A Survey of Macroprudential Policy Issues
description
Transcript of A Survey of Macroprudential Policy Issues
A Survey of Macroprudential Policy Issues
By David LongworthJohn Weatherall Distinguished Fellow,
Sept. 2011-May 2012Former Deputy Governor, Bank of Canada
9 June 2011
2
Introduction
What do we know about financial crises?• They are costly economically• They are predictable (but not perfectly!)• They are associated with the procyclicality of the
financial system• They are exacerbated by features of the cross-section
of financial firms (connections)• They are related to “market failures”• Therefore, regulation should focus on system, not on
individual institutions
3
Outline of Presentation
1. Introduction to Macroprudential Policy2. Market Failures in the Financial System3. Regulations to deal with Market Failures– A typology
4. Governance
4
1. Introduction to Macroprudential Policy
• Macroprudential policy:– Aimed at mitigating systemic risk:
• “risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or part of the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy” (IMF, ‘09)
– Has a “macro” or system-wide element– Has a “prudential” element (for “safety and soundness”)
• Hence not all financial stability policies are macroprudential
– Has a time series or procyclical aspect– Has a cross-section aspect
• Interrelationships among banks; common exposures
5
• Time series aspect:– Cycles in financial variables, particularly credit– Antecedents: studies of credit cycle; Minsky (‘82)• Financial crises typically preceded by rapid credit
growth, and often asset price bubbles as well
– Subsequent statistical work predicting crises• Borio and Lowe (2002)• Borio and Drehmann (2009a, 2009b)
– Studies of leverage-margin-liquidity cycle• Leverage: ratio of assets to capital• Margin: ratio of equity(downpayment) to loan• Optimism leads to rising prices and liquidity, falling
margins, rising leverage; Pessimism to reverse
6
• Cross-sectional aspect– Models of contagion– Banks interrelated because hold each other’s
deposits, bonds, shares, repos, derivatives– When there is a liquidity shock, if don’t have
enough liquid assets may be forced to initiate fire sales (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011)• Reduced valuations of assets for competitors
– Losses reduce capital and in extremis lead to a credit crunch
7
• Macroeconomic consequences– Stem from credit crunches, decline in wealth (value
of banking sector) and effects of fire sales on the prices of assets
– New Keynesian models predict declines in output and inflation
– Estimated real effects can be extremely significant• Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) study of recent episodes
– Output growth 1 percentage point lower in ten years after crisis then in ten years before
– Unemployment much higher in ten years after the crisis than in the ten years before
– Yet, before crisis, typically no macroprudential authority
8
2. Market Failures
• Nature of overall market failure described by Shin (2010a) as: “Risk is being ‘under-priced.’ Banks take account of their own short-term objectives without taking account of the spillover effects of their actions on other banks and on the economy as a whole.”– Need to examine particular market failures
9
• Brunnermeier et al. (2009) describe 6 major negative externalities:– Banks are special as institutions
• Loss of funding access for failed bank’s customers• When a bank is in difficulty (liquidity, capital), it may restrict
new credit extension (“credit crunch”)
– Banks are special in their interconnections• “Pure informational contagion”• Interbank connections mean uncertainty about consequences
of failure of one bank• With banks in difficulty there will be fire sales, liquidity spirals,
and deleveraging• In the boom, excessive credit expansion and investment in
bubble assets will be associated with resource misallocations
10
3. Regulations to deal with market failures
• A typology of macroprudential instruments– Policies have largely fallen into three categories:
• Capital requirements (“risk-weighted” or simple)• Pigovian taxes (and subsidies)• Maximums or minimums (quantities; or elements of
credit conditions)
– Policies have dealt with three proximate concerns:• Excessive credit creation (in aggregate, or sectoral)• Insufficient liquidity (including maturity mismatch)• Continuation of a bank where little common equity is left
11
Typical bank balance sheetAssets Liabilities
Loans (including mortgages) Core deposits (term or “sticky”)
Highly liquid bonds Non-core deposits (could “run”)
Derivatives Derivatives
Repos Repos
Less liquid securities (poss. “fire sales”) Senior debt (bonds)(poss. “bail-in debt”)
Subordinated debt andPreferred shares (Tier 2 capital)
________________________ Common equity (Tier 1 capital)
Total assets Total liabilities
12
Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
Excessive Credit Creation
InsufficientLiquidity
Continuation of a Bank
Capital Requirements
√ √ √
Pigovian Taxes √ √ √Constraints on quantities, or on credit conditions
√
√
√
√
13
1: Informational contagion2: Loss of access3. Interconnection/failure4. Fire sales/cycles5. Restriction of new credit expansion (everything in column)6. Resource misallocations in booms
Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
Excessive Credit Creation (Aggregate or Sectoral)5
InsufficientLiquidity
5
Continuation of a Bank
5Capital Requirements
6 1,3,4 2,3
Pigovian Taxes 6 (and 4) 1,3,4 2,3Constraints on quantities, or On credit conditions
6
6
1,4
4
14
1: Informational contagion2: Loss of access3. Interconnection/failure4. Fire sales/cycles5. Restriction of new credit expansion (everything in column)6. Resource misallocations in booms
Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
Excessive Credit Creation (Aggregate)5
Excessive Credit Creation (Sectoral)5
InsufficientLiquidity
5
Continuation of a Bank
5Capital Requirements
6A
6B
1,3,4D
2,3E
Pigovian Taxes 6 (and 4)Bianchi-M.
