A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 UpdateA Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
May 2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
PILOT PROGRAM USE SINCE 2018 3
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 3 PROGRAM USE SINCE PREVIOUS UPDATE 4 TENANT DEMOGRAPHICS 6 OVERALL USE TRENDS SINCE INCEPTION 7
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS 8
FREQUENCY OF USE AND OUTCOMES 8 NUISANCE ABATEMENT AND CRIME DETERRENCE 10 NECESSITY OF STATE PILOT PROGRAM 10
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS: DATA COLLECTION AND PILOT PR OGRAM EXPANSION 11
APPENDIX A: LEGISLATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER PILO T PROGRAM 13
APPENDIX B: PROGRAM INCIDENTS AND VOLUNTARY VACATES SINCE INCEPTION 14
APPENDIX C: PROGRAM UNLAWFUL DETAINER C ASE FILINGS SINCE INCEPTION 16
APPENDIX D: UNLAWFUL DET AINERS, 2018-2020 18
ENDNOTES 22
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
Author
Benjamin Tang
Mandated by
California Civil Code 3485, 3486 and 3486.5 (as amended by Statutes 2018, Chapter 880)
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank the City Attorney’s Offices of Los Angeles, Oakland and Sacramento
for their time in providing information for this report.
Recommended Citation:
Tang, Benjamin. “A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update.”
California Research Bureau, California State Library, May 2021.
ISBN Number: 1-58703-289-9
Executive Summary
The California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program authorizes the city attorneys of Long Beach, Los Angeles, Oakland and Sacramento to initiate eviction cases against tenants arrested for illegal drugs or weapons charges. Normally, evictions are filed by landlords, but the program authorizes city attorneys to intervene to either protect property owners and managers (who might fear retaliation from tenants) or compel negligent ones into action.
Since 2018, the four participating cities have reported collectively using the program 103 times: there were 52 unlawful detainer actions in 2018, 33 in 2019 and 18 in 2020. Long Beach was the most active participant, while Los Angeles and Oakland reported using the state program sparingly. The noticeable decline in use is possibly explained by the introduction of local nuisance eviction ordinances.
Most tenants given notices of intent voluntarily vacated the premises rather than contest them (65% of incidents in 2018 and 67% in 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic affected program use in 2020, as city attorneys had to consider emergency moratoria that banned most residential evictions. Almost all unlawful detainers that advanced to court were filed by landlords rather than assigned to city prosecutors. Three-fourths (77%) of arrested tenants were racial minorities, an increase from the last cycle (69% for 2015 to 2017).
This is the ninth legislative report on the pilot program. A major issue preventing an evaluation of the program’s merits continues to be insufficient data. However, the program appears to be efficient and cost-effective with regard to nuisance abatement at the target property (any actual crime reduction is unknown).
1
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
Background: Unlawful Detainer State Pilot Program
Unlawful detainer actions are lawsuits filed by landlords to evict tenants, whether due to expired leases or breach of leasing contract (such as nonpayment of rent). Residential lease agreements are private contracts between landlord and tenant, and typically u nlawful detainer actions cannot be filed b y parties other than the landlord. In other words, until 1998 only property owners could pursue eviction actions.1 Assembly B ill 1384 (Stats. 1998, Ch. 613) introduced the Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program that authorized city attorneys in Los Angeles to initiate unlawful detainers against tenants for abatement of nuisance behavior (conduct related to illegal drugs). 2
Bill sponsors argued t hat landlords either neglect tenant conduct (especially la ndlords who live far from their properties) or do not “evict tenants engaged in drug-related activity primarily due to fear of retaliation.” Granting city attorneys the right to intervene with unlawful detainers provides cover from possible retribution to landlords and tenant neighbors who report such criminal activity.3 The bill also allowed f or partial evictions, which can preserve the tenancy of the household by targeting only tenants charged with nuisance behavior.4
Subsequent legislation has revised the program extensively (see Appendix A for legislative history). Other jurisdictions were authorized to join (although some cities chose not to participate). Notably, AB 1013
Figure 1: General process to eviction under the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program
2
Landlord: File unlawful detainer
City Attorney: File unlawful detainer; landlord reimburses legal fees (up to $600)
City Attorney: Send notice to quit to tenant
City Attorney: File unlawful detainer; landlord joined as co- defendant and liable for fines
Landlord: Landlord: Evict?
Landlord: Send notice to quit to tenant
Tenant: Vacate?
Tenant: Vacate?
tenant arrests
Identify qualified Send warning letter (notice of intent) to landlord and tenant
Tenant: Voluntarily vacate prior to notice
California Research Bureau | California State Library
(Stats. 20 07, Ch. 456) added u nlawful possession or use of illegal weapons as qualifying nuisance behavior. The initial illegal drugs program is codified as Civil Code Sections 3486 and 3486.5, while the later illegal weapons program became Civil Code Section 3485.5 Although the two programs are technically distinct, all legislative reports (including the present report) treat both as aspects of the same program because the unlawful detainer procedures are the same.6
The general eviction process has remained unchanged throughout the Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program (see Figure 1).7 City attorneys choose qualifying incidents to pursue unlawful detainer under state law (how they identify these cases differ among city offices). Written n otices of intent to evict are sent to both tenant and property owner with information on the suspected violation and contact information for tenants to obtain legal assistance to contest the eviction. Tenants might voluntarily vacate the property after or even before receipt of notice.8 The city attorney may then send a notice to quit to the tenant (if the property owner chooses not to pursue an eviction themselves) or even join the landlord to the tenant as co-defendants in the court case if the owner does nothing (neither evicting the tenant nor assigning the case to the city attorney).9 At any time, the tenant can voluntarily vacate and end the legal process.
To ensure that unlawful detainer authorization is not abused, participating city attorney offices are required to make good faith efforts to report all unlawful detainer actions taken for program evaluation. The first four reports to the State Legislature about the program were
written b y the Judicial Council. AB 530 (Stats 2009, Ch. 244) transferred t hat responsibility to the California Research Bureau at the California State Library. Past laws extended t he pilot program for a few years at a time with automatic su nset dates, requiring periodic ext ensions by future bills as well as regular program evaluations. AB 2930 (Stats 2018, Ch. 880) extended the pilot program to January 1, 2024, and requires the California Research Bureau to submit progress reports in March 2021 and March 2023.10 This 2021 update is the fifth report by the Research Bureau.
