A4494a-1 03/03 / IGCC Characterizing of Biological Threats to Security Sam A Bozzette, MD, PhD UC...
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Transcript of A4494a-1 03/03 / IGCC Characterizing of Biological Threats to Security Sam A Bozzette, MD, PhD UC...
A4494a-1 03/03/ IGCC
Characterizing of Biological Characterizing of Biological Threats to SecurityThreats to Security
Sam A Bozzette, MD, PhDSam A Bozzette, MD, PhDUC Institute on Global Conflict and CollaborationUC Institute on Global Conflict and Collaboration
& RAND Health& RAND Health
A4494a-2 03/03/ IGCC
Public Policy and Biological Threats
2-3 week residential “bootcamp” at UCSD
– Intent to enroll up to 18 fellows
– Primary target UC system grad stds /post-docs
– also sought are UC Jr faculty, PRGS Students, Professionals from US and abroad
Immersion into policy aspects of biothreats
Utilize many topical expert speakers (1-3 per session)
Arrange out of session contacts as feasible
A4494a-3 03/03/ IGCC
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A4494a-5 03/03/ IGCC
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A4494a-9 03/03/ IGCC
Broad Range of Threats
• Intentional threats a small element in the total picture
– Nature is scarier than nations or terrorists (think SARS, West Nile, Hantavirus, Ebola, HIV).
– New Diseases
– New variants of old diseases
– New territories for old diseases
– Human, animal, plants vulnerabilities all considerations
A4494a-10 03/03/ IGCC
Emerging and Reemerging IDs
A4494a-11 03/03/ IGCC
Global HIV
A4494a-12 03/03/ IGCC
Intentional threats
• Familiar (Salmonella in salad bars)
• Ancient (Smallpox)
• Arcane (Wool sorters disease, aka inhalation anthrax)
• Exotic (Meliodosis, hemorrhagic fevers)
A4494a-13 03/03/ IGCC
Select Agents and Toxins
A4494a-14 03/03/ IGCC
Intentional Threat Complexity Varies
• Materials:
– Easily obtainable (lab techs)
– High Tech (milled anthrax spores)
• Delivery systems:
– Simple (direct contamination)
– Advanced (aerosolization)
• Operations
– Isolated
– Coordinated
• Attacks are unlikely to be obvious
A4494a-15 03/03/ IGCC
Key Prevention and Response Technologies
• “Primary” prevention
• Treaties / Control Regimes
• Information / technology control
• Environmental monitoring
• Surveillance / Monitoring
• Public health responses
A4494a-16 03/03/ IGCC
Response Technologies
Heavily dependent on:
• Dual use systems & facilities
• Poorly configured public sector
– Public health infrastructure badly decayed• Personnel• Diagnostic, isolation, other facilities
– Little tradition of directed public research
• Reluctant Private sector activities/investments
– Actions / decisions of providers & health care systems
– Regulatory concerns
– Pharmaceutical industry incentives
A4494a-17 03/03/ IGCC
A4494a-18 03/03/ IGCC
The Case of Smallpox Vaccination
• Infectious, contagious, disfiguring viral disease of humans
• Vaccine = live vaccinia virus
– Successful vaccination >95% protected ~5yrs
– Complications: ~50/million; Deaths: 1-3/million
• U.S. extremely vunerable
– Universal vaccination stopped in 1971
– Heath system unprepared for vaccination or care
– Health care workers at high risk
A4494a-19 03/03/ IGCC
Generating A Recommendation for National Security Policy on Smallpox
• Develop plausible attack/response scenarios
• Identified Policy options
• Perform systematic literature review
• Model outcomes based on scenarios
• Relate outcomes to policy options
A4494a-20 03/03/ IGCC
Deaths: 3 Attacks and 3 Policies
110022002700Airport—low success
Prior Prior vaccination vaccination of HCW and of HCW and
publicpublic
Prior Prior vaccination vaccination
of HCWof HCW
NoNopriorprior
actionactionDeaths
500 25 0Hoax
540 200 300Building
A4494a-21 03/03/ IGCC
Should We Vaccinate Now?
• Expected gains should exceed expected losses
– Probability(gains) losses (losses gains)
– Probability (outbreak) (lives lost if no outbreak) [(lives lost if no outbreak) (lives saved if outbreak)]
A4494a-22 03/03/ IGCC
Should We Vaccinate Now?
• Example: vaccination prior to building attack
– Vaccination of health workers causes 25 deaths but can avert 100
– Policy is favored when risk of attack [25 (25 100)] ~20%
• Expected gains should exceed expected losses
– Probability(gains) losses (losses gains)
– Probability (outbreak) (lives lost if no outbreak) [(lives lost if no outbreak) (lives saved if outbreak)]
A4494a-23 03/03/ IGCC
Threshold Probabilities: When Should We Vaccinate?
