A Strategic Estimate for the Asia-Pacific Region - THOMAS a. MAHR ART

7/30/2019 A Strategic Estimate for the Asia-Pacific Region - THOMAS a. MAHR ART

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AIR WAR COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FORTHE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

byThomas A. MahrColonel, USAF

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTYIN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUMREQUIREMENT

Professor: Dr. J. Richard WalshAcoa"91j F~or /

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA NTT? -APRIL 1992

Av "I- it? Codes-- Dis Aw'~1 2and/or"Dtst 1 Sp\clal


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STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FORTHE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER

I. Strategic Direction. Recent dramatic events in Europe and theformer Soviet Union have outmoded th e United States ' 40-year oldgrand strategy focused on containing communism. President GeorgeBush outlined th e United States ' new role in th e world in this way:

Within th e broader community of nations, we see our own roleclearly. We must not only protect our citizens and ourinterests but help create a new world in which our fundamentalvalues not only survive but f lourish. (38:v)

These fundamental values form th e basis for the globalcomponents of U.S. national security strategy outlined below.

a. Major 'Components of National Security Strategy(1) Global Components. The global components of U.S.

national security strategy and their underlying aims are:a. The survival of th e United States as a free andindependent nation, with its fundamental values in tact and its

institutions and people secure.b. A healthy and growing economy to ensureopportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national

endeavors at home and abroad.c. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorousrelations with allies and friendly nations.d. A stable and secure world, where political andeconomic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions f lourish.

(38:3-4)(2) Regional components. The United States pursues a

policy of peaceful engagement and bilateral relationships in th eAsia-Pacific region which entails:

(a) Maintaining th e military all iances outlined inparagraph id. below.

(b) Actively promoting free and expanding markets inth e region;


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(c) Seeking to reduce th e U.S.' $41 billion tradeimbalance with Japan by gaining full access to th e Japanese market;

(d) Working to expand the U.S.- Japanese partnershipto fields like refugee relief, non-proliferation, and theenvironment; (e) Remaining committed to th e continued economicgrowth and security of th e Republic of Korea (ROK);

(f) Seeking appropriate contact and consultationswith th e People's Republic of China (PRC);(g) Fostering constructive and peaceful interchange

between Taiwan and th e PRC;(h) Seeking a resolution of th e conflict in Cambodiaunder the auspices of th e U.N.; and(i) Promoting professionalism, support for civilianauthority and respect for human rights in military-to-mili taryrelations.

b. Major Components of National M ilitary S trategy(1) Global components. The new defense strategy President

Bush announced in August 1990 sees the major threat facing th e U.S.as a major regional contingency in either Europe or the Pacific,rather than a short-warning, global war with th e Russians. The goalof this new strategy remains to deter aggression against the U.S.,its allies and interests. Should deterrence fail, our strategy seeksto defeat aggression on terms favorable to U.S. interests. Thefundamental military capabili t ies necessary to do this are:

(a) Survivable and highly capable strategic offenseand defense forces to deter war;(b) Forward presence in key areas to promote regionalstability and provide an initial capabil i ty for crisis response andescalation control;(c) Conventional forces capable of effectivelyresponding to short-notice regional crises and contingenciesthreatening U.S. interests; and(d) Capacity to reconstitute a larger force structureif th e nation once again is faced with th e threat of a massiveconflict. (11:5)

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Our strategy demands we be able to move men and materiel to thescene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field anoverwhelming force. To do this, we must assure our ability to useair and sea lanes and our access to space through maritime andaerospace superiori ty. (38:29) As a maritime nation dependent on thesea to preserve legitimate security and commercial ties, freedom ofth e seas is, and will remain, a vital U.S. interest.

U.S. military strategy continues to stress equitable, verifiablearms control agreements to reduce military threats, inject greaterpredictabil i ty into international relationships, and to channel forcepostures in more stabilizing directions. (11:5) Stopping th e globalproliferation df nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well asth e missiles that deliver them, is a top priority.

