A Response to Eze’s critique of Wiredu’s consensual

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A Response to Ezes critique of Wiredus consensualdemocracy

Bernard Matolino

School of Philosophy and EthicsUniversity of KwaZulu-Natal

Private Bag X01Scottsville, 3209

South AfricaEmail: [email protected]

Abstract

The question of what political system best suites post colonial/independent

African states remain alive and ever more pertinent particularly in the face of

failed attempts at democratisation. Kwasi Wiredu notes that the adversarial

nature of Western democratic practices along party political lines may not be

well suited for African politics. Instead he suggests that the practice of con-

sensual democracy as practised in the traditional Ashanti society may be

more appropriate. Emmanuel Eze raises three objections against Wiredus

account of consensual democracy. This paper seeks to respond to Ezes ob-

jections and argue that consensual democracy may have more appeal than

Eze is prepared to concede.

1. IntroductionIn this paper I seek to respond Emmanuel Chukwudi Ezes critique of Kwasi Wiredustheory of consensual democracy. I will argue that Ezes first and third objections out-right do not succeed. I concede that Eze is correct to formulate his second objection inthe manner that he has done but I propose to reformulate Wiredus position in the lightof Ezes objection. If I succeed in reformulating Wiredus position, I contend, consen-sual democracy suffers no serious harm from Ezes objections.

Although this paper touches on a number of themes that relate to democracy in gen-eral and consensus in particular I restrict my discussion only to Wiredu and Ezes de-

bate. The reason for this restriction is that I seek to advance a debate on an Africandemocratic system on its own merits. While some may think it worthwhile to compareconsensual democracy with the Western style of representative democracy, this paperonly seeks to address Wiredus comparison which is between majoritarian democracyand consensual democracy. I understand Wiredus concern to be that majoritarian de-mocracy is one that has taken root in Africa yet seems ineffective.

2. Wiredus Consensual DemocracyWiredu argues that consensus played a crucial role in decision making and governancein traditional Africa. Most importantly it was not just a peculiarly political phenomenarestricted to adjudicating political questions. Where consensus characterises politicaldecision making in Africa, it is manifestation of an immanent approach to social inter-action. Generally, in interpersonal relations among adults, consensus as a basis of joint


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action was taken as axiomatic (Wiredu: 1997; 303). Further, resolutions representedan attainment of reconciliation which is a form of consensus. It is a restoration ofgoodwill through a reappraisal of the significance of the initial bones of contention. Itdoes not necessarily involve a complete identity of moral or cognitive opinions. It suf-fices that all parties are able to feel that adequate account has been taken of their

points of view in any proposed scheme of future action or coexistences (Wire-du:1997; 304).

Wiredus view is that consensus does not entail total agreement. It presupposes a di-versity of opinion. Dialogue is always possible enabling the production of an outcomethat is acceptable to all. Furthermore, where there is the will to consensus, dialoguecan lead to a willing suspension of disagreement, making possible agreed actions with-out necessarily agreed notions (ibid). He traces how consensus could work by dem-onstrating how it functioned in the Ashanti traditional system. According to Wiredu,

the basic political unit of the Ashanti system is the clan. Every such unit has a head,and every such head is automatically a member of the council which is the governing

body of the town or village. The qualifications for lineage leadership are seniority inage, wisdom, a sense of civic responsibility and logical persuasiveness (1997; 305).According to Wiredu, most of these these qualities were found in the eldest non-senilemember of the society which made the election of such a person routine. However, ifthese qualities could not be found in one person there would be a process to find thatindividual who possessed all these qualities. That person would remain in office unless

physical, moral or intellectual degeneration set in. In Wiredus view that was the firstpoint of consensus in the Ashanti political system. He emphasises that this process wasnot based on any acts of formal voting opining that there is no word in the local lan-guage which means the same as voting.

