A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

8/9/2019 A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

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EUROPE POLICY PAPER 1/2015

A REGION DISUNITED?

Central European Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

EDITED BY JOERG FORBRIG


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A R D

C E R R-U C

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Edited by Joerg Forbrig1

1 Joerg Forbrig is a transatlantic fellow for Central and Eastern Europe, and director of the Fund for Belarus Democracy,with The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). He is based in Berlin. He would like to particularly thanktwo colleagues for assistance with this paper. Nicolas Bouchet, TAPIR Fellow with GMF, was a tireless first editor of theincoming drafts. During her internship at the GMF Berlin office, Karolina Jesien spent countless hours researching CentralEuropean public opinion in preparation of this paper.

The Issue and Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction: A Region Disunited? Joerg Forbrig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Bulgaria: Increasingly Assertive but not Hawkish Marin Lessenski. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Czech Republic: Lacking Foreign Policy ConsensusPetr Kratochvíl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Estonia: In Pursuit of a Value-Based Foreign Policy Merle Maigre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Hungary: Singled out by the CriticsIstvan Gyarmati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Latvia: EU Presidency at a Time of Geopolitical CrisisKristīne Bērzia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Lithuania: A Staunch Supporter of a European UkraineVytis Jurkonis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Poland: Searching for a Strategic Response

Michał Baranowski and Bartosz Cichocki. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Romania: Largely Immune to Russian Pressures

Alina Inayeh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Slovakia: Ambiguity in Action Alexander Duleba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43


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A R D 1

T I P P

1The Issue

The Russian aggression against Ukraine is notonly an assault on the sovereignty, territorialintegrity, and peaceful development of

one of the European Union’s largest neighbors;it has ramifications for Europe at large. It hassent shockwaves throughout the EU’s Easternneighborhood and its eastern-most members,many of which feel directly threatened by theRussian return to geopolitics and spheres ofinfluence. It has questioned the architecture, rules,and institutions of European security, that have

emerged since the end of the Cold War. It hasexposed the multiple vulnerabilities of many EUcountries to Russian influence in their politics,economics, energy supplies and media. And, it hasrevealed the failure of European policy toward itsEastern neighborhood and Russia, and with it akey aspect of the EU’s nascent foreign and securitypolicy. On all these levels, and in their sum, Russiafundamentally challenges the European project.

Europe has been slow to grasp the principal natureand broader implications of the ongoing conflict,

and it has been even slower to respond effectively.Most surprisingly, perhaps, even those EUmembers that find themselves in close geographicalproximity to both of the conflict parties, share ahistory of Soviet occupation and are particularlysensitive or exposed to developments in EasternEurope and Russia have differed significantly intheir perceptions of and reactions to the crisis,and now war, launched by Russia against Ukraine.Discord in Central Europe adds to EU-widedissonance, and does not bode well for an effectiveEuropean response to these new realities. Whetherhandling the Ukraine crisis in the short term orthe Russian challenge in the long run, Europe ishard-pressed to muster a shared understanding ofthe problem, a strong commitment to its foundingprinciples and values, and sustainable policies forits Eastern neighbors and Russia.

Policy Priorities

Central Europe can and should play a key rolein shaping a strategic response to the Ukrainecrisis and the broader Russia challenge. For this,the EU’s eastern-most members need to enhanceintra-regional dialogue on the rapidly changingpolitical, economic, and security landscape eastof their borders, with a view to forging a strongerregional voice, understanding and consensus, a

voice that informs European and Western policy.Central Europe also needs to address regional

vulnerabilities to Russian interference jointly

and systematically. Collective efforts, such as theconstruction of energy interconnectors, can drawon existing EU funds, while joint investments inhard and cyber security should be considered bythe countries of the region.

Beyond Central Europe, stronger politicalleadership is urgently needed. In the absenceof a clearer line in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris,opportunistic behavior is encouraged amongCentral European countries, and undercuts aneffective European response to Russian actions.

From among the EU and NATO heavyweights,Germany and the United States need to be re-engaged with Central Europe. Only the closestpossible coordination and cooperation withboth will enable Central Europe to shape EUand NATO strategies and policies. In so doing,the region’s priority should be to advocate for anew policy for Eastern Europe, given the obviousfailure of hitherto EU policy toward the Easternneighborhood and Russia. Central Europe’sown recent experience suggests a vision of EUenlargement toward the Eastern neighborhood, anda containment and deterrence policy toward Russia.


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T G M F U S2

I: A R D

J F2

In a complete reversal

of the post-Cold War

European order,

Russia has returned to

aggressive geopolitics,

the assertion of a

phere of influence, andconfrontation with the

West.

Europe has struggled to come to terms withthe consequences of the conflict in Ukraine,and with the underlying challenge posed

by Russia. Nowhere has this struggle been moreobvious than in Central Europe and among theEU’s eastern-most states, which arguably shouldhave demonstrated similar assessments of andresponses to this crisis. Yet despite a shared historyas Soviet satellites, still fresh transition experience,deep understanding of Eastern Europe and Russia,and geographical proximity to the conflict, thisregion has been surprisingly divided. This casts

considerable doubt on Central Europe’s oft-declared ambition to act as an internal EU advocateof a stable and democratic neighborhood to theEast. It weakens the ability of the EU at large toeffectively react to the spiral of violence in Ukraine,and to devise long-term policies to support Easternneighbors and to stem Russia’s new assertiveness.It is with these concerns in mind that the currentstudy was conceived.

In 2009, a group of seasoned policy experts fromCentral Europe warned in an open letter that Russia

was returning “as a revisionist power pursuing a19th century agenda with 21st century tactics andmethods.”1 A mere five years on, the worst of theletter’s predictions on Russia have become the sadreality of Eastern Europe. In a complete reversalof the post-Cold War European order, Russia hasreturned to aggressive geopolitics, the assertionof a sphere of influence, and confrontation withthe West. It first launched a massive campaignagainst those of its neighbors that sought closerassociation with the European Union (Armenia,Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), using an arsenal

ranging from political meddling and propagandato economic warfare, energy blockades, andsecurity threats. When this was to no avail, as inUkraine where society mobilized to defend its

1 An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Centraland Eastern Europe, Gazeta Wyborcza, July 15, 2009.

European choice, the Kremlin did not hesitate toemploy barely veiled military means, annexing theCrimean peninsula, stoking separatism, and wagingan undeclared war in the Donbass. Thus, in itsimmediate neighborhood, Russia’s actions directlycounteract EU efforts to create “a ring of friends,”in other words a ring of stable and secure statesbordering the Union to the East.2

Yet Russian interference has gone far beyond itsimmediate neighborhood. Virtually all of CentralEurope, whether the eastern-most members of

the EU and NATO or the accession candidates inthe Western Balkans, have seen their sovereigntyundermined by Moscow, through covert supportfor certain political parties and campaigns,investments by Russian President Vladimir Putin’scronies, punitive cuts to gas supplies, and importbans. Even some of the EU’s key powers, France andGermany among them, have come to feel the longarm of the Kremlin, which has established localpropaganda outlets, sponsors extremist parties, andwoos key businesses. As has become increasinglyobvious, Russian revisionism has also taken aim

at the European Union itself. Whether throughits brutal campaign against Ukraine, by leaningon its other neighbors or by meddling inside EUmember and candidate countries, Russia effectivelyquestions the post-1989 order of the entirecontinent and it undermines the independence,politics, economies, borders, and security choices ofmany, if not all, its states. In so doing, Russia hopesto divide Europe, weaken the West and increase itsown relative importance on the world stage, notleast vis-à-vis the United States.

Europe has been slow to grasp the principal natureand gravity of the Russian challenge. For thesmaller states of the EU’s Southern and Western

2 Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe — a Proximity Policy asthe Key to Stability,” Peace, Security, and Stability InternationalDialogue and the Role of the EU, Sixth ECSA-World ConferenceBrussels, December 5-6, 2002.

http://wyborcza.pl/1,98817,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.htmlhttp://wyborcza.pl/1,98817,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.htmlhttp://wyborcza.pl/1,98817,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.htmlhttp://wyborcza.pl/1,98817,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html


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A R D 3

The EU’s Eastern

members have fou

just as difficult to fi

a common respons

the unfolding crisis

the broader challen

posed by Russia.

periphery, the unfolding Ukraine crisis was anunfortunate but far-away trouble spot of little directrelevance. Key capitals, including Berlin, Paris, andRome, have found it hard to abandon their long-held policy, and hope, that economic engagementwith Russia would eventually transform Russiapolitically. The indifference of some and theillusions of others among the EU’s Western statesare hardly a surprise, considering the strength ofinertia. More sober and realistic views of Russia arestill in the making.

