imprisonment. Te three ofcers were all members o theBhvd Cb, c c h Nhransvaal, and all justied their actions with the claim that they were obeying orders fc. T dc w jcd b h c.

Under the reaty o Versailles at the end o the First World War, the Alliesdemanded that Germany hand over some 90 people accused o breaches o thelaws o war to be tried or their crimes. Germany resisted, and the Allies eventu-ally agreed to trials conducted by German national courts, known as the Leipzig. b dcd b h 0 d w d,

some pleading obedience to superior orders, while others launched a deence basedon command responsibility. Te two most notable cases involving the deence oobedience to superior orders concerned the torpedoing o the British hospital ships

obedience to a

treasonable order is

itsel treasonable.

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eening e neensile

Dover Castle and Llandovery Castle by German submarines. In the case o the DoverCastle, the deendant, Lieutenant Captain Karl Neuman, the commander o the

German submarine, claimed that he was acting on superior orders which wereissued by his naval superiors who believed that Allied hospital ships were beingd v h w w. T c cqd hcd, :

It is a military principle that the subordinate is bound to obey the orders o his superiors;

wh h xc vc d vv c h c w, h

superior giving the order is alone responsible. Tis is in accordance with the terms o the

G w, h c , h M P Cd whch h

subordinate who acts in conormity with orders is liable to punishment as an accomplice,

wh h kw h h hv dd h d c whch vv cv

c d. T h b c h h. T d

o the German government about the misuse o enemy hospital shops were known to the

accused. He was thereore o the opinion that measures taken by the German Admiralty

h h w c w, b w

. T ccd c, h b hd h cdc.

I h Llandovery Castle c, h c dd d h ccd dc bdc d. I h c, h bcommander ordered his subordinates to open re on survivors o the torpedoedLlandovery Castle who had managed to clamber into lieboats. Te ofcers who

carried out the order, First LieutenantsDithmar and Boldt, were charged with the

killings and pleaded that they had ollowedthe orders o their commander, HelmutPatzik. Te court, however, rejected thisdc, :

Te ring on the boats was an oence

against the law o nations. Te rule o

international law, which is here involved,

is simple and is universally known. No

possible applicability the [commanders]order does not ree the accused rom guilt. It is true that, according to paragraph 47

h M P Cd, h xc d h d c d

involves such a violation the superior giving the order is alone responsible. However the

bd b ch d b h w kw h h

the order o the superior involved the inringement o civil or military law. Tis applies in

h c h ccd. I c b d v h bd,

e ocers who carried out

the order were charged

with the killings and pleaded

that they had ollowed the

orders o their commander

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that they are under no obligation to question the order o their superior ofcer, and they

c c . B ch cdc c b hd x, ch d v kw vbd, cd h ccd, b wh db

whv h w.

Attempts to extradite Kaiser Wilhelm and try him at Leipzig or war crimes ailed,as the government o the Netherlands reused to extradite him. While the Leipzig cd h h h V, h w cdd bboth victor and vanquished to be municipal trials. Te tribunal which presided atLz bd d cb d G w d w v c 228 d 22, h c v h V. D h, h b dcd d T

Responsibilities o the Authors o the War and on the Enorcement o Penalties,whch d h:

Civil and military authorities cannot be relieved rom responsibility by the mere act that

a higher authority might have been convicted o the same oence. It will be or the court

to decide whether a plea o superior orders is sufcient to acquit the person charged

b.

For a municipal tribunal, Leipzig produced a useul precedent or the latertreatment o the deence o superior orders in war crimes trials. Yet, Leipzig alsodcd d. F 0 c bh b h c

during the Leipzig rials, 888 accused were acquitted or summarily dismissed, andonly thirteen convicted. Many o the sentences handed down were maniestlyinadequate, and most o those convicted did notactually serve their sentence. Te Versaillesmodel o war crimes prosecution proved ad xc.

