A Reply to Flew's "The Presumption of Atheism"

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

A Reply to Flew's "The Presumption of Atheism"Author(s): Donald EvansSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Sep., 1972), pp. 47-50Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40230373 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume II, Number 1, September 1972

A Reply to Flew's "The Presumption of Atheism"

DONALD EVANS, University of Toronto

Let us consider Flew's main contention, that the onus of proof lies on the theist. The "proof" which is required of the theist involves (a) showing that his concept of God is such that the existence of God is theoretically possible and (b) providing suf- ficient reasons, though not necessarily a demonstration, to warrant believing that God exists. The "onus" which is on the theist does not preclude the possibility of a theistic proof. It is similar to the "onus" which is on the prosecutor in an English court: it is up to the prosecutor to prove guilt, but such proof is possible. And just as the prosecutor does not have to drop his personal conviction - if he has one - that the defendant is guilty, the theist does not have to drop hrs own theistic belief. What Flew is asking the theist to do is to accept a procedure. Like the affirmative side in a debate, the theist is asked to concede that if he has not provided grounds for what he affirms, he has lost the debate - whether or not the opposition says anything. If a theist moves, "Resolved that this house affirms the existence of God", the presumption in the debate is atheistic; the theist has to prove his claim or lose the debate. He is like a prosecutor in a court where the procedural rule is that innocence is presumed; the prosecutor must prove guilt or lose his case. Flew holds that the presumption of atheism is a better procedure than the presumption of theism, where the atheist would affirm, "Resolved that this house affirms the non-existence of God", and the atheist would have to prove his claim or lose the argument.

This, if I understand him correctly, is what Flew means when he calls for a purely procedural "presumption of atheism", and insists that the concession asked of the theist is procedural rather

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Donald Evans A Reply to Flew's 'The Presumption of Atheism"

than substantive. It seems to me, however, that he does not maintain a firm distinction between a procedural presumption, which is a rule governing a debate or a court or a philosophical dialogue, and a personal presumption, which is a man's own

(substantive) convictional stance. A personal presumption that p is a presuming that p is true unless and until adequate contrary evidence is produced. (It differs from a "categorical assumption" that p, which for Flew is (apparently) either a procedural or a

personal assumption which precludes the possibility that p is

false.) Flew blurs the distinction between procedural and personal presumptions of atheism early in his essay: he first introduces the "presumption of atheism" as a presumption "that the onus of proof must lie on the theist"; then he explains that the "atheism" in this presumption is a "negative atheism"; and then he says that a negative atheist is "someone who is simply not a theist"

(that is, presumably, someone who personally presumes atheism). This would preclude theists from taking part in the very debate which Flew asks them to initiate! This is, I think, a slip, for Flew's main line of thought in the essay is such that he supposedly allows a theist personally to presume theism - even to assume theism categorically - while presuming atheism procedurally.

But Flew's slip is not merely a slip; it is also a clue to a hidden substantive element in Flew's proposal. Once we bear down on the difference between a procedural and a personal presumption, the plot thickens. Let us distinguish between two questions: (a) Should I, a theist, accept Flew's proposed procedural rule for de-

bating theism/atheism, granting to him that the onus is on me to

give him good enough reasons for believing? (b) Should I, a theist, accept Flew's personal presumption of atheism as my own convictional stance, being "completely noncommittal" on the matter of God, being willing to believe if and only if good enough reasons are provided? These two questions come together in a third: (c) If I do accept Flew's procedural rule, and then fail to

give him what he regards as good reasons for believing, should I then, as a matter of rational and moral integrity, abandon my theism? That is, does acceptance of the procedural presumption of atheism amount to an acceptance of a personal presumption of atheism? If the answer to (c) is "Yes", then Flew's procedural proposal is a devious trap for theists. Losing a debate with him or other atheists would then have to be regarded as conceding that one's own theistic stance should be abandoned as unrea- sonable and irresponsible. And losing the debate is highly probable. Suppose that I try to explain to Flew what I mean by "God".