More unexpectedly, however, the EU’s Easternmembers have found it just as difficult to find acommon response to the unfolding crisis and thebroader challenge posed by Russia. After all, theCentral European region, from Estonia in the northto Bulgaria in the south, finds itself geographicallyclose to the zone of conflict and to potential newones in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. Many ofthe countries directly border Russia or Ukraine. Allof them share a history of Soviet hegemony, andmost of them have memories of direct occupationby Moscow during the 20th century. Deep historical,

cultural, social, and economic ties link the regionwith its neighbors to the East. These legacies andlinks naturally provide Central Europe with aparticular interest and sensitivity for developmentsto its East. It might have been expected that thisregion would discern the Russia challenge anddefine and display more unanimous responses thanothers in the EU. However, that was not the case.

Instead, and as the crisis evolved in the East, adiversity of voices and reactions has emerged fromCentral Europe. Early on, principled and engaged

positions were articulated by Estonia, Lithuania,and Poland who condemned the violence againstthe EuroMaidan, soon emphasizing the broaderimplications of the following military aggressionby Russia against Ukraine. Thus, then-PolishForeign Minister Radosław Sikorski, jointly with hisFrench and German colleagues, engaged directly

in brokering a truce between the protesters andthe president of Ukraine, while Lithuania usedits chairmanship of the UN Security Council toconvene an emergency meeting. As the crisisdeepened with Russia’s annexation of Crimea andthe subsequent military campaign in Donbass,the Northern part of Central Europe increasinglypointed to its own vulnerabilities and securitydeficits in the face of Russia, which, as EstonianPresident Toomas Hendrik Ilves put it pointedly,had launched “a battle between Europe and non-Europe […] a conflict of values.”3

By contrast, initial responses from countries furthersouth were much more subdued. They ranged fromlukewarm condemnations of Russia’s actions byBulgaria to a markedly distanced attitude towardthe EuroMaidan protests in Romania, and fromquiet pragmatism in Slovakia to vocal pro-Russian

voices in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Acrossthis southern part of Central Europe, hopes ofa swift return to the status quo ante prevailedover the fears of worse to come voiced by CentralEuropeans further north.

The ensuing debate in the EU on sanctionsagainst Russia deepened these rifts, with capitalsfrom Tallinn to Warsaw demanding swiftand broadly punitive measures, while Prague,Bratislava, and Budapest openly voiced theirdoubts about the effectiveness of sanctions andpointed to the negative fallout for their ownand other EU economies. Although all CentralEuropean countries, like the remainder of the EU,eventually supported successive waves of politicaland economic sanctions against Russia, these

differences across the region continue to simmer.They have reopened as the EU discussion hasbegun on the broadening, extension, or partiallifting of the measures imposed on Russia. What

3 President Ilves met with Ukrainian leaders, September 11,2014.

http://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10546-president-ilves-met-with-ukrainian-leaders/http://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10546-president-ilves-met-with-ukrainian-leaders/


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T G M F U S4

The Ukraine crisis has

uncovered serious

vulnerabilities to

Russian interference in

he politics, economies,

nd societies of virtually

all EU member states.

is more, this broad North-South divide amongCentral Europeans is being replicated in discussionson possible military aid and arms transfers fromthe West to Ukraine. While Estonia urged suchassistance, and Lithuania and Poland stated theirprincipal readiness to supply it, the Czech Republicand Hungary have strongly come out againstproviding Ukraine with weaponry.

Most countries of Central Europe have alsoprovided Ukraine with direct aid as the crisisunfolded, although to varying degrees and in

different forms. In response to police violenceagainst the EuroMaidan, Estonia, Lithuania, andPoland admitted injured Ukrainians to theirhospitals for medical care. All three countriesmobilized strong civil society responses, rangingfrom solidarity groups bussed in to back Ukraine’sprotest movement to international concerts held insupport of the EuroMaidan. When Ukraine facedacute energy shortages resulting from a Russianembargo, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia took toreverse flows to provide Ukraine with natural gas,and have helped their neighbor to meet much of

its energy needs ever since. By contrast, Bulgariaand Romania have largely confined themselves tosupportive rhetoric.

These differences in approach warrant a closerlook, and the contributions to this study detail thepositioning of individual Central European states

vis-à-vis the Ukraine crisis and Russia. Besidesillustrating regional diversity in what may be thegravest crisis facing Europe since the fall of theIron Curtain, the following chapters also uncoverthe reasons and rationales underlying the often

different and sometimes opposing courses ofaction taken by the countries of the region sincethe beginning of the crisis. They bring to lightconsiderable variations in political and publicdebate on the Ukraine crisis, important differencesin economic and energy relationships with Russia,and a number of long-term legacies that in several

cases even predate shared Soviet history. In sodoing, the country perspectives provided here add alevel of nuance and detail to a debate that is rapidlytaking shape in Europe.

That debate plays out in several directions. Firstand foremost it naturally asks if and how theongoing war in Ukraine can be ended. European,and more broadly Western, responses to theRussian assault on the sovereignty, territorialintegrity, and peaceful development of this largeEU neighbor have not yielded positive results so

far. Perspectives as to the origins of the conflict, themode and means for achieving a ceasefire, and theformat of a political settlement differ widely, amongCentral Europeans no less than among other EUmembers. Yet there is a broad agreement thatbreaking out of the dangerous spiral of violence isof paramount importance.

Secondly, Russia’s actions against Ukraine havethrown all of its neighbors into uncertainty andanxiety. Those that strive for a similar associationwith the EU as Ukraine — Georgia and Moldova— have already felt political and economic pressurefrom the Kremlin and they fear for more as theyprogress on their European path. Those that haveclosely allied themselves with Russia, such asBelarus and Kazakhstan, have also come to feelMoscow’s tightening grip, in the form of tradedisputes and barely veiled political threats. Acrossformer Soviet republics, it is understood thatRussian revisionism hardly limits itself to Ukraine.The emerging discussion asks if and how the EUcan effectively support the sovereign choice anddevelopment of those countries, which it considers

its Eastern neighborhood.Third, it has become clear over the last year thatRussia’s impact does not stop at EU’s borders.Instead, the Ukraine crisis has uncovered serious

vulnerabilities to Russian interference in thepolitics, economies, and societies of virtually all


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The conflict has

highlighted numero

deficits in Europea

arrangements for

preventing, handlin

and resolving

challenges to secuon the continent.

EU member states. Many of these are particularlypronounced in Central Europe, where Russianmedia power, predominance as an energy supplierand export market and investments in the region’seconomies and politics are important. This oftenpervasive presence of Russia inside the EU hasclearly shaped responses to the Ukraine crisis. Atthe same time, it has renewed an older debate onwhether and how to reduce Russian leverage fromwithin, especially by diversifying away from energysupplies originating in and exports destined forRussia.

Fourth, the conflict has highlighted numerousdeficits in European arrangements for preventing,handling, and resolving challenges to securityon the continent. The EU’s neighborhood policyhas neither managed to induce stability to theregion east of its borders, nor has its foreign policyapparatus been able to influence the course of theemerging crisis. The Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe and the Council ofEurope, both forums for pan-European dialoguethat include Russia, have played only a marginal

role in addressing the conflict. Instead, Europe hasbeen reminded that its security continues to hingeon NATO, which scrambled to return to its originalmission of territorial defense, not least under theimpression of numerous Russian provocations atits borders. As a result, many wonder, especiallyin Central Europe, how to revamp strategies andcapabilities to enhance security both in Europe andtransatlantically.

Finally, debates as to how Europe should approachRussia can be expected to intensify. Given Putin’s

open contempt for the European project, and hisever more confrontational behavior, few dare tocall him a partner any longer. Yet positions on whatdrives Russian policy today, whether past Westernmistakes are partly to blame for Russia’s aggressivestance, and what alternatives for the EU policy

vis-à-vis Russia should look like, differ widely. The

underlying sense among Central Europeans —most clearly articulated by those directly borderingRussia — is that a tectonic shift has taken placein Russia and, as a result, in European-Russianrelations. This shift is yet to receive a strategicresponse by the West.

In shaping this multi-layered discussion andits outcomes, Central Europe can and shouldplay a central role, predestined as it is throughits very geography, sensitivity and exposure todevelopments further east. To do so, the countries

of the region and their partners in the EU andacross the Atlantic should:

• Enhance regional dialogue on the rapidlychanging political, economic, and securitylandscape east of their borders. Regionalforums, such as the Visegrad Group or theCentral European Initiative along with civilsociety and expert networks, can serve toforge stronger regional understanding anda consensus that can inform European andWestern policy responses to the new challengesemanating from Russia and Eastern Europe.

