A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs May-June 2000sill- · PDF fileA Professional Bulletin for...

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. HQDA PB6-00-3

A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs May-June 2000

DISCLAIMER: Field Artillery— is published bimonthly byHeadquarters, Department of the Army, under the auspices of theUS Army Field Artillery School (Building 746), Fort Sill, OK. The viewsexpressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defenseor its elements. Field Artillery's content doesn't necessarily reflectthe US Army's position and doesn't supersede information in otherofficial Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neitheraffirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsements.

PURPOSE: (as stated in the first Field Artillery Journal in1911): To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowl-edge and furnishing information as to the Field Artillery's progress,development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the otherarms, a common understanding of the power and limitations ofeach; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the differentarms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understand-ing between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all ofwhich objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION: Distribution (free) is to USArmy and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Components FA units:seven copies to corps artillery, division artillery and brigade head-quarters; 13 to battalions; and seven to separate batteries. Inaddition, readiness groups, recruiting commands, state adjutantgenerals, Army and Marine Corps libraries and schools, liaisonofficers and other Department of Defense agencies working with FAor fire support issues or materiel may request a free copy by writingto the Editor (see “Submissions”).

PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: May be obtained through theUS Field Artillery Association, P.O. Box 33027, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0027. Telephone numbers are (580) 355-4677 or FAX (580) 355-8745 (no DSN). Dues are $20.00 per year ($38.00 for two years and$56.00 for three years) to US and APO addresses. All others add$13.00 per subscription year for postage.

SUBMISSIONS: Mail to Editor, Field Artillery, P.O. Box33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Telephone numbers are DSN 639-5121/6806 or commercial (580) 442-5121/6806 or FAX 7773 withDSN or commercial prefixes. Email is [email protected]. Mate-rial is subject to edit by the Field Artillery staff; footnotes andbibliographies may be deleted due to space.

REPRINTS: Field Artillery is pleased to grant permission toreprint articles. Please credit the author and Field Artillery.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Field Artillery (ISSN 0899-2525) (USPS 309-010) is published bimonthly. Periodicals postageis paid by the Department of the Army at Lawton, OK 73501 and anadditional mailing post office. POSTMASTER: send address changesto Field Artillery, P.O. Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.

A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs

Redleg Hotline(Organization, Materiel, Doctrine and Training)

DSN 639-4020 or (580) 442-4020 (24-Hours)

Tactical Software HotlineDSN 639-5607 or (580) 442-5607 (24-Hours)

Field Artillery Home Pagehttp://sill-www.army.mil/famag

FA Branch at PERSCOMhttp://www-perscom.army.mil/opmd/fasitrep.htmhttp://www.perscom.army.mil/epfa/fa_ltr.htm

Editor:Patrecia Slayden Hollis

Assistant Editor:Linda L. Ritter

Art Director:Bob T. Coleman

Toney StricklinMajor General, United States ArmyField Artillery School Commandant

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army, 008801

Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

May-June 2000 HQDA PB6-00-3

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

INTERVIEW

4 Transforming the Army to Meet the 21st Century ThreatAn interview with General John W. Hendrix, Commanding General ofForces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

ARTICLES: Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander

7 Stop Selling Wolf-Tickets: An Objective Way of Accomplishing EFATsby Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth

11 A Day in the Life of a Brigade FSO at the NTCby Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Siltman and Captain Keith A. Casey

16 The Battalion/Task Force FSNCO and the MDMPby Sergeant First Class Edward J. Zackery

18 With the Click of a Mouse: Fratricide in BCTPby Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas D. Morgan

22 Role and Mission of the FA in TF Falcon, Kosovoby Lieutenant Colonel James M. Waring and Major C. Phillip Royce

27 Combined Arms Commander’s Guidance for Firesby Major Alvin W. Peterson, Jr., USMC, and Major D. Wayne Andrews

28 3x6 Divisional MLRS Battalion Capabilities and Constraintsby Major Burke A. Tarble and Captain Shawn P. Reese

31 Report to the Field: Tactical Operational Fire Support Conferenceby Brigadier General William F. Engel, Colonel R. Mark Blum andMajor Rafael Torres, Jr.

36 The Company FSO TLP and Briefing—Making Fires Happen inthe Close Fight

by Major Terry A. Ivester

40 Suppressing the Objective: Echeloning Fires in the Attackby Major Michael J. Forsyth

43 Seven Steps to Managing FSCMsby Major Patrick M. Manners

DEPARTMENTS

1 FROM THE FIREBASE

2 INCOMING

Front Cover: Paladins of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery in convoy at Fort Stewart,Georgia. (Photo by Don Teft)

Field Artillery May-June 2000 1

target location systems in light units arenot light enough.

We’ll address this issue in two ways.Beginning with the 3d Infantry Divi-sion (Mechanized) Artillery, FortStewart, Georgia, in third quarter FY00,we’ll field Bradley fire support teamvehicles (BFISTs). For light units, we’reprocuring a limited number of Vipers tooffset the lack of a light, viable preci-sion target location device. Viper willbe used in the Joint Contingency Force/Advanced Warfighting Experiment(JCF/AWE) at Fort Drum, New York,and the JRTC this spring and summer aswell as in the Initial Brigade CombatTeam (BCT) JRTC rotation in 2001.

We remain committed to our light-weight laser designator rangefinder(LLDR) under development. But Viperwill be one more tool to ensure successand enhance your credibility with com-bined arms commanders.

Better Institutional Training. We’rerestructuring the way we train fire sup-port officers (FSOs), NCOs and sol-diers on the equipment and proceduresthey’ll use in their units. Today’s targetlocation training techniques are essen-tially the same as they have been fordecades: students focus on hilltop ob-servation with a compass, a set of bin-oculars and a map and then adjust roundsonto the target.

Our officer basic course (OBC) ischanging to incorporate all precisiontargeting platforms into the lieutenants’shoots. Students will learn the impor-tance and necessity of accurate targetlocation as well as become familiar withthe equipment they’ll use in the field.

I want to change the mindset of ourcompany fire support teams (FISTs)and fire support NCOs. I want them toreject map-spot target location and de-mand the use of a ground/vehicularlaser locator designator (G/VLLD),LLDR, Viper or mini eye-safe laserinfrared observation set (MELIOS).

I’m confident that when we add thesetools to the FA unit “kit bag,” they’llimprove your combined arms com-mander’s ability to better synchronizefire support and accomplish his mis-sion. Field Artillery…King of Battle.

I want to take this opportunity tospeak directly to FA commandersand Field Artillerymen who sup-

port combined arms commanders. Youare the heart and soul of our collectivemission. You are the “soldiers on point”for our combined arms commanders,and you’re doing an excellent job.

At Fort Sill, we’re committed to help-ing you train better and to providing thetools you need to deliver the most timelyand accurate fires. Here are some of thetools we’re working on.

Better Simulations. Before your unitgoes “down range” on a training event,it should have the opportunity to prac-tice its mission-essential task list(METL) tasks in simulations. As part ofour Combat Training Center (CTC)negative trends reversal program, theFA School is working aggressively toaddress limitations that don’t allow yourcombined arms commander to synchro-nize his fire support in live, construc-tive and virtual simulations.

In his interview in this edition, Gen-eral John W. Hendrix, Commander ofForces Command, expresses his con-cerns that “…we aren’t replicating thedevastating effects of artillery rounds atthe NTC [National Training Center, FortIrwin, California] or JRTC [Joint Readi-ness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisi-ana].” This is an Army issue. Indirectfire is not replicated accurately at ourdirt CTCs in the simulated area weap-ons effects-multiple integrated laserengagement system II (SAWE-MILESII) and ground fire markers. The Army’sDeputy Chief of Staff for Operationsand Plans (DAMO-TR); the Simula-tions, Training and InstrumentationCommand (STRICOM); and the DeputyChief of Staff for Training of the Train-ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)are helping Fort Sill by funding changesto SAWE-MILES II to more accuratelyreplicate indirect fires.

But combined arms commanders mustbe able to synchronize fires better in allconstructive and virtual simulations. Our

strategy to do this has three major com-ponents: integrate fires training intomaneuver simulators—improve theclose combat tactical trainer (CCTT)and fully support the Infantry School’seffort to develop a dismounted versionof the CCTT; accurately replicate firesat the CTCs by modifying SAWE-MILES II; fix the replication of fires incurrent simulations, such as Janus, corpsbattle simulation (CBS) and brigade/battalion battle simulation (BBS), andensure the developmental WarfighterSimulation (WARSIM) 2000 accuratelyreplicates fire support effects.

Improved Doctrine. I delayed thepublication of FM 6-20-40 Tactics, Tech-niques, and Procedures for Fire Supportfor Brigade Operations to incorporate thetenets of the white paper “Fire Support forBrigade and Below” and the lessonslearned from the fire support focusedCTC rotation scheduled for August. Whenthe FM is published, it will fully supportthe new version of FM 71-3 The Armoredand Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

The FA School also is working closelywith the Army War College at Carlisle,Pennsylvania, to ensure the revised FM100-7 Decisive Force: The Army inTheater Operations properly outlinesfire support doctrine, organizations, re-sponsibilities, structure and inter-agencyinterface for joint force land componentcommanders (JFLCCs) and combinedforce land component commanders(CFLCCs). Our division and corps com-manders’ fire support elements (FSEs)and deep operations coordination cells(DOCCs) are inadequately resourced toplan and execute fire support for theirJFLCCs or CFLCCs. Our work withFM 100-7 will help solve this dilemma.

Accurate Target Location. This isthe weakest link in fire support. Timeafter time, lessons learned from CTCrotations indicate that target locationerror is the major obstacle to imple-menting an otherwise effective fire sup-port plan. Current target location plat-forms in heavy units are unreliable, and

Fire Support for theCombined Arms Commander

May-June 2000 Field Artillery2

I read “Fire Support Planning for theBrigade and Below” by Major David A.Lee and Colonel John A. Yingling[March-April 1999] with interest as Ifound that Combat Training Center(CTC) lessons learned are finally be-ginning to appear in our manuals. I alsodownloaded the longer “Fire SupportPlanning for the Brigade and Below”white paper from the Internet and foundit did an excellent job of clarifyingsome points in the article [see the FireSupport and Combined Arms Opera-tions Department (FSCAOD) portionof the FA School on the Fort Sill HomePage: http://sill-www.army.mil].

I have no argument with the thrust ofthe article or white paper. I do, how-ever, have some observations on por-tions of the discussion on essential firesupport tasks (EFSTs), a part of essen-tial Field Artillery tasks (EFATs) andwhat products the FSO [fire supportofficer] should provide as part of acompleted order.

EFSTs. Although I’m more familiarwith calling these tasks “critical” ratherthan “essential,” the basic componentsare clear; however, the Method portionof the EFSTs requires comment.

Priority. The whole idea of priority offires [POF] to a maneuver formationcontinues to amaze me. The Internetpaper tries to clarify priority as priorityof observer to the HPTs [high-payofftargets] identified instead of priority offires. The bottom line is if you providePOF to a maneuver unit, it will expectfires to support it and not support thebrigade commander’s intent.

In the decide, detect, deliver and as-sess targeting methodology, we iden-tify the target we want to hit, deploysensors to find the target and mass ourshooters to kill it. Frankly, we shouldnot care if a task force, COLT [combatobservation lasing team] or aviationunit finds a target.

The critical thing is to find the righttarget and kill it at a specific time in abattle. To avoid this priority of firespitfall, we instead established a “prior-ity of targets” vice “priority of fires”and briefed these targets during themission brief. That way, all subordi-nates understood what targets we wanted

to hit, when we wanted to hit them andhow the attack of those targets sup-ported their operations.

Allocations. In the example given inthe article, it simply isn’t good enoughto tell the battalion FDC [fire directioncenter] to shoot SEAD [suppression ofenemy air defenses] targets. The bri-gade FSCOORD [fire support coordi-nator] or FSO must clearly establish thenumber and type of rounds for eachtarget fired. Using battlefield calculus,the only way the FSCOORD/FSO candetermine if he can accomplish eachtask is if he states the number of roundsrequired for each mission and adds inthe shift time to the next set of targets.Otherwise, he risks “signing up” to morethan artillery can execute. It remains thebattalion FDC’s task to decide whichelement should fire and where that unitshould fire from, but the FSCOORD/FSO must know the number of roundsfired at each target and the shift time tothe next target.

Restrictions. There must be anotherplace to put restrictions than as integralto the EFST. Most of the restrictionslisted in the article look to be either SOP[standing operating procedures] or thosein effect for the duration of a battle—farbetter to put restrictions in the fire sup-port annex and only mention changesfor each EFST when they affect thetarget. This also helps reduce the size ofthe EFST, a topic I come back to later.

EFATs. My only comment on EFATsconcerns the idea of position areas (PAs).The whole concept of M109A6 howit-zers (which don’t require communica-tion lines and survey) is to integratethem well forward with maneuver togain the benefits of range and speed.We don’t want them in carefully hoardedPAs away from maneuver. In fact, wewant maneuver to become comfortablewith artillery intermixed in its formations.

An option we explored was to givemovement instructions to a unit. Anexample might be, “Travel immediatelybehind lead Bradley platoon and ad-vance no farther west than Grid Line045. During Phase II, follow the tankcompany forward to Grid Line 035 andprovide supporting fires onto the objec-tive.” This technique kept artillery well

forward and intermixed with maneuverbut out of the way of the ground tacticalplan. Ground maneuver commandersaccepted this movement concept whenit was briefed as part of the missionorder and rehearsal and when fires sup-ported maneuver throughout the depthof the battlefield.

Final Orders Product. I don’t see theneed for a fire support execution matrix(FSEM). If the Restrictions portion ofMethod from EFSTs is moved to thefires paragraph and you add executorsto targets relative to the time and eventsof the scheme of maneuver to yourscheme of fires, you don’t need anFSEM.

We chose, instead, to include this “en-hanced” scheme of fires in our orders.We briefed the order with it, rehearsedit at the maneuver and fire support re-hearsals and used it to track the execu-tion of the battle. Everyone (maneuverand fires) understood what we weregoing to do with fires for the entirebattle. A last bonus was it cut the size ofthe fires portion in an order, ensuringwe got our orders disseminated to oursubordinates in a more timely way.

Final Comments. It became clearreading the complete white paper thatboth heavy and light forces were ad-dressed. Comments like ensuring com-pany mortars and platoon FOs [forwardobservers] came to the orders processesare only applicable to light forces. WhileI admire this attempt to cover light andheavy together—and understand howyou actually may give PAs to artilleryand POF to the first unit on the groundwhile seizing a FOB [forward operatingbase]—I believe it just confuses readers.

The Army has two separate FM 6-30series fire support manuals: heavy andlight. I believe the Army has done thatbecause the fights are very dissimilar. Itmay be better to have white paperscalled “Fire Support Planning for theHeavy Brigade and Below” and “FireSupport Planning for the Light Brigadeand Below.”

LTC Brian T. Boyle, FAFire Coordination Cell

NATO ACE Rapid Reaction CorpsRheindalen, Germany

“Fire Support for Brigade and Below” White Paper


Climbing to Glory. Specialist FarlanBingham, 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artil-lery, receives a coin from BrigadierGeneral Gary D. Speer, Assistant Divi-sion Commander for Operations, 10thMountain Division (Light Infantry) at FortDrum, New York. Specialist Binghamreceived the coin in a ceremony on 26January as one of the division’s Heroesof the Month for his level of excellenceand responsibility. He works in a staffsergeant position and performs preven-tive maintenance, checks and servicesand is accountable for all the nuclear,biological and chemical equipment inthe battalion. (Photo by SFC William Graves)

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Hennigan,Jr., put “steel on target” in his Septem-ber-October 1999 article about AC-RC[Active Component-Reserve Compo-nent] team building. It was refreshing tosee the RC portrayed in such a positivelight by the AC, along with displayingan appreciation of capabilities as wellas our limitations.

A couple of notes, however. If hethinks it’s rough operating with only 27AGR [active Guard/Reserve] instead ofthe authorized 40 (and he recommendsmore), try operating with 11 AGR likemy FA battalion. As a result, our tradi-tional, part-time soldiers and leadersare strapped with terrific administrativeburdens that detract from their limitedtraining time.

The “unit vacancy promotion” systemhe doesn’t like is used as our state’smethod of promoting the best officers“below the zone.” ARNG [Army Na-tional Guard] officers do not face thesame DA [Department of the Army]board system as AC officers do; weonly are boarded once we approach

Response to “Walk a Mile in My Shoes:AC-RC Team Building”

maximum time-in-grade. Our officershave no other way to be promoted earlyfor excellence. At least in my state, theunit vacancy promotion requirementsare very difficult to achieve, so only thebest are promoted under this program.

I graduated from Valley Forge Mili-tary Junior College and went to FAOBC[Field Artillery Officer’s Basic Course,Fort Sill, Oklahoma] before completingmy BA degree. Additionally, we oftensend OCS [officer candidate school]graduates who have yet to completetheir degrees to OBC, so this is not anMOSQ [military occupational specialty-qualified]/deployability problem asLieutenant Colonel Hennigan suggests.Of course, rules are different from stateto state in the ARNG, so perhaps Loui-siana has different rules than Pennsyl-vania.

On a final note, kudos to the magazinefor publishing an edition dedicated toRC Redlegs.

CPT Anthony M. Smith, FA1-109 FA, PAARNG

The Field Artillery magazine staff hasmoved to Building 758 on McNair Road,right across from the east side of SnowHall, on Fort Sill, Oklahoma. We movedto a one-story stone building just westof where we were before; our buildingis next door to the Marine Corps De-tachment Headquarters building,Browne Hall.

Our telephone numbers (DSN 639-5121/6806 or 580-442-5121/6806) andFax number (7773 with DSN or commer-cial prefixes) remain the same—as well asour email address ([email protected])and mailing address (Post Office Box33311, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503-0311).

The US Field Artillery Associationoffices also recently moved to Building758. The Association produces the com-mercial version of Field Artillery—called the FA Journal.

Field Artillery is produced by the De-partment of Army for US Army andMarine Field Artillerymen, both ActiveComponent (AC) and Reserve Compo-nent (RC), and is distributed free: 13 to

every FA bat-talion and se-ven per head-quarters of acorps artillery,division artil-lery or separatebattery. In addi-tion, chiefs ofArmy branches,readiness groups,state adjutantsgeneral, militarylibraries, ROTCsand special unitsor organizations in other branches, ser-vices and agencies in the Department ofthe Defense that work with Field Artil-lery or fire support doctrine, organiza-tions, training or material are eligiblefor free copies of Field Artillery. If youare eligible and want to start receivingthe magazine, email [email protected].

The FA Journal is printed by the FieldArtillery Association for members: ser-vicemen who wish to receive personalcopies at their home addresses, retirees,

corporate members, al-lies and the interested general public.The FA Journal is a reprint of FieldArtillery with color, advertising andField Artillery Association news itemsadded.

If you are ineligible for a free copy ofthe magazine and would like to receivethe FA Journal, contact the Field Artil-lery Association at [email protected].

Ed.

Field Artillery Staff Moves


As the Commanding Generalof V Corps and the US Task Force

Hawk, part of NATO’s Operation Al-lied Force, what was your initial mis-sion and how did it change en route toKosovo?

Task Force Hawk was a uniqueorganization specifically config-

ured to conduct Apache deep strikesagainst the Army of Yugoslavia thatwas destroying the population and prop-erty of the small province of Kosovo.Initially, we were to deploy to Mace-donia and attack into Kosovo. But themission changed substantially when wewere en route—Macedonia wouldn’tgive us permission to conduct operationsfrom there, so we went into Albania.

There are dramatic differences be-tween Macedonia and Albania. Mace-donia was secure and had good air-fields, an established military logisticalsupport base and a border into Serbiathat was out-posted with observers. InAlbania, we had none of these and verysevere terrain. We had 9,000-foot moun-tains that created a narrow, predictablecorridor through which we’d have to at-tack from the Albanian border.

The threat to our forces in Albania wassignificantly greater. Large portions ofAlbania are affected by large, well or-ganized criminal elements that are wellarmed—they have hundreds of thou-sands of former Soviet automatic weap-ons and artillery pieces. The Army ofYugoslavia routinely crossed the Alba-nian border to attack the KLA [KosovoLiberation Army] that based a lot of itsoperations in the northeastern part ofAlbania along the Kosovo border. Ourforces were a 10-minute flight awayfrom 60 or so Army of Yugoslavia air-craft and vulnerable to Yugoslavianground force attacks out of Montenegroalong our north and northwestern bor-ders. So, en route, we restructured the

Q

INTERVIEW

A

force and added a Bradley battalion andother assets for ground security andmore artillery [see Figure 1].

The artillery part of the task force isinteresting. We took a combination of105-mm howitzers, Paladins and MLRS[multiple-launch rocket systems] thatwere ATACMS [Army tactical missilesystem]-capable. We needed to fireSEAD [suppression of enemy air de-fenses] for the Apaches from variousweapon systems, with the option of airassaulting the 105s closer to the Kosovoborder to increase our range.

We had plans to synchronize all ourartillery plus other deep attack assets,such as Army aviation, Air Force airand naval fires, both missile and highperformance aircraft—plus NATO as-sets. This was a very complex opera-tion, and our fire supporters were wellprepared and performed superbly.

In Task Force Hawk, what les-sons did we learn about targeting

and deep operations for joint and com-bined small-scale contingency opera-tions?

We learned, or relearned, a num-ber of important lessons. We

learned the first lesson very quickly: wecan’t always do in an actual operationwhat we do in a lot of our Warfighterexercises. In most of our BCTP [BattleCommand Training Program] War-fighters, we attack multiple times in onenight with the same formation. For ex-ample, we have one Apache battalionmake two deep attacks in the same nightand do that repetitively for nights onend.

The fact is, we can’t do that. We don’thave the helicopter crews, other per-sonnel or time to plan the attack routesand conduct all the required coordina-tion. We have to take a more realisticapproach in our exercises.

Now, in the BCTP’s defense, the War-fighter we conducted just before we de-ployed did more to prepare TF Hawk foroverall operations than any single train-ing piece. It was excellent training.

Lesson Number Two is that synchro-nization among the Air Force, Armyand Navy at the procedural level ismore difficult than in our peacetimetraining exercises. We need a fuller,more realistic integration of the proce-dures from each of the services into ourtraining exercises to prepare us for jointcontingencies. And every time we con-duct deep operations, they’re going tobe joint.

It was interesting that we had no prob-lems with some things people thoughtwe would—for example we put ourattacks on the Air Force ATO [air task-ing order]. We had been doing that in VCorps in our training exercises for morethan a year. When the attacks are on theATO, they are resourced with air assetsfor JSEAD [joint SEAD] and get com-plete air caps, when needed, and accessto more commo—assets not organic tothe Army.

Another very important lesson welearned is that the DOCC [deep opera-tions coordination cell] is a complex,robust organization that’s difficult toman out-of-hide but critical to our op-erations. It’s not on any corps or divi-sion MTOE [modified table of organi-zation and equipment].

General John W. HendrixCommanding General of Forces Command with Headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia

Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Editor

A

Q

Transforming the Army to Meet the

21st Century Threat


INTERVIEW

Figure 1: Task Force Hawk Task Organization

• Task Force Command Group (V CorpsHeadquarters-Minus)

• V Corps Artillery Headquarters-Minus

• 41st Field Artillery Brigade Headquar-ters

• 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery(Multiple-Launch Rocket System)-Plus

• 12th Aviation Brigade-Minus

• 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment(Two Squadrons of Apaches)

• 2d BCT, 1st Armored Division-Minus(Force Protection)

– 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mecha-nized) Augmented with A/4-27 FAPaladin and FA Target AcquisitionSection

– 2d Battalion, 505th ParachuteInfantry Regiment AugmentedC/1-319 FA M119

• 7th Corps Support Group-Minus

• 32d Signal Battalion-Minus

• Military Police Detachment

• Psychological Operations Detachment

• Special Operations Command andControl Element

*Commanded by a three-star admiral; included an air component commander (ACC) but no land component commander (LCC).**On order chain of command anticipated but not activated.

Figure 2: Task Force Hawk Chains of Command

Tactical/Operational (NATO)**

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Allied Forces South

Albanian Forces (NATO)

Task Force Hawk

Tactical/Operational (US)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Europe

Joint Task Force Noble Anvil*

Task Force Hawk

Title X (US)

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Seventh Army

V Corps

Task Force Hawk

The DOCC integrates deep operationsinto the larger operations planned at thedivision, corps or CINC [commander-in-chief] levels and involves joint re-sources, at a minimum, and often alliedresources. It’s a unique organization offire support element, aviation, G2 andG3 personnel who must plan and coor-dinate critical operations, say, to sendhelicopters deep across enemy lines af-ter high-payoff targets.

The DOCC calls for more assets thanwe can take from a division and stretchesa corps. The bottom line is that it’s timeto put the DOCC on the MTOE andtrain with it in combined arms and jointexercises.

In Albania, you had three chainsof command (see Figure 2). What

kinds of challenges did you face withthree chains of command?

We faced the same challengesothers have faced in military op-

erations in the past and will face in thefuture. If you read about command andcontrol issues as far back as World WarI and, especially, World War II, we hadcoalition chains of commands and USchains of command. Such a structurealways carries a fair number of chal-lenges.

I had very clear operational bosses inthe US chain of command and many ofmy bosses wore two hats. The Com-mander of Joint Task Force Noble An-vil was Admiral Jim Ellis who wore hisUS hat of CINCNAV [Commander-in-Chief of the US Navy in Europe] and hisNATO hat of CINCSOUTH [Com-mander-in-Chief, South]. General WesClark was the US CINCEUR [Com-mander-in-Chief of US Forces in Eu-

rope] and NATO’s SACEUR [SupremeAllied Commander in Europe]. We keptour chains separate and distinct. Fortu-nately, because the US brings a lot to thefight, US officers are often dual-hatted.

Initially, we had some difficulty figur-ing out who controlled what portions ofthe air space because no land compo-nent commander was designated for theoperation. But our real challenges werenot so much chain of command or com-mand and control but determining theright thing to do. Who should approve

targets—the CINC, JTF commander orair component commander? We had alot of US and NATO political con-straints to work through. Overall, I thinkour command and control worked verywell.

What are the contingency optionsthe Initial/Interim BCT [brigade

combat team] brings to the CINCs?What are the challenges to achievingthese capabilities?

The BCT brings the CINCs sig-nificantly increased strategic re-

sponsiveness and flexibility. This meansa CINC can have a lethal, survivableand mobile task force of brigade size onthe ground very quickly—96 hours, any-where in the world. That’s an incrediblecapability.

The overall goal for the future is toincrease the deployability of the entireArmy with a division on the groundanywhere in the world in 120 hours andfive divisions in 30 days.

The problem is today we have theworld’s best Army for what it was cre-ated to do. But the threat we were de-signed to overwhelm doesn’t exist—wewon the Cold War. We developed anArmy that could fight the former SovietUnion, the Warsaw Pact, on the plainsof Europe and win.

Instead, we now face a variety of re-gionally based instabilities throughoutthe world, involving lingering, oftenincreased, ethnic conflicts. These small-scale contingencies call for a credibleforce to get there quickly—hopefully,to deter the crisis from becoming war.We need lighter, more mobile vehiclesthat are more rapidly deployable, evenon our lightest aircraft.

A

Q

A

Q


INTERVIEW

But if war already has broken out,then we need to bring in a larger, morelethal and tactically capable warfightingforce and do that fast and well. There isno intent in the transformation to divestthe Army of its capability to fight a high-intensity conflict. But this future forcecannot require the mountains of logisticalsupport that our present force requires.

The old concept of the force was “Giveme your best punch and I’ll take it andthen punch you out.” The future forceconcept must be “You can’t hit me, butI can hit you and stop you in yourtracks.” The concept of the future forceis fundamentally different.

One challenge is to convince our Con-gressional leaders that the concept war-rants funding. We can’t transform theforce and change combat vehicles tomake the Army more deployable with-out additional funding.

A second challenge is to work with theindustrial community to refine and in-corporate the new technologies we needfor our objective force. Some of thetechnologies are already out there, andothers will take more time. We also havesome design and developmental work todo. We need a variety of complementaryweapons and digital communicationsand situational awareness systems.

The Army has established the re-quirement for the Interim BCT to

have an IAV [intermediate armored ve-

hicle]-based 155-mm self-propelledhowitzer in FY03 to FY10. How impor-tant is it for the FA in the Interim BCT tohave the same tactical mobility as thesupported force?

Absolutely critical. The tacticsclearly demand artillery with

equal or even superior mobility to itssupported force. It will require eight to10 years to bring all of the Interim BCTcombat pieces together with a commonchassis that will reduce our logisticalconsumption (common maintenanceprocedures, parts, fuel, etc.). We can’tdelay the start of the objective artillerysystem so it isn’t ready with the rest ofthe force.

Now, in the short-term, we have to usewhat’s immediately available—admit-tedly very different from the objectiveforce. For the Initial BCT, we’ll usestate-of-the-art, off-the-shelf IAVsslightly modified to meet our require-ments. The artillery for the Initial BCTwill be M198s. The Initial BCT will havethree maneuver battalions, a reconnais-sance battalion and an artillery battalion.

Executing the first Initial BCT willtake about another year and one-half—it will go to the JRTC [Joint ReadinessTraining Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana]for its first CTC [Combat Training Cen-ter] rotation in December 2001. Fun-damentally, the BCT will give us moresoldiers on the ground and have lighter,more tactically mobile combat vehicles—they could be tracked or wheeled.

What is your philosophy for train-ing live-fire combined arms op-

erations?

Live fire is essential—from theindividual soldier firing his

weapon up to the highest level of col-lective units we can afford to live fire.Generally, a soldier will master dry-firetechniques very quickly, whether usinghis M16 rifle, a tank or howitzer. But,when he live fires, there’s another levelof learning that takes place that he re-ally can’t get anywhere else. He needsto know firsthand the effects of hisweapon and have confidence in it andother systems on the battlefield. Andthat’s especially important when itcomes to artillery.

I’m concerned that we aren’t replicat-ing the devastating effects of artillery

rounds at the NTC [National TrainingCenter, Fort Irwin, California] or JRTC.We have lasers that replicate our tanksand anti-tank systems and our smallarms fire. But with artillery, we haven’tfound a good way to replicate its fire.

Until soldiers and leaders see a battal-ion fire for effect, they don’t understandthe impact of artillery on the battlefield.And once they’ve seen it, they’ll neverforget it. But until they do, they aren’t asfocused as they need to be on bringingartillery into their close fight.

Combined arms live-fire exercisesmake us pull it all together—they trainthe “nuts and bolts” of our business.One caution is that ammunition costs alot of money, so commanders up anddown the chain must ensure they use allrounds effectively to get the most out ofour training.

What message would you like tosend Army and Marine Field Ar-

tillerymen stationed around the world?

Be very proud. You are part of thegreatest military force the world

has ever known. The US military pro-vides security, stability and hope forpeople around world. Daily, you areentrusted with the sons and daughters ofAmerica and must accomplish criticalmissions around the globe—awesomeresponsibilities.

And after watching from the inside formore than 30 years, I can tell you, youare up to the challenge.

General John W. Hendrix assumed com-mand of Forces Command, with itsheadquarters at Fort McPherson, Geor-gia, on 23 November 1999. In his previousassignment, he was the CommandingGeneral of V Corps in Germany where hecommanded the US Task Force Hawk,part of NATO’s Operation Allied Forcethat stopped the ethnic conflict in Kosovo.He also commanded the 3d Infantry Divi-sion (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart,Georgia, and the Infantry Center and FortBenning in Georgia. General Hendrix wasDeputy Chief of Staff for Operations ofthe US Army in Europe, Assistant DivisionCommander of the 1st Armored Divisionduring Operation Desert Storm and Ex-ecutive Officer to NATO’s Supreme AlliedCommander in Europe/US Commander-in-Chief of Europe.

A

Q

A

Q

A

Q

GEN Hendrix mentors at the JRTC.


Have you ever sat in a Field Artil-lery support plan briefing andasked yourself, “Can this unit

handle all these EFATs [essential FAtasks]?” Remember, as artillerymen, ifwe say we can accomplish a mission,there’s a Grunt out there who will puthis life on the line, believing we willmeet our objectives. To help our fellowsoldiers, we must be realistic in portray-ing what we can and can’t do before thefirst bullet is ever fired. Easier said thandone, right?

One method to determine if we canaccomplish our EFATs was used by 6thBattalion, 27th Field Artillery (6-27 FA)multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)during our National Training Center(NTC) rotation at Fort Irwin, Califor-nia. The method didn’t work perfectlyin every battle; however, one thing itdid was help us and the direct support(DS) unit we were reinforcing (3-16FA) in the decision-making process bydetermining which FA unit could meeteach task given to the force FA head-quarters.

This article discusses the four steps inthe determination process, focusing onClass V issues as a primary example.However, the process easily works (andshould be worked) for all classes of

supply. To simplify the example, anMLRS unit is used due to the limitednumber of ammunition types capable ofbeing fired by the MLRS battalion, al-though the method will work for anyartillery battalion.

6-27 FA had a general support rein-forcing (GSR) mission to support 3-16FA. A Battery, 6-27 FA, had been de-tached to fire Army tactical missile sys-tem (ATACM) missions for X Corps,leaving 6-27 FA in control of two bat-teries (18 launchers). Our mission wasto fire an eight-target suppression ofenemy air defenses (SEAD) plan insupport of a division deep attack andprovide counterfire to destroy the 52dDivision Artillery Group (52d DAG).All other launchers could be used inreinforcing the fires of 3-16 FA.

Initially, the plan was for the maneu-ver brigade combat team—2d BCT, 4thInfantry Division (Mechanized)—toattack a motorized rifle company (MRC)while 6-27 FA defeated the other twoMRCs in the enemy covering force. 2dBCT also asked the artillery to keep the46th Regimental Artillery Group (46thRAG) from influencing the maneuverforce. Finally, 3-16 FA asked 6-27 FAto mass along the point of penetration(POP). 3-16 FA had the missions to

by Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth

An Objective Way ofAccomplishing EFEFEFEFEFAAAAATTTTTsssss

provide DS fires for the BCT, fire allsmoke missions and provide SEAD foran air insertion.

When the brigade commander firstgave us our missions, we wanted to say,“Yes, Sir, we’ve got you covered.” Herewas a maneuver commander who reallywas using his artillery. But could werealistically meet all these EFATs?

We used four steps to answer that ques-tion: analyze your assigned tasks, knowthe enemy, know your capabilities anddo the math. Once completed, thesesteps quickly told us realistically if wecould accomplish the EFATs and whichones we needed to revise.

Step 1: Analyze Your Tasks. I onceworked for a maneuver commander whotold me his artillery support had onlytwo tasks: keep the enemy from imped-ing his maneuver plan during offensiveoperations and disrupt the enemyscheme of maneuver so the enemycouldn’t mass on his attack objectiveduring defensive operations. Althoughthis guidance leaves room for interpre-tation on how to get the tasks done, Iwas surprised he never stressed thatartillery needed to kill stuff.

Often, we artillerymen get focused onhow much we are killing without reallyanalyzing whether our fires are achiev-ing the desired endstate. Is the currentrate of fire ensuring we have the capa-bilities to mass when needed? To keepthe enemy from supporting the POP,can we afford to place suppressive fireson the enemy and, thus, conserve am-munition? It’s important to ask aboutand understand the specific tasks beforedetermining options to get the job done.

Another chance for misunderstandingthe EFATs is in the military definitionsin operations orders (OPORDs). Doeseveryone have the same understandingof these definitions? Does the word“destroy” mean the same to an artil-leryman as it does to an armor battalioncommander? What exactly constitutes“destroying” an enemy unit?

OPORDs are filled with terms like“defeat,” “suppress” and “secure theobjective.” These are great terms for acommander or staff to forward guid-ance. However, to determine the detailsof how to accomplish the required tasks,maneuver and fire support must discussexactly what they mean and what’s ex-pected for each task.

2d B

CT,

4th

ID,

Terr

ain

Map


The first task we had a question on wasthe 4th Division Artillery’s (Div Arty’s)request for 6-27 FA to “destroy the 52dDAG.” After asking the Div Arty S3 tobe more specific, he said he wanted twoof every three batteries in every enemyartillery battalion in the 52d DAG to beincapable of firing. Although forcingthe DAG to move would make it diffi-cult to fire effectively, he requestedspecifically for casualties to degradethe DAG’s command and control. Ca-sualties of this amount should makecommand and control almost non-exis-tent. With these specifics, we estab-lished the EFAT would be to providecounterfire to destroy 67 percent of alltubes and launchers within the DAG.

The next question we had was aboutthe 2d BCT’s request to defeat twoMRCs. Further guidance explained that50 percent armored vehicle causalitieswithin both of these MRCs would de-grade MRCs’ ability to support the de-fense of the enemy’s third MRC. Over-all, the goal was to keep these forcesfrom displacing during the battle tosupport the MRC in contact.

The brigade would insert combat ob-servation lasing teams (COLTs) to re-port accurate grid locations to targets.Suppression or obscuring these targetswas considered an option if ammuni-

tion was tight. Therefore, the EFATwas to defeat two MRCs of the 46thMotorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) bydestroying 50 percent of the armoredvehicles in each MRC.

We continued this process to cover allour questions. 3-16 FA had tasked 6-27FA to provide counterfires to destroy67 percent or more of the tubes of the46th RAG and the request to “mass” atPOP was better defined as having thecapability to fire three 12-rocket mis-sions at targets of opportunity.

Could we meet all these requirements?At this point, we didn’t know, but atleast we understood our assigned tasks.

Step 2: Know the Enemy. The nextstep is to visit your S2. The bottom lineis you’ve got to know what’s in eachenemy unit before you can determinewhat you need to destroy in it. Under-standing the commander’s intent andknowing the enemy’s disposition tiedto each of the maneuver commander’stasks led the 6-27 FA staff to the infor-mation outlined in Figure 1.

Step 3: Know Your Capabilities. Thisstep is nothing more than assessing yourunit’s capabilities against each EFAT.6-27 FA uses a chart we received fromthe NTC (Figure 2) to help calculate theamount of ammunition required to de-stroy specific weapon types. The figure

shows the casualty assessments expectedper target type based on the number ofM26 MLRS rockets fired (listed acrossthe top). A similar chart can be pro-duced for other artillery systems or, at aminimum, you can use the attack guid-ance matrix (AGM) published in theOPORD.

Next, you determine what the size ofthe target is you are shooting at. Thishelps determine how much ammunitionyou should expend on each fire mission.

Because two of our EFATs focused ondestroying enemy artillery systems andwe knew the enemy fought with artil-lery battery formations, we quickly de-termined that 12-rocket (two-pod) firesper battery target would take out five ofthe enemy’s six artillery pieces (seeFigure 2). This was greater than the 67percent destruction required. Therefore,for the destruction of the 46th RAG and52d DAG, we determined that one hit ofan enemy artillery battery with 12 MLRSrockets essentially would cause thatbattery to be combat ineffective.

For the SEAD targets, the Div Artyprovided an eight-target fire plan andspecified six rockets per target.

In the case of the MRC targets, themaximum number of systems we rea-sonably could expect to destroy per firemission was one (given that the ve-hicles in the MRC likely would be dis-persed or, possibly, moving). We alsocould not be sure the observers wouldbe positioned to determine the targettype in the MRC (and, therefore, thenumber of rockets required for the kill),so we decided to fire six rockets pertarget—the number required for a tankkill. This assured we’d use sufficient ord-nance to destroy any target in the MRC.

How sure are you that each fire mis-sion will hit the target? Answering thisquestion determines the “accuracy fac-tor” or the number of times you mustshoot the required rockets at a giventarget before you are confident you killedit. In counterfire operations, this equalshow rapidly you can conduct your coun-terfire battle drill as compared to howfast the enemy artillery systems candisplace.

We believed we were trained to thestandard that we would always hit the2S1 and 2S5 battalions within theirseven-minute displacement time. There-fore, for these weapon systems, ouraccuracy factor was 1.0 or one fire mis-sion with one battery killed. For the2S19 battalions, we subjectively deter-mined that we could hit these units 33

EFAT #1: Fire SEAD to destroy eight light-skinned air defense targets alongthe division air attack route.

EFAT #2: Provide counterfire to prevent the DAG from affecting the friendlybreaching site. The required effects are to destroy 67 percent ofall tubes within the DAG. The 52d DAG consisted of 18 2S5 gunswith an expected displacement time of seven minutes, 18 BM-21MRLs with an expected displacement time of two minutes and 182S19 guns with an expected displacement time of three minutes.

EFAT #3: Defeat two MRCs of the 46th MRR to prevent them from support-ing the third MRC. Effects required are the destruction of 50 per-cent of the armored vehicles in each MRC. Each MRC was esti-mated to have three T-80 tanks and 10 BMPs.

EFAT #4: Provide counterfire to prevent effective fires from the RAG onfriendly forces. Effects required are to destroy 67 percent of alltubes within the RAG. The 46th RAG consisted of 18 2S1 guns withan expected displacement time of seven minutes and 36 2S19guns with an expected displacement time of three minutes.

EFAT #5: Mass along the breaching site to support the battalion task force’sseizing of the maneuver objective. 3-16 FA requested 36 rockets(six pods) available for targets of opportunity along the axis ofattack.

Legend:

Figure 1: Sample Essential Field Artillery Tasks (EFATs)

BMPs = Soviet-Made Tracked InfantryCombat Vehicles

DAG = Division Artillery GroupMRCs = Motorized Rifle Companies

MRLs = Multiple-Rocket LaunchersMRR = Motorized Rifle RegimentRAG = Regimental Artillery Group

SEAD = Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses


what missions should be reassigned toother weapons systems—before the battle.

Step 4: Do the Math. Finally, youneed to calculate what ammunition isavailable. During this battle, 6-27 FAwas under a “Do not exceed 50 percentof the UBL [unit basic load]” restric-tion. Therefore, of the 228 MLRS podsin our two batteries available to fire the

BMPs = Soviet-Made Tracked Infantry Combat Vehicles

DAG = Division Artillery Group

Figure 3: Initial Ammunition (Unit Basic Load) versus Ammunition Required to Accomplish the EFATs

Legend:

Total AmmoRequired

8 Pods

6 Pods24 Pods18 Pods

4 Pods5 Pods

4 Pods5 Pods

6 Pods36 Pods

6 Pods

122 Pods

114 Pods

8 Pods

None

Pods RequiredRequired Kills

1. Shoot SEAD

2. Destroy 67% of DAG:(12) 2S5 Guns(12) BM-21s(12) 2S19s

3a. Defeat First MRCs (50%):(2 of 3) T-80s(5 of 10) BMPs

3b. Defeat Second MRCs (50%):(2 of 3) T-80s(5 of 10) BMPs

4. Destroy 67% of the RAG:3 Batteries of 2S1s6 Batteries of 2S19s

5. Mass at Penetration:

Total Pods Required:

Total Ammunition Available:(2) M270 Batteries x 114 Pods (UBL) x 50% (Ammunition Restriction) =

Ammunition Shortage:

Ammunition for Targets of Opportunity:

8 (8 Different Targets)

3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)

2 (2 Different Targets)5 (5 Different Targets)


3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)6 (5/6 per Battery Hit)

1

222

11

11

22

1.0

1.04.03.0

2.01.0

2.01.0

1.03.0

MRCs = Motorized Rifle CompaniesRAG = Regimental Artillery Group

SEAD = Suppression of Enemy Air DefenseUBL = Unit Basic Load

AccuracyFactorEFAT

percent of the time—an accuracy factorof 3.0 on the average. This meant wehad to shoot the target three differenttimes before we could be confident wedestroyed it.

We believed we could beat the two-minute BM-21 displacement time 25 per-cent of the time (accuracy factor of 4.0).So we had to fire on each BM-21 targetfour times to be confident we destroyed it.

For all other targets, observers coulddetermine the location of the target andguarantee the targets would be station-ary. We gave these targets an accuracyfactor of 1.0.

Later, T-80 tank targets were adjusted toan accuracy factor of 2.0 due to the factthey were dug in. The matrix in Figure 2shows a tank target in the open requires aminimum of six rockets to destroy. Weconservatively decided we might have tofire six rockets on the dug-in tank twicebefore it became inoperative.

Some may claim this step is too sub-jective. However, each unit is uniqueand needs this subjectivity to factor in itstraining status. The goal is to determinewhat missions your unit can handle and

EFATs, we could fire only 114 of them.This was a critical degradation in kill-ing power and key in determining ourabilities to meet our EFATs.

The expected ammunition expendi-ture of all the EFATs given to 6-27 FAduring this battle is shown in Figure 3.The figure shows the amount of ammu-nition needed for each EFAT, based on

1

4

12

2

6

1

2

X

X

X

Rockets

Platoon

Company

Troopsin Open

TroopsDug-In

NoO/H

Platoon

Company

Platoon

CompanyWithO/H

Artillery

Armored Personnel Carriers

Tanks

2

8

24

3

8

2

3

X

X

X

3

9

27

3

9

2

3

1

1

X

5

12

36

4

11

2

4

2

2

X

4

11

33

3

10

2

3

1

1

X

6

13

44

4

12

2

4

2

2

1

7

13

45

4

13

3

4

3

3

1

8

14

46

5

14

3

5

3

3

1

9

15

47

5

15

3

5

4

4

1

10

15

48

5

16

3

5

4

4

1

11

16

49

6

17

4

6

5

5

2

12

16

50

6

18

4

6

5

5

2

Figure 2: Expected Kills by Target Type. Across the top of the matrix are the number of M26rockets fired. Down the left side are the target types. The numbers in the matrix are thecasualties expected per rockets fired, based on the target types.

No O/H = No Overhead Cover With O/H = With Overhead CoverLegend:


Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth is theChief of the G3 Rear Plans Branch for theEighth US Army in Korea. In June, he willtake command of the 2d Battalion, 18thField Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Brigade,III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Hisprevious assignments include serving asExecutive Officer of the 75th Field ArtilleryBrigade, III Corps Artillery, and as the S3 forthe 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, alsopart of the 75th Field Artillery Brigade. Heserved as a Team Chief at the US ArtificialIntelligence Center in the Pentagon and asService Battery Commander and BattalionS4 for the 2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery,part of the 1st Armored Division in Ger-many. Lieutenant Colonel Ashworth holdsa Master of Science in Computer Sciencefrom Texas A&M University.

Figure 4: Final Ammunition Expenditure Plan to Accomplish the EFATs

Total AmmoRequired

4 Pods

6 Pods24 Pods18 Pods

4 Pods5 Pods

6 Pods36 Pods

6 Pods

109 Pods

114 Pods

5 Pods

Pods RequiredRequired Kills

1. Shoot SEAD

2. Destroy 67% of DAG:(12) 2S5 Guns(12) BM-21s(12) 2S19s

3. Defeat One MRC (50%):(2 of 3) T-80s(5 of 10) BMPs

4. Destroy 67% of the RAG:3 Batteries of 2S1s6 Batteries of 2S19s

5. Mass at Penetration:

Total Pods Required:

Total Ammunition Available:(2) M270 Batteries x 114 Pods (UBL) x 50% (Ammunition Restriction) =

Additional Ammunition Available for Targets of Opportunity:

8 (8 Different Targets)

3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)


3 (5/6 per Battery Hit)6 (5/6 per Battery Hit)

0.5

222

11

22

1.0

1.04.03.0

2.01.0

1.03.0

AccuracyFactorEFAT

the number of targets to hit and the a-mount of ammunition planned for eachtarget, factoring in the effectiveness rat-ing. By subtracting the required amountfrom the ammunition available, you de-termine the shortfall or excess available.In our case, we didn’t have enough am-munition to cover all our EFATs.

Here is where we earn our paychecks.We had to come up with at least eightpods of ammunition. First, we asked DivArty to reduce the restriction on ammuni-tion. Div Arty quickly denied our request.

Next, we reduced the fire for eachSEAD target from six to three rockets(0.5 pods). These targets were less pro-tected than the “APC” target categoryshown in Figure 2. Thus, the reductionstill adequately met the requirements forkilling each target. We presented this

logic to the Div Arty, which approved thereduction. This saved four pods of am-munition (eight SEAD targets).

Finally, the maneuver commander re-moved one of the MRCs from 6-27FA’s EFATs and had helicopters destroythe company. This saved nine pods, giv-ing us the confidence that we’d have theammunition required to accomplish theEFATs plus a few additional pods fortargets of opportunity. Figure 4 shows ourfinal ammunition plan.

After completing the four steps, theFA tactical operations center (TOC) hasseveral decisions to make before thebattle begins: Which battery shoots eachEFAT—are units positioned properly?Does the ammunition need to be down-loaded? Who’s tracking the ammuni-tion to specific tasks? Do force protec-

Redlegs work in the 6-27 FA (MLRS) battalion TOC at the NTC (1998).

tion issues need to be solved beforetargets are fired? When are the fireplans going to arrive and be rehearsed?

However, finalizing the EFATs planbefore determining if resources areavailable to execute the plan may doomat least one of your critical tasks tofailure. You gain the flexibility to ad-just for unplanned situations duringbattle when you understand your tasks,your capabilities and limitations and howresources are allocated before the battlestarts. Without this attention to detail, youenter the battle guessing if you can ac-complish your objectives rather than con-fident you can execute your EFATs.


The brigade fire support officer(FSO) looked with bleary eyes atthe division planners issuing the

division order to the brigade staff. Itwas 1300. He had been up since 0300,and the brigade combat team (BCT) hadfought a defense-in-sector in the vicin-ity of Whale Gap all morning. The BCThad just issued a new order for a move-ment-to-contact to the task forces; theplanners at the National Training Cen-ter (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, weregiving the BCT staff an order for asecurity zone attack.

After receiving the order, the BCTstaff members get into their high-mo-bility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles(HMMWVs) to find the tactical opera-tions center (TOC). The TOC is moving20 kilometers to Hill 720 for the BCT toinitiate the movement-to-contactthrough the central corridor. The staffarrives ahead of the TOC, but the S3 hadsent the plans section forward with thequartering party, and the section is setup for the staff to begin the militarydecision-making process (MDMP). It’s1430.

Mission Analysis Briefing/IssueWARNO. The S3 allots an hour for themission analysis and schedules a mis-

sion analysis briefing to the BCT com-mander at 1600. The brigade FSO un-derstands from the white paper “FireSupport Planning for the Brigade andBelow” (16 September 1998) that firesupport planning must be effective, in-tegrated and executable, and he under-stands the division’s maneuver and firesupport plan.

The brigade FSO and the targetingofficer dissect the information in the or-der. They conduct a time analysis, orga-nize facts and assumptions, identify thespecified and implied tasks, translate as-sets into capabilities and, finally, conductan analysis of the effects of the intelli-gence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)on fire support. The FSO briefs the mis-sion analysis, covering the topics in Fig-ure 1 on Page 12.

The BCT commander then issues hisintent and guidance for fires, includingthe information listed in Figure 1. Thebrigade commander also issues guid-ance for the combat observation lasingteam (COLT) platoon leader and re-connaissance and surveillance (R&S)preparations.

Armed with the initial guidance, thebrigade FSO issues a fire support warn-ing order (WARNO) to the subordinate

units, including the direct support (DS)and reinforcing battalion S3s. TheWARNO communicates the outputsfrom the mission analysis with the ap-proved essential fire support tasks(EFSTs) and the fire support timeline,at a minimum. This allows the FSO’ssubordinate units to conduct concurrentplanning to support the plan.

COA Development. At 1900, the staffbegins the course of action (COA) de-velopment. The process is short, as thecommander already has outlined twodetailed concepts in his intent.

The FSO and the targeting officer be-gin the COA development to determinethe “how” of fires execution from the“what” of mission analysis. They beginplanning the method of how to accom-plish the EFSTs—determining whereto find and attack the enemy forma-tions, identifying the high-payoff tar-gets (HPTs) in those formations andquantifying the effects required.

The FSO and the targeting officer inconcert with the brigade staff beginplanning a method for each EFST. Theyallocate assets to detect and attack eachformation to achieve the desired ef-fects. The entire staff works together tointegrate the fire support events or ac-tions into a maneuver plan.

At the completion of the COA devel-opment, the assistant brigade FSO con-ducts feasibility testing using battle cal-culus and doctrine to validate the plan.The outputs from the COA develop-ment are listed in Figure 1. The FSOissues a WARNO 2 that covers theoutputs of the COA development.

Wargame. The brigade executive of-ficer (XO) scheduled the wargame tostart at 2100. The FSO, assistant FSOand targeting officer are prepared withinitial position areas for artillery (PAAs)and the outputs of COA development.The wargame helps the FSO finalize theplan through to the targeting decisions,visualize and synchronize the plan withmaneuver, test and refine the plan andfinally modify it, as necessary. (SeeFigure 2 on .)

After the wargame ends at 0200, thefire support NCO (FSNCO) conducts aquality control check of the wargameoutputs. This ensures the annex has thewargame products listed in Figure 1.Figure 3 on Page 14 shows an exampleof the brigade scheme of fires productbased on the scheme of fires visualizedin Figure 2. After the brigade XO ap-proves the annex, it’s included in theorders production set for 0600.

A Day in the Life of aA Day in the Life of aA Day in the Life of aA Day in the Life of aA Day in the Life of aBrigade FSO at the NTCBrigade FSO at the NTCBrigade FSO at the NTCBrigade FSO at the NTCBrigade FSO at the NTC

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Siltmanand Captain Keith A. Casey

Brig

ade

Sta

ff D

urin

g W

arga

min

g


FSO’s Mission Analysis Fire Support Briefing

• Fire Support Status, Capabilities and Limitations• Number of Missions per Munition Type• Mission Timeline• Mission Constraints and Restrictions• Recommended Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)

Brigade Commander’s Guidance for Fires

• Approved EFSTs (Includes Specific Effects on Enemy Formations)• Use of Special Munitions• Force Protection Considerations• Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations and Other Amplifying Data

Course of Action (COA) Development Fire Support Products

• Concept of Fires• Draft of Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM)• Draft Target List Worksheet with Overlay• Draft Scheme of Fires• Collection/Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan (R&S)

COA Wargame/Fire Support Annex Products

• Fires Paragraph• FSEM• Scheme of Fires• Target List with Overlay• High-Payoff Target List (HPTL)• Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)• Target Selection Standards (TSS) Matrix

Brigade Fire Support Rehearsal Attendees

• Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD)• Brigade FSO and S3• Task Force FSOs• Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) Platoon Leader• Direct Support (DS) Battalion S2, S3, Fire Direction Officer (FDO) and

Signal Officer• Reinforcing FA Battalion Commander and S3.

Figure 1: Brigade FSO’s Checklist for the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

Rehearsals. At 1000, the brigade FSOconducts roll call for the brigade firesupport rehearsal for the movement-to-contact. The attendees are listed in Figure1. The FSO gives the BCT commander’sintent and the operation overview beforehanding it over to the fire support coordi-nator (FSCOORD) for comments.

After the FSCOORD gives his guid-ance, the FSO begins the rehearsal bycovering the EFSTs, fire support coor-dinating measures (FSCM) and priori-ties of fire for the operation. The S2then sets the enemy situation, and perthe BCT rehearsal agenda, each playerstates his actions, correlating maneuverand fires in turn. Each task force FSOand the COLT platoon leader state themaneuver action and how fires are syn-chronized, briefing each of his EFSTs,including the primary and alternate ob-servers, target, trigger and effects foreach critical event.

The air liaison officer (ALO) gives theaircraft time on station and number ofsorties, close air support (CAS) targetsand airspace coordination areas (ACAs).He also covers suppression of enemyair defenses (SEAD) and marking roundprocedures.

The S3s for both FA battalions discussmovement, triggers, range requirementsand positioning issues. The targetingofficer covers critical friendly zones(CFZs), call-for-fire zones (CFFZs) andradar positioning and movement. Thefire direction officer (FDO) covers eachEFST by method of attack, systems androunds fired, shift times and ammuni-tion issues.

The briefers repeat the process foreach phase and discuss coordinating in-structions and issues. The FDO alsoreviews the target list. The FSCOORDmakes concluding comments to ensureeveryone is prepared for the combinedarms rehearsal.

It is 1100, and the BCT combinedarms rehearsal for the movement-to-contact is underway. The S3 briefs theBCT maneuver action, and then theFSCOORD briefs BCT fires. The FSOstands by with the fire support execu-tion matrix (FSEM) to assist with anyquestions or issues. As each task forcecommander completes his briefing ofhis maneuver action, the task force FSObriefs the corresponding fires event.

Because the fire support rehearsal hadbeen very detailed, the synchronizationof fires and maneuver goes very well.At the end of the combined arms re-hearsal, the scheme of fires has been

confirmed with a clear understandingof what the EFSTs are, how they are tiedto the scheme of maneuver, who theobserver is, what the target is and whatthe trigger is.

At 1700, after issues are resolved fromthe rehearsals and the task forces haverefined the targets and CFZs, the assis-tant FSO begins the net call for the firesupport FM rehearsal. This is the finalopportunity to verify the target list, nofire areas (NFAs) and FSCMs for theBCT. This is an essential event to makefinal refinements to the plan. It alsoallows the company FSOs to monitorthe BCT-level rehearsal and hear thescheme of fires.

Execution. The brigade FSO is in theTOC at 0300 to prepare the battle up-date brief for the movement-to-contact.He meets the targeting officer and theFSCOORD and reviews the target listone last time, verifying the status of the

COLTs, reviewing target intelligenceupdates from the S2 and making finaltarget refinements. He also reviews thecombat power of the subordinate firesupport elements (FSEs) and firing units.

At 0330, the BCT commander is up-dated in the TOC. Then he and theFSCOORD get in the commander’sM113 armored personnel carrier tomove to the tactical command post(TAC), which is positioned forward.

The BCT crosses the line-of-depar-ture (LD) at 0400 to execute the move-ment-to-contact. In the TOC, the FSOremains at the battle board with the XO,ALO, S2, battle captain and assistantbrigade engineer (ABE).

Initially, the information flow is slow.The FSO uses his remote handset to talkto the FSCOORD and the task forceFSOs to keep accurate situational aware-ness. The brigade XO and the brigadeFSO conduct several informal targeting


meetings to synchronize all aspects offires to the current friendly situation.

At one point, the brigade ALO givesthe 20-minute warning as CAS reachesthe initial point (IP). The brigade XO, S2and FSO, along with the air defense of-ficer (ADO), work closely with the bri-gade ALO to ensure CAS has the properfocus and pilots know the target locationsand formation sizes. The staff also en-sures SEAD is accomplished and the cor-rect ACAs are in effect. As the CASdeparts the IP, the brigade FSE executesits battle drill for initiating the markinground for the SEAD fires and activatingand inactivating the appropriate ACAs.

Receives New Order. After the changeof mission, the FSCOORD and BCTcommander are involved in the com-mander of the operations group’s (COG)post-battle review. The staff arrives at

the TAC at 1200 to issue the order for asecurity zone attack.

Once all subordinate commanders arepresent, the S3 and FSO brief the planusing a maneuver and fires format foreach phase. At the conclusion of the or-der, if there are no issues, the FSO huddleswith the task force FSOs for 10 minutes toensure all understand the scheme of firesand responsibility for EFSTs.

After the staff issues the order to thetask forces at 1330, the division plan-ners prepare to issue the order for thedeliberate attack. And so the MDMPcycle begins again.

Developing the FSO. To have a suc-cessful rotation at the NTC, the DSbattalion must train its FSEs on criticaltactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) at home station and prepare themfor the NTC battle rhythm.

4445

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

05

04

03

02

01

00

99

98

97

96

COLT 1

C Co

A Co

B Co

Chevy

Ford

Buick

COLT 2

AC0003

AC0009

AC0010

EA Stab

A32C

2-2 AR

1-1 IN

A01C

2d B

de

3d B

de

B1

PL Dog

PL Cat

(CFL)

AC2011AC2002

A1

EA Kill

X

A21C

EA Chevy

3,6

EA Ford

5

7

2,4

1

1. CAS Deep2. Grp A01C on AGMB at Pass3. Grp A21C or A32C on AGMB

at ZOP4. Grp A01C on MB at Pass5. CAS Against MB Close6. Grp A21C or A32C on MB at ZOP7. Rockets on RAG

Sequence

Figure 2: Brigade Scheme of Fires Visualized

AGMB = Advanced Guard Main BodyAR = Armor

Bde = BrigadeCAS = Close Air Support

CFL = Coordinated Fire LineCo = Company

COLT = Combat Observation Lasing TeamEA = Engagement Area

Grp = Group

IN = InfantryMB = Main BodyPL = Phase Line

RAG = Regimental Army GroupZOP = Zone of Penetration

Legend:

The BCT and task force staffs mustconduct the MDMP and orders processmultiple times with all participants whowill be involved in the NTC deploy-ment. This is essential for developingthe standing operating procedures(SOPs), division of duties for FSE per-sonnel and the FSE battle drill. Theprocess must be conducted under con-strained conditions to get the staff usedto producing a good product while work-ing under pressures similar to those atthe NTC.

There are several key relationshipsthe brigade FSO has to develop to suc-ceed. First among these is the BCT S2,then the ALO, the ABE and the aviationliaison officer (LNO). The FSO, S2 andtargeting officer have to work closely toensure the targeting team functions ef-fectively and constantly update one an-


A01C

Disrupt MB east ofPL Cat.

Attrit MB deep toallow TF direct fireadvantage.

MB at NAI 3

155/MLRS

AC0003, AC0009,AC0010

570103465674028156120221

1-51 FA (DS)4-7 FA (R)

DPICM

Battery 6 and 6Rockets per Target

COLT 2

55910489

COLT 1

53940189

3x BMP6x T-80 Destroyed

FSCL PL BobCFL PL Cat

CFZ establishedover TF BPs.

Figure 3: Example of Brigade Scheme of Fires

ACA = Airspace Coordination AreaAFAC = Airborne Forward Air Controller

AGMB = Advanced Guard Main BodyBMP = Tracked Infantry Combat VehicleBPs = Battle PositionsCAS = Close Air SupportCFL = Coordinated Fire LineCFZ = Critical Friendly Zone

Fire SupportEvent

Task

Purpose

Trigger

Method

Target Number

Target Location

Unit

Munitions

Volume

Priority Observer

ObservationPost Location

AlternateObserver

ObservationPost Location

Effects

FSCM

ACA

Remarks

Phase 1

CAS with SEAD

Disrupt AGMBeast of pass.

Attrit AGMB toallow TF improvedCOFM.

AGMB at NAI 1

MLRS

AC1000

59821433

2x A-104-7 FA (R)

GBU-82DPICM

6 Rockets

COLT 2

55910489

AFAC



ACA Blue


1 1 1 2

A01C

Disrupt AGMB eastof PL Cat.

Attrit AGMB deepto allow TF directfire advantage.

AGMB at NAI 3

155/MLRS

AC0003, AC0009,AC0010

570103465674028156120221

1-51 FA (DS)4-7 FA (R)

DPICM

Battery 6 and 6Rockets per Target

COLT 2

55910489

COLT 1

53940189



CFZ establishedover TF BPs

A21C or A32C

Disrupt AGMB atobstacle.

Allow TF todestroy with directfires in EA Kill.

AGMB at EA Fordor EA Chevy

155

A21C = AC2002,AC2011, AC2021

492398194982983648789886

1-51 FA (DS)

DPICM

Battery 6 perTarget

B Company

49899739

A Company

45489847




A21C or A32C

Disrupt AGMB atobstacle.

Allow TF todestroy with directfires in EA Kill.

AGMB at EA Fordor EA Chevy

155

A32C = AC2031,AC2040, AC2052

460000894601012246230151

1-51 FA (DS)

DPICM

Battery 6 perTarget

C Company

47210292

A Company

45489847




COFM = Correlation of Forces MatrixCOLT = Combat Observation Lasing Team

DPICM = Dual-Purpose ImprovedConventional Munition

(DS) = Direct SupportEA = Engagement Area

FSCL = Fire Support Coordination LineFSCM = Fire Support Coordinating Measures

GBU = Guided Bomb UnitMLRS = Multiple-Launch Rocket System

MB = Main BodyNAI = Named Area of InterestPL = Phase Line(R) = Reinforcing

SEAD = Suppression of Enemy Air DefensesTF = Task Force

Legend:

other to refine targets and battlefieldsituational awareness.

The ALO must be integrated into eachtraining event the BCT conducts. TheFSO must be aggressive in developinga relationship with the ALO and includehim in training if the ALO is not aggres-sive in involving himself. It is critical

the BCT staff and the FSE specificallydevelop a simple and effective CASbattle drill, including the FA battalionfor SEAD operations and markingrounds. If at all possible, the FSO shouldstart planning six to eight months inadvance to request live CAS at homestation to train the methodology for

airspace deconfliction and SEAD andmarking round timing.

One member of the FSE should be-come the expert and point-of-contactfor CAS and artillery integration. Theaviation LNO also must have a closerelationship and develop good SOPswith the FSE to establish Army airspace


Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Siltman is theBrigade Fire Support Trainer at the Na-tional Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin,California. He has served as the DivisionArtillery S1, Fire Support Officer (FSO) forthe 2d Brigade and Executive Officer for the1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, all in the 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized) at FortStewart, Georgia. Other assignments in-clude serving as the Fire Direction Officer(FDO), Platoon Leader and S1 in the 3dBattalion, 6th Field Artillery, part of the 1stInfantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley,Kansas, and as the S2, FDO and B BatteryCommander with the 5th Battalion, 17thField Artillery, VII Corps Artillery in Ger-many. Lieutenant Colonel Siltman is agraduate of the Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Captain Keith A. Casey is the AssistantBrigade Fire Support Trainer at the Na-tional Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin.He also has served as the Armor TaskForce Fire Support Trainer at the NTC. Hisprevious assignments include serving as aCompany FSO with A Company and theBattalion FSO, both with the 1st Battalion,501st Infantry, part of the 172d InfantryBrigade (Separate), Fort Richardson,Alaska. Also with the 172d Brigade, he wasan FDO, Battery Executive Officer, SupportPlatoon Leader and S4 in the 4th Battalion,11th Field, which is direct support to the172d. He served as the S2 and Task ForceFSO for 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry and as BBattery Commander in the 1st Battalion,82d Field Artillery, all in the 1st CavalryDivision at Fort Hood, Texas.

command and control (A2C2) proceduresand SEAD drills for the BCT and inte-grate Army aviation operations.

The ABE has to understand the rela-tionship of fires and obstacles. He briefsthe FSO on the obstacle plan and coor-dinates indirect fires and the observersthe BCT wants on those obstacles. Healso either must understand how a fam-ily of scatterable mines (FASCAM)minefield affects the delivery of fires orat least know that any FASCAM heplans has to be coordinated with theFSO—not planned in isolation.

The FSE should develop an easily un-derstood annex that can be used at alllevels to execute the scheme of fires. Itcan be a matrix, a sketch with notes,written or a combination of those. Mostof all, it must be extremely detailed,listing EFSTs, targets, primary observ-ers, alternate observers, triggers, firingunits, method of attack, quantified ef-fects, FSCMs, priority of fires (POFs),coordinating instructions and remarks,at a minimum.

Units must have an SOP that lays outdetailed rehearsals with a clear agenda.Rehearsals generally should be con-ducted before the BCT combined armsrehearsal so the FSCOORD can ensurefires are synchronized ahead. It’s im-perative that fire support rehearsal at-tendees are there on time and preparedto brief.

The fire support rehearsal is run by theFSO as he planned the operation andunderstands it best. This allows theFSCOORD to absorb the plan, see prob-lems and identify issues. The FM re-hearsal is the confirmation of the firesupport plan after refinements from thecombined arms rehearsal and intelli-gence updates are completed. It alsorehearses the communications net andincludes the verification of the targetlist and FSCM.

The targeting meeting is the most ne-glected event of the planning process.Often, it is a “hand wave” or a tokenmeeting. The maneuver leaders need totake ownership of this event. This is notonly where fire supporters develop theHPTL, but also where they set prioritiesand develop a collection plan to supporttheir targeting priorities.

The targeting team plans fires for thebrigade to engage the enemy. The bri-gade staff must forecast and anticipateevents to attack the enemy simulta-neously throughout the battlefield.

The targeting effort is the critical de-cide element in the decide-detect-de-

liver-assess methodology. The decidefunction is important and requires closeintegration between the commander, S2,S3 and the FSE cell.

The targeting team includes, but is notlimited to the brigade commander, bri-gade XO, brigade S2, brigade S3, DSFA battalion commander (FSCOORD),brigade FSO, targeting officer and in-telligence and electronic warfare sup-port element (IEWSE) personnel. Alsoincluded are other staff members, asnecessary, including the ALO, chemi-cal officer, S3 air, ADO, engineer and,if the unit has a brigade reconnaissancetroop (BRT), its commander.

The targeting meeting takes manyforms, both formal and informal, thatinclude combinations of the targetingteam members, depending on mission,enemy, terrain, troops and time avail-able (METT-T) throughout the plan-ning and execution cycle of battle.

The brigade, task force and companyFSOs train on building engagement ar-eas (EAs) as part of a combined armsteam. This includes developing goodtargets, getting the grids of the targetsusing the precision lightweight globalpositioning system receivers (PLGRs)and identifying triggers in the sameway. FSOs should use battle calculus todevelop technical and tactical triggers,triggers for the transition of fires deepto close and triggers or criteria for thecommander to shift priorities of fire.

The unit should develop standardizedtrigger and target marking kits and trainfire support teams (FISTs) to use themat home station—important tools forFSOs. The fire supporters also mustlearn how the enemy fights, how heuses terrain, and how to target and planobservation posts (OPs) based on theenemy’s doctrine.

A performance trend at the NTC isunits are not planning OPs that supportthe scheme of fires. Units need to trainon placing observers to execute theEFSTs and planned targets. Too often,the FISTs or COLTs are behind terrainor in the wrong place to see the target,erect the targeting head and execute themission.

First, the observer responsible for atarget must be identified and OPsplanned that support attacking that tar-get using terra-base products. Addition-ally, units must train FSOs and com-manders that observers must get to ter-rain where they can see the target ontime and have their equipment ready toobserve and execute.

The art of fire support is hard and,unlike the science aspects of gunneryand battle calculus, requires judgmentand experience to be successful. Tohelp develop the FSO’s fire support art,we have outlined some TTPs for suc-cess at the NTC or on any battlefield.

What makes the difference in unitperformance is a rigorous, well-plannedhome-station training program that an-ticipates the missions and battle rhythmof the NTC. Ultimately, the key to suc-cess is a standardized method of plan-ning, preparation and execution tied tosolid SOPs that have been practicedunder various conditions and con-straints.

As observer/controllers (O/Cs), ourmandate is to coach, train and mentorfire supporters who come to the NTC.We are committed to helping units learnto fight most effectively on the NTCbattlefield. Train the Force!


Sergeants first class (SFCs) work-ing in battalion/task force fire sup-port elements (FSEs) as fire sup-

port NCOs (FSNCOs) usually are notinvolved in the military decision-mak-ing process (MDMP) during the plan-ning and preparatory phases of theiroperations. And, as a key executors ofthe plan, they should be.

The planning steps in the MDMP arereceipt of mission, mission analysis,course of action (COA) development,COA analysis (wargame), COA ap-proval and orders production.

As many as 80 percent of the FSNCOswho come to the Combat Training Cen-ters (CTCs) lack the experience, train-ing and knowledge necessary to partici-pate in the planning process with a bat-talion or task force staff. The process

can be intimidating for even the mostexperienced FSNCOs but especially sofor newly promoted SFCs who havelittle or no training on mission analysisor COA comparison.

In this environment, the FSNCO is leftout of planning and, therefore, seldomunderstands the integration of fire sup-port with the scheme of maneuver. As akey executor of the battalion/task forcefire support plan, he needs to know thehows and whys of the plan and howthey’ll complement each other duringthe course of the fight.

The Issue. The Military OccupationalSpecialty 13F Fire Support SpecialistAdvanced NCO Course (ANCOC)doesn’t prepare an SFC to be involvedin the MDMP. Fire support officers(FSOs) and maneuver staffs need to

understand this. In many cases, theFSNCO’s level of proficiency comessolely from his FSO’s mentoring. Eventhe Sergeants Major Academy’s NCOBattle Staff Course at Fort Bliss, Texas,doesn’t get into the level of detail inplanning most battalion/task force staffsachieve when preparing for a battle.

An FSNCO can be very knowledge-able and hard-charging but still lack theknowledge to pull simple things from abrigade operations order (OPORD) forthe FSO’s mission analysis briefing.This is partly because he doesn’t under-stand the concept of the ongoing staffestimate; in most cases, no one hastrained him in what’s needed for themission analysis briefing. Telling theFSNCO to extract from the brigadeOPORD what he thinks the FSO will

FSNCO and the MDMPFSNCO and the MDMPFSNCO and the MDMPFSNCO and the MDMPFSNCO and the MDMPby Sergeant First Class Edward J. Zackery

FSN

CO

SFC

Gar

y H

unsu

cker

, 4-

11 F

A,

172d

Infa

ntry

Brig

ade

(Sep

), lo

oks

over

fire

sup

pp

ort

grap

hics

.

The Battalion/Task Force


Sergeant First Class Edward J. Zackery isboth a Battalion Task Force Fire SupportTrainer and Observer/Controller with theLight Task Force Combat Trainer Division(Airborne) of the National Training Center,Fort Irwin, California. Among other assign-ments, he has been an Assistant BrigadeFire Support NCO (FSNCO), Battalion/TaskForce FSNCO and Combat ObservationLasing Team (COLT) Platoon Sergeant inthe1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, part ofthe 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ger-many; Fire Support Team (FIST) Chief forthe 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101stAirborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Camp-bell, Kentucky; and Forward Observer withthe 6th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany.Sergeant First Class Zackery is a graduateof the NCO Battle Staff Course at the Ser-geants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas;Aerial Observer Course, Fort Rucker, Ala-bama; Naval Gunfire Spotters Course,Norfolk, Virginia; and Joint Fire Power Con-trol Course, Nellis AFB, Nevada.

need for the briefing usually ends indisappointment for the FSO.

The FSO expects his FSNCO to un-derstand the orders process. However,only when the FSE is deployed does theFSO realize his FSNCO lacks the knowl-edge to participate in the MDMP. Bythen, due to the high operations tempo(OPTEMPO), it’s too late to teach theFSNCO the orders process.

FSOs and maneuver staffs correctlyrely on the targeting officer to start theplanning process while the FSO is at thebrigade OPORD briefing—the target-ing officer must be able to accomplishthe mission analysis. But the FSNCO’sMDMP duties should not be left to thetargeting officer. FM 6-20-40 Tactics,Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) forFire Support Brigade Operations,Heavy and FM 6-20-50 TTPs for FireSupport Brigade Operations, Lightclearly state that the FSNCO “must beable to perform all the duties of hisFSO.” The FSO needs a knowledge-able, trained FSNCO to have a fullyfunctional FSE and maneuver tacticaloperations center (TOC).

For some FSNCOs, it’s simply a mat-ter of getting involved in the MDMP. It’sthe FSNCO’s job to participate in theplanning process. He first should read FM101-5 Army Planning and Orders Pro-duction to understand the orders process.

Then he needs the same training thatmost battalion/task force staffs havebefore a major deployment. This wayhe can watch, ask questions and under-

stand the different steps of the MDMP.Only after the FSNCO has begun tounderstand the planning process can hebegin to use the knowledge he has gainedthroughout his career to integrate fireswith maneuver.

The FSO must ensure the maneuverstaff understands the importance of hav-ing the FSNCO at the table during theplanning process. The fire support ser-geant brings his technical expertise andyears of experience—the capabilitiesof the company fire support team (FIST)and the knowledge and experience ofhis personnel. He’s the technical expertand knows the capabilities of the equip-ment in his platoon.

Knowledge of and participation in theMDMP is usually an officer function onthe maneuver side. The FSNCO shouldnot be intimidated.

A Solution. The 13F ANCOC pro-gram of instruction (POI) should coverthe MDMP at the level of detail that thebattalion/task force NCO needs to un-derstand it. The FA School could com-bine a week of the FA Officer CareerCourse (FACCC) that has instructionon the MDMP with ANCOC so artilleryofficers and NCOs can work and learntogether. This would allow them to un-derstand each other’s role in the ordersprocess at the battalion/task force andthe brigade levels. It also would help theNCO realize he’s an integral part of theorders process.

The FSNCO must participate in train-ups that include the FSO and maneuver

staff at home station. If this trainingdoesn’t occur, the FSNCO becomes justanother NCO in the TOC and not a fullyintegrated executor of the maneuver/fire support plan.

During planning and preparation for adeployment, the FSO must train hisFSNCO. A simple training plan caninclude only the FSO and FSNCO, orthe brigade FSO and FSNCO can imple-ment a series of combined officer-NCOprofessional development sessions onthe subject.

The bottom line is that the FSO musttrain the FSNCO on the MDMP. Thereis no formal training available to him.For the FSNCO who suggests that know-ing the MDMP is really not his job, Isuggest that he step back and reevaluatehimself as an NCO.

The most immediate training solutionlies with the FSNCO. He must ask ques-tions aggressively; he must have theFSO explain in detail how the sup-ported maneuver unit planning processworks.

Understanding the MDMP is the firststep; watching it put into action at thebattalion/task force level is next. Themore the FSNCO participates, the moreknowledgeable he becomes.

The sooner the FSNCOs get formalinstruction on the MDMP, the better.The FSNCO must continue to learn andgrow as a fire supporter and be theFSO’s right-hand man, capable of fill-ing the FSO’s shoes in his absence.

The company FSO of 1-9 FA, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), and his FSNCO discussengagement area development at the NTC.


eadly US Salvo SparksAcrimony in Military Brief-ing—During a recent Gulf

War-like [computer assisted training]scenario in a Third World nation, anenemy special purpose force (SPF) raninto a CARE-operated refugee campcontaining about 10,000 displaced per-sons. Seeking to hide, the enemy SPFunit was detected by the modern sys-tems of a Force XXI Division. Twohundred and fifty-two multiple-launchrocket system (MLRS) dual-purpose im-proved conventional munitions (DPICM)were fired at the SPF unit. The resultswere 98 refugees killed and 359wounded.” [Story taken from the BattleCommand Training Program’s (BCTP’s)Warfighter exercise newspaper.]

What caused this fratricide in a mod-ern, digital “situationally aware” unit?CARE’s refugee camp was protectedby a no-fire area (NFA) specifically no-ted in the unit’s fire support plan. TheNFA had been duly entered in the ForceXXI artillery unit’s advanced Field Ar-tillery tactical data system (AFATDS).

The problem occurred when the MLRSbattalion playing in the training decidedto override its AFATDS. Missions werebacked up in AFATDS, and the opera-tor (or someone) elected to send the firemission directly to the firing unit, re-sulting in what would have been a pro-found tragedy in actual combat.

Although this fratricide didn’t happenin combat, it did occur in a BCTP com-puter-assisted wargame designed to pre-pare units for combat. The exercise wasfor Force XXI units equipped with thenew digital Army tactical command andcontrol systems (ATCCS). In the rush todigitization and modernization, have wedetermined and addressed these new sys-tems’ potential for increased fratricide?

In another battle from the same com-puterized BCTP scenario, the 1st Com-bined Arms Battalion (1-CAB) of theArmy’s new Force XXI Division col-lided with an enemy armored brigade.Supported by Crusader and the latestMLRS, the battalion fire support officer(FSO) requested “all available fire” onthe armor-heavy enemy force.

Crusaders and MLRS fired 290 senseand destroy armor (SADARM) roundsand 30 MLRS smart tactical rockets(MSTARs). When the battle ended, theeffects on the enemy were catastrophic:28 tanks, 13 armored personnel carriers(APCs) and various other weapons sys-tems destroyed, rendering the enemyunit combat ineffective.

Fratricide in BCTPFratricide is the employment of friendly weapons and

munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy hisequipment and facilities, which results in unforeseen andunintentional death or injury to friendly personnel.

TRADOC Fratricide Action Plan1

by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas D. Morgan

“DR

ealis

tic C

asua

lty W

arga

min

g B

efor

e D

eser

t S

torm

(Pho

to C

ourt

esy

of C

EN

TCO

M P

ublic

Affa

irs O

ffice

)

With the Clickof a Mouse


However, 16 of our M1A2 Abramstanks and three of the M2/3 Bradleyfighting vehicles in the 1-CAB alsowere destroyed. They had moved underthe footprints of the SADARM andMSTAR munitions. These high-tech,precision, fire-and-forget munitions goafter hard, armored targets with greateffectiveness and lethality. However,they don’t have a “friend-or-foe” detec-tion capability and will kill whatever fallswithin their footprints—in the case of thisscenario, our own tanks and Bradleys.

This short battle was a pyrrhic victoryfor the 1-CAB. If the combat had beenreal, many burning hulks and fresh bodybags would have greeted the brigadecommander when he inspected his unitafter the battle.

Digitization, automation and new sys-tems with longer ranges and more lethalwarheads produce quick, effective re-sults. Yet, the Army could pay a terribleprice in friendly blood and assets on afuture battlefield unless we exerciseadequate situational awareness and per-sonnel are trained and experienced inthese new capabilities. The chances forsuccess are greater using Force XXItechnology while the potential for dread-ful results also has increased.

FA units must know exactly wheretheir targets are located, the capabilities(and limitations) of their new systemsand munitions and the disposition offriendly forces and then apply positiveclearance of fires procedures. And theymust drill safe procedures in exercisessuch as computerized BCTP Warfight-ers exercises before war is real. The“Pacman” mentality or getting sweptup in clicks of the mouse to get comput-erized “kills” may seem to have no realconsequences in the exercise but canteach soldiers dangerous habits that cantranslate into tragedy in combat.

This article discusses fratricides inBCTP. As a Fire Support Analyst withBCTP for 12 years, I have witnessed analarming increase in the number of FAfiring incidents leading to fratricide. Italso has been my experience that whencommanders emphasize attention todetails and correct procedures to avoidfratricide, the computerized fratricideincidents go away. Hopefully, com-manders will read this article today andprepare their soldiers to protect friendlypersonnel tomorrow.

Perceptions. In the more than 100BCTP Warfighter exercises adminis-tered from 1988 to 1999, artillery frat-ricide incidences were discussed in most

after-action reviews (AARs). In the “fogand friction” of combat, some fratricideinevitably can be expected. However,with better command and control sys-tems resulting in better overall situ-ational awareness, the number of fratri-cides should be on the decline. Thisisn’t the case with BCTP exercises. Ihave witnessed a distressing increase inthe number and frequency of fratricideincidents in BCTP Warfighters.2

Artillery fratricide is a highly sensi-tive topic and a top priority of the AARprocess due to its seriousness and highlevel of command interest. If we trulytrain as we fight, the future doesn’t lookgood. There is little reason to believethat fratricide rates in real war would belower than in training.

In his seminal study of 269 fratricideincidents, “Amicide: The Problem ofFriendly Fire in Modern War” (1982),Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) CharlesShrader concluded that a fratricide rateof less than two percent occurred fromWorld War I through Vietnam.3 Thiswas considered almost statistically in-significant.

The Combat Training Centers (CTCs)track fratricide engagements. Fratricidecaused by artillery is mostly from unob-served fires. The Joint Readiness Train-ing Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisi-ana, the National Training Center(NTC), Fort Irwin, California, and theCombat Maneuver Training Center(CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany, attributefratricide generally to clearance of firesproblems associated with massing units,the high density of weapons systems,poor quality rehearsals and poor com-munications.4

At the NTC, more specific reasonsincluded incorrect target identification,battlefield disorientation, ineffective firecontrol measures, lack of fire disciplineand sleep deprivation.5 A Center forArmy Lessons Learned (CALL) studyfrom 1986 to 1990 indicated fratricideat the NTC averaged 11 percent.6

In the 1980s, the findings in Lieuten-ant Colonel Shrader’s study led theArmy to believe that fratricide was

manageable. Two percent was more orless accepted as the inevitable price ofbattle. The best way to prevent fratri-cide was to train soldiers for combat—the same skills needed to win wars wouldbe the best fratricide prevention. TheCALL study indicated a much greaterproblem than originally thought. Theadvent of longer-range weapon systemsand the use of more sophisticated war-heads created a new set of fratricideproblems for unobserved fires.

Training. The CALL study dispelledthe idea that currently fielded techno-logical enhancements were likely tomoderate the friendly fire problem.Originally, adjudicating fratricide fromsimulated combat was difficult andcould be largely subjective. Trainershad problems evaluating fratricides socorrections could be made. Now, BCTPsimulated wargames provide trainersan opportunity to objectively assess themagnitude and causes of fratricide.

The Corps Battle Simulation (CBS)portrays friendly fire losses from artil-lery, allowing the BCTP to accuratelydetermine fratricide during wargames.No overall percentage statistics havebeen assembled, but fratricide incidentscontinue to occur in BTCPs.

As would be expected from commandand control-type wargames, faulty oroutdated fire support coordinating mea-sures (FSCM) and lack of situationalawareness are frequently the problem.An example of this is when a friendlymaneuver unit becomes engaged aftercrossing a permissive FSCM that hasn’tbeen updated, such as a fire supportcoordination line (FSCL) or coordinatedfire line (CFL). The modern battlefieldis a crowded place, and units movingthrough another unit’s area of operation(AO) while engaged in combat can leadto fratricide.

Units depend on digital command andcontrol devices, such as the initial firesupport automated system (IFSAS) andAFATDS. When unskilled operatorsmake mistakes entering data, fratricidemay happen. Frequently, the operatorenters the forward observer’s (FO’s)

The pile of burning junk in the foreground could be one of our own armored fighting vehiclesif artillery fires are not carefully controlled.


location for the target grid. Because theFO is usually a member of a fire supportteam (FIST) or combat observation las-ing team (COLT) close to a maneuverunit, rounds hitting the FO also can killother personnel.

Contributing to this problem is thatMLRS is fired because of its range,effectiveness and survivability (shootand scoot) features, but MLRS DPICMbomblets cover a large area and shouldnot be fired for close-in supporting fires.In many instances during Warfighters,units continued to fire artillery, includingMLRS, when the friendly forces were tooclosely engaged with the enemy. At that“danger close” point, mortars should havebeen used. Audie Murphy called artilleryfire in on himself, but he was the last manleft in his unit.

Proper clearance of fires must includepositive identification of friends andfoe. Situational awareness is critical forsafe delivery of artillery fires. Knowingyour location at all times, as well as thelocation of friendly, enemy and neutral/noncombatant units or personnel arekey to survivability. Lack of positivetarget identification and situationalawareness are the main contributors toBCTP artillery fratricides. These areeasy to ignore in a simulated wargamewhen no one is actually killed and mis-takes may or may not be detected or noone is held responsible for the incidences.

Other causes for BCTP fratricide in-clude poor map reading and communi-cation skills in the simulation center orthe field tactical operations center(TOC), FSCMs are not updated, failureto coordinate among units and com-puter errors (“fat-fingered” CBS key-board operators).

During a 1996 division-level War-fighter, fratricides were so numerousthat a chart was used during the AAR toillustrate them. (See Figure 1 for thechart with the unit identificationspurged.) These fratricides occurred inonly two days.

Digital fire control devices that arepart of the Army’s new Battle Com-mand System claim to help prevent frat-ricides. In BCTP, human mistakes inentering data into those systems pro-duce more errors than system failures.It’s interesting to note that during BCTPWarfighters when fratricides started tooccur, they stopped when commanderstook forceful measures to ensure thatresponsibility for human errors wasfixed on the right people. Mock Article15 investigations during a Warfighterwere a therapeutic remedy.

Before a recent Warfighter, a unit sentBCTP an email reporting a deluge ofartillery fratricides during its ramp-upfor the exercise. However, when thehuman element was emphasized duringthe unit’s Warfighter (command inter-

vention and attention to detail), the fratri-cides stopped. Also when the BCTP staffgave classes on the causes of fratricide,the incidences of fratricide during War-fighters were significantly fewer.

It appears the pace of modernizing thebattlefield is moving faster than hu-mans can keep up. A study of fratricidesreveals the solution to the problem ismore apt to be human than mechanical.More emphasis on training; combatconditioning; fire discipline; planning,coordinating and synchronizing opera-tions; and keeping soldiers informed maylower incidences of fratricide better thanadding more high-tech equipment.

Digital operators must be better trainedbefore the advertised results of the digi-tal fire control devices will be seen inWarfighters. That means 50-year-oldcolonels and generals must understandtheir high-tech systems and be able tosupervise 18- and 20-year-old special-ists on digital keyboards.

Examples in Figure 2 are from a 1997corps-level Warfighter showing howthe lack of training and discipline cancause fratricides in a relatively shortperiod of time. These fratricides oc-curred in two and one-half days. Again,the figure shows generic units but thedata was taken from an actualWarfighter.

A critical aspect of fratricide is thehuman dimension. Computer operators

Cause

Fired “danger close” less than 650 meters;violated unit SOP.

Sent wrong grid through IFSAS.

Sent incorrect “voice” grid;IFSAS not working or bypassed.

CBS unit radii overlapped.

Fired HE instead of smoke;HE mission not cleared. IFSAS operator error.

Sent “voice” grid short of CFL.

“Danger close” fire not cleared.

IFSAS grid from CFR detection short of CFL;lack of clearance.

BDA = Battle Damage Assessment

CBS = Corps Battle SimulationCFL = Coordinated Fire Line

Figure 1: Examples of Division-Level Fratricide. In this sampling, all the fratricide incidents occurred within a two-day period.

Unit Hit

Infantry Platoon

Infantry Platoon

Div Arty HQ

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

BattalionTask Force

BattalionTask Force

FA Unit Fired

2 Batteries

1 Battery and2 Firing Platoons

1 Battalion

1 Battery

1 Platoon

1 Platoon

1 Battery

1 Battery

BDA

4 Troops

9 Troops

75 Troops and39 Vehicles/Equipment

4 Vehicles

11 Troops

1 Troop and10 Vehicles/Equipment

1 Troop

3 Troops and 1 Vehicle

CFR = Counterfire RadarDiv Arty = Division Artillery

IFSAS = Initial Fire Support Automated System

HE = High ExplosiveHQ = Headquarters

SOP = Standing Operating Procedures

Legend:


1. US Department of the Army, “Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses,” Newsletter N 92-4, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined ArmsCommand, April 1992, 3.2. This article was reviewed by the BCTP staff, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Although the CorpsBattle Simulation system used in BCTP does track fratricide incidents by exercise, there is nomeans currently in place to consolidate data from Warfighter to Warfighter and determine therelative frequency of fratricide incidences from year to year or determine if there is an increasein the number of incidents. The assessment that FA fratricide incidences in BCTP haveincreased is that of the author who worked as a BCTP Fire Support Analyst for 12 years.

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas D.Morgan retired 30 September 1999 as a FireSupport Analyst working for the contractorsupporting the Battle Command TrainingProgram (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan-sas; he worked for BCTP for 12 years, sincethe program’s inception. During his militaryservice, he served as Investigating Officerfor approximately 20 actual artillery fratri-cide incidents in the continental UnitedStates and Vietnam. He commanded twofiring batteries in the 5th Battalion, 16thField Artillery, part of the 4th Infantry Divi-sion at Fort Lewis, Washington. Amongother assignments, he was a Gunnery In-structor at the Field Artillery School, FortSill, Oklahoma, and an Executive Officer of1st Battalion, 321st Field Artillery in the101st Airborne Division in Vietnam. He’s agraduate of the Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, and holdsa Master of Arts in History from PacificLutheran University in Tacoma, Washing-ton, and a Master of Public Affairs from theUniversity of Missouri at Kansas City. Lieu-tenant Colonel Morgan retired from theArmy in 1986.

3. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Charles R. Shrader, Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire inModern War, (US Army Combat Studies Institute, December 1982).4. Major General (Retired) John R. Landry, “Fratricide in the Gulf War,” A paper presented atthe annual Society of Military History Conference in Alexandria, Virginia, April 1996. GeneralLandry cited reasons for fratricide incidents at the Combat Maneuver Training Centers (CTCs)from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).5. Landry, 10. General Landry obtained the NTC information from CALL.6. Kenneth K. Steinweg, “Dealing Realistically with Fratricide,” Parameters 23 (Spring 1995),15.

Endnotes:

and supervisors get blamed for many ofthe fratricides during BCTP Warfighters.When commanders and soldiers are tired,they make mistakes. Sleep deprivationcan cause irrational decision-making.Soldiers in the simulation center also ex-perience sleep deprivation because ofthe length of the Warfighter (three tofive days training followed by five toseven days of the exercise) with 24-hour operations during the Warfighter.

If commanders in the simulation cen-ter don’t ensure proper rest for theirpersonnel just as they would in the field,the IFSAS/AFATDS operators won’tperform well. Such critical skills as com-mand and control, fire control, aware-ness of friendly and enemy troops, andtarget designation and tracking are someof the first skills to be decremented byloss of sleep.

Conclusion. There is reason to sus-pect that the advance of technology hasincreased rather than reduced opportu-nities for fratricide. Given that less timeis spent training in rigorous field condi-tions, more emphasis must be placed onthe quality and intensity of training dur-ing the time available—including com-puter-assisted simulations.

There is a tendency to write-off CBSerrors as something that won’t happen

in real life. However, lack of training orattention to detail with no commandemphasis in the simulation center trans-fers to the field. Such carelessness andcomplacency are symptoms of a dis-ease that infects all the unit does.

For example, in an actual incident inVietnam, a 155-mm self-propelled bat-talion had been in the same position tofire counterfire for several months whenthe division headquarters was rocketed.The unit then fired a classic 200-milerror because the M109 gun sights hadtheir “windows” closed. It was thoughtthat because the unit rarely moved, thiswas the best way to set the sights. As aresult, the rounds all landed in the divi-sion firebase where a battalion washoused for a “stand-down.”

During the counterfire, a 95-poundshell landed in a slit trench full of sol-diers taking shelter from North Viet-namese Army (NVA) rockets and blewthem to pieces. Afterward, the onlythings recognizable were the telltalepieces of the fuse in the hole at thebottom of the trench. The shell reportpointed to the friendly firing battery.

Most Redlegs today have not witnessedsuch a horrible example of careless-ness. The unit was in a rut and suc-cumbed to base-camp complacency.

Figure 2: Examples of Corps-Level Fratricide

ACR = Armored Cavalry RegimentBDA = Battle Damage Assessment

Cause

Failed to coordinate artillery and maneuver.

Division FSE cleared fires short of CFL.

Cleared fires improperly.

Cleared fires improperly.

Refired old, uncleared mission.

“Danger Close” reinforcing artillery fired tooclose.

Legend:

Unit Hit

Recon/Surv Unit

Infantry Battalion

ACR Platoon

ACR Platoon

ACR Platoon andEngineer Platoon

Cavalry Troop

FA Unit Fired

2 Batteries

1 Battery

1 Battery

1 Battery

1 Battery

1 Battery

BDA

6 Troops and10 Vehicles

1 Troop

8 Troops and 2 Vehicles


58 Troops and 45Vehicles/Equipment


CFL = Coordinated Fire LineFSE = Fire Support Element

Recon/Surv = Reconnaissance/Surveillance

Our units in BCTP must never be al-lowed to be careless or become compla-cent. For what we see during a Warfightermay mirror the next real battle.


On 12 June 1999, the 1st Battal-ion, 7th Field Artillery (1-7 FA)was deployed to the Combat

Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) atHohenfels, Germany, for a scheduledrotation with its maneuver force, the 2dBrigade Combat Team (2d BCT), 1stInfantry Division (Mechanized). On thatday, 1-7 FA and its BCT received awarning order (WARNO) for deploy-ment to the province of Kosovo in theformer Republic of Yugoslavia.

The battalion was to join the NATOKosovo Force (KFOR) as part of theinternational civil and security pres-ence designated Operation Joint Guard-ian II. This was authorized by UnitedNations Security Council Resolution1244 and under the unified NATO com-mand. Included in the peace agreementwas the Military Technical Agreement(MTA) that detailed the Serb force with-drawal from Kosovo.

Operation Joint Guardian II cameabout to complete the NATO air cam-paign by providing a ground force pres-ence to deter aggression and enforce theprovisions of the UN resolution and MTA.This would prove easier said than done.

This article discusses 1-7 FA’s les-sons learned in Operation Joint Guard-ian II and highlights illumination mis-sions 1-7 FA fired for the KFOR (in-

cluding for Russians), the first US FAcombat missions fired in Balkan peacesupport operations.

Mission. 1-7 FA deployed as part ofTask Force (TF) Falcon, the US TFassigned to the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E), KFOR. 1-7 FA relievedTF 1-27 FA (Multiple-Launch RocketSystem, or MLRS), V Corps Artillery,which had relocated from Albania aspart of TF Hawk. TF Falcon fell underthe command of the Assistant DivisionCommander (Maneuver), 1st InfantryDivision. The 2d BCT relieved forcesof the 1st Armored Division and 26thMarine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) andassumed the mission to “monitor, verifyand, when necessary, enforce compli-ance with the MTA, provide humanitar-ian assistance in support of UNHCR[United Nations High Commission forRefugees] and establish basic law andorder and core civil functions.”

By 4 July, most of the 1-7 FA forcepackage was on the ground at the inter-mediate staging base (ISB), Camp AbleSentry, Macedonia. Force requirementsand a personnel cap largely dictatedhow the battalion task organized for thedeployment. After extensive analysisand many changes, the battalion ended updeploying as shown in Figure 1. D/1-33FA from the newly formed divisional

multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)battalion deployed early in the flow andwas the first 1st Infantry Division Artil-lery unit on the ground in Kosovo.

Upon arriving at Camp Bondsteel,Kosovo, TF 1-7 FA received C Battery,1-319 FA, 82d Airborne Division, withthe continuing non-standard mission“OPCON [under operational control]for fires” the battery had establishedwith TF 1-27 FA. Technically, C/1-319FA was attached to 2-505 Infantry ofthe 82d Airborne Division, but TF 1-7FA established a relationship to ensurepositive command and control of allartillery indirect fire systems. This or-ganization was labeled “TF Lightning”and consisted of more than 400 soldiers.

The command and control element forfire support in the TF Falcon tacticalcommand post (TAC) was provided bythe 1st Infantry Division fire supportelement (FSE) and augmented with thetarget production section (TPS) fromD/1-33 FA. The 1-7 FA commanderassumed duties as TF Falcon’s fire sup-port coordinator (FSCOORD).

Role of the Artillery. Initially, therewas a great deal of discussion as towhether the TF Falcon “troop list” wouldinclude artillery as part of the deploy-ment package. This discussion came asa result of the role of artillery in previ-

by Lieutenant Colonel James M. Waring and Major C. Phillip Royce Pal

adin

s fr

om A

/1-7

FA

occ

upy

a p

ositi

on b

y a

Ser

b m

onst

ery

near

Nov

o B

rdo,

Kos

ovo.

(Pho

to b

y LT

C J

ames

War

ing)


Task ForceFalcon

1st IDTAC

2d BdeHQ

UAE Ukrainian 13th TG(Russians)

501 Mech Bn(Greeks)

18 AAslt Bn(Polish)

TF 1-26IN

TF 1-77AR

TF 1-7FA

TF 2-505IN

299FSB

TF 2-1AV

E/1-4CavA Btry

6 M109A6Paladins

B Btry6 M109A6Paladins

HHB Svc BtryD/1-33 FA2 Q-36s2 Q-37s

Metro SectionHHB

1st Div ArtyMMS

*On order, C/3-319 FA under the operational control (OPCON) of 1-7 FA.

Figure 1: Task Organization of Task Force Falcon and its Artillery. Force requirements and a personnel cap dictated the organization of1-7 FA.

AAslt = Air AssaultAbn = AirborneAR = ArmorAV = Aviation

Bde = BrigadeBn = Battalion

HQ = Headquarters

ID = Infantry Division

IN = Infantry

Mech = Mechanized

MMS = MeteorologicalMeasuring Set

Btry = Battery

Div Arty = Division Artillery

FA = Field Artillery

FSB = Forward Support Battalion

HHB = Headquarters andHeadquarters Battery

Svc = ServiceTAC = Tactical Command Post

TF = Task ForceTG = Task Group

UAE = United Arab Emirates

C/1-319 FA82d Abn Div*6 M119A1s

105-mmTowed

Howitzers

Legend:

ous peace support operations in theBalkans coupled with concerns for per-sonnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) and theforce “cap” (mandated maximum num-ber of US troops).

Field Manual (FM) 100-23 PeaceOperations is based on previous opera-tions, including Haiti, Somalia andBosnia-Herzegovina, and provided aframework for artillery employment.As stated in FM 100-23, “Fire Supportassists commanders in the careful bal-ance of deterrent force with combat pow-er to accomplish the peace operationmission and protect the force.” Deter-rence and force protection were pervasivearguments for including artillery.

Previous deployments to the Balkansfor peace operations, such as the Imple-

mentation Force (IFOR) and StabilityForce (SFOR) missions in Bosnia, ini-tially included artillery units with clearlydefined missions. As the environmentstabilized, the artillery role diminished.The current mission in Bosnia still in-cludes US artillery units without theirhowitzers.

The comparison between Bosnia andKosovo was misleading in many ways—which quickly became apparent afterarriving in Kosovo. The most glaringdifference was the level of violence,crime and civil disobedience in Kosovo;murder, assault and arson were a dailyoccurrence. US forces already in the-ater had been involved in many situa-tions where automatic gunfire was ex-changed; the soldiers of 2d BCT were

exposed immediately to much of thesame. The absence of a civil govern-ment structure required the KFOR toassume these duties.

Soldiers of TF Lightning assumed awide variety of missions in support ofthis challenging operation. First, the TFmaintained a visible and responsive firesupport structure to provide timely andaccurate fires if the situation demandedit. The TF accomplished this by main-taining two “hot guns” on Camps Bond-steel and Montieth, with “hot” platoonoperations centers (POCs) linked digi-tally to the battalion fire direction cen-ter (FDC) and the TF Falcon FSE. Thisgunnery team was in place 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week in a Ready Con-dition (REDCON) 2 status (15-minute


response time) unless the tactical situa-tion demanded a higher state of readi-ness. Additionally, TF Lightning pro-vided personnel to man the base camp’sperimeter security force.

Competing Requirements. TF Light-ning soldiers began augmenting ma-neuver forces on checkpoint operations,mounted and dismounted patrols andvarious security operations “outside thewire” in the MNB-E area of responsi-bility (AOR). This was driven by amanpower-intensive requirement forsoldiers “on the ground” and the limitedtroops available. Our view was this pre-sented a more suitable mission for oursoldiers than working base camp secu-rity and “red cycle” tasks.

Although the battalion had receivedsome basic training at the IndividualReadiness Training (IRT) and MissionRehearsal Exercise (MRE) at the CMTCin Hohenfels before deploying, our mis-sions required an extensive train up andpreparation. The battalion conductedsome “right seat rides” with the soldiersfrom TF 1-27 FA that were extremelyhelpful and established a baseline forwhat to expect. The battalion went astep further and coordinated trainingwith our maneuver forces on patrolling,checkpoint and security operations.

Many of these tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs) were adopted fromthe Bosnia lessons learned and the Cen-ter for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)products from Fort Leavenworth, Kan-sas. Battery commanders, platoon lead-ers and platoon sergeants quickly de-veloped standing operating procedures(SOPs) and troop-leading proceduresfor conducting each of these operations.As always, rehearsals were essential forsetting the conditions for success.

One of TF Lightning’s most challeng-ing missions was the security and logis-tical support to the International CrimesTribunal Yugoslavia (ICTY) forensicmission. The ICTY conducted opera-tions at mass gravesites throughout the

AOR to discover and document evi-dence of alleged war crimes committedby belligerent forces before the NATOand KFOR units arrived.

This was a unique and difficult mis-sion for TF Lightning because of thefundamental nature of the operation,which involved exhuming human re-mains of all ages from mass gravesites.It also required the TF to work with awide variety of forensic investigatorsand pathologists. For this mission, TFLightning soldiers worked with Cana-dian, Austrian, Icelandic, Swiss, Britishand Irish personnel, among others.

Although the TF soldiers didn’t haveto actually remove remains from grave-sites, they were close to these opera-tions and provided the equipment, lo-gistics and security. It was tough duty,but it exposed many of the soldiers tothe brutality of this conflict and theharsh realities local nationals had facedbefore their arrival.

Fire Support. Fire support personnelfrom TF Lightning were immediatelyput to work operating in local villagesand towns with their respective maneu-ver forces. Less than two weeks aftertheir arrival, fire support personnel with1-26 Infantry engaged in a firefight in thecity of Gnjilane. Shooting erupted whenlocal belligerents fired on US forces toevade capture after committing crimes.

TF Lightning also positioned manyFSOs in company command posts toprovide command and control for on-going operations. The large majority ofour 13F Fire Support Specialists assumedthe same missions as their maneuver coun-terparts, conducting patrols and check-point operations throughout the sector.

Two of the deployed TF FSOs as-sumed duties as information operationscell (IOC)/targeting officers in two ofthe largest population centers in thesector. Although they did a superb job,the duties severely restricted their abili-ties to perform as fire supporters andincreased the responsibilities of the TF

fire support NCOs (FSNCOs) and othertargeting officers. The decentralizednature of this operation emphasizedemploying “maneuver shooters.”

At the TF Falcon level, fire supportplayed a unique role in peace supportoperations. While continuing to con-duct standard fire support tasks, such astargeting, employing Firefinder radarsand conducting TPS operations, the FAintelligence officer and targeting officersalso were key players in TF Falcon IO.

Targeting was unique in that it fo-cused on the local population, ethnicgroups and even specific individuals orpersonalities rather than conventional“hard target” sets. The decide, detect,deliver and assess (D3A) targeting meth-odology process still applied, and theFSE targeteers provided expertise tomembers of the IO targeting team.

Deep operations also were applicablebut focused on long-term goals, such aschanging a specific ethnic group’s viewsor opinions. Once again, many of thelessons learned from Bosnia were ap-plicable in developing the TTP in tar-geting operations.

Fire Mission. US forces have partici-pated in peace support operations in theBalkans for more than four years and,with the deployment of 1-7 FA, had notfired an operational artillery fire mis-sion. Regardless, the TF Lightning de-veloped TTP for employing indirectfires and fire support assets in Kosovo.

The result was a “graduated responsematrix” (see Figure 2). This matrix tiedthe employment of fire support assets toan escalating threat. The process wastempered by the KFOR commander’srules of engagement (ROE). The plan-ning timeline exercised to gain approvaland clearance of fires from KFOR wasno less than 30 minutes.

Before the 2d BCT arrived, US Armyand US Marine forces on the groundmany times had requested clearance tofire illumination in the MNB-E sector,but the KFOR denied the requests. On

Response

Hand-held Illumination, M203 Illumination

Request to Fire 60-mm, 81-mm or120-mm Mortar Illumination

All of Above; Request for 105-mm or155-mm Illumination or Smoke

All of Above; Mortar or Cannon High Explosive (HE)

Situation

Tier One—Observed Looting, Unruly Crowd

Tier Two—Unaimed, Unobserved Fire

Tier Three—Sniper Fire, Aimed Fire,Sporadic Firefight

Tier Four—Sustained Firefight/CasualtiesInvolving KFOR

Threat

Possible

Likely

Imminent

Actual

Figure 2: Graduated Response Matrix for Fire Support in Task Force Falcon in Kosovo


Figure 3: Clearance of Fires Procedures for Task Force Falcon in Kosovo

MissionApproval

Observer

1. Initiates CFF;sends to Bn FSE.

2. Bn FSE sendsRAF to TF FSE.

TF FalconFSE

Radar

KFOR

Bn FSE

6. TF FSE sendsRAF to KFOR.

1a. Initiates CFF;sends to TPS.

TPS

2a. TPS sendsRAF to TF FSE.

3. TF FSE sends FM:CFFto Bn FDC as “Do Not Load.”

8. FSE sends amendedCFF to Bn FDC withWR/AMC or EOM.

7. Yes or EOM.12. TF FSE sendsIFIR to KFOR.

FiringBattery

4. Bn FDCsends FM:CFF to Battery FDC as “Do Not Load.”

1-7 FAFDC

5. Battery sends CFFto gun section as“Do Not Load.”

10. Battery sends CFFto gun section asWR/AMC or EOM.

9. Bn sends amendedCFF to battery withWR/AMC or EOM.

GunSection

From the observer, the on-site commanding officer determines the need for fire support. 1. Sends the request through the FIST to the Bn FSE. 2. Bn FSE and Bn commander send an RAF to the TF Falcon FSE. 3. TF FSE creates a digital call-for-fire (FM:CFF) as a “Do Not Load” mission, which is sent to the Bn FDC. 4-5. Bn FDC sends the CFF to the firing battery, which sends it to the gun sections. 6. TF FSE sends an RAF to KFOR via PTARM. 7. KFOR approves or disapproves the RAF and sends the decision to the TF FSE (along with any CFF amendments). 8. TF FSE sends the amended CFF to the Bn FDC (WR, if approved, or EOM). 9. If the mission is approved, the WR FM:CFF is sent to the firing battery. 10. Battery sends WR or EOM to the gun sections. 11-12. After the guns fire, the Bn FDC sends an IFIR to the TF FSE, which forwards a copy to KFOR. For Counterfire Missions: 1a. Radar initiates the CFF and sends the acquisition to the TPS. 2a. TPS creates the RAF and sends it to the TF FSE. From the TF FSE, the clearance procedures follow Steps 3-12.

TF 1-7 FA Fire Mission Flow

11. If mission is fired, Bn FDC sends an IFIRto TF FSE.

AMC = At My CommandBn = Battalion

CFF = Call-for-FireEOM = End of MessageFDC = Fire Direction CenterFIST = Fire Support TeamFSE = Fire Support ElementIFIR = Indirect Fire Incident Report

KFOR = Kosovo ForcesPTARM = Ptarmigan Phone System (British)

RAF = Request for Authority to FireTF = Task Force

TPS = Target Production SectionWR = When Ready

Legend:

the night of 30 July, TF Falcon receiveda report of US soldiers under intenseautomatic gunfire in the mountainousregion north of the city of Gnjilane inthe TF 1-26 Infantry’s sector. A dis-mounted infantry team in a remote sitereported intense automatic gunfire onits position and that it couldn’t extractitself and requested assistance. Thebelligerents were firing from concealedpositions in a secluded wood line andcould not be identified.

The TF Falcon commander initiallydirected the team be extracted by ar-mored vehicles, the closest of whichwere a TF Lightning Paladin howitzerand FA ammunition support vehicle(FAASV) guarding a Serbian churchabout six miles away. Meanwhile, a

quick reaction force (QRF) was dis-patched from Camp Montieth inGnjilane. A few minutes later, beforethe Paladin could reach the dismountedteam, it reported the enemy had brokencontact. But when the QRF arrived, it,then, was taken under automatic gun-fire.

At that point, the TF Falcon com-mander cancelled the Paladin extrac-tion and told the FSCOORD to prepareto fire illumination rounds to “flush”the belligerents out of their positionsand help identify their locations. Simul-taneously, AH-64 Apache helicopterswere dispatched to the area to help lo-cate the source of fires.

A Battery, “Steel Knights” on CampMontieth on the outskirts of Gnjilane

was designated to fire the mission. TFLightning initiated a fire mission in a“Do Not Load” status while the TF Fal-con FSE began the clearance of firesdrill both with the KFOR in Pristina andinternally to MNB-E (see Figure 3).

Our biggest concern and longest delaywas clearing airspace through the Armyairspace command and control (A2C2)process. The TF cleared indirect firesthrough both headquarters and had toaccount for fixed wing, rotary wing andunmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) air-craft operating in the sector. The call-for-fire (CFF) was initiated by the QRFwho had “eyes on.” Additionally, aQ-36 radar was placed in the “friendlyfire mode” to confirm impact predictand track TF rounds.


The TF developed a drill that took clear-ance of fires a step further. The FSEused satellite imagery of the AOR on itsautomated deep operations coordina-tion system (ADOCS) software andzoomed in on the target area to confirmthere were no dwellings or urban areasthat might receive collateral damagefrom illumination canisters or be ig-nited by an illumination round. TheFDC also computed an automatic “up100” for the illumination to minimizethe threat to burnout on the ground or ona dwelling. Furthermore, the TF main-tained “eyes on” the target with UAVand AH-64 aircraft. This was a dynamicprocess as the target location grid andconfirmed locations of friendly groundtroops and aircraft changed many timesin quick succession.

Approximately 45 minutes after theinitial reports of contact, A/1-7 FA firedtwo illumination rounds that were “ob-served safe, accurate and effective.”These were the first US artillery roundsfired in an operational mission in Bal-kans peace support operations.

The mission met its intent as thebelligerents immediately ceased firingand were not heard from again. Therounds were tracked by the Q-37 radaron Camp Bondsteel and observed bythe UAV and AH-64 pilots as well asthe TF 1-26 Infantrymen on the ground.The effect of the outbound rounds wasequally dramatic to the residents ofGnjilane as local nationals scurried totheir homes and left the streets deserted.

The TF Falcon psychological opera-tions (PSYOP) teams exploited this mis-sion to publicize the firepower and le-thality that TF Falcon could bring to

bear. The PSYOP teams issued flyers tolocals throughout the area, reassuringpeaceful Kosovars and warning poten-tial belligerents. The flyers read, “Thisis KFOR artillery! Last night you wit-nessed illumination rounds being fired.Will the next rounds be high explosive?Cease your firing on the village imme-diately or become a KFOR target. Help-ing Kosovo on the road to peace—KFOR Task Force Falcon.”

TF Lightning and 1-7 FA made his-tory again on the 4th of August as thebattalion fired two more fire missions,but this time in support of Russian coun-terparts operating in the northeast por-tion of the MNB-E sector. This markedthe first time since World War II that USartillery had fired in support of Russianforces on an operational mission.

Under circumstances similar to theprevious mission, the Russian com-pound in the city of Kamenica cameunder sustained automatic gunfire,which resulted in one Russian soldierwounded. Employing their US specialoperations liaison team, the Russiansrequested illuminating fires from TFFalcon to identify and flush belligerentforces from positions on the high groundsurrounding the compound.

Using lessons learned from the firstillumination mission, TF Lightningstreamlined its response time to 17 min-utes, including clearing fires. Again, ABattery fired at maximum range fromCamp Montieth. Again, the fires wereaccurate and effective and the belliger-ent firing ceased immediately.

TF Lightning fired two more missionsfor the Russians the next night underalmost identical conditions: two rounds

Major C. Phillip Royce is the S3 of the 1stBattalion, 7th Field Artillery, 1st InfantryDivision in Germany. He deployed to Kosovoas part of Operation Joint Guardian II wherehe assumed the duties of S3 for Task ForceLightning. His previous assignments in-clude serving as the Assistant Fire SupportCoordinator for the 1st Infantry Division;Observer/Controller (O/C) for the BattleCommand Training Program (BCTP) at FortLeavenworth, Kansas; as well as an O/C forthe FA Werewolf Team at the National Train-ing Center, Fort Irwin, California. DuringOperation Desert Storm, he commanded CBattery, 4th Battalion, 5th Field Artillery,part of the 1st Infantry Division.

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Waring is theCommander of the 1st Battalion, 7th FieldArtillery, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized),Drumfire Artillery, in Germany. He com-manded the battalion and Task ForceLightning during Operation Joint GuardianII in support of Task Force Falcon in Kosovo.In a previous assignment, he was the DeputyFire Support Coordinator, also with the 1stInfantry Division. He served as the DivisionArtillery S3 of 3d the Infantry Division (Mech-anized) and as the S3 of the 1st Battalion,41st Field Artillery, also in the 3d Division atFort Stewart, Georgia. During OperationDesert Shield, he commanded A Battery,3d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101stAirborne Division (Air Assault) and duringDesert Storm, served as Assistant S3 of thesame battalion.

in staggered succession on the first mis-sion and four rounds laterally spread onthe subsequent mission. The results werethe same.

During Operation Joint Guardian II,TF Lightning validated the role of theFA and fire support in peace supportoperations as defined in FM 100-23.While also performing unique missions,such as patrolling, perimeter securityand such, the US artillery never sacri-ficed its ability to provide timely andaccurate fires in support of maneuverforces. This is a constant challenge asartillery forces are frequently viewed asforces “available” to augment the “bootson the ground” requirements or per-form force protection or base campmayoral duties.

While the tactical situation in eachoperation is unique, leaders and plan-ners must carefully review and considerthe requirements for fire support andartillery. The first rule is the Field Artil-lery is the absolute King of Battle andyou need it. Duty First!

LTC James Waring (left), Commander of TF Lightning, and his CSM Carl McPherson conferwith Serb Orthodox priests at a Serbian monastery that soldiers from 1-7 FA are guarding northof the city of Gnjilane in Kosovo.

(Pho

to b

y S

PC

Mik

e G

oran

son,

1-7

FA

)


Several articles and publications have discussed what in-formation the commander should provide his firesupport coordinator (FSCOORD) or fire support officer

(FSO) as he articulates his “commander’s guidance for fires”early in the military decision-making process (MDMP). Thisarticle discusses what the commander provides and how hisFSCOORD/FSO helps him with his guidance.

Guidance for Fires. No common format for the commander’sguidance for fires exists in current doctrine. Field Manual (FM)101-5 Organization and Operations, Appendix B, has a long listof topics for the commander to discuss but lacks focus. FM 6-71 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures [TTP] for Fire Supportfor the Combined Arms Commander (1994) covers formulatingthe commander’s guidance and provides some answers to theproblem. However, it doesn’t help the commander transitionfrom formulating to articulating the guidance.

The figure recommends the commander’s checklist to articu-late his guidance for fires. The checklist ensures the commanderwill be clear and concise and gives the information the firesupporter needs to focus his fires—the task, purpose, methodand effects methodology for his essential fire support tasks(EFSTs). If, at a minimum, the commander covers the key areasshown in the figure, he will convey to his staff and subordinatecommanders how he wants fires to support maneuver. Thefollowing is an example of commander’s guidance for move-ment-to-contact.

“Movement-to-Contact EFSTs. Fires accomplish three EFSTsfor the TF [infantry battalion task force]: use FA to suppress theenemy’s FSE [fire support element] to allow the infantry ad-vanced guard company to destroy the FSE and fix the AGMB[enemy’s advanced guard main body], use FA to disrupt theenemy’s main body to allow the TF to destroy it and use mortarsto suppress the enemy’s flank security element to allow the TFfreedom of maneuver.

“ Focus for Fires. Phase 1 focuses on the scouts and COLTs[combat observation lasing teams] until the advanced guardcompany makes contact. Then as Phase 2 begins, the focusshifts to the advanced guard company as it destroys the FSE.In Phase 3, the focus is on the main effort company as it destroysthe enemy main body.

“ High-Payoff Targets (HPTs). Phase 1: tanks in the brigadereconnaissance and GSRs [ground surveillance radars]. If DRTs[division reconnaissance teams] are found, destroy them withHE [high-explosive fires]. Phase 2: 2S1 [howitzers] with AGMB,followed by C2 [command and control] BRDMs [wheeled ar-mored reconnaissance vehicles]. Phase 3: AT-5s [air defense]on flank security followed by C2 vehicles.

“ Force Protection Priorities. The advanced guard company,mortars and then the main effort company are the priorities. Besure the FA battalion knows where friendly mortars are at all times.

“ Restrictions/Special Concerns. Use smoke to screen move-ments. Ensure there are accurate NFAs [no-fire areas] over thescouts at all times. Use an RFL [restricted fire line] between theadvanced guard company and the main body to prevent fratri-cide from direct and indirect fires during the transition. Keep theCFL [coordinated fire line] as close to the advanced guardcompany as possible. Conduct drill rehearsals to ensure theadvanced guard company commander can clear the fires infront of him as quickly as possible. Give the advanced guardcompany an additional FIST [fire support team] as it movestoward the enemy. To ensure timely support, mortars shouldmove behind and as part of the advanced guard company.”

The commander’s guidance checklist should be published inFM 6-20-20 TTP for Fire Support at Battalion Task Force andBelow; FM 6-20-40 TTP for Fire Support for Brigade Operation, FM71-123 TTP for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade,Battalion/Task Force and Company/Team and other manuals.

FM 6-71 currently being rewritten should include not only thechecklist, but also examples of the commander’s guidance forfires in various tactical scenarios, such as the one for move-ment-to-contact and others: offense, defense, military operationsin urban terrain (MOUT), etc. Each example scenario wouldprovide a baseline from which a commander could begin totailor his guidance to fit his unit’s situation.

The commander’s guidance for fires also should be taught inall pre-command courses.

FSCOORD/FSO-Commander Relationship. Equally impor-tant is the relationship between the FSCOORD/FSO and themaneuver commander. Whether at the brigade or the taskforce, the FSCOORD/FSO is responsible for enabling the com-mander to synchronize fires with maneuver. The FSCOORD/FSO translates the guidance into EFSTs. As the most experi-enced fire supporter on the staff, he advises the commanderand his staff not only on the means to employ fire support, butalso on what fires can accomplish. Essentially, the commandertaps the expertise of his FSCOORD/FSO to get the “what,”“where,” “when” and “why” of his fire support guidance, and theFSCOORD/FSO comes back with the “how” in the fire supportplan and then actively manages the execution of the plan.

The commander’s guidance for fires is key to the successfulintegration of fires into the maneuver plan. The commandermust use his FSCOORD’s/FSO’s expertise and articulate clear,concise guidance to ensure fires are effective in his combinedarms operations.

Maj Alvin W. Peterson, Jr., USMCMAJ D. Wayne Andrews, FA

Small Group Leaders, Advanced FS BranchFire Support and Combined Arms Ops Dept

Fort Sill, OKInformation Provided in the Commander’s Guidance for Fires

• Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs). What fire support isto accomplish, providing task and purpose at a minimum.

• Focus for Fires. Focus by phases of the battle and linkedto specific events.

• Targets. The type of target to be engaged and the desiredeffect on each.

• Force Protection Priorities. The priorities for protectingfriendly forces and for counterfire.

• Restrictions and Priorities for Special Munitions. Includingdual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM),smoke, family of scatterable mines (FASCAM), Copperhead,etc.

• Special Fire Support Concerns. Such as employment offire support coordinating measures (FSCM), positioningand movement of mortars, positioning of combat observa-tion lasing teams (COLTs) or fire support teams (FISTs), etc.

Combined Arms Commander’Combined Arms Commander’Combined Arms Commander’Combined Arms Commander’Combined Arms Commander’sssssGuidance for FiresGuidance for FiresGuidance for FiresGuidance for FiresGuidance for Fires


In June 1999, 2d Battalion, 20thField Artillery (2-20 FA) officiallystood up at Fort Hood, Texas, as the

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)battalion using a 3x6 table of organiza-tion and equipment (TOE). This articleis based on a white paper written for the4th Division commanders and staff plan-ners that examined lessons learned froma FireStrike Exercise conducted in Sep-tember 1999; the exercise provided inte-grated division artillery (Div Arty)-leveldigital simulation training for 2-20 FAand was the battalion’s first field exercise.

Based on lessons learned in FireStrike,this article addresses the capabilitiesand limitations of the 3x6 divisionalMLRS battalion to shoot at sustained

and surge rates, to shoot multiple muni-tions, to absorb casualties and, finally,to serve as MLRS direct support (DS) toan aviation brigade. The information isintended to help planners and employ-ers of 2-20 FA and other divisionalMLRS battalions to train and fight theirbattalions more effectively.

3x6 Sustainment and Surge Rates.The Div Arty is concerned with provid-ing the division commander timely andaccurate fires, both close and deep. Thereintroduction of an MLRS battalioninto each heavy division is a welcomeaddition of firepower. However, thenew 3x6 structure of the battalion istruly a lean organization. It’s temptingto look at the MLRS battalion as amirror of one of the division’s gun bat-

talions in terms of sustainability forcombat operations, but that would be amistake.

The 3x9 MLRS battalion structure had27 launchers, masking the thinness ofmanning for the MLRS launcher crewsand platoon operations centers (POCs).Now that there are only 18 launchers inthe battalion, “fighter management” ofthe organization becomes a critical piecefor the commander and his staff.

With only three men operating the laun-cher and three men controlling the POC,internal platoon or even battery sleepand maintenance plans are nearly im-possible. Crew and POC rest must bemanaged at the battalion level. For plan-ning purposes, an MLRS battalion hasto have one-third of its crews in a down

3x6 Divisional MLRS Battalion3x6 Divisional MLRS Battalion3x6 Divisional MLRS Battalion3x6 Divisional MLRS Battalion3x6 Divisional MLRS BattalionCapabilities and Constraints

by Major Burke A. Tarble and Captain Shawn P. Reese

2-20

FA

( M

LRS

), F

ort

Hoo

d,

Texa

s


status at any time to perform mainte-nance on their equipment and rest.

With one-third of the launchers andPOCs down and a field operational readi-ness rate (O/R) of 80 percent for thebattalion, this only leaves nine launch-ers to fire missions on a continual basis.(The O/R is based on 2-20 FA’s histori-cal data.) This equates to the loss of abattery’s worth of firepower in the old3x9 structure.

Launcher reload times plus move timesto and from the hide, ammunition re-load and firing points takes approxi-mately 20 minutes. This means the ninelaunchers realistically could shoot amaximum of 108 rockets every 20 min-utes or 324 rockets per hour. With astandard fire order of 48 rockets percounterfire target, the battalion onlycan shoot a maximum of six missionsper hour on a sustained basis.

Given three hours’ notice, the battal-ion could surge all its 14 launchers(using an O/R rate of 80 percent) for ashort period of time and shoot 168 rock-ets every 20 minutes or 504 rockets anhour. This is 10 missions per hour.

Obviously in a heavy counterfire fight,more than 10 targets per hour will availthemselves. Because 2-20 FA can’t firemore than 10 missions per hour, it wouldbe advisable to change the standard fireorder (unless reinforcing MLRS unitsare available).

Also consider that 48 rockets equals30,912 M77 bomblets. Currently, theDiv Arty is sending down point targetsfrom acquisitions. The fire directionsystem (FDS), advanced Field Artillerytactical data system (AFATDS) or thelauncher do not automatically computeany type of open sheaf. This means thatmore than 30,000 bomblets are droppedon an area the size of a football field.Without choosing multiple aim pointsbased on multiple acquisitions or obser-vations, we’re putting a lot of bomblets ontop of one another.

It’s true that to achieve devastatingresults a high volume of fire is neces-sary. However, to get the results we alldesire, the artillery community needs tocome up with an MLRS “sheaf” or startusing multiple targets.

The other constraining factor for high-volume fires is the battalion’s ability tohaul ammunition. Unlike tube units,MLRS rockets are extremely bulky andcube out the battalion’s haul capacitylong before the rockets weigh it out.

The battalion has 36 heavy expanded-mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) and

36 heavy expanded-mobility ammuni-tion trailers (HEMATs) that carry fourpods each for a total upload of 1,728rockets. Firing a surge rate of 504 rock-ets an hour would expend the battalion’sentire unit basic load (UBL) in littlemore than three hours. Without consid-erable caching of ammunition, this rate-of-fire would be impossible to sustainbeyond a few hours.

The bottom line is that a 48-rocket fireorder in a high-intensity conflict wouldbe very hard, if not impossible, to sus-tain. A 3x6 battalion only can sustain324 rockets an hour for extended peri-ods and can surge to 504 rockets anhour if given three hours’ lead time.

Special Munitions. The Army onlyhas a limited inventory of extended-range (ER) rockets. In a high-intensityconflict such as might be fought on theKorean peninsula, these stocks are likelyto be depleted or severely limited by thetime most continental US (CONUS)-based units would arrive in theater.

Given that information, we shouldn’tplan on having an MLRS range capabil-ity of more than 32 kilometers, exceptin very rare cases. Nonetheless, the DivArty needs to consider tactics, tech-niques and procedures (TTPs) for using2-20 FA when these and other specialmunitions come available in quantity.

Although some would like to believethat shooting other than standard rock-ets with MLRS is no different than se-lecting a different shell/fuse combina-tion to be fired by a gun, the fact is thattime-space factors are not the same.Unlike a gun, the MLRS launcher hasno internal ammunition haul capabilityother than what’s loaded in its launcher

loader module (LLM). The launchercan’t quickly retrieve ammunition di-rectly off an organic ammunition ve-hicle. What this means is if the ammu-nition the launcher wants to fire isn’talready in the LLM, the launcher needsconsiderable time to reload. And, priorplanning must have ensured the ammu-nition is in a proper disposition to facili-tate an upload.

Standard reload time from ammuni-tion already on the ground near the fir-ing position is 20 minutes. If the ammois not already on the ground, this pro-cess can take an hour or more, signifi-cantly longer than the minute it takes toselect a different shell/fuse combina-tion for Paladin.

Planners, fire support officers (FSOs)and fire control officers (FCOs) musttake into account constraints when con-sidering using other than standard M26rockets. TTP that could be used to over-come some of these time delays is todesignate a platoon or certain launchersas the ER/special munitions firing units.This option has the advantage of beingable to shoot the munitions immediatelywithout worrying about upload times andwhat ammunition is on the ground.

This approach, however, limits the bat-talion’s ability to use all firing elementsto engage standard targets within nor-mal range. Another drawback of thistechnique is that it requires positioningguidance that foretells where specialmunitions will be needed. It also furtherreduces the haul capacity of the battal-ion to move standard rocket pods.

Absorbing Casualties. The relativethinness of the 3x6 organization is mostapparent in its inability to absorb casu-

Standard reload time from ammunition already on the ground near the firing position is 20minutes. If the ammo is not already on the ground, this process can take an hour or more,significantly longer than the minute it takes to select a different shell/fuse combination forPaladin.


alties. Based on self-evacuation, a bat-tery can take no more than six littercasualties before its organic lift assetsare exhausted. Sustaining more casual-ties than this renders the battery combatineffective for at least six to 12 hourswhile the evacuation is conducted andreorganization takes place. Additionalbattalion assets also would have to betapped to help the battery evacuate ca-sualties and reorganize.

What makes every casualty so criticalis the lack of depth in the batteries andthe battalion as a whole. Every soldierin an MLRS battalion is mission-criti-cal. When the battalion loses one ammospecialist, his truck and the 48 rockets ithauls are out of action.

A self-propelled launcher-loader(SPLL) shouldn’t operate with less thantwo of the three crew members—andeven then, operations with two crewmembers calls for more time-consum-ing procedures to protect the safety ofthe reduced crew and should be imple-mented in emergencies only. When theSPLL gets down to two crew members,it also becomes less sustainable from amaintenance and crew-rest perspective.These effects quickly compound in amass casualty event.

Obviously, force protection is criticalto such a brittle unit with no inherentforce protection capacity of its own. In-ternally, the battalion must be able toreact to mass casualty events by evacu-ating quickly and reorganizing units toreturn its firepower to the division assoon as possible.

MLRS DS to Aviation. New aviationtechnology and tactics have propelledthe MLRS battalion into a role not origi-nally considered appropriate for rocketartillery: DS to the aviation brigade.This new role has not, however, re-lieved the divisional MLRS battalion ofits general support (GS) responsibilitiesto the division. MLRS in the counterfirerole is still too vital for the division toallow the battalion to be DS to the avia-tion brigade in the traditional sense.

As an interim fix to this conundrum,Div Arty planners have come up withthe non-doctrinal artillery support rela-tionship of “DS**.” The DS** is de-fined as DS to the brigade with positionauthority held by Div Arty (* numberone) and fire missions generated at theDiv Arty having priority over aviationbrigade missions (* number two). Thisrelationship worked relatively well inthe controlled environment of a CorpsBattle Simulation (CBS). It didn’t work

Major Burke A. Tarble is the Assistant S3for the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)Artillery, Fort Hood, Texas. He previouslyserved as an Operations Officer in the IIICorps G3 at Fort Hood. While assigned tothe 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) inGermany, he was the Liaison Officer for aRussian Separate Airborne Brigade de-ployed to Bosnia in Operation Joint Endeav-or. He commanded C Battery, 6th Battalion,29th Field Artillery (MLRS), 1st ArmoredDivision, also in Germany. Major Tarble is agraduate of the Command and GeneralStaff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

so well when units were in the field withhelicopters in the air.

The positioning asterisk is problem-atic in that the unit supported normallycontrols the positioning of a DS unit. Inthis case, that would be the 4th Brigade.The rationale behind this is that no oneknows the fire support requirements ofthe brigade better than the brigade does.The brigade is, therefore, best suited todecide where to position its supportingartillery for current and future operations.

With the Div Arty planning the posi-tioning of a DS unit, the opportunity for“de-synchronization” between the DivArty and 4th Brigade is ever present.Although this problem didn’t occur onthe confined spaces of the Fort HoodTraining Area, it could easily becomean issue in the expanded battlespace ofthe division in combat.

The second asterisk essentially givesthe Div Arty priority of fires. This isinherently contradictory to the defini-tion of DS. During FireStrike, 2-20 FAregularly received missions simulta-neously from the division and the 4thBrigade. AFATDS, using the Div Arty’sDS attack guidance, as often as not shot4th Brigade’s missions before it shotthe Div Arty’s. This put the onus on thebattalion fire direction officer (FDO) todiscern target origination by stoppingevery mission for analysis—which de-feats the purpose of digitization.

With conflicting priorities in the divi-sion—counterfire and suppression ofenemy air defenses (SEAD)—an hon-est broker has to be established. Tradi-tionally, that has been the division firesupport element (FSE). With DS**, weare abrogating that decision-makingprocess down to the battalion. The bat-talion neither has the resources nor thedivision perspective to make such deci-sions. Two alternate courses of action(COAs) may solve this dilemma.

First, the division assigns the MLRSbattalion DS to the aviation brigade forall deep operations starting at H-2 (orthereabouts) to give the battalion timeto do a live rehearsal with the brigadewithout outside interference. As soonas the exfiltration is complete, the bat-talion returns GS to the division.

Second, the division determines theminimum requirement for support ofthe counterfire fight and SEAD mis-sions and assigns one or two batteriesDS (pure, no asterisks) to the 4th Bri-gade with the rest of the battalion GS tothe division. Fire missions from the 4thBrigade and Div Arty still would flow

through the battalion fire direction center(FDC), but they only would be assignedto the respective DS or GS batteries.

In the end, it isn’t that rocket artillerycan’t serve in the DS role, but more sim-ply that we, as a division, can’t afford toallow 2-20 FA to conduct a true DS mis-sion. DS** has yet to be proven as a work-able solution to providing the divisionand 4th Brigade the rocket fires bothdemand. If it’s to become workable, theDiv Arty and 4th Brigade FSEs will haveto develop TTP that address the issuescausing the friction at the shooter level.

Just because we call a mission “DS”doesn’t mean the problem is solved.SEAD programs for ingress and egressare important to the division. Counterfireis also important to the division. Find-ing a compromise that affords both tar-get sets the servicing they deserve is atough problem, but not an unsolvableone. The two COAs discussed may notbe the answer but, hopefully, will serveas a starting point to find a solution.

The divisional MLRS battalion is asuper asset, but the 3x6 structure is stillnew and needs to be looked at and field-tested to see its impact on the roles wewant the battalion to fill. TTPs to maxi-mize the potential of this organizationmust be tested in realistic, scenario-driven,field training exercises and adjusted andrefined today for tomorrow’s combat.

Captain Shawn P. Reese is the Operations/Training Officer for the 2d Battalion, 20thField Artillery (MLRS), 4th Infantry Divisionat Fort Hood. In the 2d Battalion, 3d FieldArtillery of the 1st Armored Division basedin Germany, he served as a Firing PlatoonLeader, Combat Observation Lasing Team(COLT) Platoon Leader and Battalion Am-munitions Officer while deployed toBosnia-Herzegovina for 15 months. Cap-tain Reese is a graduate of the CombinedArms and Services Staff School at FortLeavenworth.


In a bold move, the Chief of FieldArtillery convened the first Tacti-cal/Operational Fire Support Con-

ference at the Field Artillery School,Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for three days inJanuary. Major General Toney Stricklinbrought together maneuver command-ers and their command sergeants major(CSMs) from the army, corps, divisionand brigade levels plus FA senior com-manders and their CSMs to solve FAand fire support problems for the ma-neuver commander. Attendees camefrom both the Active and Reserve Com-ponents (AC and RC) and included firesupport observer/controllers (O/Cs)from the Combat Training Centers(CTCs), among others.

The mission: Attendees were to rec-ommend solutions for a series of firesupport problems that indicate the FAhas lost its focus on supporting the ma-neuver commander—notably, in theclose fight. The problems were identi-fied by the field and in the article “Is theFA Walking Away from the CloseFight?” by the Chief of Infantry, MajorGeneral Carl F. Ernst (September-Oc-tober 1999). In addition, since assum-ing command in August 1999, the Chiefof FA has researched issues with bothbranch and maneuver leaders, travelingextensively to units around the world.

The original list of issues identifiedincluded ongoing CTC negative trendsand new problems—some perceived asopposed to actual. We scrubbed the listof issues and put them into categories.First were those problems that call for

long-term work and must be resolved atlevels above the branch. Next, prob-lems were listed for the FA to solve:those we can solve immediately with-out outside input (i.e., the role of the firesupport NCO in the military decision-making process) and those we mustwork in the longer term. The remainingproblems were identified for confer-ence attendees to brainstorm solutions.

The conference attendees were di-rected to discuss the problems and comeup with solutions that, if implemented,would result in significant improve-ments for fire support for the maneuvercommander. This article reports on sixof the problems discussed at the confer-ence that we can move on immediatelyand a series of fire support initiatives inthe FA School to “adjust fire” as wetransition into the 21st century.

FA Training Aids, Devices, Simula-tors and Simulations (TADSS). Coor-dinating and integrating the combinedarms fight on the modern battlefield isextremely difficult, calling for perish-able skills that must be honed in home-station training and at the CTCs. TheArmy, led by the FA School, must ag-gressively pursue improving the repli-cation of fires and fire support in TADSSto more effectively train the combinedarms fight.

The Army’s close combat tacticaltrainer (CCTT) is an excellent systemthat trains crews up through the battal-ion level in manned simulators that rep-licate a realistic force-on-force, free-play virtual battlefield. The FA School

is working with the Simulations, Train-ing and Instrumentation Command(STRICOM) to improve fire supportreplication in the Army’s CCTT anduse it as a fire support trainer for theentire maneuver brigade fire supportteam. We are coordinating to fix firesand effects in the CCTT software and todesign re-configurable kits for Bradleyfire support team vehicles (BFISTs) andcombat observation lasing team (COLT)Strikers at the CCTT sites. (Striker is ahigh-mobility multipurpose wheeled ve-hicle, or HMMWV, modified for COLToperations.) The goal is to fully replicatefire support in home-station combinedarms training on the virtual battlefield.

Live training at our CTCs remains themost realistic collective training oursoldiers and leaders experience, andour CTC O/Cs are outstanding coachesand mentors. But one aspect of trainingat the dirt CTCs that needs improve-ment is replicating the effects of artil-lery and mortar fires.

Many senior leaders are concernedthat we aren’t training our maneuvercommander to employ fires properlyand that the commanders are leavingthe CTCs with the impression that firescan’t support combined arms opera-tions. More realistic replication of theeffects of indirect fires at the dirt CTCswill help develop maneuver command-ers’ abilities to fight more effectivelyon tomorrow’s battlefield and give themconfidence in their fire support.

The current simulated area weaponseffects-multiple integrated laser engage-

by Brigadier General William F. Engel,Colonel R. Mark Blum andMajor Rafael Torres, Jr.

Tactical/OperationalFire SupportConference

Report to the Field


ment system (SAWE-MILES II) doesn’taccurately replicate our weapons’ sig-nature on the battlefield or the destruc-tive and suppressive effects of our muni-tions. The introduction of new smartmunitions is compounding this problem.

It is extremely costly to modify thesoftware in every SAWE-MILES IIdevice in the system at the dirt CTCs toimplement fire support replicationchanges. But standing up the new BCTis giving us the opportunity to correctmany indirect fires replication prob-lems. To reflect the survivability andlethality data for the new BCT systems,the SAWE-MILES II software and thesystem’s devices must be modified. Weare working with the Training and Doc-trine Command (TRADOC) andSTRICOM to take advantage of therequirement for BCT modifications bysimultaneously incorporating changesfor every BOS to accurately replicatenew vehicles, weapons and ammuni-tion. The SAWE-MILES II modifica-tions are a high priority at TRADOCand must be completed before the firstInitial BCT rotation at the JRTC inDecember 2001.

In addition, our constructive modelsand simulations—such as the CorpsBattle Simulation (CBS) used in theBattle Command Training Program(BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,or Janus—are not providing the degreeof resolution in replicating fires andeffects that we need to train our battlestaffs and fire supporters effectively.Efforts are underway to methodically

validate fires and effects replications invarious simulations in use today.

A parallel effort at Fort Sill is thedesign and development of future simu-lations, such as the One Semi-Auto-mated Force (OneSAF) and WarfighterSimulation 2000 (WARSIM 2000). Theplan is to establish good fires and ef-fects replication in these simulationsnow, during the design phase, ratherthan trying to repair inadequate firesreplication later.

Training is key to our success on thecombined arms battlefield. We mustaccurately replicate the effects of indi-rect fires in all training environmentsand provide the training devices andsimulations for realistic, quality home-station training.

Lightweight Target Location De-vice. Failure to provide accurate targetlocation, the first element of accuratepredicted fire, is the reason most oftencited by O/Cs for poor fires effects inthe close fight. Target location is also aweakness in the fire support reconnais-sance and surveillance plan (R&S).

Our current ground/vehicular laserlocator designator (G/VLLD) has pro-ven to be inadequate for the task. It istoo heavy (weighs 110 pounds) and toocumbersome for dismounted operationsby our observers—COLTs and FISTs.Also, the G/VLLD’s dismounted powersource has a short battery life and thesystem has no self-location capability.

The field and conference attendeesrecommended the FA get a lightweight,laser-rangefinder that can be coupled

with a global positioning system (GPS)capability to accurately locate targets.They agreed that solving this problemwas our priority.

The lightweight laser designatorrangefinder (LLDR) under developmentto replace the G/VLLD will weigh 35pounds, including a day sight withranges out to 10 kilometers, a thermalnight sight with ranges out to two kilo-meters, a laser rangefinder, laser desig-nator and tripod. The system will sig-nificantly enhance target location.

However, AC units don’t start field-ing the LLDR until the first quarter ofFY04 and field through FY09, while Na-tional Guard units will be fielded LLDRfrom FY09 to FY14. In the meantime, toanswer the field commanders’ request fora lightweight target location device now,we need an interim solution.

One option is to buy an off-the-shelfdevice that is lightweight and accuratewith a power supply common to othersystems in the inventory. The 3d Battal-ion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Ben-ning, Georgia, has been using Viper, acommercial binocular laser range-finder, with excellent results. In addi-tion, the 82d Airborne Division Artil-lery at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)Artillery at Fort Campbell, Kentucky,each have four. Although Viper is notthe only interim device that will betested and considered, it is one off-the-shelf device already in use by severalArmy units.

The contractor specifications stateViper will determine range to target upto four kilometers. (At this time, Viperhas not been tested based on Armyspecs.) The carry-weight of the systemis 8.9 pounds, including 3.8 pounds forthe binoculars plus its 10-power ex-tender, tripod and the Viper carryingcase. This lightweight device will re-duce the load of our dismounted ob-servers as they maneuver across roughterrain to position themselves in sup-port of maneuver commanders.

The FA School is getting 24 Vipers forfire support focused rotations at theCTCs and fielding to the Army’s newbrigade combat team (BCT) being stoodup at Fort Lewis, Washington. The fo-cused rotations are designed to helpreverse ongoing negative trends at theCTCs and to gather data for resolvingother challenges.

The FA School will support the Au-gust-September digitized division rota-tion at the National Training Center

The lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR) will weigh 35 pounds, including a daysight with ranges out to 10 kilometers, a thermal night sight with ranges out to twokilometers, a laser rangefinder, laser designator and tripod. (Photo Courtsey of Litton Laser Systems)


(NTC), Fort Irwin, Califor-nia, with the 4th InfantryDivision (Mechanized); thatrotation actually is a focusedrotation for the EngineerSchool (combined armsbreaching); our subject mat-ter experts will gather firesupport data during the ro-tation. In September, the FASchool will support the JointContingency Force/Ad-vanced Warfighting Experi-ment (JCF/AWE) with the10th Mountain Division(Light Infantry) at the JointReadiness Training Center(JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisi-ana. The truly fire support focused rota-tions will be in April 2001 at the JRTCwith the 2d Brigade, 10th MountainDivision out of Fort Drum, New York,and in June 2001 at the NTC with the 2dBrigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mecha-nized) out of Fort Stewart, Georgia.

In June of this year, the initial eightVipers will be distributed. Two Viperswill go to the schoolhouse for trainingat Fort Sill, two to the Initial BCT andfour to the 10th Mountain Division Ar-tillery (Div Arty), the latter to use in itsJCF/AWE.

The FA School is buying an additional14 Vipers, some of which will be dis-tributed to the 4th Div Arty out of FortHood, Texas, for its Division CapstoneExercise (DCX) in March-April 2001at the NTC. Detailed feedback from the10th and 4th Div Artys will help deter-mine if this system, or one similar to it,can offset the lack of LLDRs until FY04.

Brigade FSO as Branch Qualifying.The issue of the brigade fire supportofficer (FSO) position as branch-quali-fying for majors received considerableattention during the conference. TheFA’s job is not only to deliver accurate,timely and effective cannon, rocket andmissile fires, but also to integrate all firesupport into the combined arms fight. Itwas thought that if the FA is aboutsupporting the combined arms fight, weshould “put our money where our mouthis” and reinstate the position of brigadeFSO as branch qualifying for majors. Wealso should ensure our brightest and mostexperienced majors fill those positions.

The FA has long maintained that bri-gade FSO is the toughest position for amajor, but too many Department of theArmy boards haven’t recognized thebrigade FSO as equal to the major’sjobs of battalion S3 or executive officer

(XO) when it came time to select battal-ion commanders. As a result, the bri-gade FSO position was eliminated fromthe branch-qualifying list two years ago.

The Chief of FA has taken the firststeps to reinstate the position as branchqualifying for majors and renew ourcommitment to ensuring that top-qual-ity majors do one of the toughest jobsfor maneuver—and get credit for it.

The new Officer Personnel Manage-ment System (OPMS) XXI increasesthe stability and length of time served inoperational units for both captains andmajors. This makes serving as brigadeFSO and an additional branch-qualify-ing job entirely possible for majors.Scheduled to be fully implemented inFY02, OPMS XXI specifies that majorsin the Operations Career Field (opera-tional units) will serve a minimum of 24months (up to 36 months) in branch-qualifying or key developmental posi-tions. Beginning with Year Group 86,FA majors will have to serve at least 24months in troop assignments to bebranch-qualified. An FA major will beable to serve, for example, one year as abattalion S3 or XO and one as a brigadeFSO. He may be able to serve in all threepositions, given 36 months in his opera-tional unit.

Div Arty commanders at the confer-ence recognized that the burden of plac-ing top-quality, experienced officers inbrigade FSO positions falls to them. Itnaturally follows that those majorswould be selected for promotion andcommand at an increased rate. If we, asa branch, are going to have qualified,experienced fire support coordinators(FSCOORDs) as battalion commanders,then we must place the most competitiveofficers in positions where they can gainthe required fire support experience.

The Field Artillery ProponencyOffice (FAPO) in the FA School,in conjunction with the TotalArmy Personnel Command(PERSCOM), Alexandria, Vir-ginia, is revising DA Pamphlet600-3 Commissioned OfficerDevelopment and Career Man-agement to designate brigadeFSO as a branch-qualifying po-sition. This policy will enhancethe image of brigade FSOs sig-nificantly throughout the firesupport and maneuver commu-nities as well as increase theemphasis on the quality of firesupport the FA is providing themaneuver commander. The re-

visions should be implemented in FY01and will require the active support ofevery division and Div Arty commanderto make it work. The Chief of FA isengaging the Deputy Chief of Staff forPersonnel at the Pentagon to help himimplement the change and provide therevisions to selection boards.

Although the current discussion isabout the brigade FSO position, in fact,the Chief of FA is emphasizing all FSOpositions. The expectation is that offic-ers will serve in FA positions at thebattery and battalion levels before be-ing assigned to the critical company,battalion or brigade FSO positions. Forexample, ideally, an officer will serveas a company FSO as a first lieutenantand battalion FSO after experience as abattery commander, fire direction of-ficer (FDO) or assistant FSCOORD.The objective is to place our most expe-rienced officers in these key fire sup-port positions. We will adjust our of-ficer assignment patterns to provide allofficers the opportunity to serve in di-rect support units during their com-pany-grade years of service.

Dedicated BFISTs for BrigadeFSCOORDs and Task Force FSOs.Another long-standing issue addressedat the conference was the necessity fora dedicated, armored vehicle for everybrigade FSCOORD and task force (TF)FSO in the heavy force. The FSCOORDsand TF FSOs need agility and surviv-ability equal to the highly mobile,mechanized units they support and thecommunications capability to provideeffective fire support. Overall, the con-ference attendees recommended we useBFISTs for these dedicated vehicles.

The BFISTs will provide crew safety,enhanced situational awareness anddedicated communication assets, includ-

Viper, a Commercial Binocular Laser Rangefinder (Photo Courtsey of Leica)


ing a digital capability with either theadvanced Field Artillery tactical data sys-tem (AFATDS) or the initial fire supportautomated system (IFSAS). The vehicleswould enhance the survivability of thebrigade FSCOORDs and TF FSOs andtheir abilities to plan and execute the firesupport plan.

The total requirement to equip heavybrigade FSCOORDs and TF FSOs withBFISTs is 139 vehicles: 66 for AC units,three for the NTC and 70 for NationalGuard units. Beginning in FY06, M7BFISTs cascading from A3 BFISTfieldings will allow us to field M7 BFISTsto the AC heavy brigade FSCOORDs asdedicated fire support vehicles.

However, M7 quantities willnot allow heavy force TF FSOsto have BFISTs without caus-ing vehicle shortages in otherdivisional units. Maneuverunits should consider givingtheir TF FSOs standard M2Bradleys from their existingfleets to allow their FSOs tokeep up with their command-ers and provide synchronizedfires.

The National Guard Bureaualso is considering procuringBFISTs for their heavy brigadeFSCOORDs, TF FSOs andFISTs.

AFATDS Training/Inter-face Issues. AFATDS was an-other subject of discussion atthe conference. Fire support-ers and maneuver command-ers at all levels are concernedabout the amount of sustain-

ment training required to maintain digi-tal proficiency with AFATDS—eighthours recommended per unit per week.Additionally, vertical interface is anissue; currently, AFATDS cannot besubordinate to IFSAS or other legacysystems. (See the article “DigitalInteroperability Between AFATDS andIFSAS” by Major Michael A. Ascura inthe January-February 2000 edition.)

When AC units are fully fieldedAFATDS in 2004, many of the digitalfire direction problems in small-scalecontingencies will be resolved. The RCFA will be fielded in 2007, making theinterface issue moot.

Another issue conference attendeesdiscussed was how difficult AFATDSwas to use, relative to commercial sys-tems. The TRADOC System Manager(TSM)-FATDS is in the process ofmaking AFATDS more user-friendlyby reducing the number of screens andprocedural steps for mission planningand processing and making the systemfaster.

However, AFATDS training andleader development in the schoolhouseand home station will remain critical.As we field AFATDS to the force, sus-tainment training and additional insti-tutional instruction are key to reinforc-ing the instruction given after the newequipment training team (NETT) hasleft the unit.

The AFATDS training strategy hasbeen revised to reflect the needs of theforce. Beginning with FA Officer BasicCourse (FAOBC) Class 3-00, allFAOBC students will receive familiar-ization training on AFATDS. In FY02,AFATDS instruction in FAOBC classeswill expand to four weeks.

FA Captains Career Course (FACCC)Class 4-00 will be the first to receivetwo weeks of intensive AFATDS train-ing, starting in June. In FY02 captainsin FACCC with follow-on assignmentsto AFATDS-equipped units will receivean additional week of instruction on thenew functionality of embedded techni-cal fire direction.

For the enlisted courses, the majoraddition is the creation of the new Mili-

tary Occupational Specialty(MOS) 13D Fire SupportSpecialist that has sevenweeks of advanced indi-vidual training (AIT). Thiscourse begins in the firstquarter of FY01 and in-cludes a block of manualgunnery instruction in ad-dition to AFATDS function-ality. AFATDS instructionfor NCOs is scheduled to startin FY02 in the basic NCOcourse (BNCOC) and theadvanced NCO course(ANCOC).

Educating the entire forceis critical for the success ofAFATDS. Distance learn-ing technologies are prom-ising tools to train portions ofthe force on AFATDS, espe-cially software upgrades. TheFA School’s WarfightingIntegration and Develop-

Overall, the conference attendees recommended we use BFISTs for dedicated FSCOORDand TF FSO vehicles. (Photo of 1-41 FA, 3d ID (Mech), Fort Stewart, GA, by SFC Gerald Mitchell)

The schoolhouse is increasing AFATDS training in courses forofficers and NCOs. But for AFATDS to be successful, units mustrediscover the old “TACFIRE Park” commitment to weekly home-station training. (Photo by Kevin Tucker, Fort Sill TSC)


ment Directorate (WIDD) is workingtoward that goal.

Still, commanders at the conferenceagreed that for AFATDS to be success-ful, units had to rediscover the old“TACFIRE Park” (tactical fire direc-tion system) commitment for digitalsustainment training—weekly home-station training in a permanent “park”designed to support digital communi-cations.

Doctrinal and Organizational Short-falls for Operational Fires. This wasanother area discussed during the con-ference that required immediate atten-tion. The Army War College, CarlisleBarracks, Pennsylvania, is leading therewriting of Field Manual 100-7 Deci-sive Force: The Army in Theater Opera-tions. The FA School is supporting theWar College by addressing doctrine andorganizations for fire support at the the-ater level and echelons above corps (EAC).

As validated by the field representa-tives at the conference, current doctrinedoesn’t codify theater fires requirementsand organizations. The FA School’sintent is to establish the doctrine andorganizations to reflect effects-basedfires for joint task force (JTF), jointforce land component (JFLCC) andarmy force (ARFOR) operations. Theeffects-based fires approach focuses onthe integration and synchronization oflethal and nonlethal effects to producethe desired results, including effectsgained in information operations.

The goal is to codify the effects-basedapproach in doctrine that will becomethe basis for organizing, developing andresourcing the appropriate fires elementsat the theater and EAC levels.

Ongoing FA School Fire SupportInitiatives. CTC trends reversal was amajor issue during the conference. Thesame negative fire support trends ob-served 10 years ago at our CTCs still arebeing observed today at the CTCs.

The Combined Arms Command(CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, isdeveloping programs to improve nega-tive trends in all battlefield operatingsystems (BOS), including the fire sup-port BOS. The FA School is workingwith CAC on a number of initiatives toreverse negative fire support trends aswell as analyzing systemic fire supportissues in doctrine, leader training andcurrent and future equipment fielding.The FA School is committed to beingpart of the solution for trends reversal,not just part of a team that documentsshortcomings.

The Fire Support and Combined ArmsOperations Department (FSCAOD) atthe FA School has the lead for definingcorrective actions and initiating pro-grams to reverse these negative firesupport trends. Currently, FSCAOD isorganizing mobile training teams(MTTs) to support units participating infocused rotations during their CTC train-ups. The teams will provide any and allassistance a unit requests.

Additionally, FSCAOD has developeda handbook of TTPs for TF FSOs to bereleased by June 2000. The tenets inFSCAOD’s white paper “Fire Supportfor the Brigade and Below” have beenincorporated into manuals currently be-ing revised, and WIDD is working tointegrate them into appropriate maneu-ver manuals.

The FA School also is working to helpmaneuver commanders train brigadetargeting teams as part of home-stationtraining via a new organization trainingteam (NOTT). The NOTT includes atargeting warrant officer to train theBCT staff on targeting techniques.

The FA School also has retooled thepre-command course (PCC) to give thecourse greater tactical focus. First, theFSCOORD’s role as the integral part ofthe maneuver brigade staff and his rela-tionship with the maneuver commanderare covered in more detail. Also, TTPsfor synchronizing fires are discussed atlength in a seminar format. Addition-ally, the PCC is part of the trends rever-sal process by educating future com-manders on the negative trends at theCTCs. Finally, we continue to train fu-ture commanders in detail on planningand executing fires. The intent is to giveFSCOORDs the tactical competenceneeded to confidently advise maneuverbrigade commanders on fire supportand train subordinate FSOs.

Conclusion. Major General Stricklinconvened January’s Tactical/Opera-tional Fire Support Conference andasked participants to “roll up theirsleeves” and work to resolve importantfire support issues. Providing fire sup-port for the maneuver commander is theonly reason the FA exists. Tangiblesolutions to these problems are alreadyin motion, and we’ll aggressively tackleany obstacles to their implementation.

As important as this conference was, itdoes not take the place of the SeniorFire Support Conference held at the FASchool every 18 months. The next Se-nior Fire Support Conference is sched-uled for 23 to 27 June 2001.

Brigadier General William F. Engel is Assis-tant Commandant of the Field ArtillerySchool and Deputy Commanding Generalfor Training of the Field Artillery Center andFort Sill, Oklahoma. His previous assign-ments include serving as Deputy Directorfor Operations in the National Military Com-mand Center, J3, Joint Staff at the Pentagon;Chief of the Command Planning Group forthe Training and Doctrine Command, FortMonroe, Virginia; and Commander of the17th Field Artillery Brigade, part of III CorpsArtillery at Fort Sill. He also commandedthe 4th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery at FortBenning, Georgia, part of the 24th InfantryDivision (Mechanized), during OperationsDesert Shield and Storm.

Colonel R. Mark Blum is the Director of theFire Support and Combined Arms Opera-tions Department (FSCAOD) in the FieldArtillery School, Fort Sill. In previous as-signments, he was a Project Officer in theForce Development Division of the Office ofthe Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations atthe Pentagon and Commander of the 2dBattalion, 5th Field Artillery, part of the212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artil-lery. He served as Assistant S3 of a divisionartillery, S3 and Executive Officer of a bat-talion, twice as a battalion Fire SupportOfficer (FSO) and once as a Company FSO.He is a graduate of the National War Col-lege, Washington, DC. Colonel Blum takescommand of the 212th Field Artillery Bri-gade in June.

Major Rafael Torres, Jr., is a Small GroupInstructor at the Field Artillery CaptainsCareer Course, part of FSCAOD in the FieldArtillery School. Previously, he served asan Assistant S3 Trainer for the Battle Com-mand Training Program, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, and Battery Commander Trainerfor the 1st Battalion, 2d Regional TrainingBrigade, Fort Lewis, Washington. He com-manded two batteries: Headquarters andHeadquarters Battery of the 2d Battalion,17th Field Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Bri-gade, and A Battery, 1st Battalion, 31stField Artillery of the Field Artillery TrainingCenter, Fort Sill. Major Torres is a graduateof the Command and General Staff College,Fort Leavenworth.

The FA has not walked away from theclose fight or any other fight. We do,however, have some fire support “in-frastructure” work to do. We must spendthe time and resources to ensure thedoctrine, organizations, leaders, trainedpersonnel, procedures and equipmentare in place to put fires where the ma-neuver commander needs them—ontime, on target, every time. Fire Sup-port—King of Battle!


In recent months, the fire supportcommunity updated its doctrinethrough the publication of a white

paper “Fire Support Planning for theBrigade and Below.” The publicationaddresses the military decision-makingprocess (MDMP) as it pertains to firesupport officers (FSOs) for the brigadeand battalion/task force (TF). However,this document doesn’t adequately ad-dress the company FSO’s role as therefiner/executor of the brigade and bat-talion/TF plan.

This article provides the company FSOwith tactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) to help him understand his du-ties and responsibilities, using the eighttroop-leading procedures (TLP) as a guide.(See Figure 1.) Additionally, the articleintroduces a briefing format to help theFSO clearly brief his company commanderon the fire support plan and how firessupport the scheme of maneuver.

1. Receive the mission. First, the FSOreceives the mission as an oral or writ-ten order. He accompanies the com-pany commander to the battalion/TForders briefing, which allows him tohear firsthand what the mission is andhow the company fits into the scheme

of maneuver and fires. Of even greaterimportance, he meets with the battal-ion/TF FSO.

During the operations order (OPORD)briefing, the S2 describes in detail howthe enemy is anticipated to fight; theFSO gathers the information listed inFigure 1. The FSO also determines thecapabilities and limitations of the en-emy and information the company com-mander will use in the company intelli-gence preparation of the battlefield (IBP)as he develops the maneuver plan. TheFSO will use this information to helphim develop a fire support plan to sup-port the company commander’s plan.

Second, the FSO reads the OPORD,focusing on the brigade and TF missionas well as commander’s intent. Thisallows him to “visualize” how the bri-gade will fight and his company’s partin the plan. The brigade/TF command-er’s intent provides the FSO a frame-work of how fire support will be used tosupport the operation. He gleans theinformation listed in Figure 1 from theOPORD.

The TF FSO briefs the TF fire supportplan as part of the OPORD. During thebriefing, the FSO describes the specif-

ics of how the brigade and TF will exe-cute the fire support plan to support thebrigade and TF schemes of maneuver.The company FSO learns the essentialfire support tasks (EFSTs) and whatresponsibility his company has for ac-complishing which tasks. This infor-mation is found in the OPORD’s firesparagraph and associated matrices. TheFA organization for combat tells theFSO what FA assets are available to thebrigade.

After gathering information from theOPORD, the company FSO asks hiscommander for a mission statement andthe commander’s guidance. The FSOalso should be at the company com-mander’s back brief to the TF com-mander. During this briefing, the FSOwill hear the company mission state-ment and any task clarification issues.

Before the FSO receives the companycommander’s guidance, he should in-form and clarify with the commanderwhat EFSTs the company is responsiblefor executing. This tells the commanderhow fires are planned for the company,so he can formulate a scheme of maneu-ver and issue guidance based on theentire plan, not just the maneuver plan.

Offi

cers

brie

fing

thei

r fir

e su

pp

ort

pla

n. (

Pho

to b

y 2L

T La

rry

Cun

ning

ham

, C

/2-8

0 FA

)

by Major Terry A. IvesterMaking Fires Happen in the Close Fight


1. Receive the mission.• From the S2 intelligence briefing:

- Terrain and Weather- Enemy Situation and Most Likely and Most Dangerous Courses of

Action (COAs)• From the operations order (OPORD):

- Brigade and Task Force (TF) Mission and Commander’s Intent- Concept of the Operation and Scheme of Maneuver- Task Organization- Tasks to His Company- Tasks to the Mortars- Copies of Graphics and Execution/Synchronization Matrix

• From the battalion/TF fire support officer (FSO):- TF Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)- Organization for Combat- Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM)- Target List Worksheet- Fire Support Overlay

• From the company OPORD: Mission and Guidance

2. Issue a warning order (WARNO).• Participate in the company commander’s WARNO.• Brief all available information on the execution of fires and provide fire

support documents to forward observers (FOs), commanders, platoonleaders and mortars with attachments; issue the same information tofiresupport team (FIST) headquarters.

• Get the commander’s timeline.• Identify/begin pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections

(PCIs).• Notify company commander/battalion FSO of changes in status (war

stoppers).

3. Begin planning.• Attach overlays and plot targets.• Read and analyze the TF plan again and apply company commander’s

guidance.• Determine observation requirements.• Refine targets based on the commander’s guidance.• Plan allocated targets based on the commander’s guidance and

target allocations.• Develop the company fire support plan.• Develop the FSO briefing and advise the company commander.

4. Arrange for movement.• Position FOs/FIST vehicles (FISTVs) based on the observation plan.• Move with company/team to the assembly area (AA) or attack position.

5. Conduct reconnaissance. Reconnoiter the area with the companycommander for factors influencing the targets/observation plan; considerterrain, target locations, FISTV locations and triggers, at a minimum.

6. Complete the plan. Refine the targets and observation plan based onthe reconnaissance.

7. Issue the order. The order is based on the unit standing operatingprocedures (SOP), scheme of fires and observation plan.

8. Supervise.• Conduct PCCs.• Continue to refine the fire support plan.• Rehearse the plan.• Develop a sleep plan for 24-hour operations.

Figure 1: Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP). The eightTLP were taken from FM 71-123 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Combined ArmsHeavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force and Company/Team, Page 1-11.

2. Issue the warning order. (See Step 2in Figure 1.) After the FSO and com-mander receive the order, they return tothe company area. The company com-mander then issues a WARNO. As part ofthe order, the commander addresses thesituation/mission, the start time of theoperation and the time and place he willissue his OPORD. This allows the com-pany leadership time to begin prepara-tions for the operation and start pre-com-bat checks (PCCs).

During this step, the FSO issues hisown WARNO to the fire support team(FIST) headquarters and platoon ob-servers. The FSO briefs all informationavailable about the upcoming operationusing the documents from the battalionOPORD. Additionally, he provides theFIST specific PCCs and pre-combatinspections (PCIs) to complete the op-eration. He also informs the commanderand TF FSO of his equipment status(based on the standing operating proce-dures, or SOP) and updates that infor-mation as the situation changes.

3. Begin planning. After the WARNOis issued, the FSO develops a fire sup-port plan based on the commander’sguidance he received and what he knowsabout the brigade and TF plan. (SeeStep 3 in Figure 1.)

He reads and analyzes the TF OPORDto determine what targets he’s respon-sible for executing and if the targetsneed refining. While reading theOPORD, he keeps his company com-mander’s guidance in mind to deter-mine if any brigade or TF targets meetthe guidance, eliminating duplicationof targets. The FSO plans any addi-tional targets necessary to meet the com-pany commander’s guidance based ontarget allocations. At the same time, hedevelops the company fire support planand briefs it to his company commander.

4. Arrange for movement. The FSOpositions his forward observers (FOs),if applicable, and FIST vehicle (FISTV)based on the observation plan and moveswith the company/team to the assemblyarea (AA) or attack position.

5. Conduct reconnaissance. The FSOaccompanies the company commanderon his reconnaissance of the terrainwhere the operation will be conductedand goes as far forward as the tacticalsituation permits. The reconnaissancecontinues the planning process, con-firming or denying the tentative plan. Ifthe commander makes changes to theplan based on the recon, the FSO up-dates the tentative plan. The FSO con-


1. Situation:• Orient the commander to the map/area of operation:

- Point out grid north/address and briefly explain key terrain.- Point out the battalion’s and company’s AO (PLs, axes, objectives, EAs, etc.), friendly and enemy obstacles,

avenues of approach and mobility corridors, and any known or suspected enemy locations.- Point out all locations of your company and other TF elements. Include any attachments to the company or

TF as well as other friendly units that will call-for-fires from the DS artillery battalion (i.e., COLTs, scouts andadjacent TF units).

• Briefly explain:- The TF commander’s mission/intent and concept of the operation, pointing to the map and graphics as you

explain.- State the TF commander’s intent for fires and attack guidance.

2. Mission: State the company mission verbatim from the commander’ guidance and explain the companyscheme of maneuver, pointing to the map and graphics as you explain.

3. Execution:• State the company commander’s guidance for fires verbatim:

- Briefly address how the guidance was met.- Address and explain any part of the guidance you are unable to meet.- Ask the commander for any changes or additional guidance he may have.

• State the fire support assets available:- At a minimum, state what assets the company can request fire support from, i.e., DS battalion, TF mortars,

company mortars (light companies only) and naval gunfire. Brief other assets available to the brigade, suchas a reinforcing battalion and CAS, but emphasize that unless the TF has allocated them, the companycan’t request fires from these assets.

- Priority of Fires. State the TF priority of fires (which company) by phase, followed by the company priority offires (which platoon) by phase.

- Priority Targets. State the number of priority targets the company has and point them out on the overlay.- Final Protective Fires. State the number, size and asset for each FPF as you point them out on the overlay.- Special Munitions Allocations. State the quantity, if any, of each special munition the company is allocated

(i.e., 15 minutes of FA smoke). The munitions to discuss are smoke (FA and mortar), Copperhead, illumina-tion, FASCAM and DPICM.

- Any Other Allocations. The number of targets allocated by the TF by asset (FA or mortar) for planning. Stateif the company is allocated CAS sorties (by aircraft type and ordnance, if known).

• State the scheme of fires:- Brief the FSEM; brief the scheme of fires target by target, by phase and in the chronological sequence you

expect them to be executed. Point to each target on the overlay. Cover all the elements of the EFST (task,purpose, method and effects) or, at a minimum, the task and purpose for each target.

- Explain in detail why each trigger, observer and location was chosen for each target. Explain how eachtarget supports the company’s plan and how it relates to enemy forces and time.

• Brief the FSCM and restrictions: Brief all FSCM, when they are in effect and other restrictions on fires, i.e.,the TF commander’s approval required to fire illumination.

4. Service Support: Brief the status of company fire support personnel and equipment, i.e., the number ofpersonnel available and the G/VLLD, radios, weapons, FISTV and amount of fuel available. For light infantrycompanies, brief the ammunition load for the 60-mm mortars on hand and expected resupply.

5. Command and Signal:• Point to the location of the FISTV and brief its movement and positioning plan as well as the employment

option you have chosen.• Brief and point out the locations of the platoon FOs, their movement and positioning plan and control options.• Brief what nets you will be operating on, who you will be talking to and the call signs for all fire support assets.

Figure 2: Company FSO Briefing Format

EAs = Engagement AreasEFST = Essential Fire Support Task

FASCAM = Family of Scatterable MinesFISTV = Fire Support Team VehicleFSCM = Fire Support Coordinating

MeasuresFSEM = Fire Support Execution Matrix

AO = Area of OperationsCAS = Close Air Support

COLTs = Combat Observation LasingTeams

DPICM = Dual-Purpose ImprovedConventional Munition

DS = Direct Support

Legend:FOs = Forward Observers

FPFs = Final Protective FiresFSO = Fire Support Officer

G/VLLD = Ground/Vehicular LaserLocator Designator

PLs = Phase LinesTF = Task Force


Major Terry A. Ivester is an Instructor forthe Field Artillery Officer Basic Course inthe Basic Fire Support Branch, Fire Sup-port and Combined Arms OperationsDepartment (FSCAOD), Field ArtillerySchool, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. His previousassignments include serving as a Mecha-nized Infantry Fire Support Trainer andBattalion Fire Direction Trainer at the Na-tional Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin,California; B Battery Commander, 1st Bat-talion, 78th Field Artillery, Field ArtilleryTraining Center, Fort Sill, and Gunnery In-structor in the Field Artillery School. Healso was a Platoon Leader and Companyand Troop Fire Support Officer with the 4thBattalion, 41st Field Artillery at Fort Benning,Georgia, part of the 24th Infantry Division(Mechanized).

siders terrain, target locations, FISTVlocation and triggers, at a minimum.

6. Complete the plan. Based on thereconnaissance, the FSO makes the ap-propriate changes to the plan, includingnew guidance by the company com-mander and his other changes.

Next, the FSO briefs his company com-mander in a clear and concise manner,explaining how fires will support thescheme of maneuver. The instructors ofthe FA Officer Basic Course at the FASchool, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, use theformat shown in Figure 2 to teach lieu-tenants how to brief their commanders.

Although the format appears that thebriefing will be rather lengthy, the FSOshould be able to brief his companycommander using this format in about20 minutes. In a time-sensitive environ-ment, the format can be prioritized andmodified based on the time available.

7. Issue the order. Next, the FSO for-wards the plan to the battalion/TF FSOfor approval and briefs his FIST. Hebriefs the fire support portion of the com-pany OPORD according to the unit SOP.The information is in the FSO’s briefingto the company commander, specificallythe scheme of fires and observation plan.

8. Supervise. The FSO next focuseson tracking and completing the PCCsand PCIs initiated in Step 1. The TFFSO ensures the FSO receives all thechanges and (or) updates to the planthrough constant communications.

The FSO supervises subordinates oncompleting their tasks in the fire sup-port plan. He gives them a reasonabletime to execute the orders and thenchecks them by a combination of backbriefs, inspections and rehearsals.

The most important thing the FSOdoes before executing a fire plan is torehearse. Rehearsals improve the totalcomprehension of the plan at all levels.Participants who are unclear on specificportions of the plan gain answers throughthe repetitiveness of rehearsals.

At the company-level, the FSO en-sures the fire support plan is rehearsedin conjunction with the maneuver re-hearsal, if possible. If the company com-mander doesn’t conduct a rehearsal, theFSO should conduct a fire support re-hearsal of his own. The rehearsal in-cludes, at a minimum, all members ofthe FIST and the fire support assets.FSOs use the target list and executionmatrix to “walk through” the operation.

The FSO must determine a sleep planfor his soldiers in 24-hour operations orexecuting fires will suffer due to fatigue.

The company FSO is an importantasset to the company, TF and brigade.He gathers information and works withhis company commander to plan andexecute fires to win the brigade fight.

The Joint Readiness Training Center(JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, has wit-nessed a trend over the last several yearsin units’ abilities to conduct hasty survey.Field Artillery batteries generally don’tknow how to perform hasty astro tech-niques, which is the second best meansof getting survey data. The leaders in thebatteries have had no institutional trainingon the tasks, and hasty astro proceduresare not referenceable in the manuals com-mon to the FA cannon battery leaders.

Batteries typically deploy initially into anarea of operations at the JRTC withoutsurvey support. This forces the batterycommander to decide what method of layhe will use to establish directional controlfor his battery location. In many cases, thebattery commander elects to lay the safe bygrid azimuth—which should be the lastresort. The grid-azimuth method can leadto fratricide because of the error that mag-netic attractions can introduce into the data.

FM 6-2 Tactics, Techniques and Proce-dures [TTP] for Field Artillery Survey withChange 1, Chapters 7, 10 and 13, con-tains the procedures for conducting hastyastro, but most platoon leaders/execu-

tive officers (XOs), chiefs of firing battery(CFBs) and gunnery sergeants (GSGs)don’t have this manual. Instead, they useFM 6-50 TTP for the Field Artillery CannonBattery and ST 6-50-20 Battery ExecutiveOfficer’s/Platoon Leader’s Handbook asreferences, but these publications don’tcover the hasty astro procedures. In addi-tion, hasty astro procedures aren’t taughtin the advanced NCO course (ANCOC),and lieutenants in the officer basic course(OBC) only get a limited exposure to thesurvey method. So a baseline knowledgeof hastry astro isn’t prevalent. As a result,leaders don’t have confidence in hasty astro.

A firing unit can obtain directional con-trol day or night (weather permitting), us-ing a celestial body to an accuracy of plusor minus two mils with the forward entrydevice (FED), hand-held terminal unit (HTU)and precision lightweight global position-ing system receiver (PLGR). This is not thePolaris-Kochab or Polaris-2 methods,which are time-consuming or obsolete.When trained on hasty astros, the Big Three(XO, CFB and GSG) can perform a hastyastro as quickly as they can “float theneedle” to use the grid azimuth method.

Hasty Astro: Taking the Needle Out of the EquationHasty astro is a proven survey tech-

nique that eliminates the error associatedwith the magnetic attraction inherent inlaying by grid. It is a simple and quickmethod, more accurate than grid azimuthbut requires training so leaders are profi-cient in its use. If the FA introduces thetechnique to our battery-level leaders atthe schoolhouse, a baseline knowledgewill be established. Next, we recommendthe FA School update FM 6-50 and ST 6-50-20 to include the procedures so userscan readily reference the technique. In theinterim, FA units should develop and ex-ecute a training plan to raise the abilitiesand confidence of FA users to perform thehasty astro, using FM 6-2, Chapters 7, 10and 13.

If properly trained, leaders can compe-tently use the hasty astro method the nexttime survey is unavailable and “take theneedle out of the equation.”

MAJ Michael J. Forsyth, FAFA School, Fort Sill, OK

CPT Timonthy P. Sullivan andSFC Jeffrey M. Hoppert

JRTC, Fort Polk, LA


Your battalion just received themission to conduct a deliberateattack on an enemy company

supply point. The intelligence estimateplaces two DSHK air defense heavymachine guns and two 82-mm mortarson the objective. The battalion com-mander tells you fires must suppressthose weapons for his unit to succeed.He wants you, the fire support officer(FSO), to maintain suppression—smokeand lethal fires—as long as possible, sohe can move his companies in closewith minimal casualties.

How are you going to satisfy the com-mander’s concern? You echelon thefires of several weapon systems on theobjective up to the minimum safe dis-tances (MSDs) of each asset.

The purpose of echeloning fires is tomaintain constant suppression on anobjective while using the optimum de-livery system up to the point of its MSDin training or risk estimate distance(RED) in combat operations. This pro-vides protection for the friendly troopsas they move to and assault an objec-tive, allowing them to get in close withminimal casualties. It prevents the en-emy from observing and engaging theassault by forcing them to take cover,allowing the friendly unit to continuethe advance unimpeded.

This article focuses primarily onecheloning fires, providing step-by-steptechniques for planning, preparing andexecuting fires in a deliberate (or hasty)attack on an objective up to the MSDsfor selected weapon systems.

Planning. There are specific items ofinformation the FSO must glean fromthe military decision-making process(MDMP) to formulate a workable fireplan. To start, the FSO must determinethe locations–both suspected and con-firmed–of the enemy weapon systemsthe commander wants to engage. TheFSO works closely with the maneuverbattalion intelligence officer gatheringinformation. If higher headquarters hasnot already targeted these positions, theFSO targets them with fires accordingto the commander’s attack guidance.

The FSO then determines what weaponsystems are available to his maneuverunit for the assault. He gets this infor-mation from the higher headquarters’fire support plan in the Fires Paragraph3(a)2 of the operations order (OPORD)

or Fire Support Annex D. Allocationsrun the gamut from naval surface firesupport to close air support (CAS) inaddition to Field Artillery.

Knowledge of all systems and muni-tions is critical for the fire supporterwhen sequencing the fire plan. The FSOuses the information to determine thelength of the prep by weapon systembased on the number of volleys, salvosand minutes of munitions or sorties ofaircraft allocated to the attack.

Next, the FSO ensures he understandsthe battalion scheme of maneuver, rate-of-march and axis/route-of-advance.The FSO gets the information from thebattalion operations officer during theMDMP. (As you already can see, thekey to planning echeloned fires is for firesupport to be fully integrated into battlestaff planning.) The FSO uses the infor-mation to determine the timing of fires,positioning of the MSD lines from thetargets and the objective for all weaponsystems.

MSD is defined as the minimum dis-tance friendly troops can approach theeffects of friendly fires without suffer-ing appreciable casualties in a trainingscenario—0.1 percent probability ofincapacitation (PI), or greater. REDsare closer and are used for combat opera-tions, serving the same purpose as MSDs(See the article “Risk Estimate Distancesfor Indirect Fires in Combat” by MajorGerard Pokorski and Lonnie R. Minton,March-April 1997.) Each weapon systemhas an MSD based on range-to-target andmunition type (see Figures 1 and 2).

Once the MSD for each weapon isdefined, the FSO recommends the des-ignation of the phase lines (PLs) totrigger engaging the targets or to lift orshift fires. Some units name PLs afterthe weapon system it triggers, such asPL 155-mm. (See Figure 3 on .)

The FSO places the lines on the firesupport overlay and affixes it over themaneuver graphics. If possible, he ad-justs the lines so they correspond with

SuppressingSuppressingSuppressingSuppressingSuppressingthe Objectivethe Objectivethe Objectivethe Objectivethe ObjectiveEcheloning FiresEcheloning FiresEcheloning FiresEcheloning FiresEcheloning Firesin the Attackin the Attackin the Attackin the Attackin the Attackby Major Michael J. ForsythPhotograph by Raymond A. Barnard, Command Photographer, JRTC


prominent terrain for easy identifica-tion and triggering. The FSO must becareful to ensure that in adjusting thelines, he doesn’t push them closer to thetargets in violation of weapon MSDs.

The final piece to planning fires is thescheme of echelonment. The conceptbehind echeloning fires is to begin sup-pressing the targets on and around theobjective using the system with the larg-est MSD. As the maneuver unit closes the

distance (i.e., crosses the respective MSDline) en route to the objective, the fires lift(or shift). This triggers the engagement ofthe targets by the delivery system with thenext largest MSD. The length of time toengage the targets is based on the rate ofthe friendly force’s movement betweenthe MSD and PLs.

The process continues until the systemwith the least MSD lifts and the maneuverunit is close enough to make its final

assault and clear the objective. To en-sure no gaps in fires, the FSO triggersthe next system before lifting the lastdelivery asset.

Using echelonment of fires within thespecified MSD for a delivery systemrequires the unit to assume some risks.FSOs must remember that the decisionto bring fires within MSD of friendlytroops is a maneuver commander’s de-cision. Therefore, the FSO must get the

18,000

680

Figure 2: Minimum Safe Distances (MSDs) for Common FA Systems in Meters. These MSDs are for indirect fires where the gun-target lineis perpendicular to the maneuver axis of advance. Probable error increases with range, so the MSDs increase. MSD Sources: FM 6-141-1 Field Artillery Target Analysis and Weapons Employment: Non-Nuclear (w Ch1) and data from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)Analysis Feedback Facility, Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Range-to-Target(Meters)

60-mm Mortar

81-mm Mortar

105-mm Howitzer

155-mm Howitzer

1,000

330

330

2,000

330

330

6,000

340

440

8,000

350

450

10,000

360

460

12,000

470

14,000

530

16,000

600

4,000

332

340

430

250 m

100 m

*275 m

275 m

275 m

225 m

**

100 m

*****

275 m

*275 m

425 m

375 m

*500 m

500 m

500 m

500 m

**

175 m

*****

500 m

*500 m

MK 82 LD

MK 82 HD

MK 82 LGB

MK 83 HD

MK 83 LD

MK 83 LGB

MK 84 LD

MK 84 LGB

MK 20**2.75 FFAR

SUU-11

M-4/M-12/SUU-23/M-61

GAU-12

GPU-5A/GAU-8A

AGM-65 (AF)

MK 21/29

MK 23/30

AGM-123A

500-Pound Bomb

500-Pound Bomb

500-Pound Bomb (GBU-12)

1,000-Pound Bomb

1,000-Pound Bomb

1,000-Pound Bomb (GBU-16)

2,000-Pound Bomb

2,000-Pound Bomb (GBU-10-22)

Rockeye CBU (Antiarmor)

Rockets (Various Warheads)

7.62-mm Mini-Gun

20-mm Gatling Gun

25-mm Gatling Gun

30-mm Gatling Gun

Maverick Missile (TV/IR/Laser)

Walleye I 1,000-Pound Bomb (TV Guided)

Walleye II 2,400-Pound Bomb (TV Guided)

Skipper 100-Pound Bomb (Laser Guided, Rocket Boosted)

Weapon Description Minimum Safe Distance

10% PI 0.1% PI

* Minimum safe distances have not been determined.** Not recommended for use near friendly troops.

Figure 1: Close Air Support (CAS) Minimum Safe Distances (MSDs). Data taken from “CAS Ordnance Reference Data,” FM 71-123 Tactics andTechniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force and Company/Team (Table 7-2 on Page 7-12).

Legend:AGM = Air-to-Ground MissileCBU = Cluster-Bomb Unit

FFAR = Folding-Fin Aircraft Rocket

HD = High DragIR = Infrared

LD = Low DragLGB = Laser-Guided BombMK = Mark

PI = Probability of IncapacitationSUU = Suspension Unit Universal

GAU = Gun/Aircraft UnitGBU = Guided-Bomb UnitGPU = Gun/Pod Unit


Major Michael J. Forsyth is a Fire SupportInstructor/Doctrine Writer in the Basic FireSupport Branch of the Fire Support andCombined Arms Operations Department,Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.His previous assignment was as the FiringBattery Senior Observer/Controller (O/C)at the Joint Readiness Training Center(JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. Other assign-ments include serving as FA Controller inthe Plans/Exercise Maneuver Control Divi-sion at the JRTC and as the Commander ofHeadquarters and Service Battery of the 3dBattalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Air-borne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell,Kentucky. Major Forsyth also served asFiring Platoon Leader, Ammunition Pla-toon Leader and Platoon Fire DirectionOfficer in the 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artil-lery Regiment (Airborne), 18th Field ArtilleryBrigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

commander’s approval before proceed-ing with the preparation phase of thisprocess.

Preparation. To ensure crisp execu-tion of the plan, the FSO must do sev-eral things. When possible, he shouldparticipate in a leader’s reconnaissanceto physically identify the PLs and tar-gets in the vicinity of the objective. Thisenables the FSO to confirm the validityof the triggers based on the lay of theground. If adjustments make the planeasier to execute, the FSO can thenmake them. Also, reconnaissance givesthe opportunity to make refinements tothe targets based on the actual locationof the enemy. Once the unit observesthe targets, it must maintain surveil-lance in the event the enemy moves.

Following the reconnaissance, the FSOconducts pre-combat inspections. Heensures that all observers–especiallythose for the lead element–input thePLs in their precision lightweight glo-bal positioning system receivers(PLGRs). Using the capability of thePLGR, such as the way-point or bull’s-eye functions, fire support personnelcan lift and trigger the appropriate assetat the right time. These functions pre-vent the friendly force from crossing anMSD line before the asset’s fires havebeen lifted and help alert the FSO whento call in the next delivery system.

The linchpin in preparing the fire planis a solid fire support rehearsal withemphasis on the communications plan.When conducting the rehearsal, the FSOmust cover target purpose, refined tar-

Figure 3: Graphic of an Echeloned Fire Plan for a Deliberate Attack

PL CAS

StartCAShere.

PL NGF/155-M

StartNGF/155

here.

Minimum safeCAS line is500 meters from friendly

forces forMK 84 LD.

Minimum safeNGF/155 line is450 meters for

1 gun of 5-inch/54-mmand 155-mm

4-gun DPICM.

PL 105

Start105-mmhowitzer

here.

PL 81/60

Start81/60-mm

mortar here.

Minimum safe105-mm line is

360 metersfor 4-gunHE/PD.

Minimum safe81/60-mm line is

330 meters for 3-gunHE/PD.

PL Stop

Ensure allindirect fires onthe objectiveare lifted andshifted beyondthe objective.

LOA

AB1010

LOA

Route to Objective

CAS = Close Air SupportDPICM = Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions

HE/PD = High Explosive/Point Detonating FuzeLD = Low Drag

LOA = Limit of AdvanceNGF = Naval Gunfire

PL = Phase Line

Legend:

get locations, route to the objective,MSD PLs, commo nets and radio calls(or codewords), primary and alternateobservers and the appropriate asset. Arepresentative from every delivery as-set must attend this rehearsal, giving ob-servers and firers the opportunity to ironout problems with the plan. All playersthen conduct a radio technical rehearsal toverify communications nets are operable.

Execution. When the unit approachesthe designated PL en route to the objec-tive, the FSO begins the preparation(Figure 3). As the unit continues itsmovement toward the objective, the firstdelivery system engages its targets. Itmaintains fires on the targets until theunit crosses the next PL that corre-sponds to the MSD of the weapon.

To maintain constant pressure on thetargets the unit must start the next assetbefore the previous asset lifts. This en-sures no break in fires, enabling thefriendly forces’ approach to continueunimpeded. However, if the unit rate-of-march slows, the fire support systemmust remain flexible to the changeswhile continuing the pressure.

The FSO lifts and engages with eachasset at the prescribed triggers, workingthe fires from the system with the largestMSD to the smallest. Once the maneuverelement reaches the final PL to lift all fireson the objective, the FSO shifts to targetsbeyond the objective to seal the area. Thisenables the unit to fix and finish the de-struction of the enemy on the objective.

Conclusion. Echelonment of fires is atechnique for synchronizing and inte-

grating close fires in a deliberate attackwhile safeguarding the soldiers makingthe assault. Use of the procedure allowsfire supporters to mass fires of variousdelivery systems at the proper time andlocation to satisfy the maneuver com-mander’s intent. Several rotationsthrough the Joint Readiness TrainingCenter (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana,during both live-fire and force-on-forcescenarios, have validated the technique.

Using echelonment in home-stationtraining builds confidence among firesupport leaders and credibility in ma-neuver circles that we can adequatelysupport a hasty or deliberate attack.


You are an FA battalion S3—orbattalion or battery fire direc-tion officer (FDO) or, maybe,

work in a brigade or battalion firesupport element (FSE)—at your rota-tion at the National Training Center(NTC), Fort Irwin, California.You’ve done your homework, sofires will set the best conditions forthe soldiers out front at “the point ofthe spear.” Short of actual combatexperience, you’ve done your bestto become a subject matter expert inthe art and science of fires.

In the rotation, your brigade combatteam (BCT) is transitioning to live-fire operations. In this instance, theBCT is conducting a deliberate at-tack supported by close air support(CAS), Army attack aviation, yourdirect support (DS) battalion, a rein-forcing (R) battalion and a light bat-tery attached to the DS battalion. TheBCT has inserted its brigade recon-naissance troop (BRT) and combatobservation lasing teams (COLTs) toobserve target areas of interests (TAI)and identify enemy obstacles, high-value targets and infantry strongpoints.This allows the BCT to refine targetsand finalize the scheme of fires.

The BCT is scheduled to cross theline of departure (LD) at 0500. TheBCT and battalion task force (TF)FSEs have been working top-down/bottom-up target refinement all nightand have updated the BCT targetlist, observer and TF responsibilities,and triggers and passed the informationto the FA battalion fire direction center(FDC). The FDC worked to sort out thenew target list and assign targets; re-check triggers, ammunition and position-ing requirements; and, finally, pass a de-tailed scheme of fires to the reinforcingbattalion and firing batteries.

It’s now 0445. All the observers aretrained on their targets and the guns arelaid. Everyone else is leaning forward,waiting to cross the LD.

Suddenly, an NTC observer/control-ler (O/C) says, “You aren’t fit to fight,and you’re not authorized to go redindirect at this time.” You wonder howthis can be—all the work, all the prepa-ration, and just when it matters most,you’re told you’re not ready. The O/Creports your BCT doesn’t have 100percent visibility on all fire supportcoordination measures (FSCMs). Yourealize the BCT will not cross the LD ontime because it has to wait for its FieldArtillerymen to get their act together.

This is one of those opportunities intraining where Field Artillerymen feelsome pain that otherwise would comein a much larger dose in the form ofindirect fire fratricide in combat. In allthe FMs, TMs and published tactics,techniques and procedures (TTPs), thereis not one word on how Field Artillery-men track, update, activate/deactivateor adjust FSCMs.

While on a rotation at the NTC, a unitcan expect to track a fire support coor-dinating line (FSCL), coordinated fireline (CFL), 23 corps no-fire areas(NFAs), 11 corps restricted-fire areas(RFAs), three division airspace coordi-nation areas (ACAs) and eight divisionair corridors. By the time the BCT de-velops its own FSCM requirements,artillery units usually track an addi-tional seven to 25 brigade NFAs, two tofive brigade ACAs, two to seven bri-gade air corridors, one restricted oper-ating zone (ROZ) and, potentially, oneto two restricted-fire lines (RFLs). Ifyou take the worst-case scenario and

combine all echelons’ FSCM re-quirements, an FA battalion at theNTC easily could end up tracking thefollowing: one FSCL, one CFL, 48NFAs, eight ACAs, 15 air corridors,one ROZ and two RFLs—76 FSCMs.

There are a number of reasonswhy there could be so many FSCMs:the location of the BCT CFL, whichchanges over the course of the fight;the BCT’s use and positioning of itsBRT and scouts; and the amount offixed- or rotary-wing support avail-able to the BCT, to name just a few.The bottom line is you must have asystem to manage FSCMs, so whenyou clear fires at every echelon, youcan use fires to leverage the BCT’smaneuver operations with a reason-able expectation of a low risk ofindirect fire fratricides.

So how do you track all of theseFSCMs? You apply the seven stepsto managing FSCMs. These stepsshould be tailored for your unit andincorporated into your FA battalionand maneuver tactical standing oper-ating procedures (TACSOPs).

1. Define FSCM authority andresponsibilities. FSCMs are a BCTresponsibility, not just an FA re-sponsibility. Situational awarenessis only as good as a BCT’s reportingsystem, regardless of whether it’sautomated or manual.

Timely and accurate reporting ofall elements in the BCT’s battlespace

is paramount. For example, if a maneu-ver battalion TF scout section forwardof the CFL is given an NFA and thenproceeds to move outside the radius ofits NFA, the section needs to report itsnew location to its battalion TF head-quarters. From there, the TF headquar-ters reports it to the BCT that dissemi-nates the new location and NFA adjust-ment to all other BCT elements. (SeeFigure 1 on Page 44.)

The BCT commander and his fire sup-port coordinator (FSCOORD) are re-sponsible for ensuring the BCT has anFSCM management system. The BCTS3 and fire support officer (FSO) mustimplement that system and ensure allechelons use it. Commanders and firesupporters at all echelons below theBCT must ensure their staffs know theBCT FSCM management system andare trained to execute it.

2. Describe the BCT’s FSCM nam-ing convention. You must have a nam-ing convention or system that enablesyou to determine quickly who an FSCM

by Major Patrick M. Manners


belongs to—in particular, NFAs, ACAsand RFAs. Each maneuver TF, the BCTheadquarters and its rear area and artil-lery elements need their own block ofnames by which to name FSCMs. Thisenables each echelon in the brigade toidentify who the FSCMs belong to.

For example, if you are a battalion TFFSO and have four scout sections for-ward, you want NFAs around them. Ifone of the sections moves, how do youknow which NFA was covering thatparticular section? It’s not easy....you’renot just tracking your four scout sec-tions’ NFAs, you’re tracking (poten-tially) as many as 48 NFAs in the BCT’sbattlespace. However, using a namingconvention similar to your target blocksystem, you easily can identify the oldNFA for that scout section, delete it andcreate a new NFA.

For example, the 1st Scout Section inTF 3-69 Armor goes to ground at Grid12345678 and requires an NFA. Fromthe BCT naming convention, the TF 3-69 FSO assigns NFA 369SC1A. “369”denotes this NFA belongs to 3-69 Ar-mor. The first two letters “SC” identifythe NFA as covering a scout section.The first number “1” denotes that this isthe 1st Scout Section and the last letter“A” denotes this is its first NFA over itsinitial position. If the scout section moves,the FSO deletes NFA 369SC1A and cre-ates a new NFA around the scout, labelingit NFA 369SC1B. The last letter is theonly part of the NFA label that changes.

In this case, it changes to “B,” denotingthe 1st Scout Section’s second position.

3. Outline procedures for activat-ing/deactivating FSCMs. FSCMs arealways in a state of flux. Mission, en-emy, terrain, troops and time available(METT-T) drive our decisions to em-ploy FSCMs. You need a central clear-inghouse in the BCT to control FSCMs.The most likely place is in the BCTtactical operations center (TOC).

In the BCT TOC, the BCT S3, FSOand fire support NCO (FSNCO) coordi-nate FSCM tracking and execution.They work in concert with the maneu-ver battalion TFs, BCT rear area, sup-porting artillery battalions and BCTcommander and his FSCOORD to man-age the overall BCT FSCM picture.

But the picture is just like a snapshot intime. As the battle progresses, the BCTcommander or his FSCOORD movesthe CFL while the battalion TFs reportchanges in their NFA requirements. Inturn, the BCT FSNCO captures the in-put, “paints the picture” and continu-ously disseminates it across the BCT.

4. Define the method to maintain acommon FSCM picture. How do youensure you have a common FSCM pic-ture throughout the BCT? Our oldertactical fire direction system (TAC-FIRE) and newer advanced Field Artil-lery tactical data system (AFATDS)have FSCM tracking tools, but cur-rently they are either not robust enoughor too vulnerable to hardware failure.

So, until the day arrives when you nolonger need pencil or paper—can manageFSCMs digitally—it’s best to be prepared.

Your BCT must have a system thatenables you to track which FSCMs arein effect, who owns them and if they’replotted properly on a map. You mustmake sure FSCMs have visibility withothers in the TOC, not just the FSNCOin the FSE or the battalion/battery FDO.A simple system to help each echelonuniformly track FSCMs might look likethe matrix in Figure 2.

At the BCT, the battalion TFs, thesupporting FA battalions and batteries,and the BCT rear area each should havea copy of the FSCM matrix. The BCTTOC simply runs down each columnand covers the affected changes.

5. Define procedures for updatingFSCMs. This is your biggest challenge.You have to update the matrix using anumber of parameters. For example,when the BCT commander orders theCFL moved, the BCT TOC gets theword out as soon as possible. Probablythe next FSCMs to change in the dominoeffect will be NFAs.

These changes will take some time tosort out, so you need to prioritize yourefforts for the BCT sector most affectedby indirect fires. This usually can betraced to which unit in the BCT haspriority of fires (POF).

Once you have the NFA sorted out inthat sector, the BCT TOC disseminatesthe changes and moves on to the next

TF 2-7 ARS3/FSO

Legend:AR = Armor

BCT = Brigade Combat Team

Bn = Battalion

DFSCOORD = Deputy Fire Support Coordinator

(DS) = Direct Support

FDO = Fire Direction Officer

FSE = Fire Support Element

FSO = Fire Support Officer

ID = Infantry Division

(L) = Light

(R) = Reinforcing

TF = Task Force

Figure 1: The Trail of a Task Force No Fire Area (NFA)— Who Needs to Know?

Bn TF Scout (NFA)1st Scout Section

TF 3-69 AR

TF 3-69 ARS3/FSO

3 BCT, 52 IDS3/FSO

52 IDDFSCOORD/FSE

1-12 FA (R)S3/FDO

A/2-15 FA (L)FDO

C/3-9 FAFDO

B/3-9 FAFDO

A/3-9 FAFDO

3-9 FA (DS)S3/FDO

TF 3-7 ARS3/FSO


Major Patrick M. Manners is the Field Artil-lery S3 Combat Trainer in the Fire SupportDivision of the Operations Group at theNational Training Center, Fort Irwin, Cali-fornia. He previously served as the S3 forthe 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 10thMountain Division (Light) Artillery at FortDrum, New York, and as the Fire SupportOfficer (FSO) for the 10th Aviation Brigade,also part of the 10th Mountain Division. Hecommanded A Battery, 1st Battalion, 12thField Artillery, 75th Field Artillery Brigade,part of III Corps Artillery at Fort Sill, Okla-homa, and served as S3 of the WeaponsSupport Detachment-Korea, part of the 2dInfantry Division.

Figure 2: FSCM Management Matrix

FSCL

CFL

RFLs

ACAs

RFAs

NFAs

X Corps

PL Jack

MRRs10XXXBrazil10XXXChina

ROZ10XXXTurtle10XXXFrog

RFAs10XXX01Church10XXX02Power10XXX03Water10XXX04Cemetery

NFAs10XXXLRSD1A10XXXLRSD2A10XXXLRSD3A10XXXLRSD4A10XXXSOF110XXXSOF210XXXSOF310XXXSOF4

FSCM 52d Division

PL Tom

ACAs52XXAlaska52XXTexas52XXNevada

Air Corridors52XXEagle52XXHawk52XXFalcon

UAV52XXHummingbird

NFAs52XXLRSD1A52XXLRSD2A52XXLRSD3A52XXLRSD4A52XXGBCS1A52XXGBCS2A52XXPP551A52XXPP552A52XXT-321A

3 BCT

RFL3BCTRFL01

ACAs3BCTDallas3BCTOgdon3BCTAtlanta3BCTPhoenix

Air Corridors3BCTBee3BCTWasp3BCTHorsefly3BCTMosquito3BCTGnat

SAAFR3BCTAnt3BCTTermite

NFAs3BCTBRT1A3BCTBRT2A3BCTBRT3A3BCTBRT4A3BCTCOLT1A3BCTCOLT2A3BCTCOLT3A3BCTCOLT4A3BCTFAC1A

TF 3-69

NFAs369SC1A369SC2A369SC3A369SC4A369AFISTA369BFISTA369CFISTA369DFISTA369FAC2A

TF 3-7

RFL37RFL20


TF2-7


Legend:ACAs = Airspace Coordination Areas

BCT = Brigade Combat TeamBRT = Brigade Reconnaissance TeamCFL = Coordinated Fire Line

COLT = Combat Observation Lasing TeamFAC = Forward Air ControllerFIST = Fire Support Team

FSCM = Fire Support Coordinating MeasuresFSCL = Fire Support Coordination LineGBCS = Ground-Based Common SensorLRSD = Long-Range Surveillance DetachmentMRRs = Minimum Risk RoutesNFAs = No-Fire Areas

PL = Phase Line

RFAs = Restricted Fire AreasRFLs = Restricted Fire LinesROZ = Restricted Operating Zone

SAAFR = Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight RouteSC = Scout Section

SOF = Special Operations ForcesUAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

supported sector. If the BCT isn’t in themiddle of a meeting engagement, theupdate probably will work well if con-ducted every hour on the hour.

6. Ensure quality control of FSCMinformation. The quality and reliabilityof the FSCM information passed, receivedand translated is critical. The BCT trustsits subordinates will have the right FSCMdata, but it periodically needs to verify theFSCM message was received, understoodand plotted on the map.

Using the FSCM tracking matrix inFigure 2, each TF periodically reviewsits column of FSCMs and scrubs it withthe BCT TOC. The timing is METT-T-dependent, but “often” is better than“once in awhile.”

For the FA battalion and firing batter-ies, the task is a little tougher. In thiscase, the FA battalion TOC interfaceswith the BCT TOC and then works with

the batteries or even the reinforcingbattalion TOC to make sure all echelonshave the same picture.

7. Define procedures for straighten-ing out the FSCM picture. The laststep deals with getting an elementstraight if its picture is lost or hopelesslycorrupted. Once again, if you use some-thing similar to the FSCM matrix inFigure 2, you can walk through eachcolumn with a naming convention thatkeeps you straight as to which FSCMbelongs in which column. Then youquickly can reproduce another FSCMpicture for the unit.

If you, as the FDO, FSO or S3, take onFSCM management alone, you soonwill find yourself overwhelmed andunfocused. Use the seven steps of FSCMmanagement as a framework for youroperations and ensure your BCT crossesthe LD on time. But even more impor-

tantly, apply the seven steps so the sol-diers at the point of the spear will haveconfidence in the control and effective-ness of your fires.

A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs May-June 2000sill- · PDF fileA Professional Bulletin for...

Documents

Transcript of A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs May-June 2000sill- · PDF fileA Professional Bulletin for...