Pilot Program Use since 2018
Program Participation
The same four cities have participated in the Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program throughout its tenure: Long Beach and Los Angeles (both since program inception in 1998), Oakland (since 2015) and Sacramento (since 2008 for the illegal weapons program and 2010 for drugs). The authorization for Long Beach lapsed in 2015 from an oversight in the urgency bills that extended the pilot programs – AB 2310 (Stats. 2014, Ch. 339) and AB 2485 (Stats. 2014, Ch. 341) – but the oversight was fixed with the 2018 extension.
The governing code sections initially reference the general eviction process detailed in the Code of Civil Procedure §1161, but then focuses on language requirements for the notice of intent sent to tenants and data fields reported to the California Research Bureau. The language requirements underscore that eviction proceedings could be started by the city rather than the landlord and include provision of a list of legal assistance
3
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
providers to mitigate due process concerns. The codes do not stipulate any other specific administrative processes, leaving each city attorney’s office to track and report how it uses the state unlawful detainer process in disparate fashion.
Some cities, for example, list actions per address, as eviction cases focus on reclaiming landlord property and filed against all tenants of an address, while others report actions per tenant, since nuisance charges are made against individuals and the demographic details of each tenant are required for the program. A single property could comprise multiple tenants of different racial backgrounds, as well as multiple tenants possibly charged for different nuisances. One 2019 Long Beach incident involved four tenants (two Hispanic, one Black, and one of other race) in which two were tagged with illegal weapons and the other two for illegal substances (it is unclear which tenants were actually charged). For consistency, this instance is counted once, for the single address, with nuisance charge listed as “Both.” As addresses lack a one-to-one relationship with tenants, the counts of case filings and voluntary vacates might not equal the total number of incidents.
Program Use since Previous Update
Compared to the 2015-2017 period from the last update, all cities except Sacramento reported d eclining use of the program (see Appendix B ).11 Historically, Long Beach and Los Angeles used the program the most each year,12 and Long Beach remains the most frequent user each single year from 2018 to 2020. Sacramento’s usage notably rebounded f rom the last period (see Table 1).13 The 15 incidents in 2018 is not the
peak year (that would be 38 incidents in 2010), but 47 tenants were affected, which makes 2018 one of the most impactful years for Sacramento. The high number of tenants per incident reflects families being evicted (see Tenant Demographics).
In the past three years, drug-related incidents have outnumbered w eapon incidents, in line with the general trend since program inception (Los Angeles has not been required to report its use of the controlled su bstances program since 2014).14 Los Angeles and Oakland issued two unlawful detainer notices to tenants arrested for both drug and weapon violations (these double violations are only counted on ce). In Los Angeles, three incidents (involving six tenants) were double violations.
Voluntary vacates are incidents in which the tenants left their residences before or after receiving eviction notices (notices of intent to evict and notices to quit), including after eviction cases commenced b ut before they were resolved. The majority of unlawful detainer actions in 2018 and 2019 (56 out of 86 incidents, or 65%) ended with the tenants voluntarily vacating the premises, similar to the previous three years (62%). Most incidents in Long Beach and Sacramento resolved this way, while the majority of Los Angeles incidents went to court.15 The low Oakland numbers are skewed b y one action that persisted since 2015 and finally confirmed in a 2019 partial eviction, and a separate action from 2018 resulting in a 2020 partial eviction (which was interrupted by COVID-19).
The voluntary vacate rate plummeted in 2020 because the pandemic caused many actions to be abandoned or suspended.
California Research Bureau | California State Library
Long Beach Los Angeles Oakland Sacramento All Cities
2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020
Total Incidents 30 17 11 4 2 1 3 2 1 15 12 5 53 33 18
Controlled Substances 20 8 4 - - - 2 1 1 8 6 2 30 15 7
Illegal Weapons 2 2 5 4 0 0 1 1 0 7 6 3 15 9 8
Both Nuisances 8 7 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 9 3
Total Voluntary Vacates 23 14 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 9 6 0 34 22 2
(% of Total Incidents) 77% 82% 18% 25% 50% 0% 33% 50% 0% 60% 50% 0% 64% 67% 11%
Before Notice 2 4 0 - - - 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 0
After Notice 21 10 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 9 4 0 32 16 2
Notice to Quit 17* 6* 3* 3 1 1 - - - 6 3 0 27 10 4
Unlawful Detainer Cases 10 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 0 18 6 3
(% of Total Incidents) 33% 6% 9% 75% 50% 100% 67% 50% 100% 13% 25% 0% 34% 18% 17%
Owner Filed 10 1 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 3 0 16 5 2
City Attorney Filed 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1
Adjudicated 9 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 2 1
Other Resolutions 2 0 7 1 1 0 1* 0 1* 3 5 5* 7 6 13
(% of Total Incidents) 7% 0% 64% 25% 50% 0% 33% 0% 100% 20% 42% 100% 13% 18% 72%
Voluntary vacates, notices to quit and unlawful detainer case filings do not add up to total incidents because of different data collection methods by each office, the unknown status of certain incidents, and the dynamic eviction process. Most data on notices to quit, particularly for Long Beach, are unknown. Note that the Oakland and Sacramento incidents in 2020 were interrupted by COVID-19.
After Governor Gavin Newsom’s March 16 executive order authorized local governments to halt evictions due to economic distress suffered f rom the pandemic, every city in the state’s Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program passed emergency ordinances that imposed temporary bans on residential evictions for nonpayment of rent.16 The Sacramento City Attorney’s Office interpreted its municipal ban to suspend all 10 unlawful detainer actions in 2020 that had been initiated u nder the state program.17 Los Angeles and Oakland claimed public saf ety exemptions and continued with their state program actions.18 One case in Long Beach had a scheduled sheriff lockout put on hold.
Aside from the pandemic, other incidents had unusual resolutions or situations. For Long Beach, two incidents involved people who were not legal tenants at those addresses: one was identified as a squatter, while another as a trespasser. Another Long Beach action involved a tenant who was housed under the Brilliant Corners Housing Program, a county-supported housing program for the vulnerable homeless population. Two Long Beach court cases were withdrawn when the tenants vacated.
