A structural perspective to advancing complex social outcomes

Journal of Public Affairs (2012)Published online in Wiley Online Library(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.1434

■ Special Issue Paper

A structural perspective to advancingcomplex social outcomes

Keith Thomas*

Faculty of Business and Law, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia

*CorVictoE-ma

Cop

A key question in advancing sustainability outcomes is how to devise a system of incentive structures that can improvecapacity to guide interactions towards more sustainable trajectories. This paper examines incentives and associated rulesfrom a structural perspective, highlighting social dynamics and workplace realities that shape actual practice.Understanding and using these hidden forces will be necessary, if policy is to successfully shape local and organisationalprocesses in order to advance desired social outcomes. The social landscape model illustrated provides a framework toconsider the effect of structural and social influences. Managed suitably, there is potential for positive shifts with suitablesocial triggers. This is a leadership challenge, and the necessary steps to achieving sustainability outcomes are identified assymbolic and procedural, shaped by local context and ultimately determined by agency that stimulates consciousness anduses hidden social forces to pull collective behaviour in the desired directions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Pull a string and it will follow. Push it, it will gonowhere at all. (Dwight D. Eisenhower)

INTRODUCTION

Sustainability as a social outcome extends thedecision-making dilemma leaders face to includefundamental interactions between nature and society.Involving some core questions around multiple andinteracting stresses, a key question is how to devisea system of incentive structures including rules,norms and information that can improve capacityto guide interactions towards more sustainable trajec-tories (Kates et al., 2001). To illustrate the dilemma, interms of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, whilethe cumulative emissions have been disproportion-ately from developed countries, the impact is antici-pated to affect the poorest countries (Frame andHepburn, 2010). As Frame and Hepburn also noted,the case for emission reduction is uncontroversial,on the basis of justice-based arguments. Yet, effortstomitigate emissions present a formidable impositionon the world economy, with the cost estimated ataround one per cent or more of global gross domesticproduct. Governance of mitigation is another issue.Given existing and foreseeable capabilities, how doesone manage measurement and verification, and what

respondece to: Keith Thomas, Faculty of Business and Law,ria University, Melbourne, Australia.il: [email protected]

yright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

of conditionality of transfers in face of accusations ofimperialism or paternalism by some countries?(Frame and Hepburn, 2010) There is clearly greatscope for disagreements.Stepping outside sustainability science and the

science and technology community, this paperexamines incentives and associated rules from astructural perspective. In the corporate world, as forpublic policy related to sustainable development,there are often no easy answers. Rather, there is com-plexity in activity and choices are not painted in blackand white, but in shades of grey. Often, also, the real-ity is that there is more than one ‘right’ answer andleaders will need to select the ‘best right’ option(Badaracco and Rosenbaum, 2006). Sometimes, theremay be no obvious right answer; these are the so-called wicked or ill-structured problem, which reflecta diversity of interests embedded in a dynamic socialcontext. Using recent public events, this paper high-light social dynamics and workplace realities thatshape actual practice. Understanding and using theseforces will be necessary, if policy is to successfullyadvance desired social outcomes. Ultimately, this isa leadership challenge, with sustainability outcomesperhaps best enabled by the analogy of the string inEisenhower’s comment above.

WORKPLACE REALITIES—A STRUCTURALVIEW TO DECISION MAKING

With sustainable development one of the foremostissues facing the world, the effects of human

K. Thomas

behaviour are implicit in the question ‘does it pay tobe green?’ (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008). It is the samewith other large questions, such as access to water,poverty and Third World debt, and/or child labour.The statistics of these issues facing society are avail-able, but as one commentator remarks the effects onreal policy are negligible (Saul, 1997). Given the scaleand scope of the respective issues, the inability to con-vert knowledge into sustained action is beyond anyideological divide between regulation and deregula-tion aimed at ethical and financial, or environmentaland social, responsibility. Rather, the central issueappears to be a behavioural one that reflects con-straining and enabling forces in complex sub-systemsthat in turn suggests a critical examination of twothings: first, the dynamics of power that is central tohaving things performed and second, the impact ofcontext, which can have a significant effect on behav-iour. A useful basis to examine these issues and theircollective impact on decisions is Giddens theory ofstructuration, which explains the shaping of socialrelations across time and space (Giddens, 1984). Theeffect is a human agency–social structure cycle asdepicted in Figure 1.

