A Radical Right-Wing Failure in Canada:

The People's Party in the 2019 Federal Election

By

Charles R. Buck

A Thesis

Presented to

The University of Guelph

In partial fulfillment of requirements for

the degree of

Bachelor of Arts

In

Political Science

Guelph, Ontario, Canada

© Charles R. Buck, December, 2019

ABSTRACT

A Radical Right-Wing Failure in Canada:

The People's Party in the 2019 Federal Election

Charles R. Buck Advisor:

University of Guelph, 2019 Dr. Edward Koning

This thesis is an investigation into why Maxime Bernier’s People’s Party of Canada

(PPC), a radical right-wing party (RRP), failed to succeed in the 2019 Canadian federal election.

Canada has not witnessed the electoral breakthrough of such a party. I argue the failure of the

PPC was the result of a mixture of supply- and demand-side variables including the electoral

system, grand governing coalitions, national traditions, the stabilization of immigrant inflows,

and the softening of anti-immigrant sentiment. Other, more favourable conditions for the PPC,

including strong party organization and leadership, extensive media coverage, and increasing

support for populist and moderate authoritarian sentiment, may have been necessary, but were

not sufficient alone to allow for an RRP breakthrough. RRPs are unlikely to succeed in Canada

as long as particular institutional constraints continue to exist, the immigration rate remains

predictable, and Canadians continue to hold favourable views towards immigrants.

iii

Acknowledgements

A number of individuals were essential to the successful completion of this work. I’d like to

humbly offer my thanks to them.

First, I’d like to thank Dr. Edward Koning for his supervision over this project. His support,

guidance, and feedback were invaluable to its success. Throughout this entire process, Dr.

Koning stimulated my intellectual growth through the many discussions, memos, and comments

he provided me. His limitless availability, openness to academic inquiry, superb mastery of

research methods, and expert knowledge of anti-immigrant parties contributed immensely to the

success of this project. It has been a wonderful experience working with Dr. Koning and I am

grateful that he afforded me that opportunity.

Second, I’d like to thank Dr. Tamara Small for reading this thesis and challenging me during the

defence. Her feedback was fair and thoughtful, and her in-depth knowledge of Canadian politics

made her well suited to assess the quality of this work.

Third, I am extremely grateful to the University of Guelph and the individuals and groups

attached to it. From Writing Services to Accessibility Services to the McLaughlin Library to the

Department of Political Science as a whole, I could not ask for a better learning environment or a

more professional and knowledgeable staff.

Lastly, my family has been indispensable to the success of this paper. I’d like to thank my

grandparents Oma and Grandpa, Aunts Cathy and Margie, and my sisters Sophie and Emma, for

showing such an interest in my work and providing me with such excellent feedback. Most of all,

I’d like to thank my parents, Cathy, Dad, and Mom, for their unending support of me. Without

the many discussions we have had about politics and current events, to the outstanding editing

help they have provided in this work and every other work I have written, I would be half the

man I am today.

iv

Table of Content

Abstract ii

Acknowledgements iii

Table of Content iv

1. Introduction 1

2. What Makes a Party Radical Right-Wing? 4

3. Literature Review 6

3.1 Country-level Socio-economic Hypotheses 10

3.2 Country-level Socio-political Hypotheses 13

3.3 Intra-party Hypotheses 18

3.4 Individual-level Demographic Hypotheses 19

3.5 Individual-level Attitudinal Hypotheses 22

4. Hypotheses 25

5. Methodology 28

6. The Context of the 2019 Canadian Election 31

7. The People’s Party of Canada 36

7.1 Radicalism 36

7.2 Nativism 38

7.3 Authoritarianism 40

7.4 Populism 44

7.5 RRP Subtype 46

8. Fertile Ground for RRP Success? 48

8.1 Immigration Levels 49

8.2 Media Coverage of the PPC and Immigration Issues 53

8.3 Anti-immigrant, Populism, and Authoritarian Public Opinion 56

9. Conclusion 63

10. Works Cited 70

1

1. Introduction

The electoral support of radical right-wing parties (RRPs) has risen dramatically over the

last few decades.1 This trend is particularly acute in Western Europe. So far, Canada has been

one of the few industrialized liberal democracies that has not seen the establishment of a

successful RRP.2 Following his resignation from the Conservative Party of Canada, Maxime

Bernier formed the People’s Party of Canada (PPC), a party that seems to resemble an RRP.

Many spectators, media outlets, and government bodies took this fledgling party seriously, such

as the Leaders’ Debates Commission, who invited Bernier to debate the other five leaders of

Canada’s major parties. The party nominated candidates in 93% of Canada’s ridings and set up

electoral district associations in all but one of them (Elections Canada 2019; PPC: Our

Candidates 2019). The party also boasted of its tens of thousands of party members and its well

over a million dollars in fundraising (Bernier 2019a: 6; Bernier 2019d: 2; Taghva 2019). Yet, the

PPC performed poorly in 2019, winning zero seats and taking only 1.64% of the popular vote. Is

the PPC an RRP? Why did it fail in Canada’s 2019 election, in contrast to so many RRPs in

Europe, and despite the anticipation of so many political observers? My research has attempted

to answer these questions by investigating the viability of RRPs in Canada in general, and

Bernier’s People’s Party and its failure in the 2019 federal election in particular.

1 For example, see Adams 2017: 17-41 for a good overview of this trend.

2 There is some disagreement over whether the Reform Party of Canada and the Canadian

Reform Conservative Alliance qualified as RRPs. However, most academics seem to agree that

they are better described as right-wing parties that ran on mild anti-multicultural, anti-immigrant,

and populist platforms (see Dobbin 1991: 135-136, 168-170; Flanagan 2009: x, 15, 32-33, 68-69,

125, 197-199; Gidengil et al. 2001: 509; Gordon et al. 2019: 4; Koning 2019: 62, 136-139;

Nevitte et al. 1998; Norris 2005: 70-71; Trebilcock 2018: 843)

2

This paper has found that the PPC is an RRP, of a neo-liberal xenophobic kind, and its

failure in 2019 is the result of a combination of historical supply-side barriers and contemporary

demand-side trends. At first, the failure of the PPC may seem surprising given the number of

factors that worked in its favour. These included a robust party organization and leadership, the

PPC’s non-extreme, albeit neo-liberal ideology, extensive media coverage, and increasing

support for populist and moderate authoritarian views. Yet, a peculiar blend of circumstances

amounted to a resounding defeat of the PPC. Canada’s electoral system, lack of grand governing

coalitions, and national traditions were part of that blend, and all posed significant entrenched

supply-side challenges to this new, aspiring RRP. The single-member-plurality voting system

ensured that even a substantial vote total, hundreds of thousands of votes larger than any minor

party, would be inefficiently translated into seats. Bernier’s personal loss of the riding of Beauce

makes this factor all the more relevant to the PPC’s failure. The absence of grand governing

coalitions in Canada’s federal government, now and in the past, also contributed to the PPC’s

failure by undermining its populist credentials. Canada’s adversarial two-and-a-half-party

system, with frequent switches from Liberal to Conservative governments and vice versa,

weakened the PPC’s claim as the only true alternative. The national traditions of Canada were

also disadvantageous to the PPC’s prospects. The PPC’s xenophobic platform fits uneasily with

Canada’s emphasis on tolerance, diversity, internationalism, and immigration. Significantly, the

lack of far-right groups in Canada and the suppression of their messages have resulted in little

congruence between the PPC and Canadian political culture as well.

Turning to contemporary demand-side variables, the immigration rate, the change in that

rate, and anti-immigrant sentiment have all amounted to decreasing demand for the PPC in 2019.

In recent years, immigration to Canada has slowly increased. Yet, as a proportion of the total

3

Canadian population, immigration levels have not been particularly high, at least relative to

historical standards. Furthermore, the change in immigration has remained stable. Generations

ago, the immigration rate fluctuated wildly from year to year, dramatically increasing and

decreasing in short periods of time. Since the late 1980s, these changes have levelled off and the

substantial jumps or drops in the rate no longer occur. Finally, anti-immigrant sentiment in

Canada has softened since the 1990s. Canadians are now more pro-immigrant than they were

several decades ago. As a result of these trends, 2019 has seen little demand for the nativist

ideology of the PPC. In summary, the PPC failed in 2019 because of a mixture of both

institutionalized characteristics of the Canadian political process, stymying the supply of the

PPC, and modern shifts concerning immigration, dampening the demand for the PPC.

This project and its results have filled a geographical and empirical gap in the literature

by performing a contemporary and systematic study of variables that could explain the failure of

the PPC in Canada. I have done this by first, establishing what an RRP is and outlining the four

core components that make up its ideology. Next, the expansive body of research into RRP

success is discussed and used to compare the experiences of European RRPs with that of the

PPC. From that review, a series of hypotheses were formulated and methodologies to test them

were devised, which, once tested, helped explain the PPC’s failure. A general overview of the

Canadian context in 2019 is presented as well as an examination of the more stable variables that

affect RRP success and that make up that context. The PPC’s platform is studied qualitatively to

determine whether it is an RRP and what ideological subtype it belongs to. A quantitative

analysis, exploring whether the conditions in Canada in 2019 were ripe for RRP success,

finalizes the analysis. These last three sections showed that many variables both helped and

4

hindered the PPC. Holistically, these variables combined to prevent the PPC from breaking

through in Canada.

2. What Makes a Party Radical Right-Wing?

Despite a plethora of research into the topic, scholars do not seem to agree on a consistent

label or definition to describe RRPs.3 RRPs differ on a great many issues, such as the role of

government in the economy or in the private lives of individuals. Many of them also have

evolving or vague ideologies which makes it all the more difficult to pinpoint them on the

ideological spectrum (Kestila and Soderlund 2007: 558; Rovny and Polk 2019: 2-3).4 Despite

this diversity and elasticity, RRPs are usually characterized by four central principles: radicalism,

nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.

The first and most integral of these is radicalism, defined by Mudde (2010: 2) as

opposition to liberal democracy. Rydgren (2007: 243) states that, although new RRPs do not

usually openly oppose democracy in principle, they do aggressively attack how it is currently

practiced, especially regarding existing power structures and the protection of minorities. As a

result, although only some RRPs (such as neo-Nazi or neo-fascist variants) are extremist in that

3 These parties have been variously labelled a wide variety of terms. For this investigation, I will

consistently label this party family as radical right-wing.

4 In recent years many of these parties have changed their platforms in four directions. Anti-

Semitism has often been replaced by hostility towards Muslims. Some RRPs have emphasized

women’s rights, individualism, and liberty in contrast to their authoritarian roots (Muis and

Immerzeel 2017: 916). Adherence to biological racism, the belief that ethnic or racial groups are

unequal and should not co-exist with one another, has recently been often moderated and

replaced by a more nuanced cultural racism, the belief that cultures are ostensibly equal but

incompatible with one another (Arzheimer 2018: 147; Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 916). Finally,

since the 1990s, many of these parties have shifted away from neo-liberal policies towards

welfare chauvinism, trade protectionism, and increased state intervention (De Lange 2007;

Golder 2016: 479; Rovny and Polk 2019; Rooduijn 2015).

5

they want to overthrow the existing system entirely, all RRPs are at least radical because they

advocate a fundamental change to the existing liberal democratic state and its long-standing and

entrenched policies. The change RRPs promote is usually connected to some idealized past (Betz

1998; Carter 2005; Carter 2018; Givens 2005; Hainsworth 2000; Kitschelt 2007; Mudde 2002;

Rydgren 2018).

Nativism, the second component of an RRP’s ideological makeup, is rooted in a belief

that natives of a nation are innately superior and should be given more rights and benefits than

immigrants, and anyone else considered ‘the other.’ Nativists see outside elements as inherently

threatening to local cultures and traditions and hence object to protections of non-natives.

Nativist sentiment is, therefore, often manifested in an aversion to immigrants, refugees, racial

minorities, and international organizations (Betz 1998; Carter 2018; Gordon et al. 2019; Givens

2005; Hainsworth 2000; Mudde 2002; Mudde 2010; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; O’Malley 2008;

Rooduijn 2015).

Third, RRPs tend to promote an authoritarian agenda that emphasizes order, tradition,

retribution, and conformity. Consequently, many RRPs take a strict ‘law-and-order’ approach to

criminality and defer to authority within a rigid hierarchy. Fundamentally, what makes RRPs

right-wing is their authoritarian belief that humans are naturally unequal and that some are better

suited to lead than others. RRP’s take a range of positions regarding equality on socio-economic

matters (Rovny 2013), some advocating right-libertarianism, economically anti-egalitarian for

all, while others favour welfare chauvinism, economically egalitarian for some. However, all

RRPs share anti-egalitarian beliefs within the socio-cultural dimension because they all rank

cultures hierarchically (Carter 2018; Hainsworth 2000; Mudde 2002; Mudde 2010; Muis and

Immerzeel 2017; O’Malley 2008; Rooduijn 2015; Rydgren 2018).

6

Populism is the fourth common characteristic of RRPs. Populists dichotomize society

into two groups: a pure and honest majority, and a powerful corrupt elite. They harness this

division by attacking the elite, which is composed, according to them, of traditional parties,

multinational corporations, bankers, academics, the mainstream media, government bureaucracy,

supranational entities, and cosmopolitan professionals. Hence, RRPs are highly skeptical of

organizations or individuals perceived to be associated with these groups. RRPs advocate the

ceding of power from these elite groups to the people through a variety of mechanisms, such as

majority rule, direct democracy, constitutional reform, the weakening of the courts and the rule

of law, and the ending of corporate subsidies (Betz 1998; Givens 2005; Hainsworth 2000; Lacey

2019; Mudde 2004; Mupdde 2010; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; O’Malley 2008; Rooduijn 2015;

Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2018).

