A Schutz an Exposition and Critique

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Alfred Schutz--An Exposition and CritiqueAuthor(s): Robert A. GormanSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 1-19Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/589239 .

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RobertA. Gorman*

AlfredSchutz anexpositionndcritique

The corpusof AlfredSchutz'smethodologicalwritings s directedat

creatinga scientificmethod which does not subjugatea meaning-endowingactorto objective, mpersonal ausal aws.Giventhe nature

ofthistask, t issurprisinghatthelistofSchutz's ublishedwritingssso

small.It consists, n fact, of only one full-lengthbookand numerous

articleswhichhavebeencompiledntoa three-volumenthology.lThis

relativepaucityof publishedwritings s partlydue to theextremecare

andmeticulousnesschutzexhibitsnwritingandre-writing achwork,

andpartly heresultofaJekyll-Hyde ypeoflife nwhichdaysarespent

pursuingmoneyandsuccessnthebusinessworld, eavingonlynights o

teach and write. In this paper I shall summarilydescribeSchutz'sefforts ndseeifhisphenomenologicallyefinednotionofsubjectivitys

reasonablyncorporatedntoa validscientificmethod.

Theconceptsof 'action'and'act'arecentral o Schutz'snotionof sub-

jectivity.Weber,accordingoSchutz's ritique,hadfailed oadequately

definewhathe meantbysubjectivelymeaningful ction.Schutz,onthe

otherhand, is carefulto explicitlydefineeach of his terms.Action,definedasspontaneous umanconduct elf-consciouslyrojected ythe

actorand oriented owards he future, s distinguishedromthe Act,

which s theaccomplishedction.3Thislatter s projected sthegoalof

the actionand is brought nto beingby the action.Actionwouldbe

abstractand pointless f we had not already antasized r projecteda

proposed oalto beitsresult.Whenacting, what s visible o themind

isthecompleted ct,nottheon-goingprocesshatconstitutest. It is the

Act . . . that is projected,not the action'.4Consequently,ction s dis-

tinguished romotherbehaviourn that it aloneis 'the executionof aprojectedAct'.Thesubjectivemeaningof anyaction s itscorrespond-

ing projectedAct; 'meaning'and'action'areinseparable.5All actionrequires n actorprojectan act as alreadycompleted, or

onlyif thefulfilment f theanticipatedutureactisassumed reproper

* RobertA. Gorman .A. M.A. PH.D. Assistant rofessorfPoliticalandSocialScience,

HamptonInstitute,Hampton,Virginia,U.S.A.



Robert Gorman Alfred chutz anexpositionndcritique

meansofachieving hisactfound.The 'project's theactasit is antici-patedasalready ccomplished. ven hough,whenacting,wethinkofa

future tateofaffairs, heproject bears hetemporal haracter fpast-ness'.6Sinceactsaresimultaneouslyiewedaspastandfuture,Schutz

declares heyoriginate n the futureperfect ense (modoutursxacti).Allhumanactsmustbethoughtof in these erms,andhenceallactsare

consciously onceived n the futureperfect ense.Workings action n

theouterworld,basedon a projectandcharacterized y theintentionof bringingabouta certainstateof affairsby meansof bodilymove-ment.7Decidingon the qualityof thiswork s a complexand totallysubjectiveprocess.

All choosingbetweenprojects s precededby doubt: aboutwhichelementsof the worldshouldbe considered elevant,whichprojectso

acceptas ours,and how bestto achieveourgoals.The worldat firstappears san nfiniteeries f openpossibilities.Ouruniquebiographicalsituations,henumerous aths n lifemeaningfullyxperienced nlyby

individualravellers,imitthese o a seriesofpossibilitieselevant oour

subjectiventerests,whatSchutzcallsour'problematicossibilities'.We

decidewhichof theseproblematic ossibilities,ndtheircorrespondingprojects,o adopt,consideringachoneata time.Eachsucceedingon-

sideration orrespondso a succeedingemporal tateof consciousness,indicating hatwhilewedecidewhatto dowearesimultaneouslyrow-ingolderandconstantly ddingnewexperiencesoourmentalbaggage.We areneverthe 'same'personsn consideringachof ouralternativeproblematic ossibilities.Every imewere-considernoldproject,hat

projectdiffersromwhatit was,ourperception f it beingmodifiedbyinterveningimeandexperience.Problematic ossibilitiesactually o-

exist in 'outer time'; but actual alternativepossibilities onstantlychange throughtheir being considered uccessivelyn 'inner time'

(dure'e).e chooseourprojectsn thisinnertimeby selecting he pro-ject capableof bringingaboutthatstateof affairs onsidered y us, at

the subjectivemomentof choice,as best.The resultingdecisionsyn-theticallyunitesall the problematic lternativesnto the actualact.8Thiswholeprocessof decision s one in which'theego . . . livesanddevelopsbyitsveryhesitations ntilthefreeactiondetachestself romit liketooripea fruit.... Deliberationannotbeconceivedasanoscil-lation n space; t consists ather n a dynamicprocessnwhich heego

aswellasitsmotivesarein a continuoustageof becoming'.9Ourfree

choiceaffirmshe subjectivequalityof all action.Thefreelychosenproject, hatfuturedesired tateofaffairs santici-

patedwhenaction sbegun, salsocalledbySchutz heactor'sin-order-to' motive.All individual n-order-tomotivesarefragmentarymeanswithina preconceivedife-longplan.Thislife-project rovides riteriafor subjectivelydetermininghe 'best'choicein particular ituations.The weight we attach to alternative n-order-tomotivesis directly

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Robert . Gorman Alfred chutan expositionndcritique

relatedto thishigherordersystembecausewe will chooseonly thoseadvancingouroverall ife-longgoals.l°There are, in other words,no

isolatedprojects.Wemaychoose o go to work omorrowmorning,butwe do so only in order o pay forthe apartmentswherewe pursue, orexample,ourmoreprimary oal ofwriting.Personaln-order-tomotivesand life-projects re subjectively onstituted,as describedabove, byeachfreeactor.

