A. Philip Randolph

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A. Philip Randolph as a Charismatic Leader, 1925-1941Author(s): William H. HarrisSource: The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 301-315Published by: Association for the Study of African American Life and History, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2716940 .

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301A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AS A CHARISMATICLEADER, 1925-1941

William H. Harris*The historian August Meier has suggested that while A. Philip Randolphpioneered in mobilizing the black masses to protest for political and economicadvancement,MartinLuther King, Jr. was the most charismatic ndividual thecivil rightsmovement has produced. Meieris right n his assessment of King,butno one has yet written about Randolph'scharisma.2During his long and distin-guished career Randolphcombined charismatic qualities with effective use ofpublicity and propaganda o propel himself to the center of American life. Thepublic perceived him as brilliant and fearless. Yet his public militance did notcarry over into private dealings. Inside, he was a mild man who avoided directconfrontation.The place to study Randolph's eadershipstyle and to consider whetherhe trulyfunctionedas a charismatic igure is the period duringwhich he developed as anational figure. As the historianRobert C. Tucker puts it, "When we study acase . . . of charismatic leadership, we should go back to the beginnings of theleader-personality's emergence as a leader, rather than start with the status

achieved at the zenithof his career."3 Thus, analysisof Randolph'swork with theBrotherhoodof Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) (a period Randolphconsiders thefoundation of his later success) suggests significant parallels between the twoperiods of his life.4 As we will see, Randolph'sBSCP career demonstratesthelimits of charismatic eadershipand provides helpful insights into understandingthe methods he would employ in later years. His agitated style in the BSCPprefiguredhis later role in the National Negro Congress and the March onWashingtonMovement.Charismaticeadershipmeans "a certainqualityof an individualpersonalitybywhich he is set apart as endowed with supernatural,superhuman,or at leastspecifically exceptional powers and qualities."5 Such leaders usually originateunderconditions of stress, show an absence of formalrules or routineadministra-tion, rejectrationaleconomic conduct,andusually prevailfor only short or inter-mittent periods. Moreover, charismatic leaders have the ability to issue state-ments clearlyat variancewith facts and have their words accepted as truth,andthey demonstrateat all times an airof personal ncorruptibility.6 uch individualsusually attain for themselves prestige and influence out of proportionto theirachievements.

*WilliamH. Harris s AssociateProfessorof Historyand,AssociateDean of the GraduateSchool,IndianaUniversity, Bloomington,Indiana.


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302 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORYRandolphpossessed basic charismaticqualities.Handsome,almostexquisiteinbearing,and a masterof the arts of oratoryand rhetoric,his speechhad a hypnoticeffect upon his audience. He carriedhimself with an air that exuded such confi-

dence that opponentsfoundit almost impossibleto deny the wisdom of his argu-ments and supporters were loyal almost to his every word. So powerful wasRandolphas a speakerthat in 1926Roy Lancaster,nationalsecretary-treasurerfthe BSCP, instructed district leaders to take up collections at mass meetingsbefore Randolphspoke because he was "sure to breakup any meeting"and sendparticipantsscreaming nto the streets, too enthused to contributeto the cause.7Yet despite his ability to stimulatepeople, Randolphpossessed few routine skills.He moved in the public realm, stirringup debate on questions of black unionismand generatingpropaganda o publicize his views and the goals of the BSCP. Heleft the daily operationsof the union to trustedlieutenantswho were loyal to himpersonallyand to his ideas.Thus, the actual work of organizingand buildingthe BSCP was done not byRandolph,but by dedicated union leaders around he country,the most importantof whom was Milton Websterof Chicago.In truth, Randolph unctionedmainlyasa symbolic figure and spokesman. He was in the tradition of those blackleaders -they can be seen in the churchand black advancementorganizations,aswell as in politics-whose influence has derived largely from rhetoricand per-sonal presence. But despitehis superbrhetoricalabilitiesandpresence, Randolphwas indecisive and prone to compromise. Indeed, the critic who complained hatRandolphwanted to build a successful labor union simply on talk had a point.8Early n 1925,porters n New York invited Randolph o addressa meetingof thePullman Porters Athletic Association. He accepted and spoke to the group ontrade unionism and on the porters' need to organize in order to improve theirconditions at Pullman. Shortly thereafterRandolph met secretly with a smallgroup of these men and laid plans for a union of porters,and in Augusthe chaireda mass meeting of portersandnonporters n Harlem. At thatsession, in which noattendancewas taken or votes recorded,the groupendorsedthe idea of a porters'union, accepted Randolphas general organizer,andadoptedhisMessenger maga-zine as their officialorgan.9In the absence of a constitution,andgiven the strictrules of secrecy the union placed on its membership, Randolph embodied theBSCP and as general organizerhad unlimitedpowers to act to ensure the union'ssuccess.When the porters accepted Randolphas theirleader, they did not get a man ofproven leadership ability, or one experienced in trade unionism. Randolphwasalready thirty-six years old in 1925, and, aside from the confidence he inspired,there was little in his background hat would make him attractive to a group ofworkers thinking of startinga union. Indeed, in the view of one observer, heseemed a man"whose time hadpassedhimby." 0oBornin Crescent City, Florida,Randolphgrew up in Jacksonvilleandmoved to New YorkCityin 1911.He spenthis earliest yearsin New York as a roving bachelor,pursuinghis dreamof becom-ing an actor. He attendedclasses in economics andhistoryat City Collegeandthe


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A. PHILIPRANDOLPH:A CHARISMATICLEADER 303Rand School of Economics and eventually joined the Socialist Party. In 1917,Randolph oined anotheryoungSocialist, ChandlerOwen, in foundingMessengermagazine,a journalof radicalblack economic and social thought.TheMessenger,which LangstonHughes later described as "God knows what," a magazinethat"reflected the policy of whoever paid best at the time," did well for a few years,but by 1925 its radicalism had faded and the magazinewas experiencing deepfinancial trouble." In 1925,Randolphneeded a job.

Randolphwas poorly thoughtof in some black circles. He carriedhimself withsuch pride and dignity that some people considered him haughty and aloof. TheEnglish accent he affected, full of "maasses and claasses," did not help matters.In the view of one critic, Randolph's problemwas a "bootlet superioritycom-plex." Moreover, some black spokemen distrusted him. Soon after the union'sorganizationaldrivegot underway, one newspaperwrote thatRandolphhad failedin everythinghe had tried to do, and added that "the path of failures is said to bebedecked with shady deeds." Randolph, the claim went, was using the portersonly to enhance sales of the Messenger.12Whatever he criticisms,Randolphmovedquickly to create a nationalorganiza-tion of sleeping car portersand to personifywhat that union would be. Writingthat "public opinionis the mostpowerful weaponin America,"he was convincedthat a favorableimage, especially amonginfluential whites, was as important othe success of the union as were porters. He spent much of his time tryingto line

up support or the BSCPamongestablishedblack leaders andorganizationsandinsoliciting aid and money from liberal whites. For example, his first action wasaimed not at bringing n porters,but ratherat attractingoutsidefinancialsupport.In September1925, he appealedto the GarlandFund, a New Yorkbased founda-tionthat supportedradicalandunpopularcauses. In the name of the "biggestandmost significantmovementamong Negro workers ever started n America,"Ran-dolph asked for money not for organizationalwork among porters, but to sub-sidize theMessenger. He asked the Fundto "relieve the financialembarrassmentof the publication[because] all porters [accepted it] as their mouthpiece." TheFund respondedfavorably, butmade its checkpayable to the BSCP rather han tothe Messenger or Randolph. 3Randolph'sappeal to the GarlandFund was representativeof how he wouldfunction in coming years. He was to serve as a high moral force who articulatedthe porters' aspirationsand demandsandservedas a symbolof theirstruggle.Thechore of bringing n members fell to his lieutenants. Within months he had puttogethera network of agentsacross the country:Websterat Chicago,Dad Mooreat Oakland,California,BenjaminSmith at DetroitandPittsburgh,and E. J. Brad-ley in St. Louis. Except in rare cases, those men remainedin their positionsthroughout he long struggle or recognitionanddisplayed strongpersonal oyaltyto Randolphand his ideas. Likewise, Randolphsecuredmoneyandendorsementsfromblack andwhite groupsandassembleda batteryof white legalandeconomicexperts to work for the union, many of whom served withoutcompensation. 4


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304 JOURNALOF NEGRO HISTORYRandolphhungered or publicityandrespectability orhis strugglingunion, andbelieved that the only way the BSCP wouldsucceed would be to maintaindiscus-sion of the porters' grievances at a high volume. He filled the Messenger and

favorable newspaperswith derogatory comments aboutPullman's laborpoliciesand punctuated his speeches and other writingswith attacks against his opposi-tion, black as well as white. He was particularly austic towardporters who wouldnot immediately oin the union, referring o them as "Uncle Toms" and in otheruncomplimentary erms. Black opponents of the union were "consciencelesscrooked andcorrupt, . . . mad dervishes" who used their "murderous ingersofgraft and corruption" n efforts to destroy the union.15The strategydid not con-tribute much to recruitment, but it did gain press exposure for the union andmarkedRandolph as fearless and committed to his cause. If much of the pressopposed Randolphand what he was doing, his style made it impossiblefor news-papersto ignorehis activities. Indeed, theiroppositiononly addedto Randolph'sreputation. Because his organizationwas weak and without tradition,Randolphwas able to operate on a hit or miss basis, formulatingpolicy as he went along,projectinghimself as a man of initiative, creativity,and daring. 6BSCPleaders faced two problems. One was how to achieve the specific goals ofthe organization,whichrequired mpressingupona largenumberof menwhatwasto many the revolutionary dea that they could improvetheir standardsof livingthroughcollective bargaining, o say nothing of easing theirfear of Pullmanrepri-sals. Moreover, n 1925approximately12,000portersworkedfor Pullman,makingthe companythe largestsingle employer of blacks in the United States. This facthad gainedPullmanwidespreadsupport among Afro-American pokesmen. Dur-ing the same years, blacks were generally hostile toward organized labor. TheBrotherhoodsaw its struggle n largertermsthansimplyconfronting he PullmanCompany. Indeed, the second problemfor BSCP leaders involved changingthegeneral economic and political awarenessof black Americans. 7Given his aims, Randolph's style had more effect on the public than on theporters.If BSCPsources andfavorablenewspapersreported argeandenthusias-tic crowds showing up to hear his speeches, attendanceat ralliesdidnot translateinto union membership.Despite secret rolls, untiringefforts of BSCP organizersin variousdistricts,and suspension of enrollment ees to encouragemembership,fewer thanhalf the portersever signedup. Of those who did, only thirty percentpaid regulardues. Andmost porters maintainedoyalty to local leaders rather hanto Randolph.18Randolphwas a living contradiction.Thoughhis public rhetoricpromisedtobringPullmanto its knees and exuded militance and courage,privately he was acautious individualwho shrank rom confrontationand soughtto attainhis goalsby indirect means. As early as 1926Randolphdemonstrated he dichotomy be-tween publicutterancesandprivatereluctanceto meet Pullmanheadon, a devel-opment that was to recur in 1928. Some BSCP officials wanted to order theirportersto boycotta Pullmancompany union electionin 1926.Randolphdisagreed.His refusalto go alongcaused graveconsequencesfor the BSCP,bothfromwithin


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A. PHILIPRANDOLPH:A CHARISMATICLEADER 305and outside the union. One organizerresignedin disgustand claimedthatothersthreatenedto join him.19Randolph'scontinuoustalk aboutaction and his simul-taneousfailureto move led some observersto conclude that he was afraidandhadno plan. Many arguedthathe shouldplace more emphasison organizingportersand less on public appearances.20

Yet, such critics did not understand Randolph and the way he functioned.Attainingrecognition or the BSCPwas Randolph'sprimarygoal, buthe also hadin mind the additional aim of teaching trade unionism to the masses of blackworkers,using the BSCP as a vehicle for his participation s a national pokesmanandleader. Randolphemphasizedthatthe problemsof black people in the UnitedStates were essentially economic andthat the remedy lay in organized abor,andhe believed that if the BSCP succeeded the lesson would be drivenhome. If theunion failed, his life-long goal of finding a way to improve conditions for themasses would fail with it. Randolphalso recognizedthathis personalfortuneshadbecome intertwinedwith the BSCP. If the union failed, so would he. Thus, if hetalked big, he moved with caution, sacrificingimmediate gains for long-rangesuccess.21

At the sametime, the disparitybetween his bravewords and cautious behaviorcausedproblems or the union. Some of his staunchestsupporters ook issue withhis non-assertivepolicy, and the rankandfile began to give up on the union. Bythe summerof 1928,conflictingviews and a series of unionfailures ed to a crisisin the BrotherhoodandthreatenedRandolph'scareer as a labor eader. The unionsufferedthree major defeats between August, 1927 and June, 1928. It failed toachieve a meetingwith Pullmanto discuss porters'grievances;it failed to raiseporters' pay by havingthe InterstateCommerceCommissionoutlawtipping;andit failed in its threatto stage a strikeagainst Pullman.22Duringthe same period,the Brotherhood ost the supportof the PittsburghCourier, until then its staunch-est defender. Placingfull blamefor the union'sfailureon Randolph, he Courier'sinfluentialpublisherpersonallydemanded hatRandolphserve the porters'causeby resigning.23Partly because of animosity between district offices and union headquarters,but also because of differences over Randolph'spolicies, BSCP officials tooksteps duringlate 1927and early 1928to decentralizeoperations and to reduceRandolph'scontrol of Brotherhoodpolicy. The centralfigurein this reorganiza-tion was MiltonP. Webster.24Unlike Randolph, Webster was a practical individualwith few pretensions.WhereRandolphwas introspectiveand had a deep and abidingfaith thatjusticeeventually would prevail, Webster was a believer in action. An intelligentbutuneducatedman,Websterwas a minorfunctionary n Chicago Republicancircleswhen he joined in organizingthe BSCP in 1925. By 1928, he had succeeded inbringingofficialsfromoutsideRandolph'sNew York group nto the union'spolicymaking circle when power was transferredfrom the general organizer to theBrotherhood'spolicy committee.25


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306 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORYFrom his new position as Policy CommitteeChairman,Webstermoved quicklyto change the union's tactics. He had long argued that the only way the BSCPcould extractrecognition romPullmanwas to strike, and now led his colleagues

in laying plans for the confrontation.Randolphsupportedhis efforts reluctantly.Indeed, it appeared hatRandolphhad lost some of his old self-confidence. Muchdistressedaboutcallingmenoffjobs they mightbe unableto regain,he clearly wasafraidto call a strikein 1928.26In the end, the strike threatwas only part of Randolph's policy of operatingfrom a position of weakness, using his skills and contacts to bring influentialindividuals and organizations to support his cause. Characteristically,his an-nouncementof an imminentstrike was for public consumption.He wantedonly toraise enough noise about the probabilityof a strikeagainstPullman o cause thefederal governmentto intervene on the BSCP's behalf under provisions of theWatson-ParkerAct of 1926.27Buton this occasion Randolph oundhimselfcaughtbetween the need to appear militantand firm in the eyes of Pullman and themediationboardand at the same time allay the fears of portersabout what theycould expect from the strike. His actions during he springof 1928 such as mak-ing public statementsto the portersthat "a strike vote does not necessarilymeanthat the porterswill strike" convinced both the PullmanCompanyand federalmediators hat the whole episodewas little more thana gesture. Manyportersalsocame to questionhis intent. The mediationboard, recognizingthe contradiction,called Randolph'sbluff and refused to recommendemergency measures. TheBSCP, despite endorsementof the strikeby a majorityof the porters,didnotcarrythroughon its threat.28Randolph'sactivities of 1928 amountedto a bluff thatfailed.Randolph's failureto act, though perhapswise in light of elaborateplans thePullman Company undertook to ensure that the strike would fail, nonethelesscaused a severe crisis for the Brotherhoodand marked he end of a periodin theunion's development. Randolph'sstandingreacheda low ebb even amongfelloworganizers,while rank and file members left the union in droves. Randolph'smood duringthe strike episode so troubledWebsterthat he believed Randolph,given his current state of emotional despair, would destroy the union. TheChicagoleadertook upon himself responsibilityof maintaining he union's mili-tancy and increasing participation n policy making or organizers from outlyingregions. Routine administrative unctions were now much more crucial to theBSCP's survival than propagandaand publicity, for as Webster wrote Randolph,the BSCP was clearly "past the point of stirring things up." At a meeting ofBrotherhoodofficials in July 1928, Webster insisted that in the futurethe policycommitteewould control BSCP decisions in fact as well as in name.29AlthoughWebster left that meetingas the most influentialorganizer n BSCPcircles, he recognized Randolph'ssuperiorabilities to articulate he union's goalsand did not challenge Randolph'sposition as national leader. But just as impor-tant, Randolph understood Webster's talents for bringingin members and hisstandingamong other Brotherhood eaders. Above all, Randolphrecognizedthat


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A. PHILIP RANDOLPH:A CHARISMATICLEADER 307he must have a firm organizationalbase in order to continue to speak out onnational issues. Thus, despite their differences in styles, Randolphand Websterhad the mutualrespect and trust as well as recognitionof the unique talentsof theother needed to harness their efforts in makingthe BSCP an example for blackAmericansof the importanceof union organization or economic advancement.After 1928, the BSCP lost organizationalrigidity as various organizers tran-scended their former roles and became a social group, a "unity of persons ratherthan technicians." Since close associations during shared failures had forcedstrong bonds among them, they were able to reach their new organizational ela-tionship with a minimumof friction. Erosion of BSCP membershipthat beganafterthe strikedebacle of 1928continued, and as the nation moved into the GreatDepression the Brotherhoodbecame little more thana cell. Of the 4,632 membersin the union in 1928, only 658 remained n 1933, and more thana third of thosewere in Webster's Chicago ocal. The BSCP could hardlyconsider itself a nationalorganization.But its leaders were convinced that if they kept the doors open, theunionwould triumph n the end.30With the union's doors barely open, the period between the crisis of 1928 andthe coming of the New Deal markeda hiatus in Randolph's style as the needs ofthe union demanded that he take on routine functions. The BSCP changed itstactics and sought to attain its goal of recognition through federal courts ratherthan through the press and propaganda. Indeed, Webster became the union'smajor figure and, for all practical purposes, Brotherhood headquarters-as didRandolph-moved from New York to Chicago from which site Webster directedthe court fight and maintained the union's organizational structure. Randolphcontinued to devote full attention to the BSCP, but he utilized differentmethodsthanbefore, toningdown his rhetoric and workingthrough he AmericanFedera-tion of Labor(AFL), in which organization he BSCP attainedquasi-membershipin 1929.Fromthe strike fiasco to the coming of the New Deal, the Brotherhoodremained argely a paper organization, strugglingsimply to survive as its leaderwaited for an opportunity o reassert his rare abilities. Randolph's ailure to per-form a miraclein 1928 had dampenedhis followers' faith in his charismaticqual-ities and he had to await a victory before he could function as a symbolic figureagain.31The New Deal, with its liberalized abor laws and the emphasis the new admin-istrationplaced on organized abor, opened new fields for Randolphand providedrenewed opportunityfor him to operate with the initiative and daring that hadcharacterized his leadership of the BSCP in the days before June, 1928. TheAmendedRailway Labor Act of 1934assured for the first time federal supportofthe BSCP's claim to the right to represent porters. Under protection of thatlegislation, Randolph convinced an overwhelming majority of porters, many ofthem non-membersof the BSCP, to endorse the Brotherhoodas their bargainingagent in disputes with Pullman. After it won a bitter campaignwith the PullmanPorters and Maids Protective Association-a company front-for endorsementfrom the porters, the BSCP gained recognition from Pullman as the legitimate


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308 JOURNALOF NEGRO HISTORYrepresentative of porters and maids in 1935.32 The victory identified Randolphagain as a majorfigure amongblack spokesmen.Randolph'sstandingamong black leaders derivedfrom more than the BSCP'ssuccess in gainingrecognition rom Pullman.Long concerned aboutthe impactofthe AFL's discriminatorypolicies on the economic status of blackworkers, Ran-dolph had made numerous appeals to AFL leaders to alter the Federation'spolicies. After New Deal legislation practicallyguaranteedthe BSCP's successwith Pullman n 1934, Randolph, capitalizingupon what he saw as his increasedstature among both labor leaders and blacks, changed his action on the floor ofAFL conventions from beggingfor improved opportunityfor blacks within theFederation o demanding hatnecessary changes be made. At the convention thatyear, with supportfrom a few powerful industrialunions and a mass demonstra-tion of blacksunder NAACP leadership, Randolph orced the AFL to establishacommitteeto studydiscriminationn Federationaffiliatesandto reportthefollow-ing year.33The hearings n 1935 of the Committeeof Five on Negro Discrimination n theAFL broughtenormousprestigeto Randolphas he used every effort to make thesessions an event of importanceto all blacks. He broughtbefore the committeetestimony fromthe NAACP andthe NationalUrban League, other black spokes-men, and some Afro-Americanworkers.34Whenthe AFL leadershipat the con-vention of 1935determinedto sabotage the committee's findings of widespreadracial discrimination,Randolphenhanced his standingeven moreby the straight-forwardmanner n which he carriedto the floor the fight to save the reportandmake the Federationresponsiveto the needs of black workers.35His efforts endedin failure.Yet Randolph'seloquent appealfor an end to discrimination n organized abor,the AFL's decisionto grantthe BSCPan international harter n 1935,the public-ity surroundinghe Brotherhood'sofficial talks with Pullmanwhich commencedthatyear,and thepresscoveragethat followed this complexindividual,catapultedthe BSCP president to prominenceamong black leaders and spokesmen. Ran-dolph enjoyed wide-spread name recognition. And though his actual accom-plishments in organizing the BSCP touched only a small number of Afro-Americans andhis effortsbeforethe AFL had resultedin moralvictoriesat best)he had in fact attained a positive goal in the economic sector while others hadcontented themselves with theorizing.Moreover, Randolphpossessed the abilityto make the most routine "moral" victory appearas if he and his followers hadachieved broad practical success, and he could turn the narrowestof activitiesinto movementsfor advancementof the generalblack population.The masses ofblacks, and some leaders, seemingly unaware of the nebulous quality of hisachievements, looked on Randolphas the manto lead effortsto solve theirsocialand economic problems. He was the one individual who combined articulateexpressionsof the hopes and desires of blacks with practicalexperience in tradeunionmatters.Thus,when representativesof numerousblackgroupsconvened inChicago n February1936 o formthe National Negro Congress (NNC), a broadly


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A. PHILIP RANDOLPH: A CHARISMATICLEADER 309based organization ounded on a "minimumprogram"which all Afro-Americanscould endorse, Randolphreluctantlyyielded to a draft and consented to serve asnational president of the NNC.36

Randolph's enure as presidentof the Congress was one of failureas the organi-zation abandoned he broad base and endorsed the philosophies of the AmericanCommunist party and those of white unions associated with the Congress ofIndustrial Organizations(CIO). There is no simple explanation for this shift,though Randolph's activities were partly responsible. The BSCP leaders wereunable to devote much time to NNC affairsfor two reasons. Duringthe first twoyears of the Congress Randolphwas deeply involved in BSCP-Pullmannegotia-tions, trying to secure a favorable contract and gain support among nonmemberporters. Moreover, Randolphwas ill anddidnot have the physical energy to headtwo national organizations.The fact is, then, that Randolphwas president of the NNC, but he was not itsleader.The actual leader was JohnP. Davis, the Congress' executive secretary.Itwas Davis who as early as 1937 determined hat NNC would concentrate on theCommunist ine.37Randolph'srelationshipwith Davis and the Congress, a rela-tionship in which the president desired to function largely as symbolic leader ofthe NNC while others did the routine duties of running the organization-themannerin which he had operated in the BSCP-did not succeed. The failureunderlines the importanceof loyal supportersto the success of charismatic ig-ures. Though Webster and other BSCP organizers argued with Randolphfromtime to time on both policys and tactics, in the end they maintained heir loyalty tothe common goals of the organizationand did not attemptto sabotage Randolph'sprogram.Unlike Randolph'sexperiences in the BSCP, Davis andothers in NNCdid not agree with his philosophies. Thus, in his absence from the dailyactivitiesof the organization, hey pushed aside his views and substitutedtheir own.By the time the Congress convened for its third session in 1940, the Daviselement had succeeded in pushingthe NNC into the Communistcamp and Ran-dolphwas forced to resignor be denied reelectionto his post. Far fromresigningin disgrace, Randolphmusteredall his presence and oratoricalpowersandquittheNNC withremarkabledignityandaplomb. RalphBunche,who was presentat thesession, consideredRandolph's resignation speech-in which he warnedblacksagainst simplisticsolutions to the problemsof black people and of the inadvisabil-ity of depending upon whites for leadership and financing of theirorganizations-one of the most importantstatements ever made to black leadersandspokesmen.38Yet, though Randolph howed deep understanding f what washappening o NNC and to much of black leadership,the Congresshad reachedthat state largely because of the way he functioned. Moreover, Randolphdid noteven have his union's full backing n this endeavor. To the public, Randolphwasthe leader of the National Negro Congress, but power within the organizationdependedon delegates, andthe Davis grouphad the delegates. Most NNC mem-bers did not recognize Randolph's charismatic qualities and thus he exercisedlittle influence over them.39


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310 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORYRandolph'sacceptance of the presidencyof NNC was atypicaland defied thecanons of charistmaticeadershipbecausehe took a position to which he hadbeenelected and did not himselfrespondto a cryingneed anddevise a movement of his

own. Weberpoints out that charismausually does not rest on vested authority,norcan charismatic iguresfunctionwithin imits thatare set forthemby others.40Unlike his role in the BSCPin which he definedthe premisesand directionof themovement, in the NNC randolph ound his freedomto exercise his rareabilitiesconstrainedby the corporate structure. In no other sphere of his work is thefailure as clear as this.Despite his failurein NNC this man of enormous self confidence and sense ofmission remained undaunted and went on to found the March on WashingtonMovement(MOWM) n January, 1941. Randolphattained nationwidefame andacclaim from activities connected with this ad hoc groupwhich aimedat mobiliz-ingthousandsof blacksto marchon Washington o demandanend to employmentdiscriminationn developingwar industries and in the armed forces. A questionthat has perplexedscholarsof the 1940sand of Randolph s whether the MOWMrepresentedan actualthreat to domestic tranquilityor was simplya "magnificentbluff."41 But in manyways that is not the crucial question. Ofgreater mportanceis why the bluffworked. If MOWMhadcharteredno buses or trains to transportmarchers o Washington, f no arrangementshad been made to provide food andtoilet facilities for the expected masses, if leading blackorganizationsofferedonlynominalsupport o the march effort, and if-as EleanorRoosevelt warned-theWashingtonpolice were girdedto clear the marchingblacks out of the city, whydid thousands of Afro-Americans still maintain that they intended to go toWashingtonat the appointed time? Moreover, given the enormous sources ofinformationavailableto the Presidentof the United States, why could not Presi-dent Roosevelt ascertain that the marchwas a meaningless threat?The answers to these questions lie in large part in the inspirational eadershipand presence of A. Philip Randolph.People still intendedto march because hestood at the forefront of the movement. Embodying in himself the symbol ofcourageand perseverence, Randolphconvinced the masses that the effort couldend only in success. Likewise, his stalwart image of incorruptibilityand right-eousness apparentlyconvinced even the president that the day was near whenmasses of blacks would be parading n protest on the malls of the capital. Thepresident'sdecision also demonstrated he colossal lack of attention whites paidto blacks in the United States. Had Randolph been white, clearly Roosevelt'sadvisors would have known of his bluff against Pullman n 1928. In any event,President Roosevelt established the Fair Employment Practice Committee(FEPC) and outlawedracialdiscrimination n governmentemployment, and Ran-dolph called off the march.42

Some have concluded that Randolphaccepted far too little in this arrange-ment;43 he executive order did not even mention the armedforces. But there isanother side to that question. In accepting Roosevelt's FEPC in exchange forcalling off the march, Randolphdid compromiseon what he had demandedin


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A. PHILIPRANDOLPH:A CHARISMATICLEADER 311January. Yet, Randolph had accomplished the important result of putting thefederal governmentofficially on record for the firsttime against racialdiscrimina-tion in employment.The action achieved little immediateresults for blacks, but itdid cause an end to official racismin that importantsector.44Despite its questionableresults,MOWMmade Randolphone of the best knownand most widely respected black leaders. Many considered him willing to usemilitant leadership to mobilize the black masses in activities to improve theirliving conditionsand their self-awarenessas people. His name became a house-hold word. Accolades and commendations,as well as offers of supportof hiswork, pouredin from across the country. But by the end of 1942 much of Ran-dolph's support had melted away and he was once again just another amongnumerousblackspokesmen in Harlem.4sWhateverone might say aboutthe actualeffectiveness of MOWM n the long run, the fact is that as long as it remainedanad hoc organizationdirected at stimulating he masses andattaininga single goal,Randolph was able to function with style and effectiveness. And yet, evenMOWMwent into rapid decline when it took on routine institutionalstructureasthe PermanentMarchon WashingtonCommittee.46Randolph'ssuddenand brieffame is a superbexample of the ephemeralnatureof charismatic eadership.In some ways, Randolph'sactivities during he early 1940s marka major nter-lude in his public life. Both the avowed reason for his resignationfrom the Na-tional Negro Congress-namely that blacks must finance and lead their ownorganizations and the all-blackemphasishe placedon the Marchon WashingtonMovement, contradicted the importance of interracial cooperation that hadcharacterizedhis past. Moreover,it contradicted he emphasison class that hadbeen his hallmark.Indeed, in 1925-26 when he emergedas an individualrecog-nizable outside New York as a spokesman amongblacks, Randolphstressedthecommunityof interestamongblack andwhite workers. Convincedthatall peopleof good will, blackas well as white, shouldparticipate n improvingconditionsforthe downtrodden,Randolphhad made it a practicefor the BSCP to dependheav-ily upon money and technical expertise gainedfrom white sources. And he wascommitted to his efforts to establish black workers in organizedlabor as equalpartnerswith whites in the continuing strugglebetween laborand management.Randolph'sannouncementn 1941of the creation of a National Citizen'sCommit-tee to Save the Jobs of Negro [Railroad Firemen, underthe nominal nationalleadership of Eleanor Roosevelt and Mayor Fiorella La Guardiaof New York,underlinesthe contradictioneven more.47The fact is that thoughRandolphwasundoubtedlysincerein his desire to mobilizethe blackmasses, he never lost sightof the need to cultivate support amonginfluential ndividualsand organizations.An analysis of Randolph's leadership reveals that his activities, particularlyduring he yearsbefore 1942,usually resulted n "moral"victories andhis follow-ing was shallow, thoughat times quite broad. The temporarynatureof his vic-tories accounts in part for the various periods in which numerous blacks sup-portedhis activities-for example during 1926-27, 1935-36, and 1941-and therapiditywith which they deserted him. Part of the reason was that Randolph's


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312 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORYappeal, except in the BSCP, was based on conditions other than firm organization.George Schuyler, a one-time colleague of Randolph's on the Messenger, wrote ofRandolph's leadership in 1942:

Mr.Randolphknowshow to appealto theemotionsof the peopleandto get a greatfollowing together, but there his leadership ends because he has nowhere to leadthem and would not know if he had.... He has themessianiccomplex, considerableoratoricalability, and some understanding f the plightof the masses, butthe leader-ship capacityandexecutive ability required or the task at handsimplyis not there.The originalMarchon Washingtonmove is now admitted o have been a failureelsethecurrentagitationwould not be necessary.... Organizations not merely a matterof ballyhooandoratory,it is a Science, andone that is largely a closed book to Mr.Randolph.48Far from reflecting unfavorably on Randolph's leadership, his inability to orga-nize the masses and to maintain a large following stemmed in part from the times.

Gunnar Myrdal, in his monumental study of blacks in the United States, con-cluded that mass movements succeed only in organizations with limited and spe-cific goals.49 Though undoubtedly fearful of Pullman, porters did rally to the sideof the BSCP in the end. The March on Washington Movement succeeded inattaining its limited goal of forcing establishment of FEPC, but it fell apart when ittook on wider aims. Meier might be right in his assessment that King was theclosest to a charismatic figure produced among blacks. Yet, it is interesting,though wholly academic, to speculate on what would have been Randolph's at-tainments had he reached his prime in the era of television and heightened politicalawareness in which blacks lived during the rise to prominence of Martin LutherKing, Jr.

1Iam grateful o ProfessorsDavid L. Lewis andNancy J. Weissfor helpfulcommentsandsugges-tions they made on a version of this paper that I readbeforethe AmericanHistoricalAssociationin1974. William H. Harris, Keeping the Faith: A. Philip Randolph, Milton P. Webster, and the Brother-hood of Sleeping Car Porters, 1925-37 (Urbana:Universityof Illinois Press, 1977),discusses theBrotherhoodof Sleeping Car Porters in detail, and is complementedby BrailsfordR. Brazeal,TheBrotherhood f Sleeping Car Porters (New York:HarperBrothers, 1946).See also JervisAnderson,A. Philip Randolph: A Biographical Portrait (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanowich, Inc., 1972),151-225, and Theodore Kornweibel, No Crystal Stair: Black Life and the Messenger, 1917-1928(Westport,Conn.: GreenwoodPress, 1975).2AugustMeier, "On the Role of Martin LutherKing," New Politics, IV (Winter, 1965), 52-59.DavidL. Lewis, King:A CriticalBiography New York: PraegerPublishers,1970),brilliantlydiscus-ses King's charismaticqualities.3RobertC. Tucker, "The Theory of CharismaticLeadership," in Dankwart A. Rustow, ed.,Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: Braziller, 1970), 69-94. See particularlypp. 77-78.4Interview with Randolph,Jan. 19, 1972.

5Max Weber,The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: 1947), 328, 358. Seealso Arthur Schweitzer, "Theory and Political Charisma," Comparative Studies in Society and His-


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A. PHILIP RANDOLPH: A CHARISMATIC LEADER 313tory, 16, No. 2 (March, 1974), 150-81; and Ann Ruth Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership: ATheory Princeton,1968).6Weber, Social and Economic Organization, 358-62; James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952Campaign,"n Heinz Eulau, SamuelJ. Eldersveldand MorrisJanowitz, eds., Political Behavior:AReader in Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), 193-94.7Lancastero George Price, Feb. 3, 1926,Brotherhoodof Sleeping Car PortersChicago DivisionPapers,ManuscriptsDivision,The ChicagoHistoricalSociety. HereaftercitedBSCPChiPa.A fire inBSCP New York headquarters estroyed many of Randolph'spapers or the years before 1940.Thattragedy eaves us unable o tracedevelopmentof his oratoryand rhetoric hroughcompletespeeches.Instead we must depend upon fragments hat can be gleaned fromthe press. Messenger magazinecontainsa large volume of Randolph'swritings hrough1928,buthis writtenwordundoubledlypalesbeside the power of his spokenvoice.

8St. LouisArgus,Nov. 20, 1925;Messenger,VIII(Feb., 1926),37;Brazeal,TheBrotherhood,17.9Messenger,VII (Dec., 1925),403. In lateryears the BSCPmaintained hata smallcell hadbeenfunctioning ven beforeRandolph's alk before the AthleticAssociation.The unionused this ploy tocounterPullman harges hattheunionwas anoutside groupof radicals mposing hemselvesupontheportersagainst heirwills. But thereis no evidenceto corrobrate he union's claim. Infact, Randolphhimself wrotethat his speech had been a majorspur in causingporters o organize. See Randolph oElizabethG. Flynn, Sept. 21, 1925,AmericanFundfor PublicService Papers,ManuscriptsDivision,New YorkPublic Library.Hereaftercited, GarlandFund Pas.?0Murrayempton,Part of Our Time (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1955), 244.1Randolpho Flynn, Sept. 21and Dec. 11, 1925,GarlandFundPas;Anderson,A. PhilipRandolph,1-150; Kornweibel, No Crystal Stair; Langston Huges, Along this Way. See also, Messenger, (1920-1925), passim.

12Rienzi B. Lemus in New York Age July 14, 1928; St. LouisArgus, Nov. 20, 1925; SterlingD.Spero andAbramL. Harris,The Black WorkerNew York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1931),395."Randolph o Flynn, Sept. 21 and Oct. 23; Flynn to Randolph,Oct. 29, 1925,GarlandFund Pas.14See Harris, Keeping the Faith, Ch. 2. Randolph'sassociates in the New York office includedAshley L. Totten,WilliamDes Verney, Roy Lancaster,and FrankCrosswaith.By 1928, C. L. Del-lums hadattaineda leadershippost in the Oaklanddistrict.l5Messenger, (1925-1928),passim; Time,IV (Aug. 31, 1925),5. ChicagoDefender,Nov. 19, 1927,contains a strikingexample of Randolph'suse of uncomplimentaryhetoric.The Black Worker, uc-cessor to the Messengeras the BSCP's officialorgan n 1929,is replete with derogatoryand inflam-matory anguageabout nonunionporters. See particularly1935-37.16PhilipSelznitz, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Evanston, Ill.: RowPeterson,1957),36-37, andDaniel Katz, "Social Psychology andGroupProcesses," in C. P. Stoneand D. W. Taylor, eds., AnnualReview of Psychology, Vol. II (Stanford,Calif.:Annual Reviews,

Inc., 1951),144, arguethatthis was commonactivityfor leaders of new and weak organizations.17Harris, Keeping the Faith, 10-25. Philip S. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker:1619-1973 (New York:PraegerPublishers,1974),158-76, describesrelationsbetweenthe AmericanFederationof Labor and blackworkers, as does John Finney, Jr., "Negro LaborDuringand AfterWorldWar I," (UnpublishedPh.D. dissertation,GeorgetownUniversity, 1967).Abram L. Harris,"Negro Labor'sQuarrelwith OrganizedLabor,"CurrentHistory, XXIV (Sept. 1926),903-904; T.ArnoldHill, "The Negro in Industry,"AmericanFederationist,XXXII (Oct., 1925),912-17; andKelly Miller, "TheNegroas a WorkingMan," AmericanMercury,VI (Nov., 1925),310; and numer-ous pieces in Messenger,Opportunity, ndCrisis,are useful samples of conflictingblackthoughtontradeunionismduring he 1920s.18 Harris,KeepingtheFaith, 78-79, 99; Brazeal,TheBrotherhood,222. For statementson paymentof dues, see Randolph o Webster,June 1 and Dec. 28, 1926, BSCP ChiPa; Randolph o WilliamBaldwin,Jan. 14, 1927, NationalUrban LeagueFiles, Libraryof Congress.'9RobertL. Mays to Randolph,Jan. 15, 1926,printed n ChicagoDefender, Jan. 23, 1926;Mays inChicagoDefender, Mar. 27, 1926;Milton Webster, Statement to BrotherhoodMen, Jan. 31, andRandolph o JamesWeldonJohnson,Feb. 1, 1926,both in NAACPPapers, Libraryof Congress.


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314 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY20EvenWebster came to hold this view. See Webster to Randolph,Aug. 31 and Sept. 28, 1928,BSCP ChiPa.See also PittsburghCourier,Sept, 27, 1930.2'Randolph'sactivities in this regard were not unusual for a struggling abor leader. See LoisMacDonald, Leadership Dynamics and the Trade-Union Leader (New York: New York UniversityPress, 1959),69-71.22Harris,Keeping the Faith, chs. 4 and 5. Tucker, "Theoryof CharismaticLeadership,"74, pointsout thatdisagreementsbetween eadersandtheir associates do notnecessarilymeanthatfollowersnolonger accept the leader's charismaticauthority.23Pittsburgh ourier, Apr. 7 and 14, May 5 and 12, 1928; numerousletters, BSCP ChiPa. Theattitudeof the Courier nvolved morethanjust whatappearedon the surface. AndrewBuni,RobertLee Vann of the Pittsburgh Courier: Politics and Black Journalism (Pittsburgh: The University ofPittsburghPress, 1974),161-71, and Harris,Keeping the Faith, 134-40, both contain discussions of

the BSCP-Courier relationship.24Harris,Keeping the Faith, 123-29, 140-51.21Memorandumn BrotherhoodChiefsStrategyConference,Jan. 12, 1928, ssuedFeb. 2, 1928overRandolph's ignature,BSCPChiPa.26At he timeof the strike hreatof 1928,Randolphwas underextremepressure.Numerousnewspa-pers wereattackinghim as a failure.Inaddition,he considered he possibility hatthe unionmightnotwin. As he said later, the responsibilityof pullingmen off theirjobs, jobs they mightbe unabletoregain.weighed heavily upon him. Interviewwith Randolph,Jan. 19, 1972;Roy Lancaster o C. L.Dellums,Jan. 31, 1928.27Evidence hat Randolphwanted federal interventionaboundsin the files of the United StatesMediation Board, Case No. C-107, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters v. Pullman Company, TheNationalArchives, Washington.Randolph's etters to Websterduringthat periodreflect the samesentiments.Randolph o Webster,March19and June 14, 1928,BSCP ChiPa.28Harris,Keeping the Faith, 104-14; Board Member Edwin Morrow the Chairman SamuelWinslow, Mar. 20, 1928, MediationBoard Files; Telegram, Mediation Board to James WeldonJohnson,June7, 1928, NAACPPapers.29Harris,Keeping theFaither, 141-44, containsextensiveanalysisof crucialorganizationalhangesthatoccurred n the BSCPduring he aftermath f the abortedstrike. See also, Randolpho Webster,June21; Webster o Randolph,June21and Aug. 31; Webster,"Things o be Done" Memorandum,nbackof Randolph o Webster, June21, 1928,BSCPChiPa.30Brazeal,The Brotherhood,222;C. L. Dellums to Author,Aug. 16, 1972.3"MaxWeber,"TheSociologyof CharismaticAuthority," n H. H. GerthandC. WrightMills,eds.,trans.,From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology (New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1958),245-51.32NationalMediationBoardReport,BSCP v. PPMPA (July 1, 1935),BSCPChiPa;Harris,Keepingthe Faith, 202-09.33Webstero Smith,Oct. 15, 1934,BSCPChiPa;AFL Convention,Reportof theProceedings, (Oct.1934),230-31, 530.34CharlesH. Houston,Memorandumo WalterWhite, July 11, 1935,NAACPPapers;Opportunity,XIII (Aug. 1935),247-49.35AFL Convention, Report of the Proceedings, (Oct. 1935), 808-19.36Ralph. Bunche,"ThePrograms, deologies, Tactics andAchievementsof Negro Betterment ndInterracialOrganizations," UnpublishedResearchManuscript or Carnegie-Myrdal tudy, 1940),Vol. II, 319-71, is the best firsthand ccountof events in NNC. See also LawrenceS. Wittner,"TheNationalNegro Congress: A Reassessment,"AmericanQuarterly January,1951), 883-901. Twoolder accounts, Wilson Record, The Negro and the CommunistParty (ChapelHill: UniversityofNorth CarolinaPress, 1951),and Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American CommunistParty(New York: FrederickA. Praeger, 1962), discuss the Congress,but froma stronganti-Communistposition.37Howe andCoser,American Communist Party, 356; Record,Race and Radicalism (Ithaca,NewYork: CornellUniversityPress, 1964),96.38Bunche,"Programs,Ideologiesand Tactics," Vol. II, 360, 370-71; Wittner, "National NegroCongress,"898-901.


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A. PHILIP RANDOLPH: A CHARISMATIC LEADER 31539Weber,Schweitzerand Selznitz, supra, have stressed the dual nature of leadershipand haveemphasizedthe need for strong and loyal followership n order for charismatic eadersto succeed.Bunche,"Programs, deologiesandTactics," Vol. II, 371,points outthatNNC hadno massfollowingeven beforeRandolph's esignationas president.Wittner,"NationalNegro Congress,"886-90, dis-

putes this view and arguesthat the local councils of NNC exercised wide influence in their com-munities.Writings f blackspokesmenof the 1930s,particularlyutobiographies,uggeststhatNNC hasbeenoverplayedas a majororganization.Forexample,WalterWhite, a participantn the initialmeetingofthe Congressandexecutivesecretaryof the NAACPduring he 1930s,gives it scantmention n A ManCalledWhite Bloomington, nd.: IndianaUniversityPress,MidlandBooksEd., 1970),sayingnothingaboutwhat theCongresswas, whileAdamClaytonPowell, Jr.,AdambyAdam:TheAutobiography fAdam ClaytonPowell, Jr. (New York:Dial Press, 1971),fails to mentionNNC at all. Moreworkremains o be done on this subject.40MaxWeber,"Sociologyof CharismaticAuthority,"245-51.4'Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the Organiza-

tionalPolitics of FEPC(New York:Atheneum,1969), s a gooddiscussion of the questionssurround-ing Randolph'sworkwith MOWM.42White,A Man Called White, 190-92; Garfinkel,When Negroes March. It is of course likelythatFDR did know of Randolph'spast andused the nationalemergencyto do for blackswhat he felt hecould not do in normal imes. Additionaldata mustbe analyzedbefore this theorycan be proved.43Garfinkel, When Negroes March, esp. pp. 65-71.44See Randolph'sstatement nInterracialReview, XV, No. 7 (July1942),101.45Garfinkel, When Negroes March, 111-24.46Ibid., ch. 5.47TheBlack Worker, Sept, 1941.48PittsburghCourier,Aug. 1, 1942.49GunnarMyrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York:HarperandRow Publishers,1944),853.

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