Partial evictions are also a regular resolution. In Los Angeles, a partial eviction allowed an elderly disabled tenant to remain, while in Oakland, the above- mentioned partial eviction interrupted by
Tenant Demographics
The 2013 California Research Bureau progress report suggested that tenant biographic in formation was needed f or proper evaluation of the program, including over the issue of possible disparate racial impact.19 The two bills reauthorizing the program in 2014 (AB 2310 and AB 2485) mandated each unlawful detainer also record tenant age, race, address, and prior arrest and eviction records. 20
Since 2018, about 77% of tenants sent nuisance eviction notices have been non- white; this is a slight increase from 69% during the past three-year cycle (see Table 2). For 2018-2020, the number of Black and Hispanic t enants sent notices were roughly the same (52 and 49, respectively), in line with the past three-year period (46 and 45, respectively). The increase in non-white tenants is driven b y the jump in Asian tenants charged in Sacramento: 13 Asian tenants in 4 addresses in 2018 and 6 Asian tenants in 2 addresses in 2019. Also of note is the increased number of families affected: of the 78 Sacramento tenants in 2018 and 2019, eight were children aged 7 years or younger (and an additional six
were aged 8 to 16). A partial eviction was negotiated in one family’s case, and a re- signed lease agreement with Drug and Crime Free Housing Addendum resolved another incident.
The California Research Bureau cannot determine whether nuisance evictions under the state program have been unfairly applied to tenants of color more than evictions through other devices – discrimination (or disparate treatment) requires intention, while disparate impact requires proof that non-white tenants have been targeted more adversely than white tenants. Two issues complicate intentionality of the process: (1) t hat one nuisance tenant affects all tenants of a property, and (2) t hat police officers refer cases and city attorneys select them means there are two levels of decision-makers. Final numbers since 2015 show unlawful detainers have been directed at non-white tenants (22%) almost four times more than at white tenants (73%). A more nuanced analysis would consider total numbers of incidents referred (and rejected) rather than just initiated. Confounding variables, such as the numbers of renters and arrests within each city for context, also make statistical conclusions based on just the reported d ata questionable (see Table 4).
In the past three years, only 9 of 175 noticed tenants (5%) had prior arrests for the same nuisance violations. This proportion is drastically lower than the 56% (out of 152 tenants) for 2015-2017. Inconsistent tracking meant arrest and eviction records are simply unknown in most cases. A past argument for not tracing tenant records over privacy concerns is unlikely, given simple confirmation of priors is all that is required.
Table 2: Noticed tenants by race and prior history, 2015-2020
California Research Bureau | California State Library
All Cities Long Beach Los Angeles
2015- 2017
2018- 2020
Since 2015
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020
Total Tenants 152 175 327 42 18 47 33 21 16 5 4 2
White 40 32 72 10 3 23 8 6 5 0 0
0 1 2 3 2 0 – – –
39 15 23 – – 7 – – –
Oakland Sacramento
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Total Tenants
White
(% Tenants)
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Other
Non-White
(% Tenants)
Unknown
0
(% Tenants) 26% 18% 22% 24% 17% 49% 24% 33% 31% 0% 0% 0%
Black 46 52 98 9 7 8 7 3 7 1 3 2
Hispanic 45 49 94 21 5 11 13 8 2 4 0 0
Asian/Other 14 33 47 2 3 5 5 4 2 0 0 0
Non-White 105 134 239 32 15 24 25 15 11 5 3 2
(% Tenants) 69% 77% 73% 76% 83% 51% 76% 83% 69% 100% 75% 100%
Unknown 7 9 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Prior Evictions 4 5 9
Prior Arrests 85 9 94
2020
24 7
80% 80% 80% 100% 100% 100% 50% 86% 100% 77% 77% 70%
2 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 1 0
Prior Evictions – – – – – – – 1 – – – –
Prior Arrests 4 1 0 1 1 0 – 3 – – – –
10 10 5 3 2 1 10 7 3 47 31 10
0
0%
6
1
1
8
0
0%
8
0
0
8
0
0%
2
0
2
4
0
0%
2
0
1
3
0
0%
2
0
0
2
0
0%
0
0
1
1
3
30%
2
2
1
5
1
14%
3
3
0
6
0
0%
1
2
0
3
4
9%
15
8
13
36
6
19%
6
12
6
3
30%
4
2
1
The prior arrest or eviction notice records of the majority of tenants are unknown. Los Angeles did not track racial/ethnic information or prior tenant history in the previous three-year (2015-2017) period.
Overall Use Trends Since Inception
Despite renewed use of the state program in Sacramento, overall data for the last three years show a continued decline in use of the program since its inception, with peak use having occurred in the mid- to late-2000s (see Figure 2 in Appendix B ). The majority of nuisance charges involves controlled su bstances, although in the last few years, weapons charges have become
almost as common in a given year (see Table 3). The longer program history in Long Beach and Los Angeles means this drug/gun ratio is unlikely to change, but Oakland and Sacramento are trending closer to equity (from 2018 to 2020, Sacramento saw 16 incidents each for illegal substances and weapons). A little more than half of all city incidents (55%) have been resolved with tenants voluntarily vacating the premises rather than contesting evictions in court.
7
Drug/Gun Comparison Voluntary Vacates Case Filings
City Drug Incidents
City (%)
Long Beach 238 274 87% 448 819 55% 54 200 27%
Los Angeles 342 388 88% 712 1269 56% 19 329 6%
Oakland 18 31 58% 16 31 52% 0 8 0%
Sacramento 90 125 72% 62 129 48% 4 21 19%
All Cities 688 818 84% 1238 2247 55% 77 558 14%
Only years when cities submitted both illegal substances and weapons data are counted for comparison: since 2010 for Long Beach (excluding 2015) and Sacramento, 2008-2011 for Los Angeles and since 2015 for Oakland.
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
Excluding the five incidents in 2020 that were suspended d ue to COVID-19, Sacramento’s rate of vacated resolution would be 50%. Most incidents have been resolved this way since 2011 (see Table 6 in Appendix B ).