• Address regional vulnerabilities to Russianinterference jointly and systematically. Someof Central Europe’s weak spots, such as energydependence, have long been known but havebeen addressed inconsistently and only bysome countries. Stronger regional action isneeded, whether on energy interconnectors orto provide information to stem the Kremlin’spropaganda, and can draw on existing EUfunds. No less importantly, joint investments inhard and cyber security should be considered.

• Strengthen political leadership in Europe.The Ukraine crisis has exposed a dearthof leadership in the EU, with many of thebloc’s heavyweights pursuing their own andoften ambiguous Russia policies. For several


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T G M F U S6

countries in Central Europe, this providedan easy excuse for their own opportunisticstance. In order to craft a clear-cut andeffective European response to Russia, strongerleadership is needed, from Brussels, Berlin, andParis alike.

• Re-engage Germany and the United States

with the region. Germany has long been an

internal advocate for Central and Eastern

Europe, while the United States continues

to enjoy the particular confidence of many

societies in the region. The closest-possible

coordination and cooperation with both will

only strengthen Central Europe’s voice inshaping EU and NATO strategies and policies.

• Advocate for a new policy for Eastern Europe.

With the obvious failure of previous EU

policy toward the Eastern neighborhood and

Russia, an intense search for alternatives has

begun. Central Europe should feel encouraged

to shape that policy based on its own recent

experience. That suggests a vision of EU

enlargement toward the Eastern neighborhood,

and realism in the form of a policy of

containment and deterrence toward Russia.


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B: I A

H

M L 3

The Ukraine crisis

has exposed seriou

political, institution

and public rifts in t

country, as well as

economic and ener

dependencies onRussia.

Two elements describe Bulgaria’s position onthe crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s actionsthere. The first is loyalty to the EU, the United

States, and NATO, which trumps any domesticopposition or energy dependence on Russia, andmakes it hard to imagine a government goingagainst its Euroatlantic allies. The second is thatthere would be relief in Bulgaria if the tensionsbetween the West and Russia eased and no longerfuelled political rifts or endangered energy suppliesand economic relations.

Bulgaria has stood with its EU and U.S. allies incondemning the annexation of Crimea and joiningthe sanctions against Russia. At the same time,its reaction toward this crisis has been shaped byinternal political dynamics. This has happenedin two distinct stages that cover the periods untilmid-2014 and since then, with a new governmentcoming to power. From May 2013 to August 2014,Bulgaria was governed by a short-lived coalitionof the leftist Bulgarian Socialist party (BSP) andthe Turkish-minority Movement for Rights andFreedoms (MRF), tacitly backed by the extremely

nationalist Ataka. When that government resignedafter civic protests and discord among the rulingparties, President Rosen Plevneliev appointed acaretaker government. Snap elections in October2014 then resulted in a new ruling coalition ledby the center-right Citizens for the DemocraticDevelopment of Bulgaria (GERB) and the smallercenter-right Reformist Bloc, joined by the leftAlternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABV) partyand backed by the nationalist Patriotic Front.The Ukraine crisis has exposed serious political,institutional, and public rifts in the country, as well

as economic and energy dependencies on Russia.

While the official Bulgarian position has remainedpractically unchanged, the different governmentshave taken markedly different approaches. Thegovernment of Plamen Oresharski (May 2013 -August 2014) had a lukewarm attitude toward

condemning Russia whereas the two followinggovernments took a more assertive stance. At thesame time, the president, to whom the constitutiongives a limited foreign policy role alongside thegovernment, has remained critical of Russia andendorsed EU and U.S. policies.

Despite dependence on the support of partiesthat have strong pro-Russia sentiments and areto energy projects with Russia, the Oresharskigovernment expressed support for Ukraine’ssovereignty, territorial integrity and independence

from the first stages of the crisis. This was reiteratedwhen Foreign Minister Kristian Vigenin visitedKyiv in March 2014.

The government was torn, however, betweenobligations to the EU and domestic political andeconomic considerations. In March 2014, duringa Russian media interview and in a meeting withU.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland,Oresharski stated that Bulgaria opposed furthersanctions against Russia. Foreign Minister Vigeninclarified in an interview that the governmentwanted to avoid further sanctions because theywould harm Bulgaria and would not be effective;he also pointed to other reluctant EU members. Inthe end, though, Bulgaria did not veto the sanctionsand joined the EU’s actions without reservations.

The shift toward a more assertive stance came withthe appointment of a caretaker government byPresident Plevneliev on August 6, 2014, and withthe formation of a new government following theOctober elections.

Under the caretaker government, the Ministry of

Defense prepared a “Vision 2020” document aheadof the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014that best demonstrated the turn. This documentoutlined the external threats to Bulgaria’s securityand stated that “[t]he unlawful annexation ofCrimea by Russia and the conflict in Eastern


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T G M F U S8

There was solidarity

ith Ukraine among the

public and politicians

since the EuroMaidan

events coincided with

year-long protests in

Bulgaria against thegovernment of Plamen

Oresharski.

Ukraine became the most serious threat topeace and security in Europe after WWII.”1 Thedocument identified “hybrid warfare,” whichcombines conventional, guerilla, and informationwarfare, and energy dependence as security risksfor Bulgaria, and it emphasized that sanctions hada direct impact on the economic interests of thecountry. The dependence of the armed forces onRussia for Soviet-era equipment was also identifiedas a major problem.

Daniel Mitov, the caretaker government’s foreign

minister, criticized the elections in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics, andreaffirmed Bulgaria’s support for the territorialintegrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. The caretakergovernment also pledged to decrease the country’senergy dependence on Russia through theconstruction of inter-connectors, which has beendragging on for years.

But the caretaker government and the current onecan hardly be described as “hardliners” towardRussia. “Vision 2020” was toned down, owing toinsistent objections of then-Prime Minister GeorgiBliznashki and others. Earlier in 2014 when hewas still in opposition, Prime Minister BoykoBorissov, who took office in November 2014, spokeagainst open confrontation with Russia, includingsanctions, and strongly disagreed with identifyingRussia as a “threat” in the debates on “Vision 2020.”

President Plevneliev has played an important role,and he remains a critic of Russia. Addressing theUN General Assembly in September 2014, he oncemore highlighted the threat to European securityposed by the Ukraine crisis and said that “[t]hesigning and ratification of the AAs [AssociationAgreements] of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

1 Bulgaria in NATO and in European Defence 2020, working documentapproved by the Bulgarian government on September 2, 2014.

with the EU is an important milestone in theprocess of their European integration.”2

Domestic Political, Public, and Energy

Considerations

In addition to EU and NATO membership, andBulgaria’s status as a Black Sea country close toconflict zones, two important domestic politicaland economic factors shape its position on theUkraine crisis. First, there are political and publicopinion divides over the question of relationswith Russia. Second, there is the country’s energy

dependence on, and general economic ties with,Russia.

In relation to Ukraine, Bulgaria maintainsfriendly relations with Kyiv and is supportiveof its aspirations, but these bilateral ties did notplay a decisive role in policy formation. However,two elements are noteworthy. First, there is the200,000-strong Bulgarian minority in Ukraine,which has not so far been a strong factor inBulgaria’s decision-making but may become suchif it is affected by the conflict. Second, there was

solidarity with Ukraine among the public andpoliticians since the EuroMaidan events coincidedwith year-long protests in Bulgaria against thegovernment of Plamen Oresharski. The attitudesof protesters and government supporters towardevents in Ukraine have at least partially reflectedBulgaria’s political and public cleavages. The leftand the extreme nationalist parties are the strongestsupporters of Russia in Bulgaria; they include

very vocal circles that promote Russia’s views andcriticize the allegedly U.S.-dominated EU approachtoward Russia.

“Always with Europe, never against Russia” becamethe left’s new motto in a bid to reconcile its EU

2 Statement by President Rosen Plevneliev at the general debate of the69th session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 2014(in Bulgarian).

http://www.government.bg/fce/001/0234/files/Vision%202020.pdfhttp://president.bg/speeches-and-statements2166/izkazvane-na-prezidenta-rosen-plevneliev-na-obshtiya-debat-na-69-ta-sesiya-na-os-na-oon.htmlhttp://president.bg/speeches-and-statements2166/izkazvane-na-prezidenta-rosen-plevneliev-na-obshtiya-debat-na-69-ta-sesiya-na-os-na-oon.htmlhttp://www.government.bg/fce/001/0234/files/Vision%202020.pdf


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allegiance with its traditional Russophile position.There have been more radical voices on the leftthough, which blame the loss by the BulgarianSocialist Party (BSP) at the 2014 elections onfollowing the EU’s line on Russia. Leftist andnationalist politicians have taken symbolic andconcrete pro-Russia steps such as displaying “St.George” ribbons at the height of the Ukrainiancrisis and participating as “observers” in the Crimea“referendum” and the Donetsk and Luhansk“elections.” The most vocal support for Russia andopenly anti-EU stance came from the extreme

nationalist party Ataka and its small representationin parliament. However, the left-right divide doesnot automatically translate into strictly pro- andanti-Russian positions. The current center-rightprime minister has been careful not to antagonizeRussia and has often spoken in conciliatory termsabout the crisis.

