A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap AnalysisK.B. Sprague S.H. Bassindale LFORT, DRDC CORA D....

Defence R&D Canada

Centre for Operational Research and Analysis

LFORT

A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap Analysis Wargame NICKEL X K.B. Sprague S.H. Bassindale LFORT, DRDC CORA D. Sinclair J. King MODIS Consulting A. Eissa Student – Carleton University

DRDC CORA TM 2012-279December 2012

A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap Analysis Wargame NICKEL X

K.B. Sprague S.H. Bassindale D. Sinclair J. King MODIS Consulting A. Eissa Student - Carleton University

Defence R&D Canada – CORA Technical Memorandum DRDC CORA TM 2012-279 December 2012

Principal Author

Original signed by Dr. Kevin Sprague

Dr. Kevin Sprague

Defence Scientist

Approved by

Original signed by Ms. Isabelle Julien

Ms. Isabelle Julien

Section Head, Land Commands & Readiness

Approved for release by

Original signed by Mr. Paul Comeau

Mr. Paul Comeau

Chief Scientist DRDC CORA

Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA)

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2012

© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2012

Abstract ……..

Through DRDC CORA’s involvement with the NATO SAS-078 panel entitled Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities-Based Assessment, a wargame study was requested to evaluate, from a Canadian Forces (CF) perspective, capability gaps and the relative performance of potential non-lethal weapon (NLW) solutions in several vignettes of interest. A variety of NLW sets were compared in four vignettes. Ranges, terrain, opposing (OP) forces, own forces and objectives varied with the vignettes. Ever-present were the two main NLW sets compared: a ‘Baseline’ option representing current Canadian Forces capabilities, containing 40-mm sponge rounds launched from an under-barrel M203 together with so-called ‘Visual Warning Technology’ devices (VWT—a form of eye-safe laser dazzler), and a ‘Stun Gun’ option containing stun gun projectiles fired from a specialized 12-gauge shotgun. One additional vignette-specific option was gamed with non-lethal capabilities over and above that of the others. Additions included the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), the Active Denial System (ADS), and a simple aggregation of sponge round and stun gun capabilities into one option.

Overall, the efficacy of the Baseline option was below that of options employing stun guns only. This result was consistent across all vignettes, and holds true even though, in many cases, the number of stun guns was reduced by half compared to the number of sponge round launchers, owing to the fact that adequate and ready lethal forces must be maintained at all times in order to protect against escalating circumstances: the stun (shot)gun is a separate weapon whereas the M203 is mounted on a soldier’s rifle. This translated to a pairing off of non-lethal shooters with lethal shooters in the stun gun case. In general, adding more non-lethal force in the form of an ADS or an LRAD device improved the effectiveness considerably. Adding stun guns to the Baseline capabilities showed mixed results—in one case helping and in the other case the benefit was lost.

Résumé ….....

Par le biais du lien entre le CARO de RDDC et le groupe NATO SAS-078 appelé Groupe de travail sur l’évaluation basée sur les capacités des armes non létales, une étude de jeux de guerre pour évaluer, du point de vue des Forces canadiennes (FC), les écarts de capacité et le rendement relatif de solutions potentielles mettant en cause des armes non létales (ANL) dans plusieurs vignettes d’intérêt a été demandée. Toutes sortes d’ensembles d’ANL ont été comparés dans quatre vignettes. Les champs de tir, les terrains, les forces d’opposition (FO), les objectifs et les forces propres variaient en fonction des vignettes. Les deux principaux ensembles d’ANL comparés étaient toujours présents : un « point de comparaison » représentant les capacités actuelles des FC, contenant des projectiles de 40-mm à pointe en mousse lancés à l’aide d’un M203 sous le canon avec des soi-disant dispositifs « technologie d’alerte visuelle » (TAV— une forme de dispositif d’aveuglement laser sans danger pour les yeux), et un « pistolet électrique » à projectiles lancés à l’aide d’un fusil de calibre 12 spécialisé. Une arme supplémentaire spécifique à la vignette a été utilisée; elle avait des capacités non létales dépassant celles des autres. Les ajouts comprenaient le dispositif acoustique longue portée (DALP), le système de refus

DRDC CORA TM 2012-279 i

actif (SRA), et une simple fusion des capacités du pistolet électrique et des projectiles à pointe en mousse en une option.

Globalement, l’efficacité du « point de comparaison » était inférieure à celle des options qui utilisent les pistolets électriques uniquement. Ce résultat était constant dans toutes les vignettes même si, dans de nombreux cas, le nombre de pistolets électriques était deux fois moins important que le nombre de lance-projectiles à pointe en mousse, ce qui découle du fait que des forces létales adéquates doivent être maintenues en tout temps pour offrir une protection contre l’escalade des circonstances : le pistolet électrique (fusil) est une arme distincte, alors que le M203 est fixé sur la carabine d’un soldat. Cela s’est traduit par un appariement de dispositifs de tir non létaux et de dispositifs de tir létaux dans le cas du pistolet électrique. En général, le fait d’ajouter de la force non létale sous forme d’un SRA ou d’un DALP a amélioré l’efficacité considérablement. Le fait d’ajouter des pistolets électriques aux capacités de « point de comparaison » a donné des résultats variés : cela a été utile dans un cas et, dans l’autre cas, l’avantage a été perdu.

ii DRDC CORA TM 2012-279

Executive summary

A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap Analysis: Wargame NICKEL X

K.B. Sprague; S. Bassindale; D. Sinclair; J. King; A. Eissa; DRDC CORA TM 2012-279; Defence R&D Canada – CORA; December 2012.

Background: Through DRDC CORA’s involvement with the NATO SAS-078 panel entitled Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities-Based Assessment, a wargame study was requested to evaluate, from a Canadian Forces (CF) perspective, capability gaps and the relative performance of potential NLW solutions in a few, select vignettes of interest. The vignettes derived from a larger set of situations under consideration by the panel. The study was funded by DRDC CORA internally through Agility Funds. Input from the Director of Land Requirements (DLR) was sought and gained.

A variety of non-lethal weapon (NLW) sets were gamed in four vignettes. Ranges, terrains, opposing forces, own forces and objectives varied with the vignettes. Ever-present were the main NLW sets compared: one represented current CF capabilities, containing 40-mm sponge rounds launched from an under-barrel M203 together with so-called ‘Visual Warning Technology’ devices (VWT—an eye-safe laser dazzler), and the other contained stun gun projectiles fired from a specialized 12-gauge shotgun. VWTs were also included in the stun gun option as needed, and batons and shields were included in all options as needed. In each vignette, one additional option was gamed with non-lethal capabilities over and above that of the others. This option was called the ‘Enhanced’ option. Additions included either the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), the Active Denial System (ADS), or a simple aggregation of sponge round and stun gun resources into one option. Note that system costs and logistics chains were not considered. However, the ADS system is singled out as a possible concern in this regard.

The first vignette featured a NATO citizen evacuation from a building occupied and surrounded by an angry crowd. The second detailed a foot patrol’s encounter with an armed and aggressive gang in a crowded market square. The third vignette involved the protection of a plane crash site. The final vignette played out part of a village search where escaping (unarmed) insurgents had to be ‘captured’.

Results: Each vignette brought to light certain distinctive qualities of the various non-lethal weapon sets, which are detailed in the main body of this report. Although the results of each vignette have to be evaluated in respect of the situation dealt with, there were strong commonalities of the games that deserve special mention. Overall, the efficacy of the Baseline option, representative of current CF non-lethal capabilities, was below that of options employing stun guns only. This result was consistent across three of the four vignettes, with the remaining vignette showing inconclusive results (still favouring stun guns, but to a lesser degree of certainty). In general, adding more non-lethal force in the form of an ADS or an LRAD device improved the effectiveness considerably.

The non-lethal response capabilities of the CF can be enhanced by employing modern NLWs such as those examined in this study. The increase in neutralization effectiveness and accuracy of

DRDC CORA TM 2012-279 iii

the Taser X12, along with its effectiveness in close quarters, made it a more operationally effective NLW compared to the currently used M203. This despite a slightly shorter effective range and the requirement to split sections into two groups: one carrying non-lethal and the other lethal weapons. The LRAD, as an area hailing/warning device, added significantly to operational effectiveness at long ranges through better determination of intent, over and above the currently fielded VWT. The ADS proved to be an effective non-lethal force multiplier.

Note that these results depend on assumptions made in the study and also limitations of the modeling environment. In particular, the variation in human response after NLW contact was represented by two extremes—individuals who were ‘Determined’, meaning they would not back down, continuing their course of action to the limits of human endurance even after multiple contacts, and ‘Regular’ individuals who were basically compliant after first contact (including warnings). It is also worth noting that, despite the fact that the modeling environment used was designed purely for lethal weapons, fair representations of the NLWs in the study were achieved under the circumstances of the selected vignettes.

Recommendations: The following recommendations are based on the results of the wargame:

1. Weapon systems that efficiently combine lethal and non-lethal capabilities have a natural advantage over weapon systems that are purely non-lethal, in that they are less likely to compromise lethal capabilities. Also, fewer resources are diverted for the sole purpose of maintaining adequate lethal power, thereby maximizing the application of non-lethal power. If NLWs are to be incorporated into the CF, maintaining an adequate and operational lethal capability at all times must be treated as a key requirement for acquisition;

2. The LRAD and ADS devices had a strong positive impact on control over the situation in the vignettes where they were used. If the transition to NLWs were a high priority, these weapon systems should be investigated for integration into the CF to cover longer ranges and wider areas than handheld, point impact NLWs. In particular, in the vignette tested, the LRAD significantly added to the capability to identify individuals, even in the presence of VWT devices already in use. The effectiveness of these systems compared to Escalation of Force for dispersing non-determined (i.e., compliant) individuals should be further examined;

3. The effectiveness of 40-mm stun projectiles should be investigated as an alternative to the sponge round and Taser shotgun option sets compared in this wargame. It promises to combine many of the best attributes of both weapons—maintaining lethal capabilities while providing highly effective neutralization. The ability to clear buildings using this approach is still problematic, however, and requires further investigation;

4. If NLWs for building clearance were considered a priority, higher fidelity building clearance wargames are needed and with a more diverse set of options (flash-bang grenades, concussion grenades, tear gas, etc.). Building clearance was not well represented in the wargame;

5. If the operation of Vignette 13 were of high concern, which involved an attempt to disarm a dangerous gang in a crowded market square, it should be re-gamed with added

iv DRDC CORA TM 2012-279

LRAD and ADS options (the scale of the operation was too big to be handled by one platoon armed as they were in the wargame);

6. To protect against non-lethal operations gone ‘bad’ (turned lethal), the ability of the CF to meet lethal threats as they arise must be assessed in light of the tradeoffs made to support the desired level of non-lethal capabilities;

7. If NLW wargames were to continue, more work needs to done in understanding the terminal effects of NLWs, how they are used (e.g., standard operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)), and how best to translate important features into the various simulation environments used by CORA for wargaming. Virtually any NLW wargame conducted will require significant lead time to incorporate appropriate NLW effects at the required level of fidelity; and

8. Support NATO panel SAS-094 with further wargames on an as-needed basis to increase DRDC CORA’s NLW credentials and to impact this sector nationally and internationally.

Future plans: It is hoped that these results will be used by the newly formed (at time of writing) SAS-094 panel entitled ‘Analytical Support to the Development and Experimentation of NLW Concepts of Operation and Employment’, and also to help define future NLW wargames.

DRDC CORA TM 2012-279 v

Sommaire .....

A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap Analysis: Wargame NICKEL X

K.B. Sprague; S. Bassindale; D. Sinclair; J. King; A. Eissa; DRDC CORA TM 2012-279; R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO; décembre 2012.

Introduction : Par le biais du lien entre le CARO de RDDC et le groupe NATO SAS-078 appelé Groupe de travail sur l’évaluation basée sur les capacités des armes non létales, une étude de jeux de guerre pour évaluer, du point de vue des Forces canadiennes (FC), les écarts de capacité et le rendement relatif de solutions potentielles mettant en cause des armes non létales (ANL) dans quelques vignettes d’intérêt sélectionnées a été demandée. Les vignettes dérivaient d’un plus grand ensemble de situations considéré par le groupe. L’étude a été financée par le CARO de RDDC à l’interne par le Agility Funds. Le directeur – Besoins en ressources terrestres (DBRT) a accepté de contribuer.

Toutes sortes d’ensembles d’armes non létales (ANL) ont été utilisés dans quatre vignettes. Les champs de tir, les terrains, les forces d’opposition (FO), les objectifs et les forces propres variaient en fonction des vignettes. Les principaux ensembles d’ANL comparés étaient toujours présents : l’un d’entre eux représentait les capacités actuelles des FC, contenant des projectiles de 40-mm à pointe en mousse lancés à l’aide d’un M203 sous le canon avec des soi-disant dispositifs « technologie d’alerte visuelle » (TAV— un dispositif d’aveuglement laser sans danger pour les yeux), et l’autre contenait des projectiles de pistolet électrique lancés à l’aide d’un fusil de calibre 12 spécialisé. Les dispositifs TAV étaient aussi inclus dans l’option pistolet électrique au besoin, et des bâtons et des boucliers étaient inclus dans toutes les options au besoin. Dans chaque vignette, une option supplémentaire a été jouée avec des capacités non létales dépassant celles des autres. Cette option s’appelait l’option « améliorée ». Les ajouts comprenaient le dispositif acoustique longue portée (DALP), le système de refus actif (SRA) ou une simple fusion des pistolets électriques et des projectiles à pointe en mousse en une option. Il est à noter que les coûts du système et les chaînes logistiques n’ont pas été considérés. Cependant, le SRA est une source possible d’inquiétudes à cet égard.

La première vignette présentait l’évacuation de citoyens de l’OTAN d’un bâtiment occupé et entouré par une foule en colère. La deuxième présentait en détails la rencontre d’une patrouille à pied et d’un groupe de personnes armées et agressives dans un marché bondé. La troisième vignette mettait en cause la protection du lieu d’écrasement d’un aéronef. La dernière vignette présentait une partie de la fouille d’un village où des insurgés (non armés) qui s’échappaient devaient être « capturés ».

Résultats : Chaque vignette mettait en lumière certaines qualités distinctives des divers ensembles d’armes non létales, qui sont détaillées dans le corps du présent rapport. Bien que les résultats de chaque vignette ont été évalués en lien avec la situation à laquelle faisait face l’utilisateur, il y avait des points communs importants sur les jeux qui méritent une mention spéciale. Globalement, l’efficacité du « point de comparaison », représentative des capacités non létales des FC actuelles, était inférieure à celle des options qui utilisent uniquement les pistolets électriques. Ce résultat était présent dans trois des quatre vignettes, la vignette restante

vi DRDC CORA TM 2012-279

donnant des résultats non concluants (favorisant toujours les pistolets électriques, mais à un degré de certitude moins grand). En général, le fait d’ajouter de la force non létale sous forme d’un SRA ou d’un DALP a amélioré l’efficacité considérablement.

Les capacités d’intervention non létale des FC peuvent être améliorées à l’aide d’ANL modernes comme celles examinées dans la présente étude. L’augmentation de la précision et de l’efficacité de neutralisation du Taser X12, ainsi que son efficacité à courte distance, en a fait une ANL plus efficace du point de vue opérationnel que le M203 actuel. Cela est vrai malgré une portée efficace légèrement inférieure et la nécessité de diviser les sections en deux groupes : l’un ayant des armes non létales et l’autre ayant des armes létales. Le DALP, en tant que dispositif d’avertissement/d’appel de zone, contribuait de façon significative à l’efficacité opérationnelle à de grandes distances grâce à un meilleur établissement d’intention, en plus de la TAV présentement en service. Le SRA s’est avéré être un multiplicateur de force non létale efficace.

Il est à noter que ces résultats dépendent de suppositions faites dans l’étude et des limites de l’environnement de modélisation. En particulier, les différentes réactions après un contact avec une ANL étaient totalement opposées : les personnes qui étaient « déterminées », ce qui veut dire qu’elles ne voulaient pas se soumettre, se rendant aux limites de l’endurance humaine même après de nombreux contacts; il y avait aussi les personnes « ordinaires » qui se soumettaient après le premier contact (y compris les avertissements). Il vaut aussi la peine de noter que, malgré que l’environnement de modélisation visait purement les armes létales, des représentations justes des ANL dans l’étude ont été obtenues dans les circonstances des vignettes sélectionnées.

Recommandations : Les recommandations suivantes sont basées sur les résultats du jeu de guerre :

1. les systèmes d’arme qui combinent efficacement les capacités létales et non létales ont un avantage naturel par rapport aux systèmes d’arme purement non létaux; en effet, ils risquent moins de compromettre les capacités létales. De plus, moins de ressources sont utilisées pour maintenir un pouvoir létal adéquat, ce qui maximise l’application de puissance non létale. Si les ANL doivent être adoptées par les FC, le fait de maintenir une capacité létale opérationnelle et adéquate en tout temps doit être une caractéristique clé de ces ANL;

2. les DALP et les SRA ont eu un impact positif important sur le contrôle de la situation dans les vignettes où ils ont été utilisés. Si le passage vers les ANL est une priorité, ces systèmes d’arme doivent faire l’objet d’une enquête visant à savoir si elles couvrent de plus grandes distances et des zones plus larges que les ANL portatives à point d’impact précis. En particulier, dans la vignette testée, le DALP a amélioré grandement la capacité d’identification des personnes, même en présence de dispositifs TAV déjà utilisés. L’efficacité de ces systèmes comparée à l’escalade de la force pour la dispersion de quelconques personnes (c.-à-d. personnes soumises) doit être étudiée davantage;

3. les projectiles électriques de 40-mm doivent être étudiés comme options de rechange possibles aux projectiles à pointe en mousse, et les ensembles optionnels de fusil Taser doivent être comparés dans ce jeu de guerre. Cela promet de combiner un grand nombre des meilleurs attributs des deux armes – maintenir les capacités létales tout en permettant

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une neutralisation hautement efficace. La capacité d’assaut des bâtiments par cette approche est encore problématique cependant et nécessite qu’une étude plus approfondie soit effectuée;

4. si les ANL servant à l’assaut des bâtiments sont une priorité, les jeux de guerre d’assaut de bâtiments à haute fidélité sont nécessaires et doivent offrir un ensemble d’options plus diversifié (grenades étourdissantes, grenades à commotion, gaz lacrymogène, etc.). En effet, l’assaut de bâtiments n’était pas bien représenté dans le jeu de guerre;

5. si l’utilisation de la vignette 13 est très préoccupante, qui comportait une tentative de désarmement d’un groupe de personnes dangereuses dans un marché bondé, elle doit être refaite avec des options supplémentaires de DALP et de SRF (l’échelle de l’opération était trop importante pour un peloton armé comme celui dépeint dans le jeu);

6. dans les opérations non létales qui ont mal tourné (ont causé la mort d’une ou de plusieurs personnes), la capacité des FC à affronter les menaces létales au fur et à mesure qu’elles apparaissent doit être évaluée à la lumière des échanges faits pour maintenir le niveau désiré de capacités non létales;

7. pour que les jeux de guerre comportant des ANL se poursuivent, plus de travail doit être effectué pour comprendre les effets terminaux des armes non létales, la manière dont elles sont utilisées (p. ex. : instructions permanentes d’opération (IPO), TTP), et la manière de traduire le mieux possible les caractéristiques importantes dans les environnements de simulation divers utilisés par le CARO pour les jeux de guerre. Presque tous les jeux de guerre réalisés avec des ANL exigeront beaucoup de temps pour incorporer les effets appropriés des ANL au niveau de fidélité requis; et

8. appuyer le groupe NATO SAS-094 avec d’autres jeux de guerre au besoin pour augmenter les compétences du CARO de RDDC en matière d’ANL et pour avoir une incidence sur ce secteur aux niveaux national et international.

Recherches futures : Il est à espérer que ces résultats soient utilisés par le nouveau groupe SAS 094 (au moment de la rédaction) appelé « Groupe de travail sur le soutien analytique du développement et de l’expérimentation des concepts d’opération et d’emploi des ANL » ainsi que pour aider à définir les futurs jeux de guerre axés sur les ANL..

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Table of contents

Abstract …….. ................................................................................................................................. i Résumé …..... ................................................................................................................................... i Executive summary ........................................................................................................................ iii Sommaire ....................................................................................................................................... vi Table of contents ............................................................................................................................ ix List of figures ............................................................................................................................... xiii List of tables ................................................................................................................................. xiv Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xvi 1 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background ................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Aim................................................................................................................................ 1 1.3 Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.4 Scope ............................................................................................................................. 3 1.5 Structure of the report.................................................................................................... 4

2 Technology ............................................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Non-lethal weapons technology summary .................................................................... 7

2.1.1 Taser X12 shotgun............................................................................................... 7 2.1.2 40-mm sponge grenades ...................................................................................... 8 2.1.3 Baton.................................................................................................................... 9 2.1.4 Active Denial System ........................................................................................ 10 2.1.5 Long Range Acoustic Device ............................................................................ 10 2.1.6 Visual Warning Technology.............................................................................. 11

2.2 NLW modeling............................................................................................................ 12 2.2.1 Categorization of non-lethal effects................................................................... 13 2.2.2 Prominent non-lethal parameters ....................................................................... 14 2.2.3 Background non-lethal parameters .................................................................... 14

3 Methods .................................................................................................................................. 16 3.1 Wargame system: CAEnXP .......................................................................................... 16 3.2 Data requirements and gathering................................................................................. 16 3.3 Modeling considerations ............................................................................................. 17 3.4 Wargame results .......................................................................................................... 17 3.5 Runs and iterations ...................................................................................................... 18 3.6 Vignettes...................................................................................................................... 18

3.6.1 Vignette 6: NATO citizen evacuation ............................................................... 18 3.6.2 Vignette 13: Patrol on foot – aggressive gang................................................... 18 3.6.3 Vignette 14: Plane crash .................................................................................... 19 3.6.4 Vignette 20: Village search ............................................................................... 19

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3.7 Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 19 3.7.1 Qualitative results .............................................................................................. 19 3.7.2 Quantitative results ............................................................................................ 19

3.8 Measures of effectiveness (MOEs).............................................................................. 19 4 Individual Vignette Descriptions and Findings ...................................................................... 22

4.1 Vignette 6: NATO citizen evacuation ......................................................................... 22 4.1.1 General description............................................................................................ 22 4.1.2 BLUE force........................................................................................................ 23 4.1.3 RED force .......................................................................................................... 23 4.1.4 BLUE force plan................................................................................................ 23 4.1.5 RED force plan .................................................................................................. 23 4.1.6 Options............................................................................................................... 23 4.1.7 Judgements and insights .................................................................................... 25 4.1.8 Quantitative results ............................................................................................ 25

4.1.8.1 Vignette 6 MOEs ..................................................................................... 25 4.1.8.2 Vignette 6 MOE scores and option ranking............................................. 27

4.1.9 Vignette 6 discussion......................................................................................... 28 4.2 Vignette 13: Patrol on foot – aggressive gang............................................................. 29

4.2.1 General description............................................................................................ 29 4.2.2 BLUE force........................................................................................................ 30 4.2.3 RED force .......................................................................................................... 30 4.2.4 BLUE force plan................................................................................................ 31 4.2.5 RED force plan .................................................................................................. 31 4.2.6 Options............................................................................................................... 31 4.2.7 Judgements and insights .................................................................................... 32 4.2.8 Quantitative results ............................................................................................ 32

4.2.8.1 Vignette 13 MOEs ................................................................................... 32 4.2.8.2 Vignette 13 MOE scores and option ranking........................................... 34

4.2.9 Vignette 13 discussion....................................................................................... 35 4.3 Vignette 14: Plane crash .............................................................................................. 35

4.3.1 General description............................................................................................ 35 4.3.2 BLUE force........................................................................................................ 36 4.3.3 RED force .......................................................................................................... 36 4.3.4 BLUE force plan................................................................................................ 37 4.3.5 RED force plan .................................................................................................. 37 4.3.6 Options............................................................................................................... 37 4.3.7 Judgements and insights .................................................................................... 38 4.3.8 Quantitative results ............................................................................................ 39


4.3.9 Vignette 14 discussion....................................................................................... 41

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4.4 Vignette 20: Village search ......................................................................................... 42 4.4.1 General description............................................................................................ 42 4.4.2 BLUE force........................................................................................................ 42 4.4.3 RED force .......................................................................................................... 43 4.4.4 BLUE force plan................................................................................................ 43 4.4.5 RED force plan .................................................................................................. 43 4.4.6 Options............................................................................................................... 43 4.4.7 Judgements and insights .................................................................................... 44 4.4.8 Quantitative results ............................................................................................ 44


4.4.9 Vignette 20 discussion....................................................................................... 46 5 Overall Observations and Findings......................................................................................... 48

5.1 Use / incorporation of NLWs in operations................................................................. 48 5.2 Qualitative results: J&I................................................................................................ 49 5.3 Quantitative results ...................................................................................................... 50 5.4 Discussion of overall observations and findings ......................................................... 52

6 Summary and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 53 6.1 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 53 6.2 Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 55

References ..... ............................................................................................................................... 57 Annex A Non-lethal weapon features and parameters................................................................ 59

A.1 Description .................................................................................................................. 59 Annex B Supporting Data and Calculations ............................................................................... 60

B.1 Vignette 6 MOE data tables ........................................................................................ 60 B.1.1 Timely extraction (22.2%, sub-measure 1 of 3 for Task Fulfillment) ............... 60 B.1.2 Safe extraction (22.2%, sub-measure 2 of 3 for Task Fulfillment).................... 62 B.1.3 Safe end conditions (22.2%, sub-measure 3 of 3 for Task Fulfillment) ............ 64 B.1.4 RED non-lethal neutralization (33.3%) ............................................................. 65 B.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis ........................................................................................... 65

B.2 Vignette 13 MOE data tables ...................................................................................... 66 B.2.1 Takedown time (33.3%, sub-measure 1 of 2 for Task Fulfillment)................... 66 B.2.2 Sustainment interval (33.3%, sub-measure 2 of 2 for Task Fulfillment)........... 67 B.2.3 RED non-lethal neutralization (33.3%) ............................................................. 69 B.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis ........................................................................................... 70

B.3 Vignette 14 MOE data tables ...................................................................................... 71 B.3.1 Repelling effect (50%, single measure of Task Fulfillment) ............................. 71 B.3.2 RED non-lethal neutralization (25%) ................................................................ 72 B.3.3 Speed of determination (12.5%, sub-measure 1 of 2 for Determination of

Intent)................................................................................................................. 73

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B.3.4 Range of determination (12.5%, sub-measure 2 of 2 for Determination of Intent)................................................................................................................. 74

B.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis ........................................................................................... 75 B.4 Vignette 20 MOE data tables ...................................................................................... 76

B.4.1 Stoppage (66.7%, all of Task Fulfillment) ........................................................ 76 B.4.2 RED non-lethal neutralization (33.3%) ............................................................. 77 B.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis ........................................................................................... 78

List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms ..................................................................... 79

xii DRDC CORA TM 2012-279

List of figures

Figure 1: Taser X12 (left) and close-up of deployed Taser XREP round (right) (not to scale). ..... 7 Figure 2: M203 launcher (left) and 40-mm sponge grenade (right) (not to scale). ......................... 9 Figure 3: Expandable baton............................................................................................................. 9 Figure 4: ADS mounted on a High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). ........ 10 Figure 5: The LRAD 100X in use by a US Army Soldier............................................................. 11 Figure 6: A CF soldier using the Visual Warning Technology (VWT) device. ............................ 12 Figure 7: Vignette 6, NATO citizen evacuation (100 m grid spacing). ........................................ 22 Figure 8: Vignette 6 MOE scores. ................................................................................................. 27 Figure 9: Vignette 13, Patrol on foot—aggressive gang (100 m grid spacing). ............................ 30 Figure 10: Vignette 13 MOE scores. ............................................................................................. 34 Figure 11: Vignette 14, Plane crash (100 m grid spacing). ........................................................... 36 Figure 12: Vignette 14 MOE scores. ............................................................................................. 40 Figure 13: Vignette 20, Village search (100 m grid spacing)........................................................ 42 Figure 14: Vignette 20 MOE scores. ............................................................................................. 46 Figure B-1: Average extraction time interval (interior conflict). .................................................. 62 Figure B-2: Average ranges of engagement (interior conflict). .................................................... 63 Figure B-3: Non-lethal neutralization “snapshot” of end conditions. ........................................... 64 Figure B-4: Non-lethal neutralization over duration of game. ...................................................... 65 Figure B-5: Average non-lethal engagement time intervals.......................................................... 68 Figure B-6: Scores for non-lethal engagement time intervals. ...................................................... 69 Figure B-7: Non-lethal neutralization over game duration............................................................ 70 Figure B-8: Repelling effect. ......................................................................................................... 72 Figure B-9: Non-lethal neutralization over duration of game. ...................................................... 73 Figure B-10: Determination of intent: time. .................................................................................. 74 Figure B-11: Determination of intent: distance. ............................................................................ 75 Figure B-12: Average stoppage over game duration..................................................................... 77 Figure B-13: Non-lethal neutralization over duration of game. .................................................... 78

DRDC CORA TM 2012-279 xiii

List of tables

Table 1: Non-lethal weapon options................................................................................................ 2 Table 2: Summary of non-lethal weapon settings. .......................................................................... 6 Table 3: Weights of individual MOEs........................................................................................... 21 Table 4: Task Fulfillment. ............................................................................................................. 21 Table 5: Vignette 6 options. .......................................................................................................... 24 Table 6: Vignette 6 weighting schedule. ....................................................................................... 26 Table 7: Vignette 6 measure specifications. .................................................................................. 26 Table 8: Vignette 6 MOE rankings................................................................................................ 28 Table 9: Vignette 13 options. ........................................................................................................ 31 Table 10: Vignette 13 weighting schedule. ................................................................................... 32 Table 11: Vignette 13 measure specifications. .............................................................................. 33 Table 12: Vignette 13 MOE rankings............................................................................................ 34 Table 13: Vignette 14 options. ...................................................................................................... 38 Table 14: Vignette 14 weighting schedule. ................................................................................... 39 Table 15: Vignette 14 measure specifications. .............................................................................. 39 Table 16: Vignette 14 MOE rankings............................................................................................ 41 Table 17: Vignette 20 options. ...................................................................................................... 44 Table 18: Vignette 20 weighting schedule. ................................................................................... 45 Table 19: Vignette 20 measure specifications. .............................................................................. 45 Table 20: Vignette 20 MOE rankings............................................................................................ 46 Table 21: Common J&I statements. .............................................................................................. 50 Table 22: Summary of option rankings. ........................................................................................ 51 Table A-1: NLW prominent features............................................................................................. 59 Table A-2: NLW background features. ......................................................................................... 59 Table B-0: Option naming translation matrix................................................................................ 60 Table B-1: Extraction time intervals (interior conflict)................................................................. 61 Table B-2: Safe conditions during extraction (interior confrontation). ......................................... 63 Table B-3: Non-lethal neutralization “snapshot” of end conditions.............................................. 64 Table B-4: Non-lethal neutralization overall................................................................................. 65 Table B-5: Sensitivity of Vignette 6 results. ................................................................................. 66

xiv DRDC CORA TM 2012-279

Table B-6: Takedown time. ........................................................................................................... 67 Table B-7: Average non-lethal sustainment time intervals. .......................................................... 67 Table B-8: Non-lethal neutralization overall................................................................................. 69 Table B-9: Sensitivity of Vignette 13 results. ............................................................................... 71 Table B-10: Repelling effect. ........................................................................................................ 72 Table B-11: Non-lethal neutralization overall............................................................................... 73 Table B-12: Speed of determination.............................................................................................. 74 Table B-13: Range of determination. ............................................................................................ 75 Table B-14: Sensitivity of Vignette 14 results. ............................................................................. 76 Table B-15: Average stoppage over game duration. ..................................................................... 76 Table B-16: Non-lethal neutralization overall............................................................................... 77 Table B-17: Sensitivity of Vignette 20 results. ............................................................................. 78

DRDC CORA TM 2012-279 xv

xvi DRDC CORA TM 2012-279

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr. Peter Dobias for his valuable comments and for bringing this project to the Land Forces Operational Research Team (LFORT), and Dr. Jim Chan for his efforts early on in this project as a member of LFORT. Special thanks also to Dr. Phil Eles for providing a much needed resource in the way of student help to complete this project.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines non-lethal weapons (NLWs) as: “weapons which are explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment.” According to a 2009 media release by the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program: “For the past decade, NATO has recognized the importance of non-lethal capabilities and has taken steps to outfit NATO troops with escalation-of-force options. One of NATO’s recent efforts, System Analysis and Studies-078 (SAS-078), has conducted a capabilities-based assessment to understand NATO non-lethal weapon requirements, identify capability gaps and offer potential solutions and recommendations.” [1]

NLW technologies have advanced significantly in recent years, affording troops with new escalation-of-force options and capabilities—some already realized and others emerging. NATO and its member nations are reviewing these new capabilities in light of current non-lethal capabilities and those desired [2]. A part of that effort is to evaluate non-lethal technologies for well-grounded, representative situations where a high competency in the use of non-lethal force is vastly preferred over lethal alternatives. Motivation is provided by an overall desire to minimize unwanted and unnecessary loss of life, as well as the negative impacts that such tragic events might have on public relations.

A wargame study was requested of Defence Research and Development Canada’s (DRDC) Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) by the NATO SAS-078 panel on NLW Capabilities-Based Assessment to evaluate, from a Canadian Forces (CF) perspective, capability gaps and the relative performance of potential NLW solutions in a few, select vignettes of interest deriving from a larger set of situations under consideration by the panel [3]. Four of the thirty-seven vignettes available for use were selected for the study. The document is intended to support the follow-on SAS-094 panel (Analytical Support to the Development and Experimentation of NLW Concepts of Operation and Employment), since the SAS-078 panel has concluded its program of work.

This series of wargames was denoted as NICKEL X.

1.2 Aim

In the context of the selected vignettes, the aim of this study was to examine both recently available and emerging non-lethal capabilities that are potentially of use to the CF and NATO, so as to compare them to both current capabilities and also desired capabilities in the non-lethal regime.

1.3 Objectives

The objective of the study was to compare the effectiveness of alternative (new/emerging) NLW options against the effectiveness of a baseline kit representative of current CF capabilities, and

DRDC CORA TM 2012-279 1

also against the overall desired result for that vignette. The NLWs being evaluated are specified in Table 1 and are delineated by availability: either the weapon is ‘current’, meaning it is currently available to the CF (at time of writing), or ‘emerging’, meaning the item is newly available or may soon be available for use, although not necessarily by the CF. The vignettes listed in the final column are described in the next section, numbered as per the referenced NATO document [3].

Table 1: Non-lethal weapon options.

ID Tag System Function Regime Vignettes (NATO ID’s)

1 BS Baton & Shield Blunt Trauma Kinetic 6

2 SR 40-mm Sponge round (M203 launcher)

Blunt Trauma Kinetic 6,13,14,20

Cur

rent

3 VWT Visual Warning Technology

Communication EM* 14,20

4 LRAD Long Range Acoustic Device

Communication Acoustic 6,13,14,20

5 ADS Active Denial System

Suppression, Area Denial

EM* 6, 20

New

and

/or E

mer

ging

6 XREP

X26

Taser X12 dual weapon (a) XREP; (b) X26.

Neuromuscular Incapacitation

EM* 6,13,14,20

*EM is the abbreviation for electromagnetic.

Rather than attempt to evaluate the separate contribution of each NLW for each individual vignette, kits composed of one or more appropriate NLWs were made available for use by the BLUE force in the wargame—assumed to be a Canadian force. A baseline kit reflecting current capabilities and composed of items 1-3 in Table 1 was tested against other kits composed of alternative groupings that incorporate additional NLWs (one or more of items 4-6 in Table 1) to the exclusion of some or all of the baseline elements. For example, most games involving the Taser X12 system do not contain M203 blunt impact (40-mm sponge) rounds from the baseline kit. Note that not all non-lethal weapons currently available to the CF are available in the vignettes. In particular, 12-gauge bean bag rounds were excluded as they deal less force and have a shorter range than the 40-mm sponge round. Gaming them in the chosen synthetic environment does little to advance the main comparison at hand, namely, kinetic versus electromagnetic (EM) effectors.

2 DRDC CORA TM 2012-279

Alternative kits mixed NLWs selected from a list provided by the NATO SAS-078 panel. Selections were based on an assessment of the capabilities needed in the vignettes matched to the capabilities offered by the various NLWs. Tear gas (e.g., ‘CS’ gas—0-chlorobenzalmalononitrile powder with a dispersal liquid) was not included due to restrictions imposed by the Geneva Convention and also limitations in the representation of gas attacks in the simulation environment.

In the vignettes, the BLUE force set aside resources as deemed necessary to ensure that a sufficient level of lethal force was retained should the situation escalate. That said, in all of the vignettes the intent of BLUE was to avoid using lethal force unless absolutely necessary. Games were terminated the moment any lethal weapon was employed by RED or BLUE. In some cases, the timing of this transition was a key determinant. The lethal weapon systems available to RED and BLUE in a given vignette are noted in the corresponding write-up (Section 4). In some situations, BLUE was required to act quickly and efficiently using non-lethal systems to prevent escalation to lethal levels (e.g., in an attempt to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation or exercise tight control over it).

A secondary objective of this study was to explore and validate the ability of the simulation environment (described below) to represent NLWs.

1.4 Scope

The scope of the study was as follows:

a. The study centered around four vignettes provided by and selected in consultation with the stakeholder initiating the project—the NATO SAS-078 panel represented by the DRDC CORA member of that panel. The vignettes originated in a document produced by the panel [3]. The record of events from wargaming the four selected vignettes provided the basis of all conclusions drawn in this study, supplemented by additional sources of information where appropriate. The vignettes are outlined in Section 3.6 and detailed in Section 4;

b. This NICKEL X wargame study was mainly based on unclassified, open source data including manufacturer data, DRDC studies and independent studies. Some manufacturer data used, but not reported on directly, was proprietary at the time of writing. Current doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) were used to provide input to the baseline modeling of each vignette. Detailed TTPs for the alternative NLWs were not available. Assumptions were made using the best available data and judgements from the manufacturer, the CF and other defence organizations;

c. The Directorate of Land Requirements (DLR) provided advice and guidance regarding the current non-lethal capabilities of the CF and how they would likely be employed in the selected vignettes. Note that, at the time of writing, there was no formal CF doctrine for NLW employment, apart from Crowd Confrontation Operations;

d. The simulation environment used in the study was the Close Action Environment (CAEnXP). CAEnXP is described later in this document;


e. The following assumptions were made for this study:

1. External elements, such as close air or indirect fire support were not modeled;

2. BLUE force and RED force doctrine and organization were held constant within each vignette during the study;

3. In reality, there is simply too much variation in how NLWs impact different individuals to account for the full distribution of possible effects when they are targeted with, intimidated by and/or hit with NLWs. Consequently, factors such as individual motivation, size, musculature, dexterity, stamina and clothing were only characterized in simplistic terms for the different groups of actors in a given vignette. Therefore, for a given target group, the reaction to a particular NLW used in a particular way is homogeneous for all members of that group and is intended to represent a reasonable ‘expected response’ to the situation faced. While there is some understanding of physiological impacts, the psychological impact is not well understood at all;

4. The probability of accidental death or serious injury following a successful hit by a properly used NLW in the chosen vignettes is assumed to be negligible at the scale of the events under study, and thus was not accounted for;

5. Table 2 lists the basic parameters of each NLW system in the study. These settings are discussed along with NLW modeling in Section 2.2. Some short forms are used in Table 2: ‘[load]’ refers to the amount of ammo carried; ‘[eff]’ stands for effective range (the maximum range the full effect is delivered); ‘Muz. vel’ stands for muzzle velocity; behaviours once hit are characterized as ‘[avoid]’ to avoid contact either temporarily or permanently, ‘[incap]’ for temporary incapacitation, ‘[feign]’ to feign compliance temporarily before resuming activity, and ‘[comply]’ to indicate permanent compliance.

6. The environmental conditions within the vignettes were favourable so as not to adversely impact the performance of the NLWs (e.g., high winds were excluded, as was extreme heat or cold, and also rain). As such, the environmental conditions can be likened to normal warm-weather season outdoor conditions, clear and with a 15 km/hr wind. All of the games took place during daylight hours. Performance in other environments, especially those exhibiting environmental extremes (e.g., heat, cold, humidity, high winds, foliage, etc.), must be assessed separately.

1.5 Structure of the report

The remainder of the report is organized as follows. An overview of the non-lethal technologies under study is provided in the next section, Technology Summary. Following that is the Methods section, where the approach to modeling and simulation for the NICKEL X series of wargames is described. Also appearing in that section is a general description of the computed measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used to evaluate the operational effectiveness of the different NLW kits, in addition to the weighting scheme for option ranking and the methods used to analyze the


wargame data. More detailed vignette descriptions appear in the section that follows, Individual Vignette Descriptions and Findings, including force strengths, weapon options, and other variables of interest. That section also reports on game results, including judgments and insights (J&I) for the various vignettes recorded from the military players’ perspective, in addition to numerical results stemming from analysis of the wargame data streams. After each vignette has been reported on individually, the Overall Observations and Findings section addresses any observed patterns at the multi-vignette level. The final section, Summary and Recommendations, summarizes the main findings of the study and then lists the NLW capability gaps as indicated by the wargame analysis. Furthermore, the section outlines recommendations to address deficiencies.


Table 2: Summary of non-lethal weapon settings.

Effect ‡ Duration (s)

[mindset]

ID Tag System [load*]

Range [eff] (m)

Muz. vel

(m/s)

Chance to hit † (%)

[incl. firer errors]Chance

of effect (%) Determ. Regular

1 BS Baton & Shield

0-2 -- -- 100 6 [avoid] Perm-anent [avoid]

10m 30m 50m 2 SR 40-mm Sponge Round [10]

10-50 [37]

99

100 [100]

90 [79]

65 [--]

90 10 [incap.]

Perm-anent [avoid]

3 VWT Visual Warning Technology

20-300 [100]

-- 100: warning device only, point device

100 10 [feign] Perm-anent [comply]

4 LRAD Long Range Acoustic Device

0-300 -- 100: warning device only, area device

100 0 [ignore] 10 [feign]

Perm-anent [comply]

5 ADS Active Denial System [120]

0-750 -- 100: employed at close ranges, superior

targeting, point device

100 6 [avoid] Perm-anent [avoid]

10m 20m 30m 6a XREP

12 gauge Taser XREP cartridge [10]

4.5-30 [30]

74

## ## ##

## 25 [incap.]

Perm-anent [avoid]

1.5m 4.5m 6m 6b X26 Taser X26 [6] 0-10 [4.5]

51

## ## ##

## 10 [incap.]

Perm-anent [avoid]

* Ammo loads vary by vignette and are set higher than normal in some cases (for analysis purposes).

† Top value is for weapon calibration in the synthetic environment, based on dispersion data when fired under ideal conditions (e.g., indoors, good lighting, bore-sighted vice, stationary target) and/or minimum accuracy specifications for targeting (‘Figure 11’). These ideal chance to hit values are subsequently discounted by a variety of firing errors, shown in square braces ‘[--]’ (values marked by double hash marks ‘##’ have been omitted from this table as they may contain proprietary information).

‡ The effect durations vary with the type of individual hit: ‘Determined’ (aggressive) or ‘Regular’ (non-aggressive). Once hit, ‘Regular’ individuals were out of play, whereas ‘Determined’ individuals persisted in their behaviour. The ‘Effect Chance…’ column records the percent chance of delivering the intended non-lethal effect to the target, given a hit. This factor could not be taken into account in the wargame.


2 Technology

Before examining the wargame itself, it is instructive to first review the non-lethal technologies at play and take a cursory look at their uses and representations in the simulation environment. This will provide a basis for understanding some of the motivating factors behind the action in the vignettes as well as for interpreting exactly what the wargame results mean and how they should or should not be applied. The first subsection below summarizes the non-lethal technologies in the study, with emphasis on those factors most relevant to the action. The follow-on subsection describes the synthetic representations of the NLWs.

2.1 Non-lethal weapons technology summary

2.1.1 Taser X12 shotgun

Electrical shock weapons, also known as stun guns or by the trade name ‘Tasers’, cause temporary neuromuscular incapacitation (NMI) by delivering an electric shock to individuals struck. Common forms of stun guns include point-contact (touch) devices, pistol-like handguns launching tethered probes (e.g., Taser X26), and shotguns launching barbed Taser rounds that cling to the target (e.g., Taser eXtended Range Electronic Projectile (XREP)). Stun guns have been in use in law enforcement for several decades, and their use is also reported for US military police and several expeditionary forces (including Afghanistan). 40-mm rounds are also under development [5].

Figure 1: Taser X12 (left) and close-up of deployed Taser XREP round (right) (not to scale).1

The stun gun employed in the NICKEL X wargame series is based on the Taser X12 12-gauge shotgun, which combines the close range Taser X26 and the longer range Taser XREP into a single weapon (Figure 1). Doing so allows for effective target engagements at distances ranging from 0 to 30 m.

1 Courtesy of TASER International, Inc.


The shotgun component is capable of firing up to five non-lethal rounds before reloading. Regular (lethal) shotgun rounds will not fire in the system owing to the Radial Key™ ammunition design that only allows firing of the XREP less-lethal 12-gauge round. The tethered component must be reloaded after every shot.

This NLW was designed with building clearance in mind and its employment also extends to all situations where Tasers are currently fielded. The longer duration of electrical stimulus delivered by the shotgun round allows the shooter additional time for movement and for dealing with multiple threats. For example, the shooter potentially could use the time to cover an extended distance and reach a successfully engaged target, then apprehend that target before full recovery from the shock stimulus.

The short range, rail-mounted Taser X26 component launches two tethered probes at the target. Both probes have to hit the individual in order to deliver a 5 second (s) shock stimulus. Optimally, for a frontal shot the firer will attempt to ‘split the belt line’ when firing, that is, aim at the ‘lower center mass’ to impact the torso and thigh areas so as to affect large muscle groups and also to lower the chance of contacting the head, neck and heart areas. From behind the target, the best option is the back area, below the neck line [6]. The range of engagement of the rail-mounted component is 0 to 4.5 m (effective).

The longer range Taser XREP 12-gauge round delivers a 20 s shock at ranges from 4.5 m up to 30 m. The nose contains four small, penetrating harpoon-like prongs (electrodes) to deliver the shock; they are difficult to remove. The base separates from the nose and is left to dangle by a conductive hand trap wire. To produce an electric shock over a wide bodily area, either the individual must grab at the impact site and engage the reflex engagement electrodes or, alternatively, make contact with any of a second set of six ‘Cholla’ electrodes on the dangling base (named after the Cholla cactus). Either action will cause large muscle groups to be affected. The Cholla electrodes must make direct contact with skin and are designed to pierce clothing. It may be necessary to have the prongs removed by a medical professional.

As an aside, the 40-mm Taser round under development (at time of writing) works in much the same way as the XREP round, apart from longer ranges (10-100 m threshold with 10-250 m objective [5]) and, due to it’s greater carrying capacity and electrical charge, the separated base needs only to dangle near the body to make electrical contact through arcing, delivering a shock that may last up to 30 s.

In the context of the wargame, ‘Regular’ entities hit with either the X26 or XREP round became compliant thereafter. ‘Determined’ entities hit with the X26 were incapacitated for 10 s (5 s shock plus another 5 s to resume course of action) and those hit with the XREP round were incapacitated for 25 s (20 s shock plus 5 s to resume course of action).

2.1.2 40-mm sponge grenades

40-mm sponge grenades and the corresponding M203 launcher provide a non-lethal capability to break contact or to enforce a buffer zone through the delivery of blunt trauma (Figure 2). The system is designed to address situations where maximum deliverable energy is desired for stunning or knocking down targets and as a behaviour moderator through pain stimulus, generally


effective at ranges of 10 to 37 m. The primary target areas for the 40-mm impact munitions are the large muscle groups, including the thigh and buttocks, and also the knees, stomach and torso.

The M203 launcher attaches beneath the barrel of a soldier’s rifle (e.g., the C7) and is already used by CF grenadiers to launch high explosive (HE), smoke, and other grenades. The weapon must be reloaded after every shot. When combined with a non-lethal sponge grenade such as the XM1006, the system provides a scalable response to threats without the need to carry additional weapons or to switch weapons in the event a situation escalates. The overall accuracy of the M203, however, is typically inferior to other NLWs such as directed energy weapons, Taser XREP rounds, and other 40-mm launchers not constrained to mount under the barrel of a rifle.

In the context of the wargame, ‘Regular’ entities hit with a 40-mm sponge round became compliant, whereas ‘Determined’ entities hit were incapacitated for 10 s (5 s trauma plus another 5 s to resume course of action).

Figure 2: M203 launcher2 (left) and 40-mm sponge grenade3 (right) (not to scale).

2.1.3 Baton

A baton is a type of club typically employed by riot police to defend against crowds or individuals by delivering blunt trauma injury, or to force compliance via the same mechanism. They are typically less than arm’s length and fashioned of wood, metal or plastic (Figure 3). Batons are often used with shields. The range of the baton is limited to those targets within extended reach, set to 2 m in the study.

Figure 3: Expandable baton.4

2 Public domain (wikipedia project, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M203_grenade_launcher (September 18, 2012)). 3 Image is from http://www.casr.ca/doc-npp-sponge-grenade.htm (February 8, 2012)


In the context of the wargame, ‘Determined’ entities struck with a baton were incapacitated for 6 s and ‘Regular’ entities became compliant after a successful strike.

2.1.4 Active Denial System

The ADS is receiving much attention as a reasonably long range NLW, reaching out to about 750 m. The technology projects a focused beam of millimetre (mm) electromagnetic (EM) waves to induce an intolerable heating sensation on an individual’s skin so as to stop, deter or repel the individual with minimal risk of injury (Figure 4). The effects of the heating sensation are reported to be unbearable within a few seconds of contact, and are also reported to be temporary and reversible as long as the NLW is used properly. Although current systems are bulky (about 5 metric tonnes for military versions, vehicle mounted), expensive and logistically difficult to manage, smaller and more versatile versions are being pursued (e.g., as a deterrent in prisons).

In the context of the wargame, a ‘Regular’ entity hit with a mm wave device became compliant, whereas a ‘Determined’ entity was incapacitated (repelled) for 6 s before resuming its previous course of action.

Figure 4: ADS mounted on a High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).5

2.1.5 Long Range Acoustic Device

LRADs shape and propagate strong intelligible sounds over long distances through high intensity, directional electro-acoustic sound generation. The main function of the LRAD system is highly intelligible communication at long distances, reaching beyond 250 m for hand-held systems (LRAD 100X – see Figure 5) and beyond 3000 m for larger vehicle/ship mounted models (LRAD 1000X). The device also has the capability of following up with a warning tone to influence behaviour (e.g., deter) or determine intent. Furthermore, it may be integrated with a voice translation device.

4 Public domain (wikipedia project, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baton_(law_enforcement) (September 18, 2012)). 5 Public domain (wikipedia project, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_denial_system (September 18, 2012)).


Although the LRAD was not used in any capacity other than for communication in the wargame, extremely high decibel sonic blasts have the potential to cause vertigo and nausea, and possibly more serious effects if employed at too close a range and too high a decibel level.

In the context of the wargame, ‘Regular’ entities affected by an LRAD device became compliant, whereas ‘Determined’ entities either ignored the warning or feigned compliance for 10 s before resuming previous courses of action, depending on the scenario.

Figure 5: The LRAD 100X in use by a US Army Soldier.6

2.1.6 Visual Warning Technology

Research into non-lethal optical disruption is focused on the development of extremely bright lights and eye-safe dazzling lasers to overwhelm optical systems, warn and deter approaching pedestrians and vehicles, and to disorient and distract individuals. In particular, this technology provides a non-lethal alternative to warning shots when cultural signs, hand signals, and other methods fail to warn locals to keep away. It is not meant to cause permanent, prolonged blinding or other eye injuries [7].

The Visual Warning Technology (VWT) device projects an eye-safe beam of green laser light at individuals that pose potential threats or need to be warned of danger (Figure 6). Individuals illuminated may see dark spots for a few seconds, but in general they will still be able to see where they are and where they are heading (i.e., they are ‘dazzled’) [8]. The effective range of engagement for the VWT is approximately 20-100 m and the maximum range is 300 m [9]. The lower bound on the range represents the nominal ocular hazard distance (NOHD), which is a scientifically determined standard with a built-in safety factor [8]. Other sources report that the device is eye-safe at 12 m [10].

In the context of the wargame, ‘Regular’ entities affected by a VWT device became compliant, whereas ‘Determined’ entities feigned compliance for 10 s before resuming previous courses of

6 Courtesy of LRAD Corporation.


action.7 In terms of the game dynamics, the main difference between the VWT and the LRAD was that the former is a point device and the latter is an area device: only one individual at a time could be affected by the VWT, whereas areas containing several individuals could be affected simultaneously using the LRAD. It must be noted that the propagation of information (i.e., information sharing/sensing) through a crowd was not considered in the wargame. This would allow a warning given to one individual to spread to other members of the crowd and could be considered a multiplier for delivery of certain non-lethal effects (e.g., explicit communications between crowd members, others in an area noticing that someone was already warned, etc.).

Figure 6: A CF soldier using the Visual Warning Technology (VWT) device.8

2.2 NLW modeling

From a weapons perspective, the wargaming simulation environment used for the study, CAEnXP, was designed to model the effects of kinetic and explosive weapons on their intended targets, mainly focusing on the physical characteristics of projectile rounds such as bullets, grenades, armour piercing rounds, and other such devices used in extremely hostile life-and-death conflict situations. Modeling NLWs in CAEn, or in other similar systems available for use by LFORT at the time (e.g., JCATS9 and IWARS10), meant modeling a gentler kind of conflict in an environment that was not designed to accommodate the use of non-lethal force. The process of creating NLWs in CAEn can be likened to fitting ‘square pegs into round holes’. More specifically, NLWs are somewhat of a misfit technology in the usual wargaming environment, and hence achieving the desired non-lethal effects required considerable circumvention in the form of workarounds. In some cases, the non-lethal effects translated well to the predominantly lethal effects environment. In other cases, the representation was heavily constrained or highly specific to the situation at hand.

At a coarse level, the NLWs were characterized by the features listed in Table 2. These features encompass ranges of engagement, probabilities of delivering the intended effect, the nature of the effect, and the duration of the effect. Representative values were arrived at through a variety of methods for the various NLWs in the study. 7 In the wargame, the maximum range of the VWT was inadvertently set too high. This did not adversely affect the game due to the limited dimensions of the terrains used in the vignettes. 8 Canadian Army News article "Troops use laser system to warn locals to stay back", May 28, 2009. http://www.army.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=3526 9 Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) was developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, USA. 10 Infantry Warrior Simulation (IWARS) is being developed jointly by the Natick Soldier RD&E Center (NSRDEC) and the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA).


Some notable features of NLWs are not taken into account in the NICKEL X wargame series. One such factor is the chance of death or serious injury given a hit, and another is the chance of delivering sufficient non-lethal force given a hit (i.e., in the wargame all hits were assumed to deliver the full intended effect). Establishing representative values for death or serious injury for a properly used NLW is difficult and likely to require extensive human effects testing. Furthermore, probabilities reported in literature are considerably smaller—typically orders of magnitude smaller—than those reported for non-lethal damage. Hence, given the scale of the conflicts modeled, which is platoon level, these factors safely can be (and were) ignored in the final tally of wargame outcomes. In reality, however, any deaths or serious injuries stemming from the use of non-lethal force could lead to a media disaster for the CF, and cannot be ignored.

Although the chance of delivering the intended non-lethal effect given a hit is listed in Table 2, due to limitations of the synthetic environment, this factor could not be represented in a satisfactory way. Since the simulation is largely physics-based, as opposed to simply probability-based, reducing the chances to hit to accommodate the likelihood that the effect is not delivered would entail a warping of the overall laws of physics, causing mayhem in other aspects of the simulation. Alternatively, discounting the intended effect was not desirable either in some cases (e.g., if an NLW has a 90% chance of delivering a 10 s incapacitation on a successful hit, reducing the duration of the effect to 9 s is simply nonsensical). A third possibility, namely reprogramming the simulation to include a failure rate for ammunition, is the most sensible course of action. A programming approach could also incorporate chances of death or serious injury in a straightforward way. Unfortunately, given the timelines and resources available to the study, this method was not practical.

At a more refined level, range tables—specifying elevations and times of flight at various range increments, were either estimated from empirical data or computed from physical equations of motion to define the trajectories of non-lethal projectiles. Weapon errors and human firer errors defined the dispersion properties of non-lethal projectiles. These errors were derived from a combination of empirical results, shot grouping requirements, and estimated firer errors based on both the nature of the non-lethal equipment (sights, manner of use, etc.) and conditions in the game [4].

In CAEnXP, only rudimentary models of directed energy (beam) weapons and acoustic weapons could be implemented using the available weapon and ammunition definition fields. These systems played simple roles in the wargame in comparison to the complex dynamics associated with the projectile weapons. For example, laser dazzlers and acoustic weapons were constrained to function as point and area warning devices, respectively. Also, the modeled ADS was constrained to function as a point weapon and was only used at close ranges. Nevertheless, it is believed that the models used in the wargame captured the essential elements of the intended non-lethal effects in each vignette under study.

2.2.1 Categorization of non-lethal effects

Non-lethal effects are modeled through two levels of parameters: ‘prominent’ and ‘background’. Prominent parameters represent features most readily observable and tuneable in the wargame, including minimum and maximum ranges of engagement, hit probabilities and the effects of a hit on the spectrum of targets presented. With regard to the effects of a hit, in some cases the settings


reflect value judgements made by the project team in light of what must be regarded as an educated guess of the true (representative) effect. All of these values are listed in Table 2.

The background parameters include less observable features of the game or underlying effects that may accumulate and thereby contribute to or even generate more dominant effects. Background parameters include the range tables, weapon dispersion parameters, rates of fire, ammunition loads, range-dependent variations in effects, and so forth, encompassing all of the underlying machinery needed to represent essential elements of the simulation environment in a consistent and meaningful way.

2.2.2 Prominent non-lethal parameters

The prominent NLW effects were characterized by the following features:

Minimum, maximum and effective ranges of engagement;

Approximate probability to hit a static, dismounted target at up to three ranges;

Chance of incapacitation given that a hit has occurred; and

Incapacitation (or effect) durations given a successful hit on one of two types of targets:

1) A ‘Determined’ individual; and

2) A ‘Regular’ individual.

Most of the features above are straightforward. However, some explanatory remarks are necessary regarding incapacitation times.

Incapacitation times are separated into a ‘base’ duration plus additional time to accommodate any effects that depend on the specific type of individual targeted and also the circumstances. Base times reflect the minimum durations of the expected physiological effect. For example, in the case of the Taser 12-gauge round, the base incapacitation time was set to 20 s—the duration that the electrical current is applied in the payload delivery mechanism. Regarding the duration of additional effects, once hit, ‘Regular’ individuals normally became out of play, whereas ‘Determined’ individuals persistently returned to the pursuit of their objectives, usually as quickly as humanly possible, but sometimes after a brief interval of feigning compliance. Referring once again to the Taser shotgun round as an example, an additional 5 s was added to the base duration of the ‘Determined’ type entity, representing the minimum time it might take a determined individual to get up (assuming a knockdown) and resume his or her activities. Unfortunately, the gradual improvement of entity’s performance over time could not be realistically modeled. In the example case, the total incapacitation duration was set to 25 s, and afterwards the entity became fully functional.

2.2.3 Background non-lethal parameters

At a finer level of detail, the background NLW parameters were characterized by the following features:


Muzzle velocities for kinetic rounds;

Precise trajectory information for kinetic rounds;

Rate of fire (not separately reported on)11;

Ammunition load (if applicable);

Reload rate (if applicable);

Intrinsic weapon accuracy errors;

Human firer accuracy errors;

Area of effect (acoustic device only).

11 Rate of fire is not a direct input into the wargame system.


3 Methods

As mentioned previously, LFORT employed the computer wargame system CAEnXP, described below, to fulfill the study requirements.

3.1 Wargame system: CAEnXP

CAEnXP is both a close combat interactive wargame and a non-interactive simulation that can produce numerous replications of interactive games played to generate large amounts of data for subsequent analysis.12 It encompasses a multi-sided, multi-layered model that simulates combat systems and the environment at the tactical level. CAEnXP is a versatile tool for simulating ground combat mostly at the individual soldier, section and platoon levels and is capable of modeling many of the factors that influence mission outcomes. Military players control the movement of forces and react to detection and engagements by interacting with the computer through computer screens and keyboards. The screens provide each user with a two-dimensional (2D) overhead view of the battlefield and three-dimensional (3D) sensor views on demand. Icons represent the forces involved and an array of menus enables their control. The games are not played out in real time. Rather, the action is paused as each player plans the next move. This is necessary to enable only a few players to control a great many forces. The probability of each system detecting, suppressing, killing and surviving must be accurately defined in the CAEnXP database.

3.2 Data requirements and gathering

Only unclassified data were used in the study. Relevant information was gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs), manufacturers and open sources prior to the simulation. Additionally, the SAS-078 Panel, through Dr. Peter Dobias, was responsible for further clarification of vignettes or details on equipment. DLR reviewed the use of the modeled NLWs in the vignettes and provided comments to ensure that the baseline—representing current capabilities—was aligned with NLW employment by the CF.

In general, not all specific performance data needed are readily available in an unclassified format. This is especially evident with new technologies. Professional judgement was used, when necessary, to create such data in consultation with the study stakeholder. Some of the main assumptions follow, adding to previously mentioned assumptions that are intrinsic to the CAEnXP wargaming environment:

a. The CAEnXP suppression variable was used to model the effects of NLWs that cause temporary incapacitation to individuals. Effectively, while an entity is incapacitated (suppressed), it cannot perform any actions in the wargame;

12 A caveat concerning replication: Currently, few interactive games are played and the existing wargame replication method, although able to generate much needed additional data, is heavily constrained in that entity decision-making is overly simplistic. This limits the complexity of wargames that can be played and replicated meaningfully. This, in turn, limits the scope of the vignettes that can be simulated, and thus limits the applicability of findings to a small number of specific scenarios, actioned in specific ways.


b. Failed shots are not supported in CAEnXP, however, an attempt was made to model them using the body armour file or suppression variables. These are shots that either hit the individual and failed to cause the intended effect, or did not fire properly, or that came apart in flight. As alluded to earlier, this method failed;

c. Some NLW effects were simply scripted in the vignettes in such a way that the interactors played out pre-determined responses for those affected, as opposed to having the actions programmed into the wargaming computer system. For example, a designated crowd leader may be scripted to become aggressive during a negotiation to the point that non-lethal force is necessary and justified in order to deter the individual and others from pursuing unlawful actions. In such a case, the BLUE interactor would simply apply non-lethal force at the appropriate time in the game action sequence; and

d. Albeit desirable to estimate collateral damages stemming from the use of any weapon, especially in a heavily populated urban environment, collateral damages were not measured in this study. The human behaviours (e.g., crowd dynamics) utilized were not sufficiently sophisticated to allow for such estimations and the simulation environment is not sophisticated enough to represent environmental factors to the required level of fidelity.

3.3 Modeling considerations

NLW modeling was discussed earlier in Section 2.2. Reiterating the key methodological considerations, for projectiles, range tables that included elevations and times of flight were extracted from empirical observations. Dispersion characteristics of the rounds at various ranges were either determined in the same way or derived from maximum dispersion tolerances specified as requirements in procurement contracts. These results constituted a baseline for the trajectory and dispersion of non-lethal rounds, comparable to lab results for a ‘weapon in a vice’. Subsequently, human firer errors and weapon errors were included based on a probability of hit model developed for training purposes [4], thus adding to the ‘best-case’ round dispersion already obtained and producing more realistic inaccuracies reflective of normal field use during good environmental conditions.

Acoustic and beam weapon characteristics were approximated using the same structure designed for modeling kinetic weapons, and not without certain shortcomings. The impacts of any shortcomings were minimized as part of the scenario design phase (e.g., the VWT and LRAD devices were used for warning only, the ADS was only employed at close ranges). Essentially, achieving the modeling objectives required constraining the approach by adopting certain guiding principles for modeling NLWs in the wargames. One such principle was to focus on ‘guaranteed effects’ as much as possible and on involving as few different kinds of actors as possible, rather than attempt to model the full spectrum of behavioural responses in a population. Another was to model only those factors that were expected to play a dominant role in the game dynamics.

3.4 Wargame results

CAEnXP results, like any wargame/simulation, are affected by the assumptions and modeling techniques used by the model’s developers. Human factors such as training, morale, aggression,


fatigue, intimidation and fear are either simply modeled or were not considered in this study. Realistically, such factors may influence crowd response, weapon aiming errors, tactical prowess and the ability to perform embedded tasks competently, to name only a few. Consequently, weapons, equipment and units perform closer to their theoretical maximums than to operational norms in the wargame. These and other modeling limitations/anomalies do not diminish the simulation output credibility, but require consideration when evaluating results. CAEnXP, while unable to provide definitive absolute outcomes for particular battles, is a powerful tool for supporting the analyses of a wide range of factors, such as operational impact assessment including the effectiveness of combat systems, technology alternatives, force structure alternatives and development and validation of new and current TTPs for different operations like conventional warfare, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement in urban and rural environments. The NICKEL X wargame study was conducted using CAEnXP Version 9.3.0.11 with the most current version of DRDC CORA’s unclassified CAEnXP database, updated to include the entities used in this study.

3.5 Runs and iterations

Once acceptable data sets were developed for each option in the form of a set of interactive games, multiple runs of each option were conducted for statistical analysis. Practice games were conducted to train the interactors up to the required level of proficiency. Each option under study was gamed by the interactors at least five times in order to achieve a satisfactory level of variability in replication. This is more of a ‘rule of thumb’ for wargames at the given level of complexity than a rigorously defined practice. For each game played in CAEnXP that was conducive to automated replication, twenty such replications were generated to support statistical analysis.

3.6 Vignettes

This study involved the use of four separate vignettes modeled in CAEnXP. Each vignette was set up to exercise the options in different tasks and utilize the non-lethal weapon systems at different ranges. The situation for each of the four vignettes is briefly described below. Full vignette descriptions appear in Section 4.

3.6.1 Vignette 6: NATO citizen evacuation

A Platoon is to extract five NATO citizen teachers from a school where they are being held against their will by thirty angry, unarmed locals (extraction situation). The lives of the teachers are not believed to be in danger, suggesting that lethal force is not warranted.

3.6.2 Vignette 13: Patrol on foot – aggressive gang

A patrol of thirty-two soldiers in suburban Mogadishu spot youths carrying concealed or openly displayed weapons within a market square crowded with civilians. The leader of the group is identified. The patrol is tasked to disarm the group and guard the seized weapons until support arrives.


3.6.3 Vignette 14: Plane crash

A quick reaction team consisting of eight soldiers is tasked with securing a crashed plane from a local population possessing vague elements of roguery and possible insurgency. The setting is rural.

3.6.4 Vignette 20: Village search

A Search Team is tasked to search dwellings in a remote village for suspected Taliban insurgents, weapons, explosives and drugs. A Watchdog Team is tasked to stop and seize persons attempting to flee the scene.

3.7 Analysis

3.7.1 Qualitative results

Qualitative results are based on Military Judgments and Insights (J&I). J&I are formulated through group discussions between the game players (interactors) and are collected through a second group discussion involving the entire project team. The results of J&I are based on a careful synthesis of players’ observations during wargaming combined with individual expertise and background. J&I may be corroborated or contradicted by the quantitative analysis.

3.7.2 Quantitative results

Quantitative results are based on the statistical analysis of CAEnXP output files. The analyses were used to recommend the most effective NLW option(s) for each vignette and comment on other relevant game factors and observations.

3.8 Measures of effectiveness (MOEs)

In each vignette, options were scored by various numerical criteria (MOEs) and ranked using a statistical breakpoint analysis technique where necessary (BRANDO) [12]. Due to the non-lethal nature of the weapon systems under study, the MOEs were defined to reflect the notion that obstacles must be overcome without causing RED Force casualties while at the same time affording adequate protection to BLUE Force and civilian elements. The measures thus reflect the ability to (non-lethally) neutralize RED, determine the intent of potentially hostile individuals, and complete the task assigned in such a way as to avoid unnecessary and unintended loss of life on either side. The MOEs are seen to fall into three broad categories, listed below, and are weighted as per Table 3. Note that most vignettes do not have the ‘Determination of Intent’ MOE, in which case increased weight is assigned to the remaining two measures.

There is no rigorous way to ultimately determine what the MOE weights should be or how many of them are needed or even if the correct ones have been chosen. In this case, the MOEs were chosen by the project team in consultation with the stakeholder based on what is measurable and beliefs about what is important. To better deal with subjectivity, the assigned weights were varied widely to determine the sensitivity of the overall option ranks to the weighting schedule. If option


rankings were to change dramatically with the variation, then the result would be considered unstable (highly dependent on the scheme). On the other hand, if the option rankings showed little or no change under the variation, then the result would be considered stable (for the most part, independent of the weighting scheme and thus the specific weights chosen would not impact the conclusions of the study). In all cases, the reported rankings were found to be highly stable under wide variations in the MOE weighting schedule, which lessens the importance of exactly how the weights were distributed among the various MOEs. Refer to Annex B for more detail regarding the sensitivity analysis.

a. Task Fulfillment. This MOE measures how successfully the BLUE Force performed its task. It is vignette dependant and scales from 0% to either 50% or 66.7%, depending on the vignette. The desired end state is the highest value attainable. Unless otherwise stated13, if lethal force is necessary and/or a fatality occurs on either side, then the value assigned will be 0 or the game will terminate. There are no measurements made in this study to address situations that rely on a combination of lethal and non-lethal force. Specific task fulfillment measures for the various vignettes are summarized in Table 4, below, and more details on the internal breakdown of the measures applied to specific vignettes are provided in the vignette write-ups (Section 4);

b. RED Non-lethal Neutralization. This MOE measures the level of RED suppression or non-lethal neutralization during the engagement (i.e., the inability of RED to act against BLUE). The desired end state is either 25% or 33.3%, depending on the vignette, corresponding to complete non-lethal neutralization of the RED Force elements in play; and

c. Determination of Intent. In vignettes where RED combatants are mixed in with civilian elements, this MOE measures how well cooperative members of a crowd were distinguished from more hostile members. For example, a modern acoustic hailing device, such as the LRAD, might be sufficient to clear a large area of non-hostile, cooperative crowd members before confronting the hostile elements simply by informing the crowd they must exit the area immediately, leaving only confrontational or uncooperative individuals behind to deal with. The desired end state is 25% in the vignette where it was used, corresponding to maximal determination of intent according to the measurement criteria.

13 In Vignette 13, it is assumed that RED will eventually use lethal weapons. The first lethal shot fired by RED marks the end of game play and of measurement.


Table 3: Weights of individual MOEs.

Weight (%) Priority Measure of Effectiveness

V6 V13 V14 V20

1 Task Fulfillment 66.7 66.7 50 66.7

2 RED Non-lethal Neutralization 33.3 33.3 25 33.3

2 or N/A Determination of Intent 0 0 25 0

Total 100 100 100 100

Table 4: Task Fulfillment.

Vignette Measure of Task Fulfillment Description

6. NATO Citizen Evacuation

Safe and Timely Extraction A combined measure of 1) the time taken to extract the NATO citizens (a key factor towards ensuring their safe recovery); and 2) the conditions at the time of extraction (i.e., the degree to which the situation was under control).

13. Patrol on Foot – Aggressive Gang

Escalation Deterrence In this vignette, escalation was tied to 1) the time interval to the first incapacitation of the identified leader of hostilities; and 2) the time interval before lethal weapons were employed by RED.

14. Plane Crash Repelling Effect A measure taking account of the advancement rate of the crash site looters.

20. Village Search Stoppage Runners attempting to flee across a field are assumed to be ‘stopped’ if sufficiently slowed down via non-lethal neutralization.


4 Individual Vignette Descriptions and Findings

The vignette descriptions below summarize the full NATO vignettes as described by the SAS-078 study [3]. In addition, the qualitative and quantitative findings are tabulated and discussed briefly for each vignette.

4.1 Vignette 6: NATO citizen evacuation

4.1.1 General description

This scenario takes place in Afghanistan in 2018. A girls’ school has been taken over by angry locals. The angry locals have succeeded in ‘detaining’ five international teachers before local authorities had a chance to evacuate the area, due to a deteriorating security situation. The BLUE Force has been tasked with evacuating the five international teachers from the school. The use of force has been approved. Figure 7 shows a particular starting configuration of the NATO Citizen Evacuation wargame. This scenario was conducted in day time conditions.

1 Section

2 Section

4 Section

ADS

3 Section

School Main Door

5 Teachers

Figure 7: Vignette 6, NATO citizen evacuation (100 m grid spacing).


4.1.2 BLUE force

The BLUE Force is composed of an Infantry Platoon. They are specially equipped with and trained in the use of non-lethal weaponry—to include anti-riot gear and advanced NLWs. The BLUE Force intent is to evacuate the five international teachers quickly and safely without resorting to the use of lethal force.

4.1.3 RED force

The RED Force is composed of 30 locals who are angry with the deteriorating security situation. They seem to be unarmed, but have put up obstacles, barbed wire and have barricaded the school doors. There are no children present. The intent of the RED Force is to hold the teachers for as long as possible. They have no intent of letting the teachers go, or of hurting them.

4.1.4 BLUE force plan

The BLUE Force will follow the Rules of Engagement, only using lethal force as a last resort. The BLUE Force will attempt to negotiate with the leader to safely release the five teachers. If this is unsuccessful, the BLUE Force will use non-lethal measures to achieve their mission. 1 Section will have batons and shields and will clear the way to the main entrance where they will breach the barricaded door. 2 Section, located behind 1 Section, will then enter the school and evacuate the five teachers. 3 Section is located to the south of the school to provide security to the south and rear of the building. 4 Section (the Reserve Section) is located back from the front of the school (to the west) ready to react where needed.

4.1.5 RED force plan

The RED Force or locals will put the five international teachers in a room in the centre of the single-storey school. There will be ten RED Force personnel watching them. The RED Force leader and nine others will be at the front main door of the school. There will be another ten RED Force personnel present at the rear of the school. The RED Force leader and nine others will talk to the BLUE Force during the negotiation stage. When this fails, the leader and nine others will form a wall in front of the school near the main entrance. They will physically attempt to stop the BLUE Force from getting into the school. While a confrontation takes place at the entrance and the BLUE Force moves into the school to evacuate the five teachers, a group of ten angry locals, situated at the rear of the building, will move around the south side to help with the confrontation at the main entrance. Those that arrive will throw rocks at the BLUE Force. These are the ‘Determined’ entities on the RED side. All others are ‘Regular’. As well, the ten locals guarding the teachers will also try to prevent the BLUE extraction team from getting near the teachers.

4.1.6 Options

Three non-lethal equipment sets were trialed in this vignette, shown in Table 5. In the Baseline option, representative of current CF capabilities, the Infantry Platoon consisted of one full baton


and shield section to clear the crowd blocking entrance to the building (1 Section), one 50-50 split baton and shield / rifle section to carry out the extraction (2 Section), one sponge round carrying section to protect against interference from the crowd at the rear (east end) of the building (3 Section), and one 50-50 split baton and shield / sponge round reserve section. Note that in this option, given the unknown threat level of the hostage keepers inside the building, the extraction team had to balance non-lethal capability with lethal capability. Since the minimum safe distance for the sponge round is 10 m and ranges of engagement were expected to be close, the only non-lethal capability available to the extraction team was the baton and shield.

Due to the requirement to maintain lethal capabilities at all times, the simple replacement of sponge round launchers with Taser X12 shotguns in subsequent options could not be implemented. Since the M203 is mounted under the rifle barrel, soldiers using sponge rounds are quickly able to respond to an escalated threat level. However, since a Taser shotgun replaces a rifle rather than adding to it, in order to maintain lethal capabilities some soldiers must carry rifles instead.

In the Enhanced and Stun Gun options, the extraction team replaced the baton and shield line with X12 stun gun shooters (2 Section). The side / rear security force, having to balance lethal and non-lethal capabilities, replaced the eight sponge round shooters with four X12 stun gun shooters and four riflemen (3 Section). Similarly, the reserve force replaced their four sponge round shooters with two stun gun shooters and two riflemen (4 Section). This section maintained a dedicated reserve force consisting of four baton and shield bearers over all options. In the Enhanced option, an additional vehicle-mounted ADS system was provided by headquarters (HQ). The presence of the ADS is the only distinguishing feature between the Stun Gun option and the Enhanced option.

Table 5: Vignette 6 options.

Infantry Platoon

1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section

Baseline 8-Batons and Shields

4-Batons and Shields, 4-Rifles

8-40-mm sponge round launcher (M203)

4-Batons and Shields 4-40-mm sponge round launcher (M203)

Stun Gun 8-Batons and Shields

4-X12 Taser Shotguns (XREP/X26) 4-Rifles


4-Batons and Shields 2-X12 Taser Shotguns (XREP/X26) 2-Rifles


Enhanced 8-Batons and Shields



1-ADS (PL HQ) 4-Batons and Shields 2-X12 Taser Shotguns (XREP/X26) 2-Rifles

4.1.7 Judgements and insights

The following J&I were recorded for Vignette 6.

a. In all the options gamed, the BLUE Force was successful in evacuating the citizens. The BLUE Force never had to call in the Reserve Section to assist the other sections in their individual tasks. However, the Reserve Section did fire their NLWs when able to do so;

b. The Enhanced option was the most effective of the options. This was possibly due to the addition of the ADS that reinforced 3 Section in preventing the threat from the rear of the building from reaching the front of the building. As well, the ADS allowed 3 Section to spread out more towards the rear of the building, which meant that earlier intent and engagements of the RED Force were realized. The ADS was a force multiplier.

c. The Baseline was the least effective option. This was possibly due to 3 Section (with the M203) not being able to effectively stop the threat from the rear of the building and 2 Section (with batons and shields) having no standoff with the RED Force once they were in the building and attempting to evacuate the citizens.

d. In the Stun Gun and Enhanced options, 2 Section (with the Taser Shotgun) performed their task of dealing with the threat in the building and evacuating the citizens better than in the Baseline option. This may have been due to the fact that the Taser Shotgun gave a much greater standoff from the threat than the batons and shields did.


4.1.8.1 Vignette 6 MOEs

One of the general case MOEs laid out in Table 3 does not apply to this vignette. The intent of the protestors was established as a precondition of the scene, and therefore the MOE ‘Determination of Intent’ does not enter into measurement (Table 6). From Table 3 and Table 4, the definitions of ‘Task Fulfillment’ and ‘RED Non-lethal Neutralization’ are made precise and vignette-specific versions of these measures appear in Table 7.


Table 6: Vignette 6 weighting schedule.

Priority Measure of Effectiveness Weight (%)

1 Task Fulfillment 66.7

2 RED Non-lethal Neutralization 33.3

N/A Determination of Intent 0

Total 100

Table 7: Vignette 6 measure specifications.

MOE Description Measurement Details

Timely Extraction: Referenced to the time interval Tx between when the first member of the BLUE extraction team enters the building and the first teacher is brought to safety. The minimum time interval observed Tmin formed the baseline for comparisons.

Formula*: (Tmin / Tx) × 22.2%

Safe Extraction: The ‘Safe’ part of the extraction was quantified in terms of the level of neutralization of the hostage-takers (ht) and the average ranges of engagement Rx inside the building.

mxR

mxRmxR

mxR

S

StothtincaphtFormula

5%,1.11

55.0)%,5.4/1.11()5.0(

5.0%,0

%1.11:

Task Fulfillment - Safe and Timely Extraction

(66.7%)

A combined measure of:

1) The time taken to extract the NATO citizens (max 22.2%);

2) Conditions inside the building during the extraction (max 22.2%); and

3) The overall conditions at the moment the extraction was complete (i.e., how well the situation was under control inside and outside) (max 22.2%). Safe End Conditions: Measures RED neutralization at the time of

extraction as an indicator of how well the situation was under control at that critical instant in time.

%2.225.0:**totdetndet

totregnreg

Formula


RED Non-lethal Neutralization

(33.3%)

Measures the level of RED non-lethal neutralization during the engagement.

A measure of the level of control exercised over the duration of the operation. It is based on the (normalized) area under a neutralization curve quantifying the number of incapacitated individuals over time. The cut-off is the time of extraction, Tx.

%3.335.0: detAregAFormula

*Note: Although it is generally better to define absolute scales, the definition of this measure makes it relative to the data [11]. The measure is effectively absolute as long as the same reference values (e.g., Tmin) are maintained in any future comparisons, including those where options are deleted.

**The term (regn / regtot) represents the fraction of ‘Regular’ protesters neutralized (via incapacitation or unwillingness to act) at the time of extraction. Similarly, the term (detn / dettot) represents the fraction of ‘Determined’ protesters neutralized (via incapacitation only) at the time of extraction.

4.1.8.2 Vignette 6 MOE scores and option ranking

The overall scores are shown in Figure 8 together with estimated 95% confidence intervals14. Tabulated MOE scores and option rankings are listed in Table 8. The specific data and computed results that underlie these summary values appear in Annex B.1.

0 20 40 60 80

Option

MOE Score (out of 100)

Enhanced

Stun Gun

Baseline

Figure 8: Vignette 6 MOE scores.

14 Errors are underestimated due to the method used to compute the ‘Task Fulfillment’ measure. The scoring method for the ‘Timely Extraction’ subcomponent only compares the mean values.


Table 8: Vignette 6 MOE rankings.

MOE Scores

Option Task Fulfillment (out of 66.7)


(out of 33.3)

Total Score (out of 100) Rank

Baseline (sponge rounds) 37.3 ± 1.4 9.7 ± .3 47.0 ± 1.4 3

Stun Gun (stun guns) 44.3 ± 1.4 10.3 ± .3 54.7 ± 1.4 2

Enhanced (stun guns + ADS)

48.5 ± 1.5 14.1 ± .3 62.5 ± 1.5 1

The reported rankings were found to be invariant under wide variations in the MOE weighting schedule (Section B.1.5).

4.1.9 Vignette 6 discussion

In an operational context, the following basic hierarchy holds: Enhanced Stun Gun Baseline. Put another way, (stun guns + ADS) (stun guns) (sponge rounds). This hierarchy is in terms of the measured effectiveness. It is satisfied not only at the level of the overall scores (Figure 8), but also for each individual measure and sub-measure computed (Annex B.1). The bulk of the gains made by the Enhanced option over the others stemmed from more effective neutralization of ‘Determined’ entities in the game (Figure B-3 and Figure B-4). In terms of overall effectiveness, the Stun Gun option falls approximately mid-way between the Baseline (sponge rounds) and the Enhanced option (stun guns + ADS).

The tradeoffs between sponge round use in the Baseline option and stun projectile use in Stun Gun option were not overly pronounced for most measures. The main exception relates to that part of the conflict occurring inside the building, which accounts for ~5% of the ~7% difference in overall scores. In the Baseline case, the extraction team employed batons15. Compared to stun gun use, use of the baton lost out in both the tally of incapacitated hostage takers and in standoff distances. The overall effectiveness of the Baseline and Stun Gun options scored a tie or a near tie, in a statistical sense, for other quantities measured (neutralization capabilities and duration of extraction). This indicates a near balancing out of the tradeoffs between sponge round use and stun gun use in more open terrain, albeit at a 2:1 ratio.

Exterior to the building, the dominant tradeoff between the Baseline and the Stun Gun option can be characterized by the number of soldiers armed with personal NLWs versus the relative 15 Note that use of close range 12-gauge beanbag rounds, which are available for use by the CF, report a minimum safe range of approximately 3 m, which is under the average range of engagement experienced by the Taser X26 at 2.1-2.4 m. So using beanbag rounds instead of batons would have resulted in a range gap. Splitting the extraction section between beanbag shotguns bearers and shield/ baton bearers might have improved performance inside the building by engaging some targets at longer ranges.


neutralization capabilities. The M203 with sponge rounds could be used by all soldiers in the 3 Section of this vignette without reducing lethal capabilities due to the under-barrel mount, but the weapon was modeled as having relatively low neutralization power against ‘Determined’ individuals—the real trouble-makers in the scenario. In contrast, the Taser shotgun weapon, with high neutralization power, could be used by only half of the soldiers in order to reserve an adequate lethal capability in case it is needed. The conditions at the time of extraction favoured stun gun use over sponge rounds (the remaining ~2% of the ~7% difference in overall scores between the Baseline and the Stun Gun option can be attributed to this factor, see Table B-3).

The ADS (Enhanced option) could only be employed outside of the main building. It contributed to higher ‘Task Fulfillment’ and ‘RED Neutralization’ MOE scores. ‘Task Fulfillment’ was greatly bolstered by the Safe End Conditions portion of the measure (Table B-3). Not surprisingly, ‘RED Neutralization’ scores were stronger with the ADS than without it (Stun Gun option): the additional capability came at no cost to the operation—it was assumed to be a headquarters asset.

4.2 Vignette 13: Patrol on foot – aggressive gang


This scenario takes place in Somalia in 2013. NATO troops represent the only law enforcement agency in the area. A BLUE Force patrolling in a suburb of Mogadishu comes upon a small marketplace where they notice that many of the younger males are carrying concealed weapons. Some are openly carrying rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). It is quickly realized that the gang is intimidating merchants in the area and relieving them of goods or proceeds from sales. As part of the patrol orders, the BLUE Force has been tasked with disarming and seizing all weapons that they come across. In what is largely a judgement call based on partial information about the RED Force elements, BLUE attempts to disarm the individuals, cautiously and with the knowledge that external support is not immediately available. This scenario was conducted in day time conditions.


BLUE Force Platoon Commander

RED Force Leader

Figure 9: Vignette 13, Patrol on foot—aggressive gang (100 m grid spacing).

4.2.2 BLUE force

The BLUE Force is composed of an Infantry Platoon. They are equipped with lethal capabilities and some advanced non-lethal capabilities, however, the unit does not specialize in the application of non-lethal force. The BLUE Force intent is to safely disarm the group without sparking a lethal confrontation.

4.2.3 RED force

The RED Force is composed of twenty gang members armed with sub-machine guns, hand grenades and RPGs. They are dispersed within a larger crowd of eighty locals who are conducting normal business within the marketplace. Some of the locals also have machetes, knives and axes for their own defence, but they are not members of the gang. The RED Force intent is to take as much as they can from the merchants and not relinquish anything that was taken. Knowing the strength of their own numbers relative to BLUE’s and under the cover of the crowd, they are fully capable of countering BLUE’s attempt at control using lethal force. RED does not attempt to take hostages, use crowd members as human shields, or otherwise use the crowd to their advantage.



The BLUE Force immediately takes up positions around the small marketplace. They do not want anyone to escape, especially if carrying a weapon. The Platoon Commander wishes to control the situation and tells everyone to lie on the ground. During this initial confusion, the RED Force leader remains standing and wants to know what is going on. The Platoon Commander meets with the RED Force leader to negotiate. The meeting does not go well and the BLUE Force implements the Rules of Engagement in an effort to maintain control, first taking down the RED Force leader using non-lethal force. The remainder of the RED Force reacts violently to the take-down and the BLUE Force attempts to contain the situation and complete their mission.


The RED Force is spread out in small groups throughout the marketplace. The RED Force leader will not immediately co-operate with the BLUE Force Platoon Commander’s request and will cause the BLUE Force some problems. The two representatives will initially talk, but this will not resolve the situation. The RED Force leader’s actions will cause him to become a target for incapacitation with a NLW (he becomes overly aggressive). Unfortunately, rather than diffusing the situation, this triggers the other RED Force members to adopt a more aggressive posture toward the BLUE Force, going so far as to fire at BLUE at the first opportunity16.

4.2.6 Options

Three non-lethal equipment sets were trialed in this vignette, delineated in Table 9. All four BLUE sections were dealt the exact same configuration per option. In the Baseline option, which is representative of current CF capabilities, each section was outfitted with two M203’s dedicated to the use of sponge rounds, two C-9 gunners and four riflemen. The only deviation from the Baseline for the Stun Gun option was the replacement of the M203 weapons used for sponge rounds with an equal number of X12 stun guns. In the Enhanced option, both sponge round weapons and stun guns were employed at two a piece, at the expense of two riflemen.


Infantry Platoon 4 Infantry Sections, identical configurations per option (as below)

Non-lethal capability Lethal backup - LMG Lethal backup - Rifle

Baseline 2-40-mm sponge round launcher (M203)

2-C9 4-Rifle

Stun Gun 2-X12 Taser Shotgun (XREP/X26)

2-C9 4-Rifle

16 The point at which RED was able to fire at BLUE marked the end of the game.


Enhanced 2-40-mm sponge round launcher (M203) 2-X12 Taser Shotgun (XREP/X26)

2-C9 2-Rifle



a. The BLUE Force had difficulty in all of the options in this vignette. In every case, the conditions forced BLUE to escalate to lethal force in order to maintain control over the situation.

b. The Enhanced option was the most effective of the options. This was probably due to the fact that it had double the number of NLWs of the other options.

c. The Baseline was the least effective of the options. The Stun Gun option faired slightly better than the Baseline and this might be due to the fact that the Taser Shotgun has a higher rate of fire and a longer suppression time than the M203 sponge round.

d. An interesting, additional excursion to this scenario would be to play the games to include the escalation to lethal force to determine if there would be a possible change in the option ranking (i.e., determine BLUE vulnerability in the escalated (lethal) portion).



One of the general case MOEs laid out in Table 3 does not apply to this vignette. The identification and intent of the gang members was established as a precondition of the scene, and therefore the MOE ‘Determination of Intent’ does not enter into measurement (Table 10). From Table 3 and Table 4, the definitions of ‘Task Fulfillment’ and ‘RED Non-lethal Neutralization’ are now made precise. Vignette-specific versions of these measures appear in Table 11.



1 Task Fulfillment 66.7


N/A Determination of Intent 0

Total 100




Takedown Time: The quantity Ti represents the time interval between the first non-lethal shot fired by BLUE and incapacitation of the RED leader (relative to the desired time of achieving incapacitation within 5 s). It was believed by the senior military expert and the military players that a takedown time beyond 5 s would be unacceptable.

.,0

sec5,sec5

sec5

%3.33:

otherwise

iTiT

S

SFormula

Task Fulfillment – Escalation Deterrence

(66.7%)


1) How quickly the RED leader of hostilities could be incapacitated after the first non-lethal shot was fired (max 33.3%); and

2) How long BLUE was able to sufficiently neutralize RED, preventing them from using their weapons (max 33.3%).

Sustainment Interval: The quantity TNL represents the time interval between the first non-lethal shot fired by BLUE and the first lethal shot fired by RED. The measure derived from this quantity is computed relative to the maximum average time interval Tmax recorded for the three options.

.,0.1

max,max

%3.33:*

otherwise

TNLTT

NLT

M

MFormula


(33.3%)

Measures the level of RED non-lethal neutralization of ‘Determined’ entities during the engagement.

This is a measure for the level of control exercised over the duration of the operation. It is based on the (normalized) area under a neutralization curve quantifying the number of incapacitated ‘Determined’ individuals over time. This begins when the first non-lethal shot is fired and ends when the first lethal shot is fired (TNL).

Formula: Adet x 33.3%.

*Note: This measure is defined relative to the results, as per Table 7, due to the fact that there was no a priori way to define what a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ sustainment interval might be. Longer is simply better.



The overall scores are illustrated in Figure 10, together with estimated 95% confidence intervals17. The tabulated MOE scores and option rankings are listed in Table 12. The specific data and computed results that underlie these values appear in Annex B.2.

0 20 40 60 80

Option


Enhanced

Stun Gun

Baseline



MOE Scores

Option Task Fulfillment (out of 66.7)


(out of 33.3)

Total Score (out of 100)

Rank18

Baseline (sponge rounds) 60.1 +6.6/-6.0 4.0 ± .2 64.0 +6.6/-6.0 NA

Stun Gun (stun guns) 64.0 +3.0/-3.8 4.2 ± .2 68.4 +3.0/-3.8 NA

Enhanced (sponge round + stun guns)

57.6 +6.9/-7.5 5.8 ± .2 63.4 ± 2.1

NA

The option scores did not show differences that were statistically distinguishable at the 95% confidence level. Thus, no ranking of the options was performed. This result was found to be stable under wide variations in the MOE weighting schedule (Section B.2.4).

17 Confidence intervals are estimated due to the method used to compute the ‘Task Fulfillment’ measure (see Annex B.2.2). 18 No rank assigned. The options were statistically indistinguishable.



This was a no-win situation for BLUE and none of the options applied sufficient non-lethal force to exercise the control necessary to prevent escalation for a prolonged period. Game after game, RED consistently began firing lethal rounds at BLUE in under a minute. Note that by scenario design, RED would eventually open fire on BLUE. The only question was one of timing.

In the game results for this vignette, uncertainty in the measurements was high enough to preclude ranking the options statistically. Although measurements slightly favour the Stun Gun option over the others on the strength of the non-lethal sustainment interval—46 seconds compared to 37 seconds for the other two options (quoting averages from Table B-7)—the overall option ranking results are inconclusive.

RED non-lethal neutralization scores were dismal for all options, with scores falling in the range of 4-6% out of a possible 33.3% (Table B-8). The combined NLW option (Enhanced) scored the highest in that measure.

The fact that Stun Gun scores were equal or better than those of the Enhanced option is an interesting result, given that the Enhanced option adds two sponge round launchers to the Stun Gun option’s non-lethal complement of two Taser shotguns, and does so without compromising lethal capabilities. The combination of preserving BLUE’s lethality while increasing non-lethal force makes the Enhanced option an attractive option. Despite the fact that the larger set of NLWs did a better job of neutralizing RED over the course of the non-lethal sustainment interval (as expected), on average, it did a worse job of keeping RED from achieving their goal of opening fire on BLUE (not expected). The shorter duration assigned to sponge round incapacitations (~10 sec) provided RED with more opportunities to return fire than if they had been hit with Taser projectiles (~25 s incapacitation). Perhaps BLUE could have hit the same individuals with both rounds in order to close the gap and generate an overall gain over Taser shotguns alone.

Either way, it must be noted that this observation has to be balanced against the fact that when RED did begin to shoot at BLUE, at least in the Baseline case the BLUE soldiers already had their rifles in their hands, as opposed to the case of the Taser X12 which is a separate weapon altogether. In that case, each section was short two riflemen.

One might assume that, in general, having more NLWs available is preferable for the application of non-lethal force. These results prompt one to think twice about mixing NLWs to bolster non-lethal power—the wrong mix for the situation could actually hinder overall performance.

4.3 Vignette 14: Plane crash


This scenario takes place in Afghanistan in 2012 (fictitious). NATO continues to support Afghan National Army (ANA) efforts. Recently, NATO Response Force (NRF) air force assets were deployed to support an ANA offensive near the Pakistani border with aerial reconnaissance. A NATO plane was flying a mission near the border when the plane suddenly crashed over a sparsely inhabited mountain region in a remote area. There were no survivors. An NRF Quick-Reaction Team (QRT) was dispatched by helicopter to recover the bodies and secure the crash


site until an investigative team arrives in about 36 hours. A small village is located near the crash site. Although this scenario takes place over a 36 hour period, only a small portion of the time was gamed—a period that highlights the rush of curious onlookers and opportunists who show up to investigate the site and, in some cases, test the resolve of the QRT. This scenario was conducted in daylight conditions. 19

BLUE Force crash site

Village

Figure 11: Vignette 14, Plane crash (100 m grid spacing).

4.3.2 BLUE force

The BLUE Force is composed of an Infantry Section armed with normal section weapons including assault rifles and grenade launchers. They are night-vision equipped and have state of the art non-lethal capabilities. The BLUE Force intent is to secure the site without having to fire lethal weapons.

4.3.3 RED force

The RED Force consists of two different groups, the first of which are villagers (thirty in number) who are curious about the crash site. This group is not overly motivated to get involved in 19 Although this vignette was originally enacted in both daylight and night conditions, confidence in the representation of night conditions was low. Therefore, only the daylight condition games were analyzed.


anything illegal, although they will pilfer if given the opportunity. The second group is composed of more aggressive villagers (fifteen in number) who are willing to risk more to attempt to steal anything from the crash site. Neither group are considered armed. The intent of the first group is mainly to satisfy their curiosity about the crash site and not to linger should they perceive that they are causing any trouble with the BLUE Force. The intent of the second group is to be more aggressive (i.e., try to get to the wreckage in an effort to steal anything of perceived value).


The BLUE Force will immediately set up a perimeter defence around the crash site. The helicopter will not remain behind. Observation posts will be set up to cover all approaches and each will have non-lethal and lethal weapons available. They will attempt to keep personnel away from the crash site using the NLW kit provided and in accordance with the Rules of Engagement.


The villagers, including children, will approach the crash site and attempt to steal something. The thirty villagers that are just curious will keep their distance and just observe once they are informed of the boundaries that the BLUE Force has set. The fifteen aggressive villagers will continue to move closer to the crash site and attempt to steal what they can. They will be persistent and continue advancing even when cautioned against such action, although they may feign compliance for a short time to avoid being shot at, only to press forward again if and when attention shifts elsewhere. The persistence of these more aggressive thieves will cause the BLUE Force to escalate to higher levels of non-lethal force, including the use of non-lethal kinetic rounds.

4.3.6 Options

In the plane crash vignette, three distinct non-lethal equipment sets were trialed (Table 13). This vignette explores the only situation under study where use of the LRAD and VWT constitute a necessary part of the measured action, as opposed to just being part of a ‘script’ that feeds into the initial conditions, setting off the dynamics of game play. The lone section in the vignette was specifically outfitted for a non-lethal confrontation. In the Baseline option, representative of current CF capabilities, the section was outfitted with two VWTs (laser dazzlers) in addition to six M203’s dedicated to launching sponge rounds. The lethal component of the section consisted of two C-9 gunners in all options.

The only deviation from the Baseline for the Enhanced option was the replacement of one sponge round launcher with an LRAD bearer who was assumed to have a local translator of some sort available for use (i.e., could broadcast commands that would be understood by the local population). The Stun Gun option deviated from the Baseline by replacement of all sponge round launchers (6) with stun guns.



Quick Reaction Team (1 Infantry Section)

Non-lethal

visual warning (point)

Non-lethal verbal warning

(area)

Non-lethal incapacitation

Lethal support - LMG

Baseline 2-VWT -- 6-40-mm sponge

round launcher (M203)

2-C9

Stun Gun 2-VWT -- 6-X12 Taser

Shotgun (XREP/X26)

2-C9

Enhanced 2-VWT 1-LRAD 5-40-mm sponge

round launcher (M203)

2-C9



a. Regardless of the conditions (day or night), the outcome was the same for this scenario. The issue was the ability to distinguish between the curious on-lookers and the aggressive individuals;

b. The Enhanced option was the most effective of the options. This was probably due to the effects of the LRAD. The ability to reach people at longer ranges and distinguish the onlookers from the aggressive types was obvious. The curious onlookers would stay back and heed the warnings that were heard from the LRAD;

c. The Baseline was the least effective of the options. This was partly due to the fact that the BLUE Force seemed to have difficulty with early identification of those individuals who were aggressive. There was no early means of distinguishing the curious onlookers from the aggressive individuals; and

d. The Stun Gun option seemed to be slightly better than the Baseline. This was probably due to the better rate of fire of the Taser Shotgun over the M203.




All of the general case MOEs laid out in Table 3 apply to this vignette (Table 14). From Table 3 and Table 4, the definitions of ‘Task Fulfillment’ and ‘RED Non-lethal Neutralization’ are refined in this section. Vignette-specific versions of the measures appear in Table 15.



1 Task Fulfillment 50

2 RED Non-lethal Neutralization 25

2 Determination of Intent 25

Total 100



Task Fulfillment – Repelling Effect

(50%)

A measure of for how long and how far away from the crash site looters were successfully engaged and/or repelled using non-lethal means.

Repelling effect: This is a measure for how well incoming entities were repelled over the duration of the operation. It is based on the (normalized) area under a curve quantifying the average distance D of entities from the crash site over time, referenced to a distance of 150 m and a cutoff time of 3 minutes (near the minimum game duration).

%505.0: detDregDFormula

In the context of the above formula, maximal mission success is attained by completely stifling the advancement of RED.


(25%)

Measures the level of RED non-lethal neutralization during the engagement.

This measures the level of control exercised over the duration of the operation. It is based on the (normalized) area under a neutralization curve quantifying the number of incapacitated individuals over time.

%255.0: detAregAFormula


Speed of determination: Referenced to the time interval Tsep between employment of the first non-lethal weapon by BLUE and identification of one third (ten) of the ‘Regular’ RED entities (via neutralization). The minimum average duration observed Tmin defines the standard for comparison.

Formula*: (Tmin / Tsep) × 12.5%

Determination of Intent

(25%)


1) The time needed to distinguish ‘Regular’ entities from ‘Determined’ ones (max 12.5%); and

2) The average range of the ‘Determined’ entities at the instant a given portion of the ‘Regular’ entities were identified (max 12.5%).

Range of determination: The average distance from the crash site of the ‘Determined’ RED entities at the moment one third (ten)** of the ‘Regular’ entities have been identified, Rdet. The maximum average distance observed defines the standard for comparison.

Formula*: (Rdet / Rmax) × 12.5%

*Note: This measure is defined relative to the results, as per Table 7.

**One third was chosen as a reasonable middle ground for comparison based on the game dynamics, but is otherwise arbitrary. Ideally, early identification of all RED entities is preferred.


The overall scores are illustrated in Figure 12, together with estimated 95% confidence intervals20. The tabulated MOE scores and option rankings are listed in Table 16. The specific data and computed results that underlie these values appear in Annex B.3.

0 20 40 60 80

Option


Enhanced

Stun Gun

Baseline


20 The confidence intervals are approximate due to the method used to compute the ‘Determination of Intent’ measure (see Annexes B.3.3 and B.3.4).



MOE Scores

Option Task Fulfillment -Repelling Effect

(out of 50)


(out of 25)

Determination of Intent

(out of 25)


Baseline (sponge rounds + VWT) 17.8 ± .4 11.1 ± .3 14.2 ± 1.5 43.2 ± 1.5 3

Stun Gun (stun guns + VWT)

27.7 ± .3 13.1 ± .3 14.0 ± 1.5 54.8 ± 1.5 2

Enhanced (sponge rounds + VWT + LRAD)

25.3 ± .2 15.4 ± .2 25.0 ± 0.0 65.7 ± .3 1



In terms of ‘Task Fulfillment’, the option with stun guns repelled better than options relying on sponge rounds, although the Enhanced option, combining sponge rounds with the LRAD, ranked a close second. Comparing the Baseline with the Stun Gun option, both utilizing VWT devices without the LRAD, stun guns repelled far better than sponge rounds (~10/50 = 20%). The LRAD could engage groups of Regular entities at extended ranges, causing many to halt their advancement early in the game. Stun guns were more effective at slowing the advancement of ‘Determined’ entities at close ranges.

On average, stun guns also had a higher neutralization effect than sponge round launchers (comparing the Baseline with the Stun Gun option). The LRAD bolstered RED neutralization in the option where it was available.

The most significant differentiating factor between the options was the ‘Determination of Intent’ MOE. The LRAD allowed for faster determination of intent than VWT devices at ranges beyond the reach of the projectile weapons. The fact that the LRAD is an area weapon strongly contributed to this result.

In total effectiveness, the Enhanced option consistently soared above the others on the strength of the LRAD’s repelling effect and with regard to its use as an instrument to determine intent. Without it, the Taser projectiles of the Stun Gun option did a better job of repelling and neutralizing RED than the sponge rounds of the Baseline option.


4.4 Vignette 20: Village search


This scenario takes place in Afghanistan in 2015. ANA and NATO forces continue to ‘clean’ villages and protect them from insurgents. The BLUE Force is conducting another search operation in a remote village where insurgent presence is suspected. Earlier in the morning, forces were put in place to seal off the area in order to prevent insurgent traffic into or out of the village. Search teams are tasked to conduct house to house searches and ‘watchdog’ teams are in charge of controlling the areas around the searched dwellings. This scenario was conducted in daylight conditions.

Watchdog Team

Search Team

Watchdog Team

General direction of travel for RED

RED Force and Civilians mixed throughout buildings.

Figure 13: Vignette 20, Village search (100 m grid spacing).

4.4.2 BLUE force

The BLUE Force is composed of a Search Team and a Watchdog Team. The Search Team is composed of an Infantry Section (8 soldiers). They are armed with assault rifles, non-lethal weapons, a dog and handheld equipment for explosive detection. The Watchdog Team is


composed of two Infantry Sections (16 soldiers). They are armed with assault rifles, 2 machine guns and non-lethal weapons. The BLUE Force intent is to clean the village of all insurgents.

4.4.3 RED force

The RED Force is composed of fifteen insurgents and twenty civilians. The insurgents are initially armed with AK74’s.


The BLUE Force mission is to search and clear the dwellings of insurgents, weapons, explosives and drugs. The Search Team will move from building to building conducting the search while the Watchdog Team secures areas surrounding the dwellings, stopping and seizing any persons trying to escape the searched houses. The Watchdog Team will position themselves so that no matter where the RED Force exits a building being searched, they will be seen and dealt with. It is important to note that during the execution of this plan, incapacitated insurgents were not taken into custody immediately. Thus, after expiry of the incapacitation time, they could continue the escape.


The insurgents will hear a flash-bang grenade as the Search Team enters their building. Shaken, they will try to escape in whatever manner is available to them. Their shortest route to cover is a tree line to the west and this defines their direction of travel. Any civilians present will not run from the buildings as they have nothing to hide. Some of the civilians will assist the BLUE Force by telling them that there were insurgents in the building before they arrived. The insurgents will hide all the weapons before they leave the buildings and thus will not be carrying any weapons, making them unable to fire on the Watchdog Team. These weapons will be found later by the Search Team.

4.4.6 Options

Table 17 lists the three non-lethal equipment sets that were trialed in this vignette. Only two of the four available sections took part in the action of the game, comprising a ‘Watchdog Team’. In the Baseline option, representative of current CF capabilities, each section of the Watchdog Team had two M203’s with sponge round ammunition as the non-lethal component. The Stun Gun option was outfitted with two stun guns in place of the sponge round weapons, and the Enhanced option utilized both sponge rounds and stun guns, at the expense of two riflemen. Each configuration had two C9 gunners and either two or four riflemen.



Watchdog Team* 2 Infantry Sections, identical configurations per option (as below)

Non-lethal component Lethal Support -

LMG Lethal Support - Rifle

Baseline 2-40-mm sponge round launcher (M203)

2-C9 4-Rifle

Stun Gun 2-X12 Taser Shotgun (XREP/X26)

2-C9 4-Rifle

Enhanced 2-40-mm sponge round launcher (M203) 2-X12 Taser Shotgun (XREP/X26)

2-C9 2-Rifle

*The activities of the Search Team do not enter into measurement for this game.



a. The Enhanced option was the most effective of all the options. This was probably due to the fact that this option had more NLWs in the mix.

b. The Baseline was the least effective of all the options. Again, the M203 sponge round does not seem to be as effective as the Taser Shotgun.

c. The Stun Gun option appeared to be slightly better than the Baseline. Again, this was probably due to the rate of fire of the Taser Shotgun.



Once again, one of the general case MOEs laid out in Table 3 does not apply to this vignette. The identification and intent of the insurgents was established as a precondition of the scene, and therefore the MOE ‘Determination of Intent’ does not enter into measurement (Table 18). From Table 3 and Table 4, the definitions of ‘Task Fulfillment’ and ‘RED Non-lethal Neutralization’ are made precise. Vignette-specific versions of these measures appear in Table 19.




1 Task Fulfillment (Stoppage) 66.7


-- Determination of Intent 0

Total 100



Task Fulfillment – Stoppage

(66.7%)

A measure of the distance from the building (towards the tree line) gained by the runners over time.

Stoppage: This measure is based on the (normalized) area under a curve quantifying the average distance D of entities from the exit of the building over time, referenced to a cutoff distance of 75 m and a cutoff time of 90 s, the latter measured from the firing of the first non-lethal shot.

%7.661: detDFormula

In the context of the above formula, maximal mission success is attained by completely stifling the progress of the RED runners.


(33.3%)

Measures the level of RED non-lethal neutralization of ‘Determined’ entities during the engagement.

This measure quantifies the level of control exercised over the duration of the operation. It is based on the (normalized) area under a neutralization curve quantifying the number of incapacitated ‘Determined’ individuals over time, beginning when the first non-lethal shot is fired and ending after a cutoff time of 90 s.

Formula: Adet × 33.3%.


The overall scores are illustrated in Figure 14, together with estimated 95% confidence intervals. The tabulated MOE scores and option rankings are listed in Table 20. The specific data and computed results that underlie these values appear in Annex B.4.




MOE Scores

Option Task Fulfillment –Stoppage

(out of 66.7)


(out of 33.3)


Baseline (sponge rounds) 35.9 ± .1 7.6 ± .3 43.4 ± .3 3

Stun Gun (stun guns) 39.1 ± .1 7.4 ± .2 46.5 ± .3 2

Enhanced (sponge rounds + stun guns)

40.8 ± .1 10.8 ± .3 51.5 ± .3

1



The Enhanced option was the best performing option in both categories measured and overall. It combined the sponge rounds of the Baseline option with the shotgun stun rifles of the Stun Gun option.

In terms of slowing the advancement of the runners (by periodically rendering them immobile), stun guns (Stun Gun option) were superior to sponge rounds (Baseline). This stopping power did


not translate to overall RED neutralization, however, indicating that the longer range of the sponge round launcher contributed to a superior level of control over the duration of the operation. This control at longer ranges has to be balanced against the fact that runners were able to get farther in less time against sponge rounds due to the shorter incapacitation durations associated with sponge round impacts.


5 Overall Observations and Findings

Wargame results are not confined to the analysis of outcomes. Although the NICKEL X wargame is largely a sensitivity analysis (e.g., sensitivity of the conditions of a conflict with regard to the equipment sets used), wargames also yield information in the way that the operation was planned for and carried out in the synthetic environment. In formulating solutions to the vignette problems (e.g., a hostage taking incident), how operations were handled and the tradeoffs that had to be made to cover all relevant aspects of the situation using the available equipment constitute additional findings. In light of this correspondence, the first section below summarizes patterns of NLW use in the planning and execution of the various vignettes. The two sections that follow consolidate both qualitative and quantitative results presented earlier from the individual vignettes, and afterwards a few main points of the consolidation are discussed. Common threads in the NICKEL X wargame series at large appear later on, in the Summary section (6.1).

5.1 Use / incorporation of NLWs in operations

All vignettes featured either Taser rounds or sponge rounds as the main constituents of the NLW option sets, and some featured mixed sets. In a sense, the comparison is very much ‘electronic’ versus ‘kinetic’ versus an ‘enhanced option’. The enhanced option built on one or more of the other options, either by combining the two (sponge rounds + stun guns) or adding a new type of non-lethal capability to the mix (e.g., ADS or LRAD). To begin shaping the consolidated picture, some general observations on the use patterns of NLWs across the vignettes are brought to light.

Overall, a key factor for employing the Taser shotgun was that the weapon is purely non-lethal, so that in situations where there exists a threat of lethal retaliation, both lethal and non-lethal capabilities had to be rationed among the available resources. In most cases, this led to a division by two of the lethal and non-lethal capabilities for an engaged Infantry Section. In contrast, this division did not take place when the sponge rounds were employed, since the M203 under-barrel mount allowed the NLW to be used with the soldier holding his rifle21. NICKEL X games did not examine the tradeoff between lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

Another factor that played in heavily at times was weapon range. In the case of the sponge round launcher, a minimum safe distance of 10 m precluded its use inside buildings. The Taser shotgun could be used at close range by virtue of the fact that it consisted of two separate weapons, with a Taser X26 mounted under the barrel. This has its own limitations as well though, namely reload time (after every shot for the X26) and the fact that two simultaneously launched, tethered probes have to strike the target to be effective. In the case of both sponge rounds and stun guns, engagements beyond approximately 30 m were problematic. Simply put, practical use of the NLWs is limited to narrow range bands. The LRAD and VWT alleviated the problem to some degree at extended ranges, when they were both useful and available, but only the ADS had a guaranteed repelling effect at such ranges (out to approximately 750 m).

Lastly, the coordinated use of the various types of NLWs had to be considered carefully. Each device has a unique set of strengths and limitations, is more effective in some situations than in 21 A 40-mm stun projectile that can be launched from an M203, under development at the time of writing, could help mitigate this concern.


others, and there may be NLW interactions that come into play as well (e.g., getting hit with a sponge round and then a stun projectile, or stun projectiles passing through beam weapon areas of effect, etc.).

5.2 Qualitative results: J&I

The following J&I were recorded by the wargame interactors regarding perceptions of overall performance factors.

a. In a given scenario, the options that had more NLWs seemed to be more effective.

b. The Taser shotgun seemed to be more effective than the M203 sponge round.

c. The Taser shotgun has a higher rate of fire (load capacity of 5 versus 1) and a longer neutralization time (25 s versus 10 s) than the M203 sponge round.

The following J&I represent consolidated performance factors compiled from J&I comments provided for the individual vignettes, supported by the data listed in Table 21.

d. In all vignettes, the Baseline option seemed to be the least effective option (reasons cited included incapacitation duration, rate of fire, accuracy, and inability to use in close quarters).

e. The comparable Stun Gun option always outperformed the Baseline option.

f. Options that added a high-powered NLW, such as the LRAD or ADS, to a stun gun or sponge round weapon set, or options that employed both sponge rounds and stun guns, were rated first by the interactors (Enhanced option).


Table 21: Common J&I statements.

Topic Vignette J&I Label in Vignette

Comment

6 c The Baseline seemed to be the least effective option.

13 c The Baseline seemed to be the least effective of the options.

14 c The Baseline seemed to be the least effective of the options.

Baseline Effectiveness

(Item d, above)

20 b The Baseline seemed to be the least effective of all the options.

6 d 2 Section (with the Taser Shotgun) seemed to perform their task of dealing with the threat in the building and evacuating the citizens better than in the Baseline option.

13 c The Stun Gun option faired slightly better than the Baseline and this might be due to the fact that the Taser Shotgun has higher rate of fire and longer suppression time than the M203 sponge round.

14 d The Stun Gun option was slightly better than the Baseline.

Stun Gun Effectiveness

(Item e, above)

20 c The Stun Gun option appeared to be slightly better than the Baseline and again this was probably due to the rate of fire of the Taser Shotgun.

6 b The Enhanced option was the most effective of the options.

13 b The Enhanced option (sponge rounds and stun guns) was the most effective of the options.

14 b The Enhanced option (sponge rounds, VWT and LRAD) was the most effective of the options.

Enhanced Option Effectiveness

(Item f above)

20 a The Enhanced option (sponge rounds and stun guns) was the most effective of all the options.

5.3 Quantitative results

The option rankings for all of the vignettes appear in Table 22, divided into three categories: Baseline, Stun Gun and Enhanced. Recall that the major difference between Baseline and Stun


Gun categories is the swapping of sponge rounds for Taser shotguns22 and that the Enhanced category represents options where additional non-lethal power was added to the mix. The enhancement consisted of adding an ADS or an LRAD, or combining sponge rounds with stun guns, depending on the vignette.

Three main points are clearly evident when viewing the consolidated results. Note that sensitivity analyses confirm that the findings are robust under wide variations in the MOE weighting schedules:

a. In all vignettes where a high confidence ranking was possible, the Baseline option ranked last;

b. The comparable Stun Gun option always outperformed the Baseline option by exactly one rank category (where ranking was possible), meaning the difference in effectiveness was significant in a statistical sense; and

c. Options that added a high-powered NLW, such as the LRAD or ADS, to a stun gun or sponge round weapon set, or options that employed both sponge rounds and stun guns, ranked first (i.e., more non-lethal power was better). There was one exception: in Vignette 13 (Patrol on foot—aggressive gang), it was marginally better (sub 95% confidence level) to have just stun guns as opposed to stun guns and sponge rounds.23

Furthermore, based on Vignette 6 only,

d. In close quarters where sponge rounds could not be used, the Taser X26 outperformed the shield/ baton combination (see Footnote 15).

Table 22: Summary of option rankings.

RANK Vignette Name

Baseline Stun Gun Enhanced

6 NATO Citizen Evacuation 3 2 1

13 Patrol on Foot—Aggressive Gang NA NA NA

14 Plane Crash 3 2 1

20 Village Search 3 2 1

Average rank: 3 2 1

22 Shields and batons were swapped for X26 Tasers inside the main building of Vignette 6. 23 In this case, the lesson learned might be that more non-lethal power is still generally better, but having the right kind of weapon can be just as important.


5.4 Discussion of overall observations and findings

Overall, the J&I are in strong agreement with the quantitative results. The most obvious finding is that a common hierarchy is respected by all of the vignettes with respect to the options tested. Baseline performance was below that of stun guns, and in all but one case, adding more non-lethal force to one of the options improved effectiveness beyond the levels achieved by both options.

Based on the tradeoffs between lethal and non-lethal resources that had to be made time and again in the vignettes, ways of combining non-lethal and lethal force into the same weapon system seem to hold promise. That said, when resources are not so constrained, a lethal reserve force ready to engage at a moment’s notice presents an attractive alternative.

It can be argued that the non-lethal systems added to the Enhanced option, such as ADS or LRAD, lead to a degradation of RED capabilities and thus mitigate their lethal capabilities. LRAD alone, in high pitch tone mode, may do more to deter RED than was shown in the vignettes played out in the NICKEL X wargame. Although not addressed in this study, the path to escalation up to and including lethal force, and the commensurate BLUE force capabilities as the level of conflict rises, must be considered carefully in light of the tradeoffs that have to be made to accommodate the desired non-lethal capabilities.

Finally, it is interesting that in one situation more non-lethal force did not lead to an increase in effectiveness. BLUE was too easily overrun in this case: in Vignette 13, Patrol on Foot—Aggressive Gang, the smaller incapacitation durations of the sponge round afforded RED with more opportunities to open fire on BLUE with lethal weapons than when stun guns alone were used.


6 Summary and Recommendations

6.1 Summary

A variety of NLW sets were gamed in four vignettes. Ranges, terrains, opposition (OP) forces, own forces and objectives varied with the vignettes. Ever-present were the main NLW sets compared: one representing current CF capabilities and containing sponge rounds and VWT devices (where appropriate), and the other containing stun gun projectiles. In each vignette, one additional option was gamed with non-lethal capabilities over and above that of the others. This option was referred to as the Enhanced option. Additions included the LRAD and the ADS, or a simple aggregation of sponge round and stun gun capabilities into one option.

The results of the NICKEL X wargame study depend on assumptions made and also limitations of the modeling environment. In particular, the study focused on ‘guaranteed effects’ as much as possible and on involving as few different kinds of actors as possible, rather than attempting to model the full spectrum of behavioural responses in a population. The variation in human response after NLW contact was represented by two extremes—individuals who were ‘Determined’, meaning they would not back down, continuing their course of action to the limits of human endurance even after multiple contacts, and ‘Regular’ individuals who were basically compliant after first contact with an NLW.

Each vignette brought to light certain distinctive qualities of the NLWs tested. In terms of gap analysis, it is easy to see that there is room for improvement over the Baseline option in all cases examined. Furthermore, there were no perfect scores in the wargame. A perfect score would represent the ideal case. The most serious gap in functionality seems to appear in Vignette 13, as described below. In all other cases, the situations were handled more-or-less proficiently by the given spectrum of options, if not optimally. In general, the NLW neutralization power of the Baseline option is lacking in all vignettes, particularly at long ranges and inside buildings.

In Vignette 6, NATO citizen evacuation, there were two main distinguishing features between the option sets. First of all, adding an ADS to the Stun Gun option resulted in significant gains in effectiveness (no option was gamed where it was added to the sponge round option). Secondly, in close quarters combat inside the building, the Baseline option’s reliance on the baton and shield was a weakness, brought on by the 10 m minimum safe distance needed for sponge rounds. This reliance led to shorter standoff distances and decreased neutralization power compared to the Stun Gun option.

In Vignette 13, Patrol on foot – aggressive gang, what stood out was the fact that none of the options adequately dealt with the situation of unrest in the crowded market square. Even the Enhanced option, employing both sponge rounds and stun guns, performed poorly. Employing an LRAD to separate out the crowd elements and/or having an ADS for back-up clearly would have helped matters; however, such options were not gamed.

In Vignette 14, Plane crash, the LRAD was vital in its role to aid with the identification, at extended ranges, of ‘Regular’ individuals—those who comply—versus ‘Determined’ individuals who are motivated to cause trouble in one form or another. Also, at medium ranges (up to


approximately 30 m) the Taser shotgun rounds were better at stifling advancement than the sponge rounds.

In Vignette 20, Village search, the best performing option combined the sponge rounds of the Baseline option with the shotgun stun rifles of the Stun Gun option. Stun guns were superior to sponge rounds for slowing the escape of the runners.

Overall, the efficacy of the Baseline option, representative of current CF non-lethal capabilities, was below that of options employing stun guns only. In general, adding more non-lethal force in the form of an ADS or an LRAD device improved the effectiveness considerably by applying wide area non-lethal effects and helping to distinguish ‘Determined’ individuals from the ‘Regular’ (compliant) crowd members. The effect of other ‘Escalation of Force’ measures (i.e., warning shots from a rifle fired overhead) was not gamed or considered as an alternative to ADS or LRAD. Adding stun guns to the Baseline capabilities showed mixed results—in one case helping and in the other case the benefit was lost.

It goes without saying that an adequate lethal capability has to be maintained in operations where there is a risk of escalation or when unqualified threats are present. In the case of the Taser-only options, this meant pairing non-lethal shooters with lethal shooters, the latter as an ‘insurance policy’ in case the situation escalated. Having to pair Taser shotgun users with riflemen reduced the non-lethal capability to half in some cases. In those cases, it is safe to say that a combined weapon is preferable, assuming no significant drawbacks, to enable full NLW capability while at the same time allowing for a full, unhindered lethal response when required. One possible candidate under development is a 40-mm stun projectile similar in design to the 12-gauge stun projectile in the study. If used with an under-barrel launcher, the benefits of extended neuromuscular incapacitation are gained, although at the expense of a loss in accuracy. If the 40-mm stun projectile becomes a viable option for the CF, it would be prudent to repeat the study for that option and compare results. Note, however, that the close range advantage of having a Taser X26 available, as is mounted on the Taser shotgun, would be lost.

It should be mentioned that the use of NLWs in the synthetic environment ignores important factors that could increase weapon effectiveness. One factor that was not qualified in the wargame is intimidation. A soldier holding a rifle that can deliver both a painful stimulus and a lethal round is expected to be maximally intimidating to a threat.

A second factor that comes into play is the additional load and complexity from having to carry, use and maintain a separate weapon in the case of the Taser shotgun and additional grenades in the case of sponge round use. In the case of the LRAD, a portable but somewhat unwieldy device and its power supply must be carried. The ADS requires vehicle transport and operates from that vehicle. The VWT mounts directly on a rifle.

A third factor is acceptance. For NLWs to be relevant, they must be proven safe, proven effective and widely adopted. Proving them safe requires human effects testing and for the most part involves monumental effort—it is much easier to show the lethality of a weapon than to demonstrate that a weapon is non-lethal, especially under the constraint that NLWs must not cause permanent damage to the intended target. To be proven effective, logistical and performance issues must be addressed and credibility established on firm scientific and operational grounds. To be widely adopted, in addition to the above, defence forces also face


significant challenges in the way of integration, legal and ethical issues connected with the use of NLWs, and cultural gaps related to conventional military practice [7].

There seems to be a prevailing opinion that a “cultural change” is needed within the armed forces for NLW adoption to occur. Some evidence supports the notion that the willingness is already there, at least in the CF. For example, in the Methodology to Assess Disruption (MAD) seminar wargame series played by members of the CF and held in Halifax, January 2011 [13], advanced NLW options were the most frequently used technology in the spectrum of vignettes under study. NLWs were combined, in theory only, with air, land and marine vehicles to support a variety of operations. Also in theory only, NLWs were mounted on autonomous platforms with advanced sensing equipment and sent on various unmanned (often dangerous) missions. In situations where insurgents were mixed in with non-combatants or when the identification of RED force members was uncertain (as in many of the vignettes of this wargame series), the common mindset was to ‘safely neutralize them all, sort them out later.’24 In any event, potential applications of NLWs abound in all areas of defence and security.

The upshot is simply that if safe, effective and ‘low hindrance’ NLWs were suddenly made available, they would be taken up eventually: the desire to use them is ever present and motivations behind their use are in line with the common need to protect against unnecessary and/or unwanted loss of life. Furthermore, NLW technologies are here to stay. Therefore, they have to be recognized and dealt with accordingly.25

With little or no NLWs of adequate power to work with, unfortunately, in some preventable cases the only deterrent might be the real and present threat of serious injury or death. This can lead to dire consequences for both the individuals affected and also for the operation in its entirety, especially in the context of winning the ‘Hearts and Minds’ of the populace.

6.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the results of the wargame:

1. Weapon systems that efficiently combine lethal and non-lethal capabilities have a natural advantage over weapon systems that are purely non-lethal, in that they are less likely to compromise lethal capabilities. Also, fewer resources are diverted for the sole purpose of maintaining adequate lethal power, thereby maximizing the application of non-lethal force. If NLWs are to be incorporated into the CF, maintaining an adequate lethal capability at all times must be treated as a key requirement for acquisition;

2. In vignettes where the LRAD and ADS devices could be used, they had a strong positive impact on the control over the situation. If the transition to NLWs were a high priority, these weapon systems should be investigated for integration into the CF to cover longer ranges and wider areas than handheld, point impact NLWs. In particular, in the vignette

24 Although well intentioned, this strategy has problems. Consider, for example, the Russian experience of using fenatyl gas to end a hostage crisis in 2002, when a large number of the hostages were inadvertently killed, balanced against those who may have been saved and the fact that the building was left intact despite the presence of explosives. 25 This paragraph reflects the opinion of the main author and is not a result of the study. Also, there are political reasons underpinning reluctance to use NLWs as well, of which the author has no comment on.


tested, the LRAD significantly added to the capability to identify the intent of individuals, even in the presence of VWT devices already in use;

3. The effectiveness of 40-mm stun projectiles should be investigated as an alternative to the sponge round and Taser shotgun option sets compared in this wargame. It promises to combine many of the best attributes of both weapons—maintaining lethal capabilities while providing highly effective neutralization. The ability to clear buildings using this approach is still problematic, however, and requires further investigation. The effectiveness of these systems compared to Escalation of Force for dispersing non-determined (i.e., compliant) individuals should be further examined;

4. If NLWs for building clearance were considered a priority, higher fidelity building clearance wargames are needed and with a more diverse set of options (flash-bang grenades, concussion grenades, tear gas, etc.). Building clearance was not well represented in the wargame;

5. If the operation of Vignette 13 were of high concern, it should be re-gamed with added LRAD and ADS options (the scale of the operation was too big to be handled by one platoon armed as they were in the wargame);

6. To protect against non-lethal operations gone ‘bad’ (turned lethal), the ability of the CF to meet lethal threats as they arise must be assessed in light of the tradeoffs made to support the desired level of non-lethal capabilities; and

7. The CAEnXP simulation environment used in the study was not designed for NLWs. Nevertheless, fair representations were achieved under the circumstances of the selected vignettes. However, if NLW wargames are to continue, more work needs to done in understanding the effects of NLWs, how they are used (e.g., standard operating procedures (SOPs), TTPs), and how best to translate important features to the various simulation environments used by DRDC CORA for wargaming. Virtually any NLW wargame conducted will require significant lead time to incorporate appropriate NLW effects at the required level of fidelity; and

8. Support NATO panel SAS-094 with further wargames on an as-needed basis to increase DRDC CORA’s NLW credentials and to impact this sector nationally and internationally.


References .....

[1] Bowen, J., NATO Begins Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities-Based Assessment, MEDIA RELEASE: Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, US Department of Defense, posted Sept 14, 2009.

[2] Some Identified Solutions. NATO SAS-078 Gap and Solution Analysis Working Group, 22-24 June 2010.

[3] (NLW Vignettes) NATO SAS-078 NLW Requirements Analysis Group, Mar 2009.

[4] Roy, R. and Cazzolato, F., An Investigation of Hit Probability Calculations for JCATS, DRDC CORA TM 2007-31, July 2007.

[5] Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Non-Lethal Weapons Reference Book, July 2008.

[6] TASER® X26C Operating Manual • MMU0007 Rev: A.

[7] Roy, R., Sprague, K.B. Non-conventional Weapons Assessment: An Evaluation of Potentially Disruptive Technologies, DRDC CORA TM2011-112, July 2011.

[8] Laser-generated Visual Warning Technology systems, The Maple Leaf, 12, 3, 21 January 2009. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=5028

[9] Non-Lethal Capability DAT 11 Catalogue (Version – 2), NATO Dat 11 Non-lethal Capabilities, Defence Against Terrorism Program of Work #11, October 2010.

[10] Eggertson, L., Military claims laser dazzlers have ‘negligible’ risk, Canadian Medical Association Journal, 180, 11, May 26 2009, pp.1099-1100.

[11] Dobias, P., Sprague, K., Woodill, G., Cleophas, P., NoordKamp, W., Measures of Effectiveness and Performance in Tactical Combat Modeling (U), DRDC CORA TM 2008-03, October 2008.

[12] Emond, E.J. and Turnbull, A.E. (2006), BRANDO: Breakpoint Analysis with Nonparametric Data Option (U), (DRDC CORA TM 2006-40) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.

[13] Adlakha-Hutcheon, G., Hazen, M., Hubbard, P., McLelland, S., Sprague, K., 2010 MAD Game Part II – report and analysis, DRDC CORPORATE TM2011-015 (under review at time of writing).

[14] Biomechanical Assessment of the Taser eXtended Range Electronic Projectile (XREP) version IIa, Milestone 1 Report for Canadian Police Research Centre (CPRC), Wayne State University, Ballistic Impact Research Laboratory, Feb 15, 2011. (This report is an internal RCMP/CPRC document. Any comments herein referring to this document are paraphrased from the original.)


[15] Mesloh, C., Henych, H., Thompson, L.F., A qualitative & quantitative analysis of conducted energy devices: Taser X26 vs. Stinger S200, A report to the National Institute of Justice, ed. Wolf, R., Weapons and Equipment Research Institute, Florida Gulf Coast University, March 5, 2008.

[16] 13--M1006 Non-lethal cartridges, Solicitation Number: W15QKN-06-X-0101, Agency: Department of the Army, Office: Army Contracting Command, Location: ACC - New Jersey, Posted Nov 28, 2005.

[17] TECHNICAL REPORT: THE DIRECT IMPACT, John A. Kapeles, Director, Research and Development, Defense Technology/Federal Laboratories, Casper, WY. http://www.defense-technology.com/pdfs/resources/direct%20impact%20technical%20report.pdf


Annex A Non-lethal weapon features and parameters

A.1 Description

Table A-1 and Table A-2 describe some of the main features that characterize NLWs.

Table A-1: NLW prominent features.

Feature Description

Chance of effect Given a hit, this is the chance that the intended effect will be delivered.

Chance to hit Chance (probability) of a round hitting an “E-silhouette”26 or “Figure 11” target, calibrated at various ranges.

Duration The duration, in seconds, of the non-lethal effect on a target, given a successful hit and a successful delivery of the effect.

Range The effective range limits that must be respected to deliver the intended effect.

.

Table A-2: NLW background features.

Feature Description

Muzzle Velocity The speed at which the projectile leaves the barrel (not applicable to all NLWs).

Ammo Load The typical number of rounds/shots carried/available (may vary by vignette).

Load Capacity The number of rounds that can be loaded in one ‘magazine’.

Reload Time The time taken to load a new magazine into the weapon.

Range Table (approximate)

Elevation (el, rad), velocity (v, m/s) and time of flight (t, s) of the round at various ranges (r, m).

26 Approximate size is 19.5" x 39.25" (~.5m x 1m) (NSN 6920-00-600-6874).


Annex B Supporting Data and Calculations

This section contains tabulated data and computed MOE values used to support analysis of the vignettes. Mean values are reported together with 95% confidence intervals using the ‘±’ notation. Note that in the tables below, statistical p-values are used to determine if measures for different options are statistically different. A p-value below 0.05 indicates significant differences exist between groups of measurements [12]. A p-value above that threshold indicates that the two groups cannot be considered as distinct in a statistical sense, based solely on the measured quantity.

In the main body of the report, the options were labelled as either Baseline, Stun Gun, or Enhanced. The raw data and the information in this annex are presented as labelled during the course of the wargame. A translation table is provided (Table B-0).

Table B-0: Option naming translation matrix.

Option Name Conversion Vignette

Baseline Stun Gun Enhanced

6 Baseline OP2 OP1

13 Baseline OP1 Excursion

14 Baseline OP2 OP1

20 Baseline OP1 Excursion

B.1 Vignette 6 MOE data tables

B.1.1 Timely extraction (22.2%, sub-measure 1 of 3 for Task Fulfillment)

Timely extraction refers to the time interval between when the first BLUE entity enters the building and the first hostage is brought to safety in the secure foyer (see Figure 7). In general, a rapid advance through a building by a single unit to get to the hostages is not desirable. Rather, BLUE might attempt to overlap potential fields of fire by closing in on targets from multiple directions using multiple entry points. Also, if a significant lethal threat is present, mirrors and other surveillance equipment might be used to check rooms and hallways at minimal risk before entry. Flash-bang grenades might also come into play. Such factors are assumed to be more or less equivalent for the two weapon sets (note that indoor weapons are equivalent for options 1 and 2). The time interval measured in this study represents how quickly a BLUE extraction team can overpower a rather benign RED force to achieve the objective of freeing the hostages.


The replications were of no use for computing this particular sub-measure, since a played game predetermines what the time interval will be for replications based on that game. Since five games were played per option, the statistical tests are only capable of distinguishing relatively coarse differences between measurements. As it turned out, the extraction times were more or less equivalent, to the accuracy of the study.

The time intervals for the extraction of hostages yielded statistically indistinguishable results for the various options, balancing out to approximately two minutes a piece (Table B-1, Figure B-1). Visually, in the figure a large overlap in the 95% confidence intervals (black error bars) is clearly evident. The only truly distinguishing feature at first glance is that the uncertainty or ‘swing in the results’ is far more pronounced in the case of the Baseline. However, the notion of sameness or equivalency of the options under this measurement device was confirmed statistically using BRANDO [12]. As such, all three options were assigned the same score—the average of the three. Out of a possible 22.2% contribution to the final score, each option received a score of 21.3%. For this measurement (and only this measurement), individual games did not receive a score; the ‘average game’ of the option was scored. Thus the uncertainty limits only reflect the variation of the computed averages.

Table B-1: Extraction time intervals (interior conflict).

Score (max 22.2%) Option(s) Nb. Reps

Median T (s)

Mean T (s)

p-value* Computed Assigned**

Baseline 5 129.0 111.2 ± 27.2 22.2 21.3 ± 1.3

OP1 5 120.0 123.8 ± 11.5 .60 20.0 21.3 ± 1.3

OP2 5 110.0 113.8 ± 7.1 21.7 21.3 ± 1.3

OP1 & OP2 10 118.0 118.8 ± 7.2 .88 -- --

Baseline & OP1 & OP2

15 120 116.3 ± 9.8 -- -- --

*In this case, the optimal breakpoint lies between OP2 and the set {OP1, Baseline}—hence the dashed line between OP2 and {OP1, Baseline} in the table, but the computed p-value ~0.60 indicates the two groups are not statistically distinguishable. Since the conditions during the interior part of the conflict were equivalent for OP1 and OP2, this group was combined into one and tested against the Baseline. Again, a statistically significant difference was not found (p-value~0.88).

**The options cannot be distinguished in a statistical sense, so all were assigned the average score.


0 50 100 150Option

Time Interval (interior)

OP2

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-1: Average extraction time interval (interior conflict).

B.1.2 Safe extraction (22.2%, sub-measure 2 of 3 for Task Fulfillment)

Safe extraction attempts to quantify risk to the BLUE force extraction team (2 Section) inside the building. One of the main factors to consider is protecting against any lethal threats that may or may not be present in the building. As in all vignettes, this threat was dealt with by devoting what was deemed to be an appropriate level of resources towards lethal countermeasures. The division of resources is best illustrated in the column labelled ‘2 Section’ in Table 5, showing the mix of lethal and NLWs employed by the extraction team in the various options. The judgement calls that were made in the division of resources factor into this measure as they do all measures. Inside the building, the dynamics of the situation were driven by a rather benign RED Force with no lethal capability up against a well-armed and well-trained BLUE Force.

Since it was not possible for the extraction team or the teachers to sustain significant injuries in this part of the conflict, the ‘Safe’ part of the extraction was quantified in terms of the number of hostage-takers that were incapacitated and also the average ranges of engagement Rx (stand-off) achieved. The latter was viewed as a key factor by the wargame interactors.

In close quarters combat within the confines of the building (about 20 m by 17 m), 5 m stand-off was selected as a reasonable upper limit to aim for. To score this sub-measure, half of the weight was devoted to incapacitations and the other half to stand-off. The number of incapacitated hostage-takers over the total number of hostage-takers present (10) comprised half of the weight (11.1%). To score the stand-off portion, 2.47% (11.1/4.5) was awarded for every 1.0 m beyond 0.5 m stand-off, to a maximum of 5 m and 11.1%. For example, if the average range of engagement for one option happened to be 4 m, then the score for that option would be (4.0-0.5)x2.47 = 8.6%. If it were 0.25 m instead, the score would be 0%, and if it happened to be 5.7 m, the score would be maxed out at 11.1%. Note that the minimum safe range of engagement for the sponge round is quoted to be 10 m. As a direct consequence, in the Baseline option the baton had to be employed by the extraction team. In options 1 and 2, building dimensions limited use of the X12 shotgun to the rail-mounted Taser X26 component of that weapon. Given typical room dimensions and the fact that shooters and targets are likely to be distributed in the same room, the values obtained appear to be reasonable.

Incapacitation levels of the hostage takers varied mainly between the Baseline option where the baton was employed and the other two options that employed the Taser X26. On average, about six out of ten hostage takers inside the building were incapacitated in the Baseline case and eight or nine hostage takers were incapacitated when using stun guns (Table B-2).


Table B-2: Safe conditions during extraction (interior confrontation).

Score (max 22.2%)

Computed

Option(s) Nb. Reps

Nb. Incaps. (10 max)

Mean* R (m)

Incap Stand-off

Assigned Total**

Baseline (baton) 100 5.7 ± .1 1.4 ± .0 6.3 ± .2 2.1 ± .0 8.4 ± .2

OP1 (X26) 100 8.7 ± .1 2.4 ± .1 9.7 ± .1 4.7 ± .2 13.5 ± .2

OP2 (X26) 100 7.9 ± .1 2.1 ± .1 8.8 ± .1 3.9 ± .2 13.5 ± .2

OP1 & OP2 (X26) 200 -- -- 9.3 ± .1 4.3 ± .2 --

* Computed from the means of the individual replications, as opposed to pooling together all of the shots from all of the games (error may be underestimated).

** OP1 and OP2 used identical equipment under identical circumstances inside the building. Consequently, the average of the two scores was assigned for both.

Not surprisingly, range of engagement measurements show that the stand-off achieved with the stun gun was greater than that achieved with the baton (Figure B-2). What is somewhat surprising is that the average difference is only about 1 m (Table B-2), despite the 2.5 m difference in effective ranges (2 m for the baton and 4.5 m for the Taser X26). Comparing baton use inside and outside the building, it was found that the values inside measured about 20% closer (~0.25 m), indicating that the close-quarters compressed the range of that already close range weapon. This supports the notion that the confines of the building forced extremely close confrontations and that the extended range of the Taser X26 over the baton could not be used to great advantage.

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

Option

Range of Engagement (interior)(m)

OP2

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-2: Average ranges of engagement (interior conflict).

Based on the scoring criteria, out of a possible 22.2% the Baseline option received a score of 8.4%. OP1 and OP2 were combined. Since both options employed identical equipment (Taser X26) under identical circumstances inside the building, there is no justification to score them


differently from the perspective of ranking. A score of 13.5% was awarded for OP1 and OP2, representing the average of the two individual scores for those options.

B.1.3 Safe end conditions (22.2%, sub-measure 3 of 3 for Task Fulfillment)

The sub-measure ‘Safe end conditions’ refers to the level of RED neutralization at the time of extraction. It is used as an indicator of how well the situation was under control at that critical moment in time. The difference between this sub-measure and the MOE ‘RED non-lethal neutralization’ (below) is one of the time interval under consideration. ‘Safe end conditions’ examines a ‘snapshot’ of the conditions of the game at the time of extraction, whereas the ‘RED non-lethal neutralization’ MOE examines the level of control exercised over the entire duration of the game. ‘Safe end conditions’ highlights the importance of creating the right conditions at the right time, which may impact when events occur, the level of non-lethal force applied, and the level of restraint applied to ammunition consumption.

Table B-3: Non-lethal neutralization “snapshot” of end conditions.


Mean regincap

(max 20)

Mean detincap

(max 10) Computed Assigned

Baseline 100 12.7 ± .4 0.5 ± .2 7.6 ± .4 7.6 ± .4

OP1 100 14.8 ± .2 4.6 ± .5 13.4 ± .6 13.4 ± .6

OP2 100 14.7 ± .3 1.0 ± .3 9.2 ± .4 9.2 ± .4

0 5 10 15 20

Option

Regular opponent end conditions

OP2

OP1

Baseline

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Option

Determined opponent end conditions

OP2

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-3: Non-lethal neutralization “snapshot” of end conditions.

OP1, with stun guns and the ADS, scored the highest on this measure with the most average incapacitations in both categories: ‘Regular’ and ‘Determined’ (approximately 13.4% out of a possible 22.2%). OP2 (stun guns only) tied with OP1 in the ‘Regular’ category and received a


mid-range score of approximately 9.2%. The Baseline option (sponge rounds) trailed in both categories and received a score of approximately 7.6%.

B.1.4 RED non-lethal neutralization (33.3%)

As mentioned in the previous section, this measure examines the level of control exercised by all BLUE force elements over the entire duration of the game, extending from the time that the first shot was fired by BLUE to the time the hostages were extracted.

Taser shotgun (OP2) performance was comparable with that of the M203 with sponge rounds (Baseline) against both groups: ‘Regular’ and ‘Determined’ individuals. The addition of the ADS to the NLW mix tipped the scales in favour of OP1 in both categories (Table B-4, Figure B-4). OP1 scored 14.1%. Next was OP2 at 10.3% and lastly the Baseline at 9.7%.

Table B-4: Non-lethal neutralization overall.


Mean Areg (max 1)

Mean Adet (max 1) Computed Assigned

Baseline 100 .36 ± .01 .22 ± .01 9.7 ± .3 9.7 ± .3

OP1 100 .42 ± .01 .42 ± .01 14.1 ± .3 14.1 ± .3

OP2 100 .38 ± .01 .24 ± .01 10.3 ± .3 10.3 ± .3

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Option

Regular opponent overall neutralization

OP2

OP1

Baseline

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Option

Determined opponent overall neutralization

OP2

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-4: Non-lethal neutralization over duration of game.

B.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis

The MOE weights were varied over wide ranges to determine the sensitivity of the final option rankings to the weighting schedule. All weighting schedules yielded the same rank ordering of


options. The weights and rankings appear in Table B-5. In the table, ‘TF’ stands for the Task Fulfillment MOE and ‘RN’ stands for RED Neutralization MOE.

Table B-5: Sensitivity of Vignette 6 results.

Option(s) Scheme Mean Score Rank

Original 47.0 3 Equal Weights 40.1 3 25% TF; 75% RN 35.0 3

Baseline

75% TF; 25% RN 50.5 3 Original 62.5 1 Equal Weights 56.9 1 25% TF; 75% RN 49.0 1

OP1 (Enhanced)


OP2 (Stun Gun)

75% TF; 25% RN 57.1 2


B.2.1 Takedown time (33.3%, sub-measure 1 of 2 for Task Fulfillment)

In certain situations and for various reasons, the ability to incapacitate an individual quickly is a critical factor for consideration. In the case of the Aggressive Gang – Market Square vignette, a quick (non-lethal) takedown of the lead RED instigator is attempted in order to deter further escalation. In consideration of the close ranges and explosive nature of the situation, 5 s was chosen as the reference time interval against which the takedown would be judged, measured from the moment the first non-lethal shot was fired to the moment the leader was neutralized. The average takedown times for the various options played out is shown in Table B-6.

The average takedown times for all options measured only a fraction of a second and in the vast majority of games, the first shot fired at the RED Leader registered a hit and subsequent incapacitation. The Baseline option at 33.3% (a perfect score) showed no misses. It scored slightly higher than the other two options, which were statistically indistinguishable with regard to this measure (30.9%).


Table B-6: Takedown time.

Score (max 33.3%) Option(s) Nb. Reps Median Ti (s)

Mean Ti (s) Computed Assigned*

Baseline (sponge rounds) 81 0.0 0.0 ± .0 33.3 ± .0 33.3 ± .0

OP1 (stun guns) 95 0.0 0.3 +/- .4/.3 31.2 ± 3.0 30.9 ± 2.1

Excursion (sponge rounds + stun guns)

95 0.0 0.4 ± 0.4 30.6 ± 2.8 30.9 ± 2.1

*OP1 and the Excursion were statistically indistinguishable by this measure. They were scored according to their average.

B.2.2 Sustainment interval (33.3%, sub-measure 2 of 2 for Task Fulfillment)

The non-lethal sustainment interval measures the period of time that BLUE was able to deny the use of lethal weapons possessed by RED. The quantity TNL represents the time interval between the first non-lethal shot fired by BLUE and the first lethal shot fired by RED. For a given option, the measure derived from this quantity is computed relative to the maximum average time interval Tmax recorded for the three options (Table B-7, Table 11).

Table B-7: Average non-lethal sustainment time intervals.


Median TNL (s)

Mean TNL (s)

Computed Assigned Total*

Baseline (sponge rounds) 81 36.5 37.0 ± 4.8 26.7 +6.6/-6.0 26.7 +6.6/-6.0

OP1 (stun guns) 95 36.5 46.0 ± 5.9 32.9 +0.4/-2.3 32.9 +0.4/-2.3


95 26 37.5 ± 6.2 27.2 +6.2/-7.0 27.0 +6.3/-6.9

*For ease of computation, the score for an option was set at the mean of the range of values possible for that option, within 95% confidence bounds.


0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Option

Non lethal sustainment time interval (sec)

Excursion

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-5: Average non-lethal engagement time intervals.

OP1, employing the non-lethal Taser shotgun, lasted the longest against a RED force intent on using lethal weapons against BLUE. The average time that BLUE could hold out for OP1 was approximately 46 s. In the Baseline and Excursion options, BLUE’s capability to apply adequate non-lethal force was reduced by about 9 s. This result is particularly interesting in the case of the Excursion, which augments OP1’s lethal capability with non-lethal sponge rounds, giving it an overall higher non-lethal capability than OP1 (see Section 0 for a discussion of this point). On average, the performance of the Excursion was more in line with that of the Baseline (Table B-7).

Determining the scores and the associated uncertainty bounds is complicated by the formula used for scoring, which is based on averages and the maximum value in a set of (three) times. Varying the relative timings within the reported 95% confidence intervals produces a range of scores, shown on the right in Figure B-6. When comparing minimum, average and maximum timings (in the 95% confidence range) across options, it was found that of the twenty-seven cases, twenty-two had OP1 as ranking first, two had the Baseline ranking first, and three had the Excursion ranking first.

To represent uncertainty in a simple way that is conducive to the MOE computations, the scores are reported as mean values derived from the range of values investigated (27 per option). The variation about the mean is represented by using the minimum and maximum values as lower and upper bounds, which covers the range of possibilities within the confines of the raw 95% confidence intervals observed for the sustainment durations. Based on the scoring criteria, OP1 received 32.9%. The Baseline and Excursion options received scores of 26.7% and 27% respectively.


0 10 20 30 40

Option

Non lethal sustainment score (out of 33.3%)

Excursion

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-6: Scores for non-lethal engagement time intervals.


In this case, RED non-lethal neutralization measured the level of control exercised by BLUE Force elements over the ‘Determined’ entities—the only valid targets in this vignette. The time interval measured varied from game to game, beginning when the first non-lethal shot was fired by BLUE and ending when the first lethal shot was fired by RED.

The neutralization objectives of BLUE were simply unattainable in this vignette. Using any of the options, the situation quickly got out of control and lethal weapons were used against BLUE in less than one minute. Far more non-lethal force is required to sustain adequate levels of neutralization.

The Excursion scored the highest at a dismal 5.8% of a possible 33.3%. The Baseline and OP1 scored around 4% (Table B-8, Figure B-7).


Score (max 33.3%) Option(s) Nb. Reps Mean Adet (max 1) Computed Assigned

Baseline (sponge rounds) 81 .12 ± .00 4.0 ± .2 4.0 ± .2

OP1 (stun guns) 95 .13 ± .01 4.2 ± .2 4.2 ± .2


95 .17 ± .01 5.8 ± .2 5.8 ± .2


0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2

Option

Determined opponent non lethal neutralization

Excursion

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-7: Non-lethal neutralization over game duration.


The MOE weights were varied over wide ranges to determine the sensitivity of the final option rankings to the weighting schedule. The weights and rankings appear in Table B-9. In the table, ‘TF’ stands for the Task Fulfillment MOE and ‘RN’ stands for RED Neutralization MOE. Uncertainty bounds limited the ability to statistically distinguish between options in all cases.

There were minor differences in the option rankings under the various weighting schedules. OP1 ranked first in three of four schemes, falling to second when the weight for TF fell to 25%. In that same case, OP2 ranked first. In all other cases OP2 ranked second. Also in that same case, the Baseline ranked third. In all other cases it ranked second.



Option(s) Scheme Mean Score Rank (Mean-based)

Rank (with uncertainty)

Original 64.0 2 indistinguishable Equal Weights 51.0 3 indistinguishable 25% TF; 75% RN 31.4 3 indistinguishable

Baseline

75% TF; 25% RN 70.5 2 indistinguishable Original 68.4 1 indistinguishable Equal Weights 54.4 1 indistinguishable 25% TF; 75% RN 33.6 2 indistinguishable

OP1 (Stun Gun)

75% TF; 25% RN 75.3 1 indistinguishable Original 63.4 3 indistinguishable Equal Weights 51.9 2 indistinguishable 25% TF; 75% RN 34.6 1 indistinguishable

Excursion (Enhanced)

75% TF; 25% RN 69.2 3 indistinguishable


B.3.1 Repelling effect (50%, single measure of Task Fulfillment)

The ‘Repelling Effect’ is a combined measure of for how long and how far away from the crash site looters were successfully engaged and/or repelled using non-lethal means. It is based on the (normalized) area under a curve quantifying the average distance D of entities from the crash site over time, referenced to a (~midway) distance of 150 m and a cutoff time of 180 s (approximately the minimum game duration). Maximal mission success is attained by completely stifling the advancement of RED.

The Baseline option, employing sponge rounds and VWT devices, faired poorest. When supplemented with an LRAD device, as per OP1, the results were dramatically improved, scoring second. OP2, utilizing the VWT at long ranges and Taser shotguns at short ranges, scored the highest on the strength of it’s effects on ‘Determined’ opponents (Table B-10, Figure B-8). There was no option that combined the LRAD with the Taser shotgun.


Table B-10: Repelling effect.

Score (max 50%) Option(s) Nb. Reps

Mean Dreg (max 1)

Mean Ddet (max 1) Computed Assigned

Baseline 100 .40 ± .01 .31 ± .01 17.8 ± .4 17.8 ± .4

OP1 100 .61 ± .01 .40 ± .00 25.3 ± .2 25.3 ± .2

OP2 100 .61 ± .01 .50 ± .01 27.7 ± .3 27.7 ± .3

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Option

Regular opponent repelling effect

OP2

OP1

Baseline

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6

Option

Determined opponent repelling effect

OP2

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-8: Repelling effect.

B.3.2 RED non-lethal neutralization (25%)

As noted repeatedly, this measure examines the level of control exercised by all BLUE Force elements over the entire duration of the game, extending from the time that the first non-lethal shot was fired by BLUE to either three minutes or the moment any member of RED came within 5 m of the site, whichever was the earlier.

OP1 scored the highest for this measure, on the strength of the LRAD’s success in halting the advance of the ‘Regular’ entities. The option with stun guns and VWTs, OP2, scored higher than both of the sponge round based options on the neutralization of ‘Determined’ entities. The Baseline option scored the lowest on all fronts (Table B-11, Figure B-9).27

27 In real situations, there might be reasons other than determination (adversarial intent) causing people to advance (fail to halt) given a warning (e.g., hearing-impaired persons, teenagers with a headset playing music, confusion: there are cases where locals who seen a green laser light thought they were supposed to advance, etc.)



Score (max 25%) Option(s) Nb. Reps

Mean Areg (max 1)


Baseline 100 .63 ± .01 .26 ± .00 11.1 ± .3 11.1 ± .3

OP1 100 .89 ± .01 .34 ± .00 15.4 ± .2 15.4 ± .2

OP2 100 .67 ± .01 .38 ± .00 13.1 ± .3 13.1 ± .3

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Option

Regular opponent overall neutralization

OP2

OP1

Baseline

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Option


OP2

OP1

Baseline


B.3.3 Speed of determination (12.5%, sub-measure 1 of 2 for Determination of Intent)

This measure is based on the time needed to distinguish ‘Regular’ entities from ‘Determined’ ones, defined by the time interval Ts between when the first NLW is employed by BLUE and one third of the ‘Regular’ RED entities have been identified (neutralized). The minimum average duration observed Tmin sets the base for comparison.28 A value of one third was chosen to capture the long distance effects in the game, while still allowing much of the action to play out (approximately up to the last minute of the cut-off game time of 3 minutes total (see Section B.3.1)).

OP1 scored the highest for this measure due to the ability of the LRAD to affect a wide area populated with ‘Regular’ entities instantaneously. Options employing only the rifle mounted VWTs at long ranges produced nearly identical scores to one another (Baseline and OP2), 28 The absolute times and ranges measured in the ‘Determination of Intent’ MOE are not of value since the range of the long distance hailing devices extended beyond allowable limits. Some targets were engaged beyond 300 m with the VWT and the LRAD device, and therefore the results are reflective of more high powered versions of these devices. In a relative sense, the value of applying an area of effect hailing device versus a point hailing device is still well represented in the results.


weighing in at approximately one third the score of the LRAD option (Table B-12, Figure B-10). The stun guns and sponge round launchers were not a factor for this measure.

Table B-12: Speed of determination.


Tsep (s)

Tmin / Tsep *

Computed Assigned

Baseline 100 130.4 ± 1.5 .34 4.3 4.3

OP1 100 44.6 ± 14.6 1 12.5 12.5

OP2 100 130.3 ± 1.3 .34 4.3 4.3

*Higher is better (faster determination).

0 50 100 150

Option

Determination of Intent: Time (sec)

OP2

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-10: Determination of intent: time.

B.3.4 Range of determination (12.5%, sub-measure 2 of 2 for Determination of Intent)

Separation distance Rdet refers to the average range of the ‘Determined’ entities once one third (as per Section B.3.3) of the ‘Regular’ entities were identified. The maximum average range observed Rmax sets the base for comparison.

OP1 scored the highest for this measure due to the ability of the LRAD to affect a wide area populated with ‘Regular’ entities instantaneously and at long ranges. As with the measure ‘Speed of Determination’ (previous section), options employing only the rifle mounted VWTs at long ranges produced nearly identical scores to one another (Baseline and OP2), this instance weighing


in at approximately four fifths (~4/5) the score of the LRAD option (Table B-13, Figure B-11). Again, the stun guns and sponge round launchers were not a factor for this measure.

Table B-13: Range of determination.


Rdet (m)

Rdet / Rmax *

Computed Assigned

Baseline 100 246.4 ± 2.3 .80 10.0 10.0

OP1 100 309.0 ± 4.2 1 12.5 12.5

OP2 100 239.7 ± 2.4 .78 9.7 9.7

*Higher is better (determination farther out).

0 100 200 300 400

Option

Determination of Intent: Distance (m)

OP2

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-11: Determination of intent: distance.


The MOE weights were varied over wide ranges to determine the sensitivity of the final option rankings to the weighting schedule. All weighting schedules yielded the same rank ordering of options. The weights and rankings appear in Table B-14. In the table, ‘TF’ represents the Task Fulfillment MOE, ‘RN’ represents the RED Neutralization MOE and ‘DI’ represents the Determination of Intent MOE.



Option(s) Scheme Mean Score

Rank

Original 43.2 3 Equal Weights 45.7 3 12.5% TF; 75% RN; 12.5% DI 44.9 3 75% TF; 12.5% RN; 12.5% DI 39.4 3

Baseline

12.5% TF; 12.5% RN; 75% DI 52.7 3 Original 65.7 1 Equal Weights 70.7 1 12.5% TF; 75% RN; 12.5% DI 64.9 1 75% TF; 12.5% RN; 12.5% DI 58.2 1

OP1 (Enhanced)

12.5% TF; 12.5% RN; 75% DI 89.0 1 Original 54.8 2 Equal Weights 54.6 2 12.5% TF; 75% RN; 12.5% DI 53.2 2 75% TF; 12.5% RN; 12.5% DI 55.1 2

OP2 (Stun Gun)

12.5% TF; 12.5% RN; 75% DI 55.4 2


B.4.1 Stoppage (66.7%, all of Task Fulfillment)

Stoppage refers to the slowing effect that the NLWs have on escaping runners.

The Baseline option using sponge rounds was slightly less effective than OP1 which relied on stun guns. The Excursion, employing both NLWs, scored slightly higher than the option with stun guns (Table B-15, Figure B-12).

Table B-15: Average stoppage over game duration.


Mean (1 - Ddet) (max 1) Computed Assigned

Baseline 100 .54 ± .00 35.9 ± .1 35.9 ± .1

OP1 100 .59 ± .00 39.1 ± .1 39.1 ± .1

Excursion 100 .61 ± .00 40.8 ± .1 40.8 ± .1


0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Option

Stoppage

Excursion

OP1

Baseline

Figure B-12: Average stoppage over game duration.


As mentioned above, this measure examines the level of control exercised by all BLUE Force elements over the entire duration of the game, extending from the time that the first non-lethal shot was fired by BLUE and ending at a cutoff time of 90 s.

The Excursion exhibited the highest level of control over the situation. Sponge round and stun gun options exhibited nearly equal levels of control (Table B-16, Figure B-13).




Baseline 100 0.23 ± .01 7.6 ± .3 7.6 ± .3

OP1 100 0.22 ± .00 7.4 ± .2 7.4 ± .2

Excursion 100 0.32 ± .01 10.8 ± .3 10.8 ± .3


0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Option


Excursion

OP1

Baseline



The MOE weights were varied over wide ranges to determine the sensitivity of the final option rankings to the weighting schedule. All weighting schedules yielded the same rank ordering of options. The weights and rankings appear in Table B-17. In the table, ‘TF’ stands for the Task Fulfillment MOE and ‘RN’ stands for RED Neutralization MOE.


Option(s) Scheme Mean Score Rank

Original 43.4 3 Equal Weights 38.3 3 25% TF; 75% RN 30.5 3

Baseline


OP1 (Stun Gun)


OP2 (Enhanced)

75% TF; 25% RN 53.9 1


List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

ADS Active Denial System

CAEn Close Action Environment

CF Canadian Forces

CS 0-chlorobenzalmalononitrile powder with a dispersal liquid (tear gas)

DLR Director of Land Requirements

DND Department of National Defence

DRDC Defence Research & Development Canada

DRDKIM Director Research and Development Knowledge and Information Management

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

IWARS Infantry Warrior Simulator

JCATS Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation

LRAD Long Range Acoustic Device

LFORT Land Forces Operational Research Team

MAD Methodology to Assess Disruption

M203 Model callsign for a 40-mm grenade under-barrel launcher

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NLW Non-lethal weapon

NMI Neuro-muscular incapacitation

NOHD Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance

R&D Research & Development

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

Taser Trademark for a high voltage stun gun. “Thomas A. Swifts’ Electric Rifle”

TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

VWT Virtual Warning Technology

X12 A Taser shotgun model.

X26 A hand-held Taser device model that relies on tethered probes to deliver neuromuscular incapacitation.

XREP Taser eXtended Range Electronic Projectile


DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.) Defence R&D Canada – CORA 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.)

UNCLASSIFIED (NON- CONTROLLED GOODS) DMC:A REVIEW: GCEC June 2010

3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in parentheses after the title.) A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap Analysis: Wargame NICKEL X

4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc. not to be used) K.B. Sprague; S.H. Bassindale; D. Sinclair; J. King; A. Eissa

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Through DRDC CORA’s involvement with the NATO SAS-078 panel entitled Non-LethalWeapons Capabilities-Based Assessment, a wargame study was requested to evaluate, from aCanadian Forces (CF) perspective, capability gaps and the relative performance of potentialnon-lethal weapon (NLW) solutions in several vignettes of interest. A variety of NLW sets werecompared in four vignettes. Ranges, terrains, opposing (OP) forces, own forces and objectivesvaried with the vignettes. Ever-present were the two main NLW sets compared: a ‘Baseline’option representing current Canadian Forces capabilities, containing 40-mm sponge roundslaunched from an under-barrel M203 together with so-called ‘Visual Warning Technology’devices (VWT—a form of eye-safe laser dazzler), and a ‘Stun Gun’ option containing stun gunprojectiles fired from a specialized 12-gauge shotgun. One additional vignette-specific optionwas gamed with non-lethal capabilities over and above that of the others. Additions included theLong Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), the Active Denial System (ADS), and a simpleaggregation of sponge round and stun gun capabilities into one option.

Overall, the efficacy of the Baseline option was below that of options employing stun guns only. This result was consistent across all vignettes, and holds true even though, in many cases, the number of stun guns was halved compared to the number of sponge round launchers, owing to the fact that adequate and ready lethal forces must be maintained at all times in order to protect against escalating circumstances: the stun (shot)gun is a separate weapon whereas the M203 is mounted on a soldier’s rifle. This translated to a pairing off of non-lethal shooters with lethal shooters in the stun gun case. In general, adding more non-lethal force in the form of an ADS or an LRAD device improved the effectiveness considerably. Adding stun guns to the Baseline capabilities showed mixed results—in one case helping and in the other case the benefit was lost.

Par le biais du lien entre le CARO de RDDC et le groupe NATO SAS-078 appelé Groupe de travail sur l’évaluation basée sur les capacités des armes non létales, une étude de jeux de guerre pour évaluer, du point de vue des Forces canadiennes (FC), les écarts de capacité et le rendement relatif de solutions potentielles mettant en cause des armes non létales (ANL) dans plusieurs vignettes d’intérêt a été demandée. Toutes sortes d’ensembles d’ANL ont été comparés dans quatre vignettes. Les champs de tir, les terrains, les forces d’opposition (FO), les objectifs et les forces propres variaient en fonction des vignettes. Les deux principaux ensembles d’ANL comparés étaient toujours présents : un « point de comparaison » représentantles capacités actuelles des FC, contenant des projectiles de 40-mm à pointe en mousse lancés à l’aide d’un M203 sous le canon avec des soi-disant dispositifs « technologie d’alerte visuelle » (TAV— une forme de dispositif d’aveuglement laser sans danger pour les yeux), et un « pistolet électrique » à projectiles lancés à l’aide d’un fusil de calibre 12 spécialisé. Une arme supplémentaire spécifique à la vignette a été utilisée; elle avait des capacités non létales dépassant celles des autres. Les ajouts comprenaient le dispositif acoustique longue portée (DALP), le système de refus actif (SRA), et une simple fusion des capacités du pistolet électrique et des projectiles à pointe en mousse en une option. Globalement, l’efficacité du « point de comparaison » était inférieure à celle des options qui utilisent les pistolets électriques uniquement. Ce résultat était constant dans toutes les vignettes même si, dans de nombreux cas, le nombre de pistolets électriques était deux fois moins important que le nombre de lance-projectiles à pointe en mousse, ce qui découle du fait que des

forces létales adéquates doivent être maintenues en tout temps pour offrir une protection contre l’escalade des circonstances : le pistolet électrique (fusil) est une arme distincte, alors que le M203 est fixé sur la carabine d’un soldat. Cela s’est traduit par un appariement de dispositifs de tir non létaux et de dispositifs de tir létaux dans le cas du pistolet électrique. En général, le fait d’ajouter de la force non létale sous forme d’un SRA ou d’un DALP a amélioré l’efficacité considérablement. Le fait d’ajouter des pistolets électriques aux capacités de « point de comparaison » a donné des résultats variés : cela a été utile dans un cas et, dans l’autre cas, l’avantage a été perdu.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.) Non-lethal weapons;wargame;NATO;SAS-078;SAS-094;gap analysis

A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap AnalysisK.B. Sprague S.H. Bassindale LFORT, DRDC CORA D....

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Transcript of A Preliminary Non-lethal Weapons Gap AnalysisK.B. Sprague S.H. Bassindale LFORT, DRDC CORA D....