What this agency–social structure cycle meansis the ability by individuals and/or institutionalactors to act (and effect choice) and social structureoperate in a dynamic relationship (Gauntlett, 2001).The relationship, described as one of dynamicreciprocity, suggests that elements in the context enableor constrain the actions of people, while simultan-eously individual agency (actions) can work tochange the context itself. However, notwithstandingthe role for human actors, the key insight is thatknowledge(ability) is bounded, on the one hand byunconscious structural and social influences and onthe other by unintended system-wide consequences.

Noting the complexity of interests in terms ofadvancing mitigation strategies, structuration offersa useful framework to examine the forces involvedin order to devise incentive structures (in terms ofpush and pull effect) to guide sustainability initiatives.The recent near collapse of the financial system isinstructive in this regard, as it highlights multiple,interacting stresses and social influences. Highlightedby fallout from the global financial crisis, one possible

Figure 1 Human agency–social structure cycle

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

response (push) strategy is a heightened emphasis onethics and accountability (Zakaria, 2009), with ethicalchoice described as involving a choice between twooptions, one known to be right and another knownto be wrong (Badaracco and Rosenbaum, 2006). Yet,the reality is thatmany decisions that in hindsightweredeemed flawed or unethical were just the debit side ofchoices that offered significant (pull) advantage. Thatis, putting aside the actions of so-called rogue traders,most choices were/are driven by expected benefits.Not surprisingly, experience suggests advocating(pushing) ethical behaviour, although necessary is alsonot likely to be sufficient. In effect, if a decision offersan easier way of working or some other immediatebenefit and comes without obvious negative effect orcondemnation, it is likely to be preferred.One lesson from the financial crisis that emerges for

policy intended to moderate behaviour is that non-compliance can be compelling, particularly if onecannot see the costs. Expediency aside, stress-filled,time-sensitive situations are an insidious force, andliterature identifies ‘hot’ states of arousal (emotionand motivation) that greatly increase accessibility ofthoughts related to the immediate need (Kahneman,2003).What thiswork also highlights is the consequentimportant role for emotions, and a second lesson forpolicy development is that necessary large-scale be-havioural change will rest heavily on incentive struc-tures, as well as consensus and affective acceptance.

STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL FORCES

Although individuals and emotions matter, thehistory in industrial safety demonstrates ‘actionsare shaped and limited by local circumstance’(Reason, 2008: 75). This reality suggests that theaccompanying invisible structural and social forcesinvolved in any complex issue also deserve atten-tion as the influence of these forces can presentsignificant obstacles and downside risk for organi-sations and wider society (Reason, 2000). Import-antly, although negative or dark effects appear todominate in this analysis, as Saul (1997) noted,confronting realities is usually a negative processand a necessary first step towards awareness. Aswell, having understood the dynamics, it is possibleto make the invisible forces work in the opposite(positive) way. Bringing these two considerationstogether, what structuration reveals is the elementalnature of power (Fuchs, 2003). Social forces canwork to cause individuals and groups to do thingsthey might ordinarily never contemplate. Managedsuitably, these hidden or invisible forces can beharnessed to make it difficult for individuals andgroups to act in any way they choose. Equally, againsuitably managed, these forces have the potential toencourage (pull) individuals towards a positive,desired action.

J. Public Affairs (2012)DOI: 10.1002/pa

Advancing complex social outcomes

The influence of collective behaviour on groupactions is one example of an underappreciatedhidden social force (Quick and Kets de Vries, 2000;McNary, 2004). Familiar effects include herding orreinforcement behaviour that can encourage atendency to follow the crowd and the tendency forrisk-shift, where people in groups take greater risksbecause of a diffusion of responsibility, persuasionand/or social factors through group immersion,anonymity and reduced identifiability (Rapoport,1989: 387). Another social force that exerts a stronglyconforming influence is group norms. In a climate ofuncertainty and low accountability, dark norms suchas stereotyping and dehumanisation can normaliseunacceptable actions and lead to the emergence of aculture of impunity that allows people and groups toact in ways that would not be tolerated in normalsociety. The tobacco industry, in its prolonged delayto admitting the health risks posed by its productsand its reported attempt to falsely reassure the publicwhile being obstructive in placing healthwarnings onits products (Thomson and Wilson, 2003), is anillustrative example of dark norms and the resultantculture of impunity.