Strong pro-Russian sentiments date back to the 19th

century when Russia’s war against the OttomanEmpire led to the creation of the modern Bulgarianstate. These same sentiments were nurtured very

actively between 1944 and 1989. However, this doesnot necessarily translate into overwhelming publicsupport for pro-Russian policies. Bulgarians remain

very positive toward the EU, with 63 percent sayingthat they would vote for EU membership again ifthe issue were put to a referendum.3 At the sametime, only 10.3 percent of Bulgarians supportedtougher sanctions on Russia; 21 percent opposedthem. A larger share (40.2 percent) said thatBulgaria should not participate in sanctions againstother states as a matter of principle.4

3 Marin Lessenski, EU Membership and the Public Opinion in Bulgariain 2014, EuPI Policy Brief 43, August 2014; Marin Lessenski, SouthStream and EU Sanctions against Russia: Bulgaria’s Public Opinion, EuPIPolicy Brief 44, August 2014.

4 The aversion to sanctions may be partially explained by the fact thatBulgaria suffered from sanctions against the former Yugoslavia in the1990s.

Similar affinities were demonstrated by supportersof the left who favored the Russia-backed SouthStream gas pipeline project and who were againstsanctions, and those of the center-right whogenerally held opposite opinions. In 2014, onlyone-fifth of Bulgarians — 22 percent — supportedSouth Stream without any preconditions. Nearly athird — 28 percent — said that it should be builtonly with EU consent, and 9 percent were against itin any form. Meanwhile, 41 percent did not expressan opinion. Left-right divisions are generally

visible, but they are not very clear-cut. For example,

even among BSP supporters, who are consideredpro-Russian, only 30 percent support South Streamunconditionally, 21 percent see EU approval asnecessary, and a majority of 44 percent does notknow.

Bulgaria’s economic and trade relations withRussia are relatively modest in comparison tothose with EU members and neighboring states.There is, however, a considerable imbalance infavor of Russia due to imports of energy resources,which gives it considerable political leverage in

the country. Exports to Russia in 2013 amountedto 2.6 percent of the total, placing it ninth amongBulgaria’s markets, between Belgium and Spain;Germany was first with 12.3 percent. By contrast,Russia is Bulgaria’s top source of imports with 18.5percent, ahead of Germany (10.8 percent).5

Bulgaria’s tourism industry has also becomeincreasingly dependent on Russian visitors andbuyers of holiday homes. In 2013, Russiansaccounted for 13 percent of all visitors at hotelsand resorts, on par with Romanians and Germans.6

With the eruption of the Ukraine crisis, the tourism

5 Bulgarian Ministry of the Economy, Foreign policy statistics, “Leadingcountries in the foreign trade of Bulgaria,” data for 2013 (in Bulgarian).

6 National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, Nights spent and arrivalsof foreigners in accommodation establishments by country of originin 2013 (in Bulgarian).

Strong pro-Russian

sentiments date ba

the 19th century wh

Russia’s war again

the Ottoman Empir

to the creation of th

modern Bulgarian s

http://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/Bulgaria_EU_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014ed.pdfhttp://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/Bulgaria_EU_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014ed.pdfhttp://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/SouthStream_Sanctions_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014.pdfhttp://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/SouthStream_Sanctions_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014.pdfhttp://www.mi.government.bg/bg/themes/vanshnotargovska-statistika-126-332.htmlhttp://www.mi.government.bg/bg/themes/vanshnotargovska-statistika-126-332.htmlhttp://www.nsi.bg/en/content/7081/annual-datahttp://www.nsi.bg/en/content/7081/annual-datahttp://www.nsi.bg/en/content/7081/annual-datahttp://www.nsi.bg/en/content/7081/annual-datahttp://www.nsi.bg/en/content/7081/annual-datahttp://www.nsi.bg/en/content/7081/annual-datahttp://www.mi.government.bg/bg/themes/vanshnotargovska-statistika-126-332.htmlhttp://www.mi.government.bg/bg/themes/vanshnotargovska-statistika-126-332.htmlhttp://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/SouthStream_Sanctions_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014.pdfhttp://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/SouthStream_Sanctions_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014.pdfhttp://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/Bulgaria_EU_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014ed.pdfhttp://eupi.osi.bg/fce/001/0070/files/Bulgaria_EU_EuPI_PolicyBrief_Aug2014ed.pdf


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T G M F U S10

he most serious factor

influencing decision-

making remains

ulgaria’s considerable

energy dependence on

Russia.

sector feared that sanctions against Russia couldruin the 2014 summer season.

The most serious factor influencing decision-making remains Bulgaria’s considerable energydependence on Russia. It imports over 90 percentof its gas from Gazprom, and it does so throughone route alone — via Ukraine. Despite the factthat Bulgaria is highly vulnerable to any “gaswar,” it has completed the construction of onlyone interconnector and this only in 2014. Theownership of a refinery in Burgas and control of

a large portion of the trade of petrol and relatedproducts by Russia’s Lukoil is also a significantfactor. And the Kozloduy nuclear power plant,which generates 33.4 percent of Bulgaria’selectricity, relies on Soviet-era technology andRussian fuel for its operations.

The project to build a second nuclear power plant,Belene, with Russian companies and technology,was frozen by the first Borissov government in2012. Bulgaria is now threatened with a €1.23billion lawsuit by Russia’s Atomstroyexport,which is seen as possible leverage for Russia. In2011, Bulgaria also withdrew from the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, the third majorenergy project due to be developed with Russiaalongside Belene and South Stream.

Bulgaria’s caretaker government suspendedconstruction on the South Stream project inAugust 2014 until the details and controversiessurrounding it had been cleared, including itsconformity with EU rules. The sequence of eventsis not entirely clear, but although the Oresharskigovernment announced the suspension of SouthStream in June 2014, government agencies andcompanies have continued work on the projectand generally defied the European Commission’sprocedure initiated over public procurement rules.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcementin December 2014 to cancel South Stream in itscurrent form, putting the blame on Bulgaria, cameas a surprise to supporters and opponents of theproject in the country. Immediate criticism waslaunched mainly by the center-left oppositionagainst the caretaker and current governments forforfeiting the considerable benefits of South StreamThe official response was that South Stream wasstill on the table as a far as Bulgaria was concerned,but on two conditions: bringing South Stream inline with EU law and proving its financial benefits

for Bulgaria. In the same month, the governmentalso received support from the EU in its relationswith Russia and on the issue of South Stream.

Outlook: Keeping Current Commitments

and Hoping for the Best

The coalition government that came to powerin November 2014 has demonstrated that it willpursue a more assertive approach toward Russia,coordinate its positions and actions with the EUand the United States, and support its Black Seaneighbors that strive for closer ties with the West.The program declaration that was adopted as thebasis of the new government started with a foreignpolicy section reiterating Bulgaria’s Euroatlanticcommitment and support for EU policies andregional cooperation in the region.

Foreign Minister Mitov was retained by the newgovernment. In November, he stated that “[t]heaggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine,the breach of international law and redrawing themap of Europe in the 21st century, generating newfrozen conflicts — this is all a direct provocationagainst European and Euroatlantic values. The startof a new Cold War cannot be excluded either.”7 Atthe same time, and as a confirmation that this is

7 Keynote speech of Daniel Mitov, Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs, athe Third Annual Security Review Conference, quoted inМитов: ЗарадиРусия може да има нова студена война, Клуб Z, November 13, 2014.

http://clubz.bg/10645-%20itov_zaradi_rusiq_moje_da_ima_nova_studena_vojnahttp://clubz.bg/10645-%20itov_zaradi_rusiq_moje_da_ima_nova_studena_vojnahttp://clubz.bg/10645-%20itov_zaradi_rusiq_moje_da_ima_nova_studena_vojnahttp://clubz.bg/10645-%20itov_zaradi_rusiq_moje_da_ima_nova_studena_vojna


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A R D 11

While Bulgaria is

maintaining the mo

assertive stance se

the second half of 2

it is not likely to bec

especially hawkish

toward the crisis anRussia either.

part of Bulgaria’s position on the broader Black Searegion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticizedthe military agreement announced by Russia andAbkhazia as a threat to regional security and ashaving a negative impact on efforts to stabilizethis conflict zone in the Caucasus. DefenseMinister Nikolay Nenchev has also said that he wascommitted to the caretaker government’s “Vision2020” document, although rearmament will likelybe put on hold owing to financial restrictions.Bulgaria will also continue development andhumanitarian aid projects (small, but important

nevertheless) for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Yet, while Bulgaria is maintaining the moreassertive stance seen in the second half of 2014, itis not likely to become especially hawkish towardthe crisis and Russia either, with Prime MinisterBorisov continuing to treat the issue carefully.