Each actorexperiences nddefineshissituationandchooseshispro-jectsin thecontextof hisownunique, ubjective xistence.Theunityofanyindividualact dependson the scope of the correspondingroject,andthe project s freelychosen.We never'objectively' escribean in-

dividualactin anymeaningfullyompletemanner,becausen so-doingwe ignore,andpossiblympugn,subjective ualitiesdistinguishinghisactionfromother,unconsciousonduct, uch asreflexmovements.Yetthe scientific tudyof socialactiondependson generalization.Howdowe generalizewithoutdistorting eality,which is subjectively efined?Schutzadmits hatin trying o understand nother's ecision o pursuea certaincourse of action, the observer s never sure of the actor'sdecision-makingrocess.Even f theactorandobserver resituatedn a'we-relationship',he on-goingexperiences f a face-to-face ommuni-

cation, the biographically eterminedituations the selectionof rele-vant elementsamong all the open possibilitiesof both actor andobserver are different.We never fully understandpast actionsorpredict uturedecisions fanyindividual ctor.ll If this s true,onwhatbasisdoesSchutzconstruct isscientificmethod Heis nowconfrontinganirreducible nit ofsocialanalysis:heindividual go. Theviabilityofhistheorynowdepends nhisreconcilinghisego to a scientificmethodstressing eneralization.

II

Schutz begins by introducing he ambiguousnotion of a 'because-motive'.Whereas he in-order-tomotive s oriented owards he futureandsubjectively onstituted,he because-motiveefers o the pastanddeals only with those phenomenaobjectivelycausing the specifiedaction. Eachact hasbothan in-order-to ndbecause-motive. he in-order-tomotive is an integralpartof the actionitself. To uncoverabecause-motiveheindividualmustexertspecialeffort o reflecton the

possible easonsbecause fwhich' he actwasperformed. hismeansabecause-motiveecomes ignificant nlyafter he in-order-tomotive sfreelychosen.In otherwords,projects renotdetermined y somepre-existingbecause-motives,utareunderstoodn termsofcausalrelationsbyoursubmittinghemtoretrospectivenalysis.Theprojectwilldeter-minewhichpastexperiences re to be considered ecause-motives,ndthereforeknowledgeof because-motivesresupposes nowledgeof in-

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Robert . Gorman Alfred chutz an expositionndcritique

order-to motives. Despite this, once they are uncovered,because-motives constituteobjective causes of our free, subjectivelydefined

projects.l2

Just as in-order-tomotives exist as part of a higher order system,because-motives re similarlygrouped nto systems,and are not ran-domly manifestedn concreteactions.However, hese motivesare notsystematized y a goal for the future,but are includedwithinthe cate-gory of 'personality'. lementsof our own personalitiesauseus to be-have as we do, though hey do not determine he precisequalityof ouractions. The self'smanifold xperiences f its own basicattitudes n thepastas they arecondensedn the formof principles,maxims,habits,but

also tastes, affects, and so-on are the elementsfor building up thesystemswhich can be personified.The latter is a very complicatedproblem equiringmost earnestdeliberation.'l3 nfortunately, chutzneverdoes earnestly eliberate' n this topic. Insteadwe are eft with aconcept of motivationallowingus to freelychoosesubjectively efinedprojectswhich are, themselves,causally related to elementsof ourpersonality.Apparently chutzassumes ur freeactionwill alwayscor-respond o the inevitable,personality-causedehavioureach of us isfated to exhibit.

But evenwith thisquestionableonceptof freedomSchutzhasnot yetexplainedhow we can understand ocial action, still performed y aunique individual, by applying generalizedconcepts. The because-motive must somehowbecome socialized, o that our subjectiveper-sonalities re replacedby a moregeneral ocial orceaffecting veryonein a similarway. To do this, Schutz urns o the conceptof typification.

The most mportant omponent f our biographical ituations s theknowledgewe use n interpreting xperiential vents.This knowledge fours, called our 'stockof knowledgeat hand', constitutes he unique

patternor schemeby whichwe assimilate ew eventsand experiencesnan orderly, ystematicway.l4Projects nd actsare basedon our presentstocksof knowledge t hand. Included n this stockof knowledges theknowledge f experiences, reviously erformed, imilar o the presentproject.Schutzhere dentifies he socialworld,as perceived y the actor,as one of familiarityand personal nvolvementbased on his stock ofknowledgeat hand. The world is organizedby rules of typicality:principles, ounded n ourunquestioned astexperiences, llowingus toanticipate he meaningwe will experiencen ourperceptions f familiar

objects, hingsand people.l5We utilize particular ast experiencesoguide us in bringingabout consequences lso experienced, nd nowdesired. Consequently, ll projectingnvolvesa particulardealizationcalled by Husserl the idealization of "I-can-do-it-again",.e. theassumption hat I may under typicallysimilarcircumstances ct in away typically imllar o that in which I acted before n order o bringabout a typically imilar tate of affairs.'l6

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Alfred chutz anexpositionndcritiqueobert . Gorman

Every in-order-tomotive presupposes stockof experience har-acterizedby an 'I-can-do-it-again'uality,or else therewould be no

recognizablemeansof bringingaboutthe desired uturestate.Thoughthe repeatedactionwillbe differentbecauseour stocksof knowledge thandhave grown,nevertheless,n common-sensehinking he uniqueaspectsof the two differentacts are ignoredand the similarelementsemphasized. n the societywe normally ive and work in, wheneverwe actwe use partsof our pastsas modelsfor leadingusto expectedgoals.

Ifour ntendedprojects re expected,andour actions akeplace n anintersubjective orld of daily living,l7theremustbe somemethod or

ourpredicting ow alteregoswillreact oour nitiatives.Sucha methoddoes, n fact,exist andis basedon whatSchutzcalls'the reciprocity fmotives'.l8Sincewe eachabstract romour pasttypicalexperiencesoguideus in bringingaboutintended uturegoals,and sincethe Otheris structurallyimilar o us in all ways,l9we can reasonably oncludethat everyone n societymakesuse of the 'I-can-do-it-again'dealiza-tion.This meansall social nteractions basedon thereciprocal xpecta-tionthat the Otherwill behave n a predictablemanner, ustas he hasundersimilarcircumstancesn the past. Our actions n a particular

situationwill bring aboutthe same response he Other exhibited nsimilarpast situations.All our social behaviour, hen, is closely,in-separablynterconnected.We each expectthe Other to behave in apredictableway, andwe each determinehis ownactionsaccording othisexpectation.There s an inter-lockingf motivesbetweenourselvesandourfellowman n thatwhatwe do will,undergivencircumstances,'cause'him tobehave n an expectedmanner.Social nteractions basedon theidealizationhatour n-order-tomotiveswillbecomehe because-motivesof thosewe are dealingwith. All our socialinteractionspre-

supposea seriesof common-senseonstructs asedon this idealization.If I askyou, 'Whichwayto thesubway 'I am presupposingmy desireto reachthe subway,my in-order-tomotive,will causeyouto performan action urnishingmewith thisinformation. yyour answer,Go oneblockand turn eft',youare pre-supposingourdesire o tellme howtoreachthe subway,your n-order-tomotive,will causeme to go in thatdirection,.e.will becomemy because-motive.houghwe arenever ureof theOther'shigher n-order-tomotives do I wantthe subway tationso I can go uptown or so I can rob the teller?), the idealizationof

the reciprocity f motivesallowsus to meaningfullynteract n society.The experiences omprisingour stock of knowledgeat hand are

organized,according o this idealizationof the reciprocity f motives,into a systemof ideal types.We assume f we act in ways typicallysimilar o previousactions,undertypicallysimilarcircumstances, ewill bringabouttypically imilar tatesof affairs.This implieswe alsoideallytypifythe course-of-actionmotivesof thosewe interactwith,

