A2011Crim 2 Case Digests

7/29/2019 A2011Crim 2 Case Digests

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A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGES TS PAGE1 OF141

CRIMINAL LAW 2I. M. Gutierrez III

CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS

LAUREL v. MISABENGZON, J. / 1947

FACTS:Anastacio Laurel a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the UnitedStates Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration withthe Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned overto the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of therespondent Director of Prisons.

The legality of the petitioner's arrest and detention by the military authorities of the UnitedStates is now beyond question. 1 His present incarceration, which is merely a continuation of

his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours" counted from his delivery to therespondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 provides in part as follows:

"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to theCommonwealth Government, the Office of the Special Prosecutors shall receive allrecords, documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of theUnited States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said politicalprisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, asspeedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . . And,provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article onehundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, asthey are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners areconcerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People's Court,

but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the formaldelivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forcesof the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government."

In view of this provision, and the statement of the Solicitor General that even on the date thepetition was presented his office had, ready for filing, an information charging herein petitionerwith treason, we fail to see how petitioner's release may now be decreed.

ISSUE: WON CA 682 violates the Constitution for being discriminatory, an unduedelegation of power and retroactive. NO.

RATIO:It is first argued that the suspension is not general in application, it being made operativeonly to "the political prisoners concerned," that other citizens are not denied the six-hour

limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, that such discrimination is unexcusableand amounts to denial of the equal protection of the laws.

It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does notprevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon whichdifferent rules shall operateso long as the classification is not unreasonable. 2 Instancesof valid classification are numerous. The point to be determined then is whether thedifferentiation in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or arbitrary.

One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte(December 29, 1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who voluntarily given aid, comfortand sustenance to the Japanese. It announced his purpose to hold them in restraint for theduration of the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the Philippine Government for

its judgment upon their respective cases." When active hostilities with Japan terminated,General MacArthur ordered the delivery to the Commonwealth of all the prisoners intheretofore taken under his said proclamation. There were 6,000 in round numbers. Theproblem was momentous and urgent. Criminal informantions against all were , or amajority, or even a substantial number of them could not be properly filed in the six-hourperiod. They could not obviously be turned loose, considering the conditions of peace andorder, and the safety of the prisoners themselves. So the President, by virtue of hisemergency powers, promulgated Executive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of theRevised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, with regard to said detainees orinternees, having found such suspension necessary "to enable the Government to fulfill itsresponsibilities and to adopt temporary measures in relation with their custody and theinvestigation, prosecution and disposal of their respective cases." The Order added that itshall be in force and effect until the Congress shall provide otherwise. Congress later

approved Commonwealth Act No. 682, establishing the People's Court and the Office ofSpecial Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against national securitycommitted during the second World War. It found the thirty-day period too short comparedwith the facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six months.

The Legislature chose to give the prosecutor's office sufficient time to investigate and to filethe proper chargeor discharge those who m it may find innocent. If time had not beengranted, the prosecutor would perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees


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indiscriminately: reserving, of course, its right subsequently to request the liberation of those itmay think not guilty. But such wholesale indictment was obviously neither practical nordesirable. We will allow that there be some dispute as to the wisdom or adequacy of theextension. Yet the point is primarily for the Legislature to decide. The only issue is the powerto promulgate special rules for the custody and investigation of active collaborationists, and solong as reasons exist in support of the legislative action courts should be careful not to deny it.

There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of the suspension of article 125is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's Office," the section constitutes an invaliddelegation of legislative powers; for as explained by the Solicitor-General, the resultsomeinformations filed before, afterwardsis merely the consequence of the fact that six thousandinformations could not be filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some oneelse, necessarily the last." The law, in, effect, permitted the Solicitor General to file theinformations within six months. And statutes permitting officers to perform their duties withincertain periods of time may not surely be declared invalid delegations of legislative power.

Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retroactive in its operation. It refers to detentionafter its passage-not before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional objection to retroactivestatutes where they relate, to remedies or procedure.

The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of the RevisedPenal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release after six hours and,therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is ex post facto, retroactiveand fundamentally objectionable. The premises are incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not haveasked for release after six hours. In other words, he would not have been discharged fromcustody.(Raquiza vs. Bradford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, itis true; but not as to him. The laws of the Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur byoperation of General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation fromenemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint "forduration of the war." So, persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonablecollaboration, could not necessarily invoke the benefits of article 125 of the Revised PenalCode.

Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Hadit done so, herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on constitutional principles, as hecould claim no vested right to the continued enforcement of said section. 4 Therefore, a fortiorihe may not complain, if, instead of repealing section, our lawmaking body merely suspendedits operation for a definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspensionmust be general to be valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations regardingclassification and the equal protection of the laws.

Ryan Oliva

PEOPLE V. PEREZTUASON, J. / APR. 18, 1949

FACTS: Susano Perez was in the business providing the Japanese soldiers comfortwomen during the war

Perez was then convicted of treason Perez contended that the deeds committed did not constitute treason The Solicitor General submits that the furnishing of women for immoral purposes

was treason because it kept up the enemys morale

ISSUE: WON Perezs deeds constitute treasonHELD: No they do not constitute treason

RATIO: To be treasonous to the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must

be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and bedirectly in furtherance of the enemies hostile designs The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political

intercourse between the invaders and the nativeso The occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations

of all sorts between the invaders and the natives Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend

to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States Whatever benefit the enemy got from his undertakings were trivial, imperceptible

and unintentional However, Perez may still be punished for the rape of the women he brought to

the enemy as principal by direct participationo Without his cooperation, these rapes could not have been committed

Ramon Parel

PEOPLE V. PRIETO

TUASON, J.

FACTS:


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Eduardo Prieto (appellant) prosecuted for 7 counts of treason at the Peoples Court. Heentered a plea of guilty for counts 1,2,3, and 7 and pleaded not guilty to counts 4,5 and 6

Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows Count 1.

