A Proposal of Nuclear Materials Detection and Inspection ... · NRF Nuclear ResonanceFluorescence...
Transcript of A Proposal of Nuclear Materials Detection and Inspection ... · NRF Nuclear ResonanceFluorescence...
Japan Atomic Energy Agency(JAEA)Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)
Mitsuo KOIZUMI
A Proposal of Nuclear Materials Detectionand Inspection Systems in Heavily Shielded
Suspicious Objects by Non-destructive Manner
Collaboration of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)National Institute for Quantum and Radiological Science and Technology (QST)Joint Research Center (JRC)
Supported byMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Japan (MEXT)
Magic Maggiore Technical Reachback Workshop 15 min. (March 28-30, 2017, JRC Ispra, Italy)
1. Introduction2. Secure Detection of Heavily Shielded
Suspicious Object3. Interior Inspection of NMs Part taken out
from the Heavily Shielded Objects4. Summary
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Contents
1. Introduction
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NM : Nuclear Material
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Nuclear Materials under/out of Regulatory Control
NM Situation
Under Regulatory Control
NMs in nuclear facilities(under control of competent authority)In IAEA member states, NMs are under IAEA safeguards
Out of Regulatory Control
Smuggled NMs(out of control of competent authority)Under nuclear security policy of each state
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NMs Terrors
Type Purposes / NMs
RDDRadiological Dispersal Device
Purposes:Killing people, causing disruptionNMs, RIs :High radiation toxicity isotopes
(α-emitters etc.)
Nuclear Bomb
Purposes:Mass destruction
NMs: Special nuclear materials (235U, 239Pu)
OtherHigh Radiation Emission Objects
Purpose:Insensible high radiation exposure
NMs:NMs in criticality(High neutron emission) (JCO type criticality assemblies)
RIs: High gamma-ray radiation
We need to know the purposes of detected objects for safe handling.
apparent identification to NM
NMs out of Regulatory Control
NMs taken outfrom containers
Interior Inspection Systems
Dismantlement Systems
Handling of Detected Objects
Adequate Places(Airports, Harbors etc.)
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Airports, Harbors,Other places
Secure Detection Systems of NMs
Detection
NF Laboratories
Nuclear Forensics Analytical Systems
Nuclear Forensic
A Scheme of Strengthening Nuclear Security for NMs out of Regulatory Control
Heavy Shield (Metal)
Neutron Shield+Neutron Absorber
(NM+Mixtures)
Heavy Shield (Metal) Shield of gamma-rays from NM / gamma-rays from neutron absorption by surrounding material
Neutron Shield Moderation of neutrons emitted from NM (inside) / neutrons interrogated from outside
Neutron Absorber Absorption of thermal neutrons
(Just a pure black area by X-ray scanning)
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An Example of Heavily Shielded Objects (HSO) containing NM
Present X-ray Scanning Systems for Cargo Containers in Nuclear Security
X-ray Scanning Purposes
BackscatterX-ray imaging
Clear imaging for light elementsFor detection ofcar and truck bombs / explosives, plastic weapons, and other organic threats / illegal drugs, etc.
Transmission X-ray imaging
Imaging for heavy elementsFor detection ofheavy metal items for hiding illegal materials in cargo / heavy weapons etc.
