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Int. J. Indian Culture and Business Management, Vol. x, No. x, xxxx 1

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A survey of positive and negative aspects of the Indian administrative bureaucratic system

Prem Lal Joshi* Department of Accounting, University of Bahrain, Box 32038, Bahrain E-mail: [email protected] *Corresponding author

Rajesh Kumar Institute of Management Technology, Dubai, UAE E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: This online survey, based on a sample size of 340 responses, was carried out to ascertain public perceptions of the positive and negative aspects of the Indian administrative bureaucratic system (IAS). Only 13% of the respondents were satisfied with the system. The most important positive aspect with respect to the IAS system was the factor of decent living and working conditions, and the most important negative aspect was the tendency to serve their political masters rather than the general public. The most important positive aspect of the lower level bureaucracy was the greater dependence on the junior bureaucrats by their seniors, and the most critical negative aspect was that lower level bureaucrats have no sense of wastage of public money. The more the experience that respondents had with the system, the more negative their perceptions of the system became. The Indian residents held much stronger negative views about the IAS system than their non-resident Indian (NRI) counterparts.

Keywords: India; bureaucracy; IAS system; positive; negative; constraints; effectiveness; professionalism; lateral system; NRIs; non-resident Indians; corruption; accountability; transparency; performance appraisal.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Joshi, P.L. and Kumar, R. (xxxx) ‘A survey of positive and negative aspects of the Indian administrative bureaucratic system’, Int. J. Indian Culture and Business Management, Vol. x, No. x, pp.xx–xx.

Biographical notes: Prem Lal Joshi is a Senior Professor at the University of Bahrain. He has taught in India, Kenya, Turkey and Bahrain. He has presented papers in more than 33 international conferences and has published over 60 research papers in leading international and regional journals. He has also conducted several researches in interdisciplinary areas. He has authored five books. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of two international journals in accounting. He is on the Editorial Board of several journals.

Rajesh Kumar is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Institute of Management Technology, Dubai. He has received his PhD from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT Kharagpur). His empirical research papers have

2 Joshi and R. Kumar

appeared in several refereed journals like Afro Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting, Journal of Applied Business and Economics, IIMA Vikalpa, IIMB Management Review, IIMC Decision. He has authored two books including a text book on Mergers and Acquisitions published by McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

1 Introduction

A common explanation of bureaucracy is the ‘combined organisational structure, procedures, protocols and set of regulations in place to manage activity in large organisations’. It is the system of an administration wherein there is a specialisation of functions, objective qualifications for office, action according to the adherence to fixed rules and a hierarchy of authority and delegated power. However, it is believed that a bureaucracy traditionally does not create policy but, rather, enacts it.

The Bureaucracy Encyclopaedia provides information on the development of early civilisations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, China and India that were organised hierarchically, thus forming the bureaucratic tradition of government. As early as the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Chinese bureaucracy was taking on the form of a merit-based, centralised administrative apparatus of the state. Other early civilisations, including the Egyptians and the Greeks, included active administrative arms. The middle ages saw the expansion of ecclesiastic bureaucracy to implement policies and maintain the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

Later on, the German sociologist Max Weber saw the growth of bureaucracy in industrial societies as an inevitable reflection of the underlying shift from traditional authority to a rational and legal system of organisation and control. On the other hand, during 1980s, the new model of public management was advocated that involved the use of private sector innovation, resources and organisational ideas to improve the public sector. For example, during the Clinton Administration (1992–2000), new public management became prevalent throughout US bureaucracy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Public_administration).

During 1990s, digital era governance model came into existence that focused on themes of reintegrating government responsibilities, digitalisation, etc. (e.g. see Dunleavy et al., 2006). Another public service model also came into existence termed New Public Governance with features of centralisation of power, an increased number, role and influence of partisan – political staff under the assumption that the public service is promiscuously partisan for the government of the day (e.g. see Osborne and Gaebler, 1993).

Contemporary researchers have highlighted the problems of bureaucracy, such as its inflexibility and rigid adherence to rules, etc. The complex task of managing and coordinating public services is vulnerable to corruption, inefficiency and inflexibility. For example, amid global economic troubles, corruption has been on rise. Transparency International’s latest corruption index shows that 75 of 180 countries surveyed scored below 3 on a 10 point scale of governmental honesty. Corruption is a fixture in countries like Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco and Pakistan, where 60% of executives surveyed reported having been solicited for a bribe.

A survey of positive and negative aspects 3

Similarly, the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer by Transparency International has rated the political parties and civil services as the most corrupt institutions in the world. The survey points out that the biggest frustration for potential investors in India is the bureaucracy. As per the World Bank, it can take on an average 30 days to start a new business, 45 days to register a property, 224 days to obtain the necessary licences and permits to build a warehouse and 10 years to revolve a bankruptcy.1

Since the Indian bureaucratic system has been labelled with the above features, therefore this study focuses on investigating the positive and negative aspects of Indian administrative bureaucratic system.

2 Literature review

In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ discussion of historical materialism, the historical origin of bureaucracy is to be found in four sources: religion, the formation of the state, commerce and technology. In their theory, bureaucracy rarely creates new wealth by itself, but rather controls, coordinates and governs the production, distribution and consumption of wealth.

According to Max Weber, the attributes of modern bureaucracy include its impersonality, concentration of the means of administration, a levelling effect on social and economic differences and implementation of a system of authority that is practically indestructible. Weber’s analysis concerns:

• the historical and administrative reasons for the process of bureaucratisation (especially in the Western civilisation)

• the impact of the rule of law upon the functioning of bureaucratic organisations

• the typical personal orientations and occupational positions of bureaucratic officials as a status group

• the most important attributes and consequences of bureaucracy in the modern world.

Weber also stated that real bureaucracy will be less optimal and effective than his ideal model. Each of Weber’s seven principles can degenerate.

• competences can be unclear and used contrary to the spirit of the law; sometimes a decision itself may be considered more important than its effect

• nepotism, corruption, political infighting and other degenerations can counter the rule of impersonality, and can create a recruitment and promotion system based not on meritocracy but rather on oligarchy.

Weber, who did pioneering work related to bureaucracy, firmly believed in the superiority of bureaucracy to any other organisational form. He suggested that bureaucracy and formalisation were the best methods of creating and maintaining a viable political structure independent of its leadership. He is also well known for his critical study of the bureaucratisation of society, the rational ways in which formal social organisations apply the ideal characteristics of a bureaucracy. It was Weber who began the studies of bureaucracy and whose works led to the popularisation of this term.


Weber’s bureaucracy studies also led him to his analysis – correct, as it would turn out, after Stalin’s takeover – that socialism in Russia would lead to over-bureaucratisation rather than to the ‘withering away of the state’, as Karl Marx had predicted would happen in communist society.2

The phenomenon of a catch-22 situation arises as bureaucracy creates more and more rules and procedures, their complexity increases and coordination diminishes, facilitating creation of contradictory and recursive rules, as described by the saying ‘the bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy’.

There is a linkage between the transparency and probity of the political leaders as well as the bureaucrats of a nation and its level of development. Thus, any effort aimed at accelerating the pace of development in any country must take into consideration the actors of the system.