The chief, whose position was hereditary, presided over the council and his wordwas not the final arbiter on matters brought before the council. On the contrary the

word of the chief was an expression of the consensus reached by the councillors. Fur-ther, the position of the chief was also seen as a religious position on top of being apolitical position. The chief was the link between the people and the ancestors.

According to Wiredu consensus was operative at all levels of government. Whatmade it work was that the principle of consensus was a premeditated option. It was

based on the belief that ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same,although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different (1997; 306).He argues that humans have the ability to cut through their differences until they reachtheir rock bottom identity of interests. This is achieved through dialogue and theAshantis valued rational discussion as logical persuasiveness was the key requirementto hold office. Consensus was a decision to go beyond decision by majority opinion byseeking to represent the will of the minority in the final outcome. This is what Wireducalls consensual democracy which stands in contrast to majoritarian democracy. Majo-ritarian democracy simply seeks to secure the will of the majority and it is much easierto do that as opposed to reaching a consensual position.

For Wiredu the attraction of consensual democracy is that it encompasses both for-mal and substantive representation. The representatives presence is the formal repre-sentation and the expression of the peoples will by the representatives is substantive.Majoritarian democracies on the other hand just seek to consolidate the power of themajority.

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3. Ezes objectionsAs a preliminary Eze notes that the merit of Wiredus project lies in that it eschews as-sociation with one party governments and dictatorships in the name of unity or con-sensus by exposing how undemocratic these governments are. However, Wiredus ac-count, as an advocate of a return to the source1 fails to articulate the moral codes thatsustained consensual democracy.

4. The political legitimation objectionEzes first objection concerns itself with, in his view, the obscure manner in whichWiredu outlines the source of legitimising political authority in the Ashanti system.Wiredu argues that political office was occupied by the eldest member who possessedthe right qualities2. Eze correctly observes that in particular the chiefs office was notonly political but scared as well. This means that the office of the chief was not only

legitimated by a single political source. In Ezes view the legitimation of the politicalauthority was dependent on other factors such as the religious factor since this officewas both a religious and political position. In Ezes view the chief who could com-mand and obtain consensus from his subjects would be one who embodied all key fac-tors influencing arriving at consensus including the religious factor. However, accord-ing to Wiredu, the ultimately desired characteristic in the chief and one that securedconsensus was his persuasive power. This persuasive power guaranteed the attainmentof consensus through dialogue. For Wiredu the chiefs ability to reason and marshal

persuasive arguments was the only crucial factor in attaining consensus. Eze arguesthat this was not the case. On the contrary he claims that Wiredu does not fully spellout the relationship between powers of persuasiveness and other factors which can

prove to be crucial such as religious belief. Eze argues that religious and other beliefsshould not be ignored for they could be very crucial to making people accept one ideaover another; hence these religious beliefs should not be treated like mere scaffold-ings. Wiredu suggests that the sole factor that determines the acceptance of an idea isthe persuasiveness of the logical power behind it. Eze, on the other hand, does not be-lieve that logical persuasiveness alone can serve as the source of the legitimation of

political power. On the contrary he suggests that the exercise of public power heavilyrelies on mythologies such as God, the party, freedom, liberation and prog-ress. For Eze these are notions that demand loyalty from those subjected to them.They are social, religious and cultural fantasies that achieve their objective of making

people co-operate and see reason with each other with no recourse to reason. Eze callson Wiredu to provide an inclusive account of the source of legitimation of power inthe Ashanti system and what constituted the basis of consensual democracy.

I am not convinced that Eze is correct in claiming that Wiredu fails and hence oughtto outline the relationship between logical persuasiveness and religious beliefs assources of legitimising authority. I read Wiredu as making a sufficient distinction be-tween the exercise of real power and what can be called other functions of the chief.The sources of legitimising authority may be many but they may not command the

same power in lending credence to the exercise of power. These sources play different1 By return to the source Eze is referring to Wiredus project which attempts to retrieve what is consid-

ered to have been valuable in African traditional societies and apply it to present day Africa2 According to Wiredu these right qualities were obvious to everyone in that society and it was also quite

obvious, to everyone, which individual possessed those qualities. That individual was then chosen to bethe leader.