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Imaging with moving
Transmission X-ray Imaging
Present X-ray Cargo Container Scanning System
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Real Time Backscatter X-ray Imaging
ROI (Region of Interest)
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Not sufficient for secure detection of NM in heavy metal items (heavily-shielded NM)
A Combined Use ofX-ray Scanning Systems
+ Passive Radiation Detectors
2. Secure Detection of Heavily Shielded Suspicious Object
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HSO Heavily Shielded Object
MGB Monochromatic Gamma-ray Beam
MGS Monochromatic Gamma-ray Source
ERL Energy Recovery Linac
LCS Laser Compton Scattering
NRF Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence
NDA(D) Non-destructive Assay (Detection)
ROI Region of Interest
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A Proposal of Secure Detection System of NMs in HSO
A combined system
X-ray Scanning System + An NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB
X-ray Scanning System An NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB
For detection of suspicious objects (ROI) in cargo containers
Pin-point scanning of ROI for detection of NMs (NRF gamma-ray signals of NMs)
MGB: Monochromatic Gamma-ray BeamNRF: Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence NDD: Non-destructive Detection
Next Generation ERL(350 MeV)
Laser Enhancement Cavity
350 MeV electrons
3 loops
A Future ERL-LCS Monochromatic Gamma-ray Source
Electron Beam=350 MeV, 10 mALCS Gamma-ray (2-3 MeV)ØFlux ~ 1x1013 ph/sØΔE/E ~ 0.1%
~ 25 m
High PowerLaser Oscillator
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Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence
R. Hajima et al., J. Nuclear Science and Technology (2008)
Laser Compton Scattering
Electrons Laser
gamma-rays
A Explanation of NRF-based NDA of NM using MGB
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MGB
Detector
Hidden NM(239Pu)
Shielding Material
NRFEmission Gamma-rays
Monochromatic ( & tunable) gamma-ray beam
(Selective NRF Activation of Nuclide)
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Interrogation Gamma-rays
NRF Emission Gamma-rays
Transmission Gamma-rays
NRF Emission Gamma-rays
Bring information of NMs in HSO-Rough characterization of NMs by interrogations ofseveral gamma-rays with specific energies of NMisotopes
Transmission Gamma-rays
Bring information of detailed interior structure of HSO-CT imaging with intense monochromatic high-energy gamma-rays
Interrogation Gamma-rays:High Intensity MGB
Interior Inspections of HSO by Interrogation of MGB
(HSO)
Heavy Shield (Metal)
(NM+Mixtures)
Neutron Shield+Neutron Absorber
Rough Characterization of NMs inside of HSO by Interrogation of MGB
NRF emission gamma-rays from the isotope of interest (i)
Interrogation gamma-rayswith tuned energy of isotope of interest (i)
(HSO)
Heavy Shield (Metal)
(NM+Mixtures)
Neutron Shield+Neutron Absorber
By changing energy of interrogation gamma-rays tuned to theresonance energy of certain isotope of U/Pu, we are able tocount NRF emission gamma-rays from the all isotope of U/Pu.With having counts of NRF emission gamma-rays of all isotopesof U/Pu, we can have information of U/Pu isotopic compositionof NM inside the HSO. (Rough characterization of NMs)
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H. Toyokawa, NIMA 545, 469(2005).
Inner Structure of Thick Metal Container
CT Imaging with Intense Monochromatic High-Energy Gamma-rays
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Detailed information of inner structure of the object⇒ Essential for safe dismantlement
Interrogation Gamma-rays of high energy; well
penetrate into material
Transmission Gamma-rays
Gamma-ray Detector
(HSO)
For secure (pin-point) detection of NM hidden behind heavy-shield in freight cargo containers
An NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB
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Next Generation ERL(350 MeV)
Laser EnhancementCavity
Cargo Container
Gamma-ray Detectors
High Power Laser Oscillator
Nuclear Material in Heavy Shield
Moving
40Ft ContainerMax. Weight:30.5 tons
12.2 m
2.4 m
2.6 m
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X-ray Scanning System (Present)
NRF-based NDD System using Intense MGB
A tunnel for freight container trailers
~15 m
~15 m
~20 m
~35 m
①②
To Interior Inspection
③
① When X-ray scanning system does not find any ROI in the freight container, then the trailer skips over the NRF–based NDD system.② When X-ray scanning system finds ROI in the freight container, the trailer is moved to NRF-based NDD system.③ When signals of NMs are detected, the trailer is moved to interior inspection of detected objects
A Picture of Actual Application of the Proposed System for Secure Detection of NMs (A Combined System of X-ray Scanning with NRF-based NDD)