Alliances and other partnerships with friendly nations arecritical to our security interests. Alliances provide stability,deter aggression, and support th e forward presence of U.S. forces.For these reasons, we have entered into various bi-lateral andm ultilateral treaties and all iances in th e Asia-Pacific region.(40:11-1)

To help deter low-intensity confl icts and promote stability inth e Third World, we support representative government, integratesecurity assistance efforts, and promote economic development. We dothis through "peacetime engagement" -- a coordinated combination ofpolitical, economic and military actions aimed primarily atcounteracting local violence and promoting nation-building. (11:5-6)

Powerful drug cartels threaten th e economy, ecology, politicalprocess and social institutions of th e regions in which they operate.The supply of illicit drugs to th e United States from abroad, th e

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associated violence and international instability, and th e use ofillegal drugs within this country continue to pose a nationalsecurity threat. As a result , th e detection and countering of th eproduction, t raff icking, and use of illegal drugs is a high-priori tynational security mission of the Department of Defense. (43:85)

Our sec-,rity in the future depends, as it has in the past, onour ability to quickly incorporate th e latest technological advancesinto weapons systems in th e field. Technology has historically beena comparative advantage for American forces; we have often relied onit to overcome numerical shortages and to reduce th e risk to Americanlives. The spread of advanced technology weapons systems will surelyerode th e det~rrent value of our forces -- and our competitive edgein warfare -- unless we act decisively now to maintain ourtechnological superiority in the future. (38:30)

In a related vein, we must maintain sufficient industrialcapacity in th e United States to provide and sustain modern equipmentto support a rapid expansion of our armed forces should th e needoccur.

(2) Regional components. The principal elements of ourmilitary strategy in th e Asia-Pacific region have been forwarddeployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements.(3:5) Our forward deployed forces: ensure a rapid and flexibleresponse capability; enable signif icant economy of force by reducingthe number of U.S. units required; allow allies to share in defense:osts; provide an effective logistics base; and demonstrate a visibleU.S. commitment to the region to our allies and potential enemies.(3:7)

Adjustments to current U.S. force levels in th e Pacific are

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eing made in l ight of reduced tensions and improved capabili t ies ofur allies as a result of political self-confidence and economicrosperity. In February 1990, we announced our intent to begin ahased withdrawal of U.S. forces in th e region. The first phase,asting one to three years, consists of removing 7,000 personnel5,000 Army and 2,000 Air Force) from Korea; 5,000-6,000 Army troopsrom Japan; and all U.S. military personnel from th e Philippines.25:40; 24:12) Subsequent withdrawals will be made in th e 3-10 yearimeframe as the situation warrants.

For th e foreseeable future, we plan to maintain maritime forceshroughout th e region and land-based forces in Korea, Japan andawaii. Our joal is to transition from a leading to a supportingefense role in Korea. We anticipate little change in deploymentatterns in Japan.

As access to bases such as those in th e Philippines is reduced,ur continued forward presence in th e region will depend on newccess agreements with nations in th e region, as well as increasedlexibility and speed of response. Our forces will place a premiumn naval capabili t ies, backed by long-range air and ground forcesapable of providing deterrence and immediate crisis response.38:31)

c. Other National Sources Foreign economic and securityssistance is a vital instrument of American foreign policy. OurDreign assistance program is focused on promoting and consolidatingemocratic values; promoting free market principles; promoting peace;rotecting against transnational threats such as international ter-orism, narcotics, AIDS and environmental degradation which threaten11 peaceful nations; and meeting urgent human needs. (38:17)

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Security assistance activities such as grant aid, foreignmilitary sales, and th e international mili tary education and trainingprogram have been effective in th e Pacific Command (PACOM). (31:15)

d. Alliance or Coalition Components. Seven of th e U.S.'s tenmutual defense and security arrangements are in th e Pacific region:

(1) The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS)Treaty. (Australia and the U.S. remain strong allies. Relationsbetween New Zealand and the U.S. are strained because of NewZealand's barring of nuclear equipped or powered weapons systems.)