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roles in different functions and some of these roles and functions may not necessarilybe an exercise of power per-se. They are just concomitant to authority but do not nec-essarily constitute that authority. Thus a distinction can be drawn between the role ofthe chief as a political authority and a religious authority. Although both offices areresident in one authority/person neither has to, as a matter of essence, depend on theother.

I propose a distinction between procedural and substantive requirements and exer-cise of public office within the Ashanti system and consequently consensual democ-racy. The procedural requirements would constitute the execution of those functionsthat go with the office of king/chief. These functions do not represent an actual exer-cise of power but only show that the chief/king is the leader. In particular these func-tions serve to identify who the chief/king is. They are merely there to indicate thatwith the person who is performing these acts lies great power. They are not that pow-

er. They just say there is power, legitimate power. These functions say somethingabout power, they may even say something about themselves (that they are closelyconnected to power) but they play a negligible role in legitimising that power. We cansay they are political authority indicators and indicators are not constitutive of whatthey indicate.

I propose two senses in which we could interpret the chiefs office as being religiousas well. In the first, the person chosen for that office ought to have sufficiently demon-strated a high degree of moral integrity3. This person is free of scandal and will notlikely occasion it. He is morally worthy to occupy the office. The second sense inwhich the office can be religious is that the chief performs functions akin to priestlyfunctions. These functions will necessarily include interceding with the ancestors on

behalf of the people or leading the people in ceremonies that involve communicationwith the ancestors. The justification of the performance of these religious functionslies at the initial stage of the selection of the leader which Wiredu has cited as the be-ginning of consensus-where the most worthy person ought to be the occupant of the

office. That individual worthiness will later translate into capability to perform reli-gious acts on behalf of others. However these religious performances do not have a di-rect bearing to legitimising political authority for they do not influence the crucial re-quirement of ones ability to marshal logically persuasive arguments in the arena of

political debate. An individuals moral worthiness and performance of religious rites,as a leader, does not as a matter of course diminish or enhance his prowess in con-structing logical and persuasive arguments.

Eze has trouble accepting Wiredus assertion that the chiefs office was not only po-litical but religious as well yet the source of the chiefs power only lay in his logical

persuasiveness. He particularly wants to show that the Ashanti consensual system didnot merely rely on the kings logical persuasiveness but on religion as well. Further hedoubts the efficacy of such a system for modern day Africa where secularisation hastaken over. I read his point to be that a shared religion and other beliefs bound peopletogether in accepting the logical persuasiveness of certain ideas over others. Simply,

his point is that the Ashantis lived within a certain system that was informed by certain

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3 I do not think it is important to articulate what that moral integrity is as Eze wants Wiredu to do. What-ever moral codes each society has are generally known by everyone and consensual democracy canwork in different societies with different moral codes. Consensual democracy does not necessarily alignitself with certain moral codes at the exclusion of others, unless if there is a fundamental and irreconcil-able disagreement about the moral codes that ought to inform the process of consensus.


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beliefs to the exclusion of others. Hence he is led to dismiss the claim that rationalityand persuasiveness alone were what mattered in political discourses in consensual de-mocracies. In the end, in his view, the Ashantis did not accept a political opinion onthe basis of the merit of its contents and logical persuasiveness but on a certain set of

beliefs they held.On this account, if my reading of Eze is correct, no matter how brilliant, coherent

and persuasive a political opinion was-the Ashantis could not see its cogency unless italigned itself with their religious beliefs.