Accused, being a member of the of the Japanese police and acting as anundercover man with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and

comfort to the enemy, led, guided and accompanied a patrol of Japanesesoldiers to apprehend guerillas and locate their hideouts apprehendedAbraham Puno and upon apprehending him, he was tied up and given fistblows; thereafter Puno was taken away to the detention camp and was torturedand detained for 7 days

Count 2. Accused acting as an informer once again led, guided and accompanied a

group of Japanese soldiers and undercovers for the purpose of apprehendingguerillas and guerilla suspects. The accused and his companions were able toapprehend Guillermo Ponce and Mariano Ponce from their house. Accusedand his companions then tied their hands behind their back and proceeded togive the m fist blows on the face and body. They were then detained at theKempei Tai Headquarters. Guillermo Ponce was released the following day but

Mariano Ponce was detained and thereafter wasnt seen or heard from again Count 3.

Accused acting as an undercover led, guided and accompanied a patrol of 6Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers for the purpose of apprehending guerillasand guerilla suspects. The group apprehended as suspects Damian Alilin andSantiago Alilin who were then detained and tortured for 6 days and that on the7th day were executed.

Count 7. Accused along with several other Filipino undercovers and with conspiracy with

the enemy caused the torture of Antonio Soco and the death of Gil Soco As to Count 4 Two witnesses gave evidence and testimonies, bu t their statements do not

coincide on any single detail. The first witness, Albano, testified that the accused with other Filipino undercovers

and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and that the witness had to carrythe American to town pulled by a carabao afterwhich he was taken to the KampeiTai HQ

The second witness, Cuison, testified that he saw the accused following anAmerican whose hands were tied and that he saw the accuse strike the Americanwith a piece of rope.

Counts 5 and 6 were dropped due to a lack of evidence to have them sustained

The Peoples Court found accused Eduardo Prieto guilty of on count 1, 2, 3 ,4 and 7and was sentenced to death The Lower Court found him guilty of treason complexed by murder and physical

injuries regarding the murders and physical injuries not only as crimes distinctfrom treason but also as modifying circumstances.

The Sol. Gen agrees with the lower court except for the technical designation ofthe crime which in his opinion should be a complex crime of treason withhomicide

ISSUES: Is appellant guilty of Count 4, satisfying the 2-witness principle? Are the acts of murder, physical injuries and torture, distinct and separate from the

crime of treason and are these acts also considered modifying circumstances? Is theappellant guilt of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries or simply guilty oftreason?

HELD: Appellant is not guilty of Coun t 4. The execution of the other acts mentioned (murder, torture, physical injuries) are not

offenses separate from treason. Therefore, he is only guilty of treason.

RATIO: Appellant is not guilty in Count 4 since it fails to satisfy the 2-witness principle

expressed in the treason law. The witnesses referred to two different occasion and were unable to corroborate

each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it The execution of some of the guerilla suspects and the infliction of physical injuries

are not offenses separate from treason Under the Philippine Treason Law and under the US Constitution defining

treason there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid andcomfort. One without the other does not constitute treason

In the nature of things the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished bysome kind of action. This deed may be, and often is a criminal offense

When the deed is charges as an element of treason it becomes identified withthe latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or be used incombination with treason to increase the penalty.

Exception to the rule: If the government decides to prosecute the culpritspecifically for these crimes instead of relying on them as an element of treason.


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It is where murder or physical injuries are charged as an element of treason thatthey cannot be regarded separately general denomination

Judgment: 1 aggravating circumstance of the brutality used in killing and torturing the victims

and 1 mitigating circumstance of entering the plea of guilty

Appellant is found not guilty of Count 4 and guilty of treason in counts 1.2.3 and 7accompanied by one aggravating and one mitigating circumstance.Jecky Pelaez

PEOPLE V. ADRIANOTUASON, J. / 30 JUNE 1947

FACTS: Apolinar Adriano, a Filipno, was convicted for the crime of treason by adherence to

the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines as a member of the Makapili. Several witnesses gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizures of

personal property and performed sentry duties and military drills, but they allreferred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnessescoinciding in any one specific deed.

The witnesses agree on only one item that Adriano was a Makapili and was seenby them in Makapili uniform carrying arms.

ISSUE: Does the evidence in the present case meet the two-witness test?HELD: No.

REASONING:The mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to theenemy and giving him aid and comfort. It is not necessary that the dependent actually went tobattle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen.

But to prove membership as a Makapili, the deposition of two witnesses to the whole overt actis necessary.

Our law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so, turning to the American Constitution,we would find that although criticisms have been raised against the two-witness rule as beingseverely restrictive, the provision was in fact, adopted to make the prosecution of treasonousacts difficult. The law is intended to give suspects a certain degree of protection given thedifficult circumstances during times of war.

JUDGMENT: Without the corroboration of two witnesses on the same overt act, theconvicted is ACQUITTED of treason.

Raina Quibral

PEOPLE V. LOL-LO and SARAWMALCOLM, J. / FEBRUARY 27, 1922

FACTS: On or about June 30, 1920 a boat left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another

Dutch possession. In the boat were eleven men, women, and children, who were

subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the

evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the

Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-

four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too

for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two ofthe women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch

boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes

were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these

people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the

Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were

Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were

able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-

Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the

Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

ISSUES: WoN Lol-lo and Saraw they can be charged and convicted of the crime of piracy WoN the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in

force

HELD: Yes. they can be charged and convicted of the crime of piracy


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Yes. Those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notablyarticles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines

RATIO:

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcibledepredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in thespirit and intention of universal hostility. It cannot be contended that the Court of FirstInstance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may bepunished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found orinto which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has noterritorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that thecrime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for thoselimits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relatingto piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the UnitedStates. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. Alogical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crimeof piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by thewords "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should besubstituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the PhilippineIslands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limitedmeaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, butonly public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands. Under the constructionabove indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of thePhilippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall bepunished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with theUnited States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor. Those provisions of thePenal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force inthe Philippines.

Sam Rosales

PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZPER CURIAM / MARCH 20, 1985

PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JAIME RODRIGUEZalias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

At night, Two or three hours after departing from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi onAugust 30, 1981, about 25 miles from the port, the vessel M/V Noria 767 hasbeen attacked by several armed men.