Bureaucratic corruption is linked with the activities of bureaucrats. The concept has undergone transformation from being the practice of buying favour from bureaucrats who formulate and implement government’s economic and political policies to the violation of public duty by bureaucrats or public officials. Various explanations have been given for the widespread pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption. One school of opinion suggests that at times bureaucracy outgrows its organisational structure, and as such becomes dehumanised and monolithic. This stage is characterised by undefined structure, lack of social values and absence of rules and procedures. In this scenario, corruption is likely to evolve, persist and spread. Bureaucratic corruption has the capacity to undermine development.

Crozier (1964, p.3) examined bureaucracy as a form of organisation that evokes “...the slowness, the ponderousness, the routine, the complication of procedures and the maladapted responses of the bureaucratic organization to the needs which they should satisfy”. He also stated that “...the bureaucratic system of organization is primarily characterized by the existence of a series of relatively stable vicious circles that stem from centralization and impersonality”.

The relationships between the legislatures, the interest groups, bureaucrats and the general public all have an effect on each other. Without one of these pieces the entire structure would completely change. The public votes in the legislatures and the interest groups provide information, but the legislature and bureaucrats also have an effect on the interest groups and the public. All parts of the system are codependent on each other.

The bureau-shaping model put forward by Dunleavy (1991) argues that rational bureaucrats should only maximise the part of their budget that they spend on their own agency’s operations or give to contractors or powerful interest groups (that are able to organise a flow-back of benefits to senior officials). For instance, rational officials will get no benefit from paying out larger welfare cheques to millions of poor people, because the bureaucrats’ own utilities are not improved. Consequently, bureaucracies are expected to significantly maximise budgets in areas like police forces and defence, but not in areas like welfare spending.

Chowdhury’s (2006) model of rent-seeking bureaucracy captures the case of administrative corruption, whereby public money is directly expropriated by public servants in general. In particular, he highlights the impact of the low-level civil servants whose rent-seeking behaviour pushes up the cost of production of public goods.

Table 1 provides a summary of prior literature review.


Table 1 Summary of selected studies

Study Major highlights of the study Weber (1947) Weber suggests that bureaucracy and formalisation were the best methods

of creating and maintaining a viable political structure independent of its leadership. His study gives general explanations regarding how bureaucratic institutions should be designed, including the need for a division of labour, career personnel with specialised training and expertise and hierarchical formal organisational structures that do not duplicate other administrative units

Derakhsahn and Fatehi (1985)

This study suggests that rigidity of bureaucracy would be a substitute for fragile leadership

Wilson (1987) This study argues for an administrative apparatus that is devoid of politics and meddling

Kass (1990) A public steward must be committed to serving the public interest and must avoid using professional authority for personal gain

Eisner (1992) and Khademian (1995)

These studies emphasise the importance of professional expertise in policy administration

Osborne and Gaebler (1993)

The authors in their book suggest that in spite of inefficient bureaucracy, government can tap the power of entrepreneurial process and the force of free market

Mandel (1992) A Marxist theory of bureaucracy is suggested in reference to power and money

Crewson (1997) This study shows higher levels of organisational commitment Rainey (1997) Public employees are more likely to possess altruistic attitudes than

private employees Brewer and Selden (1998)

Those with high levels of public service motivation are more willing to engage in whistle-blowing to protect the public interest

Crewson (1997), Frank and Lewis (2004), Houston (2000) and Jurkiewicz et al. (1998)

Public employees place a higher value on intrinsic rewards like the importance of meaningful work and service to society, than on extrinsic rewards like higher pay and promotion

Conway (2000) and Blair and Garand (1995)

Bureaucrats possess a higher sense of civic duty and more strongly support democratic values

Perry (2000) Public organisations, by virtue of their missions, provide individuals a greater opportunity to engage in public service

Houston et al. (2001) The vast majority of respondents indicate that a commitment to serve the people is at least ‘somewhat’ characteristic of government administrators. About 31% of these respondents think that ‘hardly anyone’ or only ‘a small number of people’ in the public service are involved in corruption. Nearly the same amount (29.6%) view corruption to be widespread (either ‘a lot of people’ or ‘almost everyone’). While government administrators are generally perceived to be somewhat committed to serve the public interest, corruption is thought to be fairly widespread

Rainey and Bozeman (2000) and Goodsell (2004)

Public employees, particularly administrators, place a high degree of value on public service, self-sacrifice, responsibility, ethics, integrity and the worth of their mission to the public good

Meier and Krause (2004)

Explained the modern advent of the scientific study of bureaucracy as principle – agent theory

Olsen (2005) This study finds that bureaucratic organisation is part of a repertoire of overlapping, supplementary and competing forms coexisting in contemporary democracies, and so are market organisation and network organisation

Höpfl (2006) This paper shows that hierarchy cannot be eliminated from complex organisations, and bureaucracy can be retheorised to include any non-contradictory attributes


Table 1 Summary of selected studies (continued)

Study Major highlights of the study Houston (2006) and Perry (1996)

Public servants ‘receive internal satisfaction through making a contribution to society’ and are ‘characterised by an ethic built on benevolence, a life in service to others and a desire to affect the community’

Perry (2007) Public professional life ‘needs to be restructured in ways that suffuse technical competence with civic awareness and purpose

Kumar (2007) This paper concludes that in the Indian bureaucracy, no differential hierarchical tendencies exist between younger employees who joined the bureaucracy less than two years ago, and older employees who joined the bureaucracy roughly 25 years ago. Employees in Indian bureaucracy continue to be dependent on their superiors and continue to be conscious of the status of their superiors

Petukhov (2007) This paper discusses a survey that focuses on public’s opinion about Russian bureaucracy. The public has negative opinions about bureaucracy due to the problems relating to its ineffectiveness and the prevalent corruption of the economic and political elite. They see bureaucracy as one of the triads in the ruling authority aside from the president and his government and the rich businessmen. However, the public is not so worried about the ineffectiveness of bureaucracy, but rather its total corruption that brings the country to higher economic inequality

Reenock and Brian (2008)

This study develops an information exchange theory that portrays the impact of agency design choices on group-reported access as a function of the level of design-induced political insulation and the quality of the information offered by a given bureaucratic group

Feeney and DeHart (2009)

This paper tests the relationship between different forms of bureaucratic control (formalisation, red tape and centralisation) and reported employee perceptions and behaviour in local governments. Different types of bureaucratic control are related to distinct employee responses, and sometimes these responses are the very behaviours that reinventionists seek to trigger by reducing bureaucracy

Iocabuta and Baciu (2009)

The bureaucrats of the public sector do not operate for free – there are such things as lack of efficiency, poor management, bureaucratic inertia and corruption. The paper also deals with issues related to anticorruption strategy in Romania

Araujo and Joaquim (2009)

It examines the influence of New Public Management ideas in Portuguese administrative reform and discusses improvements in the way public services are implementing change, using new managerial tools in Portugal: the activity plan (AP) and the activity report (AR)

Winchell (2009) This article focuses on the different method to assess the opportunities and barriers that will affect change in the federal government organisation in the USA It has been suggested that the internal organisation needs to evaluate its ability to absorb changes based on the content of its policy guidelines and competencies of its employees

Persson and Goldkhul (2010)

Neither bureaucracy nor NPM alone supplies the core values for e-government as a practical management strategy. This paper concludes with a dialectical structure, where bureaucracy is the thesis, NPM the antithesis and e-government the practical synthesis

Farazmand (2010) This article addresses the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy, bureaucratic politics and democratic politics. It is hypocrisy to speak of functioning democracy without a balanced professional bureaucracy

Rosca and Moldovenau (2010)

This article discusses the background of the organisational processes of public administration, which is organisational culture and bureaucracy, elements that tend to an entity


3 Public perception of Indian bureaucracy

A study done by Transparency International in India in 2005 found that more than 50% of the people had first-hand experience of paying a bribe or using influence to get a job done in a public office.3 Transparency International estimates that Indian truckers pay something in the neighbourhood of $5 billion annually in bribes to keep freight flowing.