(2) The Mutual Defense Treaty Between th e United Statesand th e Republic of Korea.(3) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Betweenth e United States and Japan. (Japan's only defense treaty.)(4) ' The Mutual Defense Treaty between th e United Statesand th e Republic of th e Philippines.(5) The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (whichremains in effect on a bilateral basis with Thailand.)(6) The Compact of Free Association with th e Republic ofthe Marshall Islands.(7) The Compact of Free Association with th e FederatedStates of Micronesia. (57:79)

Two regional organizations have important security dimensions.The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), formed in 1967 bySingapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and th e Philippines,decided in January 1992 "to seek avenues to engage member states iniew areas of cooperation in security matters" (4:24). For th e mostpart, members are seeking this increased defense cooperation byatrengthening th e existing network of bilateral defense ties.

The Five Power Defence Arrangement, consisting ofkustralia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, servesprimarily to integrate air defenses of participating countries. Thearrangement is twenty years old and th e only remaining multilateral

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iecurity network in Southeast Asia. (45:8)

Theater Strategic Situation.a. Characteristics of th e Theater. PACOM's theater of operations

!overs half th e world's surface, an area of more than 100 millionquare miles; 17 of th e world's 24 time zones; and touches 40:ountries and eight American territories. (57:74)

The theater can be broken into various sub-regions on th e basisof history, geography, cultures and language. The area is frequentlyiroken into four sub-regions when discussing security issues:lortheast Asia; Southeast Asia; South Asia; and th e South Pacific.56:1) Northeast Asia consists of China, North and South Korea,*aiwan, and Japan. Southeast Asia consists of Vietnam, Laos,ambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, and th e'hilippines. South Asia is comprised of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,ri Lanka, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan. The South Pacific region consistsf th e Polynesian, Micronesian and Melanesian island chains. (34:293)

b. Intelligence Estimate. The region remains heavily armedPith, seven of th e world's largest military establishments (China,ussia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam and th e U.S.)perating here. Three of these countries (U.S., China, and Russia)eploy nuclear weapons and major conventional forces in th e area. Inddition, th e U.S. and th e former Soviet Union have provided theirlients and allies some of their most sophisticated conventionalilitary systems.

The area shows tangible signs of tension reduction. The'ietnamese have withdrawn their forces from Cambodia and a peaceccord was signed in October 1991. The two Korean governments arealking to each other about nuclear weapons inspections and other

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.ension reducing activities. China reduced its armed forces by onedillion and th e Soviets subsequently reduced their forces along the;ino-Soviet border in Mongolia and in Vietnam. (52:13) Although the'inal outcome of th e fragmentation of the Soviet Union is stillLnknown, Russia recently announced an overall reduction in th e sizeof its military forces and the intent to adopt a defensive m ilitaryloctrine (50:1).

As a result of these changes, the potential for confl ict is-everting to tradit ional forms: th e continuing standoff on th e Korean'eninsula; and civil wars and dissidence suppression/counter-.nsurgency operations in Cambodia, th e Philippines, and Indonesia.'erritorial disputes continue on th e Sino-Soviet border; betweenapan and Russia in th e Northern Terri tories; between Vietnam and!hina over th e Paracel Islands; and over th e Spratley Islands whichLre occupied by Vietnamese, Taiwanese, Chinese, Malaysian andilipino forces. Resolution of these disputes appears to depend more,n easing ethnic tensions and historic antagonisms than on diplomaticrocedures.

The greatest immediate threat to regional security, however, isorth Korea's nuclear weapons development program. The U.S.stimates th e Koreans will have a nuclear device (non deliverable dueo size) by 1994 and a nuclear weapon possibly deliverable by th eCUD-C by the mid-to-late 1990s. (30:102) There is a growingonsensus that th e North Korean nuclear weapons program should bealted. In th e past year, th e U.S., Japan, South Korea and th eormer Soviet Union have all called on North Korea to allow fullnspection of its nuclear facilities by th e International Atomicnergy Agency (IAEA). Towards this end, th e U.S. agreed on its part