On board the vessel were several traders and crew members. Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles,

started firing indiscriminately towards the passengers. The passengers and the other crew members were ordered to throw overboard

sacks of copra and some dead bodies. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armedwith a M-14 rifle, stood guard.

About 10am of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the fourappellants were able to secure pumpboats. They ordered the skipper to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases

which were full of money. The appellants boarded the pumpboats bringing withthem: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons ofwater and some meat, as well as rifles.

The Municipal Health Officer went aboard the vessel when it arrived at Cagayande Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf 10 dead bodies.

ISSUES:(1) death penalty should be imposed to the accused-appellants despite their plea of guilty;YES(2) accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of piracy; YES

(3) there was conspiracy YES

REASON:

1). Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides that themandatory penalty for piracy with the following circumstances is death:


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Rape, murder or homocide when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving

themselves, when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel

The plea of the defendants cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance because death

penalty is a single indivisible penalty. art.63 of the RPC states that single indivisible penaltIESshall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances

2.) The testimonies of 2 witnesses show that Peter Ponce fired his weapon indiscriminately atthe passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives and after the lootingand killing, he, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat

3.) The conduct of Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is acircumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As aconsequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed.

Decision: AFFIRMED.

Fredda Rosete

PEOPLE V. SIYOH

ABAD SANTOS, J. / FEBRUARY 18, 1986

Certiorari

FACTS: Julaide Siyoh, Omarkayam Kiram, Namli Indanan, and Andaw Jamahali were

accused of qualified piracy with three counts of murder and one count of frustratedmurder.

On 14 July 1979, the accused, armed with weapons fired their guns into the air tostop the pump boat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio, andAntonio de Guzman were riding.

De Guzman et al. were traveling merchants who were on their way to Pilas Island.They obtained their wares from Alberto Aurea whom they promised to repay oncethey have earned their profits.

The group took lodging at Kirams place. Kiram and his companion Siyohtransported the merchants from one island to another in order for them to sell theirgoods.

Prior to the unfortunate incident, de Guzman saw Kiram and Siyoh talk with theother two culprits during one of their trips.

On the day of the incident, Kiram (who was the boat operator), stopped uponhearing the two gunshots. Another boat containing Indanan and Jamahali closedinto the boat containing the merchants. De Guzman and his companions wererobbed of their personal belongings and profits amounting to a total of PHP

18,342. In fact, one of the culprits took fancy on de Guzmans pants that thelatter had to surrender it. The victims were later told to jump into the water where the accused fired at

them. Only Antonio survived. While waiting for the port for the bodies of his dead comrades, Antonio saw

Kiram and Siyoh (one of them was wearing Antonios) pants. The two wereimmediately arrested while Indanan and Jamahali remained at large.

The two apprehended culprits argued that they had no intention of robbing themerchants. If they did, they should have done it while they were providing themwith food and lodging. Likewise, they denied assisting the other two in robbingthe merchants on their pump boat.

ISSUE: WON the two are guilty of piracy.

HELD: Yes, because the felony was committed over water.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The claim that they did not know the other two culprits was rejected

because de Guzman had seen them talking with one another prior tothe ambush.

The claim of the accused that they could have just robbed themerchants inside their home was untenable since it would cause toomuch commotion. Likewise, doing it during transport from one island toanother lessens the chance of them being caught and makes it easierto dispose of the bodies.

Decision: The lower court found them guilty yet it also considered the provisionstated in section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, which recommendedlife imprisonment instead of the death penalty because of their illiteracy,ignorance and extreme poverty.

Pat Sadeghi-Tajar


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CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

UMIL V. RAMOS

PER CURIAM

Nature: Petitions of Habeas Corpus

Summary:

The case involves 8 petitions ofhabeas corpus:

(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos; (2-3) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa andMontano; (4-5) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.; (6) GR 83162, Ocayaand Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.; (7) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes; (8) Nazareno v.Medina, et al.

The respondents, in their respective Returns, assert that the privilege of the writ is notavailable to the petitioners as they have been legally arrestedand are detained by virtue ofvalid informations filed in court against them.

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made withoutwarrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informationsfiled against them are null and void.

The Court found, in its careful review, that the detainees have not been illegally arrested norarbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attendingthese cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus. It invoked Section 5, paragraphs(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which justifies arrests without warrant.

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just be committed, and he has personal knowledge offacts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; x x x

And based on the records of the case , it shows that the detainees had freshly committed orwere actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without warrantwere clearly justified.

FACTS:

(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos

Based on a confidential information, CAPCOM found that a member of an NPA was beingtreated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. On verification, they found Rolando Dural, amember of the NPA, and responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before.He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hoodof the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers in the car.

He was charged of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority,

docketed with no bail. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by petitioners and a returnswere filed by respondents. With Dural were Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva, who, thelatter two, posted bail and was released.

(2) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and MontanoWhen Wilfredo Buenaobra was apprehended, he admitted that he was an NPA courier andhe had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group.Amelia Roque, on the other hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission(NUFC) and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister.She was also in possession of ammunition and fragmentation grenade for which she hadno permit or authority to possess.

How these two were arrested were as follows. One Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member ofthe NPA, who surrendered to the military gave the latter information about his comradesand also the location of a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino, which is used asa safehouse of the NUFC and CPP-NPA.

Because of this, the house was placed under surveillance and pursuant to a searchwarrant, they found several items in the house. Constantino, confronted, could not produceany permit or authority to possess the firearms, ammunitions, etc. Hence, he was arrestedand although he refused to give a written statement, he admitted that he was a member ofboth NUFC and CPP.

Later that night, Buenaobra arrived and was accosted, readily admitting tthat he was aregular member of the CPP/NPA. Among other items found in his possession was a piece

of paper containing information about Amelia Roque. From this lead, they went to the placewritten in the paper, presented themselves as military, and was able to search, evenwithout warrant, the premises. The place was another safehouse and Roque admitted thatthe documents found belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had noknowledge of them.