3. Literature Review

The existing literature concerned with the electoral success of RRPs is vast. The

following review of this literature discusses five sets of explanations: country-level socio-

economic, country-level socio-political, intra-party, individual-level demographic, and

individual-level attitudinal hypotheses. Table 1 summarizes a review of 79 of some of the most

cited and recent journal articles and books in the literature on RRP success. While not

comprehensive, this table provides a broad overview of the key variables that are usually

investigated in studies of RRP success.

Table 1: Review of scholarly findings on RRP success

Hypothesis Supportive findings Unsupportive findings

Country-level socio-economic hypotheses

7

Higher unemployment

levels increase RRP

support

Arzheimer (2009), Funke et al. (2016),

Georgiadou et al. (2018), Jackman and

Volpert (1996), Lubbers and Scheepers

(2000), Rooduijn (2015)

Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Amengay and

Stockemer (2019), Arzheimer and Carter

(2006), Coffe et al. (2007), Givens (2005),

Golder (2016), Kestila and Soderlund (2007),

Knigge (1998), Lubbers and Coenders (2017),

Lubbers et al. (2002), Rydgren (2007),

Stockemer (2017a), Stockemer (2017b)

Higher levels of

immigration and

asylum seekers

increase RRP support

Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer (2018), Davis

and Deole (2017), Dinas et al. (2019),

Georgiadou et al. (2018), Kestila and

Soderlund (2007), Knigge (1998), Lubbers et

al. (2002), Lubbers and Scheepers (2000),

Rooduijn (2015), Rydgren (2007)

Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Amengay and

Stockemer (2019), Coffe et al. (2007), De Vos

and Deurloo (1999), Givens (2005), Goerres et

al. (2018), Kitschelt and McGann (1995),

Stockemer (2017b)

Higher levels of crime

increase RRP support

Amengay and Stockemer (2019) Coffe et al. (2007)

Country-level socio-political hypotheses

The presence of an

electoral niche

increases RRP support

Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015), Arzheimer

and Carter (2006), Backes and Mudde

(2000), Bustikova (2014), Carter (2005),

Kestila and Soderlund (2007), Kitschelt

(2007), Kitschelt and McGann (1995),

Loxbo (2014), Rooduijn (2015), Ryan

(2016), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007),

Startin (2014)

Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Amengay and

Stockemer (2019), Arzheimer and Carter

(2006), Down and Han (2019), Ignazi (1992),

Lubbers et al. (2002), O’Malley (2008), Muis

and Immerzeel (2017)

Higher turnout

increases RRP support

Amengay and Stockemer (2019), Kestila and

Soderlund (2007)

Electoral volatility

increases RRP support

Betz (1994), Rydgren (2002), Van Der Meer

et al. (2012)

Permissive electoral

systems increase RRP

support

Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015), Amengay

and Stockemer (2019), Arzheimer (2018),

Backes and Mudde (2000), Gordon et al.

(2019), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Kestila

and Soderlund (2007), Kriesi et al. (2006)

Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Arzheimer and

Carter (2006), Arzheimer (2009), Givens

(2005), Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Muis and

Immerzeel (2017), Rydgren (2007)

National traditions

favourable to RRPs

increase RRP support

Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Art (2008),

Backes and Mudde (2000), Startin (2014)

Muis and Immerzeel (2017)

8

Media coverage of

RRPs and their issues

increase RRP support

Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer (2018),

Backes and Mudde (2000), Berning et al.

(2019), Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart

(2007), Muis and Immerzeel (2017), Murphy

and Devine (2018), Kriesi et al. (2006),

Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007), Rydgren

(2018), Spies (2013), Startin (2014)

Intra-party hypotheses

More moderate RRP

platform increases

RRP support

Arzheimer (2018), Carter (2005), Golder

(2016), Lubbers et al. (2002), Muis and

Immerzeel (2017), Rooduijn (2015),

Rydgren (2002)

Mudde (2002)

Better organization

and leadership

increase RRP support

Art (2008), Carter (2005), Cutts et al. (2017),

Ellinas (2014), Koning (n.d.), Loxbo and

Bolin (2016), Lubbers et al. (2002), Mudde

(2010), Muis and Immerzeel (2017),

Rooduijn (2015), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren

(2007), Startin (2014)

Arzheimer (2018)

Previous success

increases RRP support

Amengay and Stockemer (2019), Koning

(n.d.)

Individual-level demographic hypotheses

Economically insecure

individuals are more

likely to support RRPs

Arzheimer (2009), Cochrane and Nevitte

(2007); Ellinas (2014), Georgiadou et al.

(2018), Han (2016), Hooghe and Marks

(2018), Im et al. (2019), Kates and Tucker

(2019), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers et al.

(2002), Minkenberg (2000), Rooduijn (2015)

Amengay and Stockemer (2019), Goerres et al.

(2018), Ivarsflaten (2008), Jackman and Volpert

(1996), Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Nevitte

et al. (1998), Rydgren (2007), Stockemer et al.

(2018), Turnbull-Dugarte (2019)

Male individuals are

more likely to support

RRPs

Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Berning

(2019), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Givens

(2005), Goerres et al. (2018), Kitschelt and

McGann (1995), Lubbers and Coenders

(2017), Lubbers et al. (2002), Nevitte et al.

(1998), Rydgren (2007), Stockemer et al.

(2018)

Oesch (2008)

Young individuals are

more likely to support

RRPs

Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Berning

(2019), Arzheimer and Carter (2006),

Lubbers and Coenders (2017), Lubbers et al.

(2002), Muis and Immerzeel (2017)

Givens (2005), Goerres et al. (2018), Jackman

and Volpert (1996), Lubbers and Scheepers

(2000), Oesch (2008), Stockemer et al. (2018)

9

Manual labourers are

more likely to support

RRPs

Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Carter

(2006), Betz (1994), Givens (2005),

Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Lubbers and

Coenders (2017), Lubbers et al. (2002),

Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Minkenberg

(2000), Rydgren (2007)

Arzheimer and Berning (2019), Ellinas (2014),

Goerres et al. (2018), Jackman and Volpert

(1996), Oesch (2008), Stockemer et al. (2018)

Less educated

individuals are more

likely to support RRPs

Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer and Berning

(2019), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Betz

(1994), Kitschelt and McGann (1995),

Lubbers et al. (2002), Lubbers and

Scheepers (2000), Nevitte et al. (1998),

Rydgren (2007)

Givens (2005), Goerres et al. (2018), Jackman

and Volpert (1996), Muis and Immerzeel

(2017), Stockemer (2017b), Stockemer et al.

(2018)

Individual-level attitudinal hypotheses

Less support for

diversity, immigrants,

and minorities

increase RRP support

Ambrose and Mudde (2015), Arzheimer

(2008), Arzheimer (2009), Arzheimer

(2018), Arzheimer and Berning (2019),

Bélanger and Aarts (2006), Betz (1994),

Daigle et al. (2019), Davis et al. (2019),

Gidron and Hall (2019), Goerres et al.

(2018), Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2019),

Ignazi (1992), Ivarsflaten (2005), Ivarsflaten

(2008), Lubbers and Coenders (2017),

Lubbers et al. (2002), Minkenberg (2000),

Muis and Immerzeel (2017), Nevitte et al.

(1998), Rooduijn (2015), Rovny and Polk

(2019), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007),

Rydgren (2008), Van Der Brug et al. (2005),

Zhirkov (2014)

Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Oesch (2018),

Stockemer et al. (2018), Turnbull-Dugarte

(2019)

Less trust/satisfaction

towards democracy,

mainstream parties,

politicians,

international

organizations, and

society increase RRP

support

Arzheimer (2009), Bélanger and Aarts

(2006), Berning and Ziller (2017), Betz

(1994), Ellinas (2014), Gidengil (2001),

Gidron and Hall (2019), Goerres et al.

(2018), Ignazi (1992), Ivarsflaten (2005),

Knigge (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006), Lubbers

and Coenders (2017), Lubbers et al. (2002),

Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Minkenberg

(2000), Nevitte et al. (1998), Rooduijn

(2015), Rydgren (2002), Rydgren (2007),

Zhirkov (2014)

Arzheimer (2008), Ivarsflaten (2008), Muis and

Immerzeel (2017), Oesch (2018), Stockemer et

al. (2018), Turnbull-Dugarte (2019)

Social isolation

increases RRP support

Coffe et al. (2007) Arzheimer (2018), Lubbers and Scheepers

(2000), Muis and Immerzeel (2017), Rydgren

(2007), Zhirkov (2014)

10

Individuals who

support more

authoritarian views

are more likely to

support RRPs

Ignazi (1992), Lubbers and Coenders (2017),

Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Muis and

Immerzeel (2017), Nevitte et al. (1998),

Rooduijn (2015)

Kitschelt and McGann (1995)

Individuals who

support right-wing

economic preferences

are more likely to

support RRPs

Goerres et al. (2018), Zhirkov (2014) Arzheimer (2008), Arzheimer and Berning

(2019), Ivarsflaten (2008), Kitschelt and

McGann (1995), Kriesi et al. (2006),

Minkenberg (2000), Nevitte et al. (1998),

Rovny (2013), Rovny and Polk (2019)

3.1 Country-level Socio-economic Hypotheses

First, many researchers have investigated the effect that large-scale, country-wide, socio-

economic variables have on RRP support. Using the so-called ethnic competition and

modernization losers/relative deprivation theses, some theorists argue that unemployment

increases RRP support. As unemployment increases, it heightens competition between

immigrants and natives over scarce resources. During times of economic recessions, immigrants

will be seen as competition by those looking for work in an environment with increasingly sparse

job prospects and public resources (Goerres et al. 2018: 253). Driven by frustration and

insecurity, the unemployed will vote for RRPs in the hopes of undoing economic transformations

that increased both structural unemployment and cross-border mobility (Lubbers and Scheepers

2000: 65-66). Long-lasting economic crises and high unemployment may also delegitimize and

destabilize the existing party system, providing opportunities for RRP growth. However, while a

few studies lend support for this claim (Arzheimer 2009; Funke et al. 2016; Georgiadou et al.

2018; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Rooduijn 2015), the majority of

studies find either no relationship or a negative one (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Amengay and

Stockemer 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Coffe et al. 2007; Givens 2005; Golder 2016;

Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Knigge 1998; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al. 2002;

11

Rydgren 2007; Stockemer 2017a; Stockemer 2017b). One possible reason for this is that voters

may return to more experienced and established parties during times of economic hardship

(Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 434-435). Golder (2016) also rejects this hypothesis because

economic crises increase the salience of socio-economic issues that weakens RRPs and divides

their voting base (488). Finally, Stockemer (2017a) finds that economic crises must be

accompanied by political ones if they are to benefit RRPs. In the same vein, Lubbers and

Scheepers (2000) find rising unemployment, in combination with increased immigration,

increases RRP support but that the rate of unemployment alone has a negative effect (82-83).

Another widely studied variable is the level of immigration and the intake of asylum

seekers. The ethnic competition thesis states that competition for resources will be greatest in

areas with high numbers of immigrants. Increasing heterogeneity through high rates of

immigration will heighten xenophobic fears and result in increased feelings of ethno-national

identity in the native population. In contrast, the contact theory argues that higher rates of

immigration will lead to greater levels of contact between natives and foreign-born individuals,

and that this contact will develop understanding and goodwill between the two and subsequently

decrease xenophobia. The literature is decidedly mixed. Several studies support the ethnic

competition thesis (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer 2018; Davis and Deole 2017; Dinas et al. 2019;

Georgiadou et al. 2018; Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers

and Scheepers 2000; Rooduijn 2015; Rydgren 2007) while several others support the contact

theory (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Givens 2015; Goerres et al.

2018; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Stockemer 2017b).

A closer look at measurements helps explain these mixed results. While some theorists

use the proportion of newcomers in their analysis of RRP success (for example Lubbers et al.

12

2002), others have looked at the rate of immigration (for example Georgiadou et al. 2018). The

majority of studies that support the ethnic competition thesis use the immigration rate to

operationalize this variable. Indeed, existing literature seems to suggest that a sudden increase in

migration accompanied by extensive media coverage can bolster the support of xenophobia and

RRPs considerably (Georgiadou et al. 2018; Hopkins 2010; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000;

Rydgren 2018).

Another aspect of measurement that helps us understand these mixed findings is the

origin of immigrants. Indeed, immigrants that are distinct from the majority population on

religious and ethnic grounds receive more criticism from RRP supporters (Georres et al. 2018:

251; Rydgren 2008: 745-746). Researchers that distinguish between non-Western and Western

migrants supported the ethnic competition thesis (Coffe et al. 2007; De Vos and Deurloo 1999;

Dinas et al. 2019; Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Lubbers et al. 2002). For example, both De Vos

and Deurloo (1999) and Coffe et al. (2007) found that increases in immigration from Maghreb

countries or Turkey increased RRP support while immigration from other countries had no

effect.

A final hypothesis is that crime increases RRP support. Crime and social deviance,

especially when perpetrated by immigrants, are blamed by RRPs on the weakness of mainstream

parties and the evils of open borders. Therefore, it is argued that crime increases the demand for

RRPs - a claim which finds supportive (Amengay and Stockemer 2019) and unsupportive (Coffe

et al. 2007) results in the literature. Overall, a review of the literature finds either unsupportive

(unemployment levels) or mixed (immigration and asylum seekers and crime) results regarding

country-level, socio-economic hypotheses of RRP support.