Beyond norms, the larger issue in collectivebehaviour is interdependence. In highly intercon-nected interactions, group or collective behaviouris very different from, and not a simple extrapola-tion of, individual behaviour (Rapoport, 1989; Ball,2005). Share trading and voting swings are someexamples of interdependence in decision making.Interdependence is encouraged by pre-existingsocial relationships that encourage rapid responses,by contagion through imitation, by leadership influ-ence of informal instigators and formal initiators,and by susceptibility of followers to factors such asawareness of alternatives, authoritarianism andideology (Muukkonen, 2008). Understanding choiceis thus rarely one dimensional, between option A orB; in a complex social landscape, the decision ‘space’can be described as having as many dimensions asthere are significant issues. Consequently, bundledtogether, choice can reflect the influence of factorsbeyond a person or group’s immediate experienceor ability to control. This makes it hard to predictthe response to events or inducements, which isarguably both a risk and a potential opportunity.

Reflecting the power of interdependence, oneinsight is that it can take very little to tip social be-haviour; examples include fashion and votingtrends, epidemics and peace movements. This influ-ence is well captured by Gladwell’s ‘tipping point’in a case history of New York City in the 1980s(Gladwell, 2000), which highlighted an abruptimprovement in crime rates as a result of removinggraffiti on trains in New York. Dramatic change ortransitions happen under unique conditions. Insocial activity, intensity (of stimulus) and the morecritical attribute of persistence are conditionsidentified by neuroscience research as evolutionary


responses to stimulate consciousness (Claxton,1998). Shifts can be by small changes at the margin,such as removing graffiti on trains. Another pathwayin an interdependent context is by the ending of ameta-stable state—a state at critical density so fragilethat a random fluctuation can lead to dramaticchange. To illustrate using densely moving traffic, ifa car brakes, other cars are forced to do so also andtraffic can suddenly become congested, whereas avehicle collision can cause all traffic to stop.

ILLUSTRATING COLLECTIVE SOCIALEFFECTS

Non-routine social activity, particularly in a highlyinterconnected and interdependent social land-scape, will involve the need to manage conflictingdemands. These collective structural tensions andsocial effects are explored in two recent, differentpublic events. The objective is twofold: to identifycontributing social forces and the pivotal events thattip social behaviour, the result of interdependence.

The global financial crisis—a culture of silence,moral ambiguity and shifting responsibilities

The financial crisis is described as ideological in itsroots, representing a tension between regulationand deregulation (Hirsh, 2009). However, viewedthrough the lens of social and structural forces, thisstudy would suggest a deeper, public interest issuerelated to an interdependent system in a meta-stablestate and prone to dramatic change. Blame for theglobal financial crisis, in hindsight, can be spreadaround—from politicians for deregulating themarkets to bankers for gambling with derivativesand the public for living beyond their means.Although a complex story, the essence is a prod-uct—credit default swaps (CDS) developed by agroup of bankers—that seemed good in terms ofprofit making, but turned bad over a period of twodecades (Tett, 2009). CDSs created in a situation ofprofit seeking group norms were sustained byincremental degradation of reasonable practice, aidedby pre-existing social relationships, moral ambiguityand weak governance.Although Zakarai argues that ‘markets are not

about morality’, the fact is most of what happenedwas legal, and as he acknowledges, few peopleacted responsibly or nobly (2009, p. 40). At a systemlevel, the influence of social and structural forcesbecomes evident. Hostile group norms, for example,appear to have become accepted or routinized overtime. This routinization was helped by the product’ssuccessful diffusion across the global economy,aided by a lack of regulation that freed individualfinanciers from external scrutiny and allowed themreportedly ‘to do as they liked’ (Tett, 2009). The


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fallout of this essentially sector-wide shift in respon-sibility was a credit bubble that revealed systemicconditions that had normalised irresponsible, if notunethical actions.

The financial crisis is compelling in that it was anunregulated boom (Lanchester, 2010). The crisis isalso compelling for what people did not do—a shiftof responsibility effected by a culture of silence andmoral ambiguity as bankers initially associated withCDS—failed to ‘declare their concerns aboutbundled risk’ and its ‘linkage to mortgage debt’(Tett, 2009, p. 81). Weak governance meant not onlylow regulatory commitment but also a structuralgap, with Zakaria (2009) noting that many of thesmart rules put in place in the 1930s, such as requir-ing banks to hold capital in order to offset liabilitiesand to maintain lower levels of leverage, have beenprogressively dismantled or consciously notupdated. In a tightly integrated system, driven byshort-term imperatives (quarterly results) and daytrading, bankers displayed a loose application ofsituational values with the pivotal factor likelybeing fear that spread like contagion across thefinancial sector.