5




sincewe assume heseactorswill be motivated o act in a typicallypre-dictable ashion.Thereresultsa systemof ideal personal ypesranging

in character romthe closeness nd informality f the 'we-relationship'to the anonymity f our relationships ith 'contemporaries',predeces-sors'and 'successors'.20

Schutzcompletes is passage rom he specific i.e. individual) o thegeneral (i.e. social),by contending hat all typifications haracterizingourstocks f knowledge t handarenot individually onstituted.Rather,they are prescribedby society, especially he in-groupsubculture heactor s part of, and normallyunquestioninglyccepted.2lOur actionsin societyare foundedon ouradopting ertain deal typifications nabl-

ing us to bringabout a state of affairswe find desirable.Thesesociallyprescribed nd approved ypifications re the basisfor our in-order-tomotives, n that, to continue he previous xample,my desire o findthesubway (my in-order-tomotive) s basedon my unquestioned ccept-ance of the social recipe prescribinghe subwayas a meansof publictransportationwhich will get me where I7m going. My in-order-tomotive, n turn,becomes he because-motivef thosewithwhomI inter-act, and therefore auses hem to freelychoosean expectedresponse,emergingas another n-order-tomotive. This repeatingprocess s the

essential quality of the common-senseworld in which we interactsocially.Sincebecause-motivesretied to theircorrespondingrecedingin-order-tomotives, and since both are derived from unquestionedsocially prescribed deal typifications,we have in these ideal typesgeneral, mpersonal riteria orunderstandingndpredictingndividualaction in society. The more standardized nd institutionalizedheseideal typesbecome, n termsof laws,rules,regulations, ustoms, abits,etc., the greater s the possibility uractionswill bringaboutourdesiredstatesof affairs,and the easier t will be for an observer o understand

and predictactionrelated o these types.This completesSchutz'sphilosophical nthropology f man n every-

day life, a necessarypreludeto his developinga specificsociologicalmethod.22 haveemphasized chutz's fforts t creating philosophicalrationalefor scientifically tudyingfree, subjectivelymeaningful n-dividualaction n society.Schutzcontends, n sum, we are all uniqueactors,each a productof a biographically etermined ituationbelong-ing to only one person.Meaningand knowledge, hose factorsdeter-mininghow we defineoursituations nd act, areconstituted ubjectively

throughour perceivingand experiencing he world. Our perceptions,however,dependuponthe type of knowledgewe bring o bear n mean-ingfullyorganizing he constantexperiential ombardment f people,objectsand events.This knowledge,n turn, consists f sociallyderivedand approved ecipesprescribinghe type of behaviour xpected romus in each typicalsituationwe experience.The natureof thoserecipeswe Endrelevantdepends argelyon the particular ocialand economic

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Alfred chutz-an expositionndcritiqueobert . Gorman

groups we belong to, each group prescribing ypical behaviourex-pected in typical situations.Briefly,we function n society as unique

subjects hinking n typically amiliarpatternsand acting in typicallyfamiliarways.

In his sociologicalmethod,23 chutz merelyutilizes these ideas forcreatinga scientificmethodappropriateo studying ociety.Basically,it calls orsecond-orderdealtype constructs,modelledaftertheprimaryidealizationsactually influencing social actors, to explain typical,regularlyperformed ocial interaction.Known as 'homunculi', heseideal type models,when empirically erified,explain this interactionscientifically hilesimultaneouslyemaining rue o the actualmeaning

experienced y an actor n typicalsituations e encounters.

III

Like Weber,Schutzrealizes he socialsciencesare interpretative,heyanalyseactualmeanings ctors xperiencewhenacting.To facilitatehisattaining his goal, Schutzestablishes is interpretativeociology n theepistemological rinciples ontained n Husserl's henomenology. inceconstitutingworldlyobjects,at least nitially,24s a functionof experi-

ence, social scientificmethoddeals exclusivelywith experiences f in-dividualactors nteractingn society.Theseexperiences re unalterablysubjective, he resultof each actor's iving n the worldand definingallobjectsand events n it throughhis own perceptions.For both Husserland Schutz, therefore,action is free, in the sense that it is self-deter-mined.By defining ubjective xperience s a filterthroughwhich theworld reveals tself to each of us, it is impossible o even conceiveanextra-personalariabledetermining n actor'sbehaviour part romhissubjectiventerpretation f it. Schutz'sprimaryproblem s to developa

methodhonouring he subjective tatusof knowledgebut, at the sametime, analysing ociety n objective erms.The substanceand logicalconsistency f Schutz'sargumentdependson his havingnot sacrificedeitherof these two aims.

Schutz uccinctly umsup his task n asking, How s it, then, possibleto graspby a systemof objectiveknowledge ubjectivemeaning truc-tures?Is this not a paradox?'25 is answers o thesequestions ave, forthe mostpart, alreadybeen described.The thoughtobjectscreatedbysocial scientists n the homunculido not refer o acts occurringwithin

the contextof unique,biographically etermined nvironments. heseare understood nly when observer nd actor sharea we-relationship,enabling ach to experiencehe otheras a unique ubject.Socialscienceis knowledge f contemporariesnd predecessors,arely eferringo per-sonalor face-to-face elationships.t replaces irst-orderhoughtobjectsof actors n societywith a constructedmodelof a specified,imited ectorof the socialworld,containing ypicalrationalactionpatterns orselect

7




types of actors.These artificialmodels,objectivemeaningcontextsofour scientificanalysis,reflect the subjectivemeaningexperiencedby

typical actors behaving rationally under specified, typical circum-stances.The self-determinedualityof action s ostensibly reservednthese scientificmodels.Beingmeaningfully dequate, hey reflectsub-jective experiences f the typicalrationalactor, n no way hindering isfreedomby, for example, ubstitutingmpersonal etermining ariablesfor meaningful ersonal nitiative.