A petition for habeas co rpus was filed on behalf of both Buenaobra and Roque.


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(3) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.Both arrived at the house of Constantino, which was still under surveillance. The militaryagenst noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, they found them to becarrying loaded guns. They also found a bag containing subversive materials. In both sets ofitems, no permit or license to possess or carry were produced. Hence they were arrested.

A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf o f both Anonuevo and Casiple, alleging thatthey were unlawfully arrested without warrant and that the information filed against them arenull and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation.

(4) GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.With a search warrant issued by the Judge of RTC of Pasig, agents of the PC Intelligence andCommand conducted a search at the house of Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. Duringthe search, Vicky Ocaya arrived with Danny Rivera. With them were found subversivedocuments and firearms. As regards the firearms, since Ocaya could not produce any licenseor permission to possess them, she, along with Rivera, were arrested.

Petition for habeas corpus were filed on behalf of the two.

(5) Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Roque alleged that the firearms and ammunitionswere planted by the military agents to justify the arrest.

(6) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and ReyesEspiritu claims that about 5am, he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group ofmen wanted to hire his jeepney. But once he came down, he was immediatel arrested. Whenhe asked for a warrant of arrest, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-typejeep. Upon petition for habeas corpus, the respondents claim tha t the detention was justifiedin view of the Information filed against him. and that when he was arrested, he had in fact just

committed an offense that afternoon during the press conference but gave the lawmen the slipwhen he was about to be arrested.

(7) Nazareno v. Medina, et al.Regala, arrested for killing, pointed to Nazareno when the former was questioned. Because ofthis, Nazareno was also arrested without warrant. When Nazareno posted bail and petition forhabeas corpus, both were denied by the judge of the RTC.

ISSUE: WoN the arrest of the petitioners without warrant was justified.

HELD: Yes

RATIO DECIDENDI:(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos

The writ, concerning Umil and Villanueva, is already moot and academic and accordinglydismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who hasbeen released on bail.

As to Dural, although he was arrested not during the commission of t he crime bu t a dayafter, his arrest without warrant not, as a whole, unjustified. The reason is that, as amember of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization, his offense is consideredcontinuing. Subversion, being a continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified asat can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested, that of being a member.

Furthermore, with the criminal case against him for Double Murder, etc. and in its

conclusion he was found guilty of the charged and sentenced accordingly, the writ ofhabeas corpus is therefore no longer available to him.

(2) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and MontanoThe contention of respondents that petitioners are officers and/or members of the NUFC ofCPP was not controverted or traversed. Hence, it must be deemed admitted. For the samereasons as (1), their arrest without warrant was justified. Furthermore, as regards Roque,her arrest without warrant was also additionally justified because she was, at the time ofarrest, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.

(3) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.Their arrest without warrant was justified because they were carrying unlicensed firearmsand ammunitions when they were apprehended. There is also no merit in the contentionabout the information since, under Sec 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,

Sec 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.When a person islawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the RTC thecomplaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer, or fiscalwithout a preliminary investigation x x x


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Both refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of RPC, in which case, nopreliminary investigation was conduction. After the informations had been filed however, theyalso didnt ask for such investigation. Hence, they cannot now claim that they have beendeprived of their constitutional right to due process.

(4)

GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.Vicky Ocayas arrest without warrant is justified because at the time of the arrest, she was inflagranti delicto. (There is no decision regarding Rivera)

(5) No evidence was given by the petitioners regarding this and that there was no ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arrestingofficers in this cases to accuse the petitioners falsely. The arrest was not a productof witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance ofNPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners inthe reel movements. Furthermore, the petitioners, when arrested, were neithertaking their snacks nor innocently visiting a cap, but were arrested in such time,place, and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they wereup to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.

(6) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and ReyesPeittioners release upon petition of habeas corpus was unwarranted because his arrest wanin accordance with Rule 113, Sec 5 (b) of the RoC and that the petitioner is detained by virtueof a valid information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeascorpus, though bail may be allowed. But the bail must be lowered from P60k to P10k becauseit is much too high.

(7) Nazareno v. Medina, et al.Nazarenos arrest without warrant was justified. The judges decision was based on facts ofthe law and so this Court will not disturb the same. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it issufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficientgrounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that thesame greounds exist to elieve that the person sougth to be detained participated therein.

(8) The rule barring petition for habeas corpus is thisthat the person alleged to berestrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by acourt or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process ormake the order, orif such person is charged before any court. Every phase andaspect of the petitioners detention must be inquired by the courtfrom themoment the petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes

upon the merits of the petition and only after such scrutiny can the court satisfyitself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfiedand this is exactly was the Court has done.

DECISION: The petitions are all DISMISSED except GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim.

Kaye Tamayao

PEOPLE V. BURGOS

FACTS:On May 12, 1982, Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered himself to the

authorities, stating that he was forcibly recruited by Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA,threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Immediately uponreceipt of said information, a team of PC-INP units was dispatched at Tiguman, Davao delSur to arrest Ruben Burgos.

Right in the house of the acused, the latter was called by the team and wasasked about his frearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused deniedpossession of said firearm but later, the wife of the accused pointed to a place below theirhouse where the gun was buried. After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewisepointed to the team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile ofcogon, at a distance of 3 meters apart from his house.

From his farm, the military personnel brought the accused to the PC Barrackswhere he was interrogated and tortured, forcing him to admit ownership of the gun. Finally,the accused yielded and was made to sign an extra-judicial confession.

ISSUE: Was the arrest of Burgos without a valid warrant lawful?

HELD: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has justcommitted, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personalknowledgeof that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.


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There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessedby the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by CesarMasamlok. The location of the firearm was given by Burgos wife. At the time of the appellantsarrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither washe committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing hisfield at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and anydeprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. In arrests without a warrant, itis not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested hascommitted a crime first. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. In thiscase, Burgos was arrested on the sole basis of Masamloks verbal report. Masamlok led theauthorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime, they were still fishing forevidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm onthe basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If anarrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happenedor is discovered afterwards can make it lawful.