Abu Ghraib: bounded rationality, dehumanisationand culture of impunity

Less public and more localised than the financialcrisis, the systematic and illegal abuse of detaineeswas similarly driven by short-term imperatives, inthis case intelligence gathering and the desire tosave US military lives. Whereas military personnelarguably showed a similar loose application ofsituational values, viewed as a system the issue sug-gests a parallel deeper, public interest issue relatedto an interdependent system in a meta-stable stateprone to dramatic change. The pattern of abuse inAbu Ghraib in Iraq in 2004 highlighted, accordingto one commentator, institutional failure of the USArmy prison system (Hersh, 2004b). This argumentis consistent with the reported ill treatment of pris-oners beyond Iraq in other US-run detention centresin Cuba and Afghanistan (Soldz, 2007; Semel, 2008).It is also consistent with the suggestion that theofficial position of a ‘few bad apples’ among themilitary police was only a cover story to protect a‘special access program’ using unconventionalmethods (Hersh, 2004b).

If cleaning up graffiti was a small but pivotalpositive change in Gladwell’s study of crime inNew York, what are the possible factors thatcontributed to failures such as that witnessed atAbu Ghraib? Consistent with earlier analysis of theMy Lai incident in 1968, during the Vietnam War,the roots of the prison scandal did not reside in the‘criminal inclinations of a few Army reservists’, butin the ‘primitive and immature behaviour of thegroup’ (Scott Peck, 1983: 216). This behaviour itself


had multiple causes, as the events in Abu Ghraibdid not occur in an operational vacuum.The journey towards prisoner abuse arguably

began weeks after the September 2001 attacks, withthe bombing of Afghanistan. According to Hersh(2004b), concern by Defence Secretary Rumsfeld overthe apparent hesitation to attack identified Talibantargets, because of apparent political correctness, ledto a secret program with blanket approval to kill orcapture and, if possible, interrogate high-value tar-gets. Citing concern that the war at that point wasat risk and something needed to be done, a formerintelligence official explained the rules were ‘dowhatyou want’ (Hersh, 2004b). Under the circumstances,the pivotal local factor in Abu Ghraib would appearto be the order that authorised male prisoners couldbe dehumanised by rough treatment and exposureto sexual humiliation (Higham and Stephens, 2004;Hersh, 2004a). Pre-conditions at Abu Ghraib, similartoMy Lai in Vietnam, included soldiers living in con-stant fear, facing nightly attacks on the prison com-plemented by riots and personal attacks byprisoners enraged over their poor living conditions(Soldz, 2007).Even as an external observer, the elemental nature

of power is evident in existing structures. Justifiedby the need to develop intelligence and the ‘waron terror’ that encouraged a strong sense of lossaversion (save US military lives), dark behaviourswere normalised under conditions of intense and per-sistent stimulus. The collective consciousness thatemerged, one of obtaining useable intelligence inorder to enable ‘mission’ achievement, led to a cultureof impunity (Soldz, 2007). Other attributes of thiscollective consciousness included a network of secret(black) prisons around the world, the practice of‘extraordinary rendition’ (involving apprehensionand illegal transfer of a person from one state to an-other) and extreme forms of torture, including waterboarding. At the other end of this cultural spectrum isthe symbolic effect of dehumanisation and humiliation;this is, as Hersh (2004a) says, unacceptable in anyculture and especially so in the Arab world.

REFLECTING ON PERFORMANCE ANDSUPPORTING CONDITIONS

What is common to both cases is short-term impera-tives that led incrementally to wider, perhaps uneth-ical, shifts. In Iraq, the wider intent of the warbecame liberation, yet as one soldier who spokeout identified, ‘[they were] doing more harm to thecitizens of Iraq than good’ (Denbeaux, 2010). Worse,people reportedly became conditioned over timeand inadvertently ended up behaving like accom-plices to evil. This is the core of structuration, whichGiddens called a duality in structure. In this dualrelationship, social self-organisation captures the sys-tem of change represented by the interplay between



opposite tendencies of structure and action, and thepotential always for unintended consequences inhuman actions. That the propensity for evil and baddeeds is highlighted, however, does not precludethe same possibility, but for good. As highlighted inthis paper, there are dark outcomes associated withthe reciprocal effects of power. While individualsunder stress can act unpredictably, social forces thatunderpin collective behaviour give a hidden senseof rationality to decisions that can take leaders andorganisations into awkward and dark places. This isnot to approve or condone actions. Rather, the aimis to explain outcomes because of hidden social forcesand effect of interdependence.