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make the Korean Peninsula nuclear free. This may have broken th ealemate. In March 1992, North and South Korea agreed to allowtual inspections of their nuclear facilities by June 1992 andeated a joint commission to draw up plans for banning nuclearapons from th e Korean Peninsula. (33:14A) In addition, th e head ofe North Korean delegation to th e IAEA said h is country would allowEA inspections to begin in June. (33:14A)

In 1985, fifteen South Pacific states signed th e South Pacificclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT), creating a formally declaredclear free zone. The treaty forbids members to acquire or testclear weapons. Transit of nuclear weapons is not prohibited,ough each merfber is permitted to determine its own policy regardingansi t by ships which may be nuclear armed. The former Soviet Uniond China signed protocols not to use, test, or base nuclear weapons

th e zone. The U.S. declared it will follow the intent of theNFZT protocols, but declined to sign them. (19:9)

The proliferation of nuclear, biological , and chemical weaponsd th e missiles to deliver them by Third World nations is a growingncern. By th e year 2000, as many as nine developing countriesald have nuclear weapons, up to 30 could have chemical weapons, andn could possess a biological weapons capability. (44:65) Nationsking steps to develop nuclear weapons or who have acquired them=lude: Israel, Libya, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Pakistan,aq , Iran, North Kore", Taiwan, South Africa and India. Indition, it is widely known th e U.S., France, Britain, China and thenmonwealth of Independent States have nuclear weapons. The concernDut proliferation is exacerbated by fears that Soviet nuclearipons experts may sell their services to th e highest bidder in th e

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(2) Influences. The following factors may influence howone or more of th e nations in this area act or react to world events:

(a) Japanese occupation of the region during World WarII continues to have a profound affect on the region; both in termsof anti-militarism in Japan and fear of Japanese expansionism in therest of the area.

(b) The lack of a widely agreed upon threat, a historyof bilateral versus multilateral security agreements, and th eproliferation of arms in the region makes comprehensive regional armscontrol agreements unlikely.

(c) Growing U.S. concern about its trade imbalanceand a perception of unfair trade practices, may lead to tensionsbetween th e U.S. and countries in th e area, particularly Japan, SouthKorea, and Taiwan.

(d) Polit ical uncertainties are growing inanticipation of th e major changes in generational leadership thatwill occur in China, North Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia.

e. Logistics Estimate. The ability to project our power willunderpin our strategy more than ever. We must be able to deploysubstantial forces and sustain them in parts of th e region wherepreposit ioning of equipment will not always be feasible, whereadequate bases may not be available (a t least before a crisis) andwhere, there is a less well-developed industrial base and infra-structure to support our forces once they have arrived. As ouroverall force levels draw down in th e theater, sustaining andexpanding our investment in airlift, sealift, and -- where possible-- preposit loning will be become more important. (38:29)

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therefore, require air and naval forces backed by highly mobile andflexible ground forces and the airlift and fast sealift to deploythem. Our strategy also requires a strong amphibious capabil i ty anda rapid, CONUS-based reinforcement capability.

(4) Low-intensi+y confl ict . The global spread ofsophisticated military and dual-use technologies will enable agrowing number of regional porers to arm themselves with capabili t iesthat in th e past were reservcd only for th e superpowers. (44:5) TheU.S. must be able to couiter these threats with selectivity,flexibility and the prospect of a favorable outcome. To do this,U.S. forces must be trained and equipped to respond to terrorism,drug trafficking and insurgencies, as well as peacekeeping andnoncombatant evacuation operations. (44:12-13) Success in this areawill depend on maintaining a strong alliance structure; technologicalsuperiority; and specially tailored military capabilities which canbe used in conjunction with other elements of national power. (44:6)

(5) Logistics. Logistic functions should be performed asroutinely as possible throughout th e entire spectrum of operations.To th e maximum extent possible, logistic functions should utilizeexisting policies and procedures of th e m ilitary departments.(54:3-57,3-58) Implementation and execution of logistic functionsremain th e responsibili ty of th e services and th e service componentcommander. Furthermore, each of th e services is responsible for th elogistic support of its own forces in th e PACOM area, except whenlogistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements orassignments concerning common servicing, Joint servicing, or crossservicing. (40:11-19)