With regard to the future behavior of thegovernment, another very important factor will

be the energy and Russia policies of its Europeanpartners and of the United States. Germany’sbehavior will be a particularly important marker.Bulgaria’s decision-makers often follow, or take as apoint of departure, Germany’s policy on a numberof issues, including foreign policy — e.g. towardthe Balkans and the Black Sea region. Consideringthe number of countries in the EU that tend tofollow Germany’s lead, it is likely that whether bydesign or coincidence, Germany will have its own“coalition of the willing” over the crisis in Ukraineand relations with Russia.

Marin Lessenski is the director of the EuropeanPolicies Initiative of the Open Society Institute —Sofia. This article expresses the personal views of theauthor and does not reflect positions of OSI–Sofia orassociated organizations.


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T G M F U S12

Nowhere is the lack of

reign policy consensus

more visible than in

he country’s approach

to Russia, particularly

the recent Russian-

Ukrainian conflict.

Like the other post-communist countries ofCentral Europe, the Czech Republic’s foreignpolicy priorities in the 1990s were heavily

concentrated on the accession to NATO and theEuropean Union. The focus on these two goalscreated the illusion that Czech foreign policy elitesshared a consensual view of the country’s future.However, with these goals achieved in 1999 and2004 respectively, this illusion was shattered. Today,many important foreign policy issues, including thenature of Czech security commitments as well asinvolvement in European integration, have become

subject to debate, with political differences growingrather than decreasing. Nowhere is the lack offoreign policy consensus more visible than in thecountry’s approach to Russia, particularly the recentRussian-Ukrainian conflict.

Two substantially different narratives about Russiaand Russian-Czech relations circulated amongpolitical elites before the Ukrainian crisis. Thefirst, more typical for the right-wing parties suchas the ODS or the TOP09, depicted Russia as athreat. This narrative built on the assumption that

Russia’s transformation into a liberal democraticcountry was not, and in fact can never be,successful, and that Russia’s relatively moderateforeign policy in the 1990s was not a consequenceof its transformation, but rather of its weakness.Hence, Czech foreign policy should remain waryof Russia’s intentions, treasure NATO membership,and cultivate close ties with the United States as themain guarantor of Czech (and European) security.

The second narrative, which was prevalent on theleft end of the Czech political spectrum, saw Russia

as an opportunity. This distinguished sharplybetween the Soviet Union and its legacy and the“new” Russia. In this interpretation, ordinaryRussians might still feel some resentment towardNATO, but Russia is a post-imperial power thatwishes stability, economic growth, and — mostimportantly — friendly relations with its former

satellites. Given the extensive experience of Czechbusinessmen with the Russian market, it was seenas a promised land with huge potential that couldbe easily tapped by Czech companies.

These two positions are also reflected in thesinuous evolution of Czech-Russian politicalties over the last 20 years, which depended onwhether the representatives of one or the otherinterpretation held sway over foreign policy.Although external shocks contributed to theworsening of mutual relations from time to time

(such as the Kosovo campaign of 1999 and theRussian-Georgian War of 2008), they did not havea lasting effect on bilateral relations. Instead, theyonly temporarily strengthened the “Russia-as-a-threat” narrative before the oscillation between thetwo poles resumed.

Historical Ties Between the

“Czech Lands” and Russia

Such a varied approach to Russia, with periodsof wariness and periods of friendly relations,distinguishes the Czech Republic from the other

post-communist countries of Central Europe.There are at least two major differences related totheir substantially dissimilar historical experiencewith Russia. First, direct historical contacts betweenRussia and the “Czech Lands” were marginaluntil the 20th century. Unlike the inhabitants ofPoland and the Baltic countries, Czechs neverperceived Russia as a direct military threat, nordid they experience czarist rule first hand. Onthe contrary, one of the national myths of their19th century “national awakening” was based onthe strongly romanticized view of Russia as the“Slavic oak” that could shield the Czechs from theGermanization pressure of the Habsburg Empire.The liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Armyat the end of World War II has also been — untiltoday — interpreted positively. The discussionabout the liberation/occupation by the Soviets that

T C R: L

F P C

P K4


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A R D 13

The public debates

the Czech Republic

resemble more clos

the situation in Fra

or Germany than th

negative consensus

Russia in the “northtier” of post-commu

countries.

is still so lively in the Baltic countries has nevertaken root in the Czech Republic. The negativeimage of Russia is, therefore, tied exclusively to thecommunist period (1948-89). In particular, the1968 invasion by the Warsaw Pact armies and thesubsequent repression left a deep mark on nationalconsciousness: distrust toward Russia is thereforedeeply rooted in the minds of those who livedthrough the 1960s and 1970s.

Economic Aspects of the Relationship

The Czech Republic’s economic transformation

of the 1990s that followed the end of the ColdWar was not only a transition from a plannedeconomy to a market economy, but also froma high level of interdependence with the SovietUnion to a reorientation toward the West. Today,Russia constitutes an important market, but itsoverall share of foreign trade is relatively small.EU member states account for 73.6 percent ofthe Czech Republic’s foreign trade; Germany isthe most important trading partner with 28.6percent, followed by Slovakia (7.3 percent) andPoland (6.7 percent). Russia, which is the CzechRepublic’s most important partner among thepost-Soviet countries accounts only for 4.5 percent,with Ukraine being substantially less relevant (0.9percent).8

Additionally, the bulk of imports from Russia areenergy resources. This means that the economicdependence on trade with Russia is relatively small,and therefore EU sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions cannot have as strong an effect on thenational economy as it might appear from followingthe Czech media. On the other hand, the highlevels of energy dependence on Russia increasepublic concerns, particularly on the right wing ofthe political spectrum. At the same time, it shouldbe stressed that unlike some of its neighbors, the

8 Czech National Bank, The Czech Republic’s trade relations withUkraine and Russia (in Czech).

Czech Republic is not fully dependent on Russianenergy resources, either in terms of oil (becauseof the IKL pipeline that carries oil imports viaGermany) or gas (because of the long-term contracton the delivery of gas from Norway).

The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis

The Ukrainian crisis is without a doubt themost substantial of the external shocks that haveinfluenced relations between the Czech Republicand Russia. And yet, unlike in Poland and theBaltic countries, even this most serious breach of

European security order has not led to the defeat ofthe Russia-friendly orientation among parts of thepolitical elites. On the contrary, the battle over the“true” interpretation of what to expect from Russiais more intense today than ever. In this sense, thepublic debates in the Czech Republic resemblemore closely the situation in France or Germanythan the negative consensus on Russia in the“northern tier” of post-communist countries.

Four basic attitudes toward the Ukrainian crisishave recently emerged among Czech policymakers.

The first influential position is that of the“anti-Russian hawks,” an alliance of right-wingconservative political forces (such as the TOP09party and former Minister of Foreign AffairsKarel Schwarzenberg) and many influential mediaoutlets. While the advocates of this position agreewith the sanctions introduced by the United Statesand the EU, they say that it is necessary to goeven further and to provide Ukraine with moresubstantive support, ranging from financial helpto military training and equipment. It is also theconviction of the hawks that the Czech Republicshould follow the example of Poland and convincethe country’s EU partners that Russia constitutes agrave threat to the security order in Europe.