Yan Yu

MILO V. SALANGA

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO

FACTS: Petitioners allege that the 42 warrants issued by several judges, for the search of

persons and the premises of their offices or warehouse and for the seizure ofdocuments regarding business transactions related in the investigation of thepetitioners violation of Central Bank laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue

Code and the Revised Penal Code. According to the petitioners, the sea rch warrants should be declared void since they

appear to be maliciously obtained and contravene the Rules of Court regarding suchmatters.

o The warrants are not specific in describing the objects that need to besearched.

o The issuance of the warrants was a fishing expedition, an attempt tofind evidence against the petitioners regarding deportation cases filedagainst them.

o Searches and seizures were done in an illegal manner and objectsseized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants.

o Money was seized even though it was not part of the warrants.

According to the responden ts, the warrants were validly obtained, the petitionersgave consent to the search thereby curing any defect which may afflict thewarrants, and the evidence gained due to the warrants may be used as evidencein court.

ISSUE: (1) WoN the warrants issued were valid,(2) WoN if invalid these warrants can be used as evidence in court

HELD: (1) NO, (2) NO

RATIO: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no

warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be determined by the judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesseshe may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and thepersons or things to be seized.

There should be probable cause before the warrant can be issued by the courtand the warrant should specifically or particularly state what it orders to beseized.

When the warrants were issued, there was no probable cause since it is obviousthat the reason for the warrants were too broad. Violating the RPC or laws suchas T and C Laws or Central Bank laws are to broad and thereby there is noknowledge of which specific violation the court has in mind to charge thepetitioners.

Stating that all papers and documents regarding all business transactions of thepetitioners should be seized makes the warrants general warrants and thereforethese are invalid. The overbroad reach of the warrants contravenes the Rules ofCourt stating that such warrants should state particularly the thing to be seizedso as to avoid power-tripping interpretations.

Regarding the second issue, seizures which are obtained against theConstitution may not be used as evidence in court. There is an exclusionary rulein Philippine jurisprudence to disallow the use of evidence unconstitutionallyobtained.


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Carlo Alojado

BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF

ESCOLIN, J. / DECEMBER 26, 1984

PARTIES: JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOSMEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs.THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THEPHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.,respondents

FACTS: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary

mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued onDecember 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then

Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No.19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, QuezonAvenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication anddistribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books andother written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner JoseBurgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application ofCol. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application wasaccompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla whichconducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the

search warrants on December 7, 1982. It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not

have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrantmay validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution whichprovides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable causeto be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,

after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things tobe seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants are maliciously obtained. YES.

HELD: The SC finds petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search isdefined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet andprudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objectssought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Andwhen the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher oreditor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar,the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating withparticularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending topublish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printingequipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents whichwere used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense

of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mereconclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft ofsuch particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, saidallegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was agrave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statementcontained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that theevidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and arecontinuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promotethe objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movementfor Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less thanpersonal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which theissuance of a search warrant may be justified

RULING:The search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge onDecember 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside.


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Wes Aquende

PEOPLE V. MANDORIAO

PEOPLE V. BAES

FACTS:The Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Lumban, Laguna charged Villaroca,Lacbay and del Rosario with an offense against religion for compelling him, with the use offorce and threats, to let their funeral pass through the formers churchyard. The plaintiffargued that it was notoriously offensive because the deceased was not a member of hiscongregation but was in fact with the Church of Christ. When the case was filed in themunicipal court, it was dismissed for lack of sufficient cause. The priest filed an appeal.

ISSUE: WON the accused committed the felony charged

HELD:Yes. The dismissal of the case in the municipal court was due to the fact that the fiscal left outone important detail in the complaint that the churchyard belonged to the church and thatthe area was devoted to religious ceremonies. Whether or not the act was notoriouslyoffensive is a question of fact and should be judged according to the feelings of the Catholicsand not those of other faiths. The case should be remanded to the lower court, let the fiscalfile the complaint with the said additional facts.MORAN: Because the churchyard was owned by and devoted to the religious ceremonies ofthe said church, the use of the area for the funeral with ceremonies of another religion isoffensive. If it were similar to the churches in Manila where the yards were used by anypedestrian or vendor, then the accused would not have been guilty.LAUREL: Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. Two elements must be present: (a) theacts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during thecelebration of any religious ceremony; and (b) that the acts were notoriously offensive to thefeelings of the faithful. The acts were performed in the atrio or patio which, in Spanish,means an open space, therefore not devoted to religious ceremonies. Also, offense toreligious feelings should not be made to depend on the narrow conception of a certain religion it should be gauged in view of the nature of the acts committed and through the mirror of anunbiased judicial criterion.

Anna Basman

PEOPLE V. TENGSONESGUERRA, J. / MARCH 1, 1971

FACTS:o Alfonso Tengson, a minister of the sect Christ Is the Answer, was asked to

perform a religious service by Leopoldo Cepillo because of a deceased familymember. Tengson and his assistant Olegario performed the religious rites in thehouse of the deceased and in the barrio chapel.

o Since the family members already obtained a permit from the Roman Catholicchurch to bury the deceased in the Roman Catholic cemetery, they proceededthere after holding the religious service in the chapel.

o In the unfinished chapel in the cemetery, Tengson performed a religious ritebefore the deceased was buried.

o He was sued for violating Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code or for performingacts offensive to the feelings of a particular religion.

ISSUE: WON Tengson and Olegario performed acts notoriously offensive the feelings of aChristian or a Roman Catholic faithful.

HELD:No. The elements of the offense penalized in Art. 133 are:

(1) Acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship orduring the celebration of any religious ceremony.

(2) The act must be notoriously offensive to those who are faithful in their religion.In this case, the first element is present even if the act was done in an unfinished chapelsince it is still devoted to religious worship. However, the second element was notsatisfied. For an act to be notoriously offensive, it must be directed against a religiouspractice for the purpose of ridicule.