Reflecting on the prospects for enhanced decisionsand ‘sustainable’ environmental and social perform-ance, two central ideas emerge. First, collectivebehaviour is different from individual behaviour,and because of interdependence, there is a potentialunder certain conditions for large shifts, the resultof small incremental changes. Second, dramatic shiftstend to happen under a unique set of conditions.These conditions in a social context include issueintensity and persistence. If they intersect with lowaccountability, these conditions can contribute to ab-errant behaviour. Equally, group norms, leadershipboth formal and informal, and follower susceptibilityappear to act as either enabling or constrainingforces. Figure 2 illustrates these conditions and thepossible effects in terms of a group agency–socialstructure cycle.

Figure 2 Social landscape and effects in


This framework identifies key structural influencesthat can push or pull change, butwhat ismore import-ant is the pulling effect of leadership agency, wherethe intrinsic motivational effect of pull is preferred asit fits better with self-interest and is also likely to beself-sustaining. Operationalising both agency and so-cial structure strategies, still however, leaves thewider(potentially darker) effects of self-interest somewhatunresolved. Understanding the pervasive effects ofself-interested behaviour on power, the need seemsto be beyond another round of incremental changesin policies. Instead, the need appears more aboutmanaging the social dynamics. Figure 2 provides aframework to address this challenge.When looking to use this behavioural dynamic to

advance social objectives, there is unlikely to be asingle, or simple, reason for why companies mayadopt strategies beyond the profit motive. Equallycompliance or violation is neither intrinsically goodnor bad when seeking competitive advantage atcorporate level. This judgement can typically onlybe made in hindsight based on success or failure ofthe action. Nonetheless, there is a need to managerisk for the public good. In an industrial safety con-text, the focus is on changing the conditions underwhich people work (Reason, 2005). In sustainability,the focus naturally must coincide with corporateinterest; hence, both strong pull and push forcescan be invoked. Taking a lead from this research,one strategy is to develop organisational resistance(encouraging sustainable decisions) by providing

the agency–social structure cycle


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adequate resources and suitable technology, build-ing commitment, developing competence (know-ledge and skills in governance etc.) throughtraining and experience and facilitating better situ-ational awareness for more effective knowledgeapplication. In effect, the argument is build capacityfor self-sustaining agency by enacting agency itself.Complementing this approach, efforts are alsonecessary to reduce an organisation’s vulnerabilityto error and deviance (encourage positive actionstowards sustainability). In effect, build structuralcontrols that shape collective activity. Actionsinclude active audits, clear rules and regulationsthat, for example, control opportunity for personalbenefit (or wider corruption) and minimiseunfamiliarity with required tasks (Reason, 1997).

What the preceding analysis highlights is the utilityof intensity of stimulus and persistence in buildingpublic and corporate awareness, with the accompany-ing caveat that rules governing processes and the useof power will need to vary in terms of high-contextand low-context cultures. Turning our attention toimplementation strategies specifically, althoughindividual states have rational incentives to adapt toclimate change because sensible adaptation will savemoney, there is a much weaker incentive to mitigate,because states and firms do not internalise the effectsof their greenhouse gas emissions (Frame andHepburn, 2010). Because of this, as Frame andHepburn suggested, ‘conditionality’ can be expectedto become more acute, with discussions on therelationship between corruption (in nation statesreceiving transfers), disbursement and trust, and

Table 1 Procedural jus

Pull factors

Ethics and strong situational valuesGovernance and transparency on processMotivational and informational strategies(versus confrontational strategies)Access to technology and resourcesFuture market opportunities