13

3.2 Country-level Socio-political Hypotheses

A second set of hypotheses many researchers have investigated are country-level, socio-

political hypotheses that concern the political opportunity structure. First, many have argued that

RRPs do better in the presence of an electoral niche within the party system. An opening to

RRPs can develop when parties opposite to RRPs on the ideological spectrum, ethno-liberal

parties, receive concessions by governing coalitions. When members of these parties are elected

and subsequently advance minority interests, RRPs have an opportunity to position themselves

as alternatives to this “politically correct,” pluralistic “elite.” Similarly, RRPs can take advantage

of electoral space when a grand governing coalition of establishment parties forms, especially

one whose prime objective is to keep an insurgent RRP out of power. Voters will then more

likely see the RRP as the only true alternative to the “corrupt,” “arrogant” elite. A third opening

of an electoral niche occurs when mainstream parties converge ideologically to the centre of the

political spectrum, especially when these parties converge on issues salient to RRP voters. When

mainstream parties agree on issues such as immigration or multiculturalism, RRPs should be able

to more easily mobilize those voters who disagree with those positions. Issue convergence also

legitimizes and reinforces populist sentiments from RRPs as established parties become one and

the same in the minds of voters and RRPs become the only “true” alternative.

Virtually all existing studies, including Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Bustikova (2014),

Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Muis and Immerzeel (2017), and Rydgren (2007), find support for

the explanations regarding the presence of an ethno-liberal party or grand governing coalition.

Regarding ideological convergence, however, the results are mixed, with some supporting this

hypothesis (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015; Backes and Mudde 2000; Carter 2005; Kestila and

Soderlund 2007; Kitschelt 2007; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Loxbo 2014; O’Malley 2008;

14

Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn 2015; Ryan 2016; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Startin

2014), a similar number contradicting it (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Amengay and Stockemer

2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Down and Han 2019; Ignazi 1992; Lubbers et al. 2002), and a

few finding mixed results (O’Malley 2008; Muis and Immerzeel 2017).

One reason for this inconsistent result is that convergence of different issues has different

effects. RRPs may benefit primarily from convergence in the socio-cultural dimension, socio-

economic issues having limited effect. This is because RRPs give priority to socio-cultural issues

and primarily mobilize their supporters through those issues (Mudde 2010; Rovny 2013; Rovny

and Polk 2019; Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2018). A competing explanation is that socio-economic

convergence makes issues within its dimension less salient to voters. The effect of this is to

encourage voting based instead on socio-cultural or intra-party considerations (Coffe et al. 2007:

153; Golder 2016: 486-487; Kitschelt 2007: 1185) that benefit RRPs (Coffe et al. 2007; Rovney

2013; Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2018). Conversely, a lack of consensus within the mainstream

may benefit RRPs. The reasoning here is that RRPs can easily depict a divided mainstream as

weak and fractured and present themselves as a strong and decisive alternative (Arzheimer and

Carter 2006). However, the shifting of issue space may only benefit RRPs when mainstream

parties converge to oppose their policy positions (Muis and Immerzeel 2017). Conversely,

attempts to debilitate RRPs by accommodating their stances might backfire by legitimizing their

positions, hence making them appear more electable (Down and Han 2019: 2; Eatwell 2000:

423; Golder 2016: 487; Jackman and Volpert 1996: 503-504).

A second variable in this category is electoral turnout. Some theorists argue that RRPs

get much of their support from protest voters and those dissatisfied with the system, groups

prone towards voter apathy (Kestila and Soderlund 2007: 561). As a result, higher turnout should

15

benefit RRPs more than other parties. Though rarely tested, there is little support for this

hypothesis (Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Kestila and Soderlund 2007).

Third, some theorists expect RRPs to do better under conditions of high electoral

volatility. RRPs are generally new parties or those that present themselves as fresh alternatives to

the established parties. Logically, the less loyal voters are to particular parties, the more likely

RRPs will succeed. Several studies find support for this argument (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2002;

Van Der Meer et al. 2012).

Fourth, many political scientists have examined how the mechanisms of the electoral

system influence RRP support. Many have argued that the electoral system matters, in particular,

because RRPs do better in more proportional systems. High thresholds may discourage potential

voters of RRPs because small, more fringe parties are unlikely to overcome such a barrier.

Likewise, the larger the district magnitude is, the easier it should be for RRPs to gain seats. Both

of these characteristics of the electoral system affect RRP’s chances because they both determine

how votes are translated into seats and, additionally, induce a psychological effect in the minds

of voters by determining whether a vote is “wasted” or not. Many studies support the proposition

that more permissive electoral systems help RRPs by more effectively converting their votes into

seats (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Givens 2005; Gordon et al. 2019; Muis and Immerzeel 2017;

Rydgren 2007). However, the majority of studies also do not find that those systems increase

RRP vote totals (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer 2018; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Givens 2005;

Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Rydgren 2007). Other studies do find

an effect (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015; Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Backes and Mudde

2000; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Kestila and Soderlund 2007; Kriesi et al. 2006). An

explanation for this is that RRP voters simply do not care or do not know about the consequences

16

of their country’s electoral system and, therefore, do not suffer the anticipated negative

psychological effect (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Another explanation is that many RRPs are

already well established, so their supporters no longer fear wasting votes on them (Golder 2016:

486).

A fifth explanation considers the unique history and political culture of the country in

question. According to the National Tradition thesis, the RRPs that can portray themselves in a

narrative consistent with national traditions while disavowing fascism or Nazism are far more

likely to succeed than those that run counter to the history and political culture of the country

(Startin 2014: 284). Similarly, RRPs in countries with a legacy of an active far-right subculture,

that can integrate that subculture’s movements and organizations into their own, benefit from

increased organizational strength (Art 2008). Some also argue that countries with a history of

successful multicultural policies, immigration policies, and robust hate speech laws will both

reduce the demand for RRPs and, in the case of hate speech laws, stifle their messaging. Some

theorists show support for the argument that history and political culture matter regarding the

success of RRPs (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Art 2008; Backes and Mudde 2000; Startin 2014),

while Muis and Immerzeel (2017) find mixed results. Ambrose and Mudde (2015), through a

qualitative analysis of the history of the far-right, immigration policies, and state repression in

Canada, conclude that Canada’s national traditions have something to do with the lack of a

successful RRP there. Startin (2014) compares the differing experiences of the British National

Party in the United Kingdom and the National Front (now known as the National Rally) in

France. He finds that the latter’s success is partly the result of tapping into national traditions

such as Gaullism, republicanism, and secularism. The former’s failure, in contrast, is partly

caused by its conflict with Britain’s national traditions of tolerance, deference to authority, and

17

anti-fascism. Muis and Immerzeel (2017) find inconclusive results, but find that oppressive

strategies can bolster RRP support by increasing their populist credentials and making them

appear as martyrs to their cause.

A final explanation concerns the particular media context. The mass media play an

essential role, acting as gatekeepers and taking part in agenda-setting, framing, and priming of

political issues. The media can make issues important to RRPs, such as immigration, more

salient to the voting public by increasing its coverage. Analogously, diminished focus on socio-

economic issues should deplete salience of issues unfavourable to RRPs (Rovny 2013; Rydgren

2002; Rydgren 2018). Moreover, by covering RRPs and their leaders, the media legitimizes them

and also makes them more visible to the electorate. This is especially true now, given that

sensational controversies, especially ones with a personal dimension to them, are becoming

increasingly defined as newsworthy (Golder 2016; Muis and Immerzeel 2017). This trend

uniquely bolsters RRP media coverage because those parties are both seen as more controversial

by journalists and also usually grant their leaders a conspicuous central role (Golder 2016: 488;

Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 914; Rydgren 2018). All research examined here indicates that a

media which covers RRPs, both by making certain issues more salient and by increasing the

legitimacy and visibility of RRPs, helps RRPs succeed (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer 2018;

Backes and Mudde 2000; Berning 2019; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Muis and

Immerzeel 2017; Murphy and Devine 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007;

Rydgren 2018; Spies 2013; Startin 2014). Altogether, a review of the literature shows either

unsupportive (turnout and electoral permissiveness), mixed (electoral niches), scarcely studied

(national traditions and electoral volatility), or supportive results (media) of country-level socio-

political explanations.

18

3.3 Intra-party Hypotheses

The third category of variables addresses internal party characteristics. First, many

hypothesize that those RRPs with a more moderate ideology are more acceptable to a larger

proportion of the electorate, which is largely hostile to neo-fascism. Put another way, the

platform of RRPs requires some degree of respectability if it is to be accepted by a large segment

of the population. For example, Carter (2005) found that RRPs that were either only culturally

racist or not racist at all and that demanded reform within the existing system rather than the

wholesale destruction of it performed stronger electorally than other RRPs. Most of the

examined studies indicated support for this theory (Arzheimer 2018; Carter 2005; Golder 2016;

Lubbers et al. 2002; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn 2015).5

The second explanation in this category involves leadership and organization. In terms of

leadership, a capable and attractive leader is especially vital for RRPs for at least two reasons.

First, RRPs tend towards infighting and factionalism (Art 2008: 424; Arzheimer and Berning

2019: 8). A strong leader, able to unite various groups and maintain harmony is an invaluable

asset to this party family. Second, many RRPs are so heavily leader-centric that they cease to

exist or rapidly decline following the resignation or death of their leader (Carter 2005: 65; Van

Holsteyn 2018). As with all parties, successful RRPs also require a vanguard of loyal supporters

and activists who make up the grassroots. These party members provide manpower and financial

resources. Another section of the party organization is the quality of the candidates themselves.

Those candidates that demonstrate competence, status, and education are not only more

successful but also provide stability (Loxbo and Bolin 2016: 174). A robust and centralized party

5 Some older studies contest this conventional wisdom, but they tend to be based on very small

samples - see, for example, Cas Mudde’s 2002 comparison of five RRPs in Germany, Belgium,

and the Netherlands.

19

membership, in addition to a high degree of party discipline and a talented candidate pool, both

legitimizes the RRP in the eyes of the electorate and also streamlines messaging and strategy.

The literature seems to largely support the idea that leadership and organization are essential to

RRP success (Art 2008; Carter 2005; Cutts et al. 2017; Ellinas 2014; Koning n.d.; Loxbo and

Bolin 2016; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2010; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn 2015;

Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Startin 2014). At the same time, it is worth paying attention to Kai

Arzheimer’s (2018) warning that many of these studies suffer from problems of endogeneity

because activists tend to join those parties that already have a reasonable prospect of success in

the first place (152).

A final variable within this category is an RRP's electoral record. Participation in

numerous elections by RRPs likely improves party organization, leads to more favourable terrain

for them by increasing the attention paid to anti-immigrant issues, and nurtures credibility of

their ideas in the minds of the electorate (Koning n.d.: 12). When a supposedly fringe party does

well at the polls, its ideas become more acceptable and its place in the political system as an

established force becomes cemented. Although rarely studied, a few scholars find support for

this hypothesis (Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Koning n.d.). In conclusion, a review of the

literature shows either supportive (ideology, leadership, and organization) or scarcely-studied

(previous success) intra-party explanations.

3.4 Individual-level Demographic Hypotheses

Another facet for explanations regarding RRP success is the individual-level

demographic characteristics of voters. Some scholars propose that economically insecure

individuals who are the losers of globalization and those in desperate financial positions will see

immigrants, trade agreements, and internationalism as a threat to their financial well-being. As a

20

result, these individuals are more favourable to the anti-immigrant and anti-globalist rhetoric of

RRPs (Rydgren 2007; Stockemer et al. 2018: 575). A number of studies found that individuals

who experienced financial insecurity had a higher likelihood of supporting RRPs (Arzheimer

2009; Cochrane and Nevitte 2007; Ellinas 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2018; Han 2016; Hooghe and

Marks 2018; Im et al. 2019; Kates and Tucker 2019; Lubbers et al. 2002; Minkenberg 2000;

Rooduijn 2015; Kriesi et al. 2006) but others did not (Amengay and Stockemer 2019; Goerres et

al. 2018; Ivarsflaten 2008; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Nevitte et al. 1998; Stockemer et al. 2018;

Turnbull-Dugarte 2019), while Rydgren (2007) and Lubbers and Scheepers (2000) found mixed

results.

Being male was found to increase the likelihood of supporting RRPs by many studies

(Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Givens 2005;

Goerres et al. 2018; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al.

2002; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rydgren 2007; Stockemer et al. 2018) with only one finding no effect

(Oesch 2008). The reasons why this pattern exists include that many RRPs hold anti-feminist

positions and are dominated by men who are generally more right-wing and more frustrated than

women (Stockemer et al. 2018: 578).

Regarding age, several studies found being young increased the likelihood of supporting

RRPs (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Lubbers and

Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al. 2002; Muis and Immerzeel 2017) while six studies found no effect

(Givens 2005; Goerres et al. 2018; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000;

Oesch 2008; Stockemer et al. 2018). A positive correlation between youth and RRP support is

likely the result of the declining prospects of owning a home and having a stable, well-paying

job. Young people are also more politically fluid than older people (Stockemer et al. 2018: 576).

21

Some studies found that age and RRP support were U-shaped in that both younger and older

individuals were more likely to support RRPs (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). This may be

because both younger and older individuals are less likely to have social ties or to participate

politically and more likely to rely on social assistance (Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 421).