Their act of performing burial rites in accordance with their religious sect is not notoriouslyoffensive provided that there was no intent to mock a particular religion. Their act might

have offended the Roman Catholic priest or some Catholics in that place but since therewas a burial permit, the religious rites are not offensive to the feelings of everybody whoprofesses the Christian faith.

JUDGMENT: Appellant was acquitted.

May Calsiyao


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PEOPLE V. NANOYFERNANDEZ, J. / 1972

FACTS:In 1969, during the afternoon services of the Assembly of God, Epifanio Nanoy entered thechapel. He was apparently drunk. Nanoy attempted to grab the choir leader, Levita Lapura.

She ran away from him. He caused such a scandal that the members of the sect ran out thedoor and their religious services were discontinued. Nanoy allowed himself to be escorted outby one of the members. The accused was later found guilty of the grave offense of OffendingReligious Feelings under Art. 133 of the Penal Code.

ISSUE: Is Nanoy really guilty of the offense of Offending Religious Feelings?

HELD and RATIO:No. Nanoys act does not constitute the said offense, but is in fact unjust vexation. It is clearthat there was no intention on his part to actually disrupt the services, and he simply made agrab for Mrs. Lapura. This is shown by his willingness to be escorted out by one of themembers.

(In other words, hes no inquisitor, just a perv. :P)

Judith Cortez


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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

ENRILE V. SALAZAR

NARVASA, J. / 1990

DOCTRINE: There is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder,that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion(People v. Hernandez).

FACTS:On February 27, 1990, Senator Enrile was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued on the sameday by Judge Salazar charging Enrile, together with the spouses Panlilio (the only reason theyare included is because they served food at the Enrile household!) and Gregorio Honasanwith the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committedduring the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the

arrest warrant. Hence, Senator Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus.

The prosecution alleges that Enriles case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because:1. the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as

a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information againstSen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, butnot in furtherance, of rebellion

2. there is a distinction between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from anoffense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in thesecond clause of Article 48, RPC, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and thecompound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or moregrave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, withwhich Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply

ISSUES:1. Is the Hernandez ruling still good law? YES.2. Did Judge Salazar issue the warrant for Enriles arrest without first personally

determining the existence of probable cause? YES.3. Was a petition for habeas corpus the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or

vindicating its denial? NO.

HELD/RATIO:First Issue

In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical baseshave withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasiveenough to warrant a complete reversal. Two other options were presented (and rejected):1. abandon the Hernandez ruling2. hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a

necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in thecourse of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less gravecharacter

This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, President Aquino, exercising herpowers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, Presidential Decree No.942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez byenacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code. The President in effectby legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law.

Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion withany other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its

commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with acrime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. The informationfiled against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionablephrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, thatindictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.

Second IssueMerely because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief periodwithin which to comply with his duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or couldnot have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legalpresumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Third IssueThe criminal case before Judge Salazar was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner'sright to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions wasbeyond the ability or competence of Judge Salazar indeed such an assumption wouldbe demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts.


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JUDGMENT: The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People v.Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and thespouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hencesaid petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. Theproceedings are remanded to respondent judge to fix the amount of bail.

Jahzeel Cruz

ENRILE V. AMINGUTIERREZ, JR., J. / SEPTEMBER 13, 1990

FACTS: Prosecution alleges that the Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by

giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing thatColonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anythingto have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure thepetitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No.

1829 and rebellion charges (RPC) He was charged with rebellion and violation of PD 1829 Sec 1 (c) (obstruction of

justice.) Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the case but Judge Amin denied the

motion on the theory that there was probable cause to hold Enrile liable for violationof PD 1829.

ISSUE: WON Enrile could be charged for violation of PD 1829 separately, given he wasalready charged with rebellion

HELD:The charge for violation of PD 1829 should be quashed; alleged violation is absorbed in thecrime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes

RATIO: Apply Hernandez ruling: the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,

and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separatelytherefrom

All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are merecomponents or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed

in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimesin themselves

Steven Dayag

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODOLFO DASIG, ET.AL.NOCON, J. / APRIL 28, 1993

REBELLIONArt. 134 RPC. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising

publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing fromthe allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of thePhilippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, ordepriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of theirpowers or prerogatives. (as amended by RA 6968)

Art. 135 RPC. Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellionor insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others inrebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.(as amended by RA 6968)

(note:only the relevant portion of Art. 135 have been included in this citation of theprovision. Note also the difference between the penalty provided here and that of thecase)

NATURE: Appeal

FACTS: Police Officers Manatad, Tizon and Catamora were assisting in canning thetraffic. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility, Manatad manned the traffic and Catamoraacted as back-up. Catamora saw 8 person acting suspiciously. Two of these 8 personsproceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Catamora to a gun battle. A series of

shots were issued by the other group which caused the death of Manatad. Thereafter, theassailants fled from the scene. Nu ez was identified as one of the assailants.On Aug.16, 2 teams of police officers conducted a surveillance on a suspected

safehouse of members of a sparrow unit (a liquidation squad of the NPA). Here theycaptured Nu ez and Dasig. However, while attempting to escape, Dasig was shot and wasbrought to the hospital. Here, he availed of the services of Atty. Parawan who wasrequested by the military as Dasig did not have a lawyer. Also he was appraised of hisconstitutional rights before the interrogation started. He then confessed that he and the


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group of Nu ez killed Manatad and that they were members of the sparrow unit. This extra-judicial confession was signed and sworn to by Dasig.

During the course of the proceedings, Nu ez died thus extinguishing his criminalliability. Dasig was convicted of murder with direct assalt.

ISSUES:Main Issue: WON Dasig is guilty of rebellion or murder with direct assault to a person inauthorityOther Issues:1.WON the taking of his extra-judicial confession was legally defective which violated hisconstitutional rights.2.What is the penalty to be imposed?

DECISION:Main Issue: Guilty of RebellionOther Issues:1. No violation of constitutional right2. 8 years of prision mayor and to indemnify the family of Manatad

REASONING:Main Issue:Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other

means (Art. 135, RPC). Dasig did not only voluntarily confess his membership with thesparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Manatad. Thesparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the dulyconstituted government. Thus, the killing of Manatad was committed as a means to or infurtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts.Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbedin one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer (a person in authority) is amere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made abasis of a separate charge.