The World Economic Forum’s India Competitiveness Review 2009 reports that ‘inadequate supply of infrastructure’ and ‘inefficient government bureaucracy’ account for 40% of ‘the most problematic factors for doing business in India’ compared with 11% for ‘corruption’. The survey by the Hong Kong-based Economic and Political Risk Consultancy (PERC report, 2009) reported that Indian bureaucracy is the least efficient in Asia. Further, the report stated that Indian bureaucracy is a power centre in its own right at both the national and state levels, and its employees are extremely resistant to reforms that affect them or the way they go about their duties. A survey of values carried by the Management Centre of Human Values, IIM. Calcutta, in 1994 found that the relationships among superiors and subordinates are worse in the civil service (Bhattacharya, 2004).

The Right to Information Act (2005) and equivalent acts in the Indian states, which require government officials to furnish information requested by citizens or face punitive action, computerisation of services and various central and state government acts that established vigilance commissions have considerably reduced corruption or at least have opened up avenues to redress grievances. The 2006 report by Transparency International puts India in 70th place and states that significant improvements have been made by India in reducing corruption.

India is still one of the most difficult places for doing business, according to World Bank’s ‘Doing Business Survey, 2010’, which places India at the rank of 133 out of 183 economies. The survey conducted by babusofindia.com in June 2010 reveals that the perception about Indian bureaucrats as a force of stumbling block rather than facilitators has not really changed much despite a number of initiatives being taken to make Indian bureaucracy as effective as that of Singapore or Australia. About 33% of respondents suggested that the system is worst while 32% opined that system is improving.

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission’s 12th report states that bureaucracy in India is generally perceived to be ‘unresponsive, insensitive and corrupt’, and a common complaint against it pertains to excessive red tape. The report further states ‘the system often suffers from problems of excessive centralisation and policies, and action plans are far removed from the needs of the citizens. This results in a mismatch between what is required and what is being provided’. The end result is that officers perceive themselves as dispensing favours to citizens rather than serving them, and given the abject poverty and illiteracy, a culture of exaggerated deference to authority has become the norm. Over the last decade, liberalisation has improved the climate for investment in India, but it is often said that the biggest frustration for potential investors in India is the bureaucracy.

4 Highlights of the study on the Indian bureaucratic system

The present Indian bureaucratic system is an arm of the government. It is technically considered as a branch of the executive. However, the legislature also has some control


over its functioning. Administrative bureaucracy in India is the by-product of two major sets of influences: British tradition of the past and the democratic welfare state of the present. It represents the features of a legacy of the British era, a conservative steel framework and a ‘touch me not’ attitude. As a result, the Indian bureaucratic system has been often subjected to criticism that dysfunctionality has become the norm. However, it is argued that the same system has stood the test of time and survived for the last 60 years. Under the same system, India has achieved the second highest economic growth rate in the world, as of now.

4.1 Methodology

In order to ascertain the public thinking and gauge their assessment, a survey was carried out to analyse the public perceptions of the positive and negative aspects of the Indian administrative bureaucratic system using a set of scorecards designed to reflect some strengths and weaknesses of the system. People from various walks of life, such as retired persons, government servants, business owners, corporate executives, doctors, engineers, social workers, journalists, academicians and students, took part in a three-month online survey. This survey, perhaps the first of its kind, was conducted using a judgemental sampling technique, because the population is infinite in such sampling. E-mails were sent to about 2,500 individuals of IAS associations, teachers’ associations, medical associations, retired officers’ associations, transparency associations, women’s associations, journalists’ associations, government employees’ associations, engineers’ associations, NGOs, entrepreneur associations, MBA associations, management associations, research associations, and NRIs associations/clubs in the Middle East, USA, UK, Canada, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Kenya and South Africa, with a request to participate. The objective, aim and intention of the survey were explained to them. A total of 340 individuals responded to our online questionnaire, making a 13.6% response rate. The format of the survey instrument and scorecards used in the questionnaire was reviewed by several experts on the subject. The results were statistically tested to understand significant differences in parameters. The research instrument was put online in www.surveymethods.com.

4.2 Highlights of the findings

4.2.1 Composition of the sample

Of the respondents, 84% were resident Indian nationals and the rest were non-resident Indians (NRIs) from 13 countries. One of the striking features of the survey is that, about 59% of the respondents belonged to the age group, above 50 years, who could better recall their experiences with the system than their younger counterparts, and this improved the validity of feedback from the survey.

People in the 20–30 age group constituted approximately 17% of the total respondents. Retired persons constituted over 30% and government servants 9%. Over 63% of the respondents had postgraduate qualifications and 15% had terminal degrees (PhDs).

About 93% of the survey respondents stated that they had dealt with the government system for various services, e.g. passport, marriage certificate, death certificate, police services and other miscellaneous services. About 46% of those respondents were not satisfied with the services provided to them by the system, and more than 25% had bad


experiences with the system. Only 13.2% considered the system to be satisfactory. Approximately 98% had an interest in the improvement of the Indian administrative bureaucratic system.

The survey was divided into two parts: the IAS system (group A civil system) and the lower-level bureaucratic system.

4.2.2 Findings about the IAS system (group A civil system) Strengths and positive aspects: one of the highlights of the survey was that about 79% of respondents believe that the IAS system has the power to take decisions that directly affect people. Approximately 81% of the respondents felt that ‘there exist decent living and working conditions for the IAS officers’. Similarly, over 72% of the respondents felt that there is enough scope for promotion and new challenges for the profession. As high as 67.4% of the participants in the survey believe that the system is still capable of attracting good talent into the cadre through its strong recruitment process. Over 68% state that there is an aura in the public about the service. These positive points generally attract the best talent of the country into the IAS services. Weaknesses and negative aspects: an overwhelming 93.5% of those surveyed were of the opinion that, in the IAS system, ‘the tendency is to serve their political masters more than the public’, which perhaps indicates that they are more the servants of politicians and less the servants of the public. In the public perception, this sounds like some kind of unholy nexus between the two, which may be susceptible to the misuse of the system, as the bureaucrats may dutifully protect the interests of politicians. This finding really suggests a need for policy makers and administrative reformers to take a close look at this issue. Similarly, approximately 92% of the respondents were of the view that the ‘over-insured job security has made the IAS officers indolent and supremely arrogant’. In spite of this, the IAS officers are so entrenched that they advance smoothly to senior positions. Furthermore, 89% of the respondents held the view that the ‘reward system is basically skewed towards the corrupt officers who get prime postings while the honest officers often get punishment transfers’. About 85% of the participants in the survey agreed that the IAS system ‘encourages only generalists and not management specialists’. This finding calls for the introduction of a lateral recruitment process into the system in order to enhance professionalism and make it more efficient and effective. It is widely held that there are three types of activity involved in the system: 1 transaction analysis 2 strategic analysis 3 strategic planning. However, in order to enhance the latter two aspects, lateral entry into the system is essential, particularly when recruiting officers into the technical departments of the government. Main constraints: it is often said that the IAS system is not designed to cope up with the political, economic and social transformations taking place. The IAS officers have to know the wishes of their political masters even if it is against the interest of the people. Officers who protest are either transferred or have obstructions in their career growth. Sankar (1997) argues that the IAS system is said to be based on a centralised concept taken at the top percolate down through various levels to the grassroots. In this system,


planning and development decisions are made at the top level by a few people with unfamiliar with ground realities. Then, these make insensitive to aspirations, constraints and needs of local people. Over 90% of the survey respondents felt that political pressure is the major constraint of the civil service system. Interestingly, 89% of the respondents also hold the view that there is ‘no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint, and public relations are aimed at mere propaganda rather than establishing rapport with the community’.