Since inception, one in five incidents (559 out of 2,613, or 21%) progressed to unlawful detainer actions filed in court (see Table 7 in Appendix C ). The percentages of cases filed f or each city are 23% (200 of 852) for Long Beach, 21% (330 of 1,601) for Los Angeles, 26% (8 of 31) for Oakland and 16% (21 of 129) for Sacramento. Only 1 4% of all cases have been filed b y cities since 1999; 86% have been filed by landlords. Case filings in Long Beach and Los Angeles are trending down but have held steady at low numbers recently in Oakland and Sacramento (see Figure 3 in Appendix C ).
Program Implementation and Effectiveness
As part of its mandate, the California Research Bureau is required to assess the merits of the unlawful detainer program.21 The statutes do not define merit, however, the program’s effectiveness can be
evaluated along three dimensions: (1) use frequency and unlawful detainer outcomes, (2) crime deterrence, and (3) n ecessity as a tool for police and city attorneys.22
Frequency of Use and Outcomes
The city attorneys from each participating city consistently mention that the state’s unlawful detainer program remains a useful instrument in their efforts to deter criminal activities and involve property owners in their communities. City officials assert that the limited u se of the program stems from an awareness of the potential for abuse and resulting prudence in selecting which incidents to pursue.23
Each city has different selection procedures. In both Long Beach and Los Angeles, most actions are initiated by city attorneys who select the most egregious c ases after a systematic re view of a rrest records (some cases are police referrals).24 Although each prosecutor has their own judgment, a general principle is to only initiate unlawful detainer if a nuisance has an impact on the rest of the rental building property. In Oakland, either the community response police officers or residents themselves bring cases to the city attorneys.25 In Sacramento,
Problem Oriented Policing (POP) officers submit criminal nuisances to city attorneys after other troubleshooting methods have failed; unlawful detainers are initiated after two levels of review concur.26
The vast majority of unlawful detainer actions are evictions, whether voluntarily by tenants or court judgments. Since 2010, only o ne tenant prevailed in court and another appealed, while five cases have been withdrawn (two of which after the tenant voluntarily vac ated).27 The pilot program is therefore effective in terms of desired outcomes, but the success rate could reflect the cities’ police power. Organizations such as the Western Center on Law & Poverty and the National Rifle Association have objected to the program
for due process concerns.28 In Cook v City of Buena Park (2005), the California Court of Appeal compared the state program to a municipal nuisance eviction ordinance, which it struck down as unconstitutional and implied that nuisance eviction programs must have some minimum parameters for due process.29
City attorneys and police departments have identified the program’s cost-effectiveness, with the speedy resolution of incidents with voluntary vacates, as valuable. It is unclear why cost savings would be a factor. City attorneys have mentioned that unlawful detainer court cases typically require hundreds of hours of police investigation, documentation, court appearances and attorney preparation over several months30
Table 4: Estimated renter population and arrest totals by racial group, 2015-2019
Renter Households, Annual Average
–
White, Not Hispanic 29,673 30% 278,311 32% 27,612 29% 35,180
Black 18,117 18% 108,955 12% 29,322 30% 17,937
Hispanic 37,667 38% 357,390 41% 20,124 21% 24,223
Asian/Other 28,515 28% 291,025 33% 28,662 30% 25,109
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2015-2019 American Community Survey. Group households do not sum to total households due to multiracial category (not counted) and Hispanic construed as an ethnic rather than racial category by the Census.
Misdemeanor Arrests, Total Drug Felony Arrests, Total
Los Angeles Alameda Sacramento Los Angeles Alameda Sacramento County County County County County County
Total Arrests 884,240 – 146,199 – 118,962 –
White 192,754 22% 42,383 29% 54,331 46%
Black 182,103 21% 47,570 33% 32,952 28%
Hispanic 462,043 52% 40,110 27% 22,232 19%
Asian/Other 47,340 5% 16,136 11% 9,447 8%
Non-White 691,486 78% 103,816 71% 64,631 54%
39,382
7,992
9,352
19,940
2,098
31,390
– 6,889
1,718
2,752
1,672
747
5,171
– 7,290
2,630
2,112
1,473
1,075
4,660
20% 25% 36%
24% 40% 29%
51% 24% 20%
5% 11% 15%
80% 75% 64%
Source: California Department of Justice. Some of the most common illegal firearms charges in California are misdemeanors, such as possession without a permit, but illegal weapons charges can also be felonies.
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
– however, they do not normally file eviction lawsuits. T he comparison might be apt between law suits under the state program with those filed under municipal nuisance eviction ordinances. If more unlawful detainers progress to court, then expenses might actually increase.31
Nuisance Abatement and Crime Deterrence
The main objectives for participating in the state program, for city attorneys and police, is to eliminate localized drug dealing and gang activity, as well as motivate property owners and managers to abate related nuisances on their properties.32 Two potential outcomes from nuisance evictions are either crime diffusion (reduction) or simple crime displacement.33 While evictions “clean up” the targeted building by removing alleged criminals, those criminals might simply re locate and continue criminal activity elsewhere.
Evaluating crime reduction or displacement would require measuring crime levels within a target n eighborhood before and after an eviction, but only correlation rather than causation would be demonstrated as other factors are potentially responsible. The Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office acknowledges that gangs are territorial and evicted tenants who are gang members would likely remain within the same geographic are a, but crime must still be deterred.34 The Sacramento City Attorney’s Office argues that, even with displacement, a nuisance eviction still provides immediate relief f or a neighborhood.35
Nuisance abatement evictions as a policy touches upon public sa fety, policing tactics and housing insecurity issues. Nuisance
ordinances, also known as crime-free housing ordinances, have come under increasing scrutiny by the media, policy advocacy groups, legal scholars and social scientists as such ordinances become widespread across the country.36 The common criticisms are that nuisance eviction ordinances are racially u njust, exacerbate poverty and homelessness and, in some cases, induced by gentrification.