3. Interior Inspection of NMs Part taken outfrom the HSO
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DDA Differential Die-away Analysis
DGS Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy
NRTA Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis
PGA Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis
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Inspection Procedures after Detection of Heavily Shielded NMs
Process Inspection / Dismantlement
Interior inspection of HSO
Dismantlement of HSO(taking NMs part out)
Interior inspection ofNMs Part
Further Dismantlementfor taking NMs out
Inspection before opening / dismantlement of the objects- Detailed interior structure- Rough characterization of NMs
Safe (remotely operated) dismantlement of HSO at adequate place for taking NMs part out
Inspection of NMs part for further dismantlement- Mixed material(explosives etc.)- Characterization of NMs
Further safe (remotely operated) dismantlement for taking NMs Out for nuclear forensics
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NMs + Mixtures
Interrogation Neutrons
A D-T Pulsed Neutron Source
NeutronsGamma-rays
Transmission Neutrons
Induced Fission Neutrons
Neutron Capture Prompt Gamma-rays
Delayed Gamma-rays (from Fission Products of Induced Fissions)
DDA
DGA
NRTA
PGA
Rough Explanation of Interior Inspectionof NMs Part by Active Neutron NDA
(Active neutron NDA techniques (DDA, DGS, NRTA , PGA))
NDA Techniques Rough Explanation
DDADifferential Die-awayAnalysis
For counting / analysis of induced fissionneutrons (to quantify fissile mass) from NMs usingdifference of die-away time of active pulsedneutrons and induced fission neutrons
DGSDelayed Gamma-raySpectroscopy
For counting / analysis of specific high energydelayed gamma-rays after induced fissionscaused by interrogation of pulsed neutrons (toobtain ratios of fissile isotopes)
NRTANeutron ResonanceTransmission Analysis
For counting / analysis of transmitted neutronsthrough the NMs part using TOF (time of flight)method for quantification of each isotope of NMs
PGAPrompt Gamma-rayAnalysis
For detection of specific prompt gamma-raysgenerated by (n, γ) reactions of isotopes(For an example; 14N (n, γ) 15N ;detection of 14Nin explosives)
Rough Explanation of Active Neutron NDA (DDA, DGS, NRTA, PGA)
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Proposal of an Active NDA Systemfor Interior Inspection of NMs Part
(PGA, DDA, DGS, NRTA)
5. Summary
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Summary
Proposed Sytems Roles
NRF-based NDD Systemusing high energy andhigh intensity MGB
Secure detection of NMs in HSO
Inspection of inner (explosion)structure of the HSO
Rough characterization of NMs(nuclear bomb or not) in the HSO
Active Neutron NDAsystem using a D-TNeutron Source
Investigation of mixtures (explosives,toxic materials) in NMs parts /characterization of NMs
- The existence of NM in a suspicious object (in a shield) have to be securely detected.
- Before opening the suspicious object, safety should be confirmed.
Thank you for your attention.
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AcknowledgementThis work has been supported by a subsidy for strengthening nuclear security of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), Japan.
Electron Gun
Energy Recovery Linac(Super-Conducting Cavity)
(9-cell x 2 cavity)
ExperimentRooms
Laser Enhancement
Cavity
Basic Technology Demonstration(Electron Beam = 20 MeV, 0.058 mA)
ØLCS X-ray (~ 6.9 keV) Flux ~ 1x109ph/s/mAØΔE/E ~0.5%
LCS Gamma -rays
Injector
Generation of High Intensity LCS Monochromatic X-rays : Demonstrated With the LCS Demo. System in March 2015 at KEK Tsukuba (Japan)
20 MeV electron
s High PowerLaser Oscillator
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LCS Demo. System
ERL-LCS Demo. System for Future ERL-LCS MGS
Characteristic points Advantages for inspection / detection
monochromaticgamma-rays
Interrogation of gamma-rays within pin-point energyregion- Avoiding unnecessary excitation or absorption- Useful for reduction of BGs and obtaining higher accuracy
energy tunablegamma-rays
Interrogation of gamma-rays with tunable energies fornuclides in targets- Selection of nuclide by gamma-ray energy in targets- Makes selective measurements possible
high intensitygamma-rays
Interrogation with high intensity- Higher probabilities of reactions to be interrogated- Makes very fast measurements with higher accuracy
(even for measurements of low concentration elements)
gooddirectivitygamma-rays
Interrogation within very limited direction- Avoiding attenuation of interrogation X-/gamma rays-Gives measurements freedom for target distance from thesource
gamma-rayswith deeppenetrability(*)
Interrogation with deep penetration-Deep penetration into heavy material reaching to the
target isotopes
Characteristic Points of ERL-based LCS MGS
* For MeV class gamma-rays 28
Selective nuclide
detection
Pin-point detection