4.2.3 Lower-level bureaucratic system Strengths and positive aspects: a vast majority of the participants (77%) believed that one of the positive aspects with respect to the lower-level bureaucratic system is ‘excessive dependence of senior officers on the junior level bureaucrats’. Approximately 62% of those surveyed agreed that the lower-level bureaucratic system constitutes ‘an integrated and inseparable part of the governing system’. Furthermore, 47.6% considered ‘proper documentation and creating memory banks of decisions’ as one of the positive aspects of the system. Weaknesses and negative aspects: a vast majority (93%) of those surveyed felt that the lower-level bureaucrats had ‘no sense of proper utilisation of public money, and the work is not done in an efficient and timely manner’. This is a serious issue and a clear indication of the existence of a cult for wasteful expenditure and non-existence of cost consciousness in the system. Almost 92% of respondents also agreed that the lower bureaucratic level in India is ‘insensitive and hostile in attitude while serving the poorest sections of society’. Approximately 91% of the respondents also believed that the ‘system encourages a culture of connections (Vasta or Jaan Pehchaan culture)’. Another key weakness of the lower bureaucracy highlighted by 91% of the respondents is that ‘promotions are based on seniority rather than merit and there is a dearth of performance-oriented motivations or even incentives’. Main constraints: it is often said that the lower-level bureaucratic system suffers from loss of initiative, corruption, arbitrary/blatant use of authority, while they are on field duty and dealing directly with common men. Similarly, it is also argued that political interference is often concerned with expediting schemes of welfare and development and breaking rigidity of administration. Later on, interference became more an aspect of power politics. Politicians wanted the help of administrators to accede to the particularistic nature of articulation of citizen’s interest.

About 79% of the respondents cited ‘political intervention’ as one of the major constraints with respect to the lower-level bureaucracy, and 70% cited ‘fewer opportunities for professional growth’ as another.

5 Analysis and interpretations of survey-based public perceptions

Over 54% of the total respondents felt that the system is a complete failure. A reasonable majority (54%) held the view that there can be an alternative to the present system and only about 16% said ‘no’.

The respondents were concerned with the degree and extent of corruption prevailing in the system. It was suggested that there should be an effective vigilance mechanism to


root out the practice of corruption. A strong judicial system is required to meet the challenges. Promotions and transfers ought to be outside the powers and purview of politicians. Transfers should take place invariably intra-ministry/department and not inter-ministry/department.

Many of the respondents suggested that lateral entry into the system would bring in more professionalism. It was suggested that lateral recruitment would strengthen the system with specialists. Entry into the IAS should be lateral from all other Indian services, including defence cadres, on merit through competition. Some even suggested that civil service personnel should have an army training background before they are inducted into the civil administration. This would instil a greater sense of discipline, commitment, honesty and patriotism.

There were also suggestions for transparency in public dealings and incorporation of public sentiments into the system.

Respondents also suggested the need for administrative reforms. There is an urgent need to install, implement, monitor and institutionalise systems, with increased use and due integration of technology to provide transparency, accountability and autonomy. Respondents highlighted measures like right to information (RTI) implementation in this context. The importance of e-governance was also emphasised by many respondents. There were also suggestions to free the administration from the influence of politicians.

Some respondents suggested that selection, training, performance appraisal, promotion and punitive measures should be brought under the purview of a special authority at the centre and state levels. There were suggestions calling for clear criteria for performance-based promotion, on the basis of merit and not seniority. Incentives must be linked to performance. Some suggested that promotions should be based on competitive exams and services based on contracts for every two years. Furthermore, there should be scope for the public to raise disputes over the appraisal of the performance of the civil servants, which should be settled by an independent body and not by government departments.

There were also suggestions for the introduction of ethics committees into the system. At the top level, a unified civil service is required. Some also highlighted the need for stringent checks at lower levels of the system for better handling of corruption-related issues. Other suggestions included zero tolerance towards political interference and a two-tier pay structure. One widely held view that emerged was that, at the higher levels, the need is for professionals rather than administrators.

6 Results of the statistical analysis

6.1 Analysis of the results for the IAS system

Tables 2 and 3 summarise the respondents’ views of the positive and negative aspects, respectively, of the IAS system.

The descriptive statistical analysis reveals that the most important positive aspect with respect to the IAS system, as perceived by the respondents, was the factor of decent living and working conditions. The mean value was 4.03 with a standard deviation of 0.892. Another attractive factor of the system was the power to take decisions. The scope for promotion and challenges and aura in public services were also significantly important aspects, based on the analysis of the descriptive statistics.


Table 2 Positive aspects of the IAS system

Mean Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD Decent working and living conditions 340 4 1 5 4.03 0.048 0.892 Power to take decisions that can directly affect people

340 4 1 5 4.01 0.057 1.057

Scope for promotion and new challenges 340 4 1 5 3.89 0.053 0.982 Aura in the public about service 340 4 1 5 3.71 0.057 1.04 Attracting good talent into the cadre through strong recruitment process

340 4 1 5 3.67 0.064 1.177

At entry level, bulk of entrants come with lot of idealism and wanting to do public good and take up challenging work

340 4 1 5 3.55 0.058 1.078

Wide scope for knowledge enhancement, skill-building and innovation

340 4 1 5 3.43 0.065 1.199

Despite a reservation policy, this system encourages territorial and national integration

340 4 1 5 3.12 0.064 1.17

Feel-good factor that you are doing public service 340 4 1 5 High level of flexibility and diversity that sustains an interest in the work

340 4 1 5 3.10 0.06 1.11

Table 3 Negative aspects of the IAS system

Mean Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD Tendency to serve more their political masters and less the public

340 4 1 5 4.59 0.038 0.704

The over-insured job security leads IAS officers to be permanent fixtures in the system, which was originally intended to be a source of continuity

340 4 1 5 4.54 0.037 0.688

The reward system is skewed towards corrupt officers who get prime postings while honest officers are shunted off to other postings

340 4 1 5 4.45 0.046 0.852

The system encourages only generalists and not specialists. Specialists and experts are essential for rapid growth of the country

340 4 1 5 4.33 0.047 0.861

Encourages a rigid bureaucracy with an exclusive process of decision-making in an overly centralised system

340 4 1 5 4.29 0.043 .801

The system encourages slow implementation of laws and decisions

340 4 1 5 4.21 0.049 0.904

Working under political pressure often leads to decisions based on management by crisis

340 4 1 5 4.20 0.047 0.870

The system has immense care for minute details and formalities, which often leads to excessive delays unless corrupt methods may be used

340 4 1 5 4.14 0.055 1.022

The lack of concern for responsiveness, commitment, awareness, accountability and transparency, along with the lack of professionalism and cost consciousness

340 4 1 5 4.08 0.052 0.950

Lack of genuine power to deal with staff who delay files

340 4 1 5 3.70 0.065 1.202


The analysis reveals that the most important negative aspect of the IAS system as perceived by the respondents was the tendency to serve more their political masters and less the public. The mean value was 4.59 with a standard deviation of 0.704. The other important parameters, which had mean values of 4.54, 4.45 and 4.33, respectively, were

1 the over-insured job security leads to IAS officers to be permanent fixtures

2 the reward system is skewed towards corrupt officers who get prime postings

3 the IAS system encourages only generalists and not specialists.