Other issues:1. The evidence clearly shows that Dasig during his investigation was properlyinformed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent andindependent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify hisintention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the personof Atty. Fortunato. It was also shown that Dasig voluntarily subscribed and swore to hisconfession which was couched in the visayan language, a language known to him. It is asettled jurisprudence that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves

that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward orleniency which were not proven in this case.2. Art. 135 of the RPC imposes prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000 toany person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, there is no evidencethat Dasig headed the crime committed. He merely participated in committing the act, orjust executed the command of an unknown leader.

Tim Guanzon

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V. ELIAS LOVEDIORO Y CASTROKAPUNAN, J. / NOVEMBER 29, 1995

FACTS:

1. Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was killed when a man suddenly walkedbeside him and shot him in the head. The man was with three companions, oneof whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After

taking the latter's gun, the 4 boarded a tricycle and fled.2. Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder and police informant, was 9 meters away

when he witnessed the event. He said he knew both the victim and identified theman who fired Elias Lovedioro, his nephew. He said that Lovedioro was identifiedas a member of the New People's Army.

3. An information charging Lovedioro of the murder was filed before the RTC whichlater found him guilty of murder.

4. Lovedioro asserts that he should be guilty of rebellion and not murder.Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or infurtherance of subversive ends," should have been deemed absorbed in thecrime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. He also

claims that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in theliquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as aparticipant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 ofArticle 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been metedonly the penalty ofprison mayorby the lower court.

5. According to the Solicitor General the crime committed by appellant may beconsidered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that themotive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive


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ends." Moreover, he contends that even if appellant is convicted of rebellion, andeven found guilty merely of as a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposablepenalty is not prision mayor reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D'etatLaw, prescribes reclusiontemporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in arebellion.

ISSUE: Whether Lovedioro is guilty of murder or rebellion? If he is found guilty of rebellion,should the penalty be prison mayor?

HELD: Lovedioro committed murder and not rebellion. The penalty should be reclusiontemporal. The trial court's decision dated is affirmed, in toto.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968,rebellion is committed in the following manner:

By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose ofremoving from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic ofthe Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, ordepriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers orprerogatives.

The crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government which byits very nature is essentially a crime of masses involving crowd action. Another aspect in thecommission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are absorbed in thecrime. The decisive factor is the intent or motive to commit rebellion. Any ordinary act,however grave, done with the intent to rebel assumes a different color by being absorbed inthe crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. The theory ofabsorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offensesunder special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose andovert acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, thecrime of rebellion legally does not exist.

In the this case the evidence for the Lovedioro merely contains self-servingassertions and denials not substantial enough to show political motivation in the killing ofvictim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.Nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did he mention that

he was an NPA. Allegations relating to accused membership in the NPA surfaced almostmerely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followedthrough upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that heknew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony,Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member. Inaddition, no specific act that caused the killing of the policeman was ever given by theaccused. The victim being an informant was never sufficiently proven.

Blanca Labay

PEOPLE V. CABRERA

FACTS:

The Phil. Constabulary (PC) vowed revenge on the Manila Police for the allegedarrest of one of the women in the household of a PC soldier and the death of a soldier

in an encounter between the two forces. Seventy-seven soldiers escaped from the barracks through a window. These soldiers

went on a shooting spree that killed 2 policemen and wounded 2 civilians. It endedwhen the officers came to round them up from the streets.

Two cases were filed: one for sedition (where they pleaded guilty) and one for murderand serious physical injuries (where they pleaded not guilty).

They were found guilty on both cases. The defendants appealed.

ISSUES / HOLDINGS / RATIO:

WON fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions thatthe court admitted as evidence.

NO. It was alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under theimpression that those who had taken part in the affray would be transferred toMindanao, and that although they did not in fact so participate, affirmed that they didbecause of a desire to leave Manila; that others stepped forward "for the good of theservice"; while still other simply didn't understand what they were doing, for theremarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, andtheir declarations were sometimes taken in a language which was unintelligible to


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them. The court, however, believes that these confessions contain the statements thatthey were made freely and voluntarily without any promise of immunity. That such wasthe case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose credibility has not beensuccessfully impeached.

WON conspiracy between the accused is essential to the crime of seditionNO. Conspiracy is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. The court, however,proceeded to expound on this issue. Common design is required to prove conspiracy. Itis incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, whichwas to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling ofresentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training wasfollowed. Therefore, there is conspiracy among them.

WON it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended partya public functionary in order for him to have violated the Treason and Sedition Law.

NO. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances inthe State. Act No. 292 penalizes all persons inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon theperson or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial orMunicipal Government for the crime of sedition. The Treason and Sedition Law makes nodistinction between the persons to which it applies.

WON the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused.NO. The prohibition against double jeopardy is against a second jeopardy for the sameoffense. To entitle a defendant to plead successfully former jeopardy, the offense chargein the two prosecutions must be the same in law and in fact. In this case it is obvious thatsedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime not the same offense asmurder. The offenses charged in the two cases for sedition and murder are perfectlydistinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of act. The gist ofthe information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in

order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hateand revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them inseveral places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is thatthe Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons andgravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and serious physical injuries werenot necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could nothave been convicted of these crimes under the first information.

JUDGMENT: GUILTY of sedition and murder and serious physical injuries. THEY putbarricades to block the entrance then shot at ever policemen that went to intramurosto see the barricades.

REMEMBER: Sedition does not absorb other offenses.