The second position is the position of“multilateralists” who argue that the Czech

http://www.cnb.cz/cs/menova_politika/zpravy_o_inflaci/2014/2014_II/boxy_a_prilohy/zoi_2014_II_box_2.htmlhttp://www.cnb.cz/cs/menova_politika/zpravy_o_inflaci/2014/2014_II/boxy_a_prilohy/zoi_2014_II_box_2.htmlhttp://www.cnb.cz/cs/menova_politika/zpravy_o_inflaci/2014/2014_II/boxy_a_prilohy/zoi_2014_II_box_2.htmlhttp://www.cnb.cz/cs/menova_politika/zpravy_o_inflaci/2014/2014_II/boxy_a_prilohy/zoi_2014_II_box_2.html


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A R D 15

as a security threat to their country, but abouthalf of the population did not actively follow thenews about the conflict. Most importantly, at thebeginning of the conflict, a large majority rejectedthe involvement of Czech diplomacy in the conflictor its solution — only 11 percent supported anykind of diplomatic action regarding the crisis.11 With the intensification of the conflict, Czechshave become increasingly critical of Russia. InOctober 2014, two-thirds of the population saidthat Russia posed a security threat to the country,twice as many as a year earlier.12 As far as sanctions

are concerned, however, the Czech public remainsdivided. Although 41 percent agree with theirimposition, 39 percent are against. The support forsanctions is more pronounced on the right, whilea negative view of sanctions dominates on the left.Also, those persons more interested in the situationin Ukraine were more favorably inclined towardsanctions than those who did not express interest.13

We can safely argue that there has not been aconsolidation of a national consensus in the

11 Většina Čechů nesouhlasí s ruskou aktivitou na Ukrajině, Aktuálně.cz ,April 29, 2014.

12 Obavy Čechů z Ruska výrazně vzrostly, prozradil průzkum, EuroZ- právy.cz , October 24, 2014.

13 Postoj české veřejnosti k dění na Ukrajině — září 2014, Centrum provýzkum veřejného mínění , October 3, 2014.

Czech Republic regarding the conflict in Ukraine,which has instead revealed deep cleavages amongthe public and foreign policy elites. Today, thepolitical mainstream oscillates between the positionof the multilateralists (stressing the need for aunified EU approach) and that of the pragmatists(accentuating economic interests). Reflecting theeven distribution of opinion among the public,the government is very cautious in its positioningon Russia and the crisis. A change toward moreunity on the issue is highly improbable. However,a trend that is already palpable today is the gradual

softening of the official Czech position, which willultimately lead to a re-evaluation of Czech supportfor the EU sanction regime.

Petr Kratochvíl is the director of the Institute ofInternational Relations in Prague. His researchinterests cover theory of international relations,European integration, Central and Eastern Europe,and the role of religion in international relations.He has published about 100 monographs, editedvolumes, book chapters, and articles, among othersin Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of

International Relations and Development, Europe-Asia Studies , and Journal of Communist andPost-Communist Studies. This chapter is based onPetr Kratochvíl, Von Falken und Russlandfreunden.Die tschechische Debatte über die EU-Sanktionen,Osteuropa , 9-10/2014, pp. 67 - 78.

Already palpable to

is the gradual softe

of the official Czech

position, which will

ultimately lead to a

re-evaluation of Cze

support for the EU sanction regime.

http://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/vetsina-cechu-nesouhlasi-s-ruskou-aktivitou-na-ukrajine/r~9fb948dccf8111e391780025900fea04/http://domaci.eurozpravy.cz/spolecnost/105141-obavy-cechu-z-ruska-vyrazne-vzrostly-prozradil-pruzkum/http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/mezinarodni-vztahy/postoj-ceske-verejnosti-k-deni-na-ukrajine-zari-2014http://dl.oe.dgo-online.org/issues/dl/OE_09_10_2014_Abstracts_E.pdfhttp://dl.oe.dgo-online.org/issues/dl/OE_09_10_2014_Abstracts_E.pdfhttp://dl.oe.dgo-online.org/issues/dl/OE_09_10_2014_Abstracts_E.pdfhttp://dl.oe.dgo-online.org/issues/dl/OE_09_10_2014_Abstracts_E.pdfhttp://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/mezinarodni-vztahy/postoj-ceske-verejnosti-k-deni-na-ukrajine-zari-2014http://domaci.eurozpravy.cz/spolecnost/105141-obavy-cechu-z-ruska-vyrazne-vzrostly-prozradil-pruzkum/http://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/vetsina-cechu-nesouhlasi-s-ruskou-aktivitou-na-ukrajine/r~9fb948dccf8111e391780025900fea04/


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T G M F U S16

E: I P V-B

F P

M M5

The conflict in Ukraine

... is not just a conflict

about Crimea,

Donetsk, and Kyiv, but

about fundamental

ssumptions underlying

European security.

The conflict in Ukraine has put theinternational community’s relationshipwith Russia on a new standing. This is not

just a conflict about Crimea, Donetsk, and Kyiv,but about fundamental assumptions underlyingEuropean security. Estonia’s first official reactionto the Ukrainian crisis was during the bloodiestdays of clashes of the EuroMaidan protests onFebruary 18-20, 2014. President Toomas HendrikIlves issued a statement insisting that the violentconfrontation in Kyiv had to stop and thatgovernment and opposition should start a political

dialogue. He warned that Estonia stood ready tosupport sanctions against those responsible for the

violence.14

In March 2014, a day after President VladimirPutin had asked the Russian Federation Councilto adopt a resolution allowing the use of Russia’sarmed forces in Ukraine, an extraordinary meetingof Estonia’s National Defense Council called forstrong counter-measures by the EU and NATO.15 A few days later, following NATO consultations,Foreign Minister Urmas Paet reiterated that Russia’s

actions and threats against Ukraine violated theUN Charter and endangered peace and security inEurope.16

At the extraordinary meeting of EU heads ofstate and government in Brussels on March 6,2014, Prime Minister Andrus Ansip stressed theimportance of stopping Russia’s aggression andof helping Ukraine in every way.17 At the sametime, foreign ministers of the Nordic, Baltic, andVisegrad countries met in Estonia’s eastern-most

14 President Toomas Hendrik Ilves on the violent confrontation in Kyiv ,

February 18, 2014.

15 President Ilves summoned the National Defence Council, March 2,2014.

16 The North Atlantic Council discussed Russia’s military action againstUkraine, March 2, 2014.

17 Ansip: EU has decided to take concrete measures to solve the crisis inCrimea, March 6, 2014.

border town, Narva, and stated that the presence ofRussian troops in Crimea was an act of aggression violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorialintegrity as well as international law.18

In the same month, Estonia’s parliament adopteda statement in support of the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of Ukraine.19 The speakersof the three Baltic parliaments further issued a

joint statement saying that the Russian FederationCouncil’s vote to allow the use of armed forcesin Ukraine violated international law and set a

dangerous precedent.

20

At the same time, Ilves discussed the crisis with theU.S. President Barack Obama and Vice PresidentJoe Biden, underlining the need for Europe and theUnited States to act decisively and collectively. Indifferent European meetings, Estonia supportedimposing sanctions against Russia and providingan aid package to Ukraine. It has since supportedstatements, resolutions, and decisions backingUkraine and condemning Russia at the UN, OSCE,Council of Europe, UNESCO, and OECD.

At the end of August 2014, when a large numberof Russian combat troops entered Eastern Ukraine,Ilves insisted that this should finally dispel anydoubts about Russia’s involvement in the conflict,and that there was little meaning in ceasefirenegotiations while one country had brought itsarmed forces into another without permission,while refusing formally to admit its involvement inthe conflict.21

18 The foreign ministers of the Nordic, Baltic and four Central European

countries are in Narva discussing the situation in Ukraine, March 6, 2014

19 Statement of the Riigikogu: In support of the sovereignty and territo-rial integrity of Ukraine, March 5, 2014.

20 Statement of the Speakers of the Parliaments of Estonia, Latvia andLithuania, March 14, 2014.

21 Comment by President Toomas Hendrik Ilves on the invasion ofRussian troops in Eastern Ukraine, August 28, 2014.

http://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/9835-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-violent-confrontation-in-kyiv/index.htmlhttp://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/9881-president-ilves-summoned-the-national-defence-council-/index.htmlhttp://vm.ee/en/news/north-atlantic-council-discussed-russias-military-action-against-ukrainehttp://vm.ee/en/news/north-atlantic-council-discussed-russias-military-action-against-ukrainehttps://valitsus.ee/en/news/ansip-eu-has-decided-take-concrete-measures-solve-crisis-crimeahttps://valitsus.ee/en/news/ansip-eu-has-decided-take-concrete-measures-solve-crisis-crimeahttp://vm.ee/en/news/foreign-ministers-nordic-baltic-and-four-central-european-countries-are-narva-discussinghttp://vm.ee/en/news/foreign-ministers-nordic-baltic-and-four-central-european-countries-are-narva-discussinghttp://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178786http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178786http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178911http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178911http://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10486-comment-by-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-invasion-of-russian-troops-in-eastern-ukraine/index.htmlhttp://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10486-comment-by-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-invasion-of-russian-troops-in-eastern-ukraine/index.htmlhttp://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10486-comment-by-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-invasion-of-russian-troops-in-eastern-ukraine/index.htmlhttp://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10486-comment-by-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-invasion-of-russian-troops-in-eastern-ukraine/index.htmlhttp://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178911http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178911http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178786http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=178786http://vm.ee/en/news/foreign-ministers-nordic-baltic-and-four-central-european-countries-are-narva-discussinghttp://vm.ee/en/news/foreign-ministers-nordic-baltic-and-four-central-european-countries-are-narva-discussinghttps://valitsus.ee/en/news/ansip-eu-has-decided-take-concrete-measures-solve-crisis-crimeahttps://valitsus.ee/en/news/ansip-eu-has-decided-take-concrete-measures-solve-crisis-crimeahttp://vm.ee/en/news/north-atlantic-council-discussed-russias-military-action-against-ukrainehttp://vm.ee/en/news/north-atlantic-council-discussed-russias-military-action-against-ukrainehttp://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/9881-president-ilves-summoned-the-national-defence-council-/index.htmlhttp://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/9835-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-violent-confrontation-in-kyiv/index.html


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A R D 17

For Estonia, Russia

aggression has

aggravated the sec

situation in the wid

Baltic Sea region a

raised questions ab

the security of NATmember states thro

collective defence.