On a comparative basis, the mean values of the negative aspects were higher than those of the positive aspects. The highest positive aspect parameters had mean values of 4.03 and 4.01 and the rest of them were below 4. The highest negative aspect parameters had values of 4.59 and 4.54, with others having a value above 4 except for the last parameter. This signifies the extreme opinions held by participants with regard to the negative aspects of the IAS system.

6.2 Analysis of the results for the lower-level bureaucracy

Tables 4 and 5 summarise the respondents’ views of the positive and negative aspects, respectively, of the lower-level bureaucracy. Table 4 Positive aspects of the lower-level bureaucracy

Mean Parameters N Range Min Max Statistic SE SD

Greater dependence on them by seniors 340 4 1 5 3.91 0.049 0.906 An integrated and inseparable arm of the governing system

340 4 1 5 3.48 0.055 1.017

Knowledge preservation 340 4 1 5 3.20 0.051 0.944 Proper documentation and creating memory banks of decisions

340 4 1 5 3.20 0.058 1.064

They are the handymen in explaining and making the public aware of government rules and procedures

340 4 1 5 2.88 0.065 1.203

Discipline both top down and bottom up 340 4 1 5 2.81 0.064 1.189

Faith in the system 340 4 1 5 2.76 0.059 1.08

Loyalty to the system 340 4 1 5 2.66 0.065 1.20

Exceptional skills in the case of emergency 340 4 1 5 2.60 0.062 1.149

Politeness (compared with IAS system) in dealing with public as they are paid from public money and more often they are first channel who deal with public

340 4 1 5 2.39 0.066 1.22


Table 5 Negative aspects of lower-level bureaucracy


No sense of wastage of public money when things are not done efficiently and in timely manner

340 4 1 5 4.55 0.039 0.725

Lack of concern, less motivation, insensitivity and even hostility in serving the poorer sections of society

340 4 1 5 4.48 0.041 0.750

The system encourages a culture of connections (vasta or jaan pehchaan culture) rather than full compliance with rules

340 4 1 5 4.46 0.040 0.730

Promotions based on seniority rather than merit and also lack of performance-oriented incentives

340 4 1 5 4.41 0.041 0.749

Secrecy, cumbersome procedures and unnecessary controls lead to incorrect interpretation and misuse of rules

340 4 1 5 4.40 0.039 0.728

Extremely rigid and mechanical procedures, which lead to obsession with rules rather than concern for output

340 4 1 5 4.39 0.041 0.750

An abysmal record of serving the public 340 4 1 5 4.31 0.043 0.792

Lack of modernisation 340 4 1 5 4.03 0.049 0.904

No power to take any decision, which often leads to low job satisfaction

340 4 1 5 3.89 0.056 1.03

Low salary compared with officials, which also leads to low job satisfaction

340 4 1 5 3.47 0.067 1.23

The most important parameter that emerged with respect to positive aspects of the lower bureaucracy was the greater dependence on the lower bureaucrats by their seniors. The respondents also felt that lower bureaucrats are an integrated and inseparable arm of the governing system.

The statistical comparison between the positive aspects of both higher and lower bureaucracy reveals that the mean values were higher for the IAS system than for the lower bureaucracy. The highest mean value for IAS system was 4.03, whereas for the lower bureaucracy it was 3.91.

Respondents very strongly felt that lower bureaucrats had no sense of wastage of public money. They are also insensitive to the concerns of the poorer sections of society. In the case of lower bureaucracy also, the respondents had extreme views on the negative aspects compared with the positive aspects.

6.3 Constraints on the system

Tables 6 and 7 summarise the respondents’ views of the constraints on the IAS system and the lower-level bureaucracy, respectively.


Table 6 Constraints on the IAS system


There is no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint and public relations are aimed at propaganda than establishing rapport with community

340 4 1 5 4.39 0.041 0.750

Political pressure 340 4 1 5 4.39 0.046 0.847

Collective accountability 340 4 1 5 3.89 0.060 1.10

Frequent transfers 340 4 1 5 3.69 0.055 1.009

Budgetary constraints 340 4 1 5 3.03 0.066 1.218

Table 7 Constraints on the lower-level bureaucracy


Political intervention 340 4 1 5 4.13 0.054 0.992

Fewer rewards for good work 340 4 1 5 3.77 0.060 1.105

Fewer opportunities for professional growth

340 4 1 5 3.71 0.057 1.056

Lack of coordination and communication

340 4 1 5 3.64 0.058 1.07

Poor adaptability to cope with change

340 4 1 5 3.59 0.061 1.118

The mean values for the five major constraints on the IAS system were higher than 3. The parameter of ‘no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint’ was found to be the main constraint, with a mean value of 4.39.

Political intervention and fewer rewards appeared as the major constraints on the lower-level system with mean values of 4.13 and 3.77, respectively. Fewer opportunities for professional growth were another constraint.

6.4 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by profession

Table 8 shows the results of the analysis of how differences in profession affect respondents’ perceptions of the IAS system and the lower-level bureaucracy. The analysis is divided into positive aspects, negative aspects and constraints. The analysis with respect to profession was carried out by segregating, the sample was segregated into professional working group (G1) and retired group (G2). The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.