Being a manual labourer or being part of the working class was also found to increase the

likelihood of supporting RRPs by a similar number of studies (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and

Carter 2006; Betz 1994; Givens 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers and Coenders 2017;

Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Minkenberg 2000; Rydgren 2007). Six studies

found no effect on RRPs by this characteristic (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Ellinas 2014;

Goerres et al. 2018; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Oesch 2008; Stockemer et al. 2018). Members

of the working class or those in low-wage occupations such as manual labourers are more likely

to be negatively affected by the forces of globalization. These forces cause the outsourcing of

jobs, automation, and demand for high-skill professions. Blue-collar workers will see immigrants

as a threat in this hostile and increasingly restrictive environment. Additionally, those in the

working class are more likely to rely upon government welfare and may want to protect those

programs and services from other ethnic groups (Stockemer et al. 2018: 575; Goerres et al. 2018:

250).

Finally, many studies found that being less educated increased the likelihood of

supporting RRPs (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Arzheimer and Carter 2006;

Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000;

Nevitte et al. 1998; Rydgren 2007) while others did not (Givens 2005; Goerres et al. 2018;

Jackman and Volpert 1996; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Stockemer 2017b; Stockemer et al.

2018). Individuals with less education are more likely to be economically vulnerable. They,

22

along with ethnic minorities and immigrants make up a large portion of the lower socio-

economic strata. As a result, they see those groups as more of a threat while higher educated

individuals do not (Hello et al. 2006). Furthermore, they are generally less tolerant of other

cultures and are more likely to hold prejudicial views towards outsiders (Stockemer et al. 2018:

577). Finally, less educated individuals tend to be more authoritarian, making them more

amenable to RRP views (Hello et al. 2006). On the whole, individual-level demographic

explanations show that males, youth, manual labourers and members of the working class, and

those with low education levels are most likely to be attracted to RRPs while economic

insecurity received mixed support in the literature.

3.5 Individual-level Attitudinal Hypotheses

The final class of explanations examined are individual-level attitudinal hypotheses, that

draw attention to the positions and opinions that influence voters’ decisions to support RRPs. It

is important to note that many scholars doubt whether individual-level, demand-side variables

help explain RRP success in the aggregate. In much of Europe, the demand is already

widespread. What really determines successes and failures, according to these scholars, is the

ability of these parties to supply this omnipresent demand to the electorate (Carter 2005; Givens

2005; Mudde 2010). Nonetheless, it is likely these variables increase the appetite for RRPs and

at least play some role in explaining their success.

The first of these are attitudes towards diversity, immigrants, and minorities. Some

scholars believe individuals hold negative views towards immigration because of the crisis of

identity that has encapsulated the postmodern nation-state. Globalization, international

organizations, multiculturalism, and mass migration have threatened the integrity of the nation-

state with which individuals identify (Lubbers and Coenders 2017: 100). In response to this loss

23

of national identity, people turn to nationalism, popular xenophobia, racism, and ethno-pluralism

(Rydgren 2007: 251). A vast majority of research supports this reasoning (Ambrose and Mudde

2015; Arzheimer 2008; Arzheimer 2018; Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Bélanger and Aarts

2006; Betz 1994; Daigle et al. 2019; Davis et al. 2019; Gidron and Hall 2019; Goerres et al.

2018; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019; Ignazi 1992; Ivarsflaten 2005; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lubbers

and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et al. 2002; Minkenberg 2000; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Nevitte

et al. 1998; Rooduijn 2015; Rovny and Polk 2019; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Rydgren 2008;

Van Der Brug et al. 2005; Zhirkov 2014). A few studies find no link (Kitschelt and McGann

1995; Oesch 2018; Turnbull-Dugarte 2019), while Stockemer et al. (2018) finds mixed results.

One potential caveat is that nationalistic attitudes do not always correlate with out-group hostility

(Lubbers and Coenders 2017: 101). This is especially significant in Canada (see Section 6

below), a country whose nationalism usually takes the form of a civic as opposed to an ethnic

kind (Breton 1988; Johnston et al. 2010; Igartua 1992).

Another commonly tested variable in this subcategory is whether those holding less trust

and satisfaction towards democracy, mainstream parties, politicians, international organizations,

and societies are more likely to support RRPs. This strand argues that political discontent has

created a voter base open to anti-establishment and anti-system messages (Rydgren 2007: 251).

Those dissatisfied with and distrustful of the political system, and the society it operates in

should be more attracted to the populist message espoused by RRPs. A substantial number of

studies support this explanation (Arzheimer 2009; Bélanger and Aarts 2006; Berning and Ziller

2017; Betz 1994; Ellinas 2014; Gidengil 2001; Gidron and Hall 2019; Goerres et al. 2018; Ignazi

1992; Ivarsflaten 2005; Knigge 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers et

al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Minkenberg 2000; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rooduijn 2105;

24

Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2007; Zhirkov 2014). There are also a few studies that do not find a link

between distrust/dissatisfaction and RRP support (Arzheimer 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008; Muis and

Immerzeel 2017; Oesch 2018; Stockemer et al. 2018; Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). This

contradiction in the literature is the result of at least three factors. One is the complex

relationship between belief and action (Rydgren 2007: 251-252). Voting preferences are not

often consistent or clearcut. This is demonstrated in qualitative research that shows that

dissatisfied or disconnected individuals must also realize there is an RRP that they can trust and

vote for. Dissatisfaction or distrust may be an important aspect of RRP support, but it is not

sufficient alone to explain voting behaviour (Stockemer et al. 2018: 583-584). Second, Zhirkov

(2014: 294) argues that RRP voters are satisfied with their country’s current political and

economic institutions but are distrustful of the politicians and parties that are supposed to protect

them. Third, some individuals are dissatisfied with the political system because of the success of

RRPs themselves (Rooduijn et al. 2016).

A third possibility for RRP electoral breakthroughs is the level of social isolation within

the populace. According to the Social Disintegration Thesis, the decline of groups leads to a loss

of belonging. Those experiencing this loss are attracted to the nativist rhetoric of RRPs because it

provides them with a new group, the nation, to identify with (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000: 67-

68; Zhirkov 2014: 288). Therefore, those individuals experiencing social alienation are more

likely to favour RRPs. However, the majority of studies find no support (Arzheimer 2018;

Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rydgren 2007; Zhirkov 2014). Coffe et

al. 2007 is the only one who finds supportive results.

The fourth explanation for RRP support is authoritarianism. As with nativism, if

authoritarianism is an important element of an RRP’s ideology, then individuals who hold

25

similarly authoritarian views are more likely to vote for RRPs because RRPs are more in line

with their ideological convictions. While Kitschelt and McGann (1995) find conflicting results,

most studies support this hypothesis (Ignazi 1992; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lubbers and

Scheepers 2000; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rooduijn 2015).

The last hypothesis that has attracted much scholarly attention involves support for right-

wing economic policies. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argued that the “winning formula” for

RRPs was a neo-liberal approach to economics. However, the vast majority of studies show that

individuals who hold neo-liberal beliefs are not more likely to support RRPs (Arzheimer 2008;

Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Ivarsflaten 2008; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006;

Minkenberg 2000; Nevitte et al. 1998; Rovny 2013; Rovny and Polk 2019), with only two

studies (Goerres et al. 2018; Zhirkov 2014) supporting the claim. In fact, more recent studies

show that successful RRPs are now increasingly taking centrist or leftist socio-economic

positions (Golder 2016; De Lange 2007; Rooduijn 2015; Rovny and Polk 2019). On the whole,

the literature reveals either supportive (support for immigrants, distrust/dissatisfaction in society

and politics, and authoritarian views) or unsupported (social isolation and support for right-wing

economics) explanations for individual-level attitudinal hypotheses.

4. Hypotheses

From this literature review, the various findings will be condensed into four sets of

hypotheses. These hypotheses, if met, demonstrate not only that Bernier’s PPC is an RRP but

also that his party had a reasonable chance to do well in 2019. The first set of hypotheses cover

whether the PPC is an RRP with the core ideological convictions of radicalism, nativism,

authoritarianism, and populism. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

26

Hypothesis 1a: the People’s Party of Canada is radical.

Hypothesis 1b: the People’s Party of Canada is nativist.

Hypothesis 1c: the People’s Party of Canada is authoritarian.

Hypothesis 1d: the People’s Party of Canada is populist.

This analysis will enable me to establish whether the PPC classifies as an RRP, and more

generally, how extreme its platform is. I will then test several hypotheses that will attempt to

gauge whether conditions in Canada are favourable to RRPs electorally. The literature review

conducted above generates several empirically testable implications. The first of these is:

Hypothesis 2: the rate of immigration to Canada has increased.

The literature on this subject suggests that sudden increases in the rate of immigration, combined

with intense media coverage of immigration, bolster support for RRPs. This brings me to the

third testable hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3a: the People’s Party of Canada and its leader are prominently covered by

the media.

Hypothesis 3b: immigration is prominently covered by the media.

The literature review shows that prominent coverage of RRPs and the issues they care about

increase the salience of RRP issues and contributes to RRP success at the polls. A final set of

hypotheses involves the attitudes of Canadian voters:

Hypothesis 4a: an increasing number of Canadians oppose diversity, immigrants, and

minorities.

Hypothesis 4b: an increasing number of Canadians are distrustful/dissatisfied with

democracy, mainstream parties, politicians, international organizations, and society.

Hypothesis 4c: an increasing number of Canadians hold authoritarian views.

27

The literature review shows that individuals who hold nativist, populist, and authoritarian views

are more likely to support RRPs.

Many of the explanations put forward in the literature review will not be investigated.

There are several reasons for this. First, many of the hypotheses show no or little support in the

existing literature. Explanations concerning unemployment levels, ideological convergence,

turnout, electoral systems, social isolation, and support for right-wing economic preferences

were not supported by most research included in Table 1. Other hypotheses are too preliminary

and/or rarely tested for there to be any definitive judgement regarding their effect on RRPs.

Explanations concerning crime rates, turnout, electoral volatility, national traditions, previous

success, and social isolation are either novel, sparingly tested, or both. Third, some variables are

tested at the individual level and will, therefore, not help to determine how well the PPC did in

the 2019 federal election. Therefore, no individual-level demographic hypotheses will be

included in this study.

Finally, many explanations for RRP success will not be tested systematically in spite of

their importance to RRP success. These explanations will only be discussed superficially for two

reasons. First, the research question involves determining whether changes over time in Canada

have allowed the PPC to have a chance to succeed in 2019. Therefore, variables that have

remained stable in Canada over time and/or are unlikely to change will not be particularly

helpful to this study. For this reason, I will not test the explanations concerning grand governing

coalitions, ethno-liberal parties, permissive electoral systems, national traditions, intra-party

leadership, or any of the individual-level demographic hypotheses. Second, the PPC is a new

party that only came into existence in September of 2018. Because of this, the PPC only

nominated 314 out of 338 candidates and the majority of them do not have a Twitter page,

28

Facebook page, or website (PPC: Our Candidates 2019). Those that do often do not clearly state

their educational backgrounds nor have they proven their competence or charisma. It is outside

the scope of this paper to investigate such an exploratory variable.

5. Methodology

To test these four hypotheses, I used a variety of methods and sources. To investigate H1,

I performed a qualitative reading of the party platform and major speeches and statements of the

PPC on its website.6 This textual reading determined whether the PPC is radical, nativist,

authoritarian, and populist and can, therefore, be appropriately labelled an RRP. It is radical if it

vigorously attacks democracy or the way it currently operates and advocates fundamental change

to the existing system. It is nativist if it disparages immigrants, non-native elements, minority

rights, and international organizations and if its policies allocate more rights to native-born

citizens. It is authoritarian if it promotes tough-on-crime measures, traditional values, anti-

egalitarianism, respects national symbols and authority, and if it degrades the media, the

judiciary, and government institutions. Finally, it is populist if its platform admonishes a corrupt

elite and champions the will of the people. To determine how moderate the PPC is within the

RRP family, I used Carter’s (2005) typology of RRPs. She places RRPs into five different camps

based on 1) the importance they place on the issue of immigration, 2) their racial views, and 3)

their attitude towards democracy (Carter 2005: 28). Based on these three characteristics, all

RRPs can be placed into neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, authoritarian xenophobic, neo-liberal

6 This is because supporters of RRPs tend to be skeptical of the mainstream media and academics

given their populist attitudes. So, I wanted to judge the PPC’s ideology using its own words and

the words of its leader rather than relying on journal or newspaper articles that would have been

seen as illegitimate repositories of PPC ideology by RRP supporters.

29

xenophobic, and neo-liberal populist subsets (Carter 2005). I, therefore, qualitatively analyzed

the PPC’s positions on these three characteristics and attempted to place it into one of the five

RRP subsets.

To investigate H2, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of the number and

proportion of foreign-born individuals in Canada and the proportion of them that came from

Western and non-Western regions. This analysis relied on data from Statistics Canada on the

number of immigrants since 1881 (Government of Canada 2017a) and the number of immigrants

from each continent since 1971 (Government of Canada 2017b). This allowed me to measure the

percentage of foreign-born in the Canadian population, the annual rate of change in that

percentage, and the proportion of immigrants coming to Canada from non-Western regions.