But meaningadequacy lone s not sufficiento qualify he ideal con-structs s scientifically alid explanations. or this, the homunculimustalso be causallyadequate: hey mustdescribe, n addition o subjective

meaningsexperiencedby actors,the impersonal, bjectivepatternofeventswithinwhich each act systematically ccurs.26

Eachhomunculus, onsisting f abstract, ationalactionpatternsnotdirectlyrelated o anyone, concrete ndividual, everthelesss modelledaftersocialactionof free ndividuals.While the model s not a person,the described ction s a self-determinedesultof meaning-endowingn-dividualsperceiving heirworldsand acting n them. Schutz's onten-tion that homunculiare causallyadequate mplies,even thoughtheseconstructs rederived romactions f self-determiningctors,whenused

to scientifically xplain his actionthey elicit data acceptable s causalproof.The empirically erifiedhomunculi recausalexplanations f thebehaviour hey express.

But how is self-determined ction also caused by rational actionpatterns ontained n a relevanthomunculus Perhaps he answeries nthe way we define causality'.Whenwe formulateudgements f causaladequacy n the socialsciences,what we are reallytalkingabout s notcausalnecessity n the strictsensebut the so-called"causality f free-dom".... A type construct s causallyadequate, hen, if it is probable

that, according o the rulesof experience, n act will be performed . .in a manner correspondingo the construct.'27 chutz distinguishesbetweenwhat he callsthe 'causality ffreedom'and 'causalnecessitynthe strictsense',only the formerbeing relevant o his analysis.Closerexamination, owever,reveals his 'causality f freedom'as too vagueand hypothetical notionto be seriously onsidered.Any observedactforwhichwe construct model s likely,sooner r later, o re-occur.Butthis re-occurrences notnecessarily causedby, or even related o, actionpatternsdescribedn the model: he new act may ust be coincidentally

related o the old one, or, on the otherhand, t may be a causal esultofaction patterns otally different romthose ncluded.Schutzobviouslyintends, n offeringa 'causality f freedom', o integrate he seeminglyopposing hesesof 'freedom' nd 'causality' nto one, logicallyviableconcept. ust as obviously, e mustnow modifyhis presentationor t tohave theoretical r practicalmeaning or socialscientists.

Schutz, n fact, is quickto supplement is previous nterpretation f8



Robert . Gorman Alfred chutz anexpositionndcritique

causality. If I amgoingto construct personaldealtypein a scientifi-callycorrectmanner, t is notenough hattheaction n questionprob-

ablytakeplace.Rather,whatis requiredn addition o thisis thattheactionbe repeatableand that the postulateof its repeatability ot beinconsistentwith the wholebodyof ourscientificknowledge.... [A]constructs appropriate ndto berecommendednlyif it derivesromactsthatarenotisolatedbuthavea certainprobability frepetition rfrequency.'28oranhomunculuso be causallyadequate hedescribedact is not only performedagain, but, moreimportantly, he modelguarantees he sameact will reappearwith 'a certainprobabilityofrepetitionor frequency'.The empirical egularity ndfrequencywith

whicha describedocialactre-occurs alidates heidealmodel's ausaladequacy.Causality, sSchutzuses t here, s anempirical ather hanalogicalconcept.There s no necessaryr apriori relationship etweenacauseanditseffect,onlythegeneralization, asedon ourownobserva-tion of the socialworld,that one act regularlyandfrequentlyollowsanother.

This revised ormulation f the 'causalityof freedom' s, in certainrespects,more nformativenduseful hantheearlier ne.In particular,socialscientists reprovidedwithexplicitcriteria orcreatingcausally

adequatehomunculiand applyingthem as scientificexplanations fsocialaction.Nevertheless,n refining he conceptof causalitySchutzsimultaneouslyssumes concomitantesponsibilityfreconcilingt tothe idea of individual freedomimplicit in any phenomenologicalanalysis. f action s free, n thesenseof beingdetermined ytheactor,how does Schutz explainconstantlyre-occurringpatternsof socialbehaviour?On what basisdoeshe causallyanalysesocialactionandalsomaintain ndividuals till act subjectively,Husserl's pistemologystillis valid? Is eachof usfree,butonlyto a degreeconsistentwiththe

'probability frepetition' Or,rather,dowe eachchoose o actexactlyaccordingo a pre-existing atternofexpectedbehaviour Sinceactionis subjectivelymeaningfuland self-determined, chutzmust explainhow and why such action manifests tself in impersonal, epeatingpatterns.

Throughout isphilosophical nthropology, chutzassumesree n-dividuals oluntarily cceptsocialrecipesassimilatedntotheirstocksofknowledge t hand.Manin societyunquestioninglycceptsandobeysrationalactionpatternscharacterizinghe surrounding nvironment,

but, at the sametime, doesso freely,alwaysdeterminingorhimselfwhat he acceptsand obeys.This is the hub of his argumentand amotivatingbeliefforall majorGermanmethodologistsinceDilthey:we canvalidlyexplain reeactionby subsumingt undergeneral, m-personal, objective' oncepts.It is easyenoughto acceptthisconclu-sion,asWeberdid, anddevelopa scientificmethodbasedon an idealtypeconcept.Schutz,however, s underan addedburdenofhavingto

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Robert . Gorman Alfredchutz anexpositionndcritique

reconcilehisacceptance, ndthecorresponding ethod, o an explicitvisionof subjectivityhat is the epistemologicaloundationorall his

ideas.Weberwasunaware f suchabstract, hilosophical remises, ndwas ustifiably riticized.Schutz's fforts retobe udgedby howwellheaccomplisheshegoalbothhe andWeber hare,buthe mustdo thisbydiligentlyadheringto principlesaccordingto which Weber'sownmethodologys rejected.

Unfortunately, his issue is never clarified.When Schutz can nolonger gnore heissue,whenheis facetofacewiththeindividualasanisolatedunitwho mustchoosehis courseof action,herehe solves heproblemby simplydefining t out of existence.Eachof us choosesm-

mediateprojectson the basisof his stockof knowledge t hand,con-sistingof sociallyderivedandapprovedypifications. hismuch s self-evident,giventhe fact we existwithina socialworldnot of our ownmaking.The importantquestion oncernswhatrolethesetypificationsplayin ourchoice.If, as Schutzassumes,we eachdetermine urownactions, hentypifications ppearas constituent lementsof ourback-groundsof concernto us duringour subjectivedecision-makingro-cesses.The finalaction s determined y the actorhimself, unctioningas a subject n the contextof social forcesaffectinghim. The social

world, ncluding dealizations ngineeredn it, is assimilatedhroughthe filterof an actor'ssubjectivity.Althoughwe do not ignorethisworld,oursubjective erceptions f it permiteachofus torespondo itin his ownway. Thereare no determining elationships etweenouractions and socially engineeredtypifications, or subjectivity irstmediatesbetween hetwo.Alternatively,fsociallyderived ypificationsdo determinebehaviour,henthere s littlevalidityto ourcontendingwe areself-determining, eaning-endowingctors.Ourbehaviour,nthiscase,is a determinedesultofvariables xistingndependent f us,

andtheproblem freconcilingreedom ndscience s eliminated.Howdoes Schutz choose between these two divergentalternatives Hedoesn't. nstead,heclaims ocialactionwechoose o performsidenticalto behaviourwewouldexhibit f thiswere mpersonallyetermined ysocialtypifications.Ourprojects rebothfreelychosengoalsof ourin-order-tomotivesanddetermined esultsof ourbecause-motives.incethelatterreflectn-order-tomotivesofpersonswerespondo, andsincetheyinitiallychoose o obeysociallyengineeredypificationsntegratedinto theirstocksof knowledgeat hand,we are,in a sense,'forced' o