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(6) Security Assistance. The security assistance programassists allies and friends and protects mutual interests; promotespeace and stability; helps maintain U.S. defense all iances; aids U.S.friends and allies to defend themselves against external aggression,internal subversion, terrorism, and narcotics t raff icking; supportsdemocratically elected governments and helps advance democraticvalues; and helps wage th e f ight against illegal drugs. (43:10) InFY 1992, for example, the security assistance funding was programmedto provide: $20 million in direct assistance to Cambodia and anaddit ional $5 million for leadership training, human rights educationand medical aid projects for th e Cambodian Resistance (14:105); $2.3million for prbfessional military education, management training andtechnical training to support th e Indonesian F-16 program (14:177-79); and $2.5 million to assist th e Royal Thai Army in aiding morethan 300,000 refugees when an elected government was restored inThailand. (14:283)

(7) Host-nation support. We expect increasing assistancefrom our allies in th e area of cost sharing. In th e Republic of Korea(ROK), we seek th e beginning of a ROK-funded relocation of U.S.forces out of Seoul and an increase in Korea's share of th e costsassociated with maintaining U.S. forces on th e Korean Peninsula. Wealso seek increased financial support of U.S. forces operating fromJapan.. In addition, we continue to stress th e importance ofmaintaining system interoperabil i ty in our weapons systems byencouraging maximum procurement from th e U.S., increasing technologyflowback, discouraging the development of non-complementary systems,increased political-military dialogue, and a revital ized securi tyconsultative process. (3:10)

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b. Diplomatic Dimensions. The U.S. is committed to maintaininga visible, credible presence in th e Asia-Pacific region throughforward deployed forces and bilateral security arrangements. (28:1A)The Bush Administration has identified "six keys to promoting lastingpeacet" in the region: progressive trade l iberalization; a sharedcommitment to democracy and human rights; educational and scientificinnovation; respect for th e environment; an appreciation for ourdistinct cultural heritages; and security cooperation. (6:841) DoDsupports these goals through peacekeeping operations, disasterrelief, nation-building assistance, humanitarian assistance,m ili tary-to-m ili tary contacts and th e security assistance program.In each 4nstance, th e effectiveness of DoD's contribution hinges onclearly translating foreign policy objectives into clear, operationalmilitary tasks. (44:13)

c. Economic Dimensions. The United States is committed to astrategy which expands and strengthens market economies around theworld. This requires international efforts to open markets andexpand trade; to strengthen cooperation among major industrialcountries and with international f inancial institutions; and to applyimaginative solut ions to th e problems of developing countries.(38:19) The U.S. seeks a leadership role in th e Pacific because ourmilitary presence here sets th e stage of our economic involvement inth e region. With a total two-way transPacific trade exceeding $320billion annually, almost 50% more than our transAtlantic trade, it isclearly in our own best interests to help preserve peace andstability in the region. (3:5)

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contingency are naval forces, naval restrictions limit our ability tomeet U.S. treaty obligations and to otherwise protect our nationalinterests. (3:15)

b. Country Recommendations.(1) Japan. U.S. an d Japanese military and civilian

officials are unambiguous in their belief the security relationshipbetween the tw o countries is crucial to future peace, stability andprosperity in the region. (8:38) The fol lowing courses of action arein th e U.S. national interest and suppor t these goals.

(a) True Global Partnership. The U.S. should doall it can to treat Japan as an equal partner in internationalaffairs and to draw Japan into positions of greater responsibi l i ty inthe international system. DISCUSSION: Japan sees an increasing rolefor th e United Nations in world affairs (16:10) and would like to bea part of it. Japanese military and civilian officials expressedhope th e Japanese Diet would authorize an expanded role for th eJapanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) in UN peacekeeping activities inth e future; Cambodia was mentioned specifically. (20,41) Inaddition, Japan has expressed growing interest in becoming apermanent member of th e UN Security Council. (49:15) The U.S. shouldactively support this goal.