Social forces:Interdependence, supported by:• Contagion• Leadership (informal instigators and formal initiators)Stimulated consciousness by:• Intensity of stimulus• Persistence• Socialisation (positive norms) reinforced by symbolic actionLinkage with other policy areas(transport, water, population, education)Trust and relationship building:• High context cultures (developing countries)suit indirect information sharing, and use of power(status and persuasion)• Persistence (in providing on-going education andevaluative information)


climate change becoming essential. This, as they pointout, is a procedural as opposed to distributive justicefocus and it suggests future questions that linkmitiga-tion policy with corruption reducing reform. Notingthe earlier point on cultural implications of dehuman-isation in an Arab world, another consideration maywell be cultural. A useful cultural framework is theidea of high and low context (Hall, 1976), wherehigh-context countries, such as China, Korea and Viet-nam, emphasise context, non-verbal cues and situ-ational factors such as person’s title and status, andtrust is viewed as more important than a legal con-tract. In contrast, as Hall explained, low-context coun-tries (US, UK, Canada and Australia) prefer explicitcommunication.Some considerations for practitioners and areas

for future research arranged in terms of push andpull factors are in Table 1.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As illustrated, the mediating effects of context are anuncertain component of performance. Figure 2 identi-fies the respective intent and conditions operating forindividuals and group, and in the social structure.Conditions highlighted include intensity of stimula-tion (stress) and persistence that can impact agencyby the individual or the group and so heighten thechance for dramatic change. Prevailing social normsand multiple-level structural influences can set theconditions that trigger actions (agency), which caninitiate dramatic shifts.

tice considerations

Push factors

Regulation and regulatory commitment• Structural rules and audits• CorruptionAccountabilityEcological problems

Guilt and social compulsion

Cultural imperialismPoor infrastructure and technology access

s



Although the specific details in complex problemscan vary considerably, collectively both cases illu-minate common conditions that contributed to aloose application of situational ethics that wereconditioned by the prevailing social structures. Theeffects on individuals and groups under persistentstress (profit motive and fear of financial loss, andintelligence gathering and defeat the insurgency,respectively) are clear; all that was needed was atrigger. The social landscape model (Figure 2)provides a framework to examine the effect of struc-tural and social influences. Managed suitably, like inGladwell’s New York graffiti on the trains’ example,there is arguably potential for positive shifts withsuitable social triggers. There is, however, aparadoxical tension in facilitating such complexoutcomes—given that many choices are driven byexpectations of benefit, non-compliance with rulesand regulations can also be compelling. This is thereality beyond idealism that the sustainabilitymovement and governments must address, particu-larly as the answer to the question—is it profitable tobe green—is that there is ‘little evidence to that effect’(Ambec and Lanoie, 2008: 48).

In closing, we return to the leadership challengepresented by Eisenhower at the start of this paper.Given the complex landscape and many competingsocial tensions, it is the job of governments to leadby symbolic actions and by policy that shapes thestructural context. Using earthquakes as an analogy,heat in the uppermantle (tensions) act like convectioncurrents below the surface to push and pull indivi-duals and groups at the surface. Periodically, thesetensions in the social landscape find release, likeearthquakes, and these releases can be unpredictable.It is the same with unintended consequences, the re-sult of corporate activity that can be irresponsibleand invite unpredictable change. However, likeearthquakes, these events are associated with certainconditions, and sociological research can cast muchneeded light on the interplay of individual and col-lective social mechanisms that can shape the neces-sary system of incentive structures to supportsustainable development and enable large-scalechange. The route towards better, sustainable deci-sions may well be, as Kates et al. (2001) suggested,through the interaction of global processes with eco-logical and social characteristics of particular placesand sectors. The necessary steps, however, to enact-ing these ideals are procedural, shaped by the contextand ultimately determined by (leadership) agencythat stimulates consciousness and uses hidden socialforces to pull collective behaviour in the desireddirections.

Successful change will require conditions such aspersistent socialisation, which stimulate conscious-ness and pull hidden social forces in the desireddirection, whereas policy and rules (push factors),as ever, must be guided by social responsibilityand public interest.


BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Keith Thomas is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty ofBusiness and Law in Victoria University. His currentresearch interests include professional and execu-tive development, facilitating learning and teachingin higher education, and leadership-related andmanagement-related topics including critical think-ing, decision making and communication skills. Hehas taught on both under-graduate and post-gradu-ate (MBA and MIB) programs in Australia, Chinaand Vietnam. He is a Visiting Military Fellow atthe Defence Leadership and Ethics Studies Centre,Australian Defence Force Academy.

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A structural perspective to advancing complex social outcomes

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