Table 8 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by profession

By profession

Statements G1

meanG2

mean

t–Test (two tailed)

df = 337 Positive aspects of IAS system Attracting good talent into the cadre through strong recruitment process (IASP1)

3.62 3.68 −0.473

Aura in the public about service (IASP2) 3.64 3.74 −0.853 Decent working and living conditions (IASP3) 4.20 3.96 (2.23)* At entry level, bulk of entrants come with lot of idealism and wanting to do public good and take up challenging work (IASP4)

3.63 3.52 0.848

High level of flexibility and diversity that sustains an interest in the work (IASP5)

3.00 3.14 −1.08

Huge scope for knowledge enhancement, skill-building and innovation (IASP6)

3.38 3.46 −0.515

Scope of promotion and new challenges (IASP7) 4.19 3.76 (3.69)*** Power to take decisions that can directly affect people (IASP8) 4.02 4.00 0.156 Despite a reservation policy, this system encourages territorial and national integration (IASP9)

2.96 3.18 −1.59

Feel-good factor that you are doing public service (IASP10) 2.83 3.24 −(2.85)*** Negative aspects of IAS system Lack of concern for responsiveness, commitment, awareness, accountability and transparency along with the lack of professionalism and cost consciousness (IASN1)

3.96 4.12 −1.438

Tendency to serve more their political masters and less the public (IASN2)

4.79 4.51 (3.506)***

System has immense care for minute details and formalities, which often leads to excessive delays unless corrupt methods may be used (IASN3)

4.29 4.06 (1.915)***

Lack of genuine power to deal with their staff who delay files (IASN4) 3.71 3.69 0.098 The reward system is skewed towards corrupt officers who get prime postings while honest officers are shunted away from prime postings (IASN5)

4.65 4.36 (2.84)***

The over-insured job security leads IAS officers to be permanent fixtures, which was originally intended to be a source of continuity for the system (IASN6)

4.83 4.43 (5.22)***

Encourages a rigid bureaucracy with an exclusive process of decision-making in an overly centralised system (IASN7)

4.43 4.22 (2.24)**

Working under political pressure often leads to decisions based on management by crisis (IASN8)

4.33 4.14 (1.84)*

System encourages only generalists and not specialists. Having specialists and experts is essential for rapid growth of the country (IASN9)

4.57 4.22 (3.43)***

System encourages slow implementation of laws and decisions (IASN10)

4.44 4.12 (3.04)***

Positive aspects of lower-level bureaucracy Knowledge preservation (LLBP1) 3.11 3.24 −1.14 Proper documentation and preparation of memory bank decisions (LLBP2)

3.09 3.25 −1.27

Greater dependence on them by seniors (LLBP3) 3.92 3.91 0.095 Discipline both at top down and bottom up (LLBP4) 2.72 2.86 −1.06 Exceptional skills in the case of emergency (LLBP5) 2.45 2.66 −1.55


Table 8 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by profession (continued)

By profession

Statements G1

mean G2

mean

t–Test (two tailed)

df = 337 Faith in the system (LLBP6) 2.71 2.78 −0.587 An integrated and inseparable arm of the governing system (LLBP7) 3.47 3.48 −0.086 Politeness (compared with IAS system) in dealing with public as they, are paid from public money and more often they are first channel who deal with public (LLBP8)

2.17 2.48 −2.19

Loyalty to the system (LLBP9) 2.52 2.73 −1.48 They are the handymen in explaining and making the public aware of government rules and procedures (LLBP10)

2.77 2.92 −1.049

Negative aspects of lower-level bureaucracy An abysmal record of serving the public (LLBN1) 4.48 4.23 (2.67)*** Extremely rigid and mechanical procedures that lead to obsession with rules rather than concern for output (LLBN2)

4.54 4.32 (2.47)**

Secrecy, cumbersome procedures and unnecessary controls are prone to incorrect interpretation and misuse of rules (LLBN3)

4.54 4.34 (2.35)*

Lack of concern, poor motivation, insensitive and even hostile in serving the poorer sections of society (LLBN4)

4.67 4.40 (3.07)***

The system encourages a culture of connections (vasta or jaan pehchaan culture) rather than full compliance with rules (LLBN5)

4.63 4.38 (2.84)***

Promotions based on seniority rather than merit, and also lack of performance-oriented incentives (LLBN6)

4.47 4.39 0.927

No power to take any decision, which often leads to low job satisfaction (LLBN7)

3.94 3.86 0.693

Low salary compared with officials, which also leads to low job satisfaction (LLBN8)

3.30 3.54 −1.627

Lack of modernisation (LLBN9) 4.06 4.01 0.470 No sense of wastage of public money when things are not done efficiently and in timely manner (LLBN10)

4.72 4.48 (2.80)***

Constraints on the IAS system There is no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint, and public relations are aimed at propaganda than establishing rapport with community (IASC1)

4.58 4.30 (3.13)***

Collective accountability (IASC2) 3.69 3.97 (2.16)** Frequent transfers (IASC3) 3.54 3.75 −(1.74)* Political pressure (IASC4) 4.43 4.37 0.598 Budgetary constraints (IASC5) 2.68 3.19 −(3.66)*** Constraints on the lower-level bureaucracy Few opportunities for professional growth (LLBC1) 3.55 3.77 −(1.79)* Political intervention (LLBC2) 4.02 4.17 −1.27 Adaptability to cope up with change (LLBC3) 3.39 3.68 −(2.15)** Coordination and communication (LLBC4) 3.50 3.70 −1.54 Few rewards for good work (LLBC5) 3.59 3.85 −(2.02)**

*, **, ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.


For positive viewpoints about the IAS system, the group mean of retired people was higher than that of the professionals for six out of the 10 positive views. For the positive variables IASP3, IASP4, IASP7 and IASP8, the group means were higher for the professionals. Statistically significant difference was found for variable IASP3 at the 10% level of significance. Variables IASP7 and IASP10 showed statistical significance at all levels. Professionals believed more in the view that ‘there exists scope for promotion and new challenges’ in the IAS system. However, the view on ‘feel-good factor’ of public service was held more strongly by retired people. This may indicate the decreasing attractiveness of the IAS system for the newer generation of professionals. Professionals also more strongly held the view that ‘there exist decent living and working conditions’.

The analysis reveals that professionals held more extreme opinions than retired people about the negative aspects of the IAS system. The group means of all the negative variables were higher for the professional group, except for variable IASN1. Statistical significance at all levels was found for variables IASN2, IASN3, IASN5, IASN6, IASN9 and IASN10.

Professionals more strongly held the view that the IAS system encourages loyalty towards political masters rather than towards public service. They also had firmer opinions that the system takes immense care over minute details and formalities. They also more firmly believed that the reward system is skewed towards corrupt officers. Professionals had more extreme views regarding other negative aspects related to over-insured job security, rigid bureaucracy, encouragement of generalists and slow implementation of laws and decisions.

With respect to positive aspects of lower-level bureaucracy, retired people held more favourable opinions than professionals. The group means for positive aspects were higher for the retired group in comparison with the professionals, except for the variable LLBP3. However, none of the results was statistically significant.

With respect to the negative aspects of lower-level bureaucracy, professionals held more extreme views than the other group. The group means were higher for professionals for all the 10 negative aspects, with statistical significance for the first five variables and the last variable (LLBN10). Professionals had more negative views with respect to factors like ‘abysmal record of public service’, ‘extremely rigid and obsession with rules’, ‘secrecy and cumbersome procedures’, ‘lack of concern towards poorer sections of society’, etc. Professionals also widely held the view that the system encourages a culture of connections and low-level bureaucrats have no sense of wastage of public money.

With respect to constraints on the IAS system, statistically significant differences of opinion exist between professional and retired groups with respect to factors, such as ‘there is no appreciation of citizen’s viewpoint’, ‘collective accountability’ and ‘frequent transfers and budgetary constraints’.

Similar differences were found with respect to the constraints on the lower-level bureaucracy. Retired people felt more strongly that major constraints on the lower-level bureaucracy are that there are fewer opportunities for professional growth and less reward for good work. Professionals felt more strongly that the system is unable to adapt to change.


6.5 Differences in the perceptions of respondents by age, residency and qualifications

Table 9 collects together the significant statistical differences that emerged when the results of the survey were analysed by the respondents’ age, residency and qualifications.