Te ailure o the Leipzig rials ollowing

the First World War hardened the resolve o theAllies at the end o the Second World War toensure that Nazi war criminals would be brought

to justice and that appropriate retribution wouldbe exacted. Te authority o the InternationalMilitary ribunal to conduct the Nuremberg rials was based on the London 8 . T Ld w cc ch dw

up to try the leaders and organisations o Nazi Germany accused o war crimes,crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. Article 8 o the NurembergCh cc h dc d. I :

e ailure o the Leipzig

rials ollowing the First

World War hardened the

resolve o the llies

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eening e neensile

Te act that the deendant acted pursuant to order o his Government or a superior shall

h b, b b cdd h h b d h jc q.

Te rst trial began on 20 November 945 in spectacular ashion, with thetribunal rejecting the claim by a number o deendants that they were not legallyresponsible or their actions because they were perormed under the orders o h. T b d h h h xc horder but whether moral choice [in executing it] was in act possible. On October946, the tribunal handed down its decisions on the original deendants. welvewere sentenced to death by hanging, seven received sentences o detention rangingrom ten years to lie, and three were acquitted. 1 Tese decisions reinorced the

point that obedience to superior orders does not constitute the ultimate deence orbreaches o the laws and customs o war. Te Nuremberg rials produced their owndisappointments or the various victims groups that sought revenge in the aermath

o the Nazi atrocities and those condemned German perpetrators who insisted thath c w ccd. T w bd vc jc h k h . Hwv, wh h bhd wh b cwas that any soldier who violates the laws o war cannot obtain immunity based ona claim that he or she was acting blindly inaccordance with the authority o the state,particularly when the state itsel acts outside

h w.Following the conclusion o the Nuremberg

rials, an additional twelve cases were triedunder the authority o Control Council LawN. 0. T w c bd h LdAgreement but provided a legal basis or theprosecution o war crimes trials in each othe our zones o occupied Germany. One hundred and eighty-ve deendants( d cv) w dcd wv c. T c d dcexperiments in concentration and prisoner-o-war camps and policies and laws

implemented in occupied states. Most o the deendants argued that they weresimply ollowing the orders o their superiors. Given the Nuremberg precedent,this deence ailed completely. Tirty deendants were sentenced to death, including b dc d SS d. x 20 h w cd cd h wh h-v w cqd.

On 9 January 946, the International Military ribunal or the Far East wascd d h h G D Mch, wh Bh FdMh S W S h b Pd. M h v h

ese cases related to

medical experiments

in concentration and

prisoner-o-war camps

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b ch w dd h h Ld . c

the charter covered the Responsibility o Accused. Tis responsibility related to the

dc bdc d d d:

Neither the ofcial position, at any time, o an accused, nor the act that an accused

acted pursuant to order o his government or o a superior shall, o itsel, be sufcient to

ch ccd b c wh whch h chd, b ch

circumstances may be considered in mitigation o punishment i the ribunal determines

h jc q.

Ev w d h k , whch k v w

and produced results parallel to those o Nuremberg. Once again the superior ordersdeence ailed. O the twenty-ve deendants, seven were executed, sixteen were

v c d w h . Te okyo rials, while achieving the highest prole, were not the only orum or

the punishment o Japanese war criminals. In act, the Asian countries victimised byh w ch d b fc,some estimates placing the number around 5000, with up to 900 executions and h h h cvcd cv . M

the subsidiary trials o alleged war criminals rom the Second World War were heldby tribunals constituted by the governments o the countries that had been occupiedin whole or part by Germany or Japan during the war. Additional military tribunalstried numerous Japanese ofcers in the Philippines and Australia. Te deence o

d w d d h .Bw d , h US C Iv Dv v-

tigated war crimes oences relating to the Vietnam War under the UCMJ. Tirty-six

cases involving war crime allegations against army personnel were tried by courtmartial. wenty o these resulted in convictions.Te most notorious o these was the case oLieutenant William Calley who was tried as aresult o an incident at My Lai (Son My), a

v V. What became known as the My Lai massacre

ccd Mch 8, wh v-vmembers o C Company entered the village oMy Lai, their mission broadly dened as the

destruction o the village. Hovering above thevillage were two helicopters, one containing the battalion commander and the otherh bd cd. S h v, C dd h d cv d v h d dch h d h v. H h dd h dz b h h v

ome o the men reused,

while others obeyed.

Calley himsel joined in

the massacre.

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eening e neensile

or eighty villagers into the drainage ditch beore directing hi

Aaj Autumn 2009

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