'choose'a projectconsistentwith thesetypifications.As membersofsocietywe are free only to obey. Because reedom s definedas theactualization f a pre-existing, re-determiningmotive,this is all wewill everchoose o do anyway.

Schutz's nalysiss notmeant o 'prove'hiscase.Onthecontrary,t isbasedon a two-foldassumptionhatallobservableocialaction s sub-jectivelymeaningful ndself-determined,ndallsubjectivelymeaning-

IO




ful and self-determinedction is consistentwith sociallyengineeredrationalaction patterns.When describing he interlocking f actors'

motives,Schutz gnores heseproblems oncerning he relationship ffreedomo scienceoutlinedhere.There s no reason oridentifyinguc-ceedingbecauseand n-order-tomotives ther hanasa rationaleorthetwo above assumptions.Can we really concludethat our free, sub-jectivelydetermined rojectsarealways dentical o objectivelydeter-minedcoursesof behaviour,withouta priorassumptionhatobservedsocialpatternsarefreelychosen?The converse,n fact,appearsmoreplausible:basedon what we observe,social behaviour s apparentlycausedby factorsndependent f the subject.The burden s on Schutz

to activelydemonstrateowoursenses redeceivingusintominimizingthe role subjectivityhas in influencing ocial behaviour.He shouldillustratehisby explaininghowtheconceptof freedomnherent n hisphenomenologicalositions reconcilableo a uniformity f behaviourempirically onfronting s.

Whatweget, instead, s a re-definitionf freedomailored o elimin-ateeventheneedforthisexplanation. f subjective ndobjectiveneces-sity coincide,they don't have to be reconciled.The reasonfor thiscoincidences thatsocially i.e.objectively) etermined ctionpatterns

areadhered o by freeactors.Eachactorbaseshisactionson hisstockofknowledge t hand,andthisknowledge onsists f thesesociallydeter-minedactionpatterns.Eachof us chooses, orhimself, o act as thesepatternsprescribe, venthoughtheyhavebeenimposed romoutside.Whydo we freelychoose o do this?Becauseby 'freedom'we meanacoincidenceof subjectiveand objectivenecessity.This is perfectlyacceptable,providedwe adopt Schutz'sunderlyingassumptions.Wepurchase urbelief,however,at an extremely ighprice,for t appearstocontradict mpirical videnceand,in anycase, eads oa deSnition f

freedom obroadas to includebehaviour etermined yfactorsorigin-atingapartfroman actor'sperception.

Schutz'suniquedoctrineoffreedom pplies o all actorscarrying uttheirgoals n thecommon-sense orld.He uses hisworldasthesugar-coatingfor a presentationwhich,if the aboveanalysis s correct,hasfailedto considervitalissuesrelevant o his task.Manin thecommon-senseworld scharacterizedya modeofconsciousnessnquestioninglyaccepting,or taking orgranted,everythingt perceives.29chutzusesthis naive attitudeas a connecting ink betweenthe two antagonistic

elementsn hispresentation. yneverquestioninghe sociallyderivedidealizationshe is confrontedwith in his daily routines,an actorassimilateshemintohis stockofknowledge t handandnaivelyobeysthem in choosinghis own projects.This unquestioning, oluntaryacceptance fidealizations riginatingn societyguarantees continualcorrespondencef subjective ndobjectivenecessity.

The actualnatureand extentof our freedom n the common-senseI I



Robert . Gorman Alfred chutz-anexpositionndcritique

outcomeofthoughtful hoice.Thisis whatSchutzmeanswhen he con-tendsa memberof an in-group urveysa situationand 'immediately'

sees the ready-made ecipeappropriate o it. 'In thosesituationshisacting showsall the marksof habituality,automatismand half-con-sciousness.This is possiblebecause he culturalpatternprovidesby itsrecipes typical solutionsfor typical problemsavailable for typicalactors.'34Rational,non-impulsive ehaviour hat is 'habitual,auto-matic and half-conscious's obviously nstigatedand determinedbyforces ndependentof the actor.Schutz'sanalysis s relevantonly tosocialbehaviourof what Natansoncalls an 'anonymous' ersonality:one lackinga senseof personaldentityandunableto transcend ocial

andnatural determinants'f hissituation.35Is this typeofsocialbehaviour helimit ofourcapabilities IsSchutz

correct n claiming ocial nteraction mongcontemporariesakesplaceonlywithinthese nhibitingparameters If so, then,paradoxically, eeliminateshe onlypossible ationale or a phenomenologicalpproach-tosocial science. With all social behaviourexhibitingnon-personalcharacteristicshere s nolongeraconflictbetweenourneed orscientiScgeneralization nd the ideal of individual reedom.Freedom-a self-conscious wareness ndchoiceofalternatives-isnotactualizedby an

unquestioning ctor,whochoosesonly to give up hisuniqueness t thealtarof socialanonymity.Henceforth, his actor'sbehaviour s deter-mined by impersonalocialforceshe internalizes ndnaivelyaccepts.Sincehis socialvaluesareprimarilyunquestionedonsequences f hisbelonging o influential ub-groups,hen 'ingeneral . . a person's asicvaluationsare no more the result of careful scrutinyand criticalappraisal fpossible lternativeshan hisreligious ffiliation.'36f this sso,whyshouldsocialscientists venbotherwith a burdensome heno-menological mphasis nconsciousness hentheycan,simplybystudy-

ing impersonal ocialphenomena achactorunthinkinglyeproduces,knowall thatcan be knownof thecommon-sense orld.Whatadvant-agedoesSchutz's henomenologicalpproach osocial cienceholdovera more traditionalempiricalapproach?Granted, his latter methodsacrificeshehumanity fsocialactors o thedemands fobjectivity, etSchutzadmits even his own method is not applicable o particular,uniquesubjects. f the everyday ocialworldreallydoesconsistonly ofsociallydeterminedbehaviourpatternseach personunthinkinglyn-ternalizes, t appearseasiestand clearestfor social scientists o focus

theireffortsprimarily n uncoveringmpirically alid,generalizationsor 'laws' nherent n thesepatterns.Thesegeneralizationsreuseful nexplaining ndpredicting ocialbehaviour.Theirdegreeofaccuracy satleastashighasSchutzclaims orhis dealmodels, orbothare oundedon the same empiricalevidence.The pure empiricalapproachhasan addedvirtueof not interjecting n elaborate,elf-defeatingndem-piricallyunverifiablergument asedonprinciplesfphenomenology.37