In September 2014, Ilves visited Kyiv and metUkrainian leaders to express support to thecountry’s efforts at political, constitutional, andeconomic reforms. Among others, he said Estonianhospitals willing to admit seriously injuredUkrainian freedom-fighters (the Foreign Ministryhad earlier on supported the treatment in Estoniaof people injured in the EuroMaidan protests).The government also increased the number ofscholarships available to Ukrainians to study atEstonian universities.

The parliament has agreed that, in addition tofinancial aid, Estonia should be able to react fastand offer refuge to Ukrainian citizens, especiallythose with links to Estonia.22 The 23,000 ethnicUkrainians in the country form the third-largestethnic group after Estonians and Russians.Regarding support to Ukrainian refugees withEstonian roots, Ilves emphasized that the interiorand foreign ministries should not find bureaucratic

justifications to turn them away.23

Factors Leading Estonia’s Policy

Various factors have shaped Estonia’s policytoward the Russian conflict with Ukraine. First andforemost, decision-making has been influencedby security concerns. For Estonia, the scope of thecrisis extends beyond Ukraine to the security ofthe Baltic region itself. The annexation of Crimeacaused many Estonians to remember the traumaof their country’s quiet submission to Sovietoccupation in 1940. Crimea’s military occupationand the subsequent referendum closely resembledhow the Soviet Union deprived Estonia of itsindependence during World War II.

22 Parliamentary Factions: Estonia Should Accept Ukrainian Refugees IfSuch a Need Arises, Estonian Public Broadcasting , October 1, 2014.

23 Ilves Calls for Government Cooperation to Bring Ukrainian RefugeesWith Estonian Roots Back , Estonian Public Broadcasting , September 22,2014.

For Estonia, Russia’s aggression has aggravatedthe security situation in the wider Baltic Searegion and raised questions about the security ofNATO member states through collective defence.NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said inNovember 2014 that there had been around 400intercepts — 50 percent more than in 2013 — ofRussian military flights near NATO membercountries. Russian provocations in the Baltic Searegion have escalated, including frequent militaryexercises and flights by strategic bombers. Inaddition, in September 2014, Russia abducted a

security officer from inside Estonia, and detaineda Lithuanian-flagged fishing vessel operatingnear Murmansk. Other Baltic and Nordic statesexperienced similar Russian aggression over thesecond half of 2014.

As Taavi Rõivas, who succeeded Ansip as primeminister in March 2014, recently explained, “we areseeing lots of activities that have not been there ayear ago, which demonstrates that the presence ofNATO allies in all NATO territories is very muchneeded.”24 Estonia insisted that a sustainable NATO

military footprint in the region’s frontline stateshad to be one of the deliverables of the September2014 NATO summit in Wales. It was importantfor the government that the summit confirmedthe political unity and military preparedness ofthe alliance, and strengthened NATO’s deterrenceposition.

Secondly, a domestic political dimension was addedto the Ukrainian crisis in the Estonian context,as a government-orchestrated shift of leadershipand power-sharing in the ruling coalition led to a

change of government. For some Estonians, thismovement in the midst of the crisis constituted asecurity risk. In a March 2014 poll commissionedby the ministry of defense, over the previous six

24 Estonia’s Prime Minister: NATO Presence Key to Counter Russia’sProvocations, Atlantic Council , December 11, 2014.

http://news.err.ee/v/politics/739ea155-6788-44d0-a822-4897fa62074bhttp://news.err.ee/v/politics/739ea155-6788-44d0-a822-4897fa62074bhttp://news.err.ee/v/society/b54d4e7e-5492-42e3-8691-136c3ecb1ad8http://news.err.ee/v/society/b54d4e7e-5492-42e3-8691-136c3ecb1ad8http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/estonias-prime-minister-nato-presence-key-to-counter-russiahttp://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/estonias-prime-minister-nato-presence-key-to-counter-russiahttp://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/estonias-prime-minister-nato-presence-key-to-counter-russiahttp://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/estonias-prime-minister-nato-presence-key-to-counter-russiahttp://news.err.ee/v/society/b54d4e7e-5492-42e3-8691-136c3ecb1ad8http://news.err.ee/v/society/b54d4e7e-5492-42e3-8691-136c3ecb1ad8http://news.err.ee/v/politics/739ea155-6788-44d0-a822-4897fa62074bhttp://news.err.ee/v/politics/739ea155-6788-44d0-a822-4897fa62074b


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T G M F U S18

has been essential for

Estonia from the start

f the crisis that the EU

and the United States

reached an agreement

about sanctions.

months the proportion of those considering a large-scale military attack by a foreign country possiblehad grown by 16 percentage points.25 Accordingto the poll, the most probable threats wereinterference by a foreign country with Estonianpolitics and economy (64 percent). In the EuropeanParliament in May 2014, and in the campaignfor the parliamentary elections in March 2015,national security matters have become the principaldiscussion topic.

Another factor shaping Estonia’s response to

the Ukraine crisis is the pursuit of a value-basedforeign policy that includes support for democracy,a market economy, and the rule of law.26 Adherenceto values is linked to the promotion of nationalself-respect. It is a general belief of policymakersthat since the 1990s the Baltic states have been backon the international map because their citizens andother people cared about values. This tendencywas strengthened by the experience of joining EUand NATO, given the EU requirement of fulfillingthe Copenhagen Criteria regarding the rule of lawand democracy, and NATO’s growing emphasis on

principles such as democratic control of the armedforces. Hence, during his meeting with UkrainianPresident Petro Poroshenko in Kyiv, Ilves noted that“What is currently happening in Ukraine is a battlebetween Europe and non-Europe; it is not solely amilitary issue, with Russian aggression as one party;instead, it is a conflict of values.”27

Additionally, Ilves has used arguments ofinternational law when outlining the importanceof Russian aggression in Ukraine. Speaking at theUN General Assembly in September 2014, he listed

several principles of international law that have

25 Public Opinion and National Defence, Saar Poll , March 2014.

26 Toomas Hendrik Ilves, In Remembrance of the Melians, Diplomaatia,October 2008.

27 President Ilves met with Ukrainian leaders, September 11, 2014.

been violated by Russia.28

The advancement ofinternational law is one of Estonia’s five prioritiesin foreign policy.29 This is based on the belief thatsmall countries are its biggest beneficiaries becauseit provides the basis for their treatment as equalsby larger ones and, crucially, guards their status asindependent states.

A strong transatlantic link is an importantprinciple of Estonia’s foreign and security policy.Coordinated, uniform, and effective action by theEU and the United States has been emphasized

throughout the crisis. The U.S. presence in Europeis seen as offering guarantees of peace, security,and stability within the Baltic Sea region and ona wider scale. Therefore, it has been essential forEstonia from the start of the crisis that the EUand the United States reached an agreement aboutsanctions.

In the media, the EU’s response has been regardedas one of political impotence and myopia, whilehopes for a more vigorous policy response areplaced in the United States. Journalists argue thatEurope is simply “too old, too complacent, tooindecisive, and too dependent on Russian money topunish Russia in any significant manner.”30

However, Estonia’s foreign policy circles haveapplauded the EU for its solidarity in imposingsanctions against Russia. Paet said that restrictionsagainst Russia must be continued because politicaland diplomatic steps have failed so far. “We haveto continue pressuring Russia on the political leveland with restrictive measures to achieve a halt to

28 Address by the President of the Republic of Estonia Toomas HendrikIlves at the General Debate of the 69th United Nations General AssemblySeptember 24, 2014.