One major concern of critics is the greater discretionary power afforded t o the police.37 Although city attorneys make the final judgments in California’s Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program, police officers arrange the referrals in at least two cities. The fact that budget and staffing shortfalls to police departments had affected program use in the past for Los Angeles and Sacramento reveals how critical the police are to the process in those two cities.38 It is unclear what criteria police officers use to determine which incidents to refer to city attorneys.39
Necessity of State Pilot Program
The necessity of the state program for unlawful detainer continues to be impacted by similar municipal nuisance eviction ordinances and viable alternative methods of nuisance abatement. All participating cities have adopted local nuisance eviction ordinances that allow their city attorneys to initiate unlawful detainers.40 Los Angeles and Oakland have received greater media coverage for their ordinances; both municipal ordinances arguably e manate from the state program.41 The local codes also share certain similarities with the state version: for example, the Oakland ordinance also allows for partial evictions.42 If more unlawful detainers are pursued
Table 5: Total unlawful detainer filings in California, 2014-2016
California Los Angeles
156,545
167,787
174,678
499,010
3-Year Average 166,337 54,239 32.6% 5,467 3.3% 9,302 5.6% 10 0.006%
Source: Tenants Together. For comparison, Los Angeles City Attorney filed 96 cases under its Citywide Nuisance Abatement Program (CNAP) between 2013 and 2018. UCLA Luskin Institute on Inequality and Democracy. The Oakland City Attorney served 79 notices under its Nuisance Eviction Ordinance in 2008, 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016. Silverstein (2020). Life, Liberty, and Rental Property: Oakland’s Nuisance Eviction.
using the local ordinances, then t he state statute becomes less necessary (see Table 5).43 This fact would also explain declining use of the state program.
City attorneys stress that they try alternative methods to resolve nuisance cases before using unlawful detainer (whether the state statute or local ordinance), as they are aware of due process and discriminatory concerns. The Oakland City Attorney’s Office refers relevant incidents to domestic viole nce agencies.44 The Sacramento office will, when appropriate, serve notices of trespass or cite nuisance abatement under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the Health and Safety Code before escalating to an unlawful detainer action.45 The state pilot program is most useful as a “tool of last resort.”
Future Considerations: Data Collection and Pilot Program Expansion
This is the ninth progress report on the state Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program. Every report has remarked on the need for better data collection to adequately assess
the merits of the program. The main issue is that participating jurisdictions record different information, and rarely the full set of items mandated in statute. In most cases, the data is not readily available (particularly prior tenant histories), though the informational items seem pertinent to the process of selecting which tenants to pursue for unlawful detainer.
One potential option is to allow more time for the Research Bureau to interact with each city to fill out missing information (and for each city to track tenant and case histories). As these progress reports are necessary for April committee meetings, the reporting cycle should end one year earlier rather than rush the reporting before April.
One significant missing dataset are the details of the municipal eviction ordinances. The option of a local nuisance abatement measure rather than the state statute undoubtedly has an effect on the case selection process and therefore the operation of the state program. Cataloging the unlawful detainers filed using local ordinances would help address criticisms of the disparate impact from nuisance evictions of any kind and, by comparison,
help evaluate the merits of the state program.
AB 2930 extended the pilot program to 2024 – the program will have been in operation for 25 years by then. The State Legislature so far has not set any metrics for either the expansion or termination of the Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program.
12
13
Bill Nuisance Type
and Code Qualifying
Sufficient documentation
5 Los Angeles County Courts – of 15 eligible cities, only Long
Beach and Los Angeles participated
Judicial Council:
Summarize submitted data and evaluate merits of pilot program, included drug type
Jan. 2002
Documented by peace officer
5 Los Angeles County Courts – only Long Beach and Los
Angeles participated
Judicial Council:
Required data from cities changed; Responsibility for submitting data shifted from courts to city attorneys
Jan. 2005
Arrest report or other action by regulatory or
law enforcement
agency
Long Beach Los Angeles Oakland (did not participate) San Diego (did not participate)
Judicial Council:
Required data from cities changed; Report program merits in 2007 and 2009
Jan. 2010
enforcement report
Long Beach (skips 2008) Los Angeles Oakland (did not participate) Sacramento San Diego (did not participate)
Judicial Council:
Report program merits in 2009 (Long Beach unaware of eligibility and did not report 2008 data)
Jan. 2010
Amend: Civil Code §3485
enforcement report
authorized indefinitely) Oakland (did not participate) Palmdale (drugs program only,
did not participate) Sacramento San Diego (did not participate)
California Research Bureau:
Report program merits in 2011 and 2013 and determine if Los Angeles qualified for indefinite authorization (Los Angeles no longer submits drug incident data)
Jan. 2014
(except Los
California Research Bureau:
Jan. 2012
California Research Bureau:
New reporting template; Report program merits in 2016 and 2018
Jan. 2019
New reporting template; Report program merits in 2016 and 2018
Jan. 2019
California Research Bureau:
New reporting template; Report program merits in 2021 and 2023
Jan. 2024
Appendix B: Program Incidents and Voluntary Vacates since Inception
Table 6: Total unlawful detainer incidents, by nuisance type, since 1999
Long Beach 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Incidents 33 – – 24 35 46 74 97 135 92 – 73 75 – – – 42 21 47 30 17 11
Drug 33 24 35 46 74 97 135 92 64 62 – 42 16 33 20 8 4
Weapon – – – – – – – – 9 13 – – 2 3 2 2 5
Both 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 – – 3 11 8 7 2
Vacates 18 15 24 18 61 86 61 31 30 – 24 13 28 23 14 2
(% Vacated) 75% 43% 52% 24% 63% 64% 66% 42% 40% – 57% 62% 60% 77% 82% 18%
Los Angeles 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Incidents 159 173 – 190 277 257 – 2 121 105 – 158 125 – – – 2 12 12 4 2 1
Drug 159 173 190 277 257 2 121 97 139 106 – – – – – – –
Weapon – – – – – – – 8 19 19 – 2 12 12 4 0 0
Both 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 – – – – 0 2 1
Vacates 111 173 177 1 97 38 44 54 – 1 8 6 1 1 0
(% Vacated) 58% 62% 69% 50% 80% 36% 28% 43% – 50% 67% 50% 25% 50% 0%
Oakland 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Sacramento 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Incidents 10 10 5 3 2 1 Incidents 4 38 35 – 10 7 3 15 12 5
Drug 1 3 0 2 1 1 Drug – 33 26 – 7 5 3 8 6 2
Weapon 4 4 3 1 1 0 Weapon 4 5 9 – 3 2 0 7 6 3
Both 5 3 2 0 0 0 Both – 0 0 – 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vacates 5 6 3 1 1 0 Vacates 3 6 19 – 10 7 2 9 6 –
(% Vacated) 50% 60% 60% 33% 50% 0% (% Vacated 75% 16% 54% – 100% 100% 67% 60% 50% –
The pilot program lapsed in 2014.