The Japanese are already playing a leadership role ininternational affairs. Japan pledged (and paid) a total of $13billion in support of th e Gulf War, more than any other nation.(10:33) Japan devotes a larger percentage of its GNP to foreign aidthan does th e U.S. and 60% of that aid is devoted to other Asiannations. (5:6) They pledged $2.5 billion in aid to Russia in October1991 (10:37) and are evaluating participation in th e $24 billion aid

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currently performed by th e U.S. which can be assumed by ROK forces.DISCUSSION: U.S. forces have begun th e process of transit ioning froma leading to a supporting role by transferring greater responsibil i tyto th e South Koreans for combined operations. A ROK General has beenappointed to head the UN side of th e Armistice commission; ROK troopsassumed responsibili ty for guarding th e PanmunJom armistice compoundin October 1991 (26:23); and in March 1992 th e U.S. and South Koreaagreed to transfer th e 279-mile Trans-Korea Pipeline from U.S.military to ROK military control. (32) If North Korea agrees torenounce its nuclear ambitions, or perhaps as an incentive to do so,th e U.S. should seriously consider transferring th e leadership of th eUN Combined Forces Command to a Korean general. This act, perhapsmore than any other, would visibly demonstrate U.S. intent to assumea supporting role on th e Korean Peninsula. (7)

(b) Host Nation Support. The U.S. shouldcontinue to press Korea to assume a greater share of th e costs ofmaintaining U.S. forces in Korea. DISCUSSION: The annual cost ofmaintaining U.S. forces in Korea is estimated to be $20 billion.(7:477) (The cost of th e 2nd Infantry Division alone is estimated tobe $2.4 billion a year.) The ROK pledged $180 million this year tooffset these costs, rising to $450 million by 1995. (44:16; 5:8) The1995 amount represents one-half of th e won-based costs of maintainingU.S. forces in country. (48) In contrast, Japan currently pays $3billion annually and, by 1995, will pay 100 percent of th e yen-basedcosts. (5:8) The South Koreans have agreed to pay $3 billion to moveU.S. forces out of Seoul (the value of th e land is estimated at *10billion). (48) Clearly, though, there is much room for increasedROK contributions.

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(c) Encourage Confidence Building Measures. TheU.S. should continue to encourage confidence building measuresbetween North and South Korea. DISCUSSION: Richard Solomon, th eAssistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,asserts th e process of building confidence must be created by th eKoreans themselves. At th e same time he says th e major powers canencourage and support the dialogue. (52:247) Three confidencebuilding measures consistent with this approach come to mind. First,Japan, China, Russia and th e U.S. can use their influence toencourage North Korea to pullback some/all of th e 650,000 troopsalong the demilitarized zone (DMZ). (19:15) General Robert W.RisCassi, Commhnder, U.S. Forces Korea, says th e North Koreans haveadded 1,000 tanks and 6,000 artillery tubes and rocket launchers totheir force structure during th e last decade (47:36) and testifiedrecently these troops are "still arrayed unequivocally for attack".(36:23) This amount of offensive military might within 35 miles ofSeoul does little to inspire confidence among the South Koreans.Second, th e ROK Ministry of National Unification states th e forcedseparation of te n million Korean families is an important problem.(39) Encouraging th e negotiation of some way for families to visitloved ones for even a brief period of time is a humanitarian gesturewhich would also inspire confidence in th e negotiation processbetween th e two Koreas. Finally, Russia, Japan, China, th e U.S. andthe two Koreas could all agree to notify each other of militaryexercises in advance and invite observers to attend. (24:22) Thisseemingly small measure would bring military forces of these nationsinto regular contact with each other and offer another avenue fordialogue.

