A Proposal for an FCC Spectrum Exchange

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A Proposal for an FCC Spectrum Exchange Evan Kwerel Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis Federal Communications Commission John Williams Spectrum Guru, Ret. Third Combinatorial Auction and Exchange Conference Wye River, MD November 21-23, 2003

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A Proposal for an FCC Spectrum Exchange. Evan Kwerel Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis Federal Communications Commission John Williams Spectrum Guru, Ret. Third Combinatorial Auction and Exchange Conference Wye River, MD November 21-23, 2003. Disclaimer. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of A Proposal for an FCC Spectrum Exchange

Page 1: A Proposal for an FCC Spectrum Exchange

A Proposal for an FCC Spectrum Exchange

Evan KwerelOffice of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis

Federal Communications Commission

John WilliamsSpectrum Guru, Ret.

Third Combinatorial Auction and Exchange ConferenceWye River, MD

November 21-23, 2003

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Disclaimer

• The opinions expressed in this talk are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the FCC or any other members of its staff.

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Only about 7% (185 MHz) of Spectrum in 300-3000 MHz Range Is Fully Available to Market Today

Cellular 50 MHz

PCS 120 MHz

SMR 15 MHz

Other 2545 MHz

Cellular 2%PCS 3%

SMR 1%

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Another 15 % (413 MHz) for Flexible Use in the Pipeline

From Gov't, MSS and

others (145 MHz)

5%

From TV Channels

52-69 (78 MHz)

3%

From MDS/ITFS (190 MHz)

6%

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But…

• Heavily encumbered

• Fragmented in geographic and frequency domains

• Needs massive restructuring

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Northeast EAG - 1

Great Lakes EAG - 4

Mid-Atlantic EAG - 2

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Federal Communications CommissionOffice of Engineering and Technology

Melvin C. Del Rosario

April 18, 2000

TV and DTV Stations on Channel 67 (Buffered)

Service

DTTV

TV and DTV Stations that Encumber Channel 67 in EAG-1

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Percent of MHz-Pops Encumbered on TV Channels 60-69 in Northeast EAG

Percent of Pops Encumbered in EAG1 (Northeast) on Paired Channels 60-69 (buffered).

Total Pops in Area = 41,569,094

65.53

77.30

85.0382.39

74.88

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

60/65 61/66 62/67 63/68 64/69

C D

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D2C2PS PSC1 D1

746 806

762 777

Three or More TV Stations Encumber All Blocks in the 700 MHz Band in NYC

Channel 59-69 TV Incumbents Within 100 Miles of New York City792752747 782

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 6959

WBNE

WBPHTV

WPPX

WTICTV

WRNNTV

WACI

WMBCTV

WHSPTV

WHSITV

WHSETV

WFMZTV

Spectrum encumbered by:

One station:

Two stations:

Three or more:

WEDY

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How to End the Spectrum Drought

• Property rights and markets– Define flexible, exclusive and exhaustive spectrum

rights – Use markets to move spectrum to its highest value use

• FCC spectrum exchange during transition– Simultaneous market mechanism to restructure

fragmented spectrum– Wholly voluntary for incumbents– Incentives for incumbents to participate– Reduces transaction costs– Increases liquidity

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Proposal for Rapid Transition

• Flexibility: reallocate restricted spectrum to flexible, exclusive use

• FCC spectrum exchange: conduct series of large-scale, two-sided simultaneous auctions of spectrum voluntarily offered by incumbents together with any unassigned spectrum

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Proposal (continued)

• Incentives to participate– Immediately grant participants flexibility – Allow participants to keep the proceeds from

the sale of their spectrum– Participating incumbents share in increased

value from flexibility and value created by a rapid and efficient restructuring of the spectrum

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Proposal (continued)

• Incumbents not harmed– Non-participants: allowed to continue current

operations and would receive full flexibility in 5 years. – Participants: not required to sell to get immediate

flexibility. Can buy back their licenses.

• Expect incumbents to participate– Participation costs are low, nothing else to lose– No flexibility withheld– Participation serves efficiency by making explicit the

opportunity cost of keeping spectrum.

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Initial Implementation

• 413 MHz in the 300 to 3000 MHz range

• Reduce current spectrum shortages for high demand uses

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Removing Barriers to Flexible Use Isn’t Enough

• Unassigned spectrum needs to be available for flexible use

• Need to reconfigure existing spectrum into tradable property rights– Redefine interference limits in terms of outputs– Some licenses dissolve into flexible overlay

licenses

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Removing Barriers to Flexible Use Isn’t Enough (cont’d)

• Need to address coordination problem– Put all highly interdependent spectrum up for sale at the

same time – Mechanism to combine spectrum into efficient

packages

• Incentive problems may prevent efficiency-enhancing trades– Interests of spectrum managers vs. interests of firm as a

whole– Incumbents with incentives to strategically hold out

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Who Runs the Exchange?

• Why not a purely private spectrum exchange?– Who sells FCC held spectrum?

• The FCC is in the best position to solve the coordination problem– FCC holds unencumbered spectrum

– Little cost to adding licensed spectrum

– FCC has established credibility in conducting transparent auctions for spectrum rights

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Who Runs the Exchange?

• The FCC is in the best position to solve incentive problems of ensuring participation and mitigating hold-out problems– FCC regulatory authority over spectrum gives

it more carrots (e.g., conditional flexibility) and sticks than private parties

– Solving the coordination problem helps solve the participation problem

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Remaining Issues

• Design of exchange mechanism– Incumbents can bid on (and buy back) own

licenses in in band-restructuring auction– Exchange with rising bids and falling ask prices– Role of FCC as seller of spectrum

• Defining flexible spectrum rights to promote liquidity in the spectrum exchange

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Remaining Issues

• Application of exchange to specific exclusively allocated bands

• Promoting efficient use of spectrum not exclusively assigned to private parties– Public safety spectrum

– Public broadcasting spectrum

– Federal government spectrum

– Non-exclusive (e.g., private land mobile)

– Unlicensed spectrum (part 15)

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Federal Communications CommissionWireless Telecommunications Bureau

Melvin C. Del Rosario

MAY 1, 2000

TV and DTV Stations that Encumber Channel 67

Service

DTTV