No prior vaccination Prior vaccination of health care workers Prior vaccination of health care workers and public
60%
0%
20%
40%
Lab release
Human vectors
Building
Probabilityof attack
Airport—low
Airport—high
A4494a-24 03/03/ IGCC
• December 2002 Presidential announcement:
– Vaccination of health workers to resume
– Vaccination of public may be allowed later
• Phased program
– 50,000 initial responders
– 500,000 addition health care worker
– up to 10M health and safety workers
The Policy
A4494a-25 03/03/ IGCC
The Outcome
• Only 50% of hospitals participated
• Less than 50,000 vaccinated
– Known complications low
– Possible cardiac complications dominated news
• Emphasis shifted to preparation for public health emergency
A4494a-26 03/03/ IGCC
A National Security Program
• Goal: protect public by raising population immunity
• Decisionmaking based on aggregate issues
• Losses expected and accepted
A4494a-27 03/03/ IGCC
A Public Health/Clinical Program
• Goal: optimize public health by preparing the system
• Decisonmaking based on clinical/individual considerations
• Losses unacceptable (“do not harm”)
A4494a-28 03/03/ IGCC
Comparison of Best Strategy from Each Investment Portfolio
GP Current
GP MVA-1 dose
GP MVA-2 dose
GP LC16 & MVA-2 doseGP LC16 & MVA-
1 Dose
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
260 265 270 275 280
Th
ou
san
ds
MillionsNumber of people protected
Nu
mb
er
of
pe
op
le w
ith
mo
rbid
ity
(i
nc
lud
ing
de
ath
)
BAD
A4494a-29 03/03/ IGCC
Large Airport Attack – Prob of Attack = .05Target Investmt RegimenPo-HCW Current NNN0Po-HCW MVA1 NNNMPo-HCW MVA1 NNMMPo-HCW MVA NNMMPo-HCW MVA1 NMMMPo-HCW MVA NMMMPo-HCW MVA1 MMMMPr-HCW Current NNN0Pr-HCW MVA1 NNNMPr-HCW MVA1 NNMMPr-HCW MVA NNMMPr-HCW MVA1 NMMMPr-HCW MVA1 NMMMPr-HCW MVA, LC LMMMPr-HCW MVA M+pN-ringPr-HCW MVA MMMMPr-H Po-G MVA1 NMMMPr-H Po-G MVA1, LC LMMMPr-H Po-G MVA, LC, M/L NMlMMPr-H Po-G MVA NMMMPr-H Po-G MVA, LC LMMMPr-H Po-G MVA MMMMPr-GP MVA1 NNMMPr-GP MVA1 NMMMPr-GP MVA1, LC LMMMPr-GP MVA1 MMMMPr-GP MVA MMMM
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
$0 $20 $40 $60 $80Billions
total government costs
QA
LY
s lo
st
preGP
preHCW
postGP
postHCW
preHCWpostGP
Ring only
dominating
extended
47,000
48,000
49,000
50,000
51,000
52,000
53,000
54,000
55,000
56,000
57,000
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5Billions
total government costs
QA
LYs
lost
preHCW
postHCW
Ring only
dominating
extended
A4494a-30 03/03/ IGCC
Large Airport Attack: Best Options For Costliness and Probability
Regimens (Current Prohibited)89 - MVA1 Pre-HCW: NYCBH : NYCBH : NYCBH : MVA1 90 – MVA1 Pre-HCW: NYCBH : NYCBH : MVA1 : MVA1206- MVA1 Post-HCW: NYCBH : NYCBH : NYCBH : MVA1207- MVA1 Post-HCW: NYCBH : NYCBH : MVA1 : MVA1
A4494a-31 03/03/ IGCC
Recommendations
NIAID: Complete development of MVA, including explorations of single dose MVA
HHS: Purchase approximately 10M courses of MVA to cover:
• All immunocompromized in mass vaccination (100% acceptance)
OR
• All immunocompromized (and possibly those with relative contraindications) in ring vaccination response plus health care workers in mass response
A4494a-32 03/03/ IGCC
A4494a-33 03/03/ IGCC
Expected Per-Person Costs - USD
170
250
25
170
17
50
50
10
1017
3
3
0.26
0.015
0.13
0.03
0.13
0.015
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
NYCBH -100%
NYCBH 10% MVA 100% MVA 10% LC16 100% LC16 10%
StoragePurchaseAdmin
Administration costs are absolutely and relatively higher in mass (100%) compared to smaller (10%) vaccination campaign, where fixed costs dominate