B I3




Arewe thento concludeSchutz'sanalysis onfirmshevalidityof a

traditional mpirical cientific pproacho studying ociety?Whenre-

ferring o determined ehaviour f the common-sense orld,thiscon-clusionslargelyustified. fonesubject'socialbehavioursdetermlned

byforcesdentically ffectinghebehaviour fothers, here slittleneedto distinguish etween ubjects.

However, t is naive to assumesocietyconsistsonly of thistype of

interaction.38 chutz maintainseach actor is inherentlycapableof

transcendingocial orces omprising isexistential ituation.39here snothingto preventone'sconsciousnessromchanging tself,makinga

newchoicein its wayof being,actingdifferentlyowardsts environ-

ment.Freedom, herefore, xistsevenwithinthe common-sense orld,butonlyasanunfulfilled ossibility otentially ttainablebyeveryone.To achievehispotentiality, n actor iberateshimself roman attitude

of naiveobedience.Butthisdoesnotnecessarilymean, n so-doing,he

divorceshimself from society. By freeinghimself from a routine,habitualized,mpersonalmode of perceiving, he actorconstitutesa

self-consciouslyealized ntersubjective orldwherehis own dealingswith othersmanifest hosequalitiesof freedomand responsibilityn-herent n hisphenomenologicallyefinedexistence.Thecommon-sense

world snotthelimitofoursocialparticipation.t iswithinourabilitiesto communicate ndinteractwith the restof the socialworldas free,

creativeactors, nfluenced,but no longersuppressed, y ourenviron-ments.

It is notwhatwedothattransposes sintothisworldofself-realizingindependence, uthowweact.Schutz's ommon-sense orldconsists f

habitual,routinized,mundaneactivitiesactorsnevereventhinkabout.

We behave automatically,withoutself-consciouslyeflectingon therelevant, nternalized ocialrecipe The social consequences f such

behaviour reexpected.Howoftenhavewebeenself-consciouslywareof mailinga letter,stoppingat a red light, answering telephone?40Thesearestandard ehaviour atternsnoureverydayworlds,deSnitelyimportantto our functioning n society, but also extra-personallyinitiated,amenableo behavioural nalysis f a traditional, aturalistickind.In contrast,howoftendo we 'automatically'ubmit o inductionin a timeof war,protestan officialpolicy,participaten or supportastrike,demonstration,r otherorganizedmovement,oin a sociallyor

politicallyactiveorganization, r (ona differentevel)promulgate n

officialdirectiveadverselyaffiectinghousandsof constituents?Thepersonal ndsocialconsequencesf theseactsaretoogreat obenaivelytaken orgranted.Weusuallycarefully onsider ocialrecipesrelevantto these ypesofactsbeforedeciding oaccept,reject,ormodify hem nouractions.

Thesecontrastingypesof socialactsusuallyparallelsimilarly on-trastingmodesofperceiving ndacting.Thefirstgroup s usuallyper-

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formedby a naive,unquestioning ctor,automatically esponding ointernalized ocial dictates.The second,by a self-consciouslyware

actorcritically onsideringndevaluatinghecircumstancesincludingsocialrecipes)he acts in. As socialactionsqualitatively pproach hesecondgroup,consequences ppearmore subjectivelymeaningful oinvolvedactors,and Schutz'smethodappears ncreasinglyrrelevant.Butevenwith routinesocialbehaviour,we arepotentially apableofexhibitinga qualityofawarenessnvalidating heusefulnessfSchutz'shomunculi.Oneexample:empiricallypeaking,mostof usstillaccedeto basicsexualstereotypesn our personalbehaviour.The importantquestion, roma scientificpoint ofview, is whywe do so. Aswe become

increasingly wareof consequences f evenroutinestereotypedexualbehaviour, specially s largenumbers fcitizensdemandourattentionto alleged njustices, urnazve acceptance notnecessarily ur accept-ance) of socialrecipesdeclines,and the explanatory dequacyof thehomunculidecreases.Whois to saywhetherpride,prejudice,pique,spite,or aninfinitenumberof otherpossibilities redecisiven shapinga self-consciouslywaresocialactor's conforming'o hissexualstereo-type.Thus,thoughempirically alid,homunculimay be meaningfullyinadequate even to theextentofdeceivingobservers s to why we act

as we do. Onthelevel ofinternational oIiticaldecision-makingtudies(publicofficialsbeing even more sensitiveto consequences f theirdecisions han mostothers),this fault can have adverse, ragic,con-sequences orpolicy-makersssuming he validityof suchgeneraliza-tions.

The importantpoint is this: once an actorstops, evenif just for amoment,to thinkaboutthe situation n which he findshimself, heeventualdecision is no longer unthinkinglydeterminedby a socialrecipe. He then decides, by himself, and for his own subjectively

meaningfuleasons,whattodo.Schutz's rtiSciallyreatedhomunculusadequately xplains he action n questiononlywhen the actordoes tautomatically,withoutthinking.It becomes ncreasingly seless,andverypossiblymis-leading,when appliedto socialactionsof increasingcomplexityand meaning for those involved. The element of sub-jectivity thoughtfulconsiderationentails eliminates, according tostandardsSchutzhas established, ny possibilityhe actual socialactcanbe scientiScally xplained.

Schutz's method is now seen in a more revealingperspective.

Originally, t washis intention o clarifyWeber'smethodology y in-troducingan explicit,unambiguous otionof subjectivity.Schutz isforced o sacriSce he clarityof thisprincipleas his own analysispro-ceeds,making newonder fperhapshephilosophernWeberacceptedthe terminologicalambiguity as a necessaryprice for a scientiScapproach to society. In any event, Schutz's zeal for clariScationapparentlyblindshim to an extremelymportant lementof Weber's

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]:2obert. Gorman AlfredcAutz- nexpositionndcritique

argument.t is theoretically ossible,nWeber's pinion, ousenatural

scientificmethod n an epistemologicallyalidstudyof society.Thisis

notdesirable ecause,whentransplantedrom hestudyofnature o thestudyofsociety, hismethod ocuses nlyonthoseregular,mechanistic-

typebehaviourpatterns haracterizingurunthinkingmundaneives.