I think Ezes position, at the very least, is condescending. It supposes that for anyopinion, particularly political opinions, for the Ashantis (who used consensus) logical

persuasiveness was lost on them. His position is that any political position is not ap-pealing in itself unless it shows itself to be deeply immersed in all other beliefs thatparticipants adhere to. I do not think it is controversial to opine that the merit of a po-litical idea or lack thereof can be seen without recourse to religion, ancestors or manyother sources of power or functions of the person in power. The Ashanti would haveknown the difference between a brilliant, articulate and perceptive chief and a slowthinking, foolish chief when it comes to articulating and arbitrating on political issuesand seeking to find consensus among divergent opinions. There is no need of the inter-vention of the religious factor in attempting to use ones persuasive powers as a chiefin search of arriving at consensus.

Ezes assertion that the exercise of public power relies on mythologies such as God,the party, the flag which are cultural, religious and social fantasies that require loyaltyfrom adherents without offering any reason for the need of that loyalty to those adher-ents is hard to accept. Ezes position renders people incapable of engaging in rationaldebate and political discourse. It is built on the assumption that people lack the abilityto see the merit of notions such as justice, liberty and equality for their own sake in theabsence of God, the party and a flag. It reduces human beings to a mindless lot that isfanatical and ready to cheer on any mythical symbol of unity without bother to inquire

about fundamental questions such as liberty, justice and right. Ezes claim is moretelling when he argues that:

If the traditional mythological origins and justifications origins of consensualpolitics can no longer hold today (due to secularisation and religious plura-lisms, for example), and it is determined that what we need today is a form ofconsensual politics, then we may have to (re)invent usable-even as we discardunusable-mythologies. For, even-and especially a secular political institution, ifit renounces brute force as a mode of mobilisation, needs some sort mythol-ogy-Platos truthful lies, or various forms of utopia-in order to endure (1997:318).

The above quote firmly exposes Ezes belief, which I think is erroneous, that all politi-cal system, traditional or modern, religious or atheistic, ought to be based on somemythological foundation which ties people together and magically makes positionsand arguments acceptable to all. Eze is wrong to assume that there is a need for that

kind of utopia with every political system. He undermines the severity of the foundingdifferences of different political systems. Whereas a theocracy may have the need torely on some myths or beliefs to support certain practices and inform certain politicalarguments as more acceptable than others this is not necessarily true in a secular mod-


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ern democratic state-be it consensual or majoritarian4. It is not absolutely necessarythat every political system should find its justification in some utopia or other. It is just

possible that a political system can be built on certain truths such as justice, civil lib-erty and equality without resorting to mythologies and utopia. Eze is either sceptical orcynical of humanitys ability to see reason and build enduring political systems thatare not imprisoned by myths and utopia.

I think a distinction ought to be introduced between the ceremonial and the substan-tive functions and requirements of the chief. The ceremonial functions of the chiefwould include, among other things, leading religious celebrations and performingother functions such as receiving visiting chiefs or officiating at clan ceremonies. Therequirements for such activities could range from decorum to moral worthiness. How-ever these acts are not constitutive of or essential to legitimising political authority.

The substantive requirement of office for the Ashanti which ensured consensus was

the ability of the individual to provide leadership in adjudicating over competing argu-ments in search of a consensual position. One who had the logical rigour and analysisof arguments as well as articulation of positions adopted would be best suited to per-form the functions of chief. This was the real exercise of power which was legitimated

by the incumbents logical persuasiveness. From the sitting of the council were politi-cal debates were carried and consensus sought-political positions were reached andthese were subsequently communicated to everyone. In this realm there was norecourse to religious or other beliefs.

5. The identity of interests objectionEzes second problem with Wiredu lies in the way that Wiredu seeks to guarantee theattainment of consensus by claiming that at the rock bottom all members of the soci-etys interests are the same although they may have differing perceptions about whatthose interests are. Eze says this view is controversial and Wiredu fails to take into ac-count actual and existing social conditions as well as competing interests among peo-

ple. Eze sees no reason to accept Wiredus assertion. On the contrary he questionswhat identity of interests exists between some members of society who may seek thetotal domination of others and those who do not. How do the commercialinterests ofa Texan oil company, or the Anglo-Dutch Shell oil company, in Nigeria simply to getoil out of the soil as quickly and as safely as possible, coincide with the political andsurvival interests of comparatively speaking, a few thousand people called theOgonis? (Eze 1997: 318). In Ezes view Wiredus position that people desire thesame thing and only their perceptions of that desire differs-brings forth two problem-atic ideas. The first is that there is a rock bottom identity of interests and secondlythat what we need to act harmoniously is good knowledge of our long term interests.The problem with the second idea is that it conflates right knowledge with right action.