To investigate H3a and H3b, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of the

media coverage involving the PPC, its leader, and immigration. For H3a, I gathered monthly

counts of Canadian newspaper articles from the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, and the

National Post containing the terms “People’s Party of Canada,” “People’s Party,” or “Maxime

Bernier” from October 2018, when polling for the PPC began, to October 2019 through the

research tool Factiva. This same news article search was done for Canada’s other major national

parties including the Liberal, Conservative, New Democratic, and Green parties. I then compared

the coverage of these parties with their average monthly support in Nanos opinion polls. To

investigate H3b, I searched for newspaper articles from the three outlets listed above containing

the terms migratio*, immigratio*, migran*, immigran*, refug*, or asylum from 1997 (the date at

which data for all three newspapers begins on Factiva) to October 2019 and compared that

number to the total article count for the three newspapers.

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To investigate H4, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of a variety of survey

data. To test H4a, I used survey data from fifteen waves of Environics Institute’s Focus Canada

survey from 1993 to 2019. The survey uses probability sampling to reach a representative sample

of Canadian adults. I analyzed three questions posed consistently throughout the waves: 1) there

is too much immigration in Canada, 2) most people claiming to be refugees are not real refugees,

and 3) too many immigrants do not adopt Canadian values.

To test H4b, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of survey data. This survey

data came from six waves of the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s AmericasBarometer

survey for Canada which covers 2006 to 2016/17. It is a periodic public opinion survey that uses

probability methods to ensure a nationally representative sample. I analyzed seven questions

asked consistently throughout the six waves: 1) how trustworthy the people living in the

community are, 2) how trustworthy the justice system is, 3) how trustworthy the political parties

are, 4) how trustworthy the Supreme Court is, 5) how trustworthy Parliament is, 6) whether

politicians are corrupt, and finally, 7) whether they are satisfied with how democracy functions

in Canada. One limitation of this analysis is that the six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey

are not the same. Some questions are worded slightly differently, while others include different

response categories. To ensure consistency, I have examined each wave to make sure the

questions are similar and to determine which responses correlate with distrust/dissatisfaction.

Lastly, question 6) was not asked in 2016/17 so only data from 2006 to 2014 will be included for

that question.

To investigate H4c, I performed a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of survey data. I

used six waves of the AmericansBarometer survey from the years 2006 to 2016/17. I analyzed

five questions or propositions posed throughout the six waves including: 1) sometimes there is

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justification for the Prime Minister to shut down Parliament, 2) sometimes there is justification

for the Prime Minister to shut down the Supreme Court, 3) democracy is better than any other

form of government, 4) how much should people support the political system of Canada, and

finally, 5) whether they trust the political institutions of Canada. As with H4b, an important

comment is that not all questions were posed in the same way or included the same responses in

each of the waves. To limit this consistency problem, I have examined each wave to ensure

uniformity in questions and matching responses with authoritarian sentiment. Additionally,

question 2) was not asked in 2016/17 so only data from 2006 to 2014 will be included for that

question.

6. The Context of the 2019 Canadian Election

Before delving into the specificities of the 2019 election, it is worth considering some of

the more stable characteristics of the Canadian political system that act as opportunities and

barriers for RRPs that will not be systematically studied. Intra-party leadership and organization

within the PPC are opportunities, while the electoral system, a lack of grand governing

coalitions, and Canada’s national traditions act as barriers to the PPC’s success.

Prior to discussing these opportunities and barriers, a short chronology of how the PPC

came about is necessary. The 2017 Conservative leadership contest saw Maxime Bernier, a

Member of Parliament (MP) from Beauce,7 Quebec, place a close second, winning 49.05% of the

points in the last round. Following disagreements with his Conservative colleagues, Bernier was

demoted from his role as critic of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada by

7 Bernier’s father, Gilles Bernier, was a longtime MP from Beauce as well, representing the

riding from 1984 to 1997, first as a Progressive Conservative and later as an independent.

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his rival and newly minted Conservative leader Andrew Scheer on June 12, 2018 (The Canadian

Press 2018a). Conflict continued on August 12 when Bernier posted six controversial tweets

concerning the state of multiculturalism and diversity in Canada. The tweets were widely

attacked, including by Bernier’s Conservative colleagues (The Canadian Press 2018b). On

August 23, Bernier held a press conference in which he announced his departure from the

Conservatives and his intention to form a new party based on the principles of freedom,

responsibility, fairness, and respect. His reasons for doing so were that the Conservative Party

was “too intellectually and morally corrupt to be reformed” and that under Scheer’s leadership,

the party had “all but abandoned its core conservative principles” (Bernier 2018a). By September

14, Bernier unveiled his new party, the People’s Party of Canada (Bernier 2018b). The PPC’s

first real test was contesting the 2019 Canadian federal election. Bernier faced embattled first-

term Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of the Liberals, his old rival Andrew Scheer of the

Conservatives, the first Sikh leader of a national party, Jagmeet Singh of the New Democrats,

longtime leader of the Greens Elizabeth May, and freshly elected leader Yves-François Blanchet

of the separatist Bloc Quebecois. None of these leaders, except May, were particularly well-liked

(Grenier 2019).

Like some of the leaders he faced in 2019, Bernier is an experienced and well-known

politician. As a result, this new party’s intra-party leadership and organization should act as

favourable forces for its success. Bernier received a Bachelor of Commerce and Law Degree, is a

member of the Quebec Bar, worked for several financial institutions, and served as Executive

Vice-President of the Montreal Economic Institute. The people of Beauce elected him in 2006,

and soon after he joined Cabinet as Minister of Industry. He also served as Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Minister of State for Small Business and Tourism (Maxime Bernier - Our Leader

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n.d.). Due to his libertarian leanings and maverick nature, Bernier has been often referred to as

“Mad Max” or the “Albertan from Quebec” (Clark and Yakabuski 2008; CTV News 2017;

Bernier 2018c). In addition to Bernier’s personal qualities, the PPC appears to be relatively well

organized. In all but one riding, the PPC has an electoral district association (Elections Canada

2019). The party claims about 40,000 members (Bernier 2019a: 6; Bernier 2019d: 2). Finally,

314 out of 338 candidates were nominated under the PPC banner for the 2019 election (PPC: Our

Candidates 2019). Overall, Bernier’s experience, distinctiveness, and name recognition, together

with a strong party membership able to establish electoral district associations and field hundreds

of candidates, should have benefited the PPC in the 2019 election.

On the other hand, three characteristics of the Canadian political system pose significant

barriers to the success of any RRP in general and Bernier’s PPC in particular. The first of these is

Canada’s electoral system. The PPC’s first contested election took place under the single-

member-plurality system, commonly referred to as first-past-the-post (FPTP). FPTP is unlikely

to benefit small or relatively new parties such as the Greens or the PPC because their votes will

be inefficiently translated into seats (Barnes et al. 2016). In a purely proportional system, without

thresholds or small district magnitudes, the PPC’s almost 300,000 votes would have translated

into two seats. Correspondingly, FPTP did pose a barrier to the PPC’s ability to gain seats in

2019.

The absence of grand governing coalitions in Canada is another barrier that negatively

affects the PPC’s success. The existence of a grand governing coalition was found in the

literature to increase RRP support. However, notwithstanding the various provincial coalitions

that have formed throughout Canadian history,8 there has only been one instance of a federal

8 Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan have all had coalition governments in

the past (Hicks 2013).

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coalition in Canada, which happened to come about due to extraordinary circumstances (Hicks

2013).9 Although coalitions have been contemplated since then,10 none of these proposals

materialized (Hicks 2013; Malcolmson et al. 2016: 46-47). Instead, the norm in Canada is for the

largest party in the legislature to form the government (Malcolmson et al. 2016: 45). The absence

of coalitions in Canada, in sum, makes it difficult for political newcomers to position themselves

as the alternative to mainstream parties.

The PPC faced another barrier by conflicting with Canadian history and political culture.

As will be demonstrated below and in Section 8.1, Canada has always relied on immigration for

population growth. Since the mid-twentieth century, Canada has increasingly emphasized

tolerance, diversity, and internationalism. The first permanent European settlers to this country,

led by Samuel de Champlain, were immigrants from France (Conrad 2012: 37). John A.

Macdonald, Canada’s first Prime Minister was born in Glasgow, Scotland (Conrad 2012: 6).

From the energetic work of Clifford Sifton under Laurier (Conrad 2012: 169-170) to Pierre

Trudeau’s advocacy of a multicultural society (Conrad 2012: 247; Trebilcock 2018: 840),

sequential governments encouraged successive waves of immigration to Canada. Since the

1960s, admissions have been colour-blind (Adams 2017: 63; Gordon et al. 2019: 3; Trebilcock

2018: 824). Moreover, as an outcome of the Seven Years’ War, francophones and anglophones

have had to live together in one bilingual and bicultural state. Canada has, therefore, long

understood the compromises required to live in a harmonious, pluralistic, and tolerant society. At

present, virtually all parties other than the PPC support immigration and multiculturalism in

9 As a result of World War I, Prime Minister Robert Bordon’s Conservatives and a collection of

pro-conscription Liberals campaigned and subsequently governed under a Unionist banner

(Conrad 2012: 198).

10 In both 1980 and 2008, the Liberals and New Democrats discussed forming a federal coalition

government (Hicks 2013).

35

Canada (Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 228; Gordon et al. 2019: 3-4; Trebilcock 2018: 824), and

they have all regularly elected immigrants and visible minorities (Adams 2017: 141). More

importantly, many scholars have shown that immigration is essential to Canadian national

identity, and that Canadian nationalism often takes a civic, pro-immigrant form rather than an

ethnic one (Breton 1988; Johnston et al. 2010; Igartua 1992). Canada’s foreign policy has tended

to favour internationalism over nationalism. As a result, Canada has played an important role on

the world stage, especially since Lester Pearson’s involvement in the Suez Crisis in 1956, as both

a peacemaker and as a conscientious middle power (Conrad 2012: 230-231).

A related point is that geographic isolation, the points system, and integration programs

for newcomers have taken some of the sting out of anti-immigrant appeal by making

immigration more selective, controlled, and orderly (Adams 2017: 40; Ambrose and Mudde

2015: 226; Trebilcock 2018: 834-835, 841). The points system has also resulted in an abundance

of highly-educated and employable immigrants in Canada who do not disproportionately rely on

welfare programs. This contrasts sharply with the experience of many European countries

(Adams 2017: 69-71; Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 226-227; Trebilcock 2018: 843).

The history of Canada’s far-right, similarly indicates a barrier for the PPC. Throughout

their history, far-right groups have been pushed to the fringes of the political discussion. They

are also normally rare, small, and ephemeral (Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 215-217). Today, only

a small number of active far-right groups exist in Canada. These include the Aryan Guard, Aryan

Nations, Blood & Honour, Combat 18, La Meute, and the Nationalist Party of Canada (Gordon

et al. 2019: 11; Parent and Ellis 2014: 7-8). Owing to a host of anti-discrimination, anti-hate

speech, and anti-hate crime laws, these groups have been widely suppressed (Ambrose and

Mudde 2015: 229-230). Because there is little historical grounding for far-right movements in

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Canada, the PPC lacks an initial base of support from which to grow. Additionally, because of

Canada’s tight restrictions on extreme views and the far-right’s trivial presence, Canadians have

not been exposed to RRP messages as prominently as Europeans have. Because of Canada’s

liberal attitude towards immigrants, the obscure history of the far-right movement, and state

repression of far-right ideas, Canada’s political ecology is not likely to be favourable to RRPs

and their success.

7. The People’s Party of Canada

The first step in this analysis is to establish whether the PPC is an RRP and, if it is one,

what subtype it belongs to. Bernier himself has noted the similarities between the PPC and the

many RRPs experiencing success in other Western countries (Bernier 2019a: 5-7; Bernier 2019c:

2; Bernier 2019d: 1). A close examination of the party’s 2019 platform supports this comparison.

7.1 Radicalism

First, the PPC advocates fundamental change to the existing system, to such an extent

that it can be labelled a radical party. Its strategy for most policies it disagrees with is outright

abolition or significant reform over gradual, piecemeal change. Bernier wants to scrap supply

management, established in 1971, which he sees as wasteful, inefficient, and unfair to

consumers, and replace it with a “free, open, and fair system” (PPC: Supply Management

2019).11 He does not see climate change, a phenomenon accepted as real and urgent by all other

major parties and the vast majority of scientists (Cook et al. 2016), as a risk and will, therefore,

abolish any subsidies, taxes, or programs that attempt to mitigate it (PPC: Global Warming and

11 The PPC’s platform consists of 16 separate policy fields, each with its own entry. The platform

has no page numbers or single document. However, for simplicity I only include one reference

for the entire platform entitled “2019 Electoral Platform.”

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Environment 2019). The PPC is highly critical of equalization payments, which it sees as

unfairly targeting wealthy provinces, seeing them as a “poverty” or “welfare trap” that

encourages dependency and underdevelopment in “have-not” provinces. The party proposes to

reform this system, entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982, to instead incentivize “pro-growth”

strategies and reduce reliance on federal monies (PPC: Equalization 2019). The PPC attacks

Canada’s cherished, decades’ old public healthcare system and Canada Health Act (Adams 2017:

7) for stifling innovation, being an undue burden on provincial budgets, and causing exorbitant

wait times. To correct this, the PPC suggests decentralization and privatization of healthcare

(Bernier 2018c; PPC: Health Care 2019). Foreign development aid, a policy in place since the

1950s, would be completely scrapped and ties to the “dysfunctional” United Nations (UN), an

organization of which Canada is an original signatory, would be cut as much as possible under a

PPC regime (PPC: Foreign Policy 2019). Canada Post, created in 1867, would be privatized and

the telecommunications and air travel sectors would be opened to foreign competition (Bernier

2018c). On indigenous policy, the PPC prefers to replace the “paternalistic” and “dependency-

inducing” Indian Act of 1876 and instead encourage self-reliance through both individual

property rights and natural resource and infrastructure projects (PPC: Aboriginal Issues 2019).