While Table 10 shows the overall assessment. Table 9 Significant statistical differences in the perceptions of respondents by age, residency

and qualifications

By age By residency By qualifications

Statements G1

mean G2 mean

t-Test (two tailed)

df = 338 G1

mean G2

mean

t-Test (two tailed)

df = 334 G1

meanG2

mean

t-Test (two tailed)

df = 338

IASP1 3.61 3.89 −(1.8)* IASP3 4.20 3.79 (4.32)*** IASP7 4.15 3.52 (6.09)*** 3.96 3.54 (2.91)*** IASP8 4.06 3.77 (1.86)* IASP9 3.06 3.33 −(1.74)* IASP10 2.92 3.38 −(3.48)***

IASN2 4.69 4.45 (3.13)*** 4.63 4.44 (1.74)* IASN3 4.25 3.97 (2.5)** IASN4 3.62 3.99 −(2.3)** IASN5 4.55 4.30 (2.61)*** IASN6 4.70 4.32 (5.27)*** 4.58 4.37 (2.06)* IASN7 4.44 4.07 (4.25)*** 4.33 4.02 (2.56)* IASN8 4.28 4.09 (1.93)* 4.24 3.94 (2.29)** IASN9 4.46 4.15 (3.30)*** 4.39 4.00 (3.04)*** IASN10 4.36 4.01 (3.62)*** 4.27 4.01 (2.15)** LLBN1 4.45 4.11 (3.9)*** 4.35 4.08 (2.28)** LLBN2 4.48 4.26 (2.62)*** 4.42 4.19 (1.97)* LLBN3 4.51 4.25 (3.28)*** 4.44 4.23 (1.88)* LLBN4 4.59 4.33 (3.21)*** 4.52 4.25 (2.4)** LLBN5 4.56 4.32 (3.01)*** LLBN8 3.32 3.70 −(2.82)*** 3.39 3.92 −(2.9)***

LLBN9 3.95 4.13 −(1.74)*

LLBN10 4.65 4.40 (3.16)*** 4.60 4.31 (2.72)*** IASC1 4.52 4.20 (4.01)*** 4.42 4.21 (1.87)* IASC2 3.74 4.09 −(2.95)***

IASC4 4.34 4.56 −(1.94)* IASC5 2.80 3.35 −(4.20)*** 2.98 3.33 −(1.92)*

LLBC1 3.62 3.83 −(1.78)*

*, **, ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.


Table 10 Overall assessment

G1 Mean G2 Mean t-test (two tailed) Df = 338

By residency Df = 334 3.53 3.42 0.649

By profession Df = 337 3.83 3.38 (3.48)***

By age 3.67 3.30 (3.072)*** By qualification 3.55 3.40 1.021

***denotes statistical significance at 1% level.

6.5.1 Analysis on the basis of age: perceptions about the IAS system

The age-wise analysis was based on the classification of age 50+ and the rest. The t-test results were statistically significant at all levels for the positive aspects of IAS for the variables IASP3, IASP7 and IASP10. But it has to be noted that the t-value for IASP10 is statistically negative, with the group mean for age group of 50+ much lower than the rest. This signifies the fact that the higher age group respondents, with much more experience, are not very impressed by the ‘feel-good factor’ of doing the public service compared with the rest. With respect to the negative aspects of the IAS system, except for IASN1 and IASN4, the variables were all statistically significant. Variables IASN2, IASN5, IASN6, IASN7, IASN9 and IASN10 were statistically significant at all levels, IASN3 was significant at 5% and IASN8 was significant at 10%. The group mean for all the negative aspects variable of the IAS system was higher for the respondents of the higher age group. This indicates that the people in the higher age bracket, who have more experience with the system, held more negative views about the IAS system compared with the rest.

6.5.2 Analysis on the basis of age: perceptions about the lower-level bureaucracy

Age-wise analysis reveals that there exists no significant statistical difference among the respondents with respect to the positive aspects of the lower bureaucratic system. The group means of the respondents aged 50+ were lower for variables LLBP4-P6 and LLBP8-P10. This indicates their low level of opinion towards the lower bureaucracy compared the rest.

These results suggest that the greater the experience with the system, the more negative the perception that people develop towards it.

The analysis of the negative aspects of the lower bureaucratic system reveals that there is a statistically significant difference between the higher and lower age groups. Except for LLBN6 and LLBN7, all other negative viewpoints are statistically significant. The mean of the higher age group was higher than that of the lower age group for all variables except for LLBN8 and LLBN9. This again, signifies that the more experienced people have a more negative opinion about the lower bureaucratic system compared with the less-experienced people. The t-statistics for LLBN8 and LLBN9 are −2.82 and −1.74, respectively, with statistical significance. This can be interpreted to mean that the low salary level leads to low job satisfaction, which is a view more widely held by the lower age group. Perhaps it reflects the sense of expectation of the younger people in the


competitive world. Moreover, the viewpoint of ‘lack of modernisation’ in lower bureaucratic levels is most ‘agreed’ by the lower age group.

With respect to the constraints on the IAS system, viewpoints IASC1, IASC2 and IASC5 were found to be statistically significant at all levels. The means of the higher age group were found to be higher for IASC1 and lower for both IASC2 and IASC5. Hence with respect to the perception that there is ‘no appreciation of citizen’s viewpoint’, the higher age group had stronger views than the lower age group. The lower age group had more positive skewness towards the constraints of collective accountability and budgetary constraints.

The constraint ‘lack of professional opportunity for growth’ was statistically significant for the lower-level bureaucracy, with the mean being higher for the lower age group.

6.5.3 Analysis on the basis of residency

The respondents were classified into Indian residents and NRIs for the purpose of analysis. Statistically significant results were found for positive variables of IASP7 and IASP8. The means were higher for the Indian resident group compared with the NRI group. Hence it can be stated that Indian residents held firmer beliefs that there is scope for promotions and new challenges in the IAS system compared with the NRIs. Similarly, Indian residents strongly held the view that the IAS system has the power to take decisions that directly affect people.

With respect to the negative aspects of the IAS system, the mean for the Indian residents was higher for all the statistically relevant variables compared with the NRI group. Hence it can be highlighted that Indian residents held much stronger negative views about the IAS system.

The variable ‘IAS encourages only generalists’ was statistically significant at all levels. Indian residents held a stronger negative view about viewpoints like ‘over-insured job leads IAS officers to be permanent fixtures of in the governing set-up’ and that ‘the system encourages rigid bureaucracy in an overly centralised system’.

The negative perception towards lower bureaucratic levels held by Indian residents was greater than that of the NRIs. The mean for all the statistically relevant negative variables was higher for the Indian residents. Indian residents held stronger negative views about aspects, such as ‘rigid obsession with rules’, ‘culture of connections’, etc. However, NRIs strongly felt that the ‘low salary level of lower bureaucracy leads to job dissatisfaction’.

With respect to constraints of the IAS system, the Indian residents felt more strongly than the NRI group that there is ‘no appreciation of the citizen’s viewpoint’. However, the viewpoint of the budgetary constraint on the IAS system was held more strongly by NRIs than by the Indian residents.