Eze argues that unless conditions of absolute justice can be guaranteed human strug-gles and antagonistic politics would be manifestly rational. He sees no self evidenttruth in the claim that at the rock bottom all interests of humans are the same. Thisrock bottom level at which all human interests may be same, I would argue, couldnot possibly be a human bottom, or at least not in the ordinary human world, wherehumans experience themselves as individuals (1997: 320). For Eze it cannot be thecase that it is merely misperception that hinders us from seeing that rock bottom iden-

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4 The South African constitution and democratic practices, for example, do not rely on some form of uto-pia for its acce ptability. They are a result of a negotiated settlement.


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tity of interests. He asks what if that identity of interests is a misperception in itself,or what if it has been conjured by those who benefit from the social and politicalarrangements.

I think Ezes claim that competing and divergent interests are characteristic of hu -man nature is correct. I also think that some interests pursued by some members of so-ciety could never be reconciled with the interests of the whole society e.g. domination.I also agree with him that Wiredu is mistaken in claiming that at the rock bottom thereis an identity of interests and it is only misperception that hinders us from reachingthat bottom.

However, this does not mean that there can be no possibility of consensus betweentwo groups whose interests are as divergent as the oil companies and the Ogoni peopleas Eze has pointed out above. I am of the view that consensus is possible even in suchsituations. The possibility and attainment of consensus lies in the process of dialoguewhich is at the heart of consensus. The dialogue is not aimed at removing misper-ception with the aim of reaching a certain rock bottom identity of interests. On thecontrary, my formulation would claim, the dialogue is aimed at rendering bare the op-

posing views, understanding their contents and aims; and most crucially the dialoguewould be directed at building bridges between the disparate opinions.

The dialogue is aimed at reaching a certain consensus but that outcome is not pre-scribed or known before the completion of the process. The outcome of the dialoguewhich is a consensual position need not be informed by the existence of an identity ofinterests. I think consensus might just as well be informed by the realisation that a situ-ation characterised by competing and divergent interests that do not take each otherinto consideration will not promote the pursuit of any interests at all. That realisationis not a realisation that all have same interests; it mere is a realisation akin to this dec-laration: If I am to successfully pursue my interests, I ought to take sufficient regardof others interests. Thus the oil companies and the Ogoni people find themselves

bound in the same fate and their divergent interests have to find a negotiated tolerable

co-existence. That outcome is consensus and the differences may remain but thosedifferences do not prevail over the consensual positionIt is self-evident that directly competing and conflictual interests obstruct, hinder

and eventually destroy each other. In a never ending series of conflicts and competi-tions no interest will triumph outrightly hence the urgency of dialogue with a view toreaching a mutually acceptable outcome will not be lost to the parties.

In this case I do not take consensus to mean unanimity or total agreement. I do noteven take it to mean a total conversion from one position to the other. I only take it tomean that a party to the dialogue recognises that its adversarys position is seriousenough to cause it to adjust its own position; and the other party recognises the same. Ithink it is not an exaggeration to point out that where there are two competing interestsa consensual position is attainable provided the will is found.

This brings me to what I believe are the crucial requirements to the attainment ofconsensual democracies. I believe every political system, to function properly, has cer-tain inviolable canons5 that keep it intact. An intolerable dictatorship, for example, en-

sures that it eliminates dissent, suppresses opposing views and promotes its own pro-paganda. All its social and political institutions are built to attain this end. A multi-party democracy on the other hand promotes the realisation of values such as freedomin all its manifestations and the protection of rights. Those who promote values con-

5 These canons need not be built on religious beliefs as Eze contemplates.


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trary to what is institutionally tolerable are severely punished. All this is done to en-sure that the political system preserves itself and that the tenets on which it is builtactually survive to perpetuate it.