Weber eelsthisautomatic ocialbehaviours of littleinterest o most

peopleand, in anycase, s so obviousand uncomplicatedt is under-

stoodwithoutusinganelaborate cientificmethod.Ourstudyofsociety

should ocusonproblemsmportantfromsocial toint of view, thatclarify

issuesunitinganddividinga peopletrying o creatively ometo terms

with theirenvironment.Yet theseareprecisely he problemsbeyond

thereachof bothSchutz'sphenomenologicalmethodandthe methodof thenatural ciences. t maybeinteresting,orsome,to scientifically

explainwhywemailletters,usetelephones,topatredlights,orattend

scheduledN.A.T.O.conferences, ut it is moreusefulandsignificant

forsocietyas a wholeto understandwhythere s dissension, iolence,

widespreadofficialcorruption, ndpovertyn themidstof a function-

ingdemocracy.f science s to contributeo thesurvival foursociety t

mustproveitselfrelevantto the problemsupon which this survival

depends.Schutz,unfortunately,s satisfiedwithmuchless.

Theseinadequaciesmakeit unlikelySchutz'smethodcan have animportantmpactonourattemptso studysociety.It doesnotaffordus

any usefultools to facilitateeither the understanding r solvingof

society'smajorproblems,while the scope of socialphenomena t is

related o is amenable o scientificanalysisby another,moreaccepted

method.Its adoptionby any particularbranchof the socialsciences

should, f ouranalysiss correct, volve ntoa dead-end enturemerely

confirminghevirtuesandvicesofa traditional aturalisticpproacho

socialscience.4

Notes

I. The book is Alfred Schutz, rhe

Phenomenolog)tf the Social World,trans.George Walsh and FrederickLehnert(Evanston,III.: NorthwesternUniver-sityPress, 967), hereafter eferredo asPSW. It has been uncritically ummar-izedbyAlfredStonierandKarlBode, ANew Approachto the Methodologyofthe Social Sciences',Economica,Vol. 4(I937), pp. 406-24. Die Struckturener

Lebenswelt,co-authoredby Schutz andThomasLuckmann,has beenpublishedas The Structuref the Life-World,trans.

RichardZanerandTristamEngelhardt,Jr., Evanston,Ill., NorthwesternUni-versityPress,I973. This bookhas beeninterpretedand summarizedby Luck-mann in 'The Foundationsof Know-

ledge n EverydayLife',ch. I of PeterL.Berger and Thomas Luckmann, TheSocialConstrustionfReality,GardenCity,Doubleday& Co.,Inc., I966, pp. I9-46.

Someof Schutz'sunpublished otesandessayshavebeencompiledandeditedbyRichard M. Zaner, Reflectionsn theProblemf Releuance,ew Haven: Yale

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RobertA. Gorman Alfred chlltz-anexpositionndcritique

UniversityPress, 970, hereafter eferredto as RPR. His publishedarticles arecompiled in Alfred Schutz, CollectedPapers 3 vols., The Hague, MartinusNijhoff; vol. I, The Problem f SocialReality, d. NIauriceNatanson,2nd ed.,I967; vol. II, Studiesn SocialTheory,ed. Arvid Brodersen,I964; vol. III,Studiesn Phenomenologicalhilosophy,d.I. Schutz, I966) These three volumeswill be referred o as CP I, CP II, andCPIII.

2. See PSW.

3 Ibid, pp. 57-9.4. Ibid., p. 60.5. Ibid.,p. 6I.6. Ibid.7.CPI,p.2I2.

8. CP I, pp. 77-85, andPSW, pp. 66-69.

9. CP I, p. 86. Schutz'sdeasconcern-ing thechoosing fprojects re nfluencedby, and closely resemble,Henri Berg-son'sthoughtson this topic. See especi-

ally Henri Bergson,TimeandFreeWill,trans. F. L. Pogson, New York, TheMacmillanCo., I9I0, ch. 3. This quoteis made by Schutz in referring o Berg-son; it is equallyapplicable o his owntheory. A modifiedSchutziantheoryisdescribedby BernardP. Dauenhauer,'MakingPlansand LivedTime',SouthernJournalfPhilosophy,ol. 7 (Spring 969),pp. 83-go, in which the resultingact isindeterminateand subject to continual

changeas it progressesn action.I0. CPI, pp. 93-4.II. Ibid.,p.gs.I2. PSW, pp. 9I-6, CP II, pp. I I-I3,

and CP I, pp. 69-72.I3. CPII, p. I2.I4. See PSW, pp. 82-4. In RPR, p.

I43, Schutz distinguishesbetween the'stockof knowledgeat hand', and the'stockof knowledgen hand'(emphasissmine).Theformer efers o experimental

knowledge sdescribed bove.Thelatterto non-thematic knowledge, such asknowledgeof our own body, necessaryforincreasing ur stockof knowledgeathand. This distinction s nevercarefullydeveloped.

I5. CP I, pp. 7-8. Foran illustration,seeSchutz, TheHomecomer', P II, pp.

I06-I9, esp. p. I09, MauriceNatanson)'Phenomenology and Typification aStudy n thePhilosophy fAlfredSchutz,SocialResearch,7 (Spring,I 970),pp. I-

22, presents generallyuncritical eviewof thisaspectof his theory.

I6. CP I, p. 20. See EdmundHusserl,Formaland Transcendentalogic, trans.Dorion Cairns, The Hague, MartinusNijhoS, I 969, pp. I 88-9.

I 7 The hardest aska subject-orientedepistemologymustaccomplishs thenon-circularproof of the existence of the

Other. Schutz was extremelyunhappywith Husserl'sinadequate solution tothisproblemofphenomenologicallyon-stituting the Other (see Chauncey B.Downes, 'Husserl'sTheory of OtherMinds:Studyof theCartesianeditations',unpublished Ph.D dissertation, NewYorkUniversity,963, for a discussion fthis inadequacy'). chutz'sown attitudeis found n PSW,pp. I04-6, CP I, p. I67,

andCPIII, pp. 73-82) . For Schutz,the

problemof intersubjectivityoesnot, asHusserl assumed,exist between trans-cendental gos,but existsasanissueonlyin the mundaneworld of our everydaylives. Within this common-senseworld,intersubjectivitys takenfor grantedasan unquestioned ssumption.The philo-sopher must phenomenologicallydes-cribe the naturalattitude to understandhowand why the Otherexists.If he canprovetheexistenceofanalter-egowithin

thismundaneworld,thenthis proofcan-not be impugnedby anymetaphysical rontologicalassumptions. chutz'sproof,contained in his 'generalthesis of thealter ego's existence' (CPI, pp. I72-9,

and PSW,p. I02-7), iS basedona pheno-menologicaldescriptionof sharedspaceand time.