On taxation policy, the party wants to abolish the capital gains and carbon taxes, transfer the

Goods and Services Tax to the provinces, and significantly slash the corporate and personal

income tax rates (Bernier 2018c; PPC: Economy 2019; PPC: Global Warming and Environment

2019; PPC: Health Care 2019; PPC: Public Finance 2019). The PPC also wants to completely

upend gun control policy in Canada by replacing the Firearms Act and the licensing system

(PPC: Firearms 2019). Finally, the popular Multiculturalism Act of 1988 (Adams 2017: 7) would

38

be abolished, and immigration and asylum-seeking claims would be seriously curtailed (PPC:

Canadian Identity 2019; PPC: Immigration 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019).

Overall, in virtually every policy field, including those considered untouchable by other

parties because of their popularity or embeddedness within Canada, the PPC promises something

dramatically different than the status quo. Many of these changes would disregard Canada’s

current constitutional, international, and social commitments. Relative to other parties in Canada,

the PPC is certainly radical for its advocacy of sweeping and profound changes to the status quo.

Bernier admits as much when he calls the Conservatives centrists and identifies the PPC as the

only truly right-wing party (Bernier 2018c). Therefore, there is clear evidence the PPC is a

radical party.

7.2 Nativism

Second, the PPC’s views towards foreign policy, immigration, refugees, and

multiculturalism make it a nativist party. On foreign policy, Bernier is hostile to internationalism,

criticizing Trudeau for following a “corrosive globalist agenda” and Scheer for running “for the

Secretary General of the UN” (Bernier 2018c; Bernier 2019b). He describes the UN as a

dysfunctional agency where “abusers of human rights” hold the most influence and fears that it

will become a “powerful, quasi-judicial world government” that will infringe on the sovereignty

of Canada. Bernier wants to cut foreign aid, pull out of overseas conflicts, restrict Canada’s

presence in the UN, withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Global Compact

for Migration, and any other treaties, accords, or compacts that Bernier believes waste Canadian

dollars on poor African and Asian countries. Instead of “wasting” it on these international

concerns, Bernier wants to spend money on domestic priorities such as paying down the national

debt (Bernier 2018c; PPC: Foreign Policy 2019). Bernier is also displeased by the intrusion of

39

“American left-wing foundations” and “hostile foreign investors” in Canadian affairs,

specifically in relation to the oil and gas industry (PPC: Pipelines 2019). His sole goal on the

international stage is to focus on the security and prosperity of Canadians.

Moreover, Bernier is highly critical of refugees and immigrants, describing them as a

drag on the economy and an unsustainable disruption to Canadian culture and traditions. He

explicitly declares that the priority of Canada should be “to help Canadians instead” (Bernier

2019b). While, according to Bernier, only a small proportion of immigrants are chosen for the

education and skills they bring, he believes most work for lower wages, contribute less in taxes,

inflate housing prices, and threaten social cohesion, all the while taking advantage of

government services as much as other Canadians (Bernier 2019b; PPC: Immigration 2019).

Refugees, Bernier says, are commonly turned back because many of them are not really in

danger and are instead trying to exploit the system (PPC: Refugees 2019).

The PPC promises numerous reforms to remedy this alleged problem. In terms of

numbers, annual immigration would be cut from 350,000 to between 100,000 and 150,000, and

fewer refugees would be accepted. The points system would be changed to emphasize economic

migrants with the “right skills,” temporary migration would be limited, and face-to-face

interviews with every newcomer would be introduced to ensure that every immigrant knows

English or French and shares universal Western values. Family reunification for parents and

grand-parents and birth tourism would be banned (Bernier 2018c; Bernier 2019b; PPC:

Immigration 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019). The Multiculturalism Act would be repealed and

funding for multiculturalism would be eliminated. Private sponsorship of immigrants would also

be encouraged (PPC: Canadian Identity 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019). The emphasis would be on

the integration of immigrants by teaching Canada’s history and culture (Bernier 2018c).

40

Undocumented entrants would face more hurdles as key illegal border crossings would be fenced

off, undocumented migrants would be sent back, and Canada would ignore UN

recommendations on refugees and immigrants. The priority would be on persecuted groups,

particularly those in majority Muslim countries, who adhere to Western values rather than

“political Islam” (PPC: Foreign Policy 2019; PPC: Refugees 2019).

Instead of promoting the existing “cult of diversity” or “extreme multiculturalism” as

Bernier calls it, a PPC government’s central imperative would be to forge a common sense of

belonging and to preserve Western civilization and its values (PPC: Canadian Identity 2019). Not

all cultures are equally valuable according to the PPC, so it would preserve those superior

Western values that, the PPC argues, have made Canada one of the greatest countries in the

world (Bernier 2019b). Under Bernier, Canada’s unique regional identities would be nurtured

rather than being supplanted by enclaves of “foreign” cultures (Bernier 2019b). Overall, although

not explicitly biologically racist, the PPC supports implicit nativist policies concerning foreign

policy, immigrants, refugees, and multiculturalism. Therefore, the PPC is a nativist party.

7.3 Authoritarianism

Third, although the PPC holds some authoritarian stances, it does not clearly share all the

positions we usually associate with authoritarianism. The party does not revere national symbols

nor does it abhor a free press or the rule of law. Of the more authoritarian positions it does hold,

the party moderates explicit authoritarianism and does not afford those positions a conspicuous

role in its platform. Starting with its gun policy, the PPC shows itself to be a tough-on-crime

party. The party believes that lawful gun owners deserve “respect and fairness.” Therefore, the

PPC would not “violate gun owners’ property rights,” criminally prosecute them, or allow

“bureaucrats” in Ottawa to easily change gun regulations. Instead, the PPC would focus on

41

fighting crime and protecting public safety by deterring and punishing criminals, particularly

those who misuse firearms (PPC: Firearms 2019).

Furthermore, social conservative overtones are present within the PPC’s position on

freedom of speech and political correctness although Bernier explicitly stated his party will not

discuss “hot-button social issues” such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and euthanasia (Kapelos

and Major 2019). The PPC specifically cites the Trudeau government’s decision to bar anti-

abortion organizations from receiving summer jobs funding and forcing individuals to use

particular gender pronouns as examples of the broader erosion of freedom of speech. Although

the PPC is ostensibly neutral on the issues of abortion and transgenderism, it does have a

problem with attempts to silence those who oppose them. The PPC further attacks internet and

social media companies censoring politically incorrect messages, university faculty and

administrators stifling dissent, and government legislation denouncing Islamophobia as examples

of this trend. Instead, the party believes that the government must provide “for maximal

protection of freedom of expression and conscience even when speech is considered by some as

politically incorrect, offensive, or hateful.” Once in office, the PPC promises to limit the

definition of hate speech, repeal legislation that threatens free expression, and withhold federal

funding to those post-secondary institutions that allow censorship (PPC: Freedom of Expression

2019). It must be paradoxically said that the PPC’s position on free speech is in some ways the

opposite of authoritarianism. However, there is a subtle undercurrent of social conservatism

behind the party’s position on freedom of expression which could be construed as authoritarian.

As expected by its staunchly libertarian economic views, the PPC is decidedly anti-

egalitarian. On tax policy, brackets will be cut from five to two with those making up to

$100,000 a year paying a 15% tax rate and those making over that amount paying 25%. The

42

party will also abolish the capital gains tax and lower the corporate income tax rate from 15% to

10%. These measures will be paid for, according to the PPC, by slashing government spending

and being fiscally disciplined. The party will cut provincial and municipal programs to such a

degree that it even promises to balance the budget just two years into its mandate (PPC:

Economy 2019; PPC: Public Finance 2019). These neo-liberal policies demonstrate that the

PPC’s philosophy is staunchly capitalistic and anti-egalitarian.

In its policy on veterans, the PPC talks about respect for national symbols and authority.

The party supports the Canadian Armed Forces, seeing their history as a proud and honourable

one. These men and women, the PPC says, who risk life and limb deserve the funding,

equipment, and support they have been deprived of, such as providing them with lifetime

pensions (PPC: Veterans 2019). Most Canadians would support this statement in principle, as it

is reasonable and not particularly excessive. Moreover, the platform does not revere Canadian

national symbols such as the anthem or the flag. Nor does the party reveal a respect for, or even

mention, centralized government institutions such as the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy

Council Office. Instead, it broadly supports decentralization of Ottawa’s authority to the

provinces. Therefore, the platform provides poor evidence that the PPC reveres national symbols

or authority.

Outside of the platform, there is evidence the PPC reveres the nation and national

symbols. Many of the PPC’s candidates and supporters include the Canadian flag on their social

media accounts. PPC rallies begin with the singing of “O Canada.” Their campaign slogan for

2019 was “strong and free,” referring to the national anthem of Canada. The party’s official

anthem is entitled “Northern Sovereign” whose lyrics include:

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We want to live patriotically, for everyone to be Canadian free, celebrating our country,

we want to proudly stand, our nation’s flag in hand…home is our country, because we

need to show who will stand, Canadians who love this land, it’s time to show that we

love our country. (Day 2019)

These examples illustrate that patriotic feelings permeate the PPC.

Despite all of these authoritarian stances, several important aspects of authoritarianism

are left out of the platform. Most importantly, the platform does not disparage the independent

media, judiciary, or government institutions. Although Bernier himself antagonizes the media

and the government in a populist way, he prefaces that criticism by saying that he will follow and

respect the Constitution of Canada which he cites throughout his platform (PPC: Aboriginal

Issues 2019; PPC: Equalization 2019; PPC: Health Care 2019; PPC: Internal Trade 2019; PPC:

Pipelines 2019). This commitment to upholding Canada’s constitutional architecture and the lack

of vitriol against journalists, judges, and government officials suggests the PPC is not in line

with an essential feature of authoritarianism.

In all, the PPC only partially satisfies the definition of an authoritarian party. On the one

side, the PPC promotes some law and order views, traditional values, and anti-egalitarianism. On

the other hand, none of these potentially authoritarian positions, with the exception of anti-

egalitarianism, are particularly extreme, and there is weak evidence the party reveres national

symbols and authority or that it loathes a free press, judiciary, or government. Of the sixteen

planks of the party platform, none have to do with explicitly authoritarian policies. Nowhere

does Bernier disparage the judiciary, Parliament, the rule of law, or any other institutions of

Canada’s system of government. The lack of these crucial characteristics means that the PPC is

44

not strongly authoritarian. Therefore, the PPC only partially satisfies the definition of an

authoritarian party.

7.4 Populism

The PPC’s strongest connection with the RRP programme is its populist outlook. The

name of the party, the People’s Party, signals its populist leaning. Throughout its platform, the

party dichotomizes society into the people and a small, privileged elite. When discussing supply

management, the PPC blames a small lobby group made up of only 10% of Canadian farms and

13,000 wealthy farmers for creating a “government-imposed cartel” that exists, according to

Bernier, at the expense of the 37 million Canadians who have to pay more for dairy, poultry, and

egg products (Bernier 2018a; Bernier 2018c; PPC: Supply Management 2019). Furthermore,

Bernier frames the issue of immigration through a populist lens. He believes that it is the

“political and intellectual elites” who are most in favour of mass immigration and that the

majority of Canadians agree with him. On that issue, Bernier insists that the other parties pander

to ethnic voting blocs rather than the Canadian people as a whole (Bernier 2019b). On climate

change, the party describes the current debate as “hijacked” by a few advocates of “big

government” who have used “crude propaganda techniques” to “ridicule and harass anyone who

expresses doubt.” These individuals “even manipulate school children, getting them to pressure

their parents and to demonstrate in the streets.” (PPC: Global Warming 2019). In a similar vein,

the PPC concludes that barriers to interprovincial trade are the result of local special interests

that pressure governments to restrict the free flow of goods by imposing monopolies and

regulations on them. To fight this influence, the PPC pledges to create a Minister of Internal

Trade to “counteract the influence of special interests” (PPC: Internal Trade 2019). On the issue

of corporate subsidies, the party promises it will never bail out huge companies like Bombardier,

45

Chrysler, or General Electric or participate in any other form of “corporate welfare” (Bernier

2018c). Bernier’s populist brand is also detected in the party’s firearms policy. It states that only

Parliament, not cabinet or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, may impose regulations on

firearms (PPC: Firearms 2019). This suggests that only the peoples’ representatives, not experts

or elites, would shape gun policy with the PPC in power. Broadly, Bernier speaks of a political

system beholden to elite groups at the expense of average people:

For too long, Canadian politics has been hijacked by interest groups, cartels, lobbies,

international organizations, corporate or union interests, and the interests of politicians

and bureaucrats in Ottawa who are disconnected from ordinary citizens…The Liberal

government is out-of-control and out-of-touch…We see it in the way the old parties try to

attract votes and support. Not by offering solutions that appeal to all Canadians. But by

pandering to various groups and dividing Canadians into little tribes that can be bought

with promises, privileges and taxpayers’ money. Nobody speaks for all Canadians.

Nobody speaks for the people. (Bernier 2018b)

Based on this evidence, the PPC exhibits all the characteristics of a populist party. From

supply management, immigration, and climate change to interprovincial trade, corporate welfare,

and firearms, populism is a consistent motif. Therefore, the PPC is a populist party. Putting the

PPC’s platform together, I can conclude that the party is an RRP because of its strong radical,

nativist, and populist views and its tepid authoritarian ones.