The same applies to a system conceived as a consensual democracy. The crucial anddefining aspect of consensus is that it is a democracy. As a democracy, consensusought to admit of all free activity as long as it does not harm others. I propose two re-quirements that ought to characterise the nature of institutions and process of dialogue.Firstly, the institutional arrangements must allow the will of the participants to prevail.Participants must be able to freely express themselves without any inducement or co-ercion. If the will of the participants is allowed to prevail freely; they would then beable to claim ownership of the outcome of the process and consensual democracywould have prevailed. Secondly the interlocutors in the process enter this process ingood faith. It is crucial that values as openness, justice, fairness and equality should be

held as fundamental and inviolable conditions under which the dialogue is conducted.In the absence of these fundamentals there is no point in entering into any dialogue.

If this is our new understanding of how consensus works or of what informs consen-sus as opposed to Wiredus claim that at the rock bottom there is an identity of inter-ests; then Ezes objection loses its initial force. What we merely need to acknowledgeis that serious differences do exist but there are mechanism of arriving at consensusthat takes those differences seriously. In this way we change consensual democracyfrom a system that essentially searches for an identity of interests to one that seriouslyaddresses a myriad of differences.

6. The democracy objection

Ezes third and final objection pertains to Wiredus use and understanding of the termdemocracy. Eze is of the view that democracy is yet another social framework whichmediates conflicts and struggles that arise as a result of the competitive nature of in-dividuated identities and desires. He sees democracys nature and role as having

nothing to do with consensus. A democracys raison detre is the legitimation-andmanagement-of this always already competitive (i.e., inherently political) conditionof relativised desires. In this sense, consensus or unanimity of substantive deci-sions cannot be the ultimate goal of democracy, but only one of its moments (Eze1997: 320). Eze claims that democracy has its own end which is expressed in a socialcompact that says: We will agree or agree to disagree, and here are established mech-anisms or rules according to which we shall secure and maintain as long as necessaryeach of these possibilities (Eze 1997: 321). He says this is the spirit of democracy byany name not the elevation of the moment of substantive agreement, reconcilia-tion, or consensus to the axiomatic (ibid). Thus Eze is opposed to the characterisa-tion of democracy as consensus.

I am of the opinion that this objection does not succeed and Eze is grossly wrong toformulate it in the way he has done. His idea of a democracy seems to be embedded inhis conception of the nature of political activity. He essentially holds that there is al-

ways a vast difference in political desires and these are always competitive. He ap-pears not to want to tolerate the possibility that humans as political entities might wantto co-operate and do so willingly. I believe that is a wrong assumption for we know ofnumerous cases where even political rivals suspend their rivalry and competing desiresin favour of co-operation. From his insistence that human beings are essentially com-

petitive and irreconcilable Eze proceeds to; quite wrongly, argue that there is only one

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brand of democracy-one which only seeks to manage different competing desires. Tohim that is the sole role of any political system described as a democracy-a mere man-agement of competing desires; setting a framework of agreements and agreements todisagree. He claims that consensus is just one moment of democracy and not its ulti-mate aim. I propose that the management of competing desires is equally also just onemoment of democracy and not its ultimate aim.