6B
1,3,4D
2,3E
Constraints on quantities
6Credit Res R
1,4D
Constraints on credit conditions
6C
4C
15
A. Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
Excessive Credit Creation(Aggregate)
5
Capital Requirements:• (Base)• Conservation Buffer• Countercyclical Buffer• Systemic surcharge• Contingent Capital and
Bail-in Debt• Variable risk weights• Simple leverage ratio• Liquidity mismatch
• Basel III: 4.5% com. equity tier 1• Basel III: 2.5% • Basel III: 0 – 2.5%• Under consideration--- (another object of concern)
--- (another object of concern)• Basel III--- (another object of concern)6
16
1: Informational contagion2: Loss of access3. Interconnection/failure4. Fire sales/cycles5. Restriction of new credit expansion (everything in column)6. Resource misallocations in booms
B. Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
Excessive Credit Creation (Sectoral) 5
Capital Requirements• Variable risk weights • Bank of England (2009) 6
Pigovian Taxes √ 6
17
4. Fire sales/cycles5. Restriction of new credit expansion (everything in column)6. Resource misallocations in booms
C. Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
Excessive Credit Creation (Sectoral)
5
InsufficientLiquidity
5Constraints on credit conditions
• Minimum through-the-cycle margins and haircuts (CGFS)
• Maximum loan-to-value ratios on mortgages
• Other restrictions on mortgages (e.g., debt-service-to-income ratio)
6
• Minimum through-the-cycle margins and haircuts (CGFS)
• Maximum loan-to-value ratios on mortgages
4
18
1: Informational contagion3. Interconnection/failure4. Fire sales/cycles5. Restriction of new credit expansion (everything in column)
D. Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
InsufficientLiquidity5
Capital Requirements• Systemic surcharge
• Liquidity mismatch
• Under consideration by BCBS. See also Gauthier et al. (2010) 1,3,4
• Geneva Report 11 (2009) 1,3
Pigovian Taxes• General• Non-core deposits• Capital inflows
• √ 3,4• Shin, Korea 1• 4
Constraints on quantities
• Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio• Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio
19
1: Informational contagion2: Loss of access3. Interconnection/failure4. Fire sales/cycles5. Restriction of new credit expansion (everything in column)6. Resource misallocations in booms
E. Object of Concern:
Macroprudential Instrument:
Continuation of a Bank
5Capital Requirements• Contingent capital and bail-in
debt• BCBS and OSFI (BoC, 2010)
2,3
Pigovian Taxes • (insurance premiums: paid to private sector insurer or public sector) 2,3
20
• Which macroprudential instruments and how many? What are the unresolved issues?– Can ask the question in a theoretical world without
constraints– But can also ask about a world in which taxes would have
to be approved by legislatures, and one in which there is already risk-weighted capital regulation
– Geneva Report 11 appears to be asking it in the second context—emphasize capital regime
– Policymakers have generally decided to focus on the time-series dimension (excessive credit growth) through capital
– Still a lot of differences on the approach to the cross-section dimension as it applies to liquidity (a concept which has many different dimensions)
21
• Strain of the literature (Shin, Korea) in which the connection between the growth in assets and growth in liabilities is essential to results– Especially true when the acceleration in credit is
financed by an acceleration in “short-term” or “non-core” liabilities
– If this is a general feature of financial cycle, the dimensionality of the policy problem may be much reduced (i.e., negative externalities not all independent)
– All this argues for a closer study across time and across countries of the association of accelerations in credit with the acceleration in various types of liabilities
22
• The focus on the health of lenders suggests an examination of how the health of specific types of borrowers (and their loans) might feed back on the health of lenders that rely heavily on collateral– Special focus on mortgages and on repos in this regard– Close examination of whether separate regulation is
needed for loan-to-value ratios and haircuts, as opposed to relying on capital to cover all credit risks
– Housing price bubbles in many crises, but is dealing with negative externalities associated with behaviour of total credit sufficient?
23
• Liquidity is the “column” where much of the work, both theoretically and in practice is less compelling than in the other columns– In part, because of multidimensional nature of liquidity
mentioned already– In part, because of multidimensional nature of negative
externalities– Basel III liquidity regulation needs to spell out what
happens when system under stress (relax constraints)– Since most academic work treats negative externalities one
by one (for tractability?) results are more difficult to use directly in policy
24
4. Governance
• Emphasis on governance for achieving results– A framework for achieving a desired objective– Specific governance practices to aid in
effectiveness• Legitimacy, relationships, structure of decision-making
Powers
Activities: Data Collection, Surveillance, Analysis, Stress Testing, Risk Assessment
Policy Instruments: Macroprudential instruments, Advice on policies, Warnings
Goals: Dampening procyclicality and reducing potential effects of contagion
Objective: Avoiding significant financial instability
Framework
25
26
• Does macroprudential authority set macroprudential instruments or just require “comply or explain” by microprudential regulator?– Not independent of who the authority should be
Committee or organization responsible
Legitimacy
Relationships
Governance
27
28
• Committees have advantages in the elements that come together to enhance achieving objectives:– Legitimacy that comes from a variety of experience– Significant ties to important international bodies:
• G20, FSB, BCBS, IOSCP, CPSS, CGFS, BIS Governors
– Blinder and Morgan (2005): “group decisions on average better than individual decisions”
– EU and US vs. UK in terms of structure• Need effective framework, leadership, and motivation
– Given market failures, what are structures and practices more likely to achieve a financial stability objective?
– Canada: FISC agencies, NSR, CMHC
29
Conclusion
• Macroprudential approach has old roots:– Systemic risk, negative externalities, bank runs– Traditional microprudential instruments– Procyclicality (historical episodes, credit cycle)– Automatic stabilizers– Networks and contagion– Behavioural finance, macroeconomics of financial
frictions
30
• Much has been accomplished in the last four years, but much remains (Ph.D. theses and articles; international standards, policies)– Two sides of same balance sheet but
multiple assets and liabilities– Collateralized credit and leverage– Role for monetary policy?– Trend in financial health of household sector– Governance of macroprudential policy