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(d) Halt the North Korean Nuclear Program. TheU.S. should continue to aggressively seek North Korean compliancewith the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and insist on IAEAinspections of known and suspected nuclear facilities. DISCUSSION:A major policy aim of th e U.S. has been to halt th e North Koreannuclear weapons program. The North and South Koreans agreed tomutual inspections by June 10th, which was seen as a major stepforward. (33:14A) In addition, th e North Koreans are expected toannounce their willingness to allow IAEA inspections this month.(33:14A)

(e) U.S. Troop Cuts. The U.S. should continueits phased withdrawal of troops from Korea subject to diminution ofthe North Korean threat. DISCUSSION: DoD is pursuing a three-phasedwithdrawal of forces from th e Asian-Pacific. The U.S. announced itwould cut its forces in Korea to 36,000 by the end of 1992 andplanned to cu t an additional 6,000 people as part of phase tw o during1993 and 1995.(13) Secretary Cheney put th e second phase troop cutson hold in November 1991 (13) and General RisCassi reiterated duringrecen t Congress ional test imony the U.S.'s intention not to removeadditional troops unti l questions about th e North Korean nuclearweapons program are answered. (36)

5. Decisions. This assessment presents a variety of reasons why th eU.S. must continue its policies of peacetime engagement and forwardpresence in the Asian-Pacific region. President Bush acknowledgedthis during his January 1992 visit to Singapore when he said:

We will maintain a visible, credible presence in th eAsia-Pacific region with our forward deployed forces, andthrough bilateral defense arrangements with nations of th eregion." (28:14A)

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He added:The United States does not maintain our security presence assome act of charity. Your security and your prosperity serveour interests because you can better help build a more stable,more prosperous world. (55:7)

Thus, a continued US presence in the region serves both ourallies' and our own interests. Admiral Larson sums it up this way:

Two key factors are needed to maintain security and stabilityin th e region: economic growth and U.S. presence. Economicgrowth will enable our friends to assume a larger responsibil-ity for their defense. Our presence protects th e sea lanesvital to expanding trade, reinforces our role as a honestbroker to help avoid regional tensions and reduces th e needfor Asian countries to expand their military capabil i ty inways which might be destabil izing. (31:4)

This does not mean, however, that US policy in th e Asia-Pacificregion must or.should remain static. Adjustments to our bi-lateralagreements, force structure and national policies can be made. Thesimple truth is th e United States can no longer do it all by itself.The courses of action outlined in this paper recognize this truth andoffer a realistic way for th e U.S. to protect its vital interestswhile acknowledging growth and transformations in the region.

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14. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, Fiscal Year1992. Jointly prepared by the Department of State and theDefense Security Assistance Agency. Washington: 1991.

15. Cooper, Ambassador Henry F. "From Confrontat ion to Cooperationon Ballistic M issile Defense," Armed Forces JournalInternational, January 1992, p.16.

16. Cropsey, Seth. "The Washington-Tokyo Defense Relationship:Where Now?" Washington: The Heritage Foundation:September 20, 1991.17. Destler, I.M. and Michael Nacht. "Beyond Mutual Recrimination:Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in th e 1990s." InAssociate Programs -- Volume II, US Pacific Command -- WS625, pp.27-39, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1991.18. "Fears Grow in Japan Over M issile 's Reach." International Herald

Tribune, March 11, 1992, p.5.19. Fisher, Richard. "Why Asia is Not Ready for Arms Control."

Washington: The Heritage Foundat ion, May 25, 1991.20. Fujishima, Mr. Briefing given to th e A ir War College facultyand students at th e Japanese Defense Agency, Tokyo, Japan,17 February 1992.21. Glacomo, Carol. "U.S. accused of hypocrisy in th e world armsmarket," The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 1992, p. 8.22. Goodman, Glenn W., Jr. "Powell Details Base Force Concept,"Armed Forces Journal International, November 1991, p. 19.23. Graham, Thomas W. "Winning th e Nonproliferation Battle," ArmsControl Today, September 1991, pp. 8-13.24. Grinter, Lawrence E. "East Asia and th e United States into th eTwenty-first Century." Air University Press: Maxwell AFB,AL, November 1991.25. Hardisty, Admiral Huntington. "The Pacific Era is Here; Is th eUnited States Ready for It?" In The Almanac of Seapower1992, pp. 39-49. Arlington Va: The Navy League, January

1991.26. Hoon, Shim Jae. "The inevitable burden." Far Eastern EconomicReview, August 22, 1991, pp. 21-23.27. Hughes, David. "Regional Nuclear Powers Pose New Risks to U.S.M ilitary," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 January1992, pp. 65-66.

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