A democracy by any name will not just concern itself with managing competing de-sires. It will probably not state this as its most important function. On the contrary itwill state the protection of rights such as liberty and equality as its fundamental aim. Ithink that Eze is mistaken in thinking that there can only be one aim of democracywhich means that there is only one type of democracy. I think it is quite possible thatthere could be a number of democracies. For example, what makes majoritarian de-mocracy and consensual democracy both democracies is that they are underpinned by

values such as freedom and the protection of human rights.Although Eze praises Wiredu for making it explicit that consensual democracy does

not align itself with dictatorship-it appears as if Eze does not shake off the suspicionthat the very act and process of arriving at consensus involves coercion and does notgive full cognisance to competing desires. This comes from the way he characterisesthe aim of democracy and his insistence on humans as monolithically and essentiallyever ultra competitive. What he fails to fully acknowledge is that consensual democ-racy asks a crucial question of action which his own version of democracy shies awayfrom. Consensual democracy asks: In the face of these competing desires and differ-ences what is the best way to proceed from here? The participants to consensual de-mocracy will respond: We shall sit and dialogue until we reach a consensus on the

best conceivable way to proceed. This is what consensual democracy strives for. Itdoes not get rid of strife and competing ends-it urges interlocutors to find a positionacceptable to them albeit their originally divergent aims.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I have sought to respond to Ezes objections to Wiredus idea of a con-sensual democracy. I have argued that Ezes first and third objections fail suffer out-right failure. I have argued that his second objection appears to be cogent but with asimple reformulation of Wiredus position its efficacy disappears.

Bibliography

Eze, E.C. 1997. Democracy or Consensus? A Response to Wiredu, in Eze, C. (Ed),

Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical reader, 313-323. Cambridge: Black-

well.

Wiredu, K. Democracy and Consensus in Traditional African Politics: A Plea for a

Non-Party Polity in Eze, C. (Ed), Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical

reader, 303-312. Cambridge: Blackwell.


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42 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2009, 28(1)

brand of democracy-one which only seeks to manage different competing desires. Tohim that is the sole role of any political system described as a democracy-a mere man-agement of competing desires; setting a framework of agreements and agreements todisagree. He claims that consensus is just one moment of democracy and not its ulti-mate aim. I propose that the management of competing desires is equally also just onemoment of democracy and not its ultimate aim.

A democracy by any name will not just concern itself with managing competing de-sires. It will probably not state this as its most important function. On the contrary itwill state the protection of rights such as liberty and equality as its fundamental aim. Ithink that Eze is mistaken in thinking that there can only be one aim of democracywhich means that there is only one type of democracy. I think it is quite possible thatthere could be a number of democracies. For example, what makes majoritarian de-mocracy and consensual democracy both democracies is that they are underpinned by

values such as freedom and the protection of human rights.Although Eze praises Wiredu for making it explicit that consensual democracy does

not align itself with dictatorship-it appears as if Eze does not shake off the suspicionthat the very act and process of arriving at consensus involves coercion and does notgive full cognisance to competing desires. This comes from the way he characterisesthe aim of democracy and his insistence on humans as monolithically and essentiallyever ultra competitive. What he fails to fully acknowledge is that consensual democ-racy asks a crucial question of action which his own version of democracy shies awayfrom. Consensual democracy asks: In the face of these competing desires and differ-ences what is the best way to proceed from here? The participants to consensual de-mocracy will respond: We shall sit and dialogue until we reach a consensus on the

best conceivable way to proceed. This is what consensual democracy strives for. Itdoes not get rid of strife and competing ends-it urges interlocutors to find a positionacceptable to them albeit their originally divergent aims.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I have sought to respond to Ezes objections to Wiredus idea of a con-sensual democracy. I have argued that Ezes first and third objections fail suffer out-right failure. I have argued that his second objection appears to be cogent but with asimple reformulation of Wiredus position its efficacy disappears.

Bibliography

Eze, E.C. 1997. Democracy or Consensus? A Response to Wiredu, in Eze, C. (Ed),

Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical reader, 313-323. Cambridge: Black-

well.

Wiredu, K. Democracy and Consensus in Traditional African Politics: A Plea for a

Non-Party Polity in Eze, C. (Ed), Postcolonial African philosophy: a critical

reader, 303-312. Cambridge: Blackwell.

A Response to Eze’s critique of Wiredu’s consensual

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