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7.5 RRP Subtype

To determine what RRP subtype the PPC fits into, I used Carter’s (2005) typology.12 The

PPC best fits the category of a neo-liberal xenophobic RRP, a subtype that puts a strong

emphasis on fighting immigration, holds cultural racist views, and wants to reform the existing

order to make it more “democratic” and less dependent on state intervention. This subtype is also

more moderate than other RRPs such as neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, and authoritarian xenophobic

types.

First, the PPC places immigration and refugees at the centre of its agenda. Immigration

must be dramatically reduced to both ensure the proper functioning of society and that Canada’s

cherished and unique culture, values, and heritage are not undermined (Bernier 2019b; PPC:

Immigration 2019). Based on the discussion of H1b above, it is clear immigration is central to

the PPC’s ideology. Second, the PPC espouses cultural racism. Bernier explicitly believes in the

superiority of Western civilization and its values. He does not say this is because the West is

majority white but instead because it has a better culture that encourages:

Democracy, individual rights and freedoms…equality between men and women, equal

treatment of all citizens regardless of ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation, the rule of

law, separation of state and religion, tolerance and pluralism, and loyalty to the wider

society instead of to one’s clan or tribe. (PPC: Canadian Identity 2019)

12 She identifies three divisions between RRPs: the importance attached to the issue of

immigration, the party’s views towards race, and its attitude towards democracy,

parliamentarism and pluralism (Carter 2005: 28)

47

These Western values have made Canada, according to Bernier, “one of the freest, most

dynamic, and most prosperous societies in the world.” For this reason, Bernier rejects the idea

that all values, social customs, and cultures are equally valuable (Bernier 2019b). Third, the PPC

advocates momentous reform of the existing system in a way that it believes would make Canada

more democratic and less reliant on the state. As the above discussion on populism demonstrates,

Bernier and his party see power concentrated in a few elite groups at the expense of the whole

body politic. To remedy this, substantial reforms are required, all of which would reduce the

influence of the state in the lives of Canadians. Based on the PPC’s views towards these three

divisions, I can conclude that the party is a neo-liberal xenophobic subtype of RRPs. To

summarize, based on a qualitative reading of the PPC’s platform and speeches posted on its

website, I have concluded that it is an RRP because it is radical, nativist, and populist, and holds

some authoritarian views. Using Carter’s (2005) typology, the PPC is of a neo-liberal

xenophobic RRP variety. The relevance of this positioning is twofold.

First, in conjunction with the literature review, I conclude that the PPC benefited from

having a more moderate RRP ideology. The party’s ideology should have shielded it from the

disdain that more extreme RRPs, such as neo-Nazi and neo-fascist ones, experience (Arzheimer

2018; Carter 2005; Golder 2016; Lubbers et al. 2002; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn

2015). As demonstrated below (see Section 8.3), Canadians are increasingly against extreme

authoritarian measures such as the dissolution of Parliament or the Supreme Court. These trends

give further impetus to this point.

Second, the PPC is neo-liberal on socio-economic issues. It is staunchly anti-egalitarian

and wants to reduce the size of government dramatically. Successful RRPs in Europe are

increasingly adopting more centrist or leftist economic positions (De Lange 2007; Golder 2016:

48

479; Rooduijn 2015; Rovny and Polk 2019). Rather than attacking the welfare state, such RRPs

as the National Rally in France or the Freedom Party in Austria now seek to defend it. The PPC’s

neo-liberalism may have compromised this programmatic appeal and undercut potential

working-class support that so many RRPs rely on as their base (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and

Carter 2006; Betz 1994; Givens 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Lubbers and Coenders 2017;

Lubbers et al. 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Minkenberg 2000; Rydgren 2007). The PPC’s

neo-liberal xenophobic disposition has, therefore, both helped, in terms of a more moderate

stance, and hindered, in terms of a neo-liberal stance on economic issues, the party’s fortunes in

the 2019 Canadian election.

8. Fertile Ground for RRP Success?

Now that it has been established that the PPC is a neo-liberal xenophobic RRP, did the

characteristics that help other RRPs also help it in Canada’s 2019 federal election? This section

will first review immigration levels, then turn to media coverage of both the issue of immigration

and the PPC, and finally investigate nativist, populist, and authoritarian public opinion in

Canada.

49

8.1 Immigration Levels

50

Figure 1 shows the immigration rate, calculated as the number of new annual migrants

per one thousand Canadians, to Canada over the last twenty years. Figure 2 presents that rate

51

from 1867 to 2021.13 Figure 3 displays the change in that rate from 1867 to 2021. Finally, Figure

4 shows the percentage of Western and non-Western immigrants in Canada from 1971 to 2031.

Two general observations can be made about these figures. First and most significantly, both the

rate of immigration and the change in that rate have gradually become more stable and

predictable since 1946. Before then, Canada’s immigration was characterized by periods of sharp

increases followed by similarly sharp declines. The best example of this pattern occurred

between 1900 and 1915 when Canada saw a dramatic increase to its immigration rate followed

by an equally dramatic decline. Although there has been instability since 1947, such volatility

has increasingly levelled out, especially since 1987. The second general observation is that by

1987 and continuing into the present day, the pattern identified above levelled off, resulting in

minimal changes to the immigration rate. When it has slowly risen or fallen, this change has not

been dramatic.

At the same time, two observations suggest favourable trends for the PPC. One of them is

that, in the last few decades, as Figure 1 shows, the immigration rate has increased by 50%. This

is due to the Trudeau government’s decision to increase the annual number of immigrants

accepted to 350,000 by 2021 (The Canadian Press 2018c). However, this uptick has occurred

gradually, as the rate of change over this period shows. Another observation is that, as Figure 4

demonstrates, a higher percentage of immigrants have originated from non-Western countries

since the second half of the twentieth century. It is, therefore, appropriate to note that the

immigrants coming to Canada are increasingly non-white, non-Christian, and non-Western. This

fact, according to the literature review, should have benefitted the PPC. Conversely, the

stigmatization of immigrants based on their assumed non-compatibility with Canadian culture is

13 Numbers for the years after 2019 are projections.

52

not a new idea. Many white, Christian, and Western immigrants have been ostracized as well.14

Figure 4’s significance is, therefore, debatable. Based on these statistics, the picture regarding

immigration is mixed. Although the rate of immigration and the change in that rate in

contemporary Canada has not increased significantly, a closer look at the data shows that, over

the last two decades, the total number of immigrants has grown substantially. Moreover,

although the last fifty years have seen a gradual increase in the proportion of non-Western

immigrants, otherizing newcomers, regardless of their race, religion, or place of origin, is no

novelty. Nevertheless, compared to historical levels, immigration is not strikingly higher.

Because of this, based on H2 alone, conditions are not better in 2019 than in previous years for

an RRP to succeed.

14 See for example Woodsworth (1909) who demonizes Mormons (65-71), Doukhobors (100-

101), Lithuanians (102), Slovaks (109), Ruthenians (109-112), Poles (114-115), the peoples of

the Balkans (122), Italians (133-134), the peoples of the Levant (138-139), the Chinese (144),

Indians (154), Japanese (154-155), Africans (158), and indigenous peoples (159-160). Also see

Stanger-Ross and Schmidtke (2019) and Conrad (2012: 117-119, 172-174).

53

8.2 Media Coverage of the PPC and Immigration Issues

54

Figures 5 and 6 display the degree of media coverage the PPC received as a proportion of

both their place in the polls and in relation to the other five main parties from October 2018 to

October 2019. Figure 7 charts the attention paid to the issue of immigration by the media from

1997 to 2019. Three principal observations can be made about these graphs. First, as Figures 5

and 6 show, the PPC benefited from a disproportionately high level of media coverage. In both

graphs, in every single month, the PPC received more attention from the media than one would

expect, given their place in the polls. The media paid more attention to the PPC, per 1% polling

average, than any of the mainstream parties. This phenomenon was particularly acute leading up

to, and during, the 2019 campaign period in the months of August, September, and October of

2019. Presumably, Canadians paid the most attention to political parties during this period. The

graphs show that between October of 2018 and June of 2019, the PPC only marginally benefited

from an overrepresentation of coverage in the media, while the last three months before the

election saw their coverage explode, both in the number of articles mentioning the PPC and

Bernier and as a percentage of total news articles covering the political parties. While the other

55

main parties saw only a twofold increase, starting during the last two months of the campaign,

the PPC benefited from coverage eleven times greater, and this trend started earlier, during the

final three months of the campaign. By October, for every 1% in the polls, the PPC received 249

more articles than the other major parties. Clearly, the PPC was given the coverage it required to

succeed as the coverage it received was significantly more than any other party relative to its

place in the polls.

Regarding Figure 7, although the frequency of coverage of immigration issues in the

media remained relatively stable between 1997 and 2013, there has been a gradual increase since

2008. This trend increased significantly between 2013 and 2017. Throughout Trudeau’s first

mandate, the media spent about twice as much time covering immigration as it did between 1997

and 2014. Although in recent years, coverage has decreased slightly, overall, the Canadian media

paid far more attention to immigration in the last few years than it did previously. In summary,

these three observations point towards a media that paid attention to the PPC and its issues in

2019. Relative to its level of estimated support and compared to other parties, the PPC has

received a disproportionate amount of attention by the media. Additionally, newspapers paid

more attention to immigration in 2019 than in the past. This should have made the anti-

immigrant message of the PPC more salient to the voting public. Therefore, by all standards,

2019 offered a media environment the PPC benefited from.

56

8.3 Anti-immigrant, Populism, and Authoritarian Public Opinion

Figure 8 illustrates respondents’ views concerning immigration from 1993 to 2019. Three

general observations stand out. First and most importantly, the data shows a rapid softening of

anti-immigrant sentiment between 1993 and 2003. For all three propositions, Canadians became

noticeably more pro-immigrant by the turn of the century. A closer look at the data15 shows this

drop in support for anti-immigrant positions was most acute for those who strongly held those

views. Those with milder anti-immigrant positions either dropped only slightly or moderately.

Second, and most relevant to this particular investigation, anti-immigrant sentiment has remained

relatively stable since 2003 for two of the questions asked. Although some amount of volatility

occurs, there does not seem to be a consistent or substantial change in the proportion of pro- or

15 This data is not shown but can be made available upon request.

57

anti-immigrant attitudes over the last two decades for those questions. In contrast, the assertion

that many people claiming to be refugees are not real refugees shows a slow decline all the way

to 2019. Third, expanded categories of these questions16 show that pro-immigrant sentiment has

intensified over the last few years. The proportion of respondents who strongly disagree that

many people claiming to be refugees are not real refugees has consistently increased since 2012

and has more than doubled from its pre-2015 levels. Since 2015, there is a steady increase in the

proportion of those who strongly disagree that too many immigrants do not adopt Canadian

values. By 2019, this proportion has more than doubled its 2012 levels. As a result, there is not

just a decrease in anti-immigrant sentiment over the years covered, but also a rising intensity in

pro-immigrant stances among Canadians throughout the last few years. Overall, the survey data

in Figure 8 show that a decreasing number of Canadians hold anti-immigrant sentiment. Not only

has opposition towards immigrants and refugees decreased and levelled off since 2003, but

additionally, the proportion of those who strongly support immigrants and refugees has increased

over the recent past as well. Therefore, 2019 was not more favourable to an RRP than

previously.

16 This data is not shown but can be made available upon request.

58

59

Moving on to populist sentiment, two general observations can be made regarding

Figures 9 and 10. First and most significantly, populist sentiment is more widespread now than it

was in 2006. Every line but one reveals a pattern whereby the proportion of those who are either

somewhat or very distrustful/dissatisfied rises from 2006 to 2010, then begins to fall again in

2014 and/or 2016/17. Despite this fall over the last few years, both Figures 9 and 10 show a

higher proportion of populist feelings in 2016/17 than in 2006. Second, in both figures, the

proportion of respondents who indicate that they are very trusting of/satisfied with Canada’s

political system and society saw a noticeable decrease between 2008 and 2010. Following this

drop, the proportion either remained stable or recovered slightly. Despite this stagnation or

recovery in recent years, enthusiasm for Canada’s political system and society has overall waned

between 2006 and 2016/17, and populist sentiment seems to have grown over this time period.

60

This suggests that the time for an RRP breakthrough seemed riper in 2019 than it did a little over

a decade ago.

61

Figures 11 and 12 reveal three general observations about authoritarian sentiment in

Canada. First, Figure 11 demonstrates that support for shutting down Parliament or the Supreme

Court was at its highest in the earlier waves of 2006 and 2008. Every subsequent survey since

then shows support for such extreme authoritarian actions is lower. Second, the proportion of

those who do not personally respect, personally support, or want others to support Canada’s

democracy and political system, as can be seen in Figure 12, has increased overall between 2006

and 2016/17. Authoritarian sentiment as illustrated in that graph is at its lowest levels of support

in 2006, rises between 2006 and 2010, peaks between 2010 and 2014, and declines following

that peak to 2016/17. Although there has been an easing of authoritarian sentiment in recent

years, it still seems more widespread now than it was in 2006. Third, among those who respect,

support, or want others to support Canada’s democracy and political system, there is a

62

moderating of views throughout the various waves. The 2006 and 2008 waves see the greatest

number of strong supporters of democracy and the political system while later waves see those

supporters moderate their positions. From these observations, Canadians hold mixed views about

authoritarianism. Support for more subtle authoritarian positions concerning democracy and

political institutions is higher now than it was in 2006 and Canadians are less enthusiastic

towards democracy and political institutions than they were in 2006. Still, Figure 11 illustrates

that the more extreme authoritarian measures of shutting down Parliament and the Supreme

Court are not as popular as they once were. From this mixed result, it appears an RRP would

have seen a modest increase in support in 2019 than in 2006 as long as it did not back extreme

authoritarian measures.