I8. CP I, pp. 20-I. See ibid., pp. 22-

34, for the theoreticaloundationof thefollowingargument.

I 9. Schutz's 'general thesis of thealter ego's existence', relies heavily onHusserl'svague concept of 'appresen-tation',which, brieflystated, 'pairs',or'couples'an existingobjectwithanothersimilar object implied by the originalbut neveritselfactuallyappearing.Thistheory s thebasisof Schutz'spostulating

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RobertA. Gorman Alfred chutz-anexpositionndcritique

the structuralsimilarityof alter egos.CP I, p. I66, fn. 37, andp. I96, contain

more exact definitions of appresen-tation. Richard M. Zaner, 'Theory ofIntersubjectivity:AlfredSchutz',SocialResearch,ol. 28 (Spring,I 96 I ), pp. 7 -

94, uncriticallydescribesSchutz's heoryof intersubjectivity,emphasizing thisnotion of appresentation esp. pp. 7I-

87). SchutzandHusserlboth writeaboutthisconcept,using t as a basis ortheoriesof communication,nvolvinglanguage,and sign and symbolsystems.CPI, pp.

294-305, contains Schutz's analysis ofHusserl's understanding of appresen-tation.Schutz'sowndevelopment f it asof sign andsymbolsystems an be foundin CP I, pp. 306-56, andPSW, pp. I I8-

32. Since these issuesare peripheral oour argument, hey are not treatedsep-arately.

20. See especiallyPSW, pp. I 39-2 I4,

CPI, pp. I6-I9, andCP II, pp. 20 63.2 I . Schutzcalls these sociallyderived

typifications social recipes', and des-cribesthem in greaterdetail in CP I, p.6I, and pp. 348-349, andCP II, pp. 95-I02, and p. 237. Schutz's essay, 'TheStranger',CP II, pp. 9I-I05, illustratesthisby showinghow a visitor o a foreigncountry anonly understandhiscountryaccordingto the 'recipes'of his nativeland.

22. Though Schutzapparentlycameto believe that individual action, even

in thecommon-sense orld, s notsimplyan interactionof because and in-order-to motives, his hesitatingreflectionsonthe subjectdealmore with the sociologyof knowledge han with a methodologyof the social sciences. These ideas aretoo vague and incomplete to seriouslyaffectouranalysis.SeeRPR,pp. 6>74.

23. SeeCPI,pp.3446.24. We are dealing now only with

thosephenomenologicalrinciples chutzand Husserl hare.Thisdoes not includethe transcendentalhenomenologicale-duction and the scientificresultsof thisreduction.

25.CPI,Pr34

26. See PSW, pp. 229-32.27. Ibid., pp. 23 -2.

28. Ibid., p. 232.

29. SeeCP III, p. I I.

30. RobertBierstedt,The Common-

Sense World of Alfred Schutz', SocialResearch,ol. 26 (Winter 959), p. I20,

brieflymentionshisdifficultyn Schutz'spresentation.However,he treats t as anisolated ault,and doesnotcarry hroughhis criticism to the extent that seemswarranted.

3I. Husserl'sanalysis of the 'Leben-swelt' is given in a series of lecturesoriginally published as Die krisisderEuropaischenissenschaftennd die trans-

zendentalehanomenologie,ost-humouslyedited by WalterBiemeland publishedin I954. The Englishtranslation s byDavid Carr, The Crisis of EuropeanSciencesnd Transcendentalhenomenolov,Evanston,Ill., NorthwesternUniversityPress, 970.

32. FernandoR. Molina (ed.), TheSourcesof Existentialism s Philosophy,Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall,I 969, p. 92.

33. PeterBerger,who admits ohavingbeen profoundly nfluencedby Schutz'sideas (p. I82), describes society insimilar erms.In this sense,he confirmsthis conclusionconcerning the natureof Schutz's common-senseworld. SeePeter Berger, Invitationto Sociology,GardenCity, N.Y., Doubleday & Co.,Inc., I963, chs6 (esp.pp. I22-50), 7, and8.

34 CPII, pp. IOI-2.

35. Natanson, 'PhenomenologyandTypification', Social Research, ol. 37(Spring, I 970), pp. I 8-20. Schutz, too,uses the word'determinants'o describethe social and natural forces an actorfinds himselfsurroundedby. See CP I,

PP. 329-30.36. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects f Scien-

tiDicExplanation, ew York, The FreePress,I964, p. 87.

37. The naturalattitude,as Kockel-mans points out in anothercontext, isbest studied by means of an empiricalrealism,'inasmuchas ... [it] makes apre-givenobjective world prevail overconsciousness, hich in the last report spassive n respect o theworld.'JosephJ.Kockelmans, Husserl'sTranscendentalIdealism',Phenomenology,d.Kockelmans,



Robert . Gorman Alfred chutz-anexpositionndcritique

New York,Doubleday& Co., Inc., I967,

p. I92. This close relationshipbetweenempirical realism and the common-sense world has been recognized byanother henomenologist: armonChap-man, 'Realism and Phenomenology',Essays in Phenomenolov,d. MauriceNatanson,The Hague, MartinusNijhoff,I 969, pp. 79-I I 5.

38. See David Braybrooke, Philo-sophicalProblems f the Social Sciences,New York, MacmillanCo., I965, pp. I-

I8, for a discussion f the differentkinds

of interaction onstituting ociety.39. CP I, pp. 207-59. These pagesinelude Schutz's analysis of 'multiplerealities'.

40. The firstexample,mailinga letter,is the examplemostemployedby Schutzthroughout is writings o illustratehowhis methodworks.Not surprisingly,hoseadoptingSchutz'smethodology re con-cerned with qualitativelysimilar 'rou-tine' social activities. See, for example,the work done by 'Decision-Making'theorists nd 'Ethnomethodologists'.

4I. Richard Snyder's Decision-MakingTheoryhas been analysedfromthis generalpoint of view by this author,'On the Inadequacies f Non-Philosophi-

cal PoliticalScience:CriticalAnalysisofDecision-MakingTheory', InternationalStudiesQuarterlv,ol. I4 (December 970)

pp 395 41

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A Schutz an Exposition and Critique

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