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Donald Evans A Reply to Flew's "The Presumption of Atheism"

I am unlikely to succeed in showing him that the existence of God is theoretically possible. Not only is it, in general, very dif- ficult to demonstrate a complete absence of self-contradiction in a complex description of God, but also - and this is more im-

portant - what I mean by "God" is only partially intelligible to me, and is likely to be even less intelligible to Flew. And suppose that I try to show Flew some good enough reasons for him to believe in God, in so far as he can understand what I mean by "God". I am unlikely to succeed, since one of the main points of difference between us is what counts as a good enough reason.

Flew, however, is ambiguous rather than devious. His intention is to have a procedural rule which is genuinely neutral, not committing the theist in a substantive way to atheism; but his

ambiguity concerning procedural and personal presumptions and his failure to reckon with differences in criteria of intelligibility and rationality for theist and atheist make his proposed rule a trap for theists. I would like to propose a different rule, which seems to me to be genuinely neutral and non-substantive. I shall call it the "presumption of epistemological innocence". I propose that Flew and I each presume that the other has what are for him good grounds for his convictions, and that the onus is on each of us to show the other what grounds there are for changing those convictions. Procedurally, let Flew presume theism as he debates with me, and I will presume atheism as I debate with him. The onus is on me to give him reasons for theism and on him to give me reasons for atheism. Since our differences are

partly concerning what counts as good reasons (e.g. some forms of religious experience) in religious matters, the debate will be inconclusive; we will both "lose" the debate, but we each benefit from the challenge to our personal presumptions.

I do not know whether Flew would accept my proposal. In much of his essay he seems to me to be arguing for both a procedural and a personal presumption of atheism. He seems to be contend-

ing that the only reasonable position for anyone is to be "com-

pletely non-committal" concerning God unless and until good enough reasons are produced (good enough for Flew, for the readers of the Canadian journal of Philosophy, for all men?). But I already have what I now regard as good enough reasons for faith in God; I do not concede Flew's personal presumption of atheism. It seems to me that my own procedural suggestion is unambiguously procedural. It obviously does not call on Flew to abandon his personal position, or on me to abandon mine. The procedural presumption of epistemological innocence is a

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Donald Evans A Reply to Flew's "The Presumption of Atheism"

way of being courteous and relevant to another man, speaking to him where he is.

A further reason for adopting my procedural proposal is that Flew's main argument in support of his procedural presumption of atheism can be extended so as to support my proposal. Flew's argument has two parts. First, he says that a knowledge- claim, and even a claim that something is probable (and, presumably, a personal presumption) imply that one is in a position to know or judge (or presume), that one has grounds. Second, where the claim has to do with a matter of grave import such as the alleged existence of God, which is related to issues of eternal life and death, it is specially incumbent on a man to have adequate grounds. It seems to me that if both parts of the argument apply to my own personal presumption of theism, they also apply to Flew's personal presumption of atheism. There is an onus of proof on Flew to justify his presumption that there is no God just as much as there is on me to justify my presumption that there is. If Flew denies this, it must be by appeal to assumptions or presumptions which belong to his own personal convictional stance in contrast with mine. Perhaps Flew holds that an uncommitted stance on matters of grave import where there is a paucity of

universally-acceptable reasons or evidence is always morally superior: if so, I disagree. Perhaps he thinks of God as an al-

leged entity sufficiently similar to theoretical scientific entities for Occam's razor to be appropriately applied; if so, I disagree.

One final point. The procedural presumption of epistemological innocence is not a categorical assumption, in Flew's sense. Many convictions, when pressed, turn out to be guilty of having in-

adequate grounds - inadequate even by reference to criteria of

inadequacy accepted by the man who has the convictions. Often, however, both debaters will lose the debate; but neither will lose face or soul, and both may gain new insight.

October, 1971

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A Reply to Flew's "The Presumption of Atheism"

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