All in all, the findings are decidedly mixed. On the one hand, the proposition that an

increasing number of Canadians hold low support for diversity, immigrants, and minorities has

been rejected. There are fewer individuals now than there were previously who hold nativist

beliefs. On the other hand, the hypothesis that an increasing number of Canadians are

distrustful/dissatisfied with democracy, mainstream parties, politicians, international

organizations, and society is supported. This means there is more of a populist sentiment now in

Canada relative to 2006. Finally, the statement that an increasing number of Canadians hold

authoritarian views was supported. Therefore, authoritarian sentiment has risen in Canada since

2006. It is germane to note that individuals are not mobilized to vote for RRPs by these three

attitudes equally, with anti-immigrant attitudes being the most influential of the three (Arzheimer

2008; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rooduijn 2015). I, therefore, conclude that based on public opinion,

2019 did not offer a particularly opportune time for the PPC to succeed.

63

9. Conclusion

This work has attempted to contribute to the timely debate relating to the rise of RRPs

and Canada’s alleged exceptionalism in this regard.17 Unlike so many other Western countries,

Canada has thwarted radical right-wing overtures into the political system. Come election night

on October 21, 2019, the PPC lost its only seat and its vote total fell short of expectations, at a

minuscule 1.64%. Why did the PPC fail in its inaugural debut?

This paper, using survey data from the Focus Canada and AmericasBarometer studies,

alongside other quantitative data from Statistics Canada, Factiva, and Nanos Research, and a

qualitative reading of the PPC’s electoral platform and the context of the Canadian political

system in 2019, has found that 2019 was not a particularly auspicious year for an RRP to succeed

in Canada owing to a combination of historical supply-side barriers and contemporary demand-

side trends. Based on a qualitative reading of the PPC platform and speeches on its website, I

have concluded that the PPC is radical, nativist, mildly authoritarian, and populist and is,

therefore, a neo-liberal xenophobic RRP. This more moderate stance should have served as an

asset for the party, although its neo-liberal economic policies contrast with the growing welfare

chauvinist positions of many RRPs in Europe. Through a qualitative examination of the static

characteristics of the Canadian regime, I have found that Canada’s FPTP voting system, lack of

grand governing coalitions, and unique national traditions, acted as significant barriers of entry

for the PPC. These supply-side barriers nullified the PPC’s leadership, organizational, and

ideological advantages.

Based on a quantitative analysis of immigration rates, media coverage, and survey data, I

have also found that 2019 was not particularly conducive to RRP success in comparison with the

17 For example, see Liberty moves north: Canada’s example to the world (The Economist 2016).

64

past in terms of demand-side trends. While the media did prominently cover both the PPC and

immigration issues, and an increasing number of Canadians hold populist and moderately

authoritarian sentiments, the rate of immigration to Canada and the change in that rate have not

increased, and Canadians do not increasingly harbour anti-immigrant views. Anti-immigration is

the raison d’etre of most RRPs and usually plays a pivotal role in motivating RRP voters. Parties

can better exploit these sentiments when the change in the immigration rate has increased

rapidly. Crucially, and unfortunately for Bernier, this did not occur in Canada throughout the last

several decades.

Therefore, I suspect that the PPC failed because of a mixture of both supply-side

institutional barriers and, on the demand-side, a lack of growing support for anti-immigrant

policies in Canada. Interestingly, the PPC cannot place the blame on a lack of media attention.

They garnered significantly greater attention than their polling numbers warranted. Bernier was

also controversially invited to both the official French and English leaders’ debate. Hence,

Canadians were exposed to RRP views but were not swayed due to their lack of demand for such

opinions.

Based on these findings, the PPC or another RRP will fare far better in the future if a

number of conditions are reached: 1) the current FPTP voting system is replaced with one that

more proportionately translates votes into seats, 2) coalitions become more frequent between the

major parties, 3) the points system is repealed, 4) there is a growth in far-right movements, 5)

restrictive anti-hate laws are scrapped, 6) the PPC or its successor shifts towards more left-

leaning economic positions, 7) the rate of immigration dramatically increases, or 8) Canadians

begin to hold more anti-immigrant views. I suspect these conditions are not likely to be met in

the near future. The political will to reform Canada’s electoral system is lacking, as Prime

65

Minister Trudeau has reneged on his promise to replace the current FPTP system. There also

seems to be a lack of popular appetite for such a change as every provincial referendum on

electoral reform has failed.18 Trudeau has also emphatically ruled out forming a coalition

government (Harris 2019). A steady flow of immigrants, the points system, the lack of far-right

organizations, and laws concerning hate speech all seem to be deeply entrenched within

Canada’s political system. Finally, as Figure 8 demonstrates, Canadians seem to have become

more tolerant of immigrants, not less. As a result, I suspect RRP success in Canada will remain

difficult to achieve.

The value of this paper within the broader discussion of RRPs is threefold. First and most

obviously, investigating whether the conditions that have led to RRP success in Europe exist

here in Canada will help strategists, politicians, voters, political scientists, and others to

understand and predict the electoral fortunes of the PPC. This is especially pertinent now, given

that the RRP party family is the fastest-growing party group in Europe (Mudde 2007) and is

rapidly expanding its reach into other areas of the globe (Anderson 2019; Fleming and Aurelien

2018; Higuchi 2018; Leal 2017; Parker 2018; Perlinger and Pedahzur 2018).

Second, the vast majority of studies on the success (or lack thereof) of RRPs focus - for

understandable reasons - on Western European countries. There are only a few that study Eastern

Europe and the United States and even fewer that examine Canada (for Canada, see Adams

2017; Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Gordon et al. 2019; for Eastern Europe, see Bustikova 2014;

Dinas 2019; Shafir 2000; for the United States, see Cox and Durham 2000; Davis 2019;

Minkenberg 2000). The handful of Canadian studies related to RRP success are either qualitative

18 Since the early twentieth century, electoral reform has been attempted in Canada. More

recently, reform has been considered in the provinces of British Columbia, Prince Edward Island,

Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and federally but all attempts have failed (Barnes et al. 2016;

Tanguay 2009: 232-235).

66

in nature (Adams 2017; Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Ryan 2016; Trebilcock 2018), use outdated

datasets (Bilodeau et al. 2012; Gidengil et al. 2001; Nevitte et al. 1998), or do not systematically

examine a wide variety of variables that determine RRP success (Adams 2017; Ambrose and

Mudde 2015; Besco and Tolley 2018; Bilodeau et al. 2012; Gidengil et al. 2001; Gordon et al.

2019; Trebilcock 2018). Most of these studies focus on issues connected with RRPs but do not

categorically ask why RRPs have not emerged in Canada or whether they will in the future.19

This is surprising given that some authors suggest there is ample potential for RRP

growth in Canada (Ambrose and Mudde 2015; Betz 1994: 22-23; Kitschelt 1995). Additionally,

several scholars argue that one weakness of the research into RRPs is an overemphasis on

countries where RRPs are already successful (Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015: 39; Rydgren 2002:

28; Rydgren 2007: 257). Uncommon are studies that attempt to explain why RRPs are not

successful,20 though such studies could be equally enlightening by explaining how such parties

operate and the mechanisms through which they succeed (Ambrose and Mudde 2015: 217). This

study has, therefore, filled a geographical and empirical gap in the literature by providing a

novel, systematic analysis of RRP failure in Canada.

Third, concerning explanations of RRP success found in the literature review, this paper

shows that, although robust intra-party organization, charismatic leadership, a conducive media

environment, and increasing demand for populism and moderate authoritarianism may be

necessary conditions, they are not sufficient alone to warrant RRP success. As long as the

19 Besco and Tolley 2018 and Trebilcock 2018 write about the popularity of multiculturalism,

tolerance, and immigration in Canada, Bilodeau et al. 2012 look at sentiment towards immigrants

and racial minorities at the provincial level, while Gidengil et al. 2001 and Nevitte et al. 1998

investigate the Reform Party of Canada. Only Adams 2017, Ambrose and Mudde 2015, and

Gordon et al. 2019 address the lack of RRP success in Canada.

20 A few exceptions include Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015), Backes and Mudde (2000),

O’Malley (2008), Rydgren (2002), and Van Holsteyn and Mudde (2000).

67

barriers to entry are high enough and the demand is low enough, RRPs are unlikely to break

through even with such favourable conditions as those listed above. Therefore, this paper

contributes to the broader literature by showing that a variety of institutional constraints, stable

immigration inflows, and decreasing anti-immigrant sentiment are important factors in keeping

RRPs out of the corridors of power.

This study, although accomplishing the goals set out by being contemporary, systematic,

and focused on Canada, is not an exhaustive analysis of the PPC. There are several avenues for

future research that I believe could bring further clarity to the research question. First, this study

suffers from being purely longitudinal. A cross-sectional analysis, comparing Canada with all

other Western democracies, could better illuminate whether Canada stands out regarding the

variables that determine RRP success. For example, is anti-immigrant sentiment vastly higher in

countries with robust RRPs such as Hungary, Poland, Switzerland, and Austria compared to

Canada? Is Canada similar to other countries that lack RRPs such as Ireland and Iceland? A

second suggestion for future research is to perform a quantitative analysis of the PPC’s platform

and speeches, perhaps by using data from the Manifesto Project Database, once it becomes

available, to determine whether it corresponds with the conclusions of my qualitative analysis of

the PPC’s platform. This same data could also be used to measure whether Canadian parties have

converged ideologically in a way that would create a favourable electoral niche for an RRP.

Third, my analysis of media coverage of the PPC suffers from the fact that it does not distinguish

between positive and negative coverage. I suspect much of this coverage was negative,

especially in light of news stories that reported a consulting firm was hired to covertly discredit

the PPC shortly before the election (Bellemare and Rogers 2019; Yates et al. 2019). It would be

advantageous to test this claim, and to figure out what sort of contribution negative stories in the

68

press and on social media made to the PPC’s failure. Finally, as this research was conducted

during the 2019 election campaign, I could not take advantage of post-election data such as that

from the 2019 Canadian Election Study. It would be a promising approach for future research to

analyze data that takes actual PPC electoral results into account. All of these are promising

avenues for future research that would complement the findings in this thesis.

One thought as to why Bernier did not succeed is that he failed to establish a regional

base. Despite being called the “Albertan from Quebec,” Bernier is a francophone with a thick

Quebec accent. In Canada, a comparable cleavage to Euroscepticism in Europe is Western

alienation. As the complete wipeout of all Liberal seats in Alberta and Saskatchewan, the

vociferous reaction to a second Trudeau mandate in those provinces, and the formation of Wexit,

a movement whose central aim is to divorce the West from Canada, demonstrate, Western

alienation remains a powerful force in Canadian politics. Bernier did not exploit this cleavage, or

at least not in the same defining way that the Reform and Canadian Alliance parties did. The

premise of Western alienation would not be well served by the leadership of a Quebecois.

Additionally, since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, Quebecers by and large support

government intervention in stark contrast to Bernier’s neo-liberalism. More importantly, Quebec

nationalists, although nativist, tend not to be authoritarian or strongly populist, making them

distinct from regionalist radical right-wing movements elsewhere, such as in Flanders and

Padania (Blanchet and Medeiros 2019). In spite of this nativism, Quebec nationalists are far

more motivated by Quebec independence than issues of immigration. Because of the presence of

a sovereigntist party in the form of the Bloc Quebecois, these potential PPC voters have been

coaxed away (Gordon et al. 2019). These circumstances meant that Bernier was unable to

establish a regional base of support, so vital in the FPTP system (Gordon et al. 2019: 6), for his

69

nascent party in either Quebec or Western Canada. Perhaps as a way to shore up this weak spot,

Bernier, in his first major speech since his defeat, focused on regional alienation and the

centralizing tendencies of Ottawa. In it, Bernier promised to decentralize the federation to

counter this growing anger from the West (Bernier 2019e). Only time will tell whether the PPC’s

initial failure in breaking through will result in its expeditious demise or whether a stronger

emphasis on regional grievances in Quebec and Western Canada will allow it to grow in the

same way that national grievances have allowed RRPs in the European Union to.

A concluding thought is that the defeat of the PPC in 2019 should not encourage

complacency in the adversaries of the radical right. Even if the PPC disbands, others will rise, as

has happened already with Wexit Alberta, a party that, as a cursory reading of its platform

suggests, is even more right-wing than the PPC (Wexit Alberta: Platform 2019). The results

should not reassure Canadians that the radical right is incongruous with Canada. Many laypeople

and academics alike, most recently in Germany and Spain, have made that mistake by

underestimating and dismissing RRPs, to their peril. Canadians would do well to heed these

warnings. A sudden increase in immigration, the formation of a Liberal-New Democratic

coalition, or the reform of the current electoral system into one more proportional, although all

unlikely possibilities at present, could each lead to an RRP breakthrough in the future.

Progressives insist that the above changes would benefit Canada. They should be careful what

they wish for, as these changes would also have unintended consequences, such as precipitating

the rise of the radical right.

70

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