Felman Magcalas

US V. TOLENTINO

FACTS: On May 14, 1903 Aurelio Tolentino staged his Tagalog theatrical work entitled

Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas, written by him, at the Teatro Libertad

This public staging of the drama happened less than 2 years after theestablishment of the Civil Government by the Americans

It is contended that this Tolentino uttered seditious words and speeches andmake scurrilous libels against the US and Insular Government which tend toincite people to rebellion, instigate others to meet together for unlawful purposes,create hatred of the government, endanger public peace and order, amongothers

ISSUE: WON this staging constitutes inciting to sedition or is merely a literary or artisticproduction

HELD: Tolentino is guilty of inciting to sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292 of thePhilippine Commission; the manner and form as well as the time during which the play wasstaged clearly shows that it is more than mere artistic production

Provision summarized in the ruling:

Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in thatsection, viz:

(1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches;

(2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of theUnited States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands;


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(3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawfulofficer in executing his office;

(4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes;

(5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots;

(6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of

the community, the safety and order of the Government;

(7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.

Considering the context of the times, the play did in fact tend to instigate people tomeet for unlawful purposes, and suggest or incite people to rebellious conspiraciesand riots, and disturb the peace and safety of the community and the government

After nearly 2 years there were still embers of hatred smoldering in the hearts ofsome people which need only suggestion of this manner to fan into flames of openrevolution

During this time the Hong Kong junta of Aguinaldo was still plotting to overthrow thecivil government and was ready to pounce at the opportune time to start rebellion

ISSUE: WON it is sufficient to prove any one of the different modes of committing the offensecharged herein

HELD: Yes; since it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the work tended to instigateothers to meet for unlawful purposes, suggested or incited people to rebellious actions, amongothers, then Tolentino is guilty of the offense charged

well-settled rule that where an offense may be committed in any of severaldifferent modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to havebeen committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove theoffense committed in any one of them, provide that it be such as to constitute thesubstantive offense

Mico Cruz

ESPUELAS V. PEOPLEBENGZON, J. / DECEMBER 17, 1951

FACTS: Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it appear as if he were hanging

lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in

truth he was merely standing on a barrel After securing copies of his photograph, he sent copies of the same to several

newspapers and weeklies of general circulation throughout the Philippines andabroad for their publication

Along with the photog raphs, he sent a suicide letter, wherein he made to appearthat it was written by one Alberto Reveniera

The letter, addressed to Revenieras supposed wife contained his displeasuretowards the Roxas administration

Some important parts of the letter:- if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I

was not pleased with the administration of Roxas- and if they asks why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to

them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio

Guillen and the banditry in Leyte- write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in thePhilippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis

- Tell the children to burn pictures of Roxas- I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo

all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self

ISSUE: Whether or not the words contained in the letter constitute scurrilous libel(punishable under Article 142 of the RPC- Inciting to Sedition)

HELD: YES. The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.

RATIO:

It not only calls the government one of crooks and dishonest persons infestedwith Nazis and Fascists but the communication also reveals a tendency toproduce a feeling of dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the dispositionto remain loyal to the government

The publication suggests rebellious conspiracies or riots and tend to stir up thepeople against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from oppositiongroups who may seek to silence the writer


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It is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxasofficials (by virtue supposedly of his mention of Juez de Cuchillo which to thelayman is the Law of the Knife; that the idea intended by Espuelas was the bloody,violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration ofRoxas and his men)

Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or toweaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the publicpeace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of peacebut because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself

If it be argued that the letter does not discredit the entire governmental structure butonly President Roxas and his men, the reply is that the article punishes not onlylibels against the government but also libels against any of the duly constitutedauthorities thereof.

TUASON, J., Dissenting: the message which the accused herein caused to be published contained no libel or

criticism against the instituted system of government as distinct from theadministration

the gist of the message was that the author was desperate and was going to killhimself because many of the men in government were following the practices ofabsolute and despotic rulers in other parts of the world

he pretended to have decided to kill himself because he was impotent to remedy orsuppress this deplorable state of affairs

far from advocating the throw of government or change the present scheme ofpolity. The article evinced intense feeling of devotion to the welfare of the countryand its institutions

the article was but a statement of grievances against official abuses andmisgovernment that already were of common knowledge and which more influentialand responsible speakers and writers had denounced in terms and ways moredangerous and revolutionary

JUDGMENT: Conviction was affirmed.

Joy Montes

MARTINEZ V. MORFEFERNANDO, J. / MARCH 24, 1972

NATURE: Petition for Certiorari

FACTS:- Manuel Martinez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, was arrested for

falsifying his date of birth in his certificate of candidacy. He claimed he was bornon June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June20, 1946. He was on his way to attend the sessions when he was arrested.

- Fernando Bautista, Sr., is the duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the functionsof such office on June 1, 1971. Two criminal complaints against him were filedwith the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet by Moises Maspil, adefeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15 th. The complaints said that he violatedSection 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that he gave and distributed free food,drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings in Benguet, one held in Sablan andthe other in Tuba.

- Petitioners prayed that the warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed onthe claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates,ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution as construedtogether with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are immune fromarrest.

- Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor; Bautistasalleged crimes are below prision mayor.

ISSUES:- Are they immune from a rrest? NO.- Can they invoke the RPC, which says that Article 145 would impose upon any

public officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or specialsession, arrest or charge any member thereof except in case such member hascommitted a crime punishable by penalty higher than prision mayor? NO.

RATIO:Their reliance on the constitutional provision, supplemented by what is provided for in theRPC, is futile. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest doesnot cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Breach of the peacecovers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It isa well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and anybreach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit


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language of the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation, they cannot claimimmunity. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such aprovision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative onNovember 15, 1935.

- INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: On December 4, 1934, upon itsbeing considered by the Convention, an amendment was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so

that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason,felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at thesessions of the National Assembly, and in going and returning from the same." He defendedhis proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the same phrase granting parliamentaryimmunity to the members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase grantingparliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is the same phrase granting parliamentaryimmunity to members of the various state legislatures of the Union.

The history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members ofthe National Assembly from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted intothese Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This theory of governmentplaces every man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any setof persons means the abrogation of this principle of equality before the eyes of the law. TheState Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the Legislature to claimprivileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The right of the State to claim rivileges isdue to the fact that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we must alsoremember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is the principal. Anycrime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangersthe State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of theprincipal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. Also, in the Willia

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