6.5.4 Analysis on the basis of qualifications

This analysis was based on postgraduate (PG) and PhD qualifications versus the rest. For the positive aspects of IAS system, statistically significant results were observed for variables IASP1 and IASP9. For negative aspects, the variables of significance were IASN4 and IASN10. The mean of the PG and above group was lower compared with the


rest of the group for the statistically significant positive variables. This highlights the fact that higher the education level, the lower the level of satisfaction with the system.

The qualification-wise analysis results for the negative aspects of the IAS system show that highly qualified people strongly hold the view that ‘there is no sense of wastage of public money when things are not done efficiently’ compared with the less educated group. However, the view that there is lack of genuine power to deal with staff who delays files is more strongly held by the less-educated group.

None of the positive and negative aspects of the lower-level bureaucracy was found to be statistically significant. The constraint ‘political pressure’ on the IAS system had statistical significance at 10%, and this view is more widely held by the people with lower educational qualification.

7 Conclusion

7.1 Summary

This online survey, based on a sample size of 340 responses, was carried out to ascertain the public perceptions on the positive and negative aspects of the Indian administrative bureaucratic system. The validity of the survey was enhanced by the fact that about 59% of the respondents belonged to the age group above 50 years, who could better recall their experiences with the system than their younger counterparts.

Only 13% of the respondents were satisfied with the system. With respect to positive aspects of the IAS system, about 79% of respondents believed that the IAS system has the power to take decisions that directly affect people. Approximately 81% of the respondents felt that ‘there exist decent living and working conditions for the IAS officers. An overwhelming 93.5% were of the opinion that, in the IAS system, ‘the tendency is to serve their political masters more than the public’.

Approximately 89% of the respondents held the view that the ‘reward system is basically skewed towards the corrupt officers, who get prime postings while the honest officers often get punishment transfers’. About 85% of the respondents who took part in the survey agreed that the IAS system ‘encourages only generalists and not management specialists’. Over 90% felt that political pressure is the major constraint of the civil service system.

About 77% believe that one of the positive aspects with respect to the lower-level bureaucratic system is ‘excessive dependence of senior officers on the junior level bureaucrats. A vast majority (93%) of those surveyed felt that the lower-level bureaucrats had ‘no sense of proper utilisation of public money, and the work is not done in an efficient and timely manner’. Another key weakness of the lower bureaucracy highlighted by 91% of the respondents is that ‘promotions are based on seniority rather than merit’. More than 70% cited that political intervention and fewer opportunities for professional growth are major constraints in the lower bureaucratic system.

The descriptive statistical analysis reveals that the most important positive aspect with respect to the IAS system as perceived by the respondents is the factor of decent living and working conditions, and the most important negative aspect is the tendency to serve more their political masters and less the public.

The most important parameter that emerged with respect to the positive aspects of the lower bureaucracy is the greater dependence on the lower bureaucrats by the seniors.


With respect to negative aspects of the lower bureaucracy, respondents ranked the factor ‘lower bureaucrats had no sense of wastage of public money’ as the highest.

Statistical analysis was also carried out to gauge the differences in opinion among the respondents on the basis of classification in terms of professional group, age, residency status and qualifications. The analysis reveals that professionals held more extreme opinions about the negative aspects of both the IAS system and the lower-level bureaucracy than retired people. Statistically, significant differences of opinion exist between professional and retired groups with respect to the constraints on both the IAS and the lower bureaucratic system.

The study found that higher age group respondents with much more experience are not impressed with the ‘feel-good factor’ of serving the public compared with the rest. In terms of age analysis, it can be concluded that the more the experience people have with the system, the more negative the perceptions they develop towards the system.

The analysis on the basis of residency reveals that Indian residents held much stronger negative views about the IAS system than their NRI counterparts. The qualification-wise analysis results for negative aspects of the IAS system show that highly qualified people hold more strongly the view that ‘there is no sense of wastage of public money when things are not done efficiently’ than the less-educated group.

7.2 Recommendations

Reforms ought to be the mantra for the revitalisation of the Indian bureaucratic system. It is high time that a way was found out to break the vicious circle of inefficiency of the system. It is a pathetic fact that only a minuscule minority of the bureaucrats are punished or reprimanded for their misdemeanours or incompetence.

A plethora of committees have been set up for recommending measures to make the bureaucracy accountable and deliver as per the national agenda. Unfortunately, the suggestions never turn into reality. Innovative mechanisms like a state commission independent of government for appointing bureaucrats could be implemented. Technocrats and specialists need to be appointed at various levels of the bureaucratic system. It is quite interesting to note that it is the technocrats/specialists who have pioneered major reforms in India. The green revolution, major breakthroughs in the areas of nuclear science, space, telecoms and economic reforms were piloted by technocrats and specialists.

The performance of the public service system must be appraised, leadership and teamwork improved and a culture of continuous improvement promoted. The values of probity and political independence need to be combined with newer qualities of leadership, excellence, openness, accountability, productivity and dynamism. The excessive concern with procedures must be replaced by a focus on results. The concerns of responsiveness, commitment, awareness and accountability espoused by the National Training Policy document formulated by the Government of India for its bureaucracy are in place. However, the challenge for academia is to produce case studies and innovative training methodology, concentrating on human values instead of merely on skills.

There should be an effective vigilance mechanism to root out the practice of corruption. Inefficiencies in bureaucracy can be resolved through the enabling power of technology. Appropriate incentives for improved transparency and control of corruption could be provided.


7.2.1 Establishment of a national academy of civil services

Lastly, there have been suggestions for the establishment of a national academy of civil services (NACS). One of the respondents to the survey believes that those selected through a preliminary selection process should be trained at such an academy for at least two years, as follows:

• first six months training at the National Defence Academy (NDA) at Pune or by the instructors from the NDA

• next three months, induction (rules, regulations, expectations of the government, etc.)

• next six months, training in rural areas (at least four different places, one each from northern, southern, western and eastern regions of the country)

• next four months, training in urban centres, including one metro, one tier-II city and two district headquarters (with appropriate geographical spread)

• on-site training for four months, two months each at a central government ministry and a state government ministry

• balance of one month being a cushion to take care of movement from one centre/office to another and to meet other contingencies.

7.3 Limitations of the survey

We used a judgemental/convenient sampling as the population is infinite, therefore there could be errors in representation of the respondents and it cannot be claimed that the sampling was truly representative.

In view of the sensitiveness of the topic, it may be possible that some respondents might have chosen to respond in a neutral range of the measures.

Another possible limitation of a questionnaire for this type of survey may be the possible understanding of the scorecards used, and perhaps inconsistencies introduced by that misunderstanding.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers and the editor for their thought-provoking comments and suggestions in improving this paper. Special thanks are due to Prof. Sharad Asthana, USA, Mr. Raghavan, India and others for their valuable suggestions in the design of the questionnaire.

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Notes 1http://www.egovonline.net/articles-list/45-cover-story/7273-indian-bureaucracy-rated-worst-in-asia.html.

2Marshall Sashkin, Leadership That Matters, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2002, ISBN 1-57675-193-7; George Ritzer, Enchanting a Disenchanted World: Revolutionising the Means of Consumption, Pine Forge Press, 2004, ISBN 0-7619-8819-X, Google Print, p.55.

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Appendix

Model 1 Public perception of negativism towards IAS system (see online version for colours)

Model 2 Public perception of negativism towards lower-level bureaucracy (see online version for colours)

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