29 Permanent Mission of Estonia in Geneva, Human Rights and Estonia,October 15, 2014.

30 Jüri Maloverjan: nukker muinasjutt Euroopast ja Krimmist, Postimees,March 19, 2014.

http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/14167_Public_Opinion_and_National_Defence_March2014.pdfhttp://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/in-remembrance-of-the-melians/http://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10546-president-ilves-met-with-ukrainian-leaders/http://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/10600-address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-estonia-toomas-hendrik-ilves-at-the-general-debate-of-the-69th-united-nations-general-assembly-/index.htmlhttp://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/10600-address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-estonia-toomas-hendrik-ilves-at-the-general-debate-of-the-69th-united-nations-general-assembly-/index.htmlhttp://www.genf.vm.ee/estonian_foreign_policy/aid-1636http://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://www.genf.vm.ee/estonian_foreign_policy/aid-1636http://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/10600-address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-estonia-toomas-hendrik-ilves-at-the-general-debate-of-the-69th-united-nations-general-assembly-/index.htmlhttp://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/10600-address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-estonia-toomas-hendrik-ilves-at-the-general-debate-of-the-69th-united-nations-general-assembly-/index.htmlhttp://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://arvamus.postimees.ee/2732962/juri-maloverjan-nukker-muinasjutt-euroopast-ja-krimmisthttp://www.president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10546-president-ilves-met-with-ukrainian-leaders/http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/in-remembrance-of-the-melians/http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/14167_Public_Opinion_and_National_Defence_March2014.pdf


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The media tends to

echo the governme

sentiment that the

recent events in Uk

constitute the grea

political and securi

crisis in Europe ofrecent decades.

the violence in Eastern-Ukraine, because this is theonly remaining way we can influence Russia.”31

Regarding the impact of the sanctions on Estonia’seconomy, the minister of foreign trade andenterprise, Anne Sulling, has maintained that “interms of numbers, the sanctions are not affectingthe Estonian economy as a whole to any significantdegree, but some enterprises feel the impactquite strongly. Alongside short-term measures,it is important for us to look for new markets.”32 According to her, Estonian dairy products have

been sold in Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea,and Thailand, which demonstrates that Estonianproducts can find markets in distant countries.She said that, in the interest of economic stability,Estonia needs to minimize its dependence on theRussian market.33

Last but not least, Ukraine is important for Estoniaas an Eastern Partnership country. Estonia hasidentified the Eastern Partnership as one of itsforeign policy priorities and directs half of itsdevelopment assistance to the partner countries.As its foreign policy interests and motives havebecome varied and multi-layered after ten yearsof EU and NATO membership, the EasternPartnership is regarded as significant, especially forpromoting the rule of law, respect for human rights,democracy, and the role of civil society. Stressingthe importance of Georgia and Moldova beingfree in their choices is also becoming increasinglyrelevant as Russia aggressively expands its area ofinfluence.

In 2014, Estonia supported Ukraine with€1 million, making it the most important

31 Estonia ready to support new sanctions against Russia in order to easethe security situation in Eastern-Ukraine, July 25, 2014.

32 Sanctions begin to impact Baltics, The Baltic Times, September 3, 2014.

33 Ibid.

destination for development assistance.34

Themain components are digital development andadmitting those who have been injured in thefighting to Estonian hospitals. The continued and

visible support of democratic countries for thereform course of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgiais important for Estonia. It expects cooperationwith those Eastern Partnership countries thathave chosen closer ties with Europe not only tomitigate the current crisis but to contribute to anatmosphere of security and confidence in Europein general. The Eastern Partnership Center, which

was established in Estonia in 2011 and has thegoal of training officials and passing along reformexperiences, has gained momentum.

Outlook

An analysis of Estonian media coverage showsthat the dominant theme in 2014 was Russianbelligerence in the Ukraine crisis and the ensuingsecurity situation, together with Obama’s visitin September.35 The media tends to echo thegovernment’s sentiment that the recent eventsin Ukraine constitute the greatest political andsecurity crisis in Europe of recent decades.The Estonian media’s coverage of the crisis hasdemonstrated a varied set of sentiments, namely:

• relief that Estonia is a NATO member, butanxiety about the alliance’s efficacy in apossible crisis of a similar kind in the Balticspace;

• an outpouring of solidarity and sympathy withUkraine as it stood on the same starting line asEstonia in 1991;

34 Mihkelson: Ukraine Now Estonia’s Aid Priority , Estonian Public Broad-casting , October 10, 2014.

35 ERR News poll: regional security the main topic of 2014, EstonianPublic Broadcasting , January 5, 2015.

http://vm.ee/en/news/estonia-ready-support-new-sanctions-against-russia-order-ease-security-situation-easternhttp://vm.ee/en/news/estonia-ready-support-new-sanctions-against-russia-order-ease-security-situation-easternhttp://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/35476/http://news.err.ee/v/Ukraine/c6b3e589-7f70-457a-947a-0c27523bfac9http://news.err.ee/v/politics/d11149bb-80e1-446b-8f0b-a7e61af1c042http://news.err.ee/v/politics/d11149bb-80e1-446b-8f0b-a7e61af1c042http://news.err.ee/v/Ukraine/c6b3e589-7f70-457a-947a-0c27523bfac9http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/35476/http://vm.ee/en/news/estonia-ready-support-new-sanctions-against-russia-order-ease-security-situation-easternhttp://vm.ee/en/news/estonia-ready-support-new-sanctions-against-russia-order-ease-security-situation-eastern


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T G M F U S20

• disgust at the immensity and crudeness ofRussia’s information warfare; and

• disappointment at the slowness and modestyof the EU’s diplomatic response in a majorpolitical and security crisis affecting thebalance of power in Europe as a whole.36

From the Estonian perspective, the conflict betweenRussia and Ukraine has important implications forthe European security architecture, affecting bothEU and NATO. On the EU side, the crisis showsthe importance of Europe having a strong and

united foreign policy. The EU’s response so far hasbeen built on phased sanctions, a concept it hassuccessfully developed over the years. This was theright approach at the right time. The question iswhat will remain of the sanctions in 2015. The EUmust make sure it brings to bear its full economicand political weight.

The crisis has also made it clear that more workneeds to be done when it comes to security anddefense matters. For many, Europe is chiefly a “softpower.” But, as European Commission President

Jean Claude Juncker has said, even the strongestsoft powers cannot make do in the long run withoutat least some integrated defense capacities.37

36 Maria Mälksoo, The Ukrainian Crisis as Reflected in the EstonianMedia, Imre Kertész Kolleg Jena, March 24, 2014.

37 Jean-Claude Juncker: Ukrainian Lessons, Postimees, May 15, 2014.

NATO has been crucial for Estonia in conveyinga signal that the alliance can respond quicklyto security threats such as the one in Ukraine.Estonia will keep stressing that NATO must beable to implement all three of the fundamentalassignments outlined in its 2010 StrategicConcept: collective defense, crisis-managementand cooperative security. It will seek for this tobe achieved through NATO’s military capabilitybeing well trained, prepared, and commanded,and through the alliance adopting the necessarypolitical determination and military deterrence

position.

It is widely agreed in Estonia that NATO’sReadiness Action Plan, which was the maindeliverable of the Wales summit, must go hand-in-hand with greater investments in defense byEuropean alliance members. The allocation of 2percent of GDP to defense spending must become amajor benchmark of their commitment. Europeancountries need to realize that meeting this targetis vital for giving credibility to deterrence and forrevitalizing the transatlantic relationship.

Merle Maigre is a security policy adviser to the president of Estonia. In 2012-13, she was a Ron Asmus Fellow with The German Marshall Fund ofthe United States, and she currently is an associated

fellow of the GMF Warsaw Office. The opinionsexpressed in this article are personal and do notreflect the official positions of the Republic of Estonia

NATO has been crucial

or Estonia in conveying

signal that the alliance

can respond quickly to

ecurity threats such as

the one in Ukraine.

http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/index.php?id=572http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/index.php?id=572http://news.postimees.ee/2795554/jean-claude-juncker-ukrainian-lessonshttp://news.postimees.ee/2795554/jean-claude-juncker-ukrainian-lessonshttp://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/index.php?id=572http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/index.php?id=572


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Hungary introduced

what it called its

“Eastern Opening”

strengthen coopera

with Russia (as wel

as China) and to re

the serious econombenefits offered by

Eastern partners.

The crisis in Ukraine and the conflict withRussia took Europe and the United Stateslargely by surprise. Few in the West had

heeded the many warnings that had, for years,pointed to the steady deterioration of affairs inEurope’s East. As early as 2009, and in the wakeof the Georgia conflict, Central and EasternEuropean leaders had addressed these worrisomedevelopments in an open letter to U.S. PresidentBarack Obama.38 Poland and the Baltic stateshad repeatedly cautioned against an increasinglyaggressive Russia. Lithuania, the holder of the

EU presidency at the time of the 2013 EasternPartnership summit in Vilnius, voiced itsskepticism over Ukraine’s ambiguous position onmoving closer to the EU. Nonetheless, Europe livedin the illusion that the signing of the AssociationAgreement with Ukraine would go ahead smoothly.

The Visegrad countries, which include Hungary,were no exception. They had, for several years,enjoyed a moment of very good cooperationextending, for first time since their joining NATOin 1999, to defense cooperation and the decision

to create a Visegrad Battle group led by Poland. Yetat the same time, there was little exchange amongthem about the impending crisis in Ukraine ora conflict with Russia. Consequentl

A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

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