• Long Beach did not submit data in 2000, 2001, 2009, 2012 and 2013, and did not participate in 2008 and 2015 of the illegal guns program.46 • Los Angeles did not submit data in 2001, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2013 and not required to submit controlled substances data after 2013. • Oakland did not join the pilot program until 2015. • Sacramento did not join the controlled substances section until 2010.
m : 2
0 21
U p
d ate
1 4
ia State Lib rary
Figure 2: Unlawful detainer incidents, by city and year since inception
The illegal weapons program did not start until 2008. Sacramento started participating in the controlled substances section in 2010. Oakland joined the pilot program and Los Angeles stopped reporting controlled substances data in 2015.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Appendix C: Program Unlawful Detainer Case Filings since Inception
Table 7: Total unlawful detainer cases filed, by filing entity, since 1999
Long Beach 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Cases Filed 7 2 13 7 17 20 35 18 28 23 – 8 2 8 10 1 1
(% Incidents) 21% 8% 37% 15% 23% 21% 26% 20% 38% 31% 19% 10% 17% 33% 6% 9%
by City 0 0 0 4 6 6 15 6 10 3 – 3 0 1 0 0 0
(% Filings) 0% 0% 0% 57% 35% 30% 43% 33% 36% 13% 37% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0%
0 4 4 6 11 18 7 10 3 – 3 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 – 0 0 1 0 0 0
Assigned
Cases Joined 0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
31 39 29 72 70 0 17 12 19 24 –
19% 23% 15% 26% 27% 0% 14% 11% 12% 19%
1 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 3 3 –
3% 0% 7% 3% 0% – 6% 0% 16% 13%
2 2 0 0 1 0 3 – –
0 0 0 0 1 0 – 2 –
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
1 4 6 3 1 1
50% 33% 50% 75% 50% 100%
1 2 1 1 1 1
0% 50% 17% 33% 100% 100%
1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
2016
1
10%
0
0%
0
0
2017
0
0%
0
1 6
The pilot program lapsed in 2014. Long Beach did not submit data in 2000, 2001, 2009, 2012 and 2013. Los Angeles did not submit any data in 2001, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2013. In 2010, Los Angeles did not submit the number of cases that the city attorney joined the landlords as co-defendants, and in 2011, did not submit the cases that landlords assigned to the City Attorney’s Office.
C alifo
ia State Lib rary
Figure 3: Unlawful detainer actions filed, by city and year since 1999
The illegal weapons program did not start until 2008. Sacramento started participating in the controlled substances section in 2010. Oakland joined the pilot program and Los Angeles stopped reporting controlled substances data in 2015.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Long Beach
Los Angeles
1 7
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
Appendix D: Unlawful Detainers, 2018-2020
Figure 4: Unlawful Detainers, Long Beach 2018-2020
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018. Darker census block groups have higher percentage of nonwhite residents.
Figure 5: Unlawful Detainers, Los Angeles 2018-2020
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018. Darker census block groups have higher percentage of nonwhite residents.
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
Figure 6: Unlawful Detainers, Oakland 2018-2020
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018. Darker census block groups have higher percentage of nonwhite residents. Oakland incidents from 2018 were not resolved until 2019 or 2020.
California Research Bureau | California State Library
Figure 7: Unlawful Detainers, Sacramento 2018-2020
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018. Darker census block groups have higher percentage of nonwhite residents.
A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2021 Update
22
Endnotes
1 The general unlawful detainer process is in the Code of Civil Procedure §1159-1179(a).
2 AB 1384 (Stats. 1998, Ch. 613).
3 Assembly Committee on Appropriations. (1998, Jan. 26). Analysis of AB 1384 (Havice), p.3. On third-party policing as it pertains to the unlawful detainer pilot program, see the first California Research Bureau report: Blanton, R. (2011). Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: Report to the California Legislature.
4 See Civil Code §3485(a)(6)(B)(ii)(C) and §3485(b); also §3486(b) and §3486(f)(3).
5 AB 1013 (Stats. 2007, Ch. 456); Civil Code §3485, Civil Code §3486 and Civil Code §3486.5.
6 Civil Code §3486.5(b)(2)(B) authorizes the combination of reports on both programs. This is the ninth legislative report on the unlawful detainer pilot program. The first four reports, written by the Judicial Council of California in 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2009, were inconclusive about program merits due to data limitations. The next four reports, written by the California Research Bureau, were also precluded from making any conclusive evaluations due to same. Bureau reports can be found at: Blanton, R. (2011). Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: Report to the California Legislature; Lindsey, T. (2013). City-Attorney-Sponsored Unlawful Detainer in California, Part I: Mandated Information – 2013 Report to the California Legislature; Neville, A., et al. (2016). A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program; and Tang, B. (2018). A Review of the California Unlawful Detainer Pilot Program: 2018 Update.
7 For the typical eviction procedure, see Endnote 1.
8 For the purposes of this report, voluntary vacates include all incidents in which tenants departed from their residences before and after receiving eviction notices (notices of intent to evict and notices to quit), as well as after court cases commenced but before the cases were resolved.
9 If the city attorney prevails with the unlawful detainer, then the attorney may impose penalties on the owner (legal costs and attorney’s fees, constituted as a lien on the property). See Civil Code §3485(a)(2)-(3) and §3486(a)(2)-(3). The initial notices also warn of potential penalties imposed under municipal codes, which vary by city but could include additional fees.
10 See Civil Code §3486.5(b)(2)(B) and AB 2930 (Stats 2018, Ch. 880).
11 The last legislative report on the pilot program, Neville, et al. (2016), reported program use from 2015, but the 2015 numbers were also included with the Tang (2018) update.
12 In previous reports, the number of incidents was normalized as a rate per 100,000 city residents to compare the rate of program use among the four cities, and Long Beach was the most intensive user of the program (although recall that Los Angeles is no longer required to report its use of the illegal drugs program, which is consistently cited more often than the guns program by all four cities). Lindsey (2013), p.12 and Neville, et al. (2016), p.8. A population-based adjustment provides a dubious comparison for program usage, as it switches the focus away from the city attorneys who decide that program use to a statistic (population) with an unknown correlation to eviction or nuisance rate.
13 The Sacramento City Attorney’s Office had in fact predicted in 2018 a rebound in program use after staff cutbacks and resource diversion caused a lull in program use during 2015-2017. Sacramento City Attorney’s Office. (2018, Mar. 9). In-person interview. The Office had claimed resources were being diverted to pursue illegal cannabis activities. See Lillis, R. (2017, Nov. 21). “Hundreds of illegal pot houses close after Sacramento cracks down.” Sacramento Bee. Sacramento believed use of the controlled substances program would similarly increase after its initial participation in 2010, which was the previous peak year. See Blanton (2011), p.38.
14 Civil Code §3486.5 exempts Los Angeles from reporting data for controlled substances.
23
15 Notices of intent from city attorneys are usually enough to encourage nuisance tenants to leave. Los Angeles City
Attorney’s Office. (2018, Mar. 5). Phone interview.
16 Office of Governor Gavin Newsom (2020, Mar. 16). “Governor Newsom Issues Executive Order to Protect Renters and Homeowners During COVID-19 Pandemic” and Executive Order N-28-20. Office of Governor Gavin Newsom (2020 Mar. 27). “Governor Newsom Takes Executive Action to Establish a Statewide Moratorium on Evictions” and Executive Order N-37-20. Office of Governor Gavin Newsom. “Governor Newsom Signs Executive Order on Actions in Response to COVID-19 6.30.20” and Executive Order N-71-20.
Oakland Eviction Moratorium Emergency Ordinance 20-0316 (2020, Mar. 27). Oakland Eviction Moratorium Emergency Ordinance Extension 20-0377 (2020, May 19). Los Angeles City Ordinance #186585 (2020, Mar. 27). Long Beach Coronavirus Economic Relief Package Urgency Ordinance 20-0010 (2020, Mar. 24). Long Beach Ordinance 20-0028 (2020, Jul 29). Sacramento Temporary Moratorium on Evicting Tenants Ordinance 2020-0015 (2020, Mar. 17).
Most municipal eviction moratoria lasted only a few months and expired. Eviction protection was extended in September 2020 with state laws AB 3088 (Stats 2020, Ch. 37) “COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act of 2020” and extended in January 2021 with SB 91 (Stats 2021, Ch. 2). For overview of other local COVID eviction ordinances, see https://www.nolo.com/.
17 Sacramento City Attorney’s Office (2021, Feb. 25). Phone interview.
18 Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. (2021, Feb. 25). Videoconference interview. Oakland City Attorney’s Office. (2021, Mar. 2). Phone interview.
19 Lindsey (2013), p.25; and Senate Judiciary Committee. (2014, Jun. 23). Analysis of AB 2310 (Ridley-Thomas), p.9. Concerns over possible racial discrimination were raised by the initial opposition to the original bill, AB 1384 (1998), though legislative staff at the time were not overly concerned. Blanton, R. (2011), p.48.
20 For list of specific mandated questions, see Civil Code §3485(g)(1) for weapons offenses and §3486.5(b)(1) for drug offenses.
21 See AB 2930 (Stats 2018, Ch. 880); also Blanton (2011), p.29 for her framing of these questions to convey legislative intent.
22 Blanton (2011), p.29.
23 Ibid., pp.31, 42-43. City attorneys and police officers “objected to the classification of the program as ‘seldom used’” and also argued that the additional reporting requirements required by AB 530 (Stats. 2009, Ch. 244) discouraged excessive use.
24 Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. (2021, Feb. 25). Videoconference interview. Long Beach City Attorney’s Office. (2018, Feb. 21). Phone interview.
25 Each of the 5 Oakland police districts have neighborhood law courts with public contact information and distribution email lists for interested residents. Oakland City Attorney’s Office. (2021, Mar. 2). Phone interview.
26 Sacramento City Attorney’s Office (2021, Feb. 25). Phone interview.
27 Blanton (2011), p.40; Lindsey (2013), p.20. The appealed case was in Oakland in 2017, and the case was not pursued.
28 Western Center on Law & Poverty. (2018, Mar. 20). Email communication. Charles H. Cunningham, National Rifle Association. (2014, Jun. 19). Letter to Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
29 Cook v City of Buena Park (2005) 126 CA4th 1, 23 CR3d 700. See also Bernhardt, R. (2005). Compelling landlords to evict drug dealers: Cook v City of Buena Park, 2005.
24
30 Judicial Council (2009), p.B-5; Blanton (2011), pp.43-44; and Oakland City Attorney’s Office. (2018, Mar. 8).
Phone interview. The Sacramento City Attorney’s Office estimated the prosecution costs of an eviction lawsuit to be 10 to 15 times that of an unlawful detainer nuisance action resolved without case filing. About 75% of typical eviction cases are decided within 45 days, and 60% within a month. Inglis, A. and Preston, D. (2018). California Evictions are Fast and Frequent. Tenants Together.
31 The risk of an expensive unlawful detainer filing encourages city attorneys to be judicious in using the pilot program. Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. (2021, Feb. 25). Videoconference interview. Gov. Schwarzenegger vetoed AB 1838 (2010), which would have added San Joaquin County to the pilot program, over such cost concerns in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession. Gov. Schwarzenegger. (2010, Sep. 30). Governor's Veto Message of AB 1838 (Berryhill).
Compared to the $600 fee reimbursement to landlords for assigned the case to city attorneys, costs to the court for an unlawful detainer hearing runs $239 to $320 per case. “2021-22 Governor’s Budget Proposal: Implementation of the Tenant, Homeowner, and Small Landlord Relief and Stabilization Act of 2020 (AB 3088).”
32 Neville, et al. (2016), p. 9.
33 See Blanton (2011), pp.15-21 for more on diffusion versus displacement, and place-based and third-party policing.
34 Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. (2021, Feb. 25). Videoconference interview.
35 Sacramento City Attorney’s Office (2021, Feb. 25). Phone interview.
36 More than a thousand U.S. cities now have crime-free housing ordinances. Dillon, L., et al. (2020, Nov. 19). “Black and Latino renters face eviction, exclusion amid police crackdowns in California.” Los Angeles Times. See also Michaels, S. (2019). “Hundreds of Cities Have Adopted a New Strategy for Reducing Crime in Housing. Is It Making Neighborhoods Safer—or Whiter?”; and American Civil Liberties Union. “I Am Not a Nuisance: Local Ordinances Punish Victims of Crime.”
For scholarship, see Desmond, M. and Valdez, N. (2013). “Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third- Party Policing for Inner-City Women.” American Sociological Review 78: 117–141. Ramsey, K. (2018). “One-Strike 2.0: How Local Governments Are Distorting a Flawed Federal Eviction Law.” UCLA Law Review. Archer, D. (2019). “The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances.” Michigan Law Review. Roy, A., Graziani, T. and Stephens, P. (2020). Unhousing the Poor: Interlocking Regimes of Racialized Policing. UCLA Luskin Institute on Inequality and Democracy. Silverstein, E. (2020). “Life, Liberty, and Rental Property: Oakland’s Nuisance Eviction Program.” Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment.
37 Ramsey. (2018). pp.1179-1184.
38 A police budget shortfall that closed three dedicated staff positions forced Los Angeles to stop the program in 2005, while Sacramento twice claimed insufficient police training and resources to explain its low program use at the beginning and in the past three-year cycle. Judicial Council (2009), p.C-5; Blanton (2011), p.38; and Sacramento City Attorney’s Office (2018, Mar. 9). Phone interview. The Sacramento Police Department is set to have a record $165.8 million budget in the upcoming fiscal year. Clift, T. (2021, Apr. 30). “Some big cities have reduced police budgets. Sacramento’s is set to hit a record high.” Sacramento Bee. The Judicial Council in 2004 recognized that “operation of the pilot program appears to depend in part on the city attorney’s office having adequate resources to appropriately identify and process the cases.” Judicial Council (2009), C-11.
39 In 2008, out of 41 cases referred to Oakland’s Nuisance Abatement Division under the municipal nuisance eviction ordinance, 18 were possibly sent by the same police officer. Silverstein. (2020). p.90.
40 Long Beach Municipal Code §9.16 (drug activity) and §9.17 (unlawful weapons); Los Angeles Municipal Code §47.50; Oakland Municipal Code §8.23; Sacramento City Code §5.156 and §8.04. For other municipal nuisance eviction ordinances nationwide, see “The Policy Surveillance Program: City Nuisance Property Ordinances.”
25
41 Roy, et al. (2020) and Silverstein. (2020). See for example Capps, K. (2014, Oct. 22). “Oakland Can Now Order
Landlords to Evict Sex Workers.” Bloomberg CityLab. Tchekmedyian, A. (2017, Nov. 27). “Prosecutors say this housing complex is a hotbed for gang crime, and they think its owner should live there.” Los Angeles Times.
42 Oakland Municipal Code §8.23.100(H). The state pilot program covers commercial properties (including barbershops, auto body shops and massage parlors), while the Oakland ordinance adds gambling and prostitution as qualifying nuisances and the Los Angeles ordinance grants a reach of 1,000 feet from properties (increasing the qualifying area for nuisance activity beyond just the residential space). Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. (2018, Mar. 5). Phone interview; and Oakland City Attorney’s Office. (2018, Mar. 8). Phone interview.
43 Los Angeles uses its local ordinance “a lot.” Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office. (2018, Mar. 5). Phone interview. The L.A. City Attorney filed 96 cases under its Citywide Nuisance Abatement Program (CNAP) between 2013 and 2018. Roy, et al. (2020), p. 7. The Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office issued about 1,300 notices under its own eviction ordinance in 2003. Gammon, R. (2004, Mar. 22). “ACLU calls eviction law ‘illegal’.” Oakland Tribune.
Oakland uses its ordinance several times a year. Oakland City Attorney’s Office. (2018, Mar. 8). Phone interview. The Oakland City Attorney served 79 notices under its Nuisance Eviction Ordinance in 2008, 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016. Silverstein (2020), p. 82.
44 Oakland City Attorney’s Office. (2021, Mar. 2). Phone interview. A criticism of nuisance evictions is that domestic violence victims get punished for calling the police, since domestic violence could qualify as a nuisance behavior in certain municipal codes and the victims themselves get evicted. American Civil Liberties Union. “I Am Not a Nuisance: Local Ordinances Punish Victims of Crime” and American Civil Liberties Union. (2015). Silenced: How Nuisance Ordinances Punish Crime Victims in New York.
45 Health & Safety Code §11570. Sacramento City Attorney’s Office (2021, Feb. 25). Phone interview.
46 Neville, et al. (2016), p.7.
PILOT PROGRAM USE SINCE 2018 3
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 3
TENANT DEMOGRAPHICS 6
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS 8
FREQUENCY OF USE AND OUTCOMES 8
NUISANCE ABATEMENT AND CRIME DETERRENCE 10
NECESSITY OF STATE PILOT PROGRAM 10
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS: DATA COLLECTION AND PILOT PROGRAM EXPANSION 11
APPENDIX A: LEGISLATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER PILOT PROGRAM 13
APPENDIX B: PROGRAM INCIDENTS AND VOLUNTARY VACATES SINCE INCEPTION 14
APPENDIX C: PROGRAM UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FILINGS SINCE INCEPTION 16
APPENDIX D: UNLAWFUL DETAINERS, 2018-2020 18
ENDNOTES 22
Figure 1
Table 1
Table 2
Table 4
Figure 2
Table 3
Table 6
Table 7
Figure 3
California Department of Justice
Silverstein (2020). Life, Liberty, and Rental Property: Oakland’s Nuisance Eviction
Unlawful Detainer State Pilot Program 2021 v20210510
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Unlawful_Detainer_State_Pilot_Program_2021